# Sphereon Documentation

---

# Introduction

# Introduction

The Identity Development Kit (IDK) is a Kotlin Multiplatform library for digital identity applications. It covers credential issuance and verification, identity proofing, trust establishment, and secure data exchange, all from a single codebase that compiles to Android, iOS, JVM, JavaScript (browser and Node.js), WebAssembly, and Linux native.

The IDK is the open-source core behind Sphereon's commercial [Enterprise Development Kit (EDK)](/edk/guides/getting-started). Use it standalone to build wallets, verifiers, issuers, and identity services, or as the foundation layer under the EDK.

<img src="/img/diagrams/idk-architecture-overview.svg" alt="IDK Architecture Overview" style={{maxWidth: '680px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## What You Can Build

### Mobile Wallets and Credential Holders

Store and present credentials using ISO/IEC 18013-5 (mDL/mDoc), SD-JWT, and OpenID4VP. The IDK handles device engagement (QR, NFC, BLE), session encryption, selective disclosure, and proximity and remote presentation protocols.

### Credential Verifiers

Request and verify credentials as a relying party. Supported flows include OpenID4VP with DCQL queries or presentation definitions, mDoc reader verification over BLE/NFC/HTTP, SD-JWT signature and disclosure verification, and multi-framework trust validation.

### Issuance and Authorization Services

Run server-side issuance with the built-in OAuth 2.0 authorization server (authorization code, client credentials, pre-authorized code, token exchange, DPoP, PKCE, PAR, introspection, revocation), SD-JWT credential issuance with selective disclosure, and DID-based issuer identity.

### Identity Proofing and Onboarding

Combine OIDC federation, wallet-based credential presentation, document verification, biometric checks, and OTP into identity verification workflows. Includes policy-driven reconciliation, privacy-preserving identity matching, and compliance tracking for eIDAS, NIST 800-63A, and UK DIATF.

### Cross-Platform Libraries and SDKs

The IDK compiles to all major platforms, so a single codebase can serve native Android, iOS, web, and server applications. JavaScript and WebAssembly targets ship with TypeScript definitions.

## Platform Support

The IDK targets all major Kotlin Multiplatform platforms:

| Platform | Targets | Notes |
|----------|---------|-------|
| **JVM** | Java 17+ | Server-side applications, Ktor |
| **Android** | API 27+ (Android 8.1) | Full support including BLE, NFC HCE, Android Keystore |
| **iOS** | arm64, x64, simulator-arm64 | CoreBluetooth, CoreNFC, Secure Enclave |
| **JavaScript** | Browser (Webpack), Node.js | ES modules, TypeScript definitions generated |
| **WebAssembly** | wasmJs (Browser + Node.js) | BigInt support, TypeScript definitions |
| **Linux** | x64 | Server and CLI tooling |

Most IDK modules compile to all of these targets. Platform-specific modules (BLE transport, NFC transport, mobile KMS) are available only on the platforms they support.

## Architecture

The IDK is organized into functional domains, each with a clean separation between public API and implementation:

| Domain | What it provides |
|--------|-----------------|
| **Core** | Dependency injection (Metro), configuration, logging, events, HTTP client |
| **Cryptography** | Key management (software, mobile, AWS, Azure), COSE/JOSE signing and verification, identifier resolution |
| **Identity** | DID resolution and management, trust establishment (ETSI, X.509, OpenID Federation, DID), identity verification, matching, and reconciliation |
| **Credentials** | SD-JWT issuance and presentation, mDoc/mDL with BLE/NFC/HTTP transports, credential claims mapping |
| **Protocols** | OAuth 2.0 client and server, OpenID4VP holder and verifier, DPoP, PKCE |
| **Data** | Key-value store, blob storage, party/identity data models |

Each domain follows the `-public` / `-impl` module pattern (see [Installation](/idk/guides/installation)).

## How These Docs Are Organized

The IDK documentation is split by reading mode:

| Section | Use it when you need to |
|---------|-------------------------|
| **Start Here** | Understand what the IDK is, how it is layered, how to install it, and which platforms need extra setup |
| **Concepts and Models** | Learn the domain model: identity, trust, identifiers, credential formats, credential design, mDoc, OID4VP, and OID4VCI |
| **Technical Guides** | Implement a capability in code: configure DI, call services, manage keys, resolve DIDs, issue credentials, verify presentations, or wire storage |
| **Deployable Services** | Embed pre-built HTTP services for KMS, OAuth2, OID4VCI, OID4VP, and Ktor-based hosting |
| **Examples and Reference** | Find runnable examples, the module list, REST API reference, Kotlin API reference, and FAQ material |

Start with concept pages when you are still deciding how a capability should fit into your application. Use technical guides once you know the capability and need concrete setup, APIs, configuration, or code flow details.

## Next Steps

1. **[Architecture](/idk/architecture)**: command architecture, services, contracts, HTTP adapters, and error handling
2. **[Installation](/idk/guides/installation)**: repository setup, module architecture (`-public` vs `-impl`), and the `lib-all` shortcut
3. **[Identity](/idk/guides/identity/overview)**: the conceptual identity model for verification, matching, resolution, and reconciliation
4. **[Dependency Injection](/idk/guides/di/scopes)**: the App / User / Session scope hierarchy
5. **[Module Reference](/idk/guides/modules)**: complete list of available modules

---

# Architecture

# Architecture

The IDK is built on a command-based architecture. Every operation (generating a key, exchanging a token, verifying a credential) is modeled as a command: a unit of work with typed input, typed output, and a well-defined identity. This page explains how commands, services, contracts, and the HTTP layer fit together.

The architecture has two views that are useful to keep separate:

| View | What it explains | Where to go next |
|------|------------------|------------------|
| **Conceptual model** | The domain capabilities: identity, trust, credentials, protocols, and storage | Use the **Concepts and Models** section for domain-level orientation |
| **Technical model** | The implementation machinery: commands, services, contracts, adapters, DI scopes, configuration, and error handling | Use the **Technical Guides** section when wiring the IDK into an application |

The rest of this page focuses on the technical model: how IDK capabilities are exposed, composed, configured, intercepted, and transported.

## Commands

A command is the fundamental building block. The base interface looks like this:

```kotlin
interface Command<Arg, SuccessResult, ErrorResult> {
    val id: String
    val isEnabled: Boolean

    fun supports(args: Arg): Boolean
    suspend fun execute(args: Arg): IdkResult<SuccessResult, ErrorResult>
}
```

Every command has an `id`, reports whether it `isEnabled`, checks whether it `supports` a given input, and `execute`s that input to produce a result. The result is always an `IdkResult`, a sealed type that is either a success or an error. There are no thrown exceptions during normal operation.

### Command Identity

Commands follow a structured naming convention: `module.service.command`. For example:

| Command ID | Module | Service | Action |
|-----------|--------|---------|--------|
| `kms.keys.generate` | kms | keys | generate |
| `oauth2.token.exchange` | oauth2 | token | exchange |
| `did.resolution.resolve` | did | resolution | resolve |
| `party.manager.create` | party | manager | create |

This naming convention is not cosmetic. It drives several systems:

- **Configuration overrides** use the `cmd.*` prefix to target specific commands, services, or entire modules. A configuration entry for `cmd.kms.keys.*` applies to every command in the KMS keys service.
- **Logging policies** can be scoped to a command, a service, or a module. You might enable debug logging for `oauth2.token.*` without affecting the rest of the system.
- **Metrics and tracing** use the command ID as the span name, so distributed traces reflect the exact operation being performed.

### Command Types

The IDK provides several specialized command types that extend the base interface for different use cases.

#### ServiceCommand

`ServiceCommand<TInput, TOutput>` is the workhorse for business logic. Most domain operations (key generation, token issuance, DID resolution) are `ServiceCommand` implementations. A service command takes a domain-specific input type and produces a domain-specific output type:

```kotlin
interface ServiceCommand<TInput, TOutput> : Command<TInput, TOutput, IdkError> {
    override val id: String
    override val isEnabled: Boolean

    override suspend fun execute(args: TInput): IdkResult<TOutput, IdkError>
}
```

Service commands participate in the full command lifecycle: initialization extensions, execution extensions, interceptor chains, configuration overrides, and transport routing all apply.

#### HttpEndpointCommand

`HttpEndpointCommand` bridges the HTTP layer with the command system. It takes a `GenericHttpRequest` and returns a `GenericHttpResponse`, handling request parsing, delegation to a service command, and response serialization:

```kotlin
interface HttpEndpointCommand : Command<GenericHttpRequest, GenericHttpResponse, IdkError> {
    val method: String       // GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, etc.
    val pathPattern: String  // e.g., "/{keyId}" or "/token"
}
```

HTTP endpoint commands are grouped into adapters (see [HTTP Layer](#http-layer) below). Each endpoint command is a standalone unit that can be enabled, disabled, or overridden independently.

#### ChainCommand

`ChainCommand` runs a list of commands in sequence, passing the output of one as the input to the next. If any command in the chain fails, execution stops and the error propagates. This is useful for composing multi-step operations where each step must succeed before the next begins.

#### PipelineCommand

`PipelineCommand` is similar to `ChainCommand` but supports more complex workflows with branching, conditional steps, and error recovery. Pipelines are used internally for operations like identity verification, where the sequence of steps depends on the outcome of earlier steps.

## Contracts

Commands can declare input and output contracts. A contract describes what the command expects and what it produces, using a structured schema.

```kotlin
interface CommandContract {
    val inputContract: ContractSchema?
    val outputContract: ContractSchema?
}
```

The **input contract** specifies the shape of valid input: required fields, types, constraints. The **output contract** specifies the shape of the command's success result. Together they make each command self-describing.

This has practical benefits:

- **Validation**: Input can be validated against the contract before execution, catching malformed requests early.
- **Documentation generation**: Contracts can be serialized into OpenAPI schemas or other formats, so API documentation stays in sync with the actual command signatures.
- **Tooling**: Development tools can inspect contracts to provide autocompletion, type checking, and request scaffolding.

Contracts are optional. Commands that do not declare a contract still work normally; they just lack the machine-readable description.

## Services

While commands are the core execution unit, most application code does not call commands directly. Instead, it interacts with **service interfaces** that aggregate related commands into a convenient API surface.

The IDK provides service interfaces for each major domain:

| Service | Domain |
|---------|--------|
| `KeyManagerService` | Key generation, storage, signing, verification |
| `OAuth2Client` | Token requests, PKCE, DPoP, authorization code flows |
| `AuthorizationServerService` | Authorization server operations (parse, verify, create for each grant type) |
| `Oid4vciIssuerService` | Credential issuance, offers, deferred issuance |
| `DidResolver` | DID document resolution |
| `DidManager` | DID creation, update, deactivation |
| `TrustValidationService` | Trust chain validation across frameworks |
| `KvStore` | Key-value data storage |
| `BlobService` | Binary object storage |

Under the hood, each service method delegates to a command. For example, when you call `authorizationServerService.createAccessToken(...)`, the service locates and executes the corresponding `ServiceCommand`. This means every service call goes through the same lifecycle as a direct command invocation. Configuration overrides, interceptors, logging policies, and extension hooks all apply regardless of whether you call the service method or the command.

```kotlin
// These two approaches are equivalent:
// 1. Through the service interface (typical application code)
val token = session.graph.authorizationServerService.createAccessToken(input)

// 2. Through the command directly (lower-level, same lifecycle)
val token = createAccessTokenCommand.execute(input)
```

Services exist to provide a discoverable, IDE-friendly API. The command layer underneath provides the extensibility.

## Extension Hooks and Interceptors

Commands support lifecycle hooks that let you inject behavior at specific points without modifying the command itself.

### Initialization Extensions

`ICommandInitExtension` runs when a command is first initialized. Use it for setup tasks like validating configuration, registering metrics collectors, or pre-loading data that the command will need.

```kotlin
interface ICommandInitExtension<Arg, SuccessResult, ErrorResult> {
    suspend fun onInit(command: Command<Arg, SuccessResult, ErrorResult>)
}
```

### Execution Extensions

`ICommandExecutionExtension` hooks into the execution lifecycle. It provides callbacks for before execution, after successful execution, and after failed execution:

```kotlin
interface ICommandExecutionExtension<Arg, SuccessResult, ErrorResult> {
    suspend fun beforeExecute(
        command: Command<Arg, SuccessResult, ErrorResult>,
        args: Arg
    )
    suspend fun afterExecuteSuccess(
        command: Command<Arg, SuccessResult, ErrorResult>,
        args: Arg,
        result: SuccessResult
    )
    suspend fun afterExecuteError(
        command: Command<Arg, SuccessResult, ErrorResult>,
        args: Arg,
        error: ErrorResult
    )
}
```

Execution extensions are well suited for cross-cutting concerns: audit logging, telemetry, input sanitization, or rate limiting. Because they run around every command invocation, they apply uniformly across the system.

### Interceptor Chains

`CommandLifecycleInterceptorChain` composes multiple extensions into an ordered chain. Interceptors can inspect and modify inputs, short-circuit execution (for example, to enforce a policy denial), or transform outputs. The chain runs in a defined order, so you can control precedence. A policy enforcement interceptor runs before an audit logging interceptor, for instance.

Interceptors are registered through dependency injection. Adding an interceptor to the DI graph is enough to activate it for all commands in the relevant scope.

## HTTP Layer

The IDK exposes HTTP APIs through a command-backed adapter pattern. Rather than coupling endpoint handlers to a specific framework (Ktor, Spring, etc.), the IDK uses framework-agnostic types and routes requests to commands.

### CommandBackedHttpAdapter

The `CommandBackedHttpAdapter` groups related `HttpEndpointCommand` instances and routes incoming requests to the matching command by HTTP method and path:

```kotlin
abstract class CommandBackedHttpAdapter(
    override val id: String,
    execution: SessionExecution,
    protected val mount: HttpAdapterMount,
    // ...
) : HttpAdapter {

    protected abstract val endpointCommands: List<HttpEndpointCommand>

    override suspend fun handleRequest(
        request: GenericHttpRequest
    ): GenericHttpResponse
}
```

Each adapter declares a mount point (a server prefix and base path) and a list of endpoint commands. When a request arrives, the adapter finds the endpoint command whose method and path pattern match, extracts path parameters, and delegates to that command.

Built-in IDK services use this pattern. The OID4VCI issuer, OID4VP verifier, OAuth2 authorization server, and KMS REST API are all sets of `HttpEndpointCommand` instances grouped by adapter. For example, the OAuth2 authorization server adapter groups endpoint commands for `/token`, `/authorize`, `/introspect`, `/revoke`, `/par`, and `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`.

### Request and Response Types

All HTTP commands work with `GenericHttpRequest` and `GenericHttpResponse`, plain data classes that carry the method, path, headers, query parameters, and body without any framework dependency:

```kotlin
data class GenericHttpRequest(
    val method: String,
    val path: String,
    val pathParameters: Map<String, String>,
    val queryParameters: Map<String, String?>,
    val headers: Map<String, String>,
    val bodySupplier: (() -> String?)?,
    val bodyContent: GenericHttpBody
)

data class GenericHttpResponse(
    val statusCode: Int,
    val headers: Map<String, String> = emptyMap(),
    val body: String? = null,
    val bodyContent: GenericHttpBody = GenericHttpBody.Empty
)
```

Framework-specific bridges (like the Ktor server plugin) translate between these generic types and the framework's native request/response objects. This means the same adapter code works on Ktor, Spring Boot, or a serverless runtime without changes.

### Adapter Dispatching

At startup, all adapters contributed to the DI graph are collected into an `HttpAdapterCatalog`. The catalog indexes adapters by their mount points and detects collisions (duplicate paths, overlapping endpoints). An `HttpAdapterDispatcher` routes each incoming request to the correct adapter based on path matching and specificity scoring.

This architecture means adding a new HTTP endpoint is a matter of writing an `HttpEndpointCommand` and adding it to an adapter's `endpointCommands` list. There is no manual route registration.

## Error Handling

All commands return `IdkResult<Success, Error>`. This is a sealed type with two variants:

```kotlin
sealed class IdkResult<out S, out E> {
    data class Ok<S>(val value: S) : IdkResult<S, Nothing>()
    data class Err<E>(val error: E) : IdkResult<Nothing, E>()
}
```

Errors are typed and carry structured information: an error type enum, a human-readable message, an optional cause, and optional detail fields. The standard error type is `IdkError`, which covers common categories like `NOT_FOUND_ERROR`, `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR`, `UNAUTHORIZED_ERROR`, `FORBIDDEN_ERROR`, `INVALID_STATE`, and `UNKNOWN_ERROR`.

### Error Mapping

`CommandErrorMapper` transforms command errors into context-appropriate responses. When a command fails inside an HTTP adapter, the error mapper converts the `IdkError` into an HTTP status code and response body. The mapping follows standard conventions:

| IdkError Type | HTTP Status |
|--------------|-------------|
| `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR` | 400 |
| `UNAUTHORIZED_ERROR` | 401 |
| `FORBIDDEN_ERROR` | 403 |
| `NOT_FOUND_ERROR` | 404 |
| `INVALID_STATE` | 409 |
| `UNKNOWN_ERROR` | 500 |

### Protocol-Specific Error Renderers

Some protocols define their own error response formats. For example, OID4VCI requires errors to follow a specific JSON structure with `error` and `error_description` fields. Protocol-specific error renderers (like `Oid4vciErrorRenderer`) transform `IdkError` instances into the format required by the protocol specification, so clients receive standards-compliant error responses.

```kotlin
// Standard IDK error handling
when (val result = command.execute(input)) {
    is IdkResult.Ok -> handleSuccess(result.value)
    is IdkResult.Err -> when (result.error.type) {
        IdkErrorType.NOT_FOUND_ERROR -> handleNotFound()
        IdkErrorType.UNAUTHORIZED_ERROR -> handleUnauthorized()
        else -> handleGenericError(result.error)
    }
}
```

This pattern is consistent throughout the entire IDK. Whether you are calling a service method, executing a command directly, or handling an HTTP request, error handling always follows the same structure.

## How the Layers Compose

The layering works like this:

1. **Services** provide the developer-facing API. You call `authorizationServerService.verifyTokenRequest(...)` and get back a typed result.
2. **Commands** do the actual work. The service delegates to a `ServiceCommand` that runs through the full lifecycle: extensions, interceptors, configuration overrides.
3. **Contracts** describe what commands expect and produce, enabling validation and documentation generation.
4. **HTTP adapters** expose commands as REST endpoints. Each endpoint is an `HttpEndpointCommand` grouped into a `CommandBackedHttpAdapter`. The adapter handles routing; the command handles logic.
5. **Extensions and interceptors** add cross-cutting behavior (audit, policy, telemetry) without modifying the commands themselves.
6. **Error handling** is uniform. `IdkResult` flows from command to service to HTTP adapter, with mappers and renderers transforming errors into the right format at each boundary.

This architecture means that adding a new capability (a new key type, a new grant flow, a new verification method) follows the same pattern every time: define a command, wire it into a service, optionally expose it through an HTTP adapter, and let the existing infrastructure handle configuration, lifecycle, and error handling.

## Key Abstractions

The IDK abstracts several cross-cutting concerns so that application code does not couple to specific implementations. Each abstraction follows the same pattern: a public interface in the `-public` module, one or more implementations in `-impl` modules, and DI contributions that wire the right implementation at startup. This means you can swap backends, providers, or strategies without changing the code that depends on them.

### Configuration

The configuration system (`ConfigService`) abstracts property resolution across multiple sources (environment variables, YAML, properties files, cloud providers, databases). Application code calls `configService.getProperty("key", Type::class)` without knowing where the value comes from. The system supports scoped overrides (app, tenant, principal) and command-scoped overrides (module, service, command) so the same code can behave differently per tenant or per operation. See [Configuration](guides/config/configuration) for details.

### Key Management

The `KeyManagerService` abstracts cryptographic key operations across multiple KMS providers (software, Android Keystore, iOS Secure Enclave, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, REST-based). Application code calls `keyManagerService.generateKeyAsync(...)` or `keyManagerService.createRawSignature(...)` and the service routes to the correct provider based on the key's provider ID or the requested algorithm. Multiple providers can be active simultaneously, and keys from different providers can be used interchangeably. See [Key Management](guides/crypto/key-management) for details.

### Logging

The logging system is scope-aware and config-driven. Each DI scope (app, user context, session) has its own log manager and log services. Log messages automatically carry scope context (tenant ID, principal, session ID). Log policies can be set globally or overridden per module, service, or command through the configuration system. Multiple log providers (console, mobile buffer, custom) run simultaneously. See [Logging](guides/core/logging/overview) for details.

### Trust Validation

Trust validation abstracts multiple trust frameworks (X.509 certificate chains, ETSI trust lists, OpenID Federation, DID-based trust) behind a single `TrustValidationService.validate()` call. The service delegates to framework-specific validators contributed via DI and returns a unified `TrustValidationResult`. Application code does not need to know which trust framework applies; the validators evaluate the input and report whether it is trusted. See [Trust](guides/trust/overview) for details.

### Identity Resolution

The `IIdentifierService` abstracts the mapping from cryptographic identifiers (DIDs, X.509 certificates, JWKs) to public key material. When verifying a signature, the IDK resolves the signer's identifier to a public key through a chain of resolution strategies (DID resolution, JWKS fetching, X.509 chain extraction, cnf claim parsing). This decouples signature verification from the specific identifier format. See [Identifier Resolution](guides/crypto/identifier-resolution) for details.

### Data Storage

The key-value store (`KvStore`) and blob store (`BlobService`) abstract data persistence across backends (in-memory, filesystem, SQLite/Kottage, HTTP remote). Application code uses the same interface regardless of backend. Both stores support scope-based tenant isolation and pluggable backends via DI contributions. See [Data Storage](guides/data-store/key-value-store) for details.

## Commands and Services: Two Levels of Access

When you are building an application, you typically use service interfaces. They provide a clean, typed API:

```kotlin
// Service-level access (typical application code)
val keyPair = keyManagerService.generateKeyAsync(
    GenerateKeyArgs(algorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256)
)
```

When you need to customize behavior (add interceptors, override configuration per command, build custom pipelines), you work with commands directly. The same operation is available as a command:

```kotlin
// Command-level access (for customization, pipelines, interceptors)
val command = session.getCommand<GenerateKeyCommand>()
command.execute(GenerateKeyArgs(algorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256))
```

Both paths go through the same lifecycle. The service is a convenience layer; the command is the execution unit. Most developers never need the command level directly, but it is there when you need fine-grained control.

---

# Sdk installation

## Maven repositories
The Kiwa Sdk is distributed through Sphereon's Nexus repository. Nexus is available at https://nexus.sphereon.com and hosts both the Kiwa Sdk and
the Open-Source Identity Development Kit.

All Open-Source software can be found in the following Maven repositories:

- https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/sphereon-opensource-releases/
- https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/sphereon-opensource-snapshots/

:::info
Snapshot versions are not guaranteed to be stable as they are built from the latest code.
:::

### Kiwa SDK repositories need an account
Although Kiwa customers get source code access to the Kiwa SDK, the Kiwa SDK itself is not open source and thus is not available in the above Maven repositories.
The Kiwa SDK is available through the Sphereon Nexus repositories below

- https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-releases/
- https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-snapshots/


### Groups Ids and artifacts
The Kiwa SDK is using the following group Id for its artifacts:

- com.sphereon.kiwa

The SDK artifacts are:
- **com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-public:** The API's, interfaces and common code. All code depends on the interfaces defined in this package.
- **com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-impl:** The implementation of the API's. This code is being injected as actual implementation of the interfaces. The artifact depends and exports the public API's.
- **com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-all:** Provides pre-build Dependency components and depends on the public and implementation artifacts.

## Setting up authentication

To access the Kiwa SDK repositories, you need to obtain Nexus credentials from Sphereon. Contact Sphereon to receive your username and password for accessing the kiwa-releases and kiwa-snapshots repositories.

### Maven authentication

For Maven, add your Nexus credentials to your `~/.m2/settings.xml` file:

```xml
<settings>
  <servers>
    <server>
      <id>kiwa-releases</id>
      <username>YOUR_NEXUS_USERNAME</username>
      <password>YOUR_NEXUS_PASSWORD</password>
    </server>
    <server>
      <id>kiwa-snapshots</id>
      <username>YOUR_NEXUS_USERNAME</username>
      <password>YOUR_NEXUS_PASSWORD</password>
    </server>
  </servers>
</settings>
```

### Gradle authentication

For Gradle, add your Nexus credentials to your `~/.gradle/gradle.properties` file:

```properties
nexusUsername=YOUR_NEXUS_USERNAME
nexusPassword=YOUR_NEXUS_PASSWORD
```

## Using dependencies in your project

### Maven configuration

Add the Kiwa repositories and dependencies to your `pom.xml`:

```xml
<project>
  <repositories>
    <repository>
      <id>kiwa-releases</id>
      <url>https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-releases/</url>
    </repository>
    <repository>
      <id>kiwa-snapshots</id>
      <url>https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-snapshots/</url>
      <snapshots>
        <enabled>true</enabled>
      </snapshots>
    </repository>
  </repositories>

  <dependencies>
    <!-- Use the all-in-one dependency for the complete SDK with components -->
    <dependency>
      <groupId>com.sphereon.kiwa</groupId>
      <artifactId>kiwa-holder-sdk-all</artifactId>
      <version>0.6.0</version>
    </dependency>

    <!-- Or use the SDK implementation without components -->
    <dependency>
      <groupId>com.sphereon.kiwa</groupId>
      <artifactId>kiwa-holder-sdk-impl</artifactId>
      <version>0.6.0</version>
    </dependency>
  </dependencies>
</project>
```

### Gradle configuration

Add the Kiwa repositories and dependencies to your `build.gradle`:

```groovy
repositories {
    maven {
        url 'https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-releases/'
        credentials {
            username = project.findProperty('nexusUsername') ?: System.getenv('NEXUS_USERNAME')
            password = project.findProperty('nexusPassword') ?: System.getenv('NEXUS_PASSWORD')
        }
    }
    maven {
        url 'https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-snapshots/'
        credentials {
            username = project.findProperty('nexusUsername') ?: System.getenv('NEXUS_USERNAME')
            password = project.findProperty('nexusPassword') ?: System.getenv('NEXUS_PASSWORD')
        }
    }
}

dependencies {
    // Use the all-in-one dependency for the complete SDK
    implementation 'com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-all:0.6.0'

    // Or use individual dependencies
    implementation 'com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-public:0.6.0'
    implementation 'com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-impl:0.6.0'
}
```

For Gradle Kotlin DSL (`build.gradle.kts`):

```kotlin
repositories {
    maven {
        url = uri("https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-releases/")
        credentials {
            username = project.findProperty("nexusUsername") as String? ?: System.getenv("NEXUS_USERNAME")
            password = project.findProperty("nexusPassword") as String? ?: System.getenv("NEXUS_PASSWORD")
        }
    }
    maven {
        url = uri("https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-snapshots/")
        credentials {
            username = project.findProperty("nexusUsername") as String? ?: System.getenv("NEXUS_USERNAME")
            password = project.findProperty("nexusPassword") as String? ?: System.getenv("NEXUS_PASSWORD")
        }
    }
}

dependencies {
    // Use the all-in-one dependency for the complete SDK
    implementation("com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-all:0.6.0")

    // Or use individual dependencies
    implementation("com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-public:0.6.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-impl:0.6.0")
}
```

:::tip
Replace `0.6.0` with the desired version of the Kiwa SDK. For snapshot versions, use a version like `0.6.0-SNAPSHOT`.
:::

## Using local binaries

If you prefer to download the binaries manually or cannot access the Nexus repository directly, you can use local file dependencies.

### Obtaining binaries manually

1. Contact Sphereon to receive the JAR files for the Kiwa SDK artifacts
2. Alternatively, if you have Nexus access, download the binaries directly from the next URLs or from the [Nexus UI](https://nexus.sphereon.com/):
   - https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-releases/com/sphereon/kiwa/
   - https://nexus.sphereon.com/content/repositories/kiwa-snapshots/com/sphereon/kiwa/
3. Save the JAR files to a local directory in your project (e.g., `libs/` folder)

### Maven local file dependencies

Add local file dependencies to your `pom.xml`:

```xml
<dependencies>
  <dependency>
    <groupId>com.sphereon.kiwa</groupId>
    <artifactId>kiwa-holder-sdk-all</artifactId>
    <version>0.6.0</version>
    <scope>system</scope>
    <systemPath>${project.basedir}/libs/kiwa-holder-sdk-all-0.6.0.jar</systemPath>
  </dependency>

  <!-- Or use individual dependencies -->
  <dependency>
    <groupId>com.sphereon.kiwa</groupId>
    <artifactId>kiwa-holder-sdk-public</artifactId>
    <version>0.6.0</version>
    <scope>system</scope>
    <systemPath>${project.basedir}/libs/kiwa-holder-sdk-public-0.6.0.jar</systemPath>
  </dependency>
  <dependency>
    <groupId>com.sphereon.kiwa</groupId>
    <artifactId>kiwa-holder-sdk-impl</artifactId>
    <version>0.6.0</version>
    <scope>system</scope>
    <systemPath>${project.basedir}/libs/kiwa-holder-sdk-impl-0.6.0.jar</systemPath>
  </dependency>
</dependencies>
```

### Gradle local file dependencies

Add local file dependencies to your `build.gradle`:

```groovy
dependencies {
    // Use the all-in-one dependency for the complete SDK
    implementation files('libs/kiwa-holder-sdk-all-0.6.0.jar')

    // Or use individual dependencies
    implementation files('libs/kiwa-holder-sdk-public-0.6.0.jar')
    implementation files('libs/kiwa-holder-sdk-impl-0.6.0.jar')
}
```

For Gradle Kotlin DSL (`build.gradle.kts`):

```kotlin
dependencies {
    // Use the all-in-one dependency for the complete SDK
    implementation(files("libs/kiwa-holder-sdk-all-0.6.0.jar"))

    // Or use individual dependencies
    implementation(files("libs/kiwa-holder-sdk-public-0.6.0.jar"))
    implementation(files("libs/kiwa-holder-sdk-impl-0.6.0.jar"))
}
```

Alternatively, you can include all JARs from a directory:

```groovy
dependencies {
    implementation fileTree(dir: 'libs', include: ['*.jar'])
}
```

Or in Kotlin DSL:

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation(fileTree(mapOf("dir" to "libs", "include" to listOf("*.jar"))))
}
```

:::warning
When using system scope dependencies in Maven or local file dependencies, ensure that the JAR files are committed to version control or documented clearly so other developers can obtain them.
:::

---

# Platform Setup

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Platform Setup

Platform-specific configuration on top of the base [Installation](installation). Most IDK modules work out of the box everywhere, but BLE, NFC, and secure key storage need extra setup.

## Android

### Gradle Configuration

```kotlin title="app/build.gradle.kts"
android {
    compileSdk = 35

    defaultConfig {
        minSdk = 27
        targetSdk = 35
    }

    compileOptions {
        sourceCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
        targetCompatibility = JavaVersion.VERSION_17
    }

    kotlinOptions {
        jvmTarget = "17"
    }
}
```

### Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)

Required for mDoc proximity presentation over Bluetooth.

Add permissions to `AndroidManifest.xml`:

```xml
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADVERTISE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" />

<uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.bluetooth_le" android:required="false" />
```

### NFC with Host Card Emulation (HCE)

Required for mDoc presentation via NFC tap.

Add permissions and register the HCE service in `AndroidManifest.xml`:

```xml
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.NFC" />
<uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.nfc" android:required="false" />

<application>
    <service
        android:name="com.sphereon.mdoc.transport.nfc.MdocNfcService"
        android:exported="true"
        android:permission="android.permission.BIND_NFC_SERVICE">
        <intent-filter>
            <action android:name="android.nfc.cardemulation.action.HOST_APDU_SERVICE" />
        </intent-filter>
        <meta-data
            android:name="android.nfc.cardemulation.host_apdu_service"
            android:resource="@xml/mdoc_nfc_service" />
    </service>
</application>
```

### Android Keystore (Mobile KMS)

The `lib-crypto-kms-provider-mobile` module uses the Android Keystore for hardware-backed key storage. No additional manifest configuration is needed; the Keystore is available on all devices running API 27+.

## iOS

### Bluetooth and NFC Entitlements

Add the following to your `Info.plist`:

```xml
<key>NSBluetoothAlwaysUsageDescription</key>
<string>This app uses Bluetooth to transfer credentials</string>

<key>NSBluetoothPeripheralUsageDescription</key>
<string>This app uses Bluetooth to transfer credentials</string>

<key>NFCReaderUsageDescription</key>
<string>This app uses NFC to present credentials</string>

<key>UIBackgroundModes</key>
<array>
    <string>bluetooth-central</string>
    <string>bluetooth-peripheral</string>
</array>
```

For NFC, add the NFC Tag Reader entitlement:

```xml
<key>com.apple.developer.nfc.readersession.formats</key>
<array>
    <string>TAG</string>
</array>
```

### Secure Enclave (Mobile KMS)

The `lib-crypto-kms-provider-mobile` module uses the iOS Secure Enclave for hardware-backed key storage on devices that support it (iPhone 5s and later, iPads with Touch ID or Face ID). No additional entitlements are required; the Secure Enclave is accessed through the standard Keychain Services API.

## JVM

### Java Version

The IDK requires Java 17 or later. For server applications:

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
java {
    toolchain {
        languageVersion.set(JavaLanguageVersion.of(17))
    }
}
```

### Ktor

For Ktor server integration, include the server plugin:

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:ktor-server-kotlin-inject:0.25.0")
}
```

See the [Ktor Integration](http/ktor) guide for details.

## JavaScript and WebAssembly

IDK modules compile to both JavaScript (ES modules) and WebAssembly (wasmJs) targets, each supporting both browser and Node.js environments.

### JavaScript (ES Modules)

JavaScript targets produce ES2015 modules with TypeScript definitions. They work with standard bundlers (Webpack, Vite, esbuild) and can be consumed from TypeScript and JavaScript projects.

### WebAssembly (wasmJs)

The wasmJs target compiles to WebAssembly with a JavaScript interop layer, useful when you need better performance for cryptographic operations in the browser.

Both targets support BigInt for large number operations and generate TypeScript `.d.ts` files alongside the compiled output.

### Node.js

For server-side JavaScript/TypeScript applications, both the JS and wasmJs targets can be used with Node.js. This is useful for building credential verification services, REST APIs, or CLI tools in the Node.js ecosystem.

## Linux Native

The IDK compiles to Linux x64 native binaries. This target is primarily used for CLI tools and server applications that need to run without a JVM. No additional configuration is required beyond standard Kotlin/Native setup.

## Next Steps

- **[Dependency Injection](di/scopes)**: setting up the scope hierarchy
- **[Application Setup](di/app-setup)**: defining your application graph
- **[Configuration](config/configuration)**: configuring IDK behavior

---

# Identity

# Identity

The IDK identity framework manages the lifecycle of binding external subjects (people, organizations, or workloads) to internal identities. It answers the questions: "Who is this external subject?", "Have we seen them before?", "Do we trust the evidence they present?", and "What level of assurance do we have?"

The framework sits at the intersection of several IDK subsystems. [Decentralized Identifiers](../did/overview) provide the subject identifiers. [Identifier Resolution](../crypto/identifier-resolution) turns those identifiers into cryptographic key material for signature verification. [Trust Establishment](../trust/overview) validates whether the issuer of a credential or the provider of an OIDC token is trusted. The identity modules add the layer on top: linking those verified external identifiers to internal identity records, and orchestrating the verification workflows that produce those links.

Four modules handle distinct concerns:

## Identity Verification (IDV)

IDV defines and executes multi-step verification workflows. A workflow is a directed graph of verification nodes, where each node delegates to a pluggable **method driver** that performs the actual check.

### Method Types

| Type | Driver | What it does |
|------|--------|--------------|
| `oidc` | `OidcMethodDefinition` | Redirects to an OIDC provider, exchanges the authorization code, extracts identity attributes from the ID token and optional UserInfo endpoint |
| `wallet` | `WalletMethodDefinition` | Triggers an OID4VP credential presentation request (via DCQL query or presentation definition), verifies the presented credential against `trustedIssuers`, and extracts attributes |
| `document` | ID verification | Delegates to document verification providers (Onfido, Jumio, ReadID) for passport, ID card, or driving license checks |
| `biometric` | Biometric | Delegates to biometric providers (iProov, Onfido, Jumio) for liveness and face-match verification |
| `otp` | OTP | Sends a one-time password via email, SMS, or authenticator app and validates the user's response |
| `claim_match` | `AttributeMatchMethodDefinition` | Performs a hash-based lookup against the identity matching store to check whether the subject's identifier (DID, key, email) is already known |
| `rest_api` | REST | Calls a custom external API with configurable authentication (API key, OAuth2 client credentials, mTLS, basic) |

### Graph Composition

Verification nodes compose into graphs using four structural node types:

- **`SequenceNode`**: children execute in order; all must pass
- **`ParallelNode`**: children execute concurrently with configurable join policy (`All`, `Any`, `BestEffort`) and failure policy (`FailFast`, `WaitForAll`, `ContinueOnFailure`)
- **`ChoiceNode`**: user or system selects one child to execute (policies: `UserSelect`, `HighestAssurance`, `LowestCost`, `FirstAvailable`)
- **`ThresholdNode`**: at least `minimumSuccesses` out of N children must pass

Each `MethodNode` can bind inputs from context attributes, prior node results, or user-provided form data. Nodes can be conditionally skipped (`skipIfAttributePresent`).

### Assurance and Compliance

Every method definition carries an `IdvAssuranceProfile` declaring the maximum eIDAS assurance level (`LOW`, `SUBSTANTIAL`, `HIGH`), authentication assurance level (`AAL1`/`AAL2`/`AAL3`), and supported authentication method references (MFA, OTP, face, fingerprint, hardware key, etc.).

Verification results (`IdvNodeResult`) include the achieved assurance, the evidence type and strength (`fair`/`strong`/`superior`), and optional trust framework metadata. The execution policy enforces a minimum assurance level; if the combined results of the graph don't meet it, the execution fails with an `AssuranceError`.

Compliance profiles track regulatory frameworks (eIDAS, NIST 800-63A, UK DIATF, DE AML), ETSI LoIP scenarios, territory restrictions, and required consent types (biometric processing, data sharing, cross-border transfer).

### Materialization

When an IDV execution completes successfully, materialization rules automatically create downstream records:

| Rule | Effect |
|------|--------|
| `CreateIdentifiersMaterialization` | Creates `CorrelationIdentifier` records (DID, X.509, etc.) linked to the party identity |
| `CreateIdentityMatchMaterialization` | Creates HMAC-hashed `IdentityMatch` entries in the matching store |
| `CreateRelationshipMaterialization` | Links the subject party to an organization party |
| `CreateRegistrationMaterialization` | Creates a jurisdiction-scoped registration record |
| `AttachEvidenceMaterialization` | Persists verification evidence for audit |
| `MarkVerifiedMaterialization` | Marks the identity as verified for a given role or use case |

This is where the identity framework feeds back into the [Party Data Models](../data-store/party-management): the materialization step creates `CorrelationIdentifier` records with types like `IdentifierType.DID` or `IdentifierType.X509`, linking the verified external identifier to an identity in the party store.

### How IDV Uses DIDs and Trust

Consider a wallet-based verification flow. The `WalletMethodDefinition` specifies a set of `trustedIssuers` (typically DID strings like `did:web:gov.example.com`) and a DCQL query describing which credentials to request. When the holder presents a verifiable credential:

1. The credential's issuer DID is extracted from the proof
2. [Identifier Resolution](../crypto/identifier-resolution) resolves the DID to the issuer's public key via the DID document
3. The credential signature is verified against that key
4. [Trust Establishment](../trust/overview) validates whether the issuer DID is trusted. This may check the `trustedIssuers` allow-list, an ETSI trust list, or an OpenID Federation trust chain
5. If trusted, the verified attributes and identifiers flow into the IDV execution result and downstream materialization

A similar pattern applies for OIDC verification: the OIDC provider's signing keys are resolved via OIDC discovery (an [identifier resolution method](../crypto/identifier-resolution#identifier-types)), the ID token signature is verified, and the provider can be validated via OpenID Federation trust if configured.

## Identity Matching

Identity matching maintains privacy-preserving links between external identifiers and internal identity IDs. The core record is:

```kotlin
data class IdentityMatch(
    val id: String,
    val identifierHash: String,       // HMAC-SHA256 of the external identifier
    val identifierType: IdentifierType, // KEY, DID, EMAIL, SUBJECT_ID, CLAIM_TUPLE
    val internalIdentityId: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val metadata: Map<String, String>,
    val hashKeyVersion: String?,       // Tracks which HMAC key was used
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val lastUsedAt: Instant?,
)
```

External identifiers are never stored in plaintext. The `ReconciliationCryptoService` provides domain-separated hashing with two distinct keys:

- **Key A** (`hashHolderKey`): HMAC-SHA256 for holder key identifiers (e.g., a DID the holder controls)
- **Key B** (`hashExternalIdentifier`): HMAC-SHA256 for institution/external identifiers (e.g., a subject ID from an OIDC provider)

For reversible fields (e.g., encrypted identity payloads in reconciliation sessions), **Key C** provides AES-256-GCM encryption.

Key rotation is supported through dual-read methods (`hashHolderKeyWithPrevious`, `hashExternalIdentifierWithPrevious`) that hash with the previous key version during a migration window. The `hashKeyVersion` field on each match record tracks which key produced the hash.

### Relationship to CorrelationIdentifier

There are two complementary identity linking mechanisms:

- **`CorrelationIdentifier`** (in the [Party Data Models](../data-store/party-management)) stores the plaintext identifier value (DID string, X.509 subject, etc.) linked to an identity in the party store. This supports direct lookup by value and is used when the identifier is not sensitive.
- **`IdentityMatch`** stores a one-way HMAC hash of the identifier. This is used when the identifier should not be stored in plaintext, e.g., for privacy-sensitive matching scenarios or when the identifier itself is a secret.

Both can be created by IDV materialization. `CreateIdentifiersMaterialization` creates `CorrelationIdentifier` records; `CreateIdentityMatchMaterialization` creates `IdentityMatch` records.

## Identity Resolution

Identity resolution answers: "given this external identifier string, which internal identity ID does it belong to?" This is distinct from [Identifier Resolution](../crypto/identifier-resolution), which answers: "given this cryptographic identifier, what is the public key?"

| Concept | Input | Output | Module |
|---------|-------|--------|--------|
| **Identifier Resolution** | DID, JWK, X5C, JWKS URL, etc. | Public key (JWK), certificate info | `lib-crypto-core-public` |
| **Identity Resolution** | External identifier string + tenant | Internal identity ID | `lib-identity-resolution-public` |

The `IdentityResolver` interface is pluggable via multibinding:

```kotlin
interface IdentityResolver {
    val resolverId: String            // e.g., "identity-matching", "oidc-introspection"
    val priority: Int                 // Higher = tried first

    suspend fun supports(tenantId: String, resolverConfig: ResolverConfig?): Boolean

    suspend fun resolve(
        identifier: String,
        tenantId: String,
        resolverConfig: ResolverConfig?
    ): IdkResult<IdentityResolutionResult, IdkError>
}
```

Multiple resolvers are tried in priority order. A resolver returns `resolved = false` to pass to the next strategy without failing, which lets you chain strategies like "try hash-based matching first, then fall back to OIDC introspection". An `Err` result stops the chain (hard failure).

The built-in `MatchingIdentityResolverImpl` uses the identity matching store: it hashes the incoming identifier with the tenant's HMAC key and looks up the hash. Custom resolvers can implement any strategy (LDAP lookup, external API call, database query) and are contributed per tenant via `IdentityResolutionConfig`.

## Reconciliation

Reconciliation is the policy engine that decides what to do when an external subject arrives. Given context about the incoming request (tenant, entry point, credential types, issuers, holder state), the `ReconciliationSelector` evaluates a list of `ReconciliationSelectorRule`s and produces a `ReconciliationPlan`:

```kotlin
sealed interface ReconciliationPlan {
    val materialProfileId: String?
    val requiredAttributeNames: Set<String>
    val selectorRuleVersion: String
}
```

The concrete plan types:

| Plan | Meaning |
|------|---------|
| `SkipReconciliation` | No identity binding needed; pass through |
| `UseExistingBinding` | The subject already has a matching identity; reuse it |
| `RunIdv` | No match found. Starts a full IDV workflow via the specified provider, with a `BindingPolicy` of `REUSE_OR_CREATE`, `CREATE_NEW`, or `REUSE_ONLY` |
| `StepUp` | Match exists but assurance is insufficient; run additional verification |
| `FailClosed` | Policy requires binding but conditions aren't met; reject with a reason |

### Selector Rules

Rules match against the incoming `ReconciliationSelectorInput`:

```kotlin
data class ReconciliationSelectorRule(
    val id: String,
    val priority: Int = 0,
    val tenants: Set<String>?,              // Match specific tenants
    val entryPointTypes: Set<String>?,      // wallet_oid4vp, federated_oidc, api_call, ...
    val triggerTypes: Set<String>?,         // onboarding, step_up, revalidation, ...
    val credentialTypes: Set<String>?,      // mDL, PID, diploma, ...
    val issuers: Set<String>?,             // DID strings or URL patterns
    val knownHolderStates: Set<KnownHolderState>?,
    val attributePredicates: List<AttributePredicate>?,
    val plan: ReconciliationPlanTemplate,
    // ...
)
```

The `issuers` field is where reconciliation connects to the DID and trust infrastructure: rules can target specific issuer DIDs (e.g., `did:web:gov.nl`) or patterns, ensuring that only credentials from trusted issuers trigger specific reconciliation plans.

### Reconciliation Sessions

For flows that require an external OAuth2 authorization (e.g., linking an identity via an OIDC provider), the reconciliation module manages `ReconciliationSession` objects that track the authorization URL, PKCE code verifier, nonce, state, and encrypted identity payload through the redirect flow. Sessions are tenant-scoped and time-limited.

## Module Structure

```
lib/identity/
├── idv/                  # Identity Verification
│   ├── public/           #   Models, commands, method driver interface, stores
│   ├── oidc/             #   OIDC method driver implementation
│   └── wallet/           #   Wallet/OID4VP method driver implementation
├── matching/             # Identity Matching
│   ├── public/           #   IdentityMatch, IdentifierType, crypto interface, commands
│   └── impl/             #   In-memory and Kottage-backed store implementations
├── resolution/           # Identity Resolution
│   ├── public/           #   IdentityResolver interface, resolution types, commands
│   └── impl/             #   MatchingIdentityResolverImpl
└── reconciliation/       # Reconciliation
    ├── public/           #   Plans, selector rules, session model, commands
    └── impl/             #   Orchestrator, KMS-backed crypto, session stores
```

## EDK Integration

The identity modules described here provide the core interfaces, models, and pluggable infrastructure. The [EDK](/edk/guides/getting-started) builds on these with pre-configured verification workflows, managed reconciliation policies, administrative APIs for identity lifecycle management, and production-ready method driver implementations. If you are building a production identity system, the EDK documentation covers the full operational feature set.

---

# Design Overview

# Credential Design in the EDK

The [IDK credential design guide](/idk/guides/credential-design/overview) is the conceptual reference. It explains what a credential design *is*, what a binding does, how claim presentations work, how the resolution engine combines layers, and what each format mapper (OID4VCI, SD-JWT VCT, JSON Schema, JSON-LD context, W3C render method, OCA) contributes. **None of that changes in the EDK**. The Kotlin interface you call is the same `CredentialDesignService`; the records you get back are the same `CredentialDesignRecord`, `IssuerDesignRecord`, `VerifierDesignRecord`, `RenderVariantRecord`, `ResolvedCredentialDesign`. Examples written for the IDK service work against the EDK service without modification.

What the EDK gives you is a different set of *bindings* of that interface. Most consumers do not call the EDK-specific service directly; they just include the right modules and the IDK interface they already use is now backed by SQL, fronted by HTTP, optionally cached, optionally version-snapshotted.

## What You Get By Default

Add the EDK `lib-data-store-credential-design-impl` plus one of the persistence modules (`-persistence-postgresql` or `-persistence-mysql`) to your service. Through Metro DI's `replaces` mechanism, the binding for `CredentialDesignService` swaps from the IDK's `DefaultCredentialDesignService` (blob-backed) to the EDK's `DefaultVersionedCredentialDesignService` (SQL-backed). Existing code that injects `CredentialDesignService` and calls `getCredentialDesign`, `listCredentialDesigns`, `resolveCredentialDesign`, `importExternalDesign`, etc. continues to work, now hitting your relational database.

You also get the `VersionedCredentialDesignService` interface which extends `CredentialDesignService` with four extra operations:

```kotlin
interface VersionedCredentialDesignService : CredentialDesignService {
    suspend fun createDesignVersion(
        tenantId: String, designId: Uuid, input: CreateDesignVersionInput,
    ): IdkResult<DesignVersion, IdkError>

    suspend fun listDesignVersions(
        tenantId: String, designId: Uuid,
    ): IdkResult<List<DesignVersion>, IdkError>

    suspend fun getDesignVersionContent(
        tenantId: String, designId: Uuid, version: Int,
    ): IdkResult<CredentialDesignRecord, IdkError>

    suspend fun setLatestDesignVersion(
        tenantId: String, designId: Uuid, version: Int,
    ): IdkResult<DesignVersion, IdkError>
}
```

Inject this interface (instead of `CredentialDesignService`) only when you actually need the version operations. See [Versioning](./versioning) for what they do and what they do not do.

## What You Need To Decide

Three deployment choices, and what they mean in code:

**Persistence backend.** Pick one of `-persistence-postgresql` or `-persistence-mysql`. Both implement the same repository contracts; they share SQLDelight-generated query code with dialect-specific tweaks for JSON column types. The choice is operational, not architectural. Multi-tenant database routing is handled by the standard EDK [database routing](/edk/guides/database/routing) layer; the design store does not have its own routing.

**REST exposure.** If anything outside the JVM (a UI, a CLI, a CI pipeline, another service) needs to manage designs, include `lib-data-store-credential-design-rest-vdx` on the server side. That module registers `CredentialDesignHttpAdapter` into the session scope, and the [Universal HTTP Adapter](/edk/guides/http/universal-adapter) mounts it under `/api/v1/designs/...`. The full endpoint reference is in [REST API](./rest-api). If your service only consumes designs internally, you do not need this module.

**Offline cache.** If your service is a wallet or verifier UI that must keep rendering credentials when the network is down, wrap the remote `CredentialDesignService` with `CachingCredentialDesignService` from the `-cache` module. See [Persistence](./persistence#offline-cache). For server-side services that have direct database access, the cache is not relevant.

## How a Developer Actually Uses the Service

The IDK guide has the full method reference. The patterns that show up most often in real code:

**Read a design by binding.** Most consumers do not have a design `id`; they have a credential type identifier (a `CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION_ID`, a `VCT`, an mDoc doctype) and want the design that matches. Use `findCredentialDesignByBindingKey`:

```kotlin
val designs = service.findCredentialDesignByBindingKey(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    bindingKey = DesignBindingKey.CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION_ID,
    bindingValue = "IdentityCredential",
).getOrElse { emptyList() }
val record: CredentialDesignRecord? = designs.firstOrNull()
```

A single design can have multiple bindings (a VCT plus a `CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION_ID` plus an OCA SAID), so the lookup works regardless of which identifier the caller has.

**Resolve a design before rendering or before issuance.** The find returns the bare stored record; the resolve runs it through the layered resolution engine, pulling in OID4VCI metadata, SD-JWT VCT, JSON Schema hints, render method content, OCA overlays, and local overrides in priority order. The result is what you render:

```kotlin
val resolved = service.resolveCredentialDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = ResolveCredentialDesignInput(
        designId = record.id,
        preferredLocales = listOf("en", "nl"),
        renderTarget = RenderVariantKind.SIMPLE_CARD,
    ),
).getOrElse { return }

// Read display metadata for UI
val display = resolved.design.displays.firstOrNull { it.locale == "en" }

// Read claim policy (mandatory + selective-disclosure) for issuance
val mandatory: Set<DesignClaimPath> =
    resolved.design.claims.filter { it.mandatory }.map { it.path }.toSet()
val sdPolicies: Map<DesignClaimPath, SdPolicy> =
    resolved.design.claims.associate { it.path to it.sdPolicy }
```

The same `resolved.design.claims` list is what the OID4VCI issuer translates into its runtime selective-disclosure and mandatory-claim policy (see `DeferredPipelineReExecutor.mapDesignToContext`). Display fields and policy fields live on the same record, so a UI render and an issuance decision can both read from the same resolved design.

**Build OID4VCI metadata from designs.** A credential design with a `CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION_ID` binding is the canonical source for one entry in `credential_configurations_supported`. List designs, filter for ones with that binding, resolve each, and pass each through `Oid4vciDesignMapper.toCredentialConfiguration(resolved, format)` to get the wire-format object. This is exactly what `DesignBackedOid4vciIssuerConfigProvider` does in the EDK OID4VCI issuer. If you are building an OID4VCI issuer of your own, follow that pattern; if you are using the EDK issuer service, it does this for you and the only thing you need to manage is the designs themselves.

**Import a design from an external source.** OID4VCI issuer metadata, SD-JWT VCT metadata, an OCA bundle URL, a JSON Schema URL: any of these can be turned into a persisted credential design through `importExternalDesign`. The server fetches the source through the SSRF-protected `DesignExternalFetcher`, snapshots the response as a `SourceSnapshotRecord`, runs the appropriate format mapper, and writes the resulting design. The snapshot is preserved so `refreshCredentialDesign` can later compare with `If-None-Match` and re-import only when the source has changed.

The full method reference (CRUD per entity type, render variants, asset upload/download, snapshots, all argument shapes) is in the IDK [Working with Designs](/idk/guides/credential-design/designs) and [Resolution and Import](/idk/guides/credential-design/resolution) guides.

## What's in This Section

- [REST API](./rest-api): every HTTP endpoint, with request/response shapes and tenancy/authorization rules
- [Versioning](./versioning): how the explicit-snapshot operations work, what "current version" actually points at, and how to do rollback
- [Persistence](./persistence): PostgreSQL and MySQL repositories, what tables they own, and how the offline cache wrapper behaves
- [OCA Bundles](../oca/overview): OCA as a credential design source

---

# SD-JWT Overview

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# SD-JWT Overview

SD-JWT (Selective Disclosure for JWTs) enables holders to present only specific claims from a credential, enhancing privacy while maintaining cryptographic verifiability. The IDK provides comprehensive support for creating, presenting, and verifying SD-JWT credentials per RFC 9901.

## What is SD-JWT?

Traditional JWTs reveal all claims to every verifier. SD-JWT solves this by allowing the issuer to create a credential where individual claims can be selectively disclosed. When presenting the credential, the holder chooses which claims to reveal, and the verifier can only see those specific claims.

The format extends standard JWT with disclosure tokens that are cryptographically bound to the main credential. This binding ensures that disclosed claims cannot be forged or modified while keeping undisclosed claims invisible to the verifier.

## SD-JWT Structure

An SD-JWT credential consists of three parts:

```
<issuer-jwt>~<disclosure1>~<disclosure2>~...~<disclosureN>~<key-binding-jwt>
```

| Component | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| Issuer JWT | The main credential signed by the issuer, containing hashes of disclosures in the `_sd` array |
| Disclosures | Base64url-encoded JSON arrays containing `[salt, claim_name, claim_value]` |
| Key Binding JWT | Optional JWT proving possession of a holder key (contains `aud`, `nonce`, `iat`, `sd_hash`) |

## How Selective Disclosure Works

When an issuer creates an SD-JWT:

1. Each selectively disclosable claim is replaced with a hash digest in the JWT's `_sd` array
2. The original claim values are encoded as separate disclosures
3. The issuer signs the JWT containing only the hashes
4. The complete SD-JWT (JWT + all disclosures) is given to the holder

When a holder presents to a verifier:

1. The holder selects which claims to reveal
2. Only the selected disclosures are included in the presentation
3. A Key Binding JWT proves the holder controls the credential (optional)
4. The verifier receives the issuer JWT plus only the revealed disclosures

<img src="/img/diagrams/sdjwt-disclosure.svg" alt="SD-JWT Selective Disclosure" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Core Service

The IDK provides `SdJwtService` for all SD-JWT operations:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get the SD-JWT service from the session
val sdJwtService = session.component.sdJwtService

// Issue SD-JWT
val issueResult = sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(issueArgs)

// Create presentation with selective disclosure
val presentResult = sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(presentArgs)

// Verify SD-JWT or presentation
val verifyResult = sdJwtService.verifySdJwt(verifyArgs)

// Access individual commands for advanced usage
val commands = sdJwtService.commands
commands.issueSdJwt
commands.presentSdJwt
commands.verifySdJwt
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get the SD-JWT service from the session
let sdJwtService = session.component.sdJwtService

// Issue SD-JWT
let issueResult = try await sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(args: issueArgs)

// Create presentation with selective disclosure
let presentResult = try await sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(args: presentArgs)

// Verify SD-JWT or presentation
let verifyResult = try await sdJwtService.verifySdJwt(args: verifyArgs)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Payload Builder Extensions

The IDK extends `JwsPayloadBuilder` with selective disclosure functions:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.crypto.jose.jws.jwsPayload
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.*

val payload = jwsPayload {
    // Standard claims (always visible)
    iss("https://issuer.example.com")
    iat(System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000)
    exp(System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000 + 86400)

    // Selectively disclosable claims
    claimSd("email", "user@example.com")
    claimSd("given_name", "John")
    claimSd("family_name", "Doe")
    claimSd("age", 25)
    claimSd("verified", true)

    // Nested object as selectively disclosable
    objClaimSd("address") {
        custom("street", "123 Main St")
        custom("city", "Springfield")
        custom("country", "US")
    }

    // Add decoy digests for privacy
    minimumDigests(5)
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonCrypto
import SphereonSdJwt

let payload = JwsPayloadBuilder()
    // Standard claims (always visible)
    .iss("https://issuer.example.com")
    .iat(Int64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970))
    .exp(Int64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970) + 86400)

    // Selectively disclosable claims
    .claimSd(name: "email", value: "user@example.com")
    .claimSd(name: "given_name", value: "John")
    .claimSd(name: "family_name", value: "Doe")
    .claimSd(name: "age", value: 25)
    .claimSd(name: "verified", value: true)
    .build()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Data Types

### SdJwt

The parsed SD-JWT structure:

```kotlin
data class SdJwt<JwtType>(
    val jwt: JwtType,                          // Signed JWT
    val header: JsonObject,                    // JWT header
    val payload: SdJwtPayload,                 // Payload with disclosure info
    val disclosures: List<Disclosure>,         // All disclosures
    val keyBindingJwt: KeyBindingJwt?          // Optional KB-JWT
) {
    val algorithm: String?   // From header
    val keyId: String?       // From header
    val type: String?        // From header
}
```

### SdJwtPayload

Provides both undisclosed and resolved views of the payload:

```kotlin
data class SdJwtPayload(
    val undisclosedPayload: JsonObject,              // Contains _sd array with digests
    val fullPayload: JsonObject,                      // All disclosed claims resolved
    val digestedDisclosures: Map<String, Disclosure>  // Digest to disclosure mapping
)
```

### Disclosure

Individual disclosure structure:

```kotlin
data class Disclosure(
    val salt: String,        // Random salt
    val key: String,         // Claim name
    val value: JsonElement,  // Claim value
    val encoded: String,     // Base64url-encoded [salt, key, value]
    val digest: String?      // Hash of encoded disclosure
)
```

### KeyBindingJwt

Key Binding JWT for holder authentication:

```kotlin
data class KeyBindingJwt(
    val jwt: String,
    val header: JsonObject,
    val payload: JsonObject
) {
    val audience: String?   // Verifier identifier
    val nonce: String?      // Fresh nonce
    val issuedAt: Long?     // Timestamp
    val sdHash: String?     // Hash of presentation
}
```

## Security Considerations

Per RFC 9901, certain claims should NOT be made selectively disclosable:

| Claim | Reason |
|-------|--------|
| `iss` | Required for trust establishment and signature verification |
| `aud` | Required to determine if JWT is intended for the verifier |
| `exp` | Required for token lifetime validation |
| `nbf` | Required for token lifetime validation |
| `cnf` | Required for holder binding validation |

The IDK intentionally does not provide `*Sd()` variants for these claims to discourage unsafe usage.

## SD-JWT vs Other Formats

| Feature | SD-JWT | mDoc | Standard JWT |
|---------|--------|------|--------------|
| Selective Disclosure | Yes | Yes | No |
| Format | JWT + Disclosures | CBOR | JWT |
| Key Binding | Optional | Required | No |
| Revocation | Via status list | Via MSO validity | Expiration only |
| Standards | RFC 9901 | ISO 18013-5 | RFC 7519 |

## Next Steps

- [Issuance](./issuance) - Create SD-JWT credentials with selective disclosure
- [Presentation](./presentation) - Present credentials and verify presentations

---

# Mobile Credentials Overview

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Mobile Credentials (mDoc) Overview

The IDK implements ISO/IEC 18013-5 for mobile driving licenses (mDL) and mobile credentials (mDoc). This standard defines how to store, present, and verify identity credentials on mobile devices using secure, privacy-preserving protocols.

## What is mDoc?

An mDoc (mobile document) is a digital credential stored on a mobile device that can be presented to verifiers through close-range communication technologies like NFC and Bluetooth. The ISO 18013-5 standard was originally designed for mobile driving licenses but has been adopted for other credential types.

Key characteristics of mDoc:

- **Offline verification**: Credentials can be verified without an internet connection
- **Selective disclosure**: Holders can share only specific attributes, not the entire credential
- **Cryptographic security**: Issuer signatures and device authentication prevent tampering
- **Privacy preserving**: Reader authentication ensures credentials are only shared with legitimate verifiers

## Protocol Flow

The mDoc presentation protocol consists of two main phases:

### Phase 1: Engagement

During engagement, the holder and verifier establish how they will communicate. The holder's device generates engagement data containing:

- A device engagement structure with transport options
- An ephemeral public key for establishing the session

This engagement data is transmitted out-of-band through:
- **QR code**: The holder displays a QR code that the verifier scans
- **NFC tap**: The holder taps their device on the verifier's reader
- **TO_APP (mdoc://)**: App-to-app reverse engagement for ISO 18013-7

### Phase 2: Data Transfer

Once engaged, the actual credential exchange occurs:

1. **Reader request**: The verifier sends a `DeviceRequest` specifying which data elements are needed
2. **User consent**: The holder reviews the request and approves sharing
3. **Device response**: The holder's device creates a signed `DeviceResponse` with the requested data
4. **Verification**: The verifier validates signatures and trust chains

## IDK Components

The IDK provides several components for implementing mDoc functionality:

### MdocEngagementManager

The central entry point for mDoc operations. It manages the complete lifecycle from engagement through data transfer.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val engagementManager = session.component.mdocEngagementManager

// Access engagement instances
val qrEngagement = engagementManager.qrEngagement     // StateFlow<EngagementInstance?>
val nfcEngagement = engagementManager.nfcEngagement   // StateFlow<EngagementInstance?>
val toAppEngagement = engagementManager.toAppEngagement // StateFlow<EngagementInstance?>

// Access event hub for UI integration
val eventHub = engagementManager.eventHub
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let engagementManager = session.component.mdocEngagementManager

// Access engagement instances
let qrEngagement = engagementManager.qrEngagement     // StateFlow<EngagementInstance?>
let nfcEngagement = engagementManager.nfcEngagement   // StateFlow<EngagementInstance?>
let toAppEngagement = engagementManager.toAppEngagement // StateFlow<EngagementInstance?>

// Access event hub for UI integration
let eventHub = engagementManager.eventHub
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

See the [Engagement Manager](engagement/engagement-manager) guide for details.

### TransferManager

Handles the data transfer phase after engagement is established. Manages device requests and responses.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Start engagement to get transfer manager
val transferManager = engagementInstance.start()

// Receive and respond to requests
val deviceRequest = transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()
val deviceResponse = transferManager.createResponse(deviceRequest, documentProvider)
transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Start engagement to get transfer manager
let transferManager = try await engagementInstance.start()

// Receive and respond to requests
let deviceRequest = try await transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()
let deviceResponse = try await transferManager.createResponse(
    deviceRequest: deviceRequest,
    documentProvider: documentProvider
)
try await transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse: deviceResponse)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

See the [Transfer Manager](transfer/transfer-manager) guide for details.

### Transport Layer

The IDK supports multiple transports for the data transfer phase:

| Transport | Use Case |
|-----------|----------|
| BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy) | Common for mobile-to-mobile presentation |
| NFC | Quick tap-and-go scenarios |
| REST API / Website | Remote or server-based verification |
| OID4VP | Integration with OpenID4VP presentation flows |
| WiFi Aware | Direct device-to-device WiFi connections |

See the [Transports](transports/ble) guides for configuration details.

## Engagement Types

The IDK supports three engagement types:

| Type | Standard | URI Scheme | Description |
|------|----------|------------|-------------|
| QR | ISO 18013-5 | `mdoc:` (opaque) | QR code displayed by holder |
| NFC | ISO 18013-5 | N/A | NFC tap proximity engagement |
| TO_APP | ISO 18013-7 | `mdoc://` or `mdoc-openid4vp://` | App-to-app reverse engagement |

### URI Scheme Patterns

The `toApp()` method supports three URI patterns:

- **`mdoc:`** (opaque, no slashes): Classic reverse engagement with BLE/NFC
- **`mdoc://`** (hierarchical, with slashes): REST API / Website retrieval
- **`mdoc-openid4vp://`**: OID4VP with OAuth 2.0 integration

## Credential Structure

An mDoc credential consists of:

### IssuerSigned Data

Data signed by the credential issuer:

- **Mobile Security Object (MSO)**: Contains digests of all data elements, signed by the issuer
- **Namespaces**: Data elements organized by namespace (e.g., `org.iso.18013.5.1` for mDL)
- **Issuer certificate chain**: X.509 certificates establishing trust

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// IssuerSigned structure
data class IssuerSigned(
    val nameSpaces: IssuerSignedNameSpaces?,
    val issuerAuth: COSE_Sign1<MobileSecurityObject>
) {
    val MSO: MobileSecurityObject  // Mobile Security Object
    val deviceKeyInfo: DeviceKeyInfoCbor  // Device key from MSO

    fun getNameSpaces(): Set<NameSpace>
    fun getIssuerSignedItems(ns: String): List<IssuerSignedItem<Any>>?
    fun limitDisclosures(docRequest: DocRequest): IssuerSigned
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// IssuerSigned structure
struct IssuerSigned {
    let nameSpaces: IssuerSignedNameSpaces?
    let issuerAuth: COSE_Sign1<MobileSecurityObject>

    var MSO: MobileSecurityObject  // Mobile Security Object
    var deviceKeyInfo: DeviceKeyInfoCbor  // Device key from MSO

    func getNameSpaces() -> Set<NameSpace>
    func getIssuerSignedItems(ns: String) -> [IssuerSignedItem]?
    func limitDisclosures(docRequest: DocRequest) -> IssuerSigned
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### DeviceSigned Data

Data signed by the holder's device during presentation:

- **Session transcript**: Cryptographic binding to the current session
- **Device authentication**: Proves the holder controls the device key

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// DeviceSigned structure
data class DeviceSigned(
    val nameSpaces: DeviceNameSpaces,
    val deviceAuth: DeviceAuth
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// DeviceSigned structure
struct DeviceSigned {
    let nameSpaces: DeviceNameSpaces
    let deviceAuth: DeviceAuth
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Data Elements

Data elements are individual attributes within a credential. For an mDL, typical elements include:

| Element | Namespace | Description |
|---------|-----------|-------------|
| `family_name` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | Holder's family name |
| `given_name` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | Holder's given name |
| `birth_date` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | Date of birth |
| `portrait` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | Photo of the holder |
| `document_number` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | License number |
| `driving_privileges` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | License categories |
| `issue_date` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | When the license was issued |
| `expiry_date` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | When the license expires |
| `age_over_18` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | Age attestation claim |
| `age_over_21` | `org.iso.18013.5.1` | Age attestation claim |

## Security Model

mDoc security relies on several layers:

### Issuer Trust

The credential issuer signs the MSO with their private key. Verifiers validate this signature against a trust anchor (typically a certificate from a trusted authority).

### Device Binding

The credential is bound to a specific device through a device key. During issuance, the device generates a key pair and the public key is included in the MSO. During presentation, the device proves possession of the private key.

### Session Encryption

All communication after engagement is encrypted using keys derived from the ephemeral key exchange. This prevents eavesdropping and man-in-the-middle attacks.

### Reader Authentication

Optionally, holders can require verifiers to prove their identity before sharing data. This prevents credential harvesting by unauthorized parties.

## Getting Started

To implement mDoc functionality in your application:

1. Set up the [Engagement Manager](engagement/engagement-manager) for holder or verifier roles
2. Configure appropriate [transports](transports/ble) for your use case
3. Handle [events](engagement/events-ui) to build responsive UIs
4. Implement the [data transfer](transfer/transfer-manager) flow for actual credential exchange

---

# DID REST Services

# DID REST Services

The EDK provides REST APIs for DID lifecycle management compatible with the [DIF Universal Registrar](https://github.com/decentralized-identity/universal-registrar) specification.

## Overview

The EDK extends the IDK's DID capabilities with enterprise REST services:

| Service | Specification | Description |
|---------|--------------|-------------|
| Universal Registrar | DIF Universal Registrar | Create, update, deactivate DIDs |
| Universal Resolver | DIF Universal Resolver | Resolve DIDs (via IDK) |

## Architecture

<img src="/img/diagrams/did-universal-api.svg" alt="DID Universal API Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '580px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Universal Registrar

The Universal Registrar provides a REST API for DID lifecycle operations.

### Endpoints

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/1.0/create` | Create a new DID |
| `POST` | `/1.0/update` | Update an existing DID |
| `POST` | `/1.0/deactivate` | Deactivate a DID |
| `GET` | `/1.0/methods` | List supported DID methods |
| `GET` | `/1.0/properties` | Get registrar capabilities |

### Create DID

```http
POST /1.0/create HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "method": "web",
  "options": {
    "domain": "example.com",
    "path": ["users", "alice"]
  },
  "secret": {
    "verificationMethod": [{
      "type": "JsonWebKey2020",
      "purpose": ["authentication", "assertionMethod"]
    }]
  }
}
```

Response:

```json
{
  "jobId": null,
  "didState": {
    "state": "finished",
    "did": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
    "didDocument": {
      "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1"],
      "id": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
      "verificationMethod": [{
        "id": "did:web:example.com:users:alice#key-1",
        "type": "JsonWebKey2020",
        "controller": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
        "publicKeyJwk": {
          "kty": "EC",
          "crv": "P-256",
          "x": "...",
          "y": "..."
        }
      }],
      "authentication": ["did:web:example.com:users:alice#key-1"],
      "assertionMethod": ["did:web:example.com:users:alice#key-1"]
    }
  },
  "didDocumentMetadata": {},
  "didRegistrationMetadata": {}
}
```

### Update DID

```http
POST /1.0/update HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "did": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
  "options": {},
  "didDocumentOperation": ["addToDidDocument"],
  "didDocument": [{
    "service": [{
      "id": "#hub",
      "type": "LinkedDomains",
      "serviceEndpoint": "https://hub.example.com"
    }]
  }]
}
```

### Deactivate DID

```http
POST /1.0/deactivate HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "did": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
  "options": {
    "reason": "Key rotation"
  }
}
```

### List Supported Methods

```http
GET /1.0/methods HTTP/1.1
```

Response:

```json
{
  "methods": ["key", "web", "jwk"]
}
```

### Get Properties

```http
GET /1.0/properties HTTP/1.1
```

Response:

```json
{
  "properties": {
    "supportedMethods": ["key", "web", "jwk"],
    "supportsKeyGeneration": true,
    "supportsUpdate": true,
    "supportsDeactivate": true
  }
}
```

## Spring Boot Integration

### Auto-Configuration

The registrar is automatically configured with Spring Boot:

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-did-rest-registrar-server:0.13.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:idk-spring-support:0.13.0")
}
```

```yaml
# application.yml
sphereon:
  did:
    registrar:
      enabled: true
      base-path: /did/registrar
```

### Custom DID Method Providers

Register custom DID method providers:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.did.manager.DidProvider
import com.sphereon.did.manager.DidProviderRegistry
import org.springframework.context.annotation.Configuration
import jakarta.annotation.PostConstruct

@Configuration
class DidConfiguration(
    private val providerRegistry: DidProviderRegistry
) {
    @PostConstruct
    fun registerProviders() {
        // Providers are auto-registered via DI
        // Custom providers can be added here
    }
}
```

## Programmatic Usage

### Creating DIDs via REST Client

```kotlin
import io.ktor.client.*
import io.ktor.client.request.*
import io.ktor.http.*

val client = HttpClient()

val response = client.post("https://api.example.com/1.0/create") {
    contentType(ContentType.Application.Json)
    setBody("""
        {
            "method": "key",
            "options": {},
            "secret": {
                "verificationMethod": [{
                    "type": "JsonWebKey2020",
                    "purpose": ["authentication"]
                }]
            }
        }
    """)
}
```

### Using the HTTP Adapter Directly

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.did.rest.registrar.UniversalRegistrarHttpAdapter

class DidService(
    private val registrarAdapter: UniversalRegistrarHttpAdapter
) {
    // The adapter automatically handles routing for /1.0/* endpoints
    // It delegates to injected command handlers:
    // - CreateDidEndpointCommand
    // - UpdateDidEndpointCommand
    // - DeactivateDidEndpointCommand
    // - GetRegistrarMethodsEndpointCommand
    // - GetRegistrarPropertiesEndpointCommand
}
```

## Integration with IDK DID Manager

The REST API delegates to the IDK's DID Manager for actual operations:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.did.manager.dsl.didCreateOptions
import com.sphereon.crypto.core.generic.KeyTypeMapping
import com.sphereon.crypto.core.generic.Curve
import com.sphereon.did.models.VerificationPurpose

// The same DSL used in IDK works with EDK
val options = didCreateOptions {
    method("web")
    domain("example.com")
    path("users", "alice")

    autoGenerateKey {
        keyType(KeyTypeMapping.EC)
        curve(Curve.P_256)
    }

    service("hub") {
        type("LinkedDomains")
        endpoint("https://hub.example.com")
    }
}

// Create via manager
val result = didManager.create(options.options, options.keyConfigs)
```

See the [IDK DID Documentation](/idk/guides/did/overview) for detailed DSL usage.

## Filtering and Querying

Use the IDK's `DidFilter` for querying DIDs:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.did.manager.DidFilter
import com.sphereon.did.manager.DidRole

// Filter by method
val webDids = didManager.list(DidFilter(method = "web"))

// Filter by role
val managedDids = didManager.list(DidFilter(role = DidRole.MANAGED))

// Combined filters
val activeWebDids = didManager.list(
    DidFilter(
        method = "web",
        role = DidRole.MANAGED,
        includeDeactivated = false
    )
)
```

## Dependencies

```kotlin
dependencies {
    // Universal Registrar server
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-did-rest-registrar-server:0.13.0")

    // Universal Resolver server (from IDK)
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-rest-resolver-server:0.13.0")

    // DID methods (include what you need)
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-key:0.13.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-jwk:0.13.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-web:0.13.0")

    // DID persistence (for storing managed DIDs)
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-persistence-sqlite:0.13.0")
    // or for enterprise
    // implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-did-persistence-postgresql:0.13.0")
}
```

## Security Considerations

1. **Authentication**: Protect registrar endpoints with appropriate authentication (JWT, OAuth2)
2. **Authorization**: Use AuthZEN policies to control who can create/update/deactivate DIDs
3. **Key Storage**: Ensure KMS providers are properly secured
4. **Audit Logging**: Enable event persistence for audit trails

```yaml
# Example: Require authentication for registrar
sphereon:
  did:
    registrar:
      require-authentication: true
  security:
    jwt:
      issuer: https://auth.example.com
      audience: did-registrar
```

## Next Steps

- [IDK DID Overview](/idk/guides/did/overview) - DID creation DSL and management
- [Authorization](../authorization/overview) - Protect DID operations with policies
- [Events](../events/overview) - Audit DID operations

---

# Trust Framework Overview

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Trust Framework Overview

The IDK provides a comprehensive trust validation framework for verifying the authenticity and trustworthiness of credentials, issuers, and certificate chains. This is essential for building applications that require high-assurance identity verification.

## Why Trust Matters

In digital identity systems, trust validation answers critical questions:

- Is the issuer of this credential authorized to issue it?
- Is the certificate chain valid and properly rooted?
- Has the credential or certificate been revoked?
- Does the issuer meet regulatory requirements?

Without proper trust validation, credentials from unauthorized sources could be accepted, undermining the entire identity ecosystem.

## Trust Components

The IDK trust framework consists of several integrated components:

| Component | Purpose |
|-----------|---------|
| Trust Lists | Published lists of authorized issuers and their metadata |
| Certificate Validation | X.509 certificate chain verification |
| Revocation Checking | CRL and OCSP verification for certificate status |
| Trust Policies | Configurable rules for trust decisions |

## Trust Validation Flow

<img src="/img/diagrams/trust-validation-flow.svg" alt="Trust Validation Flow" style={{maxWidth: '400px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Core Components

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Access trust components from session
val trustValidator = session.component.trustValidator
val certificateValidator = session.component.certificateValidator
val trustListService = session.component.trustListService
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Access trust components from session
let trustValidator = session.component.trustValidator
let certificateValidator = session.component.certificateValidator
let trustListService = session.component.trustListService
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Basic Trust Validation

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Validate trust for an issuer certificate
val trustResult = trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate = issuerCertificate,
    purpose = TrustPurpose.CREDENTIAL_ISSUER
)

when (trustResult) {
    is TrustResult.Trusted -> {
        println("Issuer is trusted")
        println("Trust level: ${trustResult.trustLevel}")
        println("Trust list: ${trustResult.trustListName}")
    }
    is TrustResult.NotTrusted -> {
        println("Issuer is not trusted: ${trustResult.reason}")
    }
    is TrustResult.Unknown -> {
        println("Trust status could not be determined")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Validate trust for an issuer certificate
let trustResult = try await trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate: issuerCertificate,
    purpose: .credentialIssuer
)

switch trustResult {
case .trusted(let result):
    print("Issuer is trusted")
    print("Trust level: \(result.trustLevel)")
    print("Trust list: \(result.trustListName)")

case .notTrusted(let reason):
    print("Issuer is not trusted: \(reason)")

case .unknown:
    print("Trust status could not be determined")
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Trust Purposes

Different validation contexts require different trust evaluations:

| Purpose | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `CREDENTIAL_ISSUER` | Entity issuing identity credentials |
| `DOCUMENT_SIGNER` | Entity signing mDoc documents |
| `TLS_SERVER` | Server providing TLS/HTTPS |
| `TLS_CLIENT` | Client authenticating via mTLS |
| `SIGNATURE` | General document/data signing |
| `ENCRYPTION` | Key used for encryption |

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Validate for mDoc document signing
val mdocTrust = trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate = documentSignerCert,
    purpose = TrustPurpose.DOCUMENT_SIGNER
)

// Validate for credential issuance
val issuerTrust = trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate = issuerCert,
    purpose = TrustPurpose.CREDENTIAL_ISSUER
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Validate for mDoc document signing
let mdocTrust = try await trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate: documentSignerCert,
    purpose: .documentSigner
)

// Validate for credential issuance
let issuerTrust = try await trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate: issuerCert,
    purpose: .credentialIssuer
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Trust Levels

The framework supports different trust levels:

| Level | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `HIGH` | Government-approved, heavily audited issuers |
| `MEDIUM` | Commercially trusted, audited issuers |
| `LOW` | Self-asserted or minimally verified issuers |
| `NONE` | Not trusted |

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Require minimum trust level
val trustResult = trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate = issuerCertificate,
    purpose = TrustPurpose.CREDENTIAL_ISSUER,
    minimumTrustLevel = TrustLevel.MEDIUM
)

if (trustResult is TrustResult.Trusted) {
    // Only accepts HIGH or MEDIUM trust levels
    val level = trustResult.trustLevel
    if (level >= TrustLevel.HIGH) {
        // High assurance credential
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Require minimum trust level
let trustResult = try await trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate: issuerCertificate,
    purpose: .credentialIssuer,
    minimumTrustLevel: .medium
)

if case .trusted(let result) = trustResult {
    // Only accepts HIGH or MEDIUM trust levels
    let level = result.trustLevel
    if level >= .high {
        // High assurance credential
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Trust Anchors

Configure root trust anchors for certificate validation:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Configure trust anchors
val trustConfig = TrustConfiguration {
    // Add root CA certificates
    trustAnchors {
        // From file
        certificate(loadCertificate("/path/to/root-ca.pem"))

        // From resource
        certificateResource("certificates/root-ca.pem")

        // PEM string
        certificatePem("""
            -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
            MIICxjCCAa6gAwIBAgIIQx...
            -----END CERTIFICATE-----
        """.trimIndent())
    }

    // Trust IACA certificates for mDoc
    iacaTrustAnchors {
        certificate(loadCertificate("/path/to/iaca-root.pem"))
    }
}

val trustValidator = TrustValidator(trustConfig)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Configure trust anchors
let trustConfig = TrustConfiguration { config in
    // Add root CA certificates
    config.trustAnchors { anchors in
        // From file
        anchors.certificate(cert: loadCertificate(path: "/path/to/root-ca.pem"))

        // From bundle resource
        anchors.certificateResource(name: "certificates/root-ca", extension: "pem")

        // PEM string
        anchors.certificatePem(pem: """
            -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
            MIICxjCCAa6gAwIBAgIIQx...
            -----END CERTIFICATE-----
        """)
    }

    // Trust IACA certificates for mDoc
    config.iacaTrustAnchors { anchors in
        anchors.certificate(cert: loadCertificate(path: "/path/to/iaca-root.pem"))
    }
}

let trustValidator = TrustValidator(configuration: trustConfig)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Trust Policies

Define custom trust policies for specific requirements:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val policy = TrustPolicy {
    name = "Production Policy"

    // Require certificates from specific issuers
    allowedIssuers {
        issuer("CN=Government Root CA, O=Government, C=US")
        issuer("CN=Acme Identity CA, O=Acme Corp, C=US")
    }

    // Require specific certificate extensions
    requiredExtensions {
        extension(OID.EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE)
        extension(OID.KEY_USAGE)
    }

    // Minimum key strength
    minimumKeySize = 2048

    // Required signature algorithms
    allowedSignatureAlgorithms = setOf(
        SignatureAlgorithm.ES256,
        SignatureAlgorithm.ES384,
        SignatureAlgorithm.RS256
    )

    // Revocation checking
    revocationCheck = RevocationCheckPolicy.REQUIRE_VALID
}

val trustValidator = TrustValidator(
    configuration = trustConfig,
    policy = policy
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let policy = TrustPolicy { policy in
    policy.name = "Production Policy"

    // Require certificates from specific issuers
    policy.allowedIssuers { issuers in
        issuers.issuer(dn: "CN=Government Root CA, O=Government, C=US")
        issuers.issuer(dn: "CN=Acme Identity CA, O=Acme Corp, C=US")
    }

    // Require specific certificate extensions
    policy.requiredExtensions { extensions in
        extensions.extension(oid: .extendedKeyUsage)
        extensions.extension(oid: .keyUsage)
    }

    // Minimum key strength
    policy.minimumKeySize = 2048

    // Required signature algorithms
    policy.allowedSignatureAlgorithms = Set([.es256, .es384, .rs256])

    // Revocation checking
    policy.revocationCheck = .requireValid
}

let trustValidator = TrustValidator(
    configuration: trustConfig,
    policy: policy
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Configuration

Configure trust validation via properties:

```properties
# Trust anchors
trust.anchors.path=/path/to/trust-anchors/
trust.anchors.include-system=true

# IACA trust for mDoc
trust.iaca.path=/path/to/iaca-certs/

# Trust lists
trust.lists.etsi.enabled=true
trust.lists.etsi.url=https://trust.example.com/tsl.xml
trust.lists.etsi.refresh-interval-hours=24

# Revocation checking
trust.revocation.enabled=true
trust.revocation.prefer-ocsp=true
trust.revocation.cache-duration-hours=1

# Policy
trust.policy.minimum-key-size=2048
trust.policy.minimum-trust-level=MEDIUM
```

## Next Steps

- [ETSI Trust Lists](./etsi-trust-lists) - Work with European trust service lists
- [Certificate Validation](./certificate-validation) - Detailed certificate chain validation

---

# Identifier Resolution

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Identifier Resolution

The IDK's identifier resolution system provides a unified way to resolve various cryptographic identifiers (DIDs, JWKs, X.509 certificates, key aliases) to their corresponding key material. This is essential for signature verification, encryption, and trust validation.

## Overview

When verifying signatures or establishing trust, you often receive identifiers rather than raw keys:

- A JWT with a `kid` (key ID) header
- A DID (Decentralized Identifier) like `did:web:example.com`
- An X.509 certificate chain
- A JWKS URL pointing to a key set

The identifier resolution system resolves these to usable key objects.

## Architecture

<img src="/img/diagrams/identifier-resolution-arch.svg" alt="Identifier Resolution Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Identifier Types

The IDK supports multiple identifier methods:

| Method | Description | Example |
|--------|-------------|---------|
| `DID` | Decentralized Identifier | `did:web:example.com` |
| `JWK` | JSON Web Key object | `{ "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256", ... }` |
| `X5C` | X.509 certificate chain | Base64-encoded certificates |
| `KID` | Key ID in KMS | `signing-key-001` |
| `KEY_ALIAS` | Key alias in KMS | `my-signing-key` |
| `JWKS_URL` | URL to JWKS endpoint | `https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json` |
| `OIDC_DISCOVERY` | OpenID Connect discovery | `https://example.com/.well-known/openid-configuration` |
| `OID4VCI_ISSUER` | OID4VCI credential issuer | `https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` |
| `ENTITY_ID` | OpenID Federation entity | `https://federation.example.com` |
| `CNF` | RFC 7800 Confirmation claim | `{ "kid": "did:key:...", "jwk": {...} }` |

## Managed vs External Identifiers

The system distinguishes between two categories:

### Managed Identifiers

Keys managed by your KMS (Key Management System):

```kotlin
// Resolve by key ID
val opts = ManagedIdentifierOpts(
    method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.KID,
    identifier = "signing-key-001",
    providerId = "azure-keyvault"
)

val result = identifierService.resolve(opts)
val keyInfo = result.getOrThrow().keyInfo
```

### External Identifiers

Keys from external sources (URLs, certificates, DIDs):

```kotlin
// Resolve from JWKS URL
val opts = ExternalIdentifierOpts(
    method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.JWKS_URL,
    identifier = "https://example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
    kid = "key-1"  // Select specific key from the set
)

val result = identifierService.resolve(opts)
val jwk = result.getOrThrow().jwk
```

## Usage Examples

### Resolve DID to Key

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="kotlin" label="Kotlin">

```kotlin
val identifierService: IIdentifierService = session.component.identifierService

// Resolve a did:web identifier
val result = identifierService.resolve(
    ExternalIdentifierOpts(
        method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.DID,
        identifier = "did:web:example.com",
        kid = "key-1"  // Optional: select specific key from DID document
    )
)

result.fold(
    success = { resolved ->
        val key = resolved.jwk
        println("Resolved key type: ${key?.kty}")
        println("Key ID: ${key?.kid}")
    },
    failure = { error ->
        println("Resolution failed: ${error.message}")
    }
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="swift" label="Swift">

```swift
let identifierService = session.component.identifierService

let result = try await identifierService.resolve(
    opts: ExternalIdentifierOpts(
        method: .DID,
        identifier: "did:web:example.com",
        kid: "key-1"
    )
)

if let resolved = result.value {
    print("Resolved key type: \(resolved.jwk?.kty ?? "unknown")")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Resolve X.509 Certificate Chain

```kotlin
// X.509 certificates as base64-encoded strings
val x5c = listOf(
    "MIIBkTCB+wIJAJ...",  // End-entity certificate
    "MIIBkTCB+wIJAK..."   // CA certificate
)

val result = identifierService.resolve(
    ExternalIdentifierOpts(
        method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.X5C,
        identifier = x5c
    )
)

val resolved = result.getOrThrow()
println("Subject: ${resolved.certificateInfo?.subjectDN}")
println("Issuer: ${resolved.certificateInfo?.issuerDN}")
```

### Resolve from OpenID Connect Discovery

```kotlin
// Resolve keys from OIDC provider
val result = identifierService.resolve(
    ExternalIdentifierOpts(
        method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.OIDC_DISCOVERY,
        identifier = "https://accounts.google.com/.well-known/openid-configuration",
        kid = "abc123"  // Select key by ID
    )
)
```

### Resolve from KMS

```kotlin
// Resolve a managed key by alias
val result = identifierService.resolve(
    ManagedIdentifierOpts(
        method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.KEY_ALIAS,
        identifier = "production-signing-key",
        providerId = "aws-kms"
    )
)

val keyInfo = result.getOrThrow().keyInfo
println("Provider: ${keyInfo?.providerId}")
println("Algorithm: ${keyInfo?.algorithm}")
```

## Context Information

Provide context to help resolution:

```kotlin
val context = IdentifierContext(
    issuer = "https://issuer.example.com",
    clientId = "my-client-id",
    clientIdScheme = "redirect_uri"
)

val opts = ExternalIdentifierOpts(
    method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.JWKS_URL,
    identifier = "https://example.com/jwks.json",
    context = context
)
```

## Checking Supported Methods

Query what identifier types a service supports:

```kotlin
val identifierService: IIdentifierService = session.component.identifierService

// List all supported methods
val methods = identifierService.supportedIdentifierMethods
println("Supported: ${methods.map { it.methodName }}")

// Check if specific identifier is supported
val isSupported = identifierService.isSupportedIdentifier("did:web:example.com")

// Check if method is supported
val methodSupported = identifierService.isSupportedIdentifierMethod(
    IdentifierMethodDefaults.DID
)
```

## Resolution Order

When multiple resolvers can handle an identifier, they are tried in priority order:

| Priority | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `HIGH` (100) | Preferred resolvers |
| `MEDIUM` (500) | Default priority |
| `LOW` (1000) | Fallback resolvers |

Custom resolvers can specify their order:

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@ContributesBinding(SessionScope::class, IExternalIdentifierService::class, multibinding = true)
class MyCustomResolver : ExternalIdentifierServiceAdapter() {

    override val order: Int = Order.HIGH.orderValue  // Run before default resolvers

    override val supportedIdentifierMethods = listOf(
        IdentifierMethodDefaults.DID
    )

    override suspend fun doResolve(
        opts: ExternalIdentifierOptsOrResult
    ): IdkResult<ExternalIdentifierOptsOrResult, IdkErrorType> {
        // Custom resolution logic
    }
}
```

## Caching

Resolution results can be cached to avoid repeated network requests:

```kotlin
val opts = ExternalIdentifierOpts(
    method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.JWKS_URL,
    identifier = "https://example.com/jwks.json",
    noCache = false  // Use cached result if available (default)
)

// Force fresh resolution
val freshOpts = opts.copy(noCache = true)
```

## Integration with JWS Verification

The identifier resolution system integrates with JWS verification:

```kotlin
val verifyJwsCommand: VerifyJwsCommand = session.component.verifyJwsCommand

// The command automatically resolves the key from the JWT header
val result = verifyJwsCommand.execute(
    VerifyJwsArgs(
        jws = signedJwt,
        // Resolution happens automatically based on 'kid', 'jwk', 'x5c' headers
        identifierOpts = ExternalIdentifierOpts(
            method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.JWKS_URL,
            identifier = "https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json"
        )
    ),
    sessionContext
)
```

## CNF (Confirmation) Claims

The IDK supports [RFC 7800](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7800) Confirmation claims for holder binding in SD-JWT and other proof-of-possession scenarios.

### CNF Structure

A CNF claim can contain any combination of:

| Property | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `jwk` | Public key as JWK (most common) |
| `kid` | Key identifier - can be a DID or opaque string |
| `jku` | JWK Set URL from which to fetch keys |

### Resolution Rules

The CNF resolver follows strict priority rules:

<img src="/img/diagrams/cnf-resolution.svg" alt="CNF Resolution Priority" style={{maxWidth: '650px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

**Key rule**: A `kid` that is not a DID cannot be resolved on its own. It must be accompanied by a `jwk` or `jku` that provides the actual key material.

### Creating CNF Claims

Use the `CnfBuilder` DSL to create CNF claims:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.cnf
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.cnfFromDid
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.cnfFromJwk

// Simple CNF with just a JWK
val simpleCnf = cnf {
    jwk(holderPublicKey)
}

// DID-based CNF (recommended for interoperability)
val didCnf = cnf {
    kid("did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK#z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK")
    jwk(holderPublicKey)  // Include for backwards compatibility
}

// Convenience function for DID-based CNF
val didCnf2 = cnfFromDid(
    verificationMethodId = "did:key:z6Mk...#z6Mk...",
    publicKey = holderPublicKey
)

// JWK Set URL reference
val jkuCnf = cnf {
    jku("https://holder.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json")
    kid("key-1")  // Select specific key from the set
}
```

### CNF Validation Rules

When building a CNF claim, the following rules are enforced:

1. At least one of `kid`, `jwk`, or `jku` must be present
2. If only `kid` is provided (no `jwk` or `jku`), it **must** be a DID
3. Non-DID `kid` values can only be used alongside `jwk` or `jku`

```kotlin
// Valid: DID-only kid (can be resolved)
val valid1 = cnf { kid("did:key:z6Mk...") }

// Valid: non-DID kid with jwk
val valid2 = cnf {
    kid("key-1")
    jwk(publicKey)
}

// INVALID: non-DID kid alone (throws IllegalArgumentException)
val invalid = cnf { kid("key-1") }  // Error!
```

### Resolving CNF Claims

```kotlin
val identifierService: IIdentifierService = session.component.identifierService

// Resolve a CNF claim
val result = identifierService.resolve(
    ExternalIdentifierCnfOpts(
        identifier = mapOf(
            "kid" to "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK",
            "jwk" to jwkMap
        ),
        kid = "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK",
        jwk = holderJwk
    )
)

result.fold(
    success = { cnfResult: ExternalIdentifierResult.Cnf ->
        val holderKey = cnfResult.keyInfo.key
        val resolvedFrom = cnfResult.resolvedFrom  // DID, JWK, or JKU
        println("Key resolved from: $resolvedFrom")
    },
    failure = { error ->
        println("CNF resolution failed: ${error.message}")
    }
)
```

### CNF Resolution Sources

The result indicates how the key was resolved:

| Source | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `CnfResolutionSource.JWK` | Key obtained from `cnf.jwk` directly |
| `CnfResolutionSource.DID` | Key obtained by resolving DID from `cnf.kid` |
| `CnfResolutionSource.JKU` | Key obtained by fetching JWK Set from `cnf.jku` |

### SD-JWT Holder Binding

CNF claims are primarily used for holder binding in SD-JWT:

```kotlin
// When issuing an SD-JWT with holder binding
val sdJwtPayload = sdJwtPayload {
    iss("https://issuer.example.com")
    sub("user123")
    cnf {
        kid("did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK#key-1")
        jwk(holderPublicKey)
    }
    // ... other claims
}

// When verifying, the CNF is automatically resolved
val verifyResult = verifySdJwtCommand.execute(
    VerifySdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt = sdJwtPresentation,
        issuerIdentifier = ExternalIdentifierOpts(
            method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.DID,
            identifier = issuerDid
        )
        // Holder binding verification uses the CNF claim automatically
    ),
    sessionContext
)
```

## Available Resolvers

| Resolver | Identifier Types | Description |
|----------|-----------------|-------------|
| `JwkExternalIdentifierResolutionService` | JWK | Resolves inline JWK objects |
| `JwksUrlExternalIdentifierResolutionService` | JWKS_URL | Fetches keys from JWKS endpoints |
| `X5cExternalIdentifierResolutionService` | X5C | Parses X.509 certificate chains |
| `KeyInfoIdentifierResolutionService` | KID, KEY_ALIAS | Resolves from KMS providers |
| `CnfExternalIdentifierResolutionService` | CNF | Resolves RFC 7800 confirmation claims |
| `ETSITrustListIdentifierResolutionService` | ENTITY_ID | Resolves from ETSI trust lists |

## Dependencies

```kotlin
dependencies {
    // Core crypto with resolution
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-crypto-core:0.13.0")

    // For trust list resolution
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-trust-etsi:0.13.0")
}
```

## Next Steps

- [Key Management](./key-management) - Managing keys in KMS providers
- [Signing & Verification](./signing-verification) - Using resolved keys
- [Trust Validation](../trust/overview) - Validating certificate chains

---

# OID4VP Overview

# OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OID4VP)

OpenID for Verifiable Presentations (OID4VP) is an OpenID Foundation standard that enables verifiable credential verification. It allows Relying Parties (verifiers) to request and verify cryptographically-signed credentials from digital wallets.

## Architecture Overview

<img src="/img/diagrams/oid4vp-universal-architecture.svg" alt="Universal OID4VP Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '750px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## What is OID4VP?

OID4VP extends OAuth 2.0 to support verification of Verifiable Credentials. Unlike traditional authentication where an Identity Provider vouches for user identity, OID4VP enables wallets to present cryptographically verifiable credentials directly to Relying Parties.

**Key characteristics:**

- **Credential Format Agnostic** - Supports SD-JWT VC, mDoc (ISO 18013-5), W3C VCDM, and other formats
- **Privacy Preserving** - Users control which claims to disclose via selective disclosure
- **Decentralized** - No central authority required during verification
- **Interoperable** - Based on open standards from OpenID Foundation

## Universal OID4VP API

The **Universal OID4VP API** is a simplified REST interface that abstracts the complexity of the OID4VP specification. It provides just three endpoints that external systems (websites, CMS plugins, native apps) can use to verify credentials.

| Endpoint | Method | Purpose |
|----------|--------|---------|
| `/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests` | POST | Create an authorization request session |
| `/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/{id}` | GET | Check session status and retrieve verified data |
| `/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/{id}` | DELETE | Clean up a completed or abandoned session |

This design enables:

- **CMS Integration** - WordPress, Drupal, Shopify plugins with a single integration
- **Wallet Interoperability** - Works with any OID4VP-compliant wallet
- **Vendor Neutrality** - Swap backend implementations without code changes

## Pre-configured Queries

The Universal OID4VP API uses **pre-configured credential queries** that are set up in the verifier backend. This approach:

- **Simplifies integration** - Just reference a `query_id`, no need to understand query syntax
- **Centralizes policy** - Credential requirements are managed by administrators
- **Improves security** - Prevents arbitrary credential requests from external systems

Your administrator will provide the available `query_id` values for your use case (e.g., `age_verification`, `identity_check`, `license_verification`).

## Verification Flow

<img src="/img/diagrams/oid4vp-verification-flow.svg" alt="OID4VP Verification Flow" style={{maxWidth: '800px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The typical verification flow:

1. **Create Request** - Your backend calls `POST /auth/requests` with a `query_id`
2. **Display QR Code** - Show the returned QR code to the user
3. **Wallet Scans** - User scans QR with their wallet app
4. **Fetch Request** - Wallet retrieves the full authorization request via `request_uri`
5. **Present Credentials** - Wallet submits selected credentials via `direct_post`
6. **Get Results** - Your backend polls status and retrieves verified claims

## Supported Credential Formats

| Format | Identifier | Description |
|--------|------------|-------------|
| SD-JWT VC | `dc+sd-jwt` | Selective Disclosure JWT Verifiable Credentials |
| mDoc | `mso_mdoc` | ISO 18013-5 Mobile Driving License format |
| JWT VC | `jwt_vc_json` | W3C JWT-encoded Verifiable Credentials |
| LDP VC | `ldp_vc` | W3C Linked Data Proof Verifiable Credentials |

## Security Features

The implementation includes several security mechanisms:

- **JAR (JWT-secured Authorization Request)** - Requests are signed per RFC 9101
- **Holder Binding Verification** - Proves the presenter controls the credential
- **Response Code Protection** - Single-use codes prevent replay attacks
- **JARM Support** - Encrypted authorization responses for sensitive data

## Module Structure

The OID4VP implementation is split across IDK and EDK:

| Layer | Location | Description |
|-------|----------|-------------|
| Core Verifier | IDK | `idk/lib/openid/oid4vp/verifier` - Core verification logic |
| Query Language | IDK | `idk/lib/openid/oid4vp/dcql` - Query language implementation |
| Universal API | IDK | `idk/lib/openid/oid4vp/universal` - REST API layer |
| Holder | IDK | `idk/lib/openid/oid4vp/holder` - Wallet-side implementation |

## Next Steps

- **[Integration Guide](./integration)** - Step-by-step integration tutorial
- **[OID4VP Verifier REST API](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/oid4vp-verifier)** - Full OpenAPI documentation

## References

- [OpenID for Verifiable Presentations 1.0](https://openid.net/specs/openid-4-verifiable-presentations-1_0.html)

---

# OpenID4VCI Overview

# OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance (OpenID4VCI)

The IDK implements the OpenID4VCI issuer: metadata, credential offers, wallet-facing protocol handlers for `/credential`, `/credential_deferred`, `/nonce`, `/notification`, the DI graph wiring, and in-memory stores for a self-contained issuer. The protocol primitives and basic handler extension points remain in the [IDK OpenID4VCI issuer guide](/idk/guides/oid4vci/issuer).

The EDK adds the enterprise issuance runtime around that protocol. The issuer gets claim values through a connector-native `PipelineConfiguration`: automatic integration is expressed as `ConnectorInvocationBinding` records bound to named OID4VCI lifecycle stages. A binding can enrich fields, export selected data, write evidence to a vault, send notifications, or orchestrate a connector route. The session has an encrypted attribute bag and connector-field map; the pipeline contract is connector invocation bindings, not a parallel source model.

## The Mental Model

An EDK issuance is an `IssuancePipelineSession`. The session carries:

- an attribute bag: resolved fields that can become credential claims,
- connector fields: correlation and integration inputs such as `email`, `employee_id`, `identity_id`, AS claims, or callback handles,
- protocol status: where the session is in issuance, deferral, approval, and completion.

The session passes through OID4VCI phases. Connector invocations can run before or during offer creation, authorization, pre-authorized issuance, token exchange, credential request, pre-issue, deferred polling, post-issuance, and notification receipt. Each invocation sees the accumulated fields and can add fields for later phases.

When the wallet calls `/credential`, the EDK runs the credential-request and pre-issue connector phases, assembles claims from the bag, and hands the result to the IDK protocol handler to sign. If required data is not available synchronously, the wallet can receive a deferred response; later connector or callback work can complete the session before `/credential_deferred` returns the credential.

## What the EDK Adds

**A registered `PipelineConfiguration` per issuance flow.** It declares `invocationBindings`, credential bindings, and expected initial connector fields. See [Attribute Pipeline](./attribute-pipeline).

**Connector invocation bindings.** A binding connects an OID4VCI stage to a connector route, connector instance, or operation binding. It carries role, exchange mode, subset mapping, execution policy, logical context, governance metadata, Party anchors, and materialization policy. See [Connector Invocations](./connector-invocations).

**Pipeline session management endpoints.** The EDK adds REST endpoints under `/oid4vci/sessions/...` for creating sessions, manually contributing attributes, evaluating completeness, approving issuance, failing an integration, and reading accumulated state. These endpoints are operator/backend surfaces; the wallet-facing OID4VCI endpoints remain protocol endpoints. See [REST API](./rest-api).

**Manual contribution surfaces.** `POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/attributes` and `POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/credential/offers` can push data into the session using compact groups. In those request bodies, `contributorId` is record provenance for manually supplied data. It is not the automatic integration contract; automatic runtime integration uses `PipelineConfiguration.invocationBindings`.

**Async and deferred execution.** Connector execution policies can be inline, optional, deferred async, or durable outbox. The EDK can hold `/credential` open for a configured sync window and fall through to deferred issuance when an integration cannot complete in time. Callback ingress is still secured by an opaque capability token scoped to one session and contribution.

**Deferral and approval gates.** Each credential binding carries deferral and approval policy. `AWAITING_DEFERRED` and `AWAITING_APPROVAL` are observable separately from the protocol-level deferred credential response.

**Encrypted session persistence.** Sessions carry sensitive data. The EDK provides plaintext mode for development, platform-encrypted mode under a tenant KEK, and client-bound mode tied to the session correlation id. See [Persistence](./persistence).

**Tenant-aware issuer paths.** Protocol endpoints can optionally be reached through a tenant slug path, while host-based tenant resolution continues to work.

## How a Developer Builds an Issuer

1. Define credential designs. The credential design system is the source of truth for credential configurations, claim policy, status lists, and display/render data.

2. Register connector invocation bindings for the stages where issuance needs integration. A typical employee credential pipeline might bind `OID4VCI_START` for audit, `OID4VCI_AUTHORIZATION` for authenticated-user context, `OID4VCI_TOKEN` to resolve an external identifier, `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST` to fetch the HR record, `OID4VCI_PRE_ISSUE` for final enrichment or policy state, and `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE` for vault retention.

3. Register the `PipelineConfiguration` with `invocationBindings`, credential bindings, and expected initial connector fields.

4. Let the IDK/EDK protocol handlers run the phases at the correct OID4VCI moments. You only call the pipeline REST API when backend code needs to seed, observe, approve, or manually contribute to a session.

You write code only when you need a new connector implementation, a custom route executor, or a custom claim mapper.

## Where Things Live

| Concern | Module |
|---------|--------|
| Issuer protocol service, DSL, handlers | `com.sphereon.idk:lib-openid-oid4vci-issuer-public` / `-impl` |
| Issuer REST endpoints | `com.sphereon.idk:services-oid4vci-issuer-rest` plus EDK tenant adapters |
| Pipeline session and command types | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-credential-issuance-pipeline-public` |
| Attribute bag and phase types | `com.sphereon.idk:lib-attribute-flow-public` |
| Connector invocation contracts | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-connector-public` |
| Pipeline command implementations and OID4VCI connector bridge | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-credential-issuance-pipeline-impl` |
| VDX durable connector registry, routes, grants, throttling, run lineage, and invocation binding REST/admin surface | `com.sphereon.vdx:vdx-data-store-connector-*` |
| Tenant-aware path adapter | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-openid-oid4vci-issuer-rest-tenant` |
| Service contracts | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-openid-oid4vci-issuer-contract` |
| Deployable container | `com.sphereon.edk:services-oid4vci-issuer` |

## Next Steps

- [Attribute Pipeline](./attribute-pipeline): phases, connector invocation bindings, session lifecycle, deferral, approval
- [Connector Invocations](./connector-invocations): binding connector routes into OID4VCI phases
- [REST API](./rest-api): pipeline session and callback endpoints
- [Persistence](./persistence): session store and encryption modes
- [IDK OpenID4VCI Issuer Guide](/idk/guides/oid4vci/issuer): protocol layer, metadata, offers, and handlers

---

# intro

import Tabs from "@theme/Tabs";
import TabItem from "@theme/TabItem";

Currently, the Mdoc SDK supports the following device engagement methods:

- QR
- NFC tag
- URI (reverse) engagement

and the retrieval (transfer) is done via:

- Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
- NFC (not recommended)
- ISO 18013-7 REST API
- ISO 18013-7 OID4VP protocol

## Quick outline of the below process

Given the engagement and transfer of mdocs can happen via multiple transports and transmission protocols, we will first give a quick summary. The process is defined in the ISO
18013-5 and 18013-7 specifications.

- You will first start the engagement process, typically either via a QR code or via NFC. The mdoc holder by default generates the QR code, so the recipient can scan it.
- The engagement manager is responsible for creating a new engagement instance. The instance returns all the information about the specific engagement
- At this point the engagement is not started yet. Meaning no connections are made yet. You will need to call `start()` on the engagement instance.
- One or more retrieval (transfer) methods will now be enabled. This allows the external Relying Party (mdoc reader) to connect to your device. Via BLE, NFC, or you connect via
HTTPS (reverse)
- The mdoc reader will connect via one of the supported methods. The other methods will be automatically closed by the mdoc holder device at this point as these apparently will
not be used. As soon as one of the methods is being used, the state will move to `CONNECTING`.
- The transfer connection is being setup until the `CONNECTED` state is reached.
- The Relying Party (mdoc reader) will send a session establishment message to the mdoc holder device. It contains a Device Request object
- The Device Request object's main responsibility is expressing which mdoc/mdoc document(s) the Relying Party would like to receive and which claims to receive.
- The mdoc holder device now will perform matching of the available mdocs against the requested document(s), typically including the user in this process to both validate and
approve the data transmission of the claims
- The mdoc holder device now will create a Device Response object, encrypt it into a SessionData object, and send it back to the Relying Party.
- The transfer session will be terminated successfully, and all connections will be closed.


### QR Engagement

QR engagement means you will generate and show a QR code to the remote party. This QR code contains information about the retrieval methods supported, like BLE and NFC. It also
contains a unique value used by the other party to set up the connection for the transfer/retrieval phase.

### NFC Engagement

NFC engagement means you will be able to tap your device to a remote mdoc reader device or terminal operated by the Relying Party. NFC engagement can either be started and enabled
on application startup, so it is always available, or it can be started on demand. Meaning it will only be enabled once the `init` method is being called with `nfc` as one of its
arguments.

### URI (reverse) Engagement

Reverse engagement is defined in ISO 18013-7 and basically means that the other side generates an mdoc URI, that you will use. So similar to the QR code being generated above
which in turn contains an mdoc URI, now you recieve a URI in the app from the reader. It contains the following information:

- URI starts with “mdoc://”
- Followed by the reader Engagement data encoded base64 url-without-padding

The SDK interprets the engagement data instead of generating the engagement data, hence why it is called reverse engagement. Typically this also involves ReaderEngagement
data being interpreted by the mdoc holder, instead of starting with DeviceEngagement data from the mdoc holder.

How the reverse engagement reaches the holder (mdoc) device is not really important. Could be a QR code, could even be a link via a website or e-mail. If it is not a QR code your
app should be able to handle the URI that starts with the `mdoc://` scheme. We provide limited information below. Please consult the respective platform documentation on how to
handle the actual URLs in your code. The idea is that you would call the engagement manager explained below using the `uri` option, once you receive a URL.

For instance for Android apps you would have to declare the intent filter in your app's manifest file (AndroidManifest.xml) for your MainActivity:

<!-- @formatter:off -->
<Tabs>
    <TabItem value="android" label="Android">
```xml
<intent-filter>
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW"/>
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE"/>
    <data android:scheme="mdoc" android:host="*"/>
</intent-filter>
```
    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="ios" label="iOS">
```xml
<key>CFBundleURLTypes</key>
<array>
    <dict>
        <key>CFBundleURLName</key>
        <string>com.yourcompany.yourapp</string>    <!-- You app identifier -->
        <key>CFBundleURLSchemes</key>
        <array>
            <string>mdoc</string>                     <!-- mdoc reverse engagement -->
        </array>
    </dict>
</array>
```
    </TabItem>
</Tabs>
<!-- @formatter:on -->

:::info
On android set `launchMode="singleTask"` for the activity.
:::


:::note
The above talks about the ISO 18013-7 reverse engagement using the scheme `mdoc://`. There is another protocol that is also supported, called OID4VP. That protocol uses a similar
scheme, called `mdoc-openid4vp://`. The above notes about intents and mobile platform support also applies for this scheme. If you want to support both, then both should be
configured properly for your app.
:::

---

# Device Request and Response

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Device Request and Response

The ISO 18013-5 protocol uses DeviceRequest and DeviceResponse structures to exchange credential data. This guide explains their structure and how to work with them in the IDK.

## DeviceRequest Structure

A DeviceRequest specifies what data the verifier is requesting:

```
DeviceRequest = {
    version: "1.0",
    docRequests: [DocRequest, ...]
}

DocRequest = {
    docType: "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL",
    itemsRequest: {
        nameSpaces: {
            "org.iso.18013.5.1": {
                "family_name": true,
                "given_name": true,
                ...
            }
        }
    },
    readerAuth: ReaderAuthentication (optional)
}
```

### Parsing Device Requests

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val deviceRequest: DeviceRequest = transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()

// Iterate over document requests
for (docRequest in deviceRequest.docRequests) {
    val docType = docRequest.docType  // e.g., "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"
    val itemsRequest = docRequest.itemsRequest

    // Iterate over namespaces
    for ((namespace, elements) in itemsRequest.nameSpaces) {
        // Iterate over requested elements
        for ((elementId, intentToRetain) in elements) {
            println("Requested: $docType / $namespace / $elementId")
            println("  Intent to retain: $intentToRetain")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let deviceRequest: DeviceRequest = try await transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()

// Iterate over document requests
for docRequest in deviceRequest.docRequests {
    let docType = docRequest.docType  // e.g., "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"
    let itemsRequest = docRequest.itemsRequest

    // Iterate over namespaces
    for (namespace, elements) in itemsRequest.nameSpaces {
        // Iterate over requested elements
        for (elementId, intentToRetain) in elements {
            print("Requested: \(docType) / \(namespace) / \(elementId)")
            print("  Intent to retain: \(intentToRetain)")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## DeviceResponse Structure

A DeviceResponse contains the requested data with cryptographic proofs:

```
DeviceResponse = {
    version: "1.0",
    documents: [Document, ...],
    status: 0
}

Document = {
    docType: "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL",
    issuerSigned: IssuerSigned,
    deviceSigned: DeviceSigned
}
```

### IssuerSigned Data

Data signed by the credential issuer, containing the Mobile Security Object (MSO) and namespace data:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val document = deviceResponse.documents?.first()
val issuerSigned: IssuerSigned = document?.issuerSigned!!

// Mobile Security Object
val mso: MobileSecurityObject = issuerSigned.MSO

// Device key info from MSO
val deviceKeyInfo: DeviceKeyInfoCbor = issuerSigned.deviceKeyInfo

// Get available namespaces
val namespaces: Set<NameSpace> = issuerSigned.getNameSpaces()

// Get signed items for a namespace
val items: List<IssuerSignedItem<Any>>? = issuerSigned.getIssuerSignedItems("org.iso.18013.5.1")

items?.forEach { item ->
    println("Element: ${item.elementIdentifier}")
    println("Value: ${item.elementValue}")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let document = deviceResponse.documents?.first
let issuerSigned: IssuerSigned = document?.issuerSigned!

// Mobile Security Object
let mso: MobileSecurityObject = issuerSigned.MSO

// Device key info from MSO
let deviceKeyInfo: DeviceKeyInfoCbor = issuerSigned.deviceKeyInfo

// Get available namespaces
let namespaces: Set<NameSpace> = issuerSigned.getNameSpaces()

// Get signed items for a namespace
let items: [IssuerSignedItem]? = issuerSigned.getIssuerSignedItems(ns: "org.iso.18013.5.1")

items?.forEach { item in
    print("Element: \(item.elementIdentifier)")
    print("Value: \(item.elementValue)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### DeviceSigned Data

Data signed by the holder's device during presentation:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val deviceSigned: DeviceSigned = document?.deviceSigned!!

// Device namespaces (additional device-provided data)
val deviceNameSpaces: DeviceNameSpaces = deviceSigned.nameSpaces

// Device authentication (COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Mac0)
val deviceAuth: DeviceAuth = deviceSigned.deviceAuth
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let deviceSigned: DeviceSigned = document?.deviceSigned!

// Device namespaces (additional device-provided data)
let deviceNameSpaces: DeviceNameSpaces = deviceSigned.nameSpaces

// Device authentication (COSE_Sign1 or COSE_Mac0)
let deviceAuth: DeviceAuth = deviceSigned.deviceAuth
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Selective Disclosure

The `limitDisclosures` method allows filtering which elements to include in a response:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val issuerSigned: IssuerSigned = document.issuerSigned

// Limit disclosures based on the request
val limitedIssuerSigned: IssuerSigned = issuerSigned.limitDisclosures(docRequest)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let issuerSigned: IssuerSigned = document.issuerSigned

// Limit disclosures based on the request
let limitedIssuerSigned: IssuerSigned = issuerSigned.limitDisclosures(docRequest: docRequest)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Common Data Elements

Standard mDL data elements in the `org.iso.18013.5.1` namespace:

| Element ID | Type | Description |
|------------|------|-------------|
| `family_name` | string | Family name |
| `given_name` | string | Given name(s) |
| `birth_date` | full-date | Date of birth |
| `issue_date` | full-date | Document issue date |
| `expiry_date` | full-date | Document expiry date |
| `issuing_country` | string | ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code |
| `issuing_authority` | string | Issuing authority name |
| `document_number` | string | License number |
| `portrait` | bytes | Photo of holder (JPEG) |
| `driving_privileges` | array | License categories |
| `un_distinguishing_sign` | string | UN country sign |
| `sex` | integer | ISO/IEC 5218 code |
| `height` | integer | Height in cm |
| `weight` | integer | Weight in kg |
| `eye_colour` | string | Eye color |
| `hair_colour` | string | Hair color |
| `resident_address` | string | Address |
| `age_over_18` | boolean | Age attestation |
| `age_over_21` | boolean | Age attestation |
| `nationality` | string | Nationality |

## Response Status Codes

DeviceResponse status codes:

| Code | Meaning | Description |
|------|---------|-------------|
| 0 | OK | Request processed successfully |
| 10 | General error | Unspecified error |
| 11 | CBOR decoding error | Invalid CBOR in request |
| 20 | User cancelled | User declined to share |

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val response = deviceResponse

when (response.status?.value?.toInt()) {
    0 -> {
        // Success - process documents
        val documents = response.documents
        processDocuments(documents)
    }
    10 -> {
        // General error
        handleError("General error from holder")
    }
    20 -> {
        // User cancelled
        handleCancellation()
    }
    else -> {
        handleError("Unknown status: ${response.status}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let response = deviceResponse

switch response.status?.value {
case 0:
    // Success - process documents
    let documents = response.documents
    processDocuments(documents: documents)
case 10:
    // General error
    handleError(message: "General error from holder")
case 20:
    // User cancelled
    handleCancellation()
default:
    handleError(message: "Unknown status: \(response.status)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Building Requests (Verifier Side)

When building a DeviceRequest as a verifier:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Build items request for mDL
val itemsRequest = ItemsRequest(
    nameSpaces = mapOf(
        "org.iso.18013.5.1" to mapOf(
            "family_name" to false,
            "given_name" to false,
            "birth_date" to false,
            "portrait" to false,
            "age_over_18" to false
        )
    )
)

// Build doc request
val docRequest = DocRequest(
    docType = "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL",
    itemsRequest = itemsRequest,
    readerAuth = null  // Optional reader authentication
)

// Build device request
val deviceRequest = DeviceRequest(
    version = "1.0",
    docRequests = listOf(docRequest)
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Build items request for mDL
let itemsRequest = ItemsRequest(
    nameSpaces: [
        "org.iso.18013.5.1": [
            "family_name": false,
            "given_name": false,
            "birth_date": false,
            "portrait": false,
            "age_over_18": false
        ]
    ]
)

// Build doc request
let docRequest = DocRequest(
    docType: "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL",
    itemsRequest: itemsRequest,
    readerAuth: nil  // Optional reader authentication
)

// Build device request
let deviceRequest = DeviceRequest(
    version: "1.0",
    docRequests: [docRequest]
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Intent to Retain

The `intentToRetain` boolean in the request indicates whether the verifier intends to store the data element:

- `false` - Verifier will not retain the data (e.g., for one-time verification)
- `true` - Verifier may store the data (e.g., for records)

Holders may choose to decline sharing elements where `intentToRetain` is `true`.

---

# Session Transcript

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Session Transcript

The session transcript is a cryptographic binding that ties each mDoc presentation to a specific session, preventing replay attacks and ensuring data authenticity.

## Purpose

The session transcript serves critical security functions:

1. **Replay prevention**: A response signed in one session cannot be used in another
2. **Session binding**: Ensures the device response was created for this specific interaction
3. **Integrity verification**: Both parties can verify they're in the same session

## Transcript Structure

The session transcript is computed from engagement data per ISO 18013-5:

```
SessionTranscript = [
    DeviceEngagementBytes,     // CBOR-encoded device engagement
    EReaderKeyBytes,           // Reader's ephemeral public key (if applicable)
    Handover                   // Additional handover data (QR/NFC/OID4VP specific)
]
```

## How It Works

### During Engagement

1. The holder creates a device engagement with an ephemeral key
2. The verifier receives the engagement and generates its own ephemeral key
3. Both parties compute the session transcript from the same inputs

### During Response Signing

The holder signs the device response with a signature that covers:

```
DeviceAuthentication = [
    "DeviceAuthentication",    // Context string
    SessionTranscript,         // The computed transcript
    DocType,                   // Document type being presented
    DeviceNameSpaceBytes       // Additional device-signed data (if any)
]
```

### During Verification

The verifier computes the same transcript and verifies that:

1. The device signature is valid
2. The signature was computed over the correct transcript
3. The transcript matches the verifier's view of the session

## Handover Types

Different engagement methods produce different handover data:

### QR Code Handover

For QR-based engagement, the handover contains the device engagement bytes:

```
QRHandover = DeviceEngagementBytes
```

### NFC Handover

For NFC-based engagement, the handover includes NFC-specific messages:

```
NFCHandover = [
    HandoverSelectMessage,     // NDEF handover select
    HandoverRequestMessage     // NDEF handover request (if any)
]
```

### OID4VP Handover

For OpenID4VP integration, the handover binds to the OAuth flow:

```
OID4VPHandover = [
    ClientIdHash,              // Hash of client_id
    ResponseUriHash,           // Hash of response_uri
    Nonce                      // Presentation nonce
]
```

## Accessing Transcript Data

The session transcript is managed internally by the IDK. When needed, you can access engagement-level information:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val engagement = engagementManager.activeEngagement.value

// Get device engagement
val deviceEngagement: CborEncodedItem<DeviceEngagement> = engagement!!.getDeviceEngagement()

// Get ephemeral key
val ephemeralKey: CoseKeyType = engagement.getEphemeralKey()
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let engagement = engagementManager.activeEngagement.value

// Get device engagement
let deviceEngagement = try await engagement!.getDeviceEngagement()

// Get ephemeral key
let ephemeralKey = try await engagement!.getEphemeralKey()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Security Considerations

### Ephemeral Keys

Each session uses fresh ephemeral keys. This ensures that even if an attacker captures a valid response, they cannot replay it in a new session because the ephemeral keys will be different.

### Handover Binding

The handover data binds the transcript to the specific engagement method used. A response created for a QR engagement cannot be used in an NFC session.

### Reader Key Inclusion

When the reader provides an ephemeral key (for mutual encryption), it's included in the transcript. This prevents man-in-the-middle attacks where an attacker might try to intercept and relay sessions.

## Debugging Session Issues

When session verification fails, common causes include:

| Issue | Cause | Solution |
|-------|-------|----------|
| Transcript mismatch | Different engagement bytes | Ensure both parties use identical device engagement |
| Missing reader key | Key not included in transcript | Verify reader key is provided when expected |
| Wrong handover type | Handover doesn't match engagement | Use correct handover for the engagement method |
| Encoding differences | Non-deterministic CBOR | Ensure deterministic CBOR encoding |

## Best Practices

When working with mDoc sessions:

- **Use fresh ephemeral keys**: Never reuse ephemeral keys across sessions
- **Let the IDK manage transcripts**: The IDK handles transcript computation internally
- **Validate before processing**: A transcript mismatch indicates a potential security issue
- **Log security events**: Track transcript mismatches for security monitoring

---

# Party Data Models

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Party Data Models

The IDK provides data models for representing parties, identities, tenants, and correlation identifiers. These models form the foundation for managing entities in credential ecosystems.

## Overview

The party module follows an "everything is a party" pattern where:

- **Parties** are the central entity representing any actor (person, organization, service)
- **Identities** represent how a party presents itself in the credential ecosystem (issuer, verifier, holder)
- **Tenants** provide organizational isolation
- **Correlation Identifiers** link external identifiers (DIDs, X.509, email) to identities

## Core Data Models

### Party

A party represents any entity in the system:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.data.store.party.model.*

data class Party(
    val partyId: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val partyType: PartyType,
    val origin: PartyOrigin,
    val displayName: String,
    val uri: String?,
    val ownerId: String?,
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant,
    val deletedAt: Instant?
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonDataStore

struct Party {
    let partyId: String
    let tenantId: String
    let partyType: PartyType
    let origin: PartyOrigin
    let displayName: String
    let uri: String?
    let ownerId: String?
    let createdAt: Date
    let updatedAt: Date
    let deletedAt: Date?
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Party Types

Party types are extensible value classes:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Built-in party types
val naturalPerson = PartyType.NATURAL_PERSON  // A human individual
val organization = PartyType.ORGANIZATION    // Company, institution, legal entity

// Custom party types
val customType = PartyType("SERVICE")
val deviceType = PartyType("DEVICE")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Built-in party types
let naturalPerson = PartyType.naturalPerson  // A human individual
let organization = PartyType.organization    // Company, institution, legal entity

// Custom party types
let customType = PartyType(value: "SERVICE")
let deviceType = PartyType(value: "DEVICE")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Party Origin

Indicates how the party was created:

| Origin | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `EXTERNAL` | Synced from outside source (IdP, external system, import, auto-discovery) |
| `MANAGED` | Created and managed natively within the system |

### Identity

An identity represents a role that a party plays in the credential ecosystem:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
data class Identity(
    val identityId: String,
    val partyId: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val identityRole: IdentityRole,
    val isDefault: Boolean,
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant,
    val deletedAt: Instant?
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
struct Identity {
    let identityId: String
    let partyId: String
    let tenantId: String
    let identityRole: IdentityRole
    let isDefault: Bool
    let createdAt: Date
    let updatedAt: Date
    let deletedAt: Date?
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Identity Roles

Identity roles define how an identity participates in credential flows:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Built-in identity roles
val issuer = IdentityRole.ISSUER     // Issues credentials (OID4VCI)
val verifier = IdentityRole.VERIFIER // Requests/verifies credentials (OID4VP)
val holder = IdentityRole.HOLDER     // Holds and presents credentials

// Custom roles
val registrar = IdentityRole("REGISTRAR")
val trustAnchor = IdentityRole("TRUST_ANCHOR")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Built-in identity roles
let issuer = IdentityRole.issuer     // Issues credentials (OID4VCI)
let verifier = IdentityRole.verifier // Requests/verifies credentials (OID4VP)
let holder = IdentityRole.holder     // Holds and presents credentials

// Custom roles
let registrar = IdentityRole(value: "REGISTRAR")
let trustAnchor = IdentityRole(value: "TRUST_ANCHOR")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Tenant

A tenant provides organizational isolation:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
data class Tenant(
    val tenantId: String,
    val tenantType: TenantType,
    val name: String,
    val description: String?,
    val ownerPartyId: String?,
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant,
    val deletedAt: Instant?
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
struct Tenant {
    let tenantId: String
    let tenantType: TenantType
    let name: String
    let description: String?
    let ownerPartyId: String?
    let createdAt: Date
    let updatedAt: Date
    let deletedAt: Date?
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Tenant Types

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Built-in tenant types
val orgTenant = TenantType.ORGANIZATION
val personTenant = TenantType.NATURAL_PERSON

// Custom types
val departmentTenant = TenantType("DEPARTMENT")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Built-in tenant types
let orgTenant = TenantType.organization
let personTenant = TenantType.naturalPerson

// Custom types
let departmentTenant = TenantType(value: "DEPARTMENT")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Correlation Identifier

Links external identifiers to identities:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
data class CorrelationIdentifier(
    val correlationId: String,
    val identityId: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val identifierType: IdentifierType,
    val value: String,
    val isPrimary: Boolean,
    val isVerified: Boolean,
    val validFrom: Instant?,
    val validUntil: Instant?,
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant,
    val deletedAt: Instant?
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
struct CorrelationIdentifier {
    let correlationId: String
    let identityId: String
    let tenantId: String
    let identifierType: IdentifierType
    let value: String
    let isPrimary: Bool
    let isVerified: Bool
    let validFrom: Date?
    let validUntil: Date?
    let createdAt: Date
    let updatedAt: Date
    let deletedAt: Date?
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Identifier Types

Types of external identifiers that can be correlated:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Built-in identifier types
val didIdentifier = IdentifierType.DID    // W3C Decentralized Identifier
val x509Identifier = IdentifierType.X509  // X.509 Certificate

// Custom identifier types
val vatNumber = IdentifierType("VAT")
val leiCode = IdentifierType("LEI")
val emailIdentifier = IdentifierType("EMAIL")
val phoneIdentifier = IdentifierType("PHONE")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Built-in identifier types
let didIdentifier = IdentifierType.did    // W3C Decentralized Identifier
let x509Identifier = IdentifierType.x509  // X.509 Certificate

// Custom identifier types
let vatNumber = IdentifierType(value: "VAT")
let leiCode = IdentifierType(value: "LEI")
let emailIdentifier = IdentifierType(value: "EMAIL")
let phoneIdentifier = IdentifierType(value: "PHONE")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Lookup Flow

The correlation identifier enables flexible lookup:

```
External Identifier Value
        ↓
Correlation Identifier (matches type + value)
        ↓
Identity (role in credential ecosystem)
        ↓
Party (the actual entity)
```

For example, to find who issued a credential:
1. Extract the issuer DID from the credential
2. Look up the correlation identifier with type=DID and value=the DID
3. Get the identity from the correlation identifier
4. Get the party from the identity

## Query Filters

### PartyFilter

Filter parties when querying:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Filter by type
val filter = PartyFilter.byType(PartyType.ORGANIZATION)

// Filter by multiple types
val multiFilter = PartyFilter.byTypes(
    setOf(PartyType.ORGANIZATION, PartyType.NATURAL_PERSON)
)

// Filter by origin
val externalFilter = PartyFilter.byOrigin(PartyOrigin.EXTERNAL)

// Filter by display name (partial match)
val nameFilter = PartyFilter.byDisplayName("Acme")

// Filter by owner
val ownedFilter = PartyFilter.byOwner("owner-party-id")

// Filter for root parties (no owner)
val rootFilter = PartyFilter.rootParties()

// Filter by creation date
val recentFilter = PartyFilter.createdBetween(
    from = Instant.now().minus(Duration.ofDays(7)),
    to = Instant.now()
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Filter by type
let filter = PartyFilter.byType(type: .organization)

// Filter by multiple types
let multiFilter = PartyFilter.byTypes(types: [.organization, .naturalPerson])

// Filter by origin
let externalFilter = PartyFilter.byOrigin(origin: .external)

// Filter by display name (partial match)
let nameFilter = PartyFilter.byDisplayName(name: "Acme")

// Filter by owner
let ownedFilter = PartyFilter.byOwner(ownerId: "owner-party-id")

// Filter for root parties (no owner)
let rootFilter = PartyFilter.rootParties()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Fetch Options

Control which related data to include when fetching parties:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Minimal - party only
val minimal = PartyFetchOptions.MINIMAL

// Include owner party
val withOwner = PartyFetchOptions.WITH_OWNER

// Include identities
val withIdentities = PartyFetchOptions.WITH_IDENTITIES

// Include identities with their correlation identifiers
val withFullIdentities = PartyFetchOptions.WITH_FULL_IDENTITIES

// Everything
val full = PartyFetchOptions.FULL

// Custom options
val custom = PartyFetchOptions(
    includeOwner = true,
    includeIdentities = true,
    identityOptions = IdentityFetchOptions(
        includeCorrelationIdentifiers = true
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Minimal - party only
let minimal = PartyFetchOptions.minimal

// Include owner party
let withOwner = PartyFetchOptions.withOwner

// Include identities
let withIdentities = PartyFetchOptions.withIdentities

// Include identities with their correlation identifiers
let withFullIdentities = PartyFetchOptions.withFullIdentities

// Everything
let full = PartyFetchOptions.full
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Input Models

### Creating Parties

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val createInput = PartyCreateInput(
    partyType = PartyType.ORGANIZATION,
    origin = PartyOrigin.MANAGED,
    displayName = "Acme Corporation",
    uri = "https://acme.example.com",
    ownerId = null  // Root party
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let createInput = PartyCreateInput(
    partyType: .organization,
    origin: .managed,
    displayName: "Acme Corporation",
    uri: "https://acme.example.com",
    ownerId: nil  // Root party
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Updating Parties

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val updateInput = PartyUpdateInput(
    displayName = "Acme Corp (Updated)",
    uri = "https://new.acme.example.com",
    ownerId = "new-owner-id"
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let updateInput = PartyUpdateInput(
    displayName: "Acme Corp (Updated)",
    uri: "https://new.acme.example.com",
    ownerId: "new-owner-id"
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Result Models

Query operations return result models with associated data:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
data class PartyResult(
    val party: Party,
    val owner: Party?,
    val identities: List<IdentityResult>?
)

data class IdentityResult(
    val identity: Identity,
    val correlationIdentifiers: List<CorrelationIdentifier>?
)

data class TenantResult(
    val tenant: Tenant,
    val ownerParty: Party?
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
struct PartyResult {
    let party: Party
    let owner: Party?
    let identities: [IdentityResult]?
}

struct IdentityResult {
    let identity: Identity
    let correlationIdentifiers: [CorrelationIdentifier]?
}

struct TenantResult {
    let tenant: Tenant
    let ownerParty: Party?
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Entity Relationships

<img src="/img/diagrams/party-entity-relationships.svg" alt="Party Entity Relationships" style={{maxWidth: '500px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Use Cases

### Representing an Issuer

```kotlin
// Party for the issuing organization
val issuerParty = Party(
    partyId = "party-gov-dmv",
    tenantId = "tenant-123",
    partyType = PartyType.ORGANIZATION,
    origin = PartyOrigin.EXTERNAL,
    displayName = "Department of Motor Vehicles",
    uri = "https://dmv.gov.example.com",
    // ...
)

// Identity for their issuer role
val issuerIdentity = Identity(
    identityId = "identity-dmv-issuer",
    partyId = "party-gov-dmv",
    tenantId = "tenant-123",
    identityRole = IdentityRole.ISSUER,
    isDefault = true,
    // ...
)

// Correlation identifier for their DID
val issuerDid = CorrelationIdentifier(
    correlationId = "corr-dmv-did",
    identityId = "identity-dmv-issuer",
    tenantId = "tenant-123",
    identifierType = IdentifierType.DID,
    value = "did:web:dmv.gov.example.com",
    isPrimary = true,
    isVerified = true,
    // ...
)
```

### Representing a Wallet User

```kotlin
// Party for the user
val userParty = Party(
    partyId = "party-user-alice",
    tenantId = "tenant-123",
    partyType = PartyType.NATURAL_PERSON,
    origin = PartyOrigin.MANAGED,
    displayName = "Alice",
    // ...
)

// Identity for their holder role
val holderIdentity = Identity(
    identityId = "identity-alice-holder",
    partyId = "party-user-alice",
    tenantId = "tenant-123",
    identityRole = IdentityRole.HOLDER,
    isDefault = true,
    // ...
)
```

---

# Injection Scopes

This document explains the three dependency injection (DI) scopes used across the Identity Development Kit (IDK) core libraries and the solutions that build on top of the SDK:

- App Scope
- Context Scope
- Session Scope

These scopes are implemented using Kotlin Inject + Anvil-style scoping. You will see types such as `AppScope`, `UserContextScope`, and `SessionScope` in the codebase.

## Scope hierarchy and access rules

The scopes form a strict parent→child hierarchy:

- App Scope (root, longest-lived)
- Context Scope (per-tenant/principal)
- Session Scope (per-session)

Access rules:

- App Scope cannot access instances from Context or Session scopes. There is no “reach down” into child scopes.
- Context Scope can access App Scope.
- Session Scope can access both Context Scope and App Scope.

This arrangement lets shorter‑lived work reuse longer‑lived services while preserving isolation toward the bottom of the hierarchy.

## App Scope

- Lifetime: Application lifetime (process or app lifecycle).
- Purpose: Hosts global, cross-tenant services and singletons.
- Access: Has no access to Context or Session scoped objects (by design). Lower scopes may depend on App-scoped services.
- Notes: Often represented via `AppScope` (from `software.amazon.lastmile.kotlin.inject.anvil.AppScope`).

## User context Scope

- Type: `UserContextScope`
- Lifetime: Created early in the request/user flow and tied to a specific tenant and principal combination.
- Purpose: Holds tenant- and principal-aware services that should be isolated per (tenant, principal).
- Typical creation points:
- Backend: Early request interception (e.g., middleware/interceptor) before passing control to session logic.
- Frontend/mobile: During or immediately after authentication.
- Annotations: Use `@SingleIn(UserContextScope::class)` for bindings that must be singletons within a given context.
- Access: Can access App Scope; cannot reach down into Session Scope.

About tenant and principal:

- “Tenant” and “principal” are generic concepts in the IDK. We provide some interfaces and example implementations, but your application/back end/front end defines how to determine the current tenant and principal.
- The context scope is where these values are bound for the lifetime of that context.

Isolation:

- Objects in a context scope are contained to that scope instance. They cannot observe or mutate state in other tenants/principals.

## Session Scope

- Type: `SessionScope`
- Lifetime: Shortest-lived; created beneath a specific Context Scope.
- Purpose: Encapsulates per-session state and services (e.g., logging, per-session coroutines).
- Input: This is where the session is initialized and where tenant and principal (coming from the active Context Scope) are effectively the inputs for the session’s runtime.
- Access: Can access Context Scope and App Scope.
- Annotations: Use `@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)` for bindings that must be singletons within a given session.

Isolation:

- Objects in a session scope are contained to that session instance. They cannot reach across different sessions, tenants, or principals.

## Lifecycle and cleanup

- Each scope owns its set of instances. When a scope is no longer referenced/used, it is cleaned up, including its resources (e.g., child coroutine scopes created via `CoroutineScopeScoped`).
- The codebase provides managers to help with scope lifecycle, for example:
- Context: `UserContextManager`, `UserContextComponent` and `UserContextScope`
- Session: `SessionContextManager`, `SessionComponent` and `SessionScope`

## Working with the IDK and SDK

- The IDK and solutions built on the SDK assume that these scopes are used as designed. This is reflected in APIs that expect a context and/or session to be active.
- While it may be technically possible to operate without the provided DI setup, we do not recommend it and it is not tested.

## Quick reference

- App Scope
    - Root scope
    - No access to lower scopes
    - Reused by Context/Session
- Context Scope (`UserContextScope`)
    - Per-tenant/principal
    - Access to App Scope
    - Isolated across tenants/principals
- Session Scope (`SessionScope`)
    - Per-session
    - Access to Context and App Scopes
    - Isolated across sessions

## Related types in code

- Context
    - `sure.di.context.UserContextScope`
    - `sure.di.context.UserContextComponent`
    - `sure.di.context.UserContextManager`
    - `sure.di.context.UserContext`
- Session
    - `sure.di.session.SessionScope`
    - `sure.di.session.SessionComponent`
    - `sure.di.session.SessionContextManager`
    - `sure.di.session.SessionContext`

For more details, explore the interfaces and documentation comments within the codebase under `libraries/core/api/public/src/commonMain/kotlin/sure/di/`.

---

# App component setup

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Setup app with scopes

:::info
Please read the [scopes documentation](/idk/v0.10/guides/di/scopes) first to grasp the 3 scopes being used in the IDK.
:::

## 1. **Initialize application component and scope**

Typically, there only is one application scope within a single app or service. Technically, multiple instances could be created.
The app scope has an app component, that is initialized with some information. The app component acts as a singleton in the app scope.

The `application` parameter below for instance is the typically the Android context or Apple app object.
The `appId` is the name of your application. It is mainly being used in configuration management. All configuration properties being used, will use the `appId` internally.
Same for the `profile`. Within a single app you can support multiple profiles. However, a single app instance will only be started with a single profile. What a profile exactly is,
is up to you as a developer. A typical use case is the type of environment the app is running in. The profile is also being used in the configuration service to distinguish, for
instance, between different configuration values between your production and test app. Lastly there is the app version. Although the component expects your app version to be
supplied there, currently it is not really in use yet in the IDK.

```kotlin

// Create your application component
val appComponent = YourAppComponent.init(
    application = yourApplication, // This can be your mobile app reference instance
    appId = "your-app-id", // A string denoting your app
    profile = "prod", // A profile so you could have different properties for different environments or profiles of the app
    version = "1.0.0" // The version of your app.
)
```

Now you get access to a few objects in the app scope via the `appComponent` above. The app component however knows about quite a lot more interfaces it can injects. Its primary
function is to ensure that any objects being created with these interfaces are using Dependency Injection, so a developer does not directly provide an actual implementation. This
allows for clean, cohesive code with low coupling. One of the most important objects on the app component is the `contextManager` which we will use next.

## 2. **Initialize context scope**:

Once the application component has been created it is time to create the context scope, which contains the tenant and principal values. A principal either is a
natural person (user) or system account. This scope is used to allow separation of object instances and asynchronous code. It is also being used by the configuration system,
meaning that it is possible to have different configuration values for different tenants, or even principals. If multi-tenancy is not needed in your use case, you can either always
initialize with a fake tenant and principal, or simply leverage the anonymous context scope.

```kotlin
// Initialize context with tenant and principal information
val contextComponent = appComponent.contextManager
    .initFromTenantAndPrincipal(
        TenantInputString("your-tenant-id"),
        PrincipalInputString("your-principal-id@for-instance-an-email.com")
    )

// As an anonymous user, or if you don't use multi-tenancy at all:
//val contextComponent = appComponent.contextManager.initAnonymous()
```

## 3. **Initialize Session scope**:

Now we have a singleton app scope, and a context scope for the tenant and principal, it is time to create a session. You can define what a session entails. It could be a long-lived
session (from user login to logout in a mobile app) or a short-lived one (a single request/response in a REST API,
for instance). The session scope is mainly used to bind all objects and asynchronous code together. This means that any outstanding work within a session will be stopped once the
session is destroyed.

```kotlin
// Initialize session
val sessionContextManager = contextComponent.sessionContextManager
val sessionComponent = sessionContextManager.initSession("unique-example-session") // A unique value for the session
```


# Create your components

Since we are using Dependency Injection and have gradle module seperation between interfaces and implementations, it is possible to swap out implementations of the interfaces
without having to change other code that relies on the interfaces. The `public` modules contain the interfaces and data classes, whilst the `impl` modules contain
the actual implementations.

The DI system brings all the contributions together at build time. All components, subcomponents and injections are being brought together and this should typically happen
in your app. If you do not have a Kotlin Multiplatform App, we suggest to create a specific project in Kotlin Multiplatform with the specific purpose to build
the modules and dependencies. The 3 scope components then can be used in your app, and will only contain the actual implementations you need.

## Example components
Below you can find example code to create components that you could use in your app.

<Tabs>
<TabItem value="AppScope" label="App scope">

```kotlin
/**
* Jvm implementation for [AbstractAppComponent] and provides the package name as application
* ID as well as the application and its context.
*
* This class is a singleton and automatically provided in the dependency graph whenever you
* inject [AbstractAppComponent] through the [ContributesBinding] annotation.
*/
@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
@MergeComponent(AppScope::class)
@Component
abstract class YourAppComponent(
    application: Any,
    appId: String,
    profile: String,
    version: String,
) : YourAppComponentMerged, AbstractAppComponent(application, version, appId, profile, DefaultSureRootScopeProvider()) {
    companion object {
        fun init(
            application: Any,
            appId: String,
            profile: String,
            version: String,
        ): TestAppComponent {
            val component = TestAppComponent::class.create(
                application,
                appId,
                profile,
                version
            )

            component.initRootScopeProvider()
            return component
        }
    }
}
```
</TabItem>
<TabItem value="ContextScope" label="Context scope">
```kotlin

@SingleIn(UserContextScope::class)
@MergeComponent(UserContextScope::class)
@Component
abstract class YourContextComponent(
    @Component
    val appComponent: YourAppComponent // <-- The app component is being injected here.
) : YourContextComponentMerged

```
</TabItem>
<TabItem value="SessionScope" label="Session scope">
```kotlin
@MergeComponent(SessionScope::class)
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@Component
abstract class YourSessionComponent(
    @Component
    val appComponent: YourAppComponent, // <-- The app component is being injected here.
    @Component
    val contextComponent: YourContextComponent // <-- The context component is being injected here.>
) : YourSessionComponentMerged

```
</TabItem>

    <TabItem value="Imports" label="Imports">
        ```kotlin
        package my.example

        import me.tatarka.inject.annotations.Component
        import software.amazon.lastmile.kotlin.inject.anvil.AppScope
        import software.amazon.lastmile.kotlin.inject.anvil.ContributesBinding
        import software.amazon.lastmile.kotlin.inject.anvil.MergeComponent
        import software.amazon.lastmile.kotlin.inject.anvil.SingleIn
        import sure.di.app.AbstractAppComponent
        import sure.core.defaults.app.DefaultSureRootScopeProvider
        import sure.di.context.UserContextScope
        import sure.di.session.SessionScope


        ```
    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

The interfaces being extended ending with `Merged` are being used to merge the components together. This is done by the `MergeComponent` annotation and KSP.
These files and interfaces are automatically generated at build time. Please make sure that the name before the `Merged` part is the same as the name of the component.

It is important to have components for all 3 scopes, just at is is important to inject the components of lower scopes into higher scopes. For example the AppScope has no additional
components injects, but the Context scope has the app scope component injected, just like the session scope has both the app and context scope components injected. This ensures
that the entire dependency graph is available in the respective scopes. So any injection at the app scope level will also be available at the context scope level, and so on.

:::info
It makes sense to have the above code somewhere early in your application. For instance during app start, or close to the authentication process.
:::


> **Note**
> You could be using [kotlin-inject](https://github.com/evant/kotlin-inject) in your own code as well, in which case you could inject an IKiwaHolderServices property as
> constructor argument. You would automatically be provided with an instance.

## Kotlin Symbol Processing
We are using [KSP](https://github.com/google/ksp) to generate the components and interfaces. Kotlin-inject, kotlin-inject-anvil and Amazon App platform provide contributions to KSP
to make code generation happen at build time. The downside is a slightly longer build time. The upside is that DI happens at compile time instead of runtime which means:
- Errors visible during build time
- No runtime overhead
- No reflection
- No runtime dependencies

In order to use KSP with injection you need to setup any project that needs to generate code properly

<Tabs>
    <TabItem value="ksp" label="KSP">
```kotlin
    ksp {
        // [ksp] Cannot find an @Inject constructor or provider for: kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineDispatcher
        //provideAppScopeCoroutineScopeScoped(dispatcher: kotlinx.coroutines.CoroutineDispatcher): software.amazon.app.platform.scope.coroutine.CoroutineScopeScoped
        //appScopeCoroutineScopeScoped: software.amazon.app.platform.scope.coroutine.CoroutineScopeScoped
        // Only set to false if you get the above error about injecting CoroutineDispatcher
        useKsp2.set(false)

        // We are using the Amazon App Platform binding processor instead of the Kotlin Inject anvil binding processor!
        arg("software.amazon.lastmile.kotlin.inject.anvil.processor.ContributesBindingProcessor", "disabled")
    }
    dependencies {
        // Adjust for the languages you need
        addProvider("kspJs", libs.kotlin.inject.compiler.ksp)
        add("kspJs", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.public)
        add("kspJs", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.code.generators)
        add("kspJs", libs.anvil.compiler.ksp)

        addProvider("kspJsTest", libs.kotlin.inject.compiler.ksp)
        add("kspJsTest", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.public)
        add("kspJsTest", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.code.generators)
        add("kspJsTest", libs.anvil.compiler.ksp)

        addProvider("kspJvm", libs.kotlin.inject.compiler.ksp)
        add("kspJvm", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.public)
        add("kspJvm", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.code.generators)
        add("kspJvm", libs.anvil.compiler.ksp)

        addProvider("kspJvmTest", libs.kotlin.inject.compiler.ksp)
        add("kspJvmTest", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.public)
        add("kspJvmTest", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.code.generators)
        add("kspJvmTest", libs.anvil.compiler.ksp)

        addProvider("kspIosX64", libs.kotlin.inject.compiler.ksp)
        add("kspIosX64", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.public)
        add("kspIosX64", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.code.generators)
        add("kspIosX64", libs.anvil.compiler.ksp)

        addProvider("kspIosArm64", libs.kotlin.inject.compiler.ksp)
        add("kspIosArm64", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.public)
        add("kspIosArm64", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.code.generators)
        add("kspIosArm64", libs.anvil.compiler.ksp)

        addProvider("kspLinuxX64", libs.kotlin.inject.compiler.ksp)
        add("kspLinuxX64", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.public)
        add("kspLinuxX64", libs.amz.kotlin.inject.contribute.code.generators)
        add("kspLinuxX64", libs.anvil.compiler.ksp)
    }
```
    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="libs" label="Toml catalog"></TabItem>
</Tabs>

---

# Extending the DI Graph

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Extending the DI Graph

The IDK uses [Metro](https://github.com/zacsweers/metro) for dependency injection. Metro is a Kotlin compiler plugin that generates all DI wiring at compile time, so there is no runtime reflection and no annotation processing step like KSP. This makes it fully compatible with Kotlin Multiplatform, including native targets and GraalVM.

Every IDK application defines its own application graph (see [Application Setup](app-setup)). This page explains how Metro works, how the IDK uses it, and how you can contribute your own services into the dependency graph.

## The Metro Compiler Plugin

The Metro Gradle plugin must be applied to any module that defines or contributes to a dependency graph:

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
plugins {
    id("dev.zacsweers.metro") version "<version>"
}
```

That's it: no annotation processor, no KSP plugin, no code generation task to configure. Metro hooks into the Kotlin compiler directly.

## How Metro DI Works

Metro uses a small set of annotations to define dependency graphs at compile time. The compiler plugin reads these annotations, resolves the dependency tree, and generates the wiring code as part of normal Kotlin compilation. There is no service locator, no classpath scanning, and no runtime overhead.

The key concepts are:

- **Dependency graphs** define a set of services and how they are created
- **Scopes** control the lifetime of instances (singleton per scope)
- **Contributions** let modules declare bindings that are automatically merged into a graph
- **Factories** define the inputs needed to create a graph instance

### Key Annotations

| Annotation | Purpose |
|-----------|---------|
| `@DependencyGraph` | Marks an abstract class as a dependency graph (the top-level container for a scope) |
| `@DependencyGraph.Factory` | Interface for creating a graph instance with external parameters |
| `@GraphExtension` | Defines a child scope graph that extends a parent graph |
| `@GraphExtension.Factory` | Interface for creating a child scope instance |
| `@Provides` | Marks a method or parameter that supplies a dependency |
| `@Inject` | Marks a class for constructor injection |
| `@SingleIn(Scope::class)` | Scopes an instance as a singleton within the given scope |
| `@ContributesTo(Scope::class)` | Contributes an interface (with accessors) to a scope's graph |
| `@ContributesBinding(Scope::class)` | Binds an implementation to its interface within a scope |
| `@ContributesIntoSet(Scope::class)` | Contributes an implementation into a `Set<T>` multibinding |
| `@Named("name")` | Distinguishes multiple bindings of the same type |
| `@ForScope(Scope::class)` | Qualifies a binding to a specific scope (used with multibindings) |
| `@Multibinds` | Declares a `Set` or `Map` multibinding that may have zero contributors |

### Scope Markers

The IDK uses a three-level scope hierarchy:

| Scope | Marker Class | Lifetime |
|-------|-------------|----------|
| Application | `AppScope` | Entire application lifetime |
| User Context | `UserScope` | Per tenant + principal combination |
| Session | `SessionScope` | Per working session or request |

`AppScope` is provided by Metro. `UserScope` and `SessionScope` are defined by the IDK. When you annotate a class with `@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)`, Metro ensures only one instance exists within each session.

## Contributing Services to Existing Scopes

The most common extension pattern is contributing your own service implementations into an existing IDK scope. This lets your services participate in the same lifecycle and be injected alongside IDK services.

### Single-Implementation Binding

Use `@ContributesBinding` when there is one implementation per interface:

```kotlin
import dev.zacsweers.metro.ContributesBinding
import dev.zacsweers.metro.Inject
import dev.zacsweers.metro.SingleIn
import dev.zacsweers.metro.binding
import com.sphereon.di.session.SessionScope

interface MyCredentialFormatter {
    fun format(claims: Map<String, Any>): String
}

@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@ContributesBinding(SessionScope::class, binding = binding<MyCredentialFormatter>())
class JsonCredentialFormatter(
    private val configProvider: ConfigProvider
) : MyCredentialFormatter {
    override fun format(claims: Map<String, Any>): String {
        // Format credentials as JSON
        return claims.entries.joinToString("\n") { "${it.key}: ${it.value}" }
    }
}
```

Metro automatically discovers this binding at compile time and includes it in the session scope graph. Any service in the session scope can now receive `MyCredentialFormatter` as a constructor parameter.

### Set Multibinding

Use `@ContributesIntoSet` when multiple implementations contribute to a `Set<T>`:

```kotlin
import dev.zacsweers.metro.ContributesIntoSet
import dev.zacsweers.metro.Inject
import dev.zacsweers.metro.SingleIn
import dev.zacsweers.metro.binding
import dev.zacsweers.metro.AppScope

@Inject
@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
@ContributesIntoSet(AppScope::class, binding = binding<PropertySourceContribution>())
class MyCustomProviderContribution(
    private val configService: AppConfigService
) : PropertySourceContribution {

    override val configLevel = ConfigLevel.APP
    override val providerId = "my-custom-provider"

    override fun isEnabled(resolver: PropertyResolver): Boolean {
        val disabled = resolver.getProperty(
            "config.providers.my-custom-provider.enabled",
            Boolean::class
        )
        return disabled != false
    }

    override fun getPropertySource(): PropertySource<*> =
        MyCustomPropertySource(configService)

    override fun getOrder(): Int = Order.MEDIUM.orderValue
}
```

This contributes your provider into the `Set<PropertySourceContribution>` that the IDK's configuration bootstrap process collects at startup.

### Exposing Accessors on Scope Graphs

Use `@ContributesTo` to add accessor properties to an existing scope's graph. This makes your service available as a named property on the graph:

```kotlin
import dev.zacsweers.metro.ContributesTo
import com.sphereon.di.session.SessionScope

@ContributesTo(SessionScope::class)
interface MyCredentialFormatterAccessor {
    val myCredentialFormatter: MyCredentialFormatter
}
```

With this in place, any code that has access to the session graph can call `session.graph.myCredentialFormatter`.

## Defining the Application Graph

Every application defines its own `@DependencyGraph(AppScope::class)` class that extends `AbstractAppGraph`. At compile time, Metro merges all contributed bindings from the IDK modules on your classpath into this graph:

```kotlin
import dev.zacsweers.metro.DependencyGraph
import dev.zacsweers.metro.Provides
import dev.zacsweers.metro.Named
import dev.zacsweers.metro.AppScope
import dev.zacsweers.metro.Provides
import dev.zacsweers.metro.createGraphFactory
import com.sphereon.di.app.AbstractAppGraph
import com.sphereon.di.app.RootScopeProvider
import com.sphereon.core.defaults.app.DefaultRootScopeProvider

@DependencyGraph(AppScope::class)
abstract class MyAppGraph : AbstractAppGraph() {

    @DependencyGraph.Factory
    fun interface Factory {
        fun create(
            @Provides application: Any,
            @Provides @Named("appId") appId: String,
            @Provides @Named("profile") profile: String,
            @Provides @Named("version") version: String,
            @Provides rootScopeProvider: RootScopeProvider,
        ): MyAppGraph
    }

    companion object {
        fun init(
            application: Any,
            appId: String = "my-app",
            profile: String = "production",
            version: String = "1.0.0"
        ): MyAppGraph {
            val graph = createGraphFactory<MyAppGraph.Factory>().create(
                application = application,
                appId = appId,
                profile = profile,
                version = version,
                rootScopeProvider = DefaultRootScopeProvider()
            )
            graph.initRootScopeProvider()
            return graph
        }
    }
}
```

The `@DependencyGraph(AppScope::class)` annotation tells Metro to merge all `@ContributesBinding` and `@ContributesTo` contributions targeting `AppScope` into this graph. The child scopes (`UserScope`, `SessionScope`) are created automatically through the IDK's scope managers.

## Testing with Metro

For unit tests, create a test-specific dependency graph that provides mock or stub implementations:

```kotlin
@DependencyGraph(SessionScope::class)
abstract class TestSessionGraph {
    @Provides
    fun provideKeyManager(): KeyManagerService = mockk()

    @Provides
    fun provideConfigProvider(): ConfigProvider = mockk()

    @Provides
    fun provideCredentialFormatter(
        configProvider: ConfigProvider
    ): MyCredentialFormatter = JsonCredentialFormatter(configProvider)
}

class MyFormatterTest {
    @Test
    fun testFormat() {
        val graph = createGraph<TestSessionGraph>()
        val formatter = graph.provideCredentialFormatter(graph.provideConfigProvider())

        val result = formatter.format(mapOf("name" to "Alice"))
        assertEquals("name: Alice", result)
    }
}
```

For integration tests where you need the full IDK scope hierarchy, use your application graph's `init()` as you would in production, then access services from the session graph.

## Comparison with Other DI Frameworks

If you're coming from another DI framework, these concepts map as follows:

| Concept | Dagger | Koin | Metro |
|---------|--------|------|-------|
| Container | `@Component` | `module { }` | `@DependencyGraph` |
| Binding | `@Provides` / `@Binds` | `single { }` / `factory { }` | `@Provides` / `@ContributesBinding` |
| Scope | `@Singleton` / custom | `single` | `@SingleIn(Scope::class)` |
| Injection | `@Inject` constructor | `inject()` / `get()` | `@Inject` constructor |
| Multibinding | `@IntoSet` | n/a | `@ContributesIntoSet` |
| Child scope | `@Subcomponent` | `scope` | `@GraphExtension` |

The main difference from Dagger is that Metro uses a compiler plugin rather than annotation processing, making it compatible with Kotlin Multiplatform without platform-specific workarounds. Unlike Koin, all wiring is validated at compile time, so missing dependencies are compilation errors, not runtime crashes.

## Best Practices

**Use constructor injection.** Declare dependencies as constructor parameters on your `@Inject`-annotated classes. This makes dependencies explicit, enables compile-time validation, and simplifies testing.

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@ContributesBinding(SessionScope::class, binding = binding<MyService>())
class MyServiceImpl(
    private val keyManager: KeyManagerService,
    private val configProvider: ConfigProvider
) : MyService {
    // Implementation
}
```

**Choose the right scope.** Place services in the narrowest scope that fits their lifetime. Application-wide singletons go in `AppScope`, tenant-specific services in `UserScope`, and per-request or per-session services in `SessionScope`.

**Avoid circular dependencies.** If service A depends on B and B depends on A, restructure one of them to break the cycle. Metro validates the dependency graph at compile time and will report cycles as errors.

**Keep contributions focused.** Each `@ContributesBinding` or `@ContributesIntoSet` class should do one thing. Rather than a single large service, prefer multiple focused services that each contribute to the appropriate scope.

---

# Events System

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Events System

The IDK provides a core event system for broadcasting and subscribing to events across the application. Events are used for command lifecycle tracking, audit logging, cross-component communication, and integration with external systems.

## Modules

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-core-events-public` | Event interfaces, types, and filtering |
| `lib-core-events-impl` | Default implementations |

## Core Concepts

### Event

Events are immutable records of something that happened in the system:

```kotlin
interface Event {
    val id: Uuid                    // Unique event identifier
    val type: EventType             // Event type (extensible)
    val origin: String              // Command/service that emitted the event
    val timestamp: Instant          // When the event occurred
    val context: EventContext       // Session, tenant, principal info
    val subsystem: EventSubsystem   // Which subsystem emitted the event
    val category: EventCategory     // Event category for filtering
    val payload: JsonObject         // Event-specific data
    val signature: EventSignature?  // Optional cryptographic signature
    val encryption: EventEncryption? // Optional encryption
}
```

### EventHub

The central hub for event broadcasting and subscription. It's an AppScope singleton that serves as the distribution point for all events:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.core.events.EventHub
import com.sphereon.core.events.EventTypes
import kotlinx.coroutines.launch

// Get the EventHub from your DI component
val eventHub: EventHub = appComponent.eventHub

// Collect all events
launch {
    eventHub.events.collect { event ->
        when (event.type) {
            EventTypes.COMMAND_COMPLETED -> {
                log.info("Command completed: ${event.origin}")
            }
            EventTypes.COMMAND_FAILED -> {
                log.error("Command failed: ${event.origin}")
            }
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonIDK

// Get the EventHub from your DI component
let eventHub = appComponent.eventHub

// Collect all events
Task {
    for await event in eventHub.events {
        switch event.type {
        case EventTypes.commandCompleted:
            print("Command completed: \(event.origin)")
        case EventTypes.commandFailed:
            print("Command failed: \(event.origin)")
        default:
            break
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### EventService

Scoped services for emitting events at different levels:

| Service | Scope | Description |
|---------|-------|-------------|
| `AppEventService` | AppScope | Application-level events |
| `UserEventService` | UserScope | Per-tenant/principal events |
| `SessionEventService` | SessionScope | Per-session events |

## Event Types

Built-in event types for common scenarios:

| Type | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `COMMAND_STARTED` | Command execution began |
| `COMMAND_COMPLETED` | Command completed successfully |
| `COMMAND_FAILED` | Command execution failed |
| `STATE_CHANGED` | State machine transition |
| `CUSTOM` | Application-defined events |

### Defining Custom Event Types

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.core.events.EventType

// Create custom event types as extensions
object MyEventTypes {
    val USER_LOGGED_IN = EventType("user.logged_in")
    val CREDENTIAL_PRESENTED = EventType("credential.presented")
    val VERIFICATION_COMPLETED = EventType("verification.completed")
}
```

## Subsystems

Events are categorized by subsystem for filtering:

| Subsystem | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `CORE` | Core IDK operations |
| `CRYPTO` | Cryptographic operations |
| `KMS` | Key management operations |
| `MDOC` | Mobile credential operations |
| `OID4VP` | OpenID4VP operations |
| `OAUTH2` | OAuth 2.0 operations |

## Event Filtering

The `EventFilter` allows selective subscription to events:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.core.events.EventFilter
import com.sphereon.core.events.EventSubsystems
import com.sphereon.core.events.EventCategories

// Build a filter
val filter = EventFilter {
    // Filter by subsystems
    subsystems(EventSubsystems.CRYPTO, EventSubsystems.KMS)

    // Filter by categories
    categories(EventCategories.ERROR, EventCategories.WARNING)

    // Filter by event type pattern (glob-style)
    typePatterns("command.*", "kms.key.*")

    // Filter by origin
    origins("SignDocumentCommand", "KeyManagerService")

    // Filter by context
    tenantIds("tenant-123")
    principalIds("user@example.com")
}

// Use the filter with subscription
val job = eventHub.subscribe(scope, filter) { event ->
    alertService.notify("Issue in ${event.subsystem}: ${event.payload}")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonIDK

// Build a filter
let filter = EventFilter { builder in
    builder.subsystems([.crypto, .kms])
    builder.categories([.error, .warning])
    builder.typePatterns(["command.*", "kms.key.*"])
}

// Use the filter with subscription
let job = eventHub.subscribe(scope: scope, filter: filter) { event in
    alertService.notify("Issue in \(event.subsystem): \(event.payload)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Subscription DSL

Subscribe to events using a builder DSL:

```kotlin
val job = eventHub.subscribe(scope) {
    filter {
        subsystems(EventSubsystems.MDOC)
        categories(EventCategories.INFO, EventCategories.SUCCESS)
    }
    onEvent { event ->
        when (event.type) {
            EventTypes.COMMAND_COMPLETED -> {
                analytics.track("mdoc_operation", event.payload)
            }
        }
    }
}

// Cancel subscription when done
job.cancel()
```

## Flow-Based API

For integration with Kotlin Flow operators:

```kotlin
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.filter
import kotlinx.coroutines.flow.map

// Get filtered flow
val errorFlow = eventHub.filteredEvents(
    EventFilter { categories(EventCategories.ERROR) }
)

// Use Flow operators
errorFlow
    .filter { it.subsystem == EventSubsystems.KMS }
    .map { it.payload }
    .collect { payload ->
        errorReporter.report(payload)
    }

// Convenience methods
eventHub.eventsBySubsystem(EventSubsystems.CRYPTO).collect { ... }
eventHub.eventsByCategory(EventCategories.ERROR).collect { ... }
eventHub.eventsByTypePattern("command.*").collect { ... }
```

## Event Storage

The `EventStore` interface provides persistent event storage:

```kotlin
interface EventStore {
    suspend fun store(event: Event)
    suspend fun query(filter: EventFilter, limit: Int = 100): List<Event>
    suspend fun getById(id: Uuid): Event?
    suspend fun count(filter: EventFilter): Long
}
```

### RingBufferEventStore

The default in-memory implementation with configurable capacity:

```kotlin
val eventStore = RingBufferEventStore(
    capacity = 10000,  // Keep last 10,000 events
    scope = applicationScope
)

// Query recent events
val recentErrors = eventStore.query(
    EventFilter { categories(EventCategories.ERROR) },
    limit = 50
)
```

## Event Signing

Events can be cryptographically signed for authenticity:

```kotlin
interface EventSigningService {
    suspend fun sign(event: Event): Event
    suspend fun verify(event: Event): Boolean
}

// Signed events include signature metadata
data class EventSignature(
    val keyAlias: String,     // Key used for signing
    val providerId: String,   // KMS provider
    val algorithm: String,    // e.g., "ES256"
    val jws: String           // JWS signature
)
```

## Event Encryption

Events can be encrypted for confidentiality:

```kotlin
interface EventEncryptionService {
    suspend fun encrypt(event: Event, parts: Set<EncryptedPart>): Event
    suspend fun decrypt(event: Event): Event
}

enum class EncryptedPart {
    PAYLOAD,   // Encrypt event data
    CONTEXT    // Encrypt session/tenant info
}
```

## Command Event Integration

Commands automatically emit lifecycle events when configured:

```kotlin
// Configure command to emit events
val commandConfig = CommandEventConfig(
    emitStarted = true,
    emitCompleted = true,
    emitFailed = true,
    includeArgsInPayload = false,  // Privacy control
    includeResultInPayload = true
)

// Or use the @SilentCommand annotation to disable events
@SilentCommand
class InternalHelperCommand : ICommand<Unit, Unit> { ... }
```

## Best Practices

**Use subsystem filtering.** Subscribe only to relevant subsystems to minimize processing overhead.

**Handle events asynchronously.** Event handlers should not block. Use coroutines for I/O operations.

**Consider event signing for audit trails.** Sign events that may be used for compliance or legal purposes.

**Use the ring buffer store for debugging.** Keep recent events in memory for troubleshooting.

**Don't include sensitive data in payloads.** Or use encryption for events containing PII.

```kotlin
// Good: Include only necessary metadata
val payload = buildJsonObject {
    put("documentId", documentId)
    put("signatureType", "PAdES")
    put("success", true)
}

// Avoid: Including sensitive document content
val payload = buildJsonObject {
    put("documentContent", Base64.encode(sensitiveDocument))  // Don't do this
}
```

---

# CBOR

# CBOR

The IDK includes a CBOR (RFC 8949) library used throughout the mDoc, COSE, and credential modules. It provides type-safe encoding and decoding, a Kotlin DSL for building CBOR structures, tagged value support, and diagnostic output.

## Modules

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-cbor-public` | Types, interfaces, and the builder DSL |
| `lib-cbor-impl` | Encoder, decoder, and diagnostics |

## Core Types

All CBOR values are represented by the `CborItem<Type>` sealed hierarchy. This gives you compile-time type safety when constructing and inspecting CBOR data.

### Primitives

| Type | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `CborUInt` | Unsigned integer (major type 0) |
| `CborNInt` | Negative integer (major type 1) |
| `CborString` | UTF-8 text string |
| `CborByteString` | Raw byte string |
| `CborBool` | Boolean, with subtypes `CborTrue` and `CborFalse` |
| `CborNull` | CBOR null value |
| `CborFloat` | 16/32-bit floating point |
| `CborDouble` | 64-bit floating point |

### Collections

| Type | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `CborArray<V>` | Ordered sequence of CBOR items; supports indefinite-length encoding |
| `CborMap<K, V>` | Key-value map of CBOR items; supports indefinite-length encoding |

### Tagged Values

| Type | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `CborTagged<T>` | Wraps a value with an RFC 8949 tag number |
| `CborEncodedItem<T>` | Tag 24 embedded CBOR with lazy decoding; the inner value is not decoded until `data()` is called |

### COSE Labels

| Type | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `NumberLabel` | Integer-based COSE map key |
| `StringLabel` | String-based COSE map key |

## Builder DSL

The library provides a Kotlin DSL for building CBOR maps and arrays without manual type wrapping.

### Building Maps

```kotlin
val engagement = cborMap {
    "version" to "1.0"
    1 to algorithmId
    "security" array {
        add(cipherSuite)
        add(ephemeralKey)
    }
    optional("info", optionalValue)  // skipped when null
}
```

### Building Arrays

```kotlin
val items = cborArray {
    +"hello"
    add(42)
    +true
    map {
        "nested" to "value"
    }
}
```

### DSL Features

- **`optional(key, value)`**: Adds the entry only when `value` is non-null. Eliminates boilerplate null checks.
- **`nonEmptyArray(key) { ... }`**: Adds an array entry only when at least one element is present.
- **String and Int keys**: Both `"key" to value` and `1 to value` are supported.
- **`@DslMarker` annotation**: Prevents accidental access to outer builder scopes, catching mistakes at compile time.

## Encoding and Decoding

There are three ways to encode and decode CBOR, depending on the context.

### DI-injected services

The `lib-cbor-impl` module contributes three singleton services into `AppScope` via Metro. If your class is part of the DI graph, inject them as constructor parameters:

```kotlin
@Inject
class MyCredentialProcessor(
    private val cborEncoder: CborEncoder,
    private val cborParser: CborParser,
    private val cborDiagnostics: CborDiagnostics,
) {
    fun processCredential(issuerSignedBytes: ByteArray) {
        // Decode
        val result = cborParser.parse(issuerSignedBytes)
        if (result.isOk) {
            val item = result.value
            // ...
        } else {
            // handle error
        }

        // Encode
        val response = cborMap {
            "status" to 0
            "version" to "1.0"
        }
        val bytes: ByteArray = cborEncoder.encode(response)
    }
}
```

The interfaces and their implementations:

| Interface | Implementation | Scope | Description |
|-----------|---------------|-------|-------------|
| `CborEncoder` | `CborEncoderImpl` | `AppScope` | Encodes a `CborItem` to `ByteArray` |
| `CborParser` | `CborParserImpl` | `AppScope` | Parses `ByteArray` into `CborItem`, returns `IdkResult` |
| `CborDiagnostics` | `CborDiagnosticsImpl` | `AppScope` | Renders CBOR as human-readable diagnostic notation |

### CborParser methods

`CborParser` has two methods:

```kotlin
interface CborParser {
    // Parse from the start of the byte array
    fun parse(
        bytes: ByteArray,
        config: CborDecoderConfig = CborDecoderConfig.DEFAULT,
    ): IdkResult<CborItem<*>, IdkError>

    // Parse from a specific offset, returns (newOffset, item) pair
    fun parseWithOffset(
        bytes: ByteArray,
        offset: Int,
        config: CborDecoderConfig = CborDecoderConfig.DEFAULT,
    ): IdkResult<Pair<Int, CborItem<*>>, IdkError>
}
```

`parseWithOffset` is useful when reading multiple CBOR values concatenated in a single byte array. It returns the byte offset after the decoded item so you can continue reading from there.

### Static Cbor object

For code outside the DI graph (tests, utilities, standalone scripts), the `Cbor` object provides static access to the same operations:

```kotlin
// Encode
val bytes = Cbor.encode(cborMap { "key" to "value" })

// Decode (returns IdkResult)
val result = Cbor.tryDecode(bytes)

// Decode with offset
val (newOffset, item) = Cbor.tryDecodeWithOffset(bytes, offset = 0)

// Diagnostics
val text = Cbor.toDiagnostics(item, setOf(DiagnosticOption.PRETTY_PRINT))
val textFromBytes = Cbor.toDiagnosticsEncoded(bytes)
```

### Direct encoding on CborItem

Every `CborItem` has an `encodeCbor()` method that encodes itself to bytes without needing an injected encoder:

```kotlin
val map = cborMap { "name" to "Alice" }
val bytes: ByteArray = map.encodeCbor()
```

This is convenient for one-off encoding when you already have a `CborItem` in hand.

### Decoder security limits

`CborDecoderConfig` protects against malicious or malformed input. Pass it to `parse()` or `tryDecode()`.

| Setting | Default | Strict | Permissive | Purpose |
|---------|---------|--------|------------|---------|
| `maxDepth` | 64 | 32 | unlimited | Stack overflow from deep nesting |
| `maxItems` | 1,000,000 | 100,000 | unlimited | Memory exhaustion from large collections |
| `maxStringLength` | 10,000,000 | 1,000,000 | unlimited | Memory exhaustion from huge strings |

```kotlin
// Use strict limits for untrusted external input
val result = cborParser.parse(untrustedBytes, CborDecoderConfig.STRICT)

// Use permissive limits only for input you control
val result = cborParser.parse(trustedBytes, CborDecoderConfig.PERMISSIVE)
```

## Tagged CBOR

RFC 8949 defines semantic tags that annotate CBOR values with additional meaning. The IDK supports these through `CborTagged<T>`.

### Standard Tags

| Tag | Type | Description |
|-----|------|-------------|
| 0 | `CborDate` | RFC 3339 datetime string |
| 1 | `CborTime` | Epoch-based timestamp |
| 24 | `CborEncodedItem` | Embedded CBOR (byte string containing a CBOR-encoded value) |
| 1004 | - | Full-date string (RFC 8943) |

Tag 24 is used heavily in mDoc for wrapping structures like `DeviceEngagement` and `IssuerSignedItem`. The wrapped content is not decoded until explicitly requested, which improves performance when processing large credential payloads.

```kotlin
// Wrap a value in Tag 24
val encoded = CborEncodedItem.fromValue(deviceEngagement, encoder)

// Lazy decode: the inner bytes are only parsed when data() is called
val decoded = encoded.data { bytes -> decoder.decode(bytes) }
```

## Diagnostic Notation

The `CborDiagnostics` service renders CBOR structures in human-readable diagnostic notation, which is useful for debugging and logging.

```kotlin
val diagnostics: CborDiagnostics = ...

// Render a CborItem as diagnostic text
val text = diagnostics.render(item, setOf(DiagnosticOption.PRETTY_PRINT))

// Render directly from raw bytes
val text = diagnostics.renderEncoded(bytes, setOf(
    DiagnosticOption.PRETTY_PRINT,
    DiagnosticOption.EMBEDDED_CBOR
))
```

### Diagnostic Options

| Option | Effect |
|--------|--------|
| `PRETTY_PRINT` | Adds indentation and line breaks for readability |
| `EMBEDDED_CBOR` | Automatically decodes and expands Tag 24 content inline |
| `BSTR_PRINT_LENGTH` | Shows byte count instead of raw byte content |

## CDDL Type System

The `CDDL` sealed class hierarchy maps CBOR types to CDDL (Concise Data Definition Language) notation. This is used internally for JSON interop and type metadata.

Common CDDL types include `CDDL.bstr`, `CDDL.tstr`, `CDDL.uint`, `CDDL.int`, `CDDL.bool`, and `CDDL.float`. Each type provides factory methods for creating typed `CborItem` instances, ensuring that values conform to the expected CDDL schema.

## JSON Interop

`CborItem` instances support conversion to JSON for interoperability with JSON-based systems:

- **`toJson()`**: Converts the CBOR item to a standard JSON representation.
- **`toJsonSimple()`**: Produces a simplified JSON form, omitting type metadata.
- **`toJsonWithCDDL()`**: Outputs JSON annotated with CDDL type information, useful for debugging or schema validation.

---

# Configuration

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Configuration

The IDK provides a powerful configuration system that lets you read configuration values from multiple sources without worrying about where they come from. Your application code simply calls `configService.getProperty("my.key")` and the system handles resolution from environment variables, property files, cloud providers, and databases.

## Quick Start

The most common pattern is reading configuration values through the `ConfigService`:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get ConfigService from your DI component
val configService: ConfigService = appComponent.configService

// Read a string property
val apiUrl = configService.getProperty("api.base.url", String::class)

// Read with a default value
val timeout = configService.getProperty("http.timeout.ms", Int::class, 30000)

// Read a required property (throws if missing)
val apiKey = configService.getRequiredProperty("api.key", String::class)

// Check if a property exists
if (configService.containsProperty("feature.enabled")) {
    // ...
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get ConfigService from your DI component
let configService = appComponent.configService

// Read a string property
let apiUrl = configService.getProperty(key: "api.base.url", targetType: String.self)

// Read with a default value
let timeout = configService.getProperty(key: "http.timeout.ms", targetType: Int.self, defaultValue: 30000)

// Read a required property (throws if missing)
let apiKey = configService.getRequiredProperty(key: "api.key", targetType: String.self)

// Check if a property exists
if configService.containsProperty(key: "feature.enabled") {
    // ...
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## ConfigService API

The `ConfigService` interface provides type-safe access to configuration:

| Method | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `getProperty(key, type)` | Get a property value, returns `null` if not found |
| `getProperty(key, type, default)` | Get a property with a default fallback |
| `getRequiredProperty(key, type)` | Get a property, throws if not found |
| `containsProperty(key)` | Check if a property exists |
| `getAllProperties()` | Get all properties as a map |
| `getSubProperties(prefix)` | Get all properties under a prefix |
| `getActiveProfile()` | Get the current configuration profile |
| `getAppName()` | Get the application name |

### Supported Types

The configuration system supports automatic type conversion:

```kotlin
// String
val name = configService.getProperty("app.name", String::class)

// Numbers
val port = configService.getProperty("server.port", Int::class)
val timeout = configService.getProperty("timeout.ms", Long::class)
val ratio = configService.getProperty("cache.ratio", Double::class)

// Boolean
val enabled = configService.getProperty("feature.enabled", Boolean::class)
```

## Configuration Sources

Configuration values are resolved from multiple sources in priority order:

| Priority | Source | Description |
|----------|--------|-------------|
| 1 (Highest) | Environment Variables | `API_BASE_URL` maps to `api.base.url` |
| 2 | System Properties | JVM `-D` properties |
| 3 | Cloud Providers | Azure App Config, REST API servers |
| 4 | Database | Persisted settings (VDX only) |
| 5 | Property Files | `application-{profile}.properties` |
| 6 (Lowest) | Programmatic Defaults | Code-defined defaults |

Higher priority sources override lower priority ones. This means environment variables always win, allowing production overrides without code changes.

### Key Normalization

Keys are normalized for consistent lookup across sources:

| Property Key | Environment Variable | Normalized Form |
|-------------|---------------------|-----------------|
| `api.base.url` | `API_BASE_URL` | `api.base.url` |
| `http.timeout-ms` | `HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS` | `http.timeout.ms` |
| `OAuth2.ClientId` | `OAUTH2_CLIENTID` | `oauth2.clientid` |

You can use any format when reading properties - they'll all resolve to the same value:

```kotlin
// All these read the same configuration value
configService.getProperty("api.base.url", String::class)
configService.getProperty("api.baseUrl", String::class)
configService.getProperty("api.base-url", String::class)
```

## Property Files

Create `application-{profile}.properties` files in your classpath:

```properties title="application-production.properties"
# API Configuration
api.base.url=https://api.production.example.com
api.timeout.ms=30000

# Feature Flags
feature.new-dashboard.enabled=true
feature.beta-features.enabled=false

# Logging
logging.level=INFO
```

```properties title="application-development.properties"
# API Configuration
api.base.url=http://localhost:8080
api.timeout.ms=60000

# Feature Flags
feature.new-dashboard.enabled=true
feature.beta-features.enabled=true

# Logging
logging.level=DEBUG
```

The profile is set during application initialization:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Kotlin">

```kotlin
val appComponent = IdkAppComponent.init(
    appId = "my-app",
    profile = "production",  // Loads application-production.properties
    version = "1.0.0"
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let appComponent = IdkAppComponent.companion.doInit(
    appId: "my-app",
    profile: "production",  // Loads application-production.properties
    version: "1.0.0"
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Environment Variables

Environment variables provide the highest priority configuration source. They're ideal for:
- Production deployments
- Secrets and credentials
- Container/Kubernetes configurations
- CI/CD pipeline overrides

```bash
# Set configuration via environment variables
export API_BASE_URL=https://api.example.com
export API_KEY=secret-key-value
export LOG_LEVEL=DEBUG
export FEATURE_NEW_DASHBOARD_ENABLED=true
```

### Conversion Rules

| Property Format | Environment Variable |
|-----------------|---------------------|
| `api.base.url` | `API_BASE_URL` |
| `oauth2.client-id` | `OAUTH2_CLIENT_ID` |
| `kms.providers.aws.region` | `KMS_PROVIDERS_AWS_REGION` |

## Writing Configuration

You can write configuration programmatically using property sources:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Add a property source with configuration values
val myConfig = MapPropertySource(
    name = "my-custom-config",
    source = mapOf(
        "api.base.url" to "https://api.example.com",
        "http.timeout.ms" to 30000,
        "feature.enabled" to true
    )
)

configService.addPropertySource(myConfig)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

For persistent configuration storage, see [EDK settings persistence](/edk/v0.13/guides/persistence/settings) (EDK/VDX only).

## Scoped Configuration

The configuration system supports hierarchical scopes for multi-tenant applications:

| Scope | Description | Use Cases |
|-------|-------------|-----------|
| **App** | Application-wide settings | API endpoints, default timeouts, feature flags |
| **Tenant** | Organization-specific settings | API keys, branding, org feature flags |
| **Principal** | User-specific settings | Preferences, individual credentials |

Each scope inherits from its parent, so tenant settings can override app settings, and principal settings can override tenant settings.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Kotlin">

```kotlin
// App-level configuration (shared by all tenants)
val appConfigService: AppConfigService = appComponent.appConfigService
val apiUrl = appConfigService.getProperty("api.base.url", String::class)

// Tenant-level configuration (inherits from app)
val tenantConfigService: TenantConfigService = tenantComponent.tenantConfigService
val tenantApiKey = tenantConfigService.getProperty("api.subscription.key", String::class)

// Principal-level configuration (inherits from tenant)
val principalConfigService: PrincipalConfigService = principalComponent.principalConfigService
val userTimeout = principalConfigService.getProperty("http.timeout.ms", Int::class)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

For more details on multi-tenant configuration, see [Multi-Tenancy](./multi-tenancy).

## Common Configuration Patterns

### Feature Flags

```kotlin
// Check if a feature is enabled
val isNewDashboardEnabled = configService.getProperty(
    "feature.new-dashboard.enabled",
    Boolean::class
) ?: false

if (isNewDashboardEnabled) {
    showNewDashboard()
} else {
    showLegacyDashboard()
}
```

### API Client Configuration

```kotlin
// Configure an API client from properties
val apiConfig = ApiClientConfig(
    baseUrl = configService.getRequiredProperty("api.base.url", String::class),
    timeoutMs = configService.getProperty("api.timeout.ms", Long::class, 30000L),
    retryCount = configService.getProperty("api.retry.count", Int::class, 3)
)
```

### Getting All Properties with a Prefix

```kotlin
// Get all properties under "kms.providers"
val kmsProviderProps = configService.getSubProperties(
    prefixes = setOf("kms.providers"),
    stripPrefix = true  // "kms.providers.aws.region" becomes "aws.region"
)

kmsProviderProps.forEach { (key, value) ->
    println("$key = $value")
}
```

## Best Practices

**Use environment variables for secrets.** Never commit API keys, passwords, or other sensitive values to source control. Use environment variables in production.

**Define sensible defaults.** Property files should contain reasonable defaults for development. Production values come from environment variables.

**Use descriptive key names.** Follow dot-notation conventions: `component.feature.setting` (e.g., `http.client.timeout.ms`).

**Validate at startup.** Check that required configuration is present before serving requests:

```kotlin
fun validateConfig(configService: ConfigService) {
    val requiredKeys = listOf("api.base.url", "api.key", "database.url")

    val missing = requiredKeys.filter { !configService.containsProperty(it) }
    if (missing.isNotEmpty()) {
        throw IllegalStateException("Missing required configuration: $missing")
    }
}
```

**Use typed configuration classes** for complex configuration:

```kotlin
data class DatabaseConfig(
    val url: String,
    val username: String,
    val password: String,
    val poolSize: Int = 10
) {
    companion object {
        fun fromConfigService(config: ConfigService) = DatabaseConfig(
            url = config.getRequiredProperty("database.url", String::class),
            username = config.getRequiredProperty("database.username", String::class),
            password = config.getRequiredProperty("database.password", String::class),
            poolSize = config.getProperty("database.pool.size", Int::class, 10)
        )
    }
}
```

## Next Steps

- [Property Resolution](./property-resolution) - Deep dive into how properties are resolved
- [Configuration Providers](./providers) - Available configuration providers and how to enable them
- [Secrets Management](./secrets) - Handling sensitive configuration values
- [Multi-Tenancy](./multi-tenancy) - Scoped configuration for multi-tenant applications

---

# Configuration Providers

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Configuration Providers

The configuration system uses **property sources** (also called providers) to supply configuration values. Multiple providers can be active simultaneously, with values resolved by priority order.

## Available Providers

| Provider | Module | Priority | Description |
|----------|--------|----------|-------------|
| Environment Variables | IDK Core | Highest | System environment variables |
| System Properties | IDK Core | High | JVM `-D` properties |
| Azure App Configuration | EDK | High | Cloud-based configuration from Azure |
| REST Config Client | EDK | High | Configuration from a REST API server |
| Database (PostgreSQL) | VDX | Medium | Persisted settings in PostgreSQL |
| Database (MySQL) | VDX | Medium | Persisted settings in MySQL |
| Database (SQLite) | VDX | Medium | Persisted settings in SQLite |
| Properties Files | IDK Core | Low | `application-{profile}.properties` |
| Programmatic Maps | IDK Core | Lowest | Code-defined configuration |

## Auto-Registration

Providers are **automatically registered** when their module is on the classpath. You don't need to write any code to enable them - just add the dependency and configure connection details.

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    // Adding this dependency automatically enables Azure App Configuration
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-conf-azure-app-config:$version")

    // Adding this enables REST-based configuration
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-conf-config-rest-client:$version")
}
```

When the application starts, the `PropertySourceBootstrap` service:
1. Discovers all available providers via dependency injection
2. Checks if each provider is enabled (via configuration)
3. Registers enabled providers with the appropriate `ConfigService`
4. Initializes providers that need async setup (like cloud providers)

## Enabling and Disabling Providers

Each provider has a unique ID used to control whether it's enabled:

| Provider | Provider ID | Enable/Disable Key |
|----------|-------------|-------------------|
| Azure App Config | `azure-app-config` | `config.providers.azure-app-config.enabled` |
| REST Config Client | `rest-config` | `config.providers.rest-config.enabled` |
| PostgreSQL Database | `postgresql-db` | `config.providers.postgresql-db.enabled` |
| MySQL Database | `mysql-db` | `config.providers.mysql-db.enabled` |
| SQLite Database | `sqlite-db` | `config.providers.sqlite-db.enabled` |

### Disabling a Provider

Providers are enabled by default when their module is on the classpath. To disable a provider:

<Tabs>
    <TabItem value="env" label="Environment Variable">

```bash
# Disable Azure App Configuration
export CONFIG_PROVIDERS_AZURE_APP_CONFIG_ENABLED=false

# Disable database provider
export CONFIG_PROVIDERS_POSTGRESQL_DB_ENABLED=false
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="props" label="Properties File">

```properties title="application.properties"
# Disable Azure App Configuration
config.providers.azure-app-config.enabled=false

# Disable database provider
config.providers.postgresql-db.enabled=false
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Conditional Enablement

Some providers only enable themselves when properly configured. For example, Azure App Configuration only registers if connection details are provided:

```bash
# Azure provider enables itself when these are set
export AZURE_APPCONFIG_CONNECTION_STRING=Endpoint=https://myconfig.azconfig.io;...

# Or using endpoint + managed identity
export AZURE_APPCONFIG_ENDPOINT=https://myconfig.azconfig.io
```

## Built-in Providers (IDK Core)

These providers are always available in IDK applications.

### Environment Variables

Automatically reads all system environment variables. Keys are converted:
- `API_BASE_URL` → `api.base.url`
- Uppercase with underscores → lowercase with dots

**Priority:** Highest (always wins)

### System Properties

Reads JVM system properties set via `-D` flags:

```bash
java -Dapi.base.url=https://api.example.com -jar myapp.jar
```

**Priority:** High

### Properties Files

Reads `application-{profile}.properties` from the classpath:

```properties title="application-production.properties"
api.base.url=https://api.production.example.com
http.timeout.ms=30000
```

The profile is set during app initialization via `profile` parameter.

**Priority:** Low

### Programmatic Maps

Add configuration programmatically using `MapPropertySource`:

```kotlin
val defaults = MapPropertySource(
    name = "app-defaults",
    source = mapOf(
        "http.timeout.ms" to 30000,
        "retry.max.attempts" to 3
    )
)
configService.addPropertySource(defaults)
```

**Priority:** Lowest

## Cloud Providers (EDK)

Cloud providers fetch configuration from external services and provide:
- Centralized configuration management
- Dynamic configuration updates
- Offline caching for resilience

See [Cloud Providers](/edk/v0.13/guides/config/cloud-providers) for detailed configuration.

### Azure App Configuration

Fetches configuration from Azure App Configuration service.

**Module:** `lib-conf-azure-app-config`

**Configuration:**
```properties
azure.appconfig.connection-string=Endpoint=https://myconfig.azconfig.io;Id=...;Secret=...
# Or use endpoint with managed identity
azure.appconfig.endpoint=https://myconfig.azconfig.io

# Optional settings
azure.appconfig.key-filter=myapp/*
azure.appconfig.label-filter=production
azure.appconfig.key-prefix=myapp/
azure.appconfig.trim-key-prefix=true
```

### REST Configuration Client

Fetches configuration from a VDX or compatible REST API server.

**Module:** `lib-conf-config-rest-client`

**Configuration:**
```properties
rest.config.base-url=https://config.example.com
rest.config.tenant-id=my-tenant
rest.config.profile=production

# Authentication
rest.config.auth.method=API_KEY
rest.config.auth.api-key=my-api-key
rest.config.auth.api-key-header=X-API-Key
```

## Database Providers (VDX)

Database providers store and retrieve configuration from SQL databases, supporting:
- Persistent configuration storage
- Multi-tenant isolation
- Profile-aware settings
- In-memory caching for performance

See [EDK settings persistence](/edk/v0.13/guides/persistence/settings) for detailed configuration.

### PostgreSQL

**Module:** `vdx-conf-settings-persistence-postgresql`

Stores settings in a PostgreSQL database with caching.

### MySQL

**Module:** `vdx-conf-settings-persistence-mysql`

Stores settings in a MySQL database with caching.

### SQLite

**Module:** `vdx-conf-settings-persistence-sqlite`

Stores settings in a SQLite database. Ideal for embedded or single-server deployments.

## Provider Priority

When the same key exists in multiple providers, the highest-priority provider wins:

```
Environment Variable: api.url=https://env.example.com     ← WINS
Azure App Config:     api.url=https://azure.example.com
Database:             api.url=https://db.example.com
Properties File:      api.url=https://file.example.com
```

This allows you to:
- Define defaults in property files
- Override with cloud configuration
- Override everything with environment variables in production

## Creating Custom Providers

To create a custom configuration provider:

1. **Implement `PropertySource`**:

```kotlin
class MyCustomPropertySource(
    private val dataSource: MyDataSource
) : AbstractPropertySource<MyDataSource>(
    name = "my-custom-source",
    source = dataSource,
    order = Order.MEDIUM.orderValue
) {
    override fun <T : Any> getProperty(name: String, targetType: KClass<T>): T? {
        val value = dataSource.getValue(name) ?: return null
        // Convert and return value
        return convertValue(value, targetType)
    }

    override fun getAllPropertyNames(): Set<String> {
        return dataSource.getAllKeys()
    }

    override val isPlatformSupported: Boolean = true
}
```

2. **Create a contribution for auto-registration** (optional):

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
@ContributesBinding(AppScope::class, boundType = PropertySourceContribution::class, multibinding = true)
class MyCustomProviderContribution(
    private val dataSource: MyDataSource
) : PropertySourceContribution {

    override val configLevel = ConfigLevel.APP
    override val providerId = "my-custom-provider"

    override fun isEnabled(resolver: PropertyResolver): Boolean {
        val disabled = resolver.getProperty(
            "config.providers.my-custom-provider.enabled",
            Boolean::class
        )
        return disabled != false && dataSource.isConfigured
    }

    override fun getPropertySource(): PropertySource<*> {
        return MyCustomPropertySource(dataSource)
    }

    override fun getOrder(): Int = Order.MEDIUM.orderValue
}
```

3. **Register manually** (if not using auto-registration):

```kotlin
val mySource = MyCustomPropertySource(dataSource)
configService.addPropertySource(mySource)
```

## Caching

Providers use caching to improve performance:

| Provider Type | Cache Type | Purpose |
|--------------|------------|---------|
| Cloud Providers | `OfflineConfigCache` | Persists config to disk for network failure resilience |
| Database Providers | `SettingsCache` | In-memory cache to reduce database queries |

### Offline Cache

Cloud providers (Azure, REST) can persist configuration locally. When the cloud service is unavailable, the cached configuration is used:

```properties
# Enable offline caching (enabled by default when available)
azure.appconfig.offline-cache.enabled=true
```

### Database Cache

Database providers cache query results in memory with TTL-based expiration:

- Cache hit: Returns immediately from memory
- Cache miss: Queries database, caches result
- Write/Delete: Invalidates relevant cache entries

## Troubleshooting

### Provider Not Registering

1. **Check module is on classpath**: Verify the dependency is in your build file
2. **Check enable flag**: Ensure `config.providers.{id}.enabled` isn't set to `false`
3. **Check required config**: Some providers need connection details to enable

### Wrong Value Being Used

1. **Check provider priority**: Higher priority sources override lower ones
2. **Check key normalization**: `api.baseUrl` and `api.base.url` resolve to the same key
3. **Enable debug logging**: Set `logging.level.config=DEBUG` to see resolution details

### Cloud Provider Failing

1. **Check credentials**: Verify connection strings, API keys, or managed identity setup
2. **Check network**: Ensure firewall allows connections to cloud service
3. **Check offline cache**: If available, cached values may be returned during outages

---

# Property Resolution Pipeline

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Property Resolution Pipeline

The IDK configuration system uses a sophisticated resolution pipeline that handles property lookup, value interpolation, type conversion, and caching. Understanding this pipeline helps you design effective configuration strategies.

## Resolution Pipeline Overview

When you request a configuration value, it passes through several stages:

<img src="/img/diagrams/resolution-pipeline.svg" alt="Property Resolution Pipeline" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Key Normalization

All property keys are normalized before lookup:

```kotlin
// These all resolve to the same property
configProvider.getProperty("database.host")
configProvider.getProperty("DATABASE.HOST")
configProvider.getProperty("Database.Host")
configProvider.getProperty("database-host")  // Kebab case
configProvider.getProperty("database_host")  // Snake case
```

### Normalization Rules

| Input | Normalized |
|-------|------------|
| `DATABASE.HOST` | `database.host` |
| `Database-Host` | `database.host` |
| `database_host` | `database.host` |
| `OAUTH2_CLIENT_ID` | `oauth2.client.id` |

### Environment Variable Mapping

Environment variables are mapped to property keys:

```bash
# Environment variable
export DATABASE_HOST=localhost
export DATABASE_PORT=5432
export OAUTH2_CLIENT_ID=my-client
```

```kotlin
// These properties resolve from the environment variables
val host = configProvider.getProperty("database.host")  // "localhost"
val port = configProvider.getProperty("database.port")  // "5432"
val clientId = configProvider.getProperty("oauth2.client.id")  // "my-client"
```

## Source Resolution Order

Properties are resolved from sources in priority order:

### 1. Environment Variables (Highest Priority)

```bash
export API_BASE_URL=https://api.production.com
```

### 2. System Properties

```bash
java -Dapi.base.url=https://api.staging.com -jar myapp.jar
```

### 3. Programmatic Configuration

```kotlin
configProvider.setProperty(
    scope = ConfigScope.APP,
    key = "api.base.url",
    value = "https://api.override.com"
)
```

### 4. Properties Files

```properties
# application-production.properties
api.base.url=https://api.default.com
```

### 5. Default Providers (Lowest Priority)

Built-in defaults provided by IDK modules.

### Resolution Example

```kotlin
// Given:
// - ENV: API_BASE_URL=https://env.com
// - System property: api.base.url=https://system.com
// - Properties file: api.base.url=https://file.com

val url = configProvider.getProperty("api.base.url")
// Returns: "https://env.com" (environment variable wins)
```

## Value Interpolation

Properties can reference other properties using `${...}` syntax:

```properties
# application.properties
base.url=https://api.example.com
api.users.endpoint=${base.url}/users
api.orders.endpoint=${base.url}/orders
```

```kotlin
val usersEndpoint = configProvider.getProperty("api.users.endpoint")
// Returns: "https://api.example.com/users"
```

### Nested Interpolation

```properties
env=production
region=us-east-1
api.url=https://api-${env}.${region}.example.com
```

```kotlin
val apiUrl = configProvider.getProperty("api.url")
// Returns: "https://api-production.us-east-1.example.com"
```

### Default Values in Interpolation

```properties
# Use default if property not found
api.timeout=${custom.timeout:5000}
log.level=${LOG_LEVEL:INFO}
```

### Recursive Interpolation

```properties
service.name=my-app
instance.id=${HOSTNAME:localhost}
full.service.id=${service.name}-${instance.id}
```

### Escaping Interpolation

Use `$$` to escape interpolation:

```properties
# Literal ${variable} in output
template.syntax=Use $${variable} for templates
```

## Type Conversion

The IDK automatically converts string values to requested types:

```kotlin
// String → Int
val port: Int = configProvider.getProperty("database.port", Int::class, 5432)

// String → Boolean
val enabled: Boolean = configProvider.getProperty("feature.enabled", Boolean::class, false)

// String → Long
val timeout: Long = configProvider.getProperty("http.timeout", Long::class, 30000L)

// String → Double
val ratio: Double = configProvider.getProperty("sample.ratio", Double::class, 1.0)

// String → Duration
val ttl: Duration = configProvider.getProperty("cache.ttl", Duration::class, 5.minutes)
```

### Boolean Conversion

These string values convert to `true`:
- `"true"`, `"TRUE"`, `"True"`
- `"yes"`, `"YES"`, `"Yes"`
- `"1"`
- `"on"`, `"ON"`, `"On"`

All other values convert to `false`.

### Collection Conversion

```properties
# Comma-separated lists
allowed.origins=https://app.com,https://admin.com,https://api.com
```

```kotlin
val origins: List<String> = configProvider.getPropertyList("allowed.origins")
// Returns: ["https://app.com", "https://admin.com", "https://api.com"]
```

## Caching

The resolution pipeline includes caching for performance:

### Cache Configuration

```kotlin
data class ConfigCacheConfig(
    val enabled: Boolean = true,
    val maxSize: Long = 1000,
    val expireAfterWrite: Duration = 5.minutes,
    val expireAfterAccess: Duration = 1.minutes
)
```

### Cache Behavior

```kotlin
// First call: full resolution pipeline
val value1 = configProvider.getProperty("database.host")  // Cache miss

// Subsequent calls: cache hit
val value2 = configProvider.getProperty("database.host")  // Cache hit (instant)

// After programmatic change: cache invalidated
configProvider.setProperty(ConfigScope.APP, "database.host", "new-host")
val value3 = configProvider.getProperty("database.host")  // Cache miss (re-resolved)
```

### Manual Cache Control

```kotlin
// Invalidate specific key
configProvider.invalidate("database.host")

// Invalidate all cached values
configProvider.invalidateAll()
```

## Scope-Based Resolution

Properties can be scoped to different levels:

```kotlin
enum class ConfigScope {
    SESSION,    // Most specific - current session
    PRINCIPAL,  // Current user
    TENANT,     // Current organization
    APP         // Least specific - application-wide
}
```

### Resolution with Scopes

```kotlin
// Set at different scopes
configProvider.setProperty(ConfigScope.APP, "timeout", "5000")      // Default
configProvider.setProperty(ConfigScope.TENANT, "timeout", "10000")  // Org override
configProvider.setProperty(ConfigScope.PRINCIPAL, "timeout", "15000") // User override

// Resolution checks scopes in order: SESSION → PRINCIPAL → TENANT → APP
val timeout = configProvider.getProperty("timeout")
// Returns: "15000" (most specific scope wins)
```

## PropertySource Interface

The core interface for configuration sources:

```kotlin
interface PropertySource<T> {
    val name: String
    val source: T

    fun containsProperty(key: String): Boolean
    fun <V : Any> getProperty(key: String, type: KClass<V>): V?
    fun <V : Any> getProperty(key: String, type: KClass<V>, defaultValue: V): V
    fun getPropertyNames(): Set<String>
}
```

### Implementing Custom Sources

```kotlin
class RemoteConfigPropertySource(
    private val remoteClient: RemoteConfigClient
) : PropertySource<Map<String, Any>> {

    override val name = "remote-config"
    override val source: Map<String, Any>
        get() = cachedConfig

    private var cachedConfig: Map<String, Any> = emptyMap()

    override fun containsProperty(key: String): Boolean =
        source.containsKey(normalizeKey(key))

    override fun <V : Any> getProperty(key: String, type: KClass<V>): V? {
        val value = source[normalizeKey(key)] ?: return null
        return convertValue(value, type)
    }

    override fun <V : Any> getProperty(key: String, type: KClass<V>, defaultValue: V): V =
        getProperty(key, type) ?: defaultValue

    override fun getPropertyNames(): Set<String> = source.keys

    suspend fun refresh() {
        cachedConfig = remoteClient.fetchConfig()
    }
}
```

## ConfigEnvironment

The `ConfigEnvironment` aggregates multiple property sources:

```kotlin
interface ConfigEnvironment {
    val propertySources: List<PropertySource<*>>
    val activeProfiles: Set<String>

    fun <T : Any> getProperty(key: String, type: KClass<T>): T?
    fun <T : Any> getProperty(key: String, type: KClass<T>, defaultValue: T): T
    fun containsProperty(key: String): Boolean
    fun getPropertyNames(): Set<String>
}
```

### Adding Custom Sources

```kotlin
// DI configuration
@ContributesBinding(AppScope::class)
class CustomConfigEnvironment @Inject constructor(
    private val systemPropertySource: SystemPropertySource,
    private val envPropertySource: EnvironmentPropertySource,
    private val filePropertySource: FilePropertySource,
    private val remotePropertySource: RemoteConfigPropertySource
) : ConfigEnvironment {

    override val propertySources = listOf(
        envPropertySource,       // Highest priority
        systemPropertySource,
        remotePropertySource,
        filePropertySource       // Lowest priority
    )

    // Resolution iterates sources in order
    override fun <T : Any> getProperty(key: String, type: KClass<T>): T? {
        for (source in propertySources) {
            val value = source.getProperty(key, type)
            if (value != null) return value
        }
        return null
    }
}
```

## Best Practices

### 1. Use Meaningful Key Names

```properties
# Good - hierarchical, descriptive
database.connection.pool.max-size=10
oauth2.client.token-endpoint=https://auth.example.com/token

# Avoid - flat, ambiguous
maxPoolSize=10
tokenUrl=https://auth.example.com/token
```

### 2. Provide Defaults for Optional Config

```kotlin
// Always provide sensible defaults
val timeout = configProvider.getProperty("http.timeout", Int::class, 30000)
val retries = configProvider.getProperty("http.max-retries", Int::class, 3)
```

### 3. Validate Required Configuration

```kotlin
fun validateConfig() {
    val required = listOf("database.url", "api.key", "oauth2.client-id")
    val missing = required.filter { !configProvider.containsProperty(it) }

    if (missing.isNotEmpty()) {
        throw ConfigurationException("Missing required config: $missing")
    }
}
```

### 4. Use Interpolation for DRY Configuration

```properties
# DRY - single source of truth
api.base=https://api.example.com
api.users=${api.base}/users
api.orders=${api.base}/orders
api.products=${api.base}/products
```

### 5. Document Configuration Options

```kotlin
/**
 * HTTP client timeout in milliseconds.
 *
 * Property: `http.timeout`
 * Environment: `HTTP_TIMEOUT`
 * Default: 30000
 */
val httpTimeout = configProvider.getProperty("http.timeout", Int::class, 30000)
```

---

# Secret Management

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Secret Management

Secrets such as database passwords, API keys, signing keys, and client credentials must never be committed to configuration files or version control. Supply them through a secret store or an orchestrator-managed secret. A runtime may expose a secret to a process through a protected file or environment variable, but the literal value must not be present in Helm values, manifests, Compose files, or application configuration.

Instead of `db.password=hunter2`, you write `db.password=${secret:vault:myapp/database:password}`. At runtime, when the configuration system reads this value, the secret provider resolves the reference by calling the vault, caching the result, and returning the actual secret. The plaintext secret never leaves memory, it's not in config files, not in logs, not in cloud provider storage.

The EDK provides production-grade providers for **AWS Secrets Manager**, **Azure Key Vault**, and **HashiCorp Vault**. Each provider auto-registers, supports multi-tenant secret routing (different tenants can have different vault configurations), and caches resolved secrets to avoid excessive vault API calls.

## Deployment Bootstrap Secrets

Kubernetes must resolve some secrets before an EDK process starts. The Helm chart therefore uses Kubernetes `secretKeyRef` entries for the east-west client credential and software-keystore password. These bootstrap values are not `${secret:...}` application-provider references.

Create a Secret such as `edk-runtime-secrets` in the release namespace with both required keys:

```bash
kubectl -n edk create secret generic edk-runtime-secrets \
  --from-literal=internal-client-secret='<high-entropy-shared-secret>' \
  --from-literal=keystore-password='<high-entropy-keystore-password>'
```

Bind it to the chart with:

```yaml
serviceIdentity:
  internalClientExistingSecret: edk-runtime-secrets

keystore:
  existingSecret: edk-runtime-secrets
```

The equivalent Helm parameter names are `serviceIdentity.internalClientExistingSecret` and `keystore.existingSecret`.

The Secret must exist in the same namespace as the Helm release. If it is absent, pods remain in `CreateContainerConfigError` with `secret "edk-runtime-secrets" not found`. If either key is absent, Kubernetes reports the missing key. Application secret providers described below become relevant only after the process has started.

## Quick Comparison

| | AWS Secrets Manager | Azure Key Vault | HashiCorp Vault |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Provider ID** | `aws` | `azure` | `vault` |
| **Required config** | None (SDK default chain) | `secrets.azure.vault-url` | `secrets.vault.address` |
| **Auth methods** | Default chain, Access Key, Profile | Default Credential, Client Secret, Managed Identity, CLI | Token, AppRole, Kubernetes |
| **Structured secrets** | JSON key extraction | Single value only | JSON key extraction |
| **Default cache TTL** | 5 minutes | 5 minutes | 5 minutes |
| **Enterprise features** | Regional endpoints | - | Namespace isolation |

## AWS Secrets Manager

AWS Secrets Manager is Amazon's managed secret storage service. It handles encryption, rotation, and access control for secrets. The EDK provider uses the AWS SDK for Kotlin (coroutine-native), which means secret resolution is non-blocking and works efficiently in high-throughput applications.

The AWS provider is the easiest to set up because it requires no mandatory configuration when running in an environment with an ambient credential chain, EC2 instance roles, ECS task credentials, Lambda execution roles, and IAM Roles for Service Accounts (IRSA) in EKS all work out of the box. Just add the module to your classpath and reference secrets.

For multi-tenant deployments, the provider supports per-tenant AWS account routing. Different tenants can have their secrets in different AWS accounts or regions. The provider maintains a concurrent pool of `SecretsManagerClient` instances, one per distinct configuration, so tenant isolation doesn't add configuration overhead.

### Configuration Properties

| Property | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `secrets.aws.region` | SDK default | AWS region for Secrets Manager requests |
| `secrets.aws.endpoint` | - | Endpoint override (for LocalStack or VPC endpoints) |
| `secrets.aws.auth-method` | `DEFAULT` | Authentication method: `DEFAULT`, `ACCESS_KEY`, or `PROFILE` |
| `secrets.aws.access-key-id` | - | AWS access key ID (required for `ACCESS_KEY`) |
| `secrets.aws.secret-access-key` | - | AWS secret access key (required for `ACCESS_KEY`) |
| `secrets.aws.session-token` | - | Session token for temporary credentials |
| `secrets.aws.profile-name` | - | Named profile from `~/.aws/credentials` (required for `PROFILE`) |
| `secrets.aws.cache-ttl` | `300` | Cache TTL in seconds |

### Authentication Methods

<Tabs>
<TabItem value="default" label="Default Chain" default>

Uses the standard AWS SDK credential chain. No additional configuration needed, the SDK checks environment variables, `~/.aws/credentials`, IAM instance roles, ECS task credentials, and web identity tokens in order.

```properties
secrets.aws.auth-method=DEFAULT
secrets.aws.region=eu-west-1
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="access-key" label="Access Key">

Authenticates with static credentials. Suitable for development or environments where IAM roles are not available.

```properties
secrets.aws.auth-method=ACCESS_KEY
secrets.aws.region=eu-west-1
secrets.aws.access-key-id=${secret:env:AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID}
secrets.aws.secret-access-key=${secret:env:AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY}
# Optional: for temporary credentials from STS
secrets.aws.session-token=${secret:env:AWS_SESSION_TOKEN}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="profile" label="Named Profile">

Uses a named profile from the local AWS credentials file.

```properties
secrets.aws.auth-method=PROFILE
secrets.aws.profile-name=production
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Referencing Secrets

AWS Secrets Manager stores secrets as either plaintext strings or JSON objects. The provider supports both:

```properties
# Plaintext secret — returns the raw value
api.key=${secret:aws:prod/api-key}

# JSON secret — extract a specific field
db.password=${secret:aws:prod/database:password}
db.username=${secret:aws:prod/database:username}
```

When no `key` is specified and the stored value is JSON, the full JSON string is returned.

### Local Development with LocalStack

Override the endpoint to point at a local LocalStack instance:

```properties
secrets.aws.endpoint=http://localhost:4566
secrets.aws.region=us-east-1
```

---

## Azure Key Vault

Azure Key Vault is Microsoft's cloud secret management service, commonly used alongside Azure App Configuration. While App Configuration holds non-sensitive settings (feature flags, endpoints, timeouts), Key Vault holds the secrets those settings reference (database passwords, API keys, certificates).

The EDK provider uses Azure's async SDK with a coroutine bridge for non-blocking resolution. Like the AWS provider, it supports per-tenant vault routing, each tenant can have its own Key Vault instance, and the provider maintains a client pool per vault URL.

The provider requires a `secrets.azure.vault-url` to be configured. Without it, the auto-registration check returns `false` and the provider stays disabled.

```properties
config.providers.azure-keyvault-secrets.enabled=true
secrets.azure.vault-url=https://my-vault.vault.azure.net/
```

### Configuration Properties

| Property | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `secrets.azure.vault-url` | - | Key Vault URL (**required**) |
| `secrets.azure.auth-method` | `DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL` | Authentication method: `DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL`, `CLIENT_SECRET`, `MANAGED_IDENTITY`, or `CLI` |
| `secrets.azure.tenant-id` | - | Azure AD tenant ID (required for `CLIENT_SECRET`) |
| `secrets.azure.client-id` | - | Service principal client ID (required for `CLIENT_SECRET`) |
| `secrets.azure.client-secret` | - | Service principal secret (required for `CLIENT_SECRET`) |
| `secrets.azure.cache-ttl` | `300` | Cache TTL in seconds |

### Authentication Methods

<Tabs>
<TabItem value="default" label="Default Credential" default>

Uses `DefaultAzureCredential`, which tries environment variables, managed identity, Visual Studio auth, Azure CLI, and shared token cache in sequence.

```properties
secrets.azure.auth-method=DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL
secrets.azure.vault-url=https://my-vault.vault.azure.net/
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="client-secret" label="Client Secret">

Authenticates as a service principal with a client secret. Typical for CI/CD and non-Azure hosted workloads.

```properties
secrets.azure.auth-method=CLIENT_SECRET
secrets.azure.vault-url=https://my-vault.vault.azure.net/
secrets.azure.tenant-id=12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012
secrets.azure.client-id=abcdefgh-abcd-abcd-abcd-abcdefghijkl
secrets.azure.client-secret=${secret:env:AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="managed-identity" label="Managed Identity">

Uses the system-assigned managed identity of the Azure resource (VMs, App Service, Container Apps).

```properties
secrets.azure.auth-method=MANAGED_IDENTITY
secrets.azure.vault-url=https://my-vault.vault.azure.net/
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="cli" label="Azure CLI">

Uses Azure CLI credentials. Intended for **local development only**.

```properties
secrets.azure.auth-method=CLI
secrets.azure.vault-url=https://my-vault.vault.azure.net/
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Referencing Secrets

Azure Key Vault stores each secret as a single string value. The `key` segment in the reference syntax is not used, the path maps directly to the Key Vault secret name.

```properties
# Retrieve a secret named "database-password"
db.password=${secret:azure:database-password}

# Retrieve a secret named "api-key"
api.key=${secret:azure:api-key}
```

:::note
Azure Key Vault secret names may only contain alphanumeric characters and dashes. If your secret name does not match this constraint, rename it in Key Vault.
:::

---

## HashiCorp Vault

HashiCorp Vault is the most flexible option, it's cloud-agnostic, self-hosted, and supports advanced features like dynamic secrets, secret rotation, and audit logging at the vault level. It's the natural choice for on-premises deployments, multi-cloud environments, and organizations that need full control over their secret infrastructure.

The EDK provider communicates directly with Vault's KV v2 HTTP API using Ktor, no external Vault SDK or agent is required. It supports three authentication methods: direct token (simplest), AppRole (for automated systems), and Kubernetes service account JWT (for pods in Kubernetes clusters).

For Vault Enterprise, the provider supports namespace isolation, allowing different tenants to access different Vault namespaces. Like the other providers, it maintains a token cache per configuration and supports per-tenant vault routing.

The Vault provider requires `secrets.vault.address` to be configured.

```properties
config.providers.vault-secrets.enabled=true
secrets.vault.address=https://vault.example.com:8200
```

### Configuration Properties

| Property | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `secrets.vault.address` | - | Vault server URL (**required**) |
| `secrets.vault.auth-method` | `TOKEN` | Authentication method: `TOKEN`, `APPROLE`, or `KUBERNETES` |
| `secrets.vault.token` | - | Vault token (required for `TOKEN`) |
| `secrets.vault.approle.role-id` | - | AppRole role ID (required for `APPROLE`) |
| `secrets.vault.approle.secret-id` | - | AppRole secret ID (required for `APPROLE`) |
| `secrets.vault.approle.mount` | `approle` | AppRole auth mount path |
| `secrets.vault.kubernetes.role` | - | Kubernetes auth role (required for `KUBERNETES`) |
| `secrets.vault.kubernetes.jwt-path` | `/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token` | Path to the Kubernetes service account JWT |
| `secrets.vault.kubernetes.mount` | `kubernetes` | Kubernetes auth mount path |
| `secrets.vault.mount` | `secret` | KV v2 secrets engine mount path |
| `secrets.vault.namespace` | - | Vault Enterprise namespace |
| `secrets.vault.cache-ttl` | `300` | Cache TTL in seconds |

### Authentication Methods

<Tabs>
<TabItem value="token" label="Token" default>

Direct token authentication. The simplest method, suitable for development or when tokens are injected by an external process.

```properties
secrets.vault.auth-method=TOKEN
secrets.vault.token=${secret:env:VAULT_TOKEN}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="approle" label="AppRole">

Machine-oriented authentication using a role ID and secret ID. The provider authenticates and caches the resulting token automatically.

```properties
secrets.vault.auth-method=APPROLE
secrets.vault.approle.role-id=db27de19-1af8-a67c-7c1a-123456789012
secrets.vault.approle.secret-id=${secret:env:VAULT_SECRET_ID}
# Optional: custom mount path
secrets.vault.approle.mount=approle
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="kubernetes" label="Kubernetes">

Authenticates using the Kubernetes service account token mounted into the pod. The provider reads the JWT from the filesystem and exchanges it for a Vault token.

```properties
secrets.vault.auth-method=KUBERNETES
secrets.vault.kubernetes.role=my-app
# Defaults to the standard K8s mount path
secrets.vault.kubernetes.jwt-path=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
secrets.vault.kubernetes.mount=kubernetes
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Referencing Secrets

Vault's KV v2 engine stores secrets as JSON objects. You can retrieve the entire object or extract a specific key:

```properties
# Extract a single key from the secret at path "app/database"
db.password=${secret:vault:app/database:password}
db.username=${secret:vault:app/database:username}

# Retrieve the full JSON object as a string
db.config=${secret:vault:app/database}
```

When no `key` is specified, the provider looks for a `value` field in the secret data. If that field does not exist, the full data object is returned as a JSON string.

### Vault Enterprise Namespaces

Set the `namespace` property to isolate secrets per Vault Enterprise namespace. The provider sends the `X-Vault-Namespace` header with every request.

```properties
secrets.vault.namespace=team-payments
```

### Custom Secrets Engine Mount

If your KV v2 engine is mounted at a non-default path, specify it with the `mount` property:

```properties
secrets.vault.mount=kv
# Secrets are now read from /v1/kv/data/<path>
```

---

## Multi-Tenant Configuration

All three providers support multi-tenant deployments. When a secret is resolved, the provider reads its configuration through the `PropertyResolver` passed at resolution time. This means each tenant can override provider settings, for example, pointing at a different Vault address or AWS region.

A typical setup stores tenant-specific overrides in the settings database:

```properties
# App-level defaults
secrets.vault.address=https://vault.example.com:8200
secrets.vault.auth-method=APPROLE

# Tenant "acme" overrides (stored at TENANT scope)
secrets.vault.address=https://vault-eu.example.com:8200
secrets.vault.namespace=acme
```

Each unique combination of provider configuration gets its own cached client connection, so tenants sharing the same backend reuse a single connection.

## Caching

All three providers cache resolved secrets in memory with a configurable TTL (default: 5 minutes). The cache is thread-safe and per-provider.

To force a fresh fetch for a specific secret, use the `bypassCache` option programmatically:

```kotlin
provider.getSecret(
    path = "app/database",
    key = "password",
    options = SecretOptions(bypassCache = true)
)
```

To invalidate the entire cache (e.g. after a secret rotation event):

```kotlin
provider.invalidateCache()            // clear all
provider.invalidateCache("app/database")  // clear a specific path
```

## Health Checks

Each provider exposes a `healthCheck()` method that verifies connectivity to the backend:

| Provider | Health check mechanism |
|----------|----------------------|
| AWS | Attempts a describe call against Secrets Manager |
| Azure | Lists secret properties in the configured vault |
| Vault | Calls `GET /v1/sys/health` |

Use these in your application's readiness probe to detect secret backend outages early.

## Disabling a Provider

To prevent a provider from being registered at startup, set its contribution flag to `false`:

```properties
config.providers.aws-secrets.enabled=false
config.providers.azure-keyvault-secrets.enabled=false
config.providers.vault-secrets.enabled=false
```

---

# Multi-Tenancy

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Multi-Tenancy

The IDK provides built-in support for multi-tenant applications through its scope hierarchy. This enables you to isolate data, configuration, and keys between different tenants (organizations) and principals (users) within your application.

## Tenant and Principal Concepts

In the IDK's multi-tenancy model, a tenant represents an organization or isolated environment, while a principal represents an individual user or system account within that tenant.

The combination of tenant and principal creates a unique user context that isolates:

- Configuration values specific to that tenant or principal
- Cryptographic keys stored in the key management system
- Session state and cached data
- Logging context for traceability

## Creating Tenant-Specific Contexts

When your application serves multiple organizations, create a user context for each tenant-principal combination:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// User from Organization A
val orgAUserContext = appComponent.userContextManager.createOrGetFromInputs(
    tenantInput = DefaultTenantInputString(tenant = "org-a.example.com"),
    principalInput = DefaultPrincipalInputString(principal = "alice@org-a.example.com"),
    makeActive = false
)

// User from Organization B
val orgBUserContext = appComponent.userContextManager.createOrGetFromInputs(
    tenantInput = DefaultTenantInputString(tenant = "org-b.example.com"),
    principalInput = DefaultPrincipalInputString(principal = "bob@org-b.example.com"),
    makeActive = false
)

// Each context has isolated configuration and data
val orgASession = orgAUserContext.sessionContextManager.createOrGetFromId("session-1", true)
val orgBSession = orgBUserContext.sessionContextManager.createOrGetFromId("session-1", true)

// Keys generated in one context are not visible in the other
val orgAKeyManager = orgASession.component.keyManagerService
val orgBKeyManager = orgBSession.component.keyManagerService
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// User from Organization A
let orgAUserContext = appComponent.userContextManager.createOrGetFromInputs(
    tenantInput: DefaultTenantInputString(tenant: "org-a.example.com"),
    principalInput: DefaultPrincipalInputString(principal: "alice@org-a.example.com"),
    makeActive: false
)

// User from Organization B
let orgBUserContext = appComponent.userContextManager.createOrGetFromInputs(
    tenantInput: DefaultTenantInputString(tenant: "org-b.example.com"),
    principalInput: DefaultPrincipalInputString(principal: "bob@org-b.example.com"),
    makeActive: false
)

// Each context has isolated configuration and data
let orgASession = orgAUserContext.sessionContextManager.createOrGetFromId(sessionId: "session-1", makeActive: true)
let orgBSession = orgBUserContext.sessionContextManager.createOrGetFromId(sessionId: "session-1", makeActive: true)

// Keys generated in one context are not visible in the other
let orgAKeyManager = orgASession.component.keyManagerService
let orgBKeyManager = orgBSession.component.keyManagerService
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Configuration Scoping

Configuration values can be set at different scope levels, allowing you to define defaults that can be overridden per tenant or principal.

### Scope Precedence

When resolving a configuration value, the IDK checks scopes in this order:

1. Session scope (most specific)
2. Principal scope
3. Tenant scope
4. Application scope (least specific)

The first scope that has a value for the requested property wins.

### Setting Tenant-Specific Configuration

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Application-wide default
appComponent.configProvider.setProperty(
    scope = ConfigScope.APP,
    key = "api.base.url",
    value = "https://api.default.example.com"
)

// Tenant-specific override
val tenantConfigProvider = userContext.component.configProvider
tenantConfigProvider.setProperty(
    scope = ConfigScope.TENANT,
    key = "api.base.url",
    value = "https://api.tenant-a.example.com"
)

// When resolved in this tenant's context, returns the tenant-specific value
val apiUrl = tenantConfigProvider.getProperty("api.base.url")
// Returns: "https://api.tenant-a.example.com"
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Application-wide default
appComponent.configProvider.setProperty(
    scope: .app,
    key: "api.base.url",
    value: "https://api.default.example.com"
)

// Tenant-specific override
let tenantConfigProvider = userContext.component.configProvider
tenantConfigProvider.setProperty(
    scope: .tenant,
    key: "api.base.url",
    value: "https://api.tenant-a.example.com"
)

// When resolved in this tenant's context, returns the tenant-specific value
let apiUrl = tenantConfigProvider.getProperty(key: "api.base.url")
// Returns: "https://api.tenant-a.example.com"
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Key Isolation

Cryptographic keys are automatically isolated by the user context. Keys generated or stored in one tenant's context are not accessible from another tenant's context.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Generate a key in Tenant A's context
val tenantASession = tenantAContext.sessionContextManager.createOrGetFromId("session", true)
val tenantAKeyManager = tenantASession.component.keyManagerService

val keyPairA = tenantAKeyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ES256,
    keyId = "signing-key"
)

// This key is NOT accessible from Tenant B's context
val tenantBSession = tenantBContext.sessionContextManager.createOrGetFromId("session", true)
val tenantBKeyManager = tenantBSession.component.keyManagerService

// Attempting to retrieve the same key ID returns null or throws
val keyPairB = tenantBKeyManager.getKey("signing-key")
// keyPairB is null - the key doesn't exist in Tenant B's context
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Generate a key in Tenant A's context
let tenantASession = tenantAContext.sessionContextManager.createOrGetFromId(sessionId: "session", makeActive: true)
let tenantAKeyManager = tenantASession.component.keyManagerService

let keyPairA = try await tenantAKeyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alg: .es256,
    keyId: "signing-key"
)

// This key is NOT accessible from Tenant B's context
let tenantBSession = tenantBContext.sessionContextManager.createOrGetFromId(sessionId: "session", makeActive: true)
let tenantBKeyManager = tenantBSession.component.keyManagerService

// Attempting to retrieve the same key ID returns null
let keyPairB = tenantBKeyManager.getKey(keyId: "signing-key")
// keyPairB is nil - the key doesn't exist in Tenant B's context
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Data Storage Isolation

The key-value store and party data store also respect tenant boundaries:

```kotlin
// Store data in Tenant A's context
val tenantAStore = tenantASession.component.keyValueStore
tenantAStore.put("user-preferences", userPreferencesJson)

// This data is NOT accessible from Tenant B's context
val tenantBStore = tenantBSession.component.keyValueStore
val preferences = tenantBStore.get("user-preferences")
// preferences is null - data doesn't exist in Tenant B's context
```

## Mobile Applications

For mobile applications that don't require true multi-tenancy (where a single user uses the app), you can still use the scope system with the anonymous context:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Single-user mobile app
val userContext = appComponent.userContextManager.getAnonymous(makeActive = true)

// The anonymous context provides default tenant and principal values
// All data is still properly scoped, just not across multiple tenants
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Single-user mobile app
let userContext = appComponent.userContextManager.getAnonymous(makeActive: true)

// The anonymous context provides default tenant and principal values
// All data is still properly scoped, just not across multiple tenants
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Server Applications

For server applications handling requests from multiple tenants, create a user context for each incoming request based on the authenticated user:

```kotlin
suspend fun handleRequest(request: HttpRequest): HttpResponse {
    // Extract tenant and principal from the authenticated request
    val tenantId = request.headers["X-Tenant-Id"] ?: "default"
    val principalId = request.authentication.principal

    // Create or retrieve the user context
    val userContext = appComponent.userContextManager.createOrGetFromInputs(
        tenantInput = DefaultTenantInputString(tenant = tenantId),
        principalInput = DefaultPrincipalInputString(principal = principalId),
        makeActive = false
    )

    // Create a request-scoped session
    val requestId = request.headers["X-Request-Id"] ?: UUID.randomUUID().toString()
    val session = userContext.sessionContextManager.createOrGetFromId(requestId, true)

    try {
        // Handle the request with tenant-isolated services
        val keyManager = session.component.keyManagerService
        // ... process request
    } finally {
        // Clean up the session after the request
        userContext.sessionContextManager.destroy(requestId)
    }
}
```

## Best Practices

When implementing multi-tenancy:

Use meaningful tenant identifiers. Domain names or organization IDs work well and make logs easier to understand.

Don't hardcode tenant values. Accept them from authentication tokens or request headers.

Clean up sessions promptly in server applications. This prevents resource leaks when handling many concurrent requests.

Test with multiple tenants. Verify that data truly is isolated by creating test cases that attempt cross-tenant access.

Consider tenant provisioning. You may need additional logic to provision tenant-specific configuration when a new tenant onboards.

---

# Logging

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Logging

The IDK provides a structured logging system that is scope-aware, asynchronous, and multiplatform. Loggers are tied to the DI scope hierarchy (app, user context, and session), so every log message carries the context of where it was produced. Multiple log providers (console, mobile, custom) can run simultaneously, and a policy system controls what gets logged at runtime without code changes.

## Key Concepts

**Scope-aware:** Each scope level has its own `LogManager` and set of `LogService` instances. A session-scoped logger automatically includes the session ID and context, while an app-scoped logger only has application-level context. In session-scoped code, prefer the session logger; it knows which tenant, principal, and session produced the log.

**Async by default:** All logging is non-blocking. Log calls dispatch to a coroutine scope and return immediately, so logging never slows down your application's critical path.

**Lazy evaluation:** Every log method has a lambda variant. The lambda is only evaluated when the log level is enabled, avoiding expensive string formatting for disabled levels.

**Multi-provider:** The IDK routes log messages to all registered providers (console, mobile buffer, custom backends) simultaneously. Providers are contributed to the DI graph per scope.

**Config-driven:** Log levels can be controlled entirely from config files, with overrides per module, service, or individual command. You can also set different log levels per tenant. No code changes needed to adjust logging in production. See [Configuration](configuration#config-driven-log-policy) for details.

## Log Managers

Each scope has a dedicated `LogManager`:

| Scope | Manager | Graph accessor |
|-------|---------|---------------|
| Application | `AppLogManager` | `appGraph.appLogManager` |
| User Context | `UserContextLogManager` | `userContext.graph.logManager` |
| Session | `SessionLogManager` | `session.graph.logManager` |

The session graph also exposes a `SessionLogService` through `SessionExecution`, which is the most common way to log from session-scoped code.

## Basic Usage

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get a logger from the session graph
val logger = session.graph.logManager.withTag("MyFeature")

// Simple log calls
logger.info("Processing credential request")
logger.debug("Request payload size: ${payload.size}")
logger.warn("Retry attempt 2 of 3")
logger.error("Failed to verify signature", exception = ex)

// Lazy evaluation - the lambda is only called if DEBUG is enabled
logger.debug { "Full request dump: ${request.toDetailedString()}" }
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get a logger from the session graph
let logger = session.graph.logManager.withTag(tag: "MyFeature")

// Simple log calls
logger.info(message: "Processing credential request")
logger.debug(message: "Request payload size: \(payload.count)")
logger.warn(message: "Retry attempt 2 of 3")
logger.error(message: "Failed to verify signature", exception: ex)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Log Levels

| Level | Value | Use for |
|-------|-------|---------|
| `TRACE` | 0 | Fine-grained diagnostic detail |
| `DEBUG` | 10 | Development and troubleshooting information |
| `INFO` | 20 | Normal operational events |
| `WARN` | 30 | Unexpected but recoverable situations |
| `ERROR` | 40 | Failures that need attention |
| `OFF` | 100 | Disables logging entirely |

## Log Messages

Every log call produces a `LogMessage`:

```kotlin
data class LogMessage(
    val level: LogLevel,
    val message: String,
    val tag: String? = null,
    val exception: Throwable? = null,
    val errorResult: IdkResult<Nothing, *>? = null,
    val metadata: Map<String, String>? = null,
    val timestamp: Long
)
```

The `metadata` map lets you attach structured key-value pairs to any log entry. The `errorResult` field integrates with the IDK's `IdkResult` error handling, so you can log a failed result directly without extracting the error message yourself.

## Why Session Loggers Matter

When code runs inside a session scope, the session logger knows the tenant, principal, and session ID. This context is automatically included in log output:

```kotlin
// App logger - no session context
val appLogger = appGraph.appLogManager.withTag("Startup")
appLogger.info("Application started")  // Logs: [INFO] [Startup] Application started

// Session logger - includes session context
val sessionLogger = session.graph.logManager.withTag("Verification")
sessionLogger.info("Signature verified")
// Logs: [INFO] [Verification] [session:abc-123] [tenant:acme] Signature verified
```

If you use an app-scoped logger from within session code, you lose this context. Always prefer the scope-appropriate logger.

## Next Steps

- [Scoped Loggers](scoped-loggers): Detailed guide to app, user, and session loggers
- [Configuration](configuration): Log levels, policies, output formats, and providers

---

# Scoped Loggers

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Scoped Loggers

The IDK provides loggers at three scope levels. Each level carries progressively more context about the execution environment. Choosing the right scope for your logger ensures that log output is traceable and that expensive log evaluation only happens when needed.

## The Three Scopes

### Application Scope

The `AppLogManager` is a singleton that lives for the entire application. Use it for startup/shutdown events, global configuration changes, and anything that happens outside a user context or session.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val appLogger = appGraph.appLogManager.withTag("Startup")

appLogger.info("IDK initialized, version ${appGraph.version}")
appLogger.debug("Loaded ${providers.size} configuration providers")
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let appLogger = appGraph.appLogManager.withTag(tag: "Startup")

appLogger.info(message: "IDK initialized")
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### User Context Scope

The `UserContextLogManager` is scoped to a tenant and principal combination. Use it when you have a user context but haven't created a session yet, for example during tenant-level configuration setup.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val contextLogger = userContext.graph.logManager.withTag("TenantSetup")

contextLogger.info("Configuring tenant ${userContext.context.tenant.tenantId}")
contextLogger.debug("Loading tenant-specific trust anchors")
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let contextLogger = userContext.graph.logManager.withTag(tag: "TenantSetup")

contextLogger.info(message: "Configuring tenant")
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Session Scope

The `SessionLogManager` carries the full context: tenant, principal, and session ID. This is the logger you should use in most application code, since the majority of IDK operations happen within a session.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val sessionLogger = session.graph.logManager.withTag("Verification")

sessionLogger.info("Starting credential verification")
sessionLogger.debug("Verifying against ${trustAnchors.size} trust anchors")
sessionLogger.error("Verification failed", exception = ex)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let sessionLogger = session.graph.logManager.withTag(tag: "Verification")

sessionLogger.info(message: "Starting credential verification")
sessionLogger.error(message: "Verification failed", exception: ex)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### SessionLogService via SessionExecution

IDK services that extend `SessionExecution` have a built-in `log` property that is already tagged with the session ID:

```kotlin
// Inside a session-scoped service
class MyServiceImpl(
    private val sessionExecution: SessionExecution
) {
    fun doWork() {
        sessionExecution.log.info("Starting work")
        // Automatically tagged with session ID
    }
}
```

## Choosing the Right Scope

The rule is simple: **use the most specific scope available.**

| You are in... | Use | Why |
|--------------|-----|-----|
| Application startup, background tasks | `AppLogManager` | No session or user context exists |
| Tenant configuration, user context setup | `UserContextLogManager` | Includes tenant/principal context |
| Session-scoped services, request handlers, credential operations | `SessionLogManager` | Includes full context (tenant, principal, session ID) |

Using an app-scoped logger inside session code is a common mistake. The log output will work, but it loses the session context that makes logs traceable in multi-tenant, multi-session environments.

## Tags

Tags group related log messages. Use `withTag()` to create a tagged logger:

```kotlin
val logger = session.graph.logManager.withTag("OID4VP")
logger.info("Processing authorization request")
// Output: [INFO] [OID4VP] [session:abc-123] Processing authorization request
```

Tags are also used by the log policy system to selectively enable or disable logging for specific features.

The `withTagAsync()` variant returns an `AsyncLogService` for use in suspend functions:

```kotlin
val asyncLogger = session.graph.logManager.withTagAsync("OID4VP")
asyncLogger.info("Processing authorization request")
```

## Lazy Log Evaluation

Every log method has a lambda overload. The lambda is only evaluated when the log level is enabled, making it safe to include expensive computations:

```kotlin
val logger = session.graph.logManager.withTag("Debug")

// Eager - always evaluates the string, even if DEBUG is disabled
logger.debug("Request: ${request.toJson()}")

// Lazy - toJson() is only called if DEBUG is enabled
logger.debug { "Request: ${request.toJson()}" }
```

This matters when formatting large objects, serializing data, or computing diagnostics that you only need during development.

All levels support the lazy pattern:

```kotlin
logger.trace { "Detailed state: ${computeState()}" }
logger.debug { "Payload: ${payload.toHexString()}" }
logger.info { "Processed ${items.size} items in ${elapsed}ms" }
logger.warn(errorResult = result) { "Unexpected response: ${result.errorMessage}" }
logger.error(exception = ex) { "Failed: ${ex.stackTraceToString()}" }
```

## Metadata

Attach structured key-value pairs to any log message for filtering and analysis:

```kotlin
logger.info(
    "Credential presented",
    metadata = mapOf(
        "credentialType" to "mDL",
        "transport" to "BLE",
        "verifierDid" to verifier.did
    )
)
```

Metadata is included in both text and JSON output formats, and is available to custom log providers for structured log ingestion.

## Error Integration

Log methods accept `IdkResult` error results directly:

```kotlin
val result = keyManager.generateKey(opts)
if (result.isErr) {
    logger.error(errorResult = result.asErr()) { "Key generation failed" }
}
```

The `warn` and `error` methods also accept exceptions:

```kotlin
try {
    // ...
} catch (e: Exception) {
    logger.error("Unexpected failure", exception = e)
}
```

## The Log Registry

For code outside the DI graph, the `Log` object provides static access to registered log managers:

```kotlin
// Access app-level logger (always available after initialization)
Log.app().withTag("Global").info("Application-level log")

// Access session-level logger by instance
Log.sessionInstance(session).withTag("Ad-hoc").info("Session-level log")
```

This is a convenience for interop scenarios. In DI-managed code, prefer constructor-injected loggers.

---

# Logging Configuration

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Logging Configuration

The IDK logging system is configured at two levels: **LoggerConfig** controls global settings like minimum level and output format, while **LogPolicy** provides fine-grained runtime filtering by scope, service, and command patterns.

## LoggerConfig

The `LoggerConfig` sets the baseline behavior for a logger:

```kotlin
data class LoggerConfig(
    val minLevel: LogLevel = LogLevel.DEBUG,
    val tag: String = "sphereon",
    val outputFormat: LogOutputFormat = LogOutputFormat.TEXT,
    val includeTimestamp: Boolean = false
)
```

### Predefined Configurations

| Config | Level | Format | Timestamp |
|--------|-------|--------|-----------|
| `LoggerConfig.Default` | DEBUG | TEXT | No |
| `LoggerConfig.Debug` | DEBUG | TEXT | No |
| `LoggerConfig.Disabled` | OFF | TEXT | No |
| `LoggerConfig.JsonWithTimestamp` | DEBUG | JSON | Yes |

### Applying a Configuration

Set the global config on any log manager:

```kotlin
val logManager = session.graph.logManager

// setGlobalConfig is a suspend function
scope.launch {
    // Set minimum level to INFO (suppresses TRACE and DEBUG)
    logManager.setGlobalConfig(LoggerConfig(minLevel = LogLevel.INFO))

    // Enable JSON output with timestamps
    logManager.setGlobalConfig(LoggerConfig.JsonWithTimestamp)

    // Disable all logging
    logManager.setGlobalConfig(LoggerConfig.Disabled)
}
```

### Output Formats

**TEXT**: Human-readable plain text:
```
[2025-03-23T10:15:30Z] [INFO] [OID4VP] Processing authorization request {transport=BLE}
```

**JSON**: Structured format for log aggregation:
```json
{"level":"INFO","message":"Processing authorization request","tag":"OID4VP","timestamp":1711181730000,"metadata":{"transport":"BLE"}}
```

## LogPolicy

A `LogPolicy` provides runtime filtering without changing code. Policies filter by scope, service pattern, and command pattern, with wildcard support.

```kotlin
data class LogPolicy(
    val minLevelByScope: Map<IdkScope, LogLevel> = emptyMap(),
    val minLevelByServicePattern: Map<String, LogLevel> = emptyMap(),
    val minLevelByCommandPattern: Map<String, LogLevel> = emptyMap(),
    val disabledScopes: Set<IdkScope> = emptySet(),
    val disabledServicePatterns: Set<String> = emptySet(),
    val disabledCommandPatterns: Set<String> = emptySet()
)
```

### Scope-Level Filtering

Control the minimum log level per scope:

```kotlin
val policy = LogPolicy(
    minLevelByScope = mapOf(
        IdkScope.APP to LogLevel.INFO,       // App logs: INFO and above
        IdkScope.SESSION to LogLevel.DEBUG,   // Session logs: DEBUG and above
        IdkScope.USER to LogLevel.WARN        // User context logs: WARN and above
    )
)

// setGlobalPolicy is a suspend function
scope.launch {
    logManager.setGlobalPolicy(policy)
}
```

### Pattern-Based Filtering

Use wildcard patterns to filter by service or command:

```kotlin
val policy = LogPolicy(
    // Suppress debug logs from all trust-related services
    minLevelByServicePattern = mapOf(
        "trust.*" to LogLevel.INFO
    ),
    // Enable trace logs for a specific command
    minLevelByCommandPattern = mapOf(
        "trust.etsi.validate" to LogLevel.TRACE
    ),
    // Disable logging from noisy services
    disabledServicePatterns = setOf("health-check*")
)
```

Patterns use `*` as a wildcard. When multiple patterns match, the most specific one (fewest wildcards) wins.

### Policy Evaluation Order

When a log call is made, the policy is evaluated in this order:

1. **Scope**: Is the scope disabled? Is the level above the scope minimum?
2. **Service pattern**: Does the service ID match a pattern? Apply its level.
3. **Command/tag pattern**: Does the command or tag match? Apply its level.

Later steps override earlier ones. A service-level override takes precedence over a scope-level setting.

## Config-Driven Log Policy

Instead of setting log policies in code, you can drive them entirely from configuration files. The logging system uses the [module/service/command override](../../config/configuration#module-service-and-command-overrides) mechanism, so you can set a global log level and then override it for specific modules or commands without touching code.

### Global settings

Set log policy at the application level using the `logging.policy` config suffix:

```properties
# Default minimum level for everything
logging.policy.min.level=INFO

# Per-scope minimums
logging.policy.by.scope.app=INFO
logging.policy.by.scope.session=DEBUG

# Per-module minimums (applies to all services in that module)
logging.policy.by.module.kms=DEBUG
logging.policy.by.module.trust=WARN

# Per-service pattern
logging.policy.by.service.trust.*=WARN

# Disable logging for noisy services
logging.policy.disabled.service.patterns=health-check*
```

Or in YAML:

```yaml title="application.yml"
logging:
  policy:
    min:
      level: INFO
    by:
      scope:
        app: INFO
        session: DEBUG
      module:
        kms: DEBUG
        trust: WARN
    disabled:
      service-patterns:
        - "health-check*"
```

### Per-module and per-command overrides

For more targeted control, use the `cmd.*` prefix to override logging for a specific module, service, or command. This is the same mechanism the [HTTP client config](../../config/configuration#module-service-and-command-overrides) uses:

```properties
# All OID4VP operations: DEBUG
cmd.oid4vp.default.default.logging.policy.min.level=DEBUG

# Just the KMS key-get command: TRACE
cmd.kms.keys.get.logging.policy.min.level=TRACE

# Trust validation service: suppress debug noise
cmd.trust.default.default.logging.policy.min.level=WARN
```

These overrides compose with the global settings. The `CommandScopedConfigBinder` merges them from least-specific (global) to most-specific (command), so a command-level override only needs to specify the properties it changes. Everything else falls through to the module or global level.

### Tenant-level overrides

Because the config system cascades through APP, TENANT, and PRINCIPAL scopes, you can set different log levels per tenant. A tenant's config file can override the global policy:

```properties title="config/tenant/acme-corp/tenant.properties"
logging.policy.min.level=DEBUG
logging.policy.by.module.oid4vp=TRACE
```

This only affects sessions running under the `acme-corp` tenant. Other tenants keep the app-level defaults.

### How it works

The `LogPolicyConfigResolver` reads `logging.policy.*` properties through a `CommandScopedConfigBinder` and converts them to a runtime `LogPolicy`. It's injected into the user scope and resolves config from the principal-level `ConfigService`, which cascades through tenant and app parents automatically. The resolved `LogPolicy` is the same data structure you'd build programmatically, so the code-based and config-based approaches are interchangeable.

## Log Providers

The IDK ships with built-in providers and supports custom ones. Providers are registered per scope via the DI graph.

### Console Logger

The default provider. Writes to `println()` on all platforms. One instance is contributed per scope:

- `AppConsoleLogServiceImpl`: `AppScope`
- `UserContextConsoleLogServiceImpl`: `UserScope`
- `SessionConsoleLogServiceImpl`: `SessionScope`

These are always available. No additional dependencies needed.

### Mobile Logger (Optional)

For iOS and Android apps, the mobile logger adds:

- **In-memory circular buffer** (default 5000 entries) for on-device log inspection
- **Platform-native output**: Android Logcat, iOS NSLog
- **Log querying**: filter by level, tag, time range
- **Export**: text, JSON, or CSV format
- **Real-time flow**: `StateFlow<List<MobileLogEntry>>` for UI binding

Add the mobile logger module:

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-core-mobile-logger:0.25.0")
}
```

Once on the classpath, mobile log services are auto-registered at all three scopes via `@ContributesIntoSet`.

Access the mobile log manager for querying and export:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val mobileLogManager: MobileLogManager = session.graph.mobileLogManager

// Query recent logs
val recentLogs = mobileLogManager.getRecentLogs(count = 50)

// Filter by level
val errors = mobileLogManager.getErrorLogs()

// Search by text
val results = mobileLogManager.searchLogs(query = "verification")

// Export for sharing
val logText = mobileLogManager.exportLogsAsText()
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let mobileLogManager = session.graph.mobileLogManager

// Query recent logs
let recentLogs = mobileLogManager.getRecentLogs(count: 50)

// Export for sharing
let logText = mobileLogManager.exportLogsAsText()
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Custom Providers

Implement `LogService` and contribute it to the appropriate scope:

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@ContributesIntoSet(SessionScope::class, binding = binding<LogService>())
class MyRemoteLogService(
    private val httpClient: HttpClientFactory
) : AbstractLogService() {

    override val id = "RemoteLogger"
    override val scope = IdkScope.SESSION
    override val isEnabled = true

    override suspend fun doExecute(args: LogMessage): IdkResult<Unit, IdkErrorType> {
        // Send to your log aggregation backend
        httpClient.post("/logs", args.toJson())
        return Unit.asOkResult()
    }
}
```

The IDK's `MultiLogService` automatically routes messages to all registered providers, so your custom logger receives events alongside the console logger without any additional wiring.

## No-Op Loggers

Each scope also contributes a `NoLogService` that discards all messages. These exist to satisfy the DI graph when no real loggers are configured. They are always disabled (`isEnabled = false`) and are filtered out by the log manager automatically.

---

# Key Management

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Key Management

The IDK provides a unified key management system through the `KeyManagerService`. This service abstracts the details of different key storage backends, allowing you to generate, store, and use cryptographic keys consistently across platforms and providers.

## KeyManagerService Overview

The `KeyManagerService` is the central entry point for all cryptographic key operations. It delegates actual key operations to registered KMS providers while presenting a consistent interface.

Key capabilities include:

- Key generation with configurable algorithms
- Key storage and retrieval
- Signing and verification operations
- Encryption and decryption
- Key wrapping and unwrapping
- Key agreement for establishing shared secrets
- Provider capability querying

## Accessing the Service

The `KeyManagerService` is available from the session component:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val keyManager = session.component.keyManagerService
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let keyManager = session.component.keyManagerService
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Generating Keys

Generate cryptographic key pairs using the `generateKeyAsync` method:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.crypto.core.SignatureAlgorithm
import com.sphereon.crypto.jose.JwkUse
import com.sphereon.crypto.core.KeyOperations

// Generate an ECDSA P-256 signing key
val signingKeyPair = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId = null,  // Use default provider
    alias = "my-signing-key",
    use = JwkUse.sig,
    keyOperations = arrayOf(KeyOperations.SIGN, KeyOperations.VERIFY),
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256,
    keyVisibility = KeyVisibility.PRIVATE
)

// Generate with a specific provider
val awsKeyPair = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId = "aws",
    alias = "my-aws-key",
    use = JwkUse.sig,
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonCrypto

// Generate an ECDSA P-256 signing key
let signingKeyPair = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId: nil,  // Use default provider
    alias: "my-signing-key",
    use: .sig,
    keyOperations: [.sign, .verify],
    alg: .ecdsaSha256,
    keyVisibility: .private_
)

// Generate with a specific provider
let awsKeyPair = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId: "aws",
    alias: "my-aws-key",
    use: .sig,
    alg: .ecdsaSha256
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Supported Algorithms

The IDK supports the following signature algorithms:

| Algorithm | Description | Curve/Size |
|-----------|-------------|------------|
| `ECDSA_SHA256` | ECDSA with SHA-256 | P-256 |
| `ECDSA_SHA384` | ECDSA with SHA-384 | P-384 |
| `ECDSA_SHA512` | ECDSA with SHA-512 | P-521 |
| `RSA_SHA256` | RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 | 2048+ bits |
| `RSA_SHA384` | RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-384 | 2048+ bits |
| `RSA_SHA512` | RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-512 | 2048+ bits |
| `RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA256_MGF1` | RSA-PSS with SHA-256 | 2048+ bits |
| `RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA384_MGF1` | RSA-PSS with SHA-384 | 2048+ bits |
| `RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA512_MGF1` | RSA-PSS with SHA-512 | 2048+ bits |

## ManagedKeyPair

After generating a key, you receive a `ManagedKeyPair` containing both COSE and JOSE representations:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// ManagedKeyPair contains both formats
val keyPair: ManagedKeyPair = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(...)

// Access COSE format
val cosePublicKey = keyPair.cose.publicCoseKey
val cosePrivateKey = keyPair.cose.privateCoseKey  // May be null for hardware keys

// Access JOSE/JWK format
val publicJwk = keyPair.jose.publicJwk
val privateJwk = keyPair.jose.privateJwk  // May be null for hardware keys

// Key identifiers
val kid = keyPair.kid
val alias = keyPair.alias
val providerId = keyPair.providerId
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// ManagedKeyPair contains both formats
let keyPair: ManagedKeyPair = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(...)

// Access COSE format
let cosePublicKey = keyPair.cose.publicCoseKey
let cosePrivateKey = keyPair.cose.privateCoseKey  // May be nil for hardware keys

// Access JOSE/JWK format
let publicJwk = keyPair.jose.publicJwk
let privateJwk = keyPair.jose.privateJwk  // May be nil for hardware keys

// Key identifiers
let kid = keyPair.kid
let alias = keyPair.alias
let providerId = keyPair.providerId
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Key Info Types

The IDK provides different key info types for different use cases:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Convert to ManagedKeyInfo for COSE operations
val coseKeyInfo: ManagedKeyInfoType<CoseKeyType> = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(
    visibility = KeyVisibility.PUBLIC
)

// Convert to ManagedKeyInfo for JOSE operations
val joseKeyInfo: ManagedKeyInfoType<JwkType> = keyPair.joseToManagedKeyInfo(
    visibility = KeyVisibility.PUBLIC
)

// Generic conversion with encoding specification
val keyInfo = keyPair.toManagedKeyInfo<CoseKeyType>(
    visibility = KeyVisibility.PRIVATE,
    keyEncoding = KeyEncoding.COSE
)

// Access key info properties
val providerId = keyInfo.providerId
val alias = keyInfo.alias
val signatureAlgorithm = keyInfo.signatureAlgorithm
val x5c = keyInfo.x5c  // X.509 certificate chain if available
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Convert to ManagedKeyInfo for COSE operations
let coseKeyInfo: ManagedKeyInfoType = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(
    visibility: .public_
)

// Convert to ManagedKeyInfo for JOSE operations
let joseKeyInfo: ManagedKeyInfoType = keyPair.joseToManagedKeyInfo(
    visibility: .public_
)

// Access key info properties
let providerId = keyInfo.providerId
let alias = keyInfo.alias
let signatureAlgorithm = keyInfo.signatureAlgorithm
let x5c = keyInfo.x5c  // X.509 certificate chain if available
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Signing Data

Create signatures using stored keys:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get key info for signing (needs private key access)
val keyInfo = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(visibility = KeyVisibility.PRIVATE)

// Sign raw bytes
val data = "Hello, World!".encodeToByteArray()
val signature = keyManager.createRawSignature(
    keyInfo = keyInfo,
    input = data,
    requireX5Chain = false
)

// Sign with X.509 certificate chain requirement
val signatureWithCert = keyManager.createRawSignature(
    keyInfo = keyInfo,
    input = data,
    requireX5Chain = true  // Requires associated certificate
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get key info for signing (needs private key access)
let keyInfo = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(visibility: .private_)

// Sign raw bytes
let data = "Hello, World!".data(using: .utf8)!
let signature = try await keyManager.createRawSignature(
    keyInfo: keyInfo,
    input: data,
    requireX5Chain: false
)

// Sign with X.509 certificate chain requirement
let signatureWithCert = try await keyManager.createRawSignature(
    keyInfo: keyInfo,
    input: data,
    requireX5Chain: true  // Requires associated certificate
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Verifying Signatures

Verify signatures against public keys:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get public key info for verification
val publicKeyInfo = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(visibility = KeyVisibility.PUBLIC)

// Verify the signature
val isValid = keyManager.isValidRawSignature(
    keyInfo = publicKeyInfo,
    input = data,
    signature = signature
)

if (isValid) {
    println("Signature is valid")
} else {
    println("Signature verification failed")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get public key info for verification
let publicKeyInfo = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(visibility: .public_)

// Verify the signature
let isValid = try await keyManager.isValidRawSignature(
    keyInfo: publicKeyInfo,
    input: data,
    signature: signature
)

if isValid {
    print("Signature is valid")
} else {
    print("Signature verification failed")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Key Retrieval

Retrieve previously generated keys using the key store:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// List all keys in the key store
val allKeys = keyManager.keyStore.listKeys()
for (keyInfo in allKeys) {
    println("Key: ${keyInfo.alias}, Provider: ${keyInfo.providerId}")
}

// Get a specific key
val keyInfo = KeyInfo<CoseKeyType>(
    alias = "my-signing-key",
    providerId = keyManager.defaultProviderId()
)
val existingKey = keyManager.keyStore.getKey(keyInfo)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// List all keys in the key store
let allKeys = try await keyManager.keyStore.listKeys()
for keyInfo in allKeys {
    print("Key: \(keyInfo.alias), Provider: \(keyInfo.providerId)")
}

// Get a specific key
let keyInfo = KeyInfo(
    alias: "my-signing-key",
    providerId: keyManager.defaultProviderId()
)
let existingKey = try await keyManager.keyStore.getKey(keyInfo: keyInfo)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Key Deletion

Remove keys that are no longer needed:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Delete a specific key
val keyInfo = KeyInfo<CoseKeyType>(
    alias = "my-signing-key",
    providerId = keyManager.defaultProviderId()
)
val deleted = keyManager.keyStore.deleteKey(keyInfo)
if (deleted) {
    println("Key deleted successfully")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Delete a specific key
let keyInfo = KeyInfo(
    alias: "my-signing-key",
    providerId: keyManager.defaultProviderId()
)
let deleted = try await keyManager.keyStore.deleteKey(keyInfo: keyInfo)
if deleted {
    print("Key deleted successfully")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Provider Management

Query and manage KMS providers:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get default provider ID
val defaultProvider = keyManager.defaultProviderId()

// List all registered providers
val providerIds = keyManager.getProviderIds()

// Get a specific provider
val provider = keyManager.getProviderById("software")

// Find provider by algorithm support
val ecdsaProvider = keyManager.getKmsBySignatureAlgorithm(SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256)

// Query providers by capabilities
val queryResult = keyManager.queryProviderAsync(
    KmsProviderQuery(
        signatureAlgorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256,
        requireHardwareBacking = true
    )
)

when (queryResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val provider = queryResult.value.provider
        println("Found provider: ${provider.id}")
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("No matching provider found")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get default provider ID
let defaultProvider = keyManager.defaultProviderId()

// List all registered providers
let providerIds = keyManager.getProviderIds()

// Get a specific provider
let provider = keyManager.getProviderById(id: "software")

// Find provider by algorithm support
let ecdsaProvider = keyManager.getKmsBySignatureAlgorithm(
    alg: .ecdsaSha256
)

// Query providers by capabilities
let queryResult = try await keyManager.queryProviderAsync(
    query: KmsProviderQuery(
        signatureAlgorithm: .ecdsaSha256,
        requireHardwareBacking: true
    )
)

switch queryResult {
case .success(let value):
    let provider = value.provider
    print("Found provider: \(provider.id)")
case .failure:
    print("No matching provider found")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Provider Capabilities

Query what operations a provider supports:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get all capabilities from all providers
val capsResult = keyManager.getAllCapabilitiesAsync(includeDisabled = false)

when (capsResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        for (cap in capsResult.value.capabilities) {
            println("Provider: ${cap.providerId}")
            println("  Storage types: ${cap.storageTypes.joinToString()}")
            println("  Supports import: ${cap.supportsKeyImport}")
            println("  Supports export: ${cap.supportsKeyExport}")
            println("  Hardware backing: ${cap.supportsHardwareBacking}")
            println("  Supported curves: ${cap.supportedCurves.joinToString()}")
            println("  Supports signing: ${cap.supportsSigning()}")
            println("  Supports encryption: ${cap.supportsEncryption()}")
        }
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Failed to get capabilities")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get all capabilities from all providers
let capsResult = try await keyManager.getAllCapabilitiesAsync(includeDisabled: false)

switch capsResult {
case .success(let value):
    for cap in value.capabilities {
        print("Provider: \(cap.providerId)")
        print("  Storage types: \(cap.storageTypes)")
        print("  Supports import: \(cap.supportsKeyImport)")
        print("  Supports export: \(cap.supportsKeyExport)")
        print("  Hardware backing: \(cap.supportsHardwareBacking)")
        print("  Supported curves: \(cap.supportedCurves)")
        print("  Supports signing: \(cap.supportsSigning())")
        print("  Supports encryption: \(cap.supportsEncryption())")
    }
case .failure:
    print("Failed to get capabilities")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Key Lifecycle Best Practices

When managing cryptographic keys:

**Generate keys with appropriate algorithms.** `ECDSA_SHA256` (ES256) is a good default for signing, offering a balance of security and performance.

**Use meaningful aliases.** Include context like purpose and creation date to simplify key management.

**Scope keys appropriately.** Keys are tied to their provider and cannot be transferred between providers.

**Consider key rotation.** For long-lived applications, implement key rotation where new keys are generated periodically and old keys retained for verification until they expire.

**Use hardware backing when available.** The mobile provider uses platform secure storage (iOS Secure Enclave, Android Keystore) which cannot export private keys.

---

# KMS Providers

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# KMS Providers

The IDK supports multiple key management system (KMS) providers, allowing you to store cryptographic keys in the most appropriate backend for your use case. Multiple providers can be active simultaneously.

## Available Providers

| Provider Type | Platforms | Use Case |
|---------------|-----------|----------|
| `SOFTWARE` | All | In-memory or file-based keys for development and testing |
| `MOBILE` | iOS, Android | Hardware-backed keys using Secure Enclave or Android Keystore |
| `AWS_KMS` | JVM | Cloud-hosted HSM keys with AWS Key Management Service |
| `AZURE_KEYVAULT` | JVM, JS | Cloud-hosted HSM keys with Azure Key Vault |
| `REST` | All | Remote KMS accessed via REST API |

## Provider Capabilities Comparison

### Platform Availability

| Provider | Android | iOS | JVM/Server | Web/JS |
|----------|---------|-----|------------|--------|
| Software | ✓ | ✓ (Keychain) | ✓ | ✓ (WebCrypto) |
| Mobile | ✓ (Keystore) | ✓ (Secure Enclave) | ✗ | ✗ |
| AWS KMS | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Azure Key Vault | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| REST Client | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

### Key Operations

| Operation | Software | Mobile | AWS KMS | Azure | REST |
|-----------|----------|--------|---------|-------|------|
| Generate Key | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Import Key | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Export Key | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| Delete Key | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| List Keys | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

### Cryptographic Operations

| Operation | Software | Mobile | AWS KMS | Azure | REST |
|-----------|----------|--------|---------|-------|------|
| Sign | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Verify | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Encrypt | ✓ (GCM) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Decrypt | ✓ (GCM) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Key Wrap | ✓ (RSA-OAEP, AES-KW) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Key Unwrap | ✓ (RSA-OAEP, AES-KW) | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ |
| Key Agreement (ECDH) | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ |

### Supported Key Types and Curves

| Provider | EC Curves | RSA Key Sizes |
|----------|-----------|---------------|
| Software | P-256, P-384, P-521 | 2048, 3072, 4096 |
| Mobile | P-256, P-384, P-521 | 2048, 3072, 4096 |
| AWS KMS | P-256, P-384, P-521 | 2048, 3072, 4096 |
| Azure Key Vault | P-256, P-384, P-521, secp256k1 | 2048 |
| REST Client | P-256, P-384, P-521 | 2048, 3072, 4096 |

### Signature Algorithms

| Algorithm | Software | Mobile | AWS KMS | Azure | REST |
|-----------|----------|--------|---------|-------|------|
| ECDSA + SHA-256 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| ECDSA + SHA-384 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| ECDSA + SHA-512 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| RSA PKCS#1 + SHA-256 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| RSA PKCS#1 + SHA-384 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| RSA PKCS#1 + SHA-512 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| RSA-PSS + SHA-256 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| RSA-PSS + SHA-384 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| RSA-PSS + SHA-512 | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

### Content Encryption Algorithms

| Algorithm | Software | Mobile | AWS KMS | Azure |
|-----------|----------|--------|---------|-------|
| A128GCM | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| A192GCM | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| A256GCM | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| A128CBC-HS256 | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| A192CBC-HS384 | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| A256CBC-HS512 | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |

### Key Wrapping Algorithms

| Algorithm | Software | Mobile | AWS KMS | Azure |
|-----------|----------|--------|---------|-------|
| RSA-OAEP | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| RSA-OAEP-256 | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| RSA-OAEP-512 | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| RSA1_5 | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| A128KW | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| A192KW | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |
| A256KW | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✓ |

### Key Agreement Algorithms

| Algorithm | Software | Mobile | AWS KMS | Azure |
|-----------|----------|--------|---------|-------|
| ECDH-ES | ✓ | ✗ | ✓ | ✗ |
| ECDH-ES+A128KW | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| ECDH-ES+A192KW | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| ECDH-ES+A256KW | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |

### Storage and Security

| Feature | Software | Mobile | AWS KMS | Azure | REST |
|---------|----------|--------|---------|-------|------|
| Hardware Backing | Optional | ✓ | ✓ (HSM) | ✓ (HSM) | Depends on backend |
| Private Key Export | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | Depends on backend |
| Persistent Storage | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| Ephemeral Storage | ✓ | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| Certificate Generation | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Certificate Import | ✓ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |

### Provider Selection Quick Reference

| Use Case | Recommended Provider |
|----------|---------------------|
| Production mobile wallet | Mobile |
| Development and testing | Software |
| Server-side with AWS infrastructure | AWS KMS |
| Server-side with Azure infrastructure | Azure Key Vault |
| Delegated signing to remote service | REST Client |
| Cross-platform with hardware preference | Software (uses native APIs when available) |

## Provider Capabilities

Each provider declares its capabilities. Query them to understand what operations are available:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val provider = keyManager.getProviderById("software")
val capabilities = provider.getCapabilities()

// Storage capabilities
println("Storage types: ${capabilities.storageTypes.joinToString()}")  // PERSISTENT, EPHEMERAL
println("Supports import: ${capabilities.supportsKeyImport}")
println("Supports export: ${capabilities.supportsKeyExport}")
println("Exposes private keys: ${capabilities.exposePrivateKeys}")

// Cryptographic capabilities
println("Key types: ${capabilities.supportedKeyTypes.joinToString()}")  // EC, RSA
println("Curves: ${capabilities.supportedCurves.joinToString()}")  // P_256, P_384, P_521
println("Digests: ${capabilities.supportedDigestAlgorithms.joinToString()}")

// Operations
println("Supports signing: ${capabilities.supportsSigning()}")
println("Supports encryption: ${capabilities.supportsEncryption()}")
println("Supports key agreement: ${capabilities.supportsKeyAgreement()}")
println("Hardware backing: ${capabilities.supportsHardwareBacking}")
println("X.509 support: ${capabilities.supportsX509}")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let provider = keyManager.getProviderById(id: "software")
let capabilities = provider.getCapabilities()

// Storage capabilities
print("Storage types: \(capabilities.storageTypes)")  // PERSISTENT, EPHEMERAL
print("Supports import: \(capabilities.supportsKeyImport)")
print("Supports export: \(capabilities.supportsKeyExport)")
print("Exposes private keys: \(capabilities.exposePrivateKeys)")

// Cryptographic capabilities
print("Key types: \(capabilities.supportedKeyTypes)")  // EC, RSA
print("Curves: \(capabilities.supportedCurves)")  // P_256, P_384, P_521
print("Digests: \(capabilities.supportedDigestAlgorithms)")

// Operations
print("Supports signing: \(capabilities.supportsSigning())")
print("Supports encryption: \(capabilities.supportsEncryption())")
print("Supports key agreement: \(capabilities.supportsKeyAgreement())")
print("Hardware backing: \(capabilities.supportsHardwareBacking)")
print("X.509 support: \(capabilities.supportsX509)")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Software Provider

The software provider stores keys in memory or on the filesystem. It's suitable for development, testing, and scenarios where hardware-backed storage isn't required.

### Capabilities

- **Storage**: Persistent and ephemeral
- **Key Types**: EC, RSA, Symmetric (oct)
- **Curves**: P-256, P-384, P-521
- **Operations**: Generate, import, export, delete, sign, verify, encrypt, decrypt, wrap, unwrap, key agreement
- **Signature Algorithms**: ECDSA (SHA-256/384/512), RSA (SHA-256/384/512), RSA-PSS
- **Encryption Algorithms**: A128GCM, A192GCM, A256GCM
- **Key Wrap Algorithms**: RSA-OAEP, RSA-OAEP-256, RSA-OAEP-512, A128KW, A192KW, A256KW
- **Key Agreement**: ECDH-ES, ECDH-ES+A128KW, ECDH-ES+A192KW, ECDH-ES+A256KW

### Configuration

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.crypto.kms.provider.software.SoftwareKmsProviderConfig
import com.sphereon.crypto.kms.provider.software.SoftwareKmsProviderFactory

// Create software provider configuration
val softwareConfig = SoftwareKmsProviderConfig(
    id = "software",
    exposePrivateKeysDuringGeneration = true,
    keyStore = KeyStoreConfig(
        path = "/data/app/keys",
        overwriteAlias = true
    )
)

// Factory creates the provider instance
val factory: SoftwareKmsProviderFactory = ...
val softwareProvider = factory.create(softwareConfig, session.execution)

// Register with key manager
keyManager.registerProvider(softwareProvider, makeDefaultKms = true)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonCrypto

// Create software provider configuration
let softwareConfig = SoftwareKmsProviderConfig(
    id: "software",
    exposePrivateKeysDuringGeneration: true,
    keyStore: KeyStoreConfig(
        path: "/data/app/keys",
        overwriteAlias: true
    )
)

// Factory creates the provider instance
let factory: SoftwareKmsProviderFactory = ...
let softwareProvider = factory.create(config: softwareConfig, execution: session.execution)

// Register with key manager
keyManager.registerProvider(provider: softwareProvider, makeDefaultKms: true)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Mobile Provider

The mobile provider uses platform-specific secure storage:

- **iOS**: Secure Enclave for private key operations
- **Android**: Android Keystore with hardware backing when available

This is the recommended provider for production mobile applications.

### Capabilities

- **Storage**: Hardware-backed persistent
- **Key Types**: EC (platform-dependent)
- **Curves**: P-256 (most common)
- **Operations**: Generate, sign, verify (no export of private keys)
- **Hardware Backing**: Yes
- **Attestation**: Platform-dependent

### Key Characteristics

- Private keys never leave the secure hardware
- Keys are bound to the device and cannot be exported
- Biometric authentication can be required for key use
- Keys persist across app restarts but may be deleted with app uninstall

## AWS KMS Provider

The AWS KMS provider integrates with Amazon Web Services Key Management Service.

### Configuration

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.crypto.kms.provider.aws.AwsKmsProviderConfig

val awsConfig = AwsKmsProviderConfig(
    id = "aws",
    region = "us-east-1",
    accessKeyId = System.getenv("AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID"),
    secretAccessKey = System.getenv("AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"),
    endpointOverride = null  // Optional: for LocalStack testing
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonCrypto

let awsConfig = AwsKmsProviderConfig(
    id: "aws",
    region: "us-east-1",
    accessKeyId: ProcessInfo.processInfo.environment["AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID"] ?? "",
    secretAccessKey: ProcessInfo.processInfo.environment["AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY"] ?? "",
    endpointOverride: nil  // Optional: for LocalStack testing
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### IAM Permissions

The AWS credentials must have permissions for the following KMS actions:

```json
{
    "Version": "2012-10-17",
    "Statement": [
        {
            "Effect": "Allow",
            "Action": [
                "kms:CreateKey",
                "kms:Sign",
                "kms:Verify",
                "kms:GetPublicKey",
                "kms:DescribeKey",
                "kms:ScheduleKeyDeletion"
            ],
            "Resource": "*"
        }
    ]
}
```

## Azure Key Vault Provider

The Azure provider integrates with Azure Key Vault.

### Configuration

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.crypto.kms.provider.azure.AzureKmsProviderConfig

val azureConfig = AzureKmsProviderConfig(
    id = "azure",
    vaultUrl = "https://my-vault.vault.azure.net",
    tenantId = "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012",
    clientId = "87654321-4321-4321-4321-210987654321",
    clientSecret = System.getenv("AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET")
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonCrypto

let azureConfig = AzureKmsProviderConfig(
    id: "azure",
    vaultUrl: "https://my-vault.vault.azure.net",
    tenantId: "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012",
    clientId: "87654321-4321-4321-4321-210987654321",
    clientSecret: ProcessInfo.processInfo.environment["AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET"] ?? ""
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Using Multiple Providers

The `KeyManagerService` can work with multiple providers simultaneously. Specify the provider when generating keys:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Generate a key using the default provider
val defaultKey = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId = null,  // Uses default
    alias = "default-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
)

// Generate a key in AWS KMS
val awsKey = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId = "aws",
    alias = "aws-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
)

// Generate a key in Azure Key Vault
val azureKey = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId = "azure",
    alias = "azure-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
)

// Generate a key in software provider
val softwareKey = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId = "software",
    alias = "software-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Generate a key using the default provider
let defaultKey = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId: nil,  // Uses default
    alias: "default-key",
    alg: .ecdsaSha256
)

// Generate a key in AWS KMS
let awsKey = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId: "aws",
    alias: "aws-key",
    alg: .ecdsaSha256
)

// Generate a key in Azure Key Vault
let azureKey = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId: "azure",
    alias: "azure-key",
    alg: .ecdsaSha256
)

// Generate a key in software provider
let softwareKey = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId: "software",
    alias: "software-key",
    alg: .ecdsaSha256
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Registering Providers

Register custom or additional providers with the key manager:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Register a provider
keyManager.registerProvider(
    provider = myCustomProvider,
    makeDefaultKms = false
)

// Register and make it the default
keyManager.registerProvider(
    provider = softwareProvider,
    makeDefaultKms = true
)

// Check the default provider
val defaultId = keyManager.defaultProviderId()
println("Default provider: $defaultId")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Register a provider
keyManager.registerProvider(
    provider: myCustomProvider,
    makeDefaultKms: false
)

// Register and make it the default
keyManager.registerProvider(
    provider: softwareProvider,
    makeDefaultKms: true
)

// Check the default provider
let defaultId = keyManager.defaultProviderId()
print("Default provider: \(defaultId)")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Provider Selection Guidelines

When choosing a KMS provider:

**Mobile Provider**: Use for production mobile apps. Keys are hardware-backed and cannot be extracted, providing strong security guarantees.

**Software Provider**: Use for development, testing, or when you need to export keys. Not recommended for production mobile apps holding sensitive keys.

**AWS KMS**: Use when you need centralized key management, audit logging, or when keys must be accessible from multiple services.

**Azure Key Vault**: Similar to AWS KMS, use for Azure-centric architectures or when Azure compliance certifications are required.

## Storage Types

Providers support different storage types:

| Type | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `NONE` | No storage, ephemeral keys only |
| `EPHEMERAL` | Session-scoped, keys lost on restart |
| `PERSISTENT` | Disk or database storage, keys survive restart |
| `HARDWARE` | HSM, Secure Enclave, or TPM backed |

## Supported Operations

Providers may support different operations:

| Operation | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `GENERATE_KEY` | Create new key pairs |
| `IMPORT_KEY` | Import existing keys |
| `EXPORT_KEY` | Export keys (if allowed) |
| `DELETE_KEY` | Remove keys from storage |
| `SIGN` | Create signatures |
| `VERIFY` | Verify signatures |
| `ENCRYPT` | Content encryption |
| `DECRYPT` | Content decryption |
| `WRAP_KEY` | Key wrapping |
| `UNWRAP_KEY` | Key unwrapping |
| `KEY_AGREEMENT` | ECDH key agreement |

---

# Signing and Verification

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Signing and Verification

The IDK provides comprehensive support for creating and verifying cryptographic signatures. This guide covers raw signatures, the signature algorithms supported, and best practices.

## Raw Signatures

Raw signatures operate directly on byte arrays without additional structure. They're suitable when you need full control over the data format or when integrating with systems that expect raw signatures.

### Creating Raw Signatures

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val keyManager = session.component.keyManagerService

// Generate or retrieve a signing key
val keyPair = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId = null,
    alias = "signing-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
)

// Prepare the data to sign
val data = "Important message to sign".encodeToByteArray()

// Get key info for signing (need private key access)
val keyInfo = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(visibility = KeyVisibility.PRIVATE)

// Create the signature
val signature = keyManager.createRawSignature(
    keyInfo = keyInfo,
    input = data,
    requireX5Chain = false
)

// The signature is a raw byte array
println("Signature length: ${signature.size} bytes")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let keyManager = session.component.keyManagerService

// Generate or retrieve a signing key
let keyPair = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    providerId: nil,
    alias: "signing-key",
    alg: .ecdsaSha256
)

// Prepare the data to sign
let data = "Important message to sign".data(using: .utf8)!

// Get key info for signing (need private key access)
let keyInfo = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(visibility: .private_)

// Create the signature
let signature = try await keyManager.createRawSignature(
    keyInfo: keyInfo,
    input: data,
    requireX5Chain: false
)

// The signature is a raw byte array
print("Signature length: \(signature.count) bytes")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Verifying Raw Signatures

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get public key info for verification
val publicKeyInfo = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(visibility = KeyVisibility.PUBLIC)

// Verify the signature
val isValid = keyManager.isValidRawSignature(
    keyInfo = publicKeyInfo,
    input = data,
    signature = signature
)

if (isValid) {
    println("Signature verified successfully")
} else {
    println("Signature verification failed - data may have been tampered with")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get public key info for verification
let publicKeyInfo = keyPair.cborToManagedKeyInfo(visibility: .public_)

// Verify the signature
let isValid = try await keyManager.isValidRawSignature(
    keyInfo: publicKeyInfo,
    input: data,
    signature: signature
)

if isValid {
    print("Signature verified successfully")
} else {
    print("Signature verification failed - data may have been tampered with")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Signature Algorithms

The IDK supports multiple signature algorithms. Choose based on your security requirements and interoperability needs.

### ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm)

ECDSA is the most common choice for mobile applications due to its compact signatures and good performance.

| Algorithm | Curve | Signature Size | Security Level |
|-----------|-------|----------------|----------------|
| `ECDSA_SHA256` | P-256 | 64 bytes | 128-bit |
| `ECDSA_SHA384` | P-384 | 96 bytes | 192-bit |
| `ECDSA_SHA512` | P-521 | 132 bytes | 256-bit |

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// ECDSA_SHA256 - recommended for most use cases
val es256Key = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias = "es256-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
)

// ECDSA_SHA384 - higher security, larger signatures
val es384Key = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias = "es384-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA384
)

// ECDSA_SHA512 - highest security, largest signatures
val es512Key = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias = "es512-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA512
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// ECDSA_SHA256 - recommended for most use cases
let es256Key = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias: "es256-key",
    alg: .ecdsaSha256
)

// ECDSA_SHA384 - higher security, larger signatures
let es384Key = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias: "es384-key",
    alg: .ecdsaSha384
)

// ECDSA_SHA512 - highest security, largest signatures
let es512Key = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias: "es512-key",
    alg: .ecdsaSha512
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### RSA Signatures

RSA signatures are larger but offer broad compatibility with legacy systems.

| Algorithm | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `RSA_SHA256` | RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 |
| `RSA_SHA384` | RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-384 |
| `RSA_SHA512` | RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-512 |
| `RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA256_MGF1` | RSA-PSS with SHA-256 |
| `RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA384_MGF1` | RSA-PSS with SHA-384 |
| `RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA512_MGF1` | RSA-PSS with SHA-512 |

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// RSA-PSS with SHA-256 (recommended over PKCS#1 v1.5)
val rsaPssKey = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias = "rsa-pss-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA256_MGF1
)

// RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 (for legacy compatibility)
val rsaKey = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias = "rsa-key",
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.RSA_SHA256
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// RSA-PSS with SHA-256 (recommended over PKCS#1 v1.5)
let rsaPssKey = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias: "rsa-pss-key",
    alg: .rsaSsaPssSha256Mgf1
)

// RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 with SHA-256 (for legacy compatibility)
let rsaKey = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alias: "rsa-key",
    alg: .rsaSha256
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Including X.509 Certificates

When signing for external parties, you may need to include the X.509 certificate chain that vouches for your signing key:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Sign with certificate chain included
val signature = keyManager.createRawSignature(
    keyInfo = keyInfo,
    input = data,
    requireX5Chain = true  // Include X.509 certificate chain
)

// The key info must have an associated certificate for this to work
// If no certificate is available and requireX5Chain is true,
// the operation will fail
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Sign with certificate chain included
let signature = try await keyManager.createRawSignature(
    keyInfo: keyInfo,
    input: data,
    requireX5Chain: true  // Include X.509 certificate chain
)

// The key info must have an associated certificate for this to work
// If no certificate is available and requireX5Chain is true,
// the operation will fail
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Encryption and Decryption

The `KeyManagerService` also supports content encryption operations:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Encrypt data
val encryptionResult = keyManager.encrypt(
    keyInfo = keyInfo,
    plaintext = "Secret message".encodeToByteArray(),
    algorithm = ContentEncryptionAlgorithm.A256GCM,
    additionalAuthenticatedData = "context".encodeToByteArray()  // Optional AAD
)

// Access encrypted components
val ciphertext = encryptionResult.ciphertext
val iv = encryptionResult.iv
val authTag = encryptionResult.authTag

// Decrypt data
val plaintext = keyManager.decrypt(
    keyInfo = keyInfo,
    ciphertext = ciphertext,
    algorithm = ContentEncryptionAlgorithm.A256GCM,
    iv = iv,
    authTag = authTag,
    additionalAuthenticatedData = "context".encodeToByteArray()
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Encrypt data
let encryptionResult = try await keyManager.encrypt(
    keyInfo: keyInfo,
    plaintext: "Secret message".data(using: .utf8)!,
    algorithm: .a256gcm,
    additionalAuthenticatedData: "context".data(using: .utf8)  // Optional AAD
)

// Access encrypted components
let ciphertext = encryptionResult.ciphertext
let iv = encryptionResult.iv
let authTag = encryptionResult.authTag

// Decrypt data
let plaintext = try await keyManager.decrypt(
    keyInfo: keyInfo,
    ciphertext: ciphertext,
    algorithm: .a256gcm,
    iv: iv,
    authTag: authTag,
    additionalAuthenticatedData: "context".data(using: .utf8)
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Content Encryption Algorithms

| Algorithm | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `A128GCM` | AES-128-GCM |
| `A192GCM` | AES-192-GCM |
| `A256GCM` | AES-256-GCM |

## Key Wrapping

Wrap and unwrap keys for secure key transport:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Wrap a key for transport
val wrappedKey = keyManager.wrapKey(
    wrappingKeyInfo = wrappingKeyInfo,
    keyToWrap = secretKey,
    algorithm = KeyWrapAlgorithm.RSA_OAEP_256
)

// Unwrap a received key
val unwrappedKey = keyManager.unwrapKey(
    unwrappingKeyInfo = unwrappingKeyInfo,
    wrappedKey = wrappedKey,
    algorithm = KeyWrapAlgorithm.RSA_OAEP_256
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Wrap a key for transport
let wrappedKey = try await keyManager.wrapKey(
    wrappingKeyInfo: wrappingKeyInfo,
    keyToWrap: secretKey,
    algorithm: .rsaOaep256
)

// Unwrap a received key
let unwrappedKey = try await keyManager.unwrapKey(
    unwrappingKeyInfo: unwrappingKeyInfo,
    wrappedKey: wrappedKey,
    algorithm: .rsaOaep256
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Key Wrap Algorithms

| Algorithm | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `RSA_OAEP` | RSA-OAEP with SHA-1 |
| `RSA_OAEP_256` | RSA-OAEP with SHA-256 |
| `RSA_OAEP_512` | RSA-OAEP with SHA-512 |

## Key Agreement

Perform ECDH key agreement to establish shared secrets:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Perform ECDH key agreement
val sharedSecret = keyManager.performKeyAgreement(
    privateKeyInfo = myPrivateKeyInfo,
    publicKeyInfo = theirPublicKeyInfo,
    algorithm = KeyAgreementAlgorithm.ECDH_ES_HKDF_256,
    keyDataLen = 32  // Desired output length in bytes
)

// Use the shared secret for symmetric encryption
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Perform ECDH key agreement
let sharedSecret = try await keyManager.performKeyAgreement(
    privateKeyInfo: myPrivateKeyInfo,
    publicKeyInfo: theirPublicKeyInfo,
    algorithm: .ecdhEsHkdf256,
    keyDataLen: 32  // Desired output length in bytes
)

// Use the shared secret for symmetric encryption
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Key Agreement Algorithms

| Algorithm | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `ECDH_ES_HKDF_256` | ECDH-ES with HKDF-SHA256 |
| `ECDH_ES_HKDF_512` | ECDH-ES with HKDF-SHA512 |
| `ECDH_SS_HKDF_256` | ECDH-SS with HKDF-SHA256 |
| `ECDH_SS_HKDF_512` | ECDH-SS with HKDF-SHA512 |

## Best Practices

When implementing signing and verification:

**Always verify signatures before trusting data.** Never assume data is authentic without cryptographic verification.

**Use appropriate algorithms for your security requirements.** `ECDSA_SHA256` provides good security for most applications. Use `ECDSA_SHA384` or `ECDSA_SHA512` for higher security requirements.

**Protect signing keys.** Use the mobile KMS provider for hardware-backed protection on mobile devices.

**Consider replay attacks.** Signatures alone don't prevent replay attacks. Include timestamps, nonces, or sequence numbers in signed data.

**Log signature failures.** Failed signature verifications may indicate attacks or data corruption and should be logged for security monitoring.

**Handle errors appropriately.** Signature operations can fail for various reasons including key not found, hardware errors, or missing certificates.

---

# JOSE and COSE Operations

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# JOSE and COSE Operations

The IDK provides comprehensive support for two major cryptographic message formats: JOSE (JSON Object Signing and Encryption) and COSE (CBOR Object Signing and Encryption). JOSE is the primary format used in OpenID protocols (OID4VP, OID4VCI, SD-JWT), while COSE is used for ISO mDoc credentials.

## Format Overview

| Aspect | JOSE | COSE |
|--------|------|------|
| Encoding | Text (JSON) | Binary (CBOR) |
| Size | Larger | Compact |
| Primary Use | OAuth, OpenID, Web APIs | mDoc, IoT |
| Key Format | JWK | COSE_Key |
| Signature | JWS | COSE_Sign1 |
| Encryption | JWE | COSE_Encrypt |

## JwtService - JWS and JWT Operations

The `JwtService` is the primary service for creating and verifying JSON Web Signatures (JWS) and JSON Web Tokens (JWT). It provides a command-based API for all JWS operations.

### Obtaining the Service

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val jwtService = session.component.jwtService

// Access individual commands
val createJwsCompact = jwtService.commands.createJwsCompact
val createJwsJsonFlattened = jwtService.commands.createJwsJsonFlattened
val createJwsJsonGeneral = jwtService.commands.createJwsJsonGeneral
val verifyJws = jwtService.commands.verifyJws
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let jwtService = session.component.jwtService

// Access individual commands
let createJwsCompact = jwtService.commands.createJwsCompact
let createJwsJsonFlattened = jwtService.commands.createJwsJsonFlattened
let createJwsJsonGeneral = jwtService.commands.createJwsJsonGeneral
let verifyJws = jwtService.commands.verifyJws
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Creating JWS with Existing Keys

The most common use case is signing with a key that already exists in your KMS. Reference keys by alias, key ID, or pass the key directly:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Reference key by alias (most common for KMS-managed keys)
val byAlias = ManagedOptsAlias(identifier = "my-signing-key")

// Reference key by key ID
val byKid = ManagedOptsKid(identifier = "key-123")

// Reference key by KeyInfo (with additional metadata)
val byKeyInfo = ManagedOptsKeyInfo(
    identifier = KeyInfo(
        alias = "my-signing-key",
        providerId = "software",
        signatureAlgorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
    )
)

// Pass an existing JWK directly
val byJwk = ManagedOptsJwk(identifier = existingJwkDto)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Reference key by alias (most common for KMS-managed keys)
let byAlias = ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "my-signing-key")

// Reference key by key ID
let byKid = ManagedOptsKid(identifier: "key-123")

// Reference key by KeyInfo (with additional metadata)
let byKeyInfo = ManagedOptsKeyInfo(
    identifier: KeyInfo(
        alias: "my-signing-key",
        providerId: "software",
        signatureAlgorithm: .ecdsaSha256
    )
)

// Pass an existing JWK directly
let byJwk = ManagedOptsJwk(identifier: existingJwkDto)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Creating Compact JWS

Compact serialization produces the familiar `header.payload.signature` format:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Create payload
val payload = mapOf(
    "iss" to "https://issuer.example.com",
    "sub" to "user-123",
    "aud" to "https://verifier.example.com",
    "iat" to System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000,
    "exp" to (System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000) + 3600,
    "name" to "Alice Smith"
)

// Create compact JWS using key alias
val result = jwtService.createJwsCompact(
    CreateJwsArgs(
        issuer = ManagedOptsAlias("my-signing-key"),
        payload = payload,
        mode = JwsIdentifierMode.KID,  // Include key ID in header
        opts = CreateJwsOpts(
            protectedHeader = buildJsonObject {
                put("typ", "JWT")
            }
        )
    )
)

when (result) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val jwt = result.value.jwt
        println("JWT: $jwt")
        // eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCIsImtpZCI6Im15LXNpZ25pbmcta2V5In0.eyJpc3MiOi...
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Error: ${result.error.message}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Create payload
let payload: [String: Any] = [
    "iss": "https://issuer.example.com",
    "sub": "user-123",
    "aud": "https://verifier.example.com",
    "iat": Int64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970),
    "exp": Int64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970) + 3600,
    "name": "Alice Smith"
]

// Create compact JWS using key alias
let result = try await jwtService.createJwsCompact(
    args: CreateJwsArgs(
        issuer: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "my-signing-key"),
        payload: payload,
        mode: .kid,  // Include key ID in header
        opts: CreateJwsOpts(
            protectedHeader: ["typ": "JWT"]
        )
    )
)

switch result {
case .success(let value):
    let jwt = value.jwt
    print("JWT: \(jwt)")
case .failure(let error):
    print("Error: \(error.message)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### JWS Identifier Modes

Control how the signing key is identified in the JWS header:

| Mode | Header Field | Use Case |
|------|--------------|----------|
| `KID` | `kid` | Key ID reference - verifier looks up key |
| `JWK` | `jwk` | Embed public key in header |
| `X5C` | `x5c` | Embed X.509 certificate chain |
| `DID` | `kid` (DID URL) | Decentralized identifier reference |
| `AUTO` | Automatic | IDK selects based on key metadata |

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Embed the public key in the header
val jwsWithEmbeddedKey = jwtService.createJwsCompact(
    CreateJwsArgs(
        issuer = ManagedOptsAlias("my-signing-key"),
        payload = payload,
        mode = JwsIdentifierMode.JWK  // Embeds public JWK in header
    )
)

// Include X.509 certificate chain
val jwsWithCertChain = jwtService.createJwsCompact(
    CreateJwsArgs(
        issuer = ManagedOptsKeyInfo(
            identifier = KeyInfo(
                alias = "my-signing-key",
                x5c = arrayOf(base64EncodedCert)
            )
        ),
        payload = payload,
        mode = JwsIdentifierMode.X5C
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Embed the public key in the header
let jwsWithEmbeddedKey = try await jwtService.createJwsCompact(
    args: CreateJwsArgs(
        issuer: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "my-signing-key"),
        payload: payload,
        mode: .jwk  // Embeds public JWK in header
    )
)

// Include X.509 certificate chain
let jwsWithCertChain = try await jwtService.createJwsCompact(
    args: CreateJwsArgs(
        issuer: ManagedOptsKeyInfo(
            identifier: KeyInfo(
                alias: "my-signing-key",
                x5c: [base64EncodedCert]
            )
        ),
        payload: payload,
        mode: .x5c
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Creating JSON Serialized JWS

For scenarios requiring JSON format or multiple signatures:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// JSON Flattened - single signature in JSON format
val flattenedResult = jwtService.createJwsJsonFlattened(
    CreateJwsJsonArgs(
        issuer = ManagedOptsAlias("my-signing-key"),
        payload = payload,
        mode = JwsIdentifierMode.KID
    )
)

// Result structure:
// {
//   "payload": "eyJpc3MiOi...",
//   "protected": "eyJhbGciOi...",
//   "header": { "kid": "my-signing-key" },
//   "signature": "DtEhU3lj..."
// }

// JSON General - supports multiple signatures
val generalResult = jwtService.createJwsJsonGeneral(
    CreateJwsJsonArgs(
        issuer = ManagedOptsAlias("primary-key"),
        payload = payload,
        mode = JwsIdentifierMode.KID,
        existingSignatures = listOf(existingSignature)  // Add to existing signatures
    )
)

// Result structure:
// {
//   "payload": "eyJpc3MiOi...",
//   "signatures": [
//     { "protected": "...", "header": {...}, "signature": "..." },
//     { "protected": "...", "header": {...}, "signature": "..." }
//   ]
// }
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// JSON Flattened - single signature in JSON format
let flattenedResult = try await jwtService.createJwsJsonFlattened(
    args: CreateJwsJsonArgs(
        issuer: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "my-signing-key"),
        payload: payload,
        mode: .kid
    )
)

// JSON General - supports multiple signatures
let generalResult = try await jwtService.createJwsJsonGeneral(
    args: CreateJwsJsonArgs(
        issuer: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "primary-key"),
        payload: payload,
        mode: .kid,
        existingSignatures: [existingSignature]
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Verifying JWS

Verify signatures using the verifier's key or by resolving the key from the JWS header:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Parse the JWS
val jws = Jws.fromCompact(jwtString)

// Verify with explicit key
val result = jwtService.verifyJws(
    VerifyJwsArgs(
        jws = jws,
        identifier = ManagedOptsAlias("issuer-public-key")
    )
)

when (result) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val validation = result.value
        if (validation.isValid) {
            println("Signature valid")
            println("Payload: ${jws.payload.decodeToString()}")
        } else {
            println("Invalid: ${validation.errorMessages.joinToString()}")
        }
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Verification error: ${result.error.message}")
    }
}

// Verify using embedded JWK from header (if present)
val autoResult = jwtService.verifyJws(
    VerifyJwsArgs(
        jws = jws,
        identifier = null  // Key resolved from header
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Parse the JWS
let jws = Jws.fromCompact(compact: jwtString)

// Verify with explicit key
let result = try await jwtService.verifyJws(
    args: VerifyJwsArgs(
        jws: jws,
        identifier: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "issuer-public-key")
    )
)

switch result {
case .success(let validation):
    if validation.isValid {
        print("Signature valid")
        print("Payload: \(String(data: jws.payload, encoding: .utf8)!)")
    } else {
        print("Invalid: \(validation.errorMessages.joined(separator: ", "))")
    }
case .failure(let error):
    print("Verification error: \(error.message)")
}

// Verify using embedded JWK from header (if present)
let autoResult = try await jwtService.verifyJws(
    args: VerifyJwsArgs(
        jws: jws,
        identifier: nil  // Key resolved from header
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## JweService - JWE Encryption Operations

The `JweService` handles JSON Web Encryption for encrypting content to one or more recipients.

### Obtaining the Service

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val jweService = session.component.jweService

// Access individual commands
val prepareJwe = jweService.commands.prepareJwe
val createJweCompact = jweService.commands.createJweCompact
val createJweJsonFlattened = jweService.commands.createJweJsonFlattened
val createJweJsonGeneral = jweService.commands.createJweJsonGeneral
val decryptJwe = jweService.commands.decryptJwe
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let jweService = session.component.jweService

// Access individual commands
let prepareJwe = jweService.commands.prepareJwe
let createJweCompact = jweService.commands.createJweCompact
let createJweJsonFlattened = jweService.commands.createJweJsonFlattened
let createJweJsonGeneral = jweService.commands.createJweJsonGeneral
let decryptJwe = jweService.commands.decryptJwe
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### JWE Algorithm Selection

JWE uses two algorithms: one for key encryption and one for content encryption.

**Key Encryption Algorithms:**

| Algorithm | Description | Key Type |
|-----------|-------------|----------|
| `RSA-OAEP` | RSA with OAEP padding | RSA |
| `RSA-OAEP-256` | RSA-OAEP with SHA-256 | RSA |
| `ECDH-ES` | Direct ECDH key agreement | EC |
| `ECDH-ES+A128KW` | ECDH with AES key wrap | EC |
| `ECDH-ES+A256KW` | ECDH with AES-256 key wrap | EC |
| `A128KW` | AES key wrap (symmetric) | Symmetric |
| `A256KW` | AES-256 key wrap (symmetric) | Symmetric |
| `dir` | Direct encryption (no key wrap) | Symmetric |

**Content Encryption Algorithms:**

| Algorithm | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `A128GCM` | AES-128 in GCM mode |
| `A192GCM` | AES-192 in GCM mode |
| `A256GCM` | AES-256 in GCM mode |
| `A128CBC-HS256` | AES-128-CBC with HMAC-SHA-256 |
| `A256CBC-HS512` | AES-256-CBC with HMAC-SHA-512 |

### Creating Compact JWE

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val plaintext = "Sensitive data to encrypt".encodeToByteArray()

// Step 1: Prepare the JWE (generates CEK, builds headers)
val prepareResult = jweService.prepareJwe(
    PrepareJweArgs(
        plaintext = plaintext,
        recipient = ManagedOptsAlias("recipient-public-key"),
        keyEncryptionAlg = "RSA-OAEP-256",
        contentEncryptionAlg = "A256GCM",
        opts = CreateJweOpts(
            compress = false
        )
    )
)

when (prepareResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val prepared = prepareResult.value

        // Step 2: Create the compact JWE
        val jweResult = jweService.createJweCompact(
            CreateJweCompactArgs(
                preparedJwe = prepared,
                aad = null  // Optional additional authenticated data
            )
        )

        when (jweResult) {
            is IdkResult.Success -> {
                val jwe = jweResult.value
                println("JWE: ${jwe.compact}")
                // eyJhbGciOiJSU0EtT0FFUC0yNTYiLCJlbmMiOiJBMjU2R0NNIn0.OKOaw...
            }
            is IdkResult.Failure -> {
                println("Encryption failed: ${jweResult.error.message}")
            }
        }
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Preparation failed: ${prepareResult.error.message}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let plaintext = "Sensitive data to encrypt".data(using: .utf8)!

// Step 1: Prepare the JWE (generates CEK, builds headers)
let prepareResult = try await jweService.prepareJwe(
    args: PrepareJweArgs(
        plaintext: plaintext,
        recipient: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "recipient-public-key"),
        keyEncryptionAlg: "RSA-OAEP-256",
        contentEncryptionAlg: "A256GCM",
        opts: CreateJweOpts(
            compress: false
        )
    )
)

switch prepareResult {
case .success(let prepared):
    // Step 2: Create the compact JWE
    let jweResult = try await jweService.createJweCompact(
        args: CreateJweCompactArgs(
            preparedJwe: prepared,
            aad: nil
        )
    )

    switch jweResult {
    case .success(let jwe):
        print("JWE: \(jwe.compact)")
    case .failure(let error):
        print("Encryption failed: \(error.message)")
    }

case .failure(let error):
    print("Preparation failed: \(error.message)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Creating Multi-Recipient JWE

JSON General serialization supports encrypting to multiple recipients:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Prepare for primary recipient
val prepareResult = jweService.prepareJwe(
    PrepareJweArgs(
        plaintext = plaintext,
        recipient = ManagedOptsAlias("recipient-1-key"),
        keyEncryptionAlg = "ECDH-ES+A256KW",
        contentEncryptionAlg = "A256GCM"
    )
)

when (prepareResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val prepared = prepareResult.value

        // Create multi-recipient JWE
        val generalResult = jweService.createJweJsonGeneral(
            CreateJweJsonGeneralArgs(
                preparedJwe = prepared,
                additionalRecipients = listOf(
                    AdditionalRecipient(
                        recipient = ManagedOptsAlias("recipient-2-key"),
                        keyEncryptionAlg = "ECDH-ES+A256KW"
                    ),
                    AdditionalRecipient(
                        recipient = ManagedOptsAlias("recipient-3-key"),
                        keyEncryptionAlg = "RSA-OAEP-256"
                    )
                )
            )
        )

        // Result: JweJsonGeneral with recipients array
        // Each recipient can decrypt using their own key
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> { /* handle error */ }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Prepare for primary recipient
let prepareResult = try await jweService.prepareJwe(
    args: PrepareJweArgs(
        plaintext: plaintext,
        recipient: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "recipient-1-key"),
        keyEncryptionAlg: "ECDH-ES+A256KW",
        contentEncryptionAlg: "A256GCM"
    )
)

switch prepareResult {
case .success(let prepared):
    // Create multi-recipient JWE
    let generalResult = try await jweService.createJweJsonGeneral(
        args: CreateJweJsonGeneralArgs(
            preparedJwe: prepared,
            additionalRecipients: [
                AdditionalRecipient(
                    recipient: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "recipient-2-key"),
                    keyEncryptionAlg: "ECDH-ES+A256KW"
                ),
                AdditionalRecipient(
                    recipient: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "recipient-3-key"),
                    keyEncryptionAlg: "RSA-OAEP-256"
                )
            ]
        )
    )
case .failure(let error):
    // handle error
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Decrypting JWE

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Parse the JWE (handles compact, flattened, and general formats)
val jwe = Jwe.parse(jweString)

// Decrypt using recipient's private key
val decryptResult = jweService.decryptJwe(
    DecryptJweArgs(
        jwe = jwe,
        decryptor = ManagedOptsAlias("my-private-key")
    )
)

when (decryptResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val decrypted = decryptResult.value
        val plaintext = decrypted.plaintext
        println("Decrypted: ${plaintext.decodeToString()}")

        // Access header information
        val header = decrypted.header
        println("Algorithm: ${header.alg}")
        println("Encryption: ${header.enc}")
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Decryption failed: ${decryptResult.error.message}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Parse the JWE (handles compact, flattened, and general formats)
let jwe = Jwe.parse(jweString: jweString)

// Decrypt using recipient's private key
let decryptResult = try await jweService.decryptJwe(
    args: DecryptJweArgs(
        jwe: jwe,
        decryptor: ManagedOptsAlias(identifier: "my-private-key")
    )
)

switch decryptResult {
case .success(let decrypted):
    let plaintext = decrypted.plaintext
    print("Decrypted: \(String(data: plaintext, encoding: .utf8)!)")

    // Access header information
    let header = decrypted.header
    print("Algorithm: \(header.alg)")
    print("Encryption: \(header.enc)")

case .failure(let error):
    print("Decryption failed: \(error.message)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## COSE Operations

COSE is used for ISO mDoc credentials and other CBOR-based protocols. The IDK provides `CoseCryptoService` for COSE operations.

### Obtaining the Service

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val coseCryptoService = session.component.coseCryptoService
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let coseCryptoService = session.component.coseCryptoService
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Creating COSE_Sign1

COSE_Sign1 is the single-signer signature format used in mDoc:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Build COSE_Sign1 input
val coseSign1Input = CoseSign1Input(
    protectedHeader = CoseHeaderCbor(
        algorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256.cose
    ),
    unprotectedHeader = null,
    payload = CborByteString("Payload data".encodeToByteArray())
)

// Get key info for signing
val keyInfo = KeyInfo<CoseKeyType>(
    alias = "my-signing-key",
    providerId = "mobile",
    keyVisibility = KeyVisibility.PRIVATE,
    signatureAlgorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
)

// Sign
val signResult = coseCryptoService.sign1<ByteArray>(
    input = coseSign1Input,
    keyInfo = keyInfo,
    requireX5Chain = false
)

val coseSign1 = signResult.coseSign1
val cborBytes = coseSign1.toCbor()
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Build COSE_Sign1 input
let coseSign1Input = CoseSign1Input(
    protectedHeader: CoseHeaderCbor(
        algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm.ecdsaSha256.cose
    ),
    unprotectedHeader: nil,
    payload: CborByteString(data: "Payload data".data(using: .utf8)!)
)

// Get key info for signing
let keyInfo = KeyInfo<CoseKeyType>(
    alias: "my-signing-key",
    providerId: "mobile",
    keyVisibility: .private_,
    signatureAlgorithm: .ecdsaSha256
)

// Sign
let signResult = try await coseCryptoService.sign1(
    input: coseSign1Input,
    keyInfo: keyInfo,
    requireX5Chain: false
)

let coseSign1 = signResult.coseSign1
let cborBytes = coseSign1.toCbor()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Verifying COSE_Sign1

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Parse COSE_Sign1 from CBOR bytes
val coseSign1 = CoseSign1.fromCbor<ByteArray>(cborBytes)

// Get public key for verification
val publicKeyInfo = KeyInfo<CoseKeyType>(
    alias = "issuer-public-key",
    providerId = "software",
    keyVisibility = KeyVisibility.PUBLIC
)

// Verify
val verificationResult = coseCryptoService.verify1(
    input = coseSign1,
    keyInfo = publicKeyInfo,
    requireX5Chain = false
)

if (verificationResult.isValid) {
    val payload = coseSign1.payload?.value
    println("Verified payload: ${payload?.decodeToString()}")
} else {
    println("Verification failed: ${verificationResult.error}")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Parse COSE_Sign1 from CBOR bytes
let coseSign1 = CoseSign1.fromCbor(cborBytes)

// Get public key for verification
let publicKeyInfo = KeyInfo<CoseKeyType>(
    alias: "issuer-public-key",
    providerId: "software",
    keyVisibility: .public_
)

// Verify
let verificationResult = try await coseCryptoService.verify1(
    input: coseSign1,
    keyInfo: publicKeyInfo,
    requireX5Chain: false
)

if verificationResult.isValid {
    let payload = coseSign1.payload?.value
    print("Verified payload: \(String(data: payload!, encoding: .utf8)!)")
} else {
    print("Verification failed: \(verificationResult.error)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Key Format Conversion

The IDK provides mapping utilities to convert between COSE and JOSE formats. This is essential when working with systems that use different formats.

### Converting Existing Keys

Use `KeyInfo` or `ResolvedKeyInfo` to work with existing keys and convert between formats:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Start with an existing JWK
val existingJwk: Jwk = loadJwkFromSomewhere()

// Create KeyInfo for JOSE operations
val joseKeyInfo = ResolvedKeyInfo(
    key = existingJwk,
    kid = existingJwk.kid,
    keyVisibility = KeyVisibility.PUBLIC,
    signatureAlgorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256,
    keyEncoding = KeyEncoding.JOSE
)

// Convert JWK to COSE Key
val coseKey = CoseKey.fromJwk(existingJwk)

// Create KeyInfo for COSE operations
val coseKeyInfo = ResolvedKeyInfo(
    key = coseKey,
    kid = coseKey.kid?.value,
    keyVisibility = KeyVisibility.PUBLIC,
    signatureAlgorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256,
    keyEncoding = KeyEncoding.COSE
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Start with an existing JWK
let existingJwk: Jwk = loadJwkFromSomewhere()

// Create KeyInfo for JOSE operations
let joseKeyInfo = ResolvedKeyInfo(
    key: existingJwk,
    kid: existingJwk.kid,
    keyVisibility: .public_,
    signatureAlgorithm: .ecdsaSha256,
    keyEncoding: .jose
)

// Convert JWK to COSE Key
let coseKey = CoseKey.fromJwk(jwk: existingJwk)

// Create KeyInfo for COSE operations
let coseKeyInfo = ResolvedKeyInfo(
    key: coseKey,
    kid: coseKey.kid?.value,
    keyVisibility: .public_,
    signatureAlgorithm: .ecdsaSha256,
    keyEncoding: .cose
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Direct Key Conversion

Convert keys directly between formats:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// JWK to COSE Key
val jwk: Jwk = ...
val coseKey = CoseKey.fromJwk(jwk)

// COSE Key to JWK
val coseKey: CoseKey = ...
val jwk = coseKey.toJwk()

// Both directions preserve key material and metadata
println("Original kid: ${jwk.kid}")
println("Converted kid: ${coseKey.kid?.value}")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// JWK to COSE Key
let jwk: Jwk = ...
let coseKey = CoseKey.fromJwk(jwk: jwk)

// COSE Key to JWK
let coseKey: CoseKey = ...
let jwk = coseKey.toJwk()

// Both directions preserve key material and metadata
print("Original kid: \(jwk.kid ?? "none")")
print("Converted kid: \(coseKey.kid?.value ?? "none")")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Algorithm Mapping

Convert algorithm identifiers between COSE and JOSE:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// From SignatureAlgorithm to both formats
val algorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
val coseAlg = algorithm.cose  // CoseAlgorithm.ES256 (-7)
val joseAlg = algorithm.jose  // JwaAlgorithm.ES256 ("ES256")

// Convert COSE algorithm to JOSE
val joseFromCose = SignatureAlgorithm.toJose(CoseAlgorithm.ES256)
// Result: JwaAlgorithm.ES256

// Convert JOSE algorithm to COSE
val coseFromJose = SignatureAlgorithm.toCose(JwaAlgorithm.RS256)
// Result: CoseAlgorithm.RS256

// Flexible conversion from any format
val alg = SignatureAlgorithm.toJoseAlg(-7)  // Works with Int (COSE ID)
val alg2 = SignatureAlgorithm.toCoseAlg("ES256")  // Works with String (JOSE name)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// From SignatureAlgorithm to both formats
let algorithm = SignatureAlgorithm.ecdsaSha256
let coseAlg = algorithm.cose  // CoseAlgorithm.es256 (-7)
let joseAlg = algorithm.jose  // JwaAlgorithm.es256 ("ES256")

// Convert COSE algorithm to JOSE
let joseFromCose = SignatureAlgorithm.toJose(cose: .es256)
// Result: JwaAlgorithm.es256

// Convert JOSE algorithm to COSE
let coseFromJose = SignatureAlgorithm.toCose(jose: .rs256)
// Result: CoseAlgorithm.rs256
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Key Type and Curve Mapping

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Key type mapping
val keyType = KeyTypeMapping.EC
val joseKty = keyType.jose  // JwaKeyType.EC
val coseKty = keyType.cose  // CoseKeyTypeEnum.EC2

// Convert from COSE to JOSE
val joseKeyType = KeyTypeMapping.toJose(CoseKeyTypeEnum.EC2)
// Result: JwaKeyType.EC

// Curve mapping
val curve = Curve.P_256
val joseCrv = curve.jose  // JwaCurve.P_256
val coseCrv = curve.cose  // CoseCurve.P_256

// Key operations mapping
val ops = KeyOperations.SIGN
val joseOps = ops.jose  // JoseKeyOperations.SIGN
val coseOps = ops.cose  // CoseKeyOperations.SIGN
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Key type mapping
let keyType = KeyTypeMapping.ec
let joseKty = keyType.jose  // JwaKeyType.ec
let coseKty = keyType.cose  // CoseKeyTypeEnum.ec2

// Convert from COSE to JOSE
let joseKeyType = KeyTypeMapping.toJose(cose: .ec2)
// Result: JwaKeyType.ec

// Curve mapping
let curve = Curve.p256
let joseCrv = curve.jose  // JwaCurve.p256
let coseCrv = curve.cose  // CoseCurve.p256

// Key operations mapping
let ops = KeyOperations.sign
let joseOps = ops.jose  // JoseKeyOperations.sign
let coseOps = ops.cose  // CoseKeyOperations.sign
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Algorithm Reference

### Signature Algorithms

| Algorithm | COSE ID | JOSE Name | Curve/Key |
|-----------|---------|-----------|-----------|
| `ED25519` | -8 | EdDSA | Ed25519 |
| `ECDSA_SHA256` | -7 | ES256 | P-256 |
| `ECDSA_SHA384` | -35 | ES384 | P-384 |
| `ECDSA_SHA512` | -36 | ES512 | P-521 |
| `RSA_SHA256` | -257 | RS256 | RSA |
| `RSA_SHA384` | -258 | RS384 | RSA |
| `RSA_SHA512` | -259 | RS512 | RSA |
| `RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA256_MGF1` | -37 | PS256 | RSA |
| `RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA384_MGF1` | -38 | PS384 | RSA |
| `RSA_SSA_PSS_SHA512_MGF1` | -39 | PS512 | RSA |

### Key Types

| Key Type | COSE | JOSE |
|----------|------|------|
| Elliptic Curve | EC2 (2) | EC |
| RSA | RSA (3) | RSA |
| Octet Key Pair | OKP (1) | OKP |

### Curves

| Curve | COSE | JOSE |
|-------|------|------|
| P-256 | P-256 (1) | P-256 |
| P-384 | P-384 (2) | P-384 |
| P-521 | P-521 (3) | P-521 |
| Ed25519 | Ed25519 (6) | Ed25519 |
| X25519 | X25519 (4) | X25519 |
| secp256k1 | secp256k1 (8) | secp256k1 |

## When to Use JOSE vs COSE

Use **JOSE** when:
- Working with OAuth 2.0 or OpenID Connect
- Implementing OID4VP or OID4VCI protocols
- Working with SD-JWT credentials
- Building web APIs
- Human readability aids debugging

Use **COSE** when:
- Working with ISO mDoc credentials (ISO 18013-5)
- Size constraints are critical
- Interoperating with CBOR-based systems
- Building IoT or constrained device applications

Many identity solutions use both formats. The IDK makes it straightforward to work with both and convert between them as needed.

---

# DID Resolution

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# DID Resolution

The IDK provides a complete DID resolution system through the `DidResolverRegistry`, which manages method-specific resolvers and provides a unified API for resolution and dereferencing.

## DidResolverRegistry

The `DidResolverRegistry` is the main entry point for DID resolution. It aggregates all registered method-specific resolvers and routes requests appropriately.

```kotlin
val resolverRegistry: DidResolverRegistry = session.component.didResolverRegistry

// Check supported methods
val methods = resolverRegistry.getSupportedMethods()
println("Supported methods: $methods")  // [key, jwk, web]

// Check if a method is supported
if (resolverRegistry.hasResolver("web")) {
    println("did:web is supported")
}

// Get method capabilities
val capabilities = resolverRegistry.getCapabilities("web")
println("Supports update: ${capabilities?.lifecycle?.supportsUpdate}")
```

## Basic Resolution

Resolve a DID to retrieve its DID Document:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="kotlin" label="Kotlin">

```kotlin
val resolverRegistry: DidResolverRegistry = session.component.didResolverRegistry

val result = resolverRegistry.resolve("did:web:example.com")

result.fold(
    success = { resolutionResult ->
        val didDocument = resolutionResult.didDocument
        println("DID: ${didDocument?.id}")

        // Access verification methods
        didDocument?.verificationMethod?.forEach { vm ->
            println("Key ID: ${vm.id}")
            println("Type: ${vm.type}")
            println("Controller: ${vm.controller}")
        }

        // Access services
        didDocument?.service?.forEach { svc ->
            println("Service: ${svc.id} -> ${svc.serviceEndpoint}")
        }
    },
    failure = { error ->
        println("Resolution failed: ${error.message}")
    }
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="swift" label="Swift">

```swift
let resolverRegistry = session.component.didResolverRegistry

let result = try await resolverRegistry.resolve(did: "did:web:example.com")

if let didDocument = result.didDocument {
    print("DID: \(didDocument.id)")

    for vm in didDocument.verificationMethod ?? [] {
        print("Key ID: \(vm.id)")
        print("Type: \(vm.type)")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Resolution Options

```kotlin
val result = resolverRegistry.resolve(
    did = "did:web:example.com",
    options = DidResolutionOptions(
        accept = "application/did+ld+json",  // Response format
        noCache = false                       // Use cached result if available
    )
)
```

### Resolution Result

The `DidResolutionResult` contains:

```kotlin
data class DidResolutionResult(
    val didDocument: DidDocument?,
    val didResolutionMetadata: DidResolutionMetadata,
    val didDocumentMetadata: DidDocumentMetadata
)

// Metadata includes
data class DidDocumentMetadata(
    val created: String?,      // ISO 8601 timestamp
    val updated: String?,      // ISO 8601 timestamp
    val deactivated: Boolean?, // Whether DID is deactivated
    val versionId: String?     // Version identifier
)
```

## Dereference DID URLs

Dereference specific parts of a DID document using DID URLs:

### Get a Verification Method by Fragment

```kotlin
val resolverRegistry: DidResolverRegistry = session.component.didResolverRegistry

// Dereference did:web:example.com#key-1
val result = resolverRegistry.dereference("did:web:example.com#key-1")

result.fold(
    success = { dereferenceResult ->
        val verificationMethod = dereferenceResult.contentStream
        println("Key: ${verificationMethod?.id}")
        println("Public Key: ${verificationMethod?.publicKeyJwk}")
    },
    failure = { error ->
        println("Dereference failed: ${error.message}")
    }
)
```

### Get a Service by Query Parameter

```kotlin
// Dereference did:web:example.com?service=hub
val result = resolverRegistry.dereference("did:web:example.com?service=hub")
```

### DID URL Syntax

```
did:web:example.com/path?query=value#fragment
                    │    │            │
                    │    │            └── Fragment (key ID)
                    │    └── Query parameters
                    └── Path
```

## Method-Specific Resolvers

Access individual resolvers for advanced use cases:

```kotlin
// Get the did:web resolver directly
val webResolver: DidResolver? = resolverRegistry.getResolver("web")

webResolver?.let { resolver ->
    // Check capabilities
    println("Supports deactivation: ${resolver.capabilities.lifecycle.supportsDeactivate}")

    // Resolve directly through the method resolver
    val result = resolver.resolve("did:web:example.com")
}
```

### Available Resolvers

| Resolver | Method | Module |
|----------|--------|--------|
| `KeyDidResolverImpl` | `did:key` | `lib-did-methods-key` |
| `JwkDidResolverImpl` | `did:jwk` | `lib-did-methods-jwk` |
| `WebDidResolverImpl` | `did:web` | `lib-did-methods-web` |

Resolvers are automatically registered via DI multibinding when their modules are included.

## Querying Verification Methods

### Find Keys by Purpose

```kotlin
val resolverRegistry: DidResolverRegistry = session.component.didResolverRegistry

// Resolve the DID first
val result = resolverRegistry.resolve("did:web:example.com")

result.fold(
    success = { resolutionResult ->
        val doc = resolutionResult.didDocument ?: return@fold

        // Get authentication keys
        val authKeyIds = doc.authentication?.mapNotNull { it.reference ?: it.embedded?.id }
        println("Authentication keys: $authKeyIds")

        // Get assertion method keys
        val assertionKeyIds = doc.assertionMethod?.mapNotNull { it.reference ?: it.embedded?.id }
        println("Assertion keys: $assertionKeyIds")

        // Get key agreement keys (for encryption)
        val keyAgreementIds = doc.keyAgreement?.mapNotNull { it.reference ?: it.embedded?.id }
        println("Key agreement keys: $keyAgreementIds")

        // Resolve a specific verification method
        val keyId = "#key-1"
        val verificationMethod = doc.verificationMethod?.find {
            it.id == keyId || it.id.endsWith(keyId)
        }
        println("Found key: ${verificationMethod?.publicKeyJwk}")
    },
    failure = { error -> println("Failed: ${error.message}") }
)
```

### Helper Extension Functions

```kotlin
// Extension to get verification methods for a purpose
fun DidDocument.getVerificationMethodsForPurpose(
    purpose: VerificationPurpose
): List<VerificationMethod> {
    val refs = when (purpose) {
        VerificationPurpose.AUTHENTICATION -> authentication
        VerificationPurpose.ASSERTION_METHOD -> assertionMethod
        VerificationPurpose.KEY_AGREEMENT -> keyAgreement
        VerificationPurpose.CAPABILITY_INVOCATION -> capabilityInvocation
        VerificationPurpose.CAPABILITY_DELEGATION -> capabilityDelegation
    } ?: return emptyList()

    return refs.mapNotNull { ref ->
        ref.embedded ?: verificationMethod?.find {
            it.id == ref.reference || it.id.endsWith("#${ref.reference}")
        }
    }
}

// Usage
val authKeys = didDocument.getVerificationMethodsForPurpose(VerificationPurpose.AUTHENTICATION)
```

## Integration with Identifier Resolution

DIDs integrate with the unified [Identifier Resolution](../crypto/identifier-resolution) system for cryptographic operations.

### Resolve DID to Key Material

```kotlin
val identifierService: IIdentifierService = session.component.identifierService

// Resolve a DID to get its public key
val result = identifierService.resolve(
    ExternalIdentifierOpts(
        method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.DID,
        identifier = "did:web:example.com",
        kid = "#key-1"  // Optional: select specific key
    )
)

result.fold(
    success = { resolved: ExternalIdentifierResult.Did ->
        // Access the JWK
        val jwk = resolved.keyInfo.key
        println("Key type: ${jwk.kty}")

        // Access all JWKs from the document
        resolved.jwks.forEach { keyInfo ->
            println("Available key: ${keyInfo.kid}")
        }

        // Access JWKs by purpose
        val didJwks = resolved.didJwks
        val authKeys = didJwks?.get("authentication")
        val assertionKeys = didJwks?.get("assertionMethod")
    },
    failure = { error ->
        println("Resolution failed: ${error.message}")
    }
)
```

### Parsed DID Information

```kotlin
val result: ExternalIdentifierResult.Did = identifierService.resolve(opts).getOrThrow()

// Access parsed DID components
val parsed = result.didParsed
println("Method: ${parsed.method}")     // "web"
println("ID: ${parsed.id}")             // "example.com"
println("Path: ${parsed.path}")         // "/users/alice"
println("Fragment: ${parsed.fragment}") // "key-1"

// Access full DID document
val didDocument = result.didDocument
```

### Using DIDs for Signature Verification

```kotlin
val verifyJwsCommand: VerifyJwsCommand = session.component.verifyJwsCommand

// Verify a JWS signed by a DID
val result = verifyJwsCommand.execute(
    VerifyJwsArgs(
        jws = signedJwt,
        identifierOpts = ExternalIdentifierOpts(
            method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.DID,
            identifier = "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK"
        )
    ),
    sessionContext
)

when {
    result.isSuccess -> println("Signature valid!")
    else -> println("Verification failed: ${result.error}")
}
```

### Using DIDs for SD-JWT Verification

```kotlin
val verifySdJwtCommand: VerifySdJwtCommand = session.component.verifySdJwtCommand

val result = verifySdJwtCommand.execute(
    VerifySdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt = sdJwtPresentation,
        issuerIdentifier = ExternalIdentifierOpts(
            method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.DID,
            identifier = issuerDid
        )
    ),
    sessionContext
)
```

## Querying Stored DIDs

Query DIDs stored in the local repository using `DidFilter`:

```kotlin
val didManager: IDidManager = session.component.didManager

// Filter by method
val webDids = didManager.list(DidFilter(method = "web"))

// Filter by alias
val namedDids = didManager.list(DidFilter(alias = "production-signing"))

// Filter by role
val managedDids = didManager.list(DidFilter(role = DidRole.MANAGED))
val externalDids = didManager.list(DidFilter(role = DidRole.EXTERNAL))

// Combined filters
val activeWebDids = didManager.list(
    DidFilter(
        method = "web",
        role = DidRole.MANAGED,
        includeDeactivated = false
    )
)

// Include deactivated DIDs
val allDids = didManager.list(
    DidFilter(includeDeactivated = true)
)
```

### DidFilter Properties

| Property | Type | Description |
|----------|------|-------------|
| `method` | `String?` | Filter by DID method (e.g., "web", "key") |
| `alias` | `String?` | Filter by exact alias match |
| `role` | `DidRole?` | Filter by MANAGED or EXTERNAL |
| `includeDeactivated` | `Boolean` | Include deactivated DIDs (default: false) |

### Find by DID or Alias

```kotlin
// Find by DID string
val did = didManager.findByDid("did:web:example.com")

// Find by alias
val did = didManager.findByAlias("my-signing-did")
```

## Method Capabilities

Query what a DID method supports:

```kotlin
val resolverRegistry: DidResolverRegistry = session.component.didResolverRegistry

val capabilities = resolverRegistry.getCapabilities("web")
capabilities?.let { caps ->
    // Resolution capabilities
    println("Supports resolution: ${caps.resolution.supportsResolution}")

    // Lifecycle capabilities
    println("Supports create: ${caps.lifecycle.supportsCreate}")
    println("Supports update: ${caps.lifecycle.supportsUpdate}")
    println("Supports deactivate: ${caps.lifecycle.supportsDeactivate}")

    // Key management
    println("Supports key rotation: ${caps.keyManagement.supportsKeyRotation}")
    println("Supported key types: ${caps.keyManagement.supportedKeyTypes}")

    // Metadata
    println("Method name: ${caps.metadata.methodName}")
    println("Specification: ${caps.metadata.specificationUrl}")
}
```

## Caching

The resolver registry supports caching for improved performance:

```kotlin
// Resolution with cache control
val result = resolverRegistry.resolve(
    did = "did:web:example.com",
    options = DidResolutionOptions(noCache = true)  // Force fresh resolution
)
```

Cache behavior by method:
- `did:key` - Always cached (immutable, derived from identifier)
- `did:jwk` - Always cached (immutable, derived from identifier)
- `did:web` - Cached with TTL based on HTTP cache headers

## REST API (Universal Resolver)

Expose DID resolution as a REST API:

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-rest-resolver-server:0.13.0")
}
```

### Endpoint

```http
GET /1.0/identifiers/{did}
```

### Example Request

```http
GET /1.0/identifiers/did:web:example.com HTTP/1.1
Accept: application/did+ld+json
```

### Example Response

```json
{
  "didDocument": {
    "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1"],
    "id": "did:web:example.com",
    "verificationMethod": [...]
  },
  "didResolutionMetadata": {
    "contentType": "application/did+ld+json"
  },
  "didDocumentMetadata": {
    "created": "2024-01-15T10:30:00Z",
    "updated": "2024-06-20T14:45:00Z"
  }
}
```

## Error Handling

Common resolution errors:

| Error | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `UNSUPPORTED_OPERATION` | DID method not registered |
| `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT` | Malformed DID syntax |
| `NETWORK_ERROR` | Failed to fetch did:web document |
| `NOT_FOUND` | DID document not found |

```kotlin
result.fold(
    success = { /* handle success */ },
    failure = { error ->
        when {
            error.message?.contains("No resolver registered") == true ->
                println("Unsupported DID method")
            error.message?.contains("Invalid DID") == true ->
                println("Malformed DID")
            else -> println("Error: ${error.message}")
        }
    }
)
```

## Next Steps

- [DID Management](./management) - Create, update, and manage DIDs
- [Identifier Resolution](../crypto/identifier-resolution) - Unified identifier resolution
- [SD-JWT](../sdjwt/overview) - Selective disclosure with DIDs

---

# DID Management

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# DID Management

The IDK provides a comprehensive DID management system for creating, updating, and deactivating DIDs with a fluent Kotlin DSL.

## DID Manager

The `IDidManager` interface provides lifecycle operations for DIDs:

| Operation | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `create` | Create a new DID with generated or existing keys |
| `update` | Modify a DID document (add/remove keys, services) |
| `addKey` | Add a verification method to an existing DID |
| `deactivate` | Deactivate a DID |
| `list` | Query stored DIDs with filters |
| `findByDid` | Find a DID by its identifier |
| `findByAlias` | Find a DID by alias |

## Creation DSL

The IDK provides a Kotlin DSL for creating DIDs with a fluent, type-safe syntax.

### Simple did:key

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.did.manager.dsl.didCreateOptions
import com.sphereon.crypto.core.generic.KeyTypeMapping
import com.sphereon.crypto.core.generic.Curve
import com.sphereon.did.models.VerificationPurpose

val options = didCreateOptions {
    method("key")
    alias("my-signing-did")

    autoGenerateKey {
        keyType(KeyTypeMapping.OKP)
        curve(Curve.Ed25519)
        purposes(
            VerificationPurpose.AUTHENTICATION,
            VerificationPurpose.ASSERTION_METHOD
        )
    }
}

val result = didManager.create(options.options, options.keyConfigs)
println("Created: ${result.did}")
// Output: Created: did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK
```

### did:jwk

```kotlin
val options = didCreateOptions {
    method("jwk")
    alias("my-jwk-did")

    autoGenerateKey {
        keyType(KeyTypeMapping.EC)
        curve(Curve.P_256)
        purposes(VerificationPurpose.AUTHENTICATION)
    }
}

val result = didManager.create(options.options, options.keyConfigs)
// Output: did:jwk:eyJrdHkiOiJFQyIsImNydiI6IlAtMjU2Ii...
```

### did:web with Domain and Path

```kotlin
val options = didCreateOptions {
    method("web")
    domain("example.com")
    path("users", "alice")  // Results in did:web:example.com:users:alice
    alias("alice-did")

    autoGenerateKey {
        keyType(KeyTypeMapping.EC)
        curve(Curve.P_256)
        purposes(
            VerificationPurpose.AUTHENTICATION,
            VerificationPurpose.ASSERTION_METHOD
        )
    }

    // Add service endpoints
    service("website") {
        type("LinkedDomains")
        endpoint("https://alice.example.com")
    }
}

val result = didManager.create(options.options, options.keyConfigs)

// After creation, publish the DID document:
// https://example.com/users/alice/did.json
```

### Multiple Verification Methods

For DIDs that need multiple keys (common with did:web):

```kotlin
val options = didCreateOptions {
    method("web")
    domain("example.com")

    // Authentication key (Ed25519 for signatures)
    verificationMethod("key-1") {
        autoGenerateKey {
            keyType(KeyTypeMapping.OKP)
            curve(Curve.Ed25519)
            kmsProvider("software")  // Optional: specify KMS provider
        }
        purposes(VerificationPurpose.AUTHENTICATION)
    }

    // Assertion key (P-256 for credentials)
    verificationMethod("key-2") {
        autoGenerateKey {
            keyType(KeyTypeMapping.EC)
            curve(Curve.P_256)
        }
        purposes(VerificationPurpose.ASSERTION_METHOD)
    }

    // Key agreement (X25519 for encryption)
    verificationMethod("key-3") {
        autoGenerateKey {
            keyType(KeyTypeMapping.OKP)
            curve(Curve.X25519)
        }
        purposes(VerificationPurpose.KEY_AGREEMENT)
    }

    // Multiple services
    service("hub") {
        type("LinkedDomains")
        endpoint("https://hub.example.com")
    }

    service("messaging") {
        type("DIDCommMessaging")
        endpoint("https://messaging.example.com")
    }
}
```

### Using Existing Keys

Reference keys already stored in KMS:

```kotlin
val options = didCreateOptions {
    method("web")
    domain("example.com")

    // Use existing key by alias
    verificationMethod("key-1") {
        useExistingKey {
            alias("my-existing-signing-key")
            providerId("aws-kms")  // Optional: specify provider
        }
        purposes(VerificationPurpose.AUTHENTICATION)
    }
}
```

### Using an Existing JWK

Create a DID from an existing public key:

```kotlin
val existingJwk = Jwk(
    kty = JwaKeyType.EC,
    crv = "P-256",
    x = "WKn-ZIGevcwGFOMJ0GeEei2HpXXU6H0z...",
    y = "y77t-RvAHRKTsSGd5KhPq8dJ7VhxqPxM..."
)

val options = didCreateOptions {
    method("jwk")
    useExistingKey(existingJwk)
    alias("imported-key")
}

val result = didManager.create(options.options, options.keyConfigs)
```

## DSL Reference

### DidCreateBuilder

| Method | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `method(name)` | DID method: "key", "jwk", "web" |
| `alias(name)` | Human-readable alias |
| `domain(domain)` | Domain for did:web |
| `path(segments...)` | Path segments for did:web |
| `controller(did)` | Controller DID (defaults to self) |
| `autoGenerateKey { }` | Generate a new key via KMS |
| `useExistingKey { }` | Use existing key by alias |
| `useExistingKey(jwk)` | Use existing JWK directly |
| `verificationMethod(id) { }` | Add named verification method |
| `service(id) { }` | Add service endpoint |

### AutoGenerateKeyBuilder

| Method | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `keyType(type)` | KeyTypeMapping.OKP, EC, or RSA |
| `curve(curve)` | Curve.Ed25519, P_256, P_384, etc. |
| `algorithm(alg)` | Optional signature algorithm |
| `kmsProvider(id)` | KMS provider ID |
| `purposes(...)` | Verification purposes |
| `verificationMethodId(id)` | Custom key ID |

### ExistingKeyByAliasBuilder

| Method | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `alias(name)` | Key alias in KMS |
| `providerId(id)` | KMS provider ID |
| `purposes(...)` | Verification purposes |

### ServiceBuilder

| Method | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `type(type)` | Service type (e.g., "LinkedDomains") |
| `endpoint(url)` | Service endpoint URL |
| `endpoint(map)` | Complex endpoint as map |

## Update DID

Modify an existing DID document:

```kotlin
val updateResult = didManager.update(
    did = "did:web:example.com",
    options = DidUpdateOptions(
        // Add a new service
        addServices = listOf(
            DidService(
                id = "#messaging",
                type = "DIDCommMessaging",
                serviceEndpoint = "https://messaging.example.com"
            )
        ),

        // Remove services
        removeServiceIds = listOf("#old-service"),

        // Add verification methods
        addVerificationMethods = listOf(
            VerificationMethod(
                id = "did:web:example.com#key-4",
                type = "JsonWebKey2020",
                controller = "did:web:example.com",
                publicKeyJwk = newPublicKey
            )
        ),

        // Remove verification methods
        removeVerificationMethodIds = listOf("#deprecated-key")
    )
)

updateResult.fold(
    success = { result ->
        println("Updated: ${result.did}")
        // For did:web, publish the updated document
    },
    failure = { error ->
        println("Update failed: ${error.message}")
    }
)
```

## Add Key

Add a verification method to an existing DID:

```kotlin
val addKeyResult = didManager.addKey(
    did = "did:web:example.com",
    options = AddKeyOptions(
        publicKeyJwk = newPublicKey,
        verificationMethodId = "key-5",
        verificationMethodType = VerificationMethodType.JSON_WEB_KEY_2020,
        purposes = listOf(VerificationPurpose.ASSERTION_METHOD)
    )
)
```

## Deactivate DID

Mark a DID as deactivated:

```kotlin
val deactivateResult = didManager.deactivate(
    did = "did:web:example.com",
    options = DidDeactivateOptions(
        reason = "Key compromise"
    )
)

deactivateResult.fold(
    success = { result ->
        println("Deactivated: ${result.did}")

        // For did:web, publish the deactivated document
        val deactivatedDoc = result.deactivatedDocument
        // Publish to https://example.com/.well-known/did.json
    },
    failure = { error ->
        println("Deactivation failed: ${error.message}")
    }
)
```

## Persistence

### Storage Backends

| Backend | Use Case | Module |
|---------|----------|--------|
| Memory | Testing, ephemeral | `lib-did-persistence-memory` |
| SQLite | Mobile, embedded | `lib-did-persistence-sqlite` |
| PostgreSQL | Enterprise (EDK) | EDK module |

### DidRepository API

Direct access to DID storage:

```kotlin
val didRepository: DidRepository = session.component.didRepository

// Save a DID record
didRepository.save(didRecord).getOrThrow()

// Find by DID
val record = didRepository.findByDid("did:web:example.com").getOrNull()

// Find by alias
val record = didRepository.findByAlias("my-did").getOrNull()

// Query with filter
val records = didRepository.findAll(
    DidRecordFilter(
        method = "web",
        role = DidRole.MANAGED
    )
).getOrThrow()

// Update
didRepository.update(updatedRecord).getOrThrow()

// Delete
didRepository.delete("did:web:example.com").getOrThrow()
```

### Key Mappings

Track the relationship between verification methods and KMS keys:

```kotlin
// Get key mappings for a DID
val mappings = didRepository.getKeyMappings(didRecordId).getOrThrow()

mappings.forEach { mapping ->
    println("Verification method: ${mapping.verificationMethodId}")
    println("KMS key alias: ${mapping.kmsKeyAlias}")
    println("KMS provider: ${mapping.kmsProviderId}")
    println("Purposes: ${mapping.purposesJson}")
}

// Save a key mapping
didRepository.saveKeyMapping(
    didRecordId = recordId,
    mapping = DidKeyMappingRecord(
        id = uuid(),
        verificationMethodId = "#key-1",
        kmsKeyAlias = "my-signing-key",
        kmsProviderId = "software",
        purposesJson = """["authentication", "assertionMethod"]"""
    )
).getOrThrow()

// Delete key mappings
didRepository.deleteKeyMapping(mappingId)
didRepository.deleteKeyMappingsForDid(didRecordId)
```

## Publishing did:web

For did:web, you must publish the DID document to your web server:

```kotlin
val result = didManager.create(options.options, options.keyConfigs)
val didDocument = result.didDocument

// Serialize to JSON
val json = Json.encodeToString(didDocument)

// Publish to the correct URL based on the DID:
// did:web:example.com           → https://example.com/.well-known/did.json
// did:web:example.com:users:alice → https://example.com/users/alice/did.json

// Example with Ktor client
httpClient.put("https://example.com/.well-known/did.json") {
    contentType(ContentType.Application.Json)
    setBody(json)
}
```

### did:web URL Mapping

| DID | Published URL |
|-----|---------------|
| `did:web:example.com` | `https://example.com/.well-known/did.json` |
| `did:web:example.com:path` | `https://example.com/path/did.json` |
| `did:web:example.com:users:alice` | `https://example.com/users/alice/did.json` |
| `did:web:example.com%3A8080` | `https://example.com:8080/.well-known/did.json` |

## REST API (Universal Registrar)

The EDK provides REST APIs for DID management. See [EDK Decentralized Identifiers](/edk/guides/identity/decentralized-identifiers/overview).

| Endpoint | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `POST /1.0/create` | Create a new DID |
| `POST /1.0/update` | Update an existing DID |
| `POST /1.0/deactivate` | Deactivate a DID |
| `GET /1.0/methods` | List supported methods |
| `GET /1.0/properties` | Get capabilities |

## Platform Examples

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="kotlin" label="Kotlin/JVM">

```kotlin
// Complete example: Create and use a DID
val didManager: IDidManager = session.component.didManager

// 1. Create DID
val createOptions = didCreateOptions {
    method("key")
    alias("signing-key")
    autoGenerateKey {
        keyType(KeyTypeMapping.OKP)
        curve(Curve.Ed25519)
        purposes(VerificationPurpose.ASSERTION_METHOD)
    }
}

val createResult = didManager.create(
    createOptions.options,
    createOptions.keyConfigs
)
val did = createResult.did

// 2. Use DID for signing
val signCommand: SignJwsCommand = session.component.signJwsCommand
val signResult = signCommand.execute(
    SignJwsArgs(
        payload = "Hello, World!".encodeToByteArray(),
        identifierOpts = ManagedIdentifierOpts(
            method = IdentifierMethodDefaults.DID,
            identifier = did
        )
    ),
    sessionContext
)

println("Signed JWS: ${signResult.getOrThrow().jws}")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="swift" label="Swift/iOS">

```swift
// Create DID on iOS
let didManager = session.component.didManager

let options = DidCreateOptions(
    method: "key",
    alias: "signing-key"
)

let result = try await didManager.create(options: options)
print("Created DID: \(result.did)")

// Use for signing
let signCommand = session.component.signJwsCommand
let signResult = try await signCommand.execute(
    args: SignJwsArgs(
        payload: "Hello, World!".data(using: .utf8)!,
        identifierOpts: ManagedIdentifierOpts(
            method: .DID,
            identifier: result.did
        )
    ),
    context: sessionContext
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Next Steps

- [DID Resolution](./resolution) - Resolve and query DIDs
- [Key Management](../crypto/key-management) - Manage cryptographic keys
- [Identifier Resolution](../crypto/identifier-resolution) - Unified identifier resolution

---

# ETSI Trust Lists

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# ETSI Trust Lists

The IDK supports ETSI TS 119 612 Trust Service Status Lists (TSL), the standard format used across the European Union for publishing trusted service providers. This enables validation of credentials issued by EU-recognized trust services.

## What are ETSI Trust Lists?

ETSI Trust Lists (also called Trusted Lists or TSL) are standardized XML documents that publish information about trust service providers and their services. In the EU, each member state maintains a trusted list of qualified trust service providers (QTSPs) that meet eIDAS regulation requirements.

The EU also maintains a List of Trusted Lists (LOTL), which is a master index pointing to all member state trusted lists.

## Trust List Hierarchy

<img src="/img/diagrams/etsi-trust-list-hierarchy.svg" alt="ETSI Trust List Hierarchy" style={{maxWidth: '550px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Loading Trust Lists

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val trustListService = session.component.trustListService

// Load the EU List of Trusted Lists
val lotl = trustListService.loadLotl(
    url = "https://ec.europa.eu/tools/lotl/eu-lotl.xml"
)

// This automatically loads all referenced member state lists
println("Loaded ${lotl.trustedLists.size} member state lists")

// Access a specific country's list
val germanList = lotl.trustedLists.find { it.schemeTerritory == "DE" }
println("German TSPs: ${germanList?.trustServiceProviders?.size}")
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let trustListService = session.component.trustListService

// Load the EU List of Trusted Lists
let lotl = try await trustListService.loadLotl(
    url: "https://ec.europa.eu/tools/lotl/eu-lotl.xml"
)

// This automatically loads all referenced member state lists
print("Loaded \(lotl.trustedLists.count) member state lists")

// Access a specific country's list
if let germanList = lotl.trustedLists.first(where: { $0.schemeTerritory == "DE" }) {
    print("German TSPs: \(germanList.trustServiceProviders.count)")
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Loading Individual Lists

For scenarios where you only need specific country lists:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Load a single country's trusted list
val germanList = trustListService.loadTrustedList(
    url = "https://example.de/tsl.xml"
)

// Inspect the list
println("Territory: ${germanList.schemeTerritory}")
println("Operator: ${germanList.schemeOperatorName}")
println("Version: ${germanList.tslVersionIdentifier}")
println("Sequence: ${germanList.tslSequenceNumber}")
println("Issue Date: ${germanList.listIssueDateTime}")
println("Next Update: ${germanList.nextUpdate}")
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Load a single country's trusted list
let germanList = try await trustListService.loadTrustedList(
    url: "https://example.de/tsl.xml"
)

// Inspect the list
print("Territory: \(germanList.schemeTerritory)")
print("Operator: \(germanList.schemeOperatorName)")
print("Version: \(germanList.tslVersionIdentifier)")
print("Sequence: \(germanList.tslSequenceNumber)")
print("Issue Date: \(germanList.listIssueDateTime)")
print("Next Update: \(germanList.nextUpdate)")
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Querying Trust Service Providers

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Find all qualified trust service providers
val qualifiedProviders = lotl.findProviders {
    status = TrustServiceStatus.QUALIFIED
}

qualifiedProviders.forEach { provider ->
    println("Provider: ${provider.name}")
    println("  Country: ${provider.schemeTerritory}")
    println("  Services: ${provider.services.size}")
}

// Find providers offering specific service types
val signatureProviders = lotl.findProviders {
    serviceType = ServiceType.QUALIFIED_CERTIFICATE_FOR_ELECTRONIC_SIGNATURE
}

// Find providers by certificate
val matchingProviders = lotl.findProvidersByCertificate(
    certificate = issuerCertificate
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Find all qualified trust service providers
let qualifiedProviders = lotl.findProviders { query in
    query.status = .qualified
}

for provider in qualifiedProviders {
    print("Provider: \(provider.name)")
    print("  Country: \(provider.schemeTerritory)")
    print("  Services: \(provider.services.count)")
}

// Find providers offering specific service types
let signatureProviders = lotl.findProviders { query in
    query.serviceType = .qualifiedCertificateForElectronicSignature
}

// Find providers by certificate
let matchingProviders = try lotl.findProvidersByCertificate(
    certificate: issuerCertificate
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Trust Service Status

ETSI defines specific status values for trust services:

| Status | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `GRANTED` | Service is currently granted/active |
| `WITHDRAWN` | Service has been withdrawn |
| `DEPRECATED` | Service is deprecated but may still be valid |
| `RECOGNISEDAT NATIONALLEVEL` | Recognized at national level |
| `QUALIFIED` | Service is qualified under eIDAS |

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Check if a service is currently valid
val service = provider.services.first()

when (service.currentStatus) {
    TrustServiceStatus.GRANTED,
    TrustServiceStatus.QUALIFIED -> {
        println("Service is active and trusted")
    }
    TrustServiceStatus.WITHDRAWN -> {
        println("Service has been withdrawn")
    }
    TrustServiceStatus.DEPRECATED -> {
        println("Service is deprecated - check validity period")
    }
}

// Check status history
service.statusHistory.forEach { statusEntry ->
    println("${statusEntry.status} from ${statusEntry.startDate}")
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Check if a service is currently valid
let service = provider.services.first!

switch service.currentStatus {
case .granted, .qualified:
    print("Service is active and trusted")
case .withdrawn:
    print("Service has been withdrawn")
case .deprecated:
    print("Service is deprecated - check validity period")
default:
    break
}

// Check status history
for statusEntry in service.statusHistory {
    print("\(statusEntry.status) from \(statusEntry.startDate)")
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Trust Validation with TSL

Use trust lists for credential validation:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Configure trust validator with ETSI trust lists
val trustValidator = TrustValidator {
    etsiTrustLists {
        // Load EU LOTL
        lotlUrl = "https://ec.europa.eu/tools/lotl/eu-lotl.xml"

        // Only trust qualified services
        minimumStatus = TrustServiceStatus.QUALIFIED

        // Cache settings
        cacheEnabled = true
        cacheDuration = Duration.ofHours(24)

        // Refresh in background
        backgroundRefresh = true
    }
}

// Validate a certificate against trust lists
val result = trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate = issuerCertificate,
    purpose = TrustPurpose.CREDENTIAL_ISSUER
)

when (result) {
    is TrustResult.Trusted -> {
        // Certificate found in trust list
        println("Issuer: ${result.trustServiceProvider}")
        println("Service: ${result.trustService}")
        println("Country: ${result.schemeTerritory}")
        println("Status: ${result.serviceStatus}")
    }
    is TrustResult.NotTrusted -> {
        println("Not found in trust lists")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Configure trust validator with ETSI trust lists
let trustValidator = TrustValidator { config in
    config.etsiTrustLists { etsi in
        // Load EU LOTL
        etsi.lotlUrl = "https://ec.europa.eu/tools/lotl/eu-lotl.xml"

        // Only trust qualified services
        etsi.minimumStatus = .qualified

        // Cache settings
        etsi.cacheEnabled = true
        etsi.cacheDuration = 24 * 60 * 60  // 24 hours

        // Refresh in background
        etsi.backgroundRefresh = true
    }
}

// Validate a certificate against trust lists
let result = try await trustValidator.validateTrust(
    certificate: issuerCertificate,
    purpose: .credentialIssuer
)

switch result {
case .trusted(let trust):
    // Certificate found in trust list
    print("Issuer: \(trust.trustServiceProvider)")
    print("Service: \(trust.trustService)")
    print("Country: \(trust.schemeTerritory)")
    print("Status: \(trust.serviceStatus)")

case .notTrusted:
    print("Not found in trust lists")
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Custom Trust Lists

Create custom trust lists following the ETSI format:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Build a custom trust list
val customList = TrustedListBuilder()
    .schemeOperatorName("My Organization")
    .schemeTerritory("XX")
    .tslVersionIdentifier(5)
    .tslSequenceNumber(1)
    .listIssueDateTime(Instant.now())
    .nextUpdate(Instant.now().plus(Duration.ofDays(180)))
    .trustServiceProvider {
        name = "Internal Identity Provider"
        tradeName = "Internal IDP"
        electronicAddress = "https://idp.example.com"

        service {
            type = ServiceType.QUALIFIED_CERTIFICATE_FOR_ELECTRONIC_SIGNATURE
            name = "Identity Credential Service"
            status = TrustServiceStatus.GRANTED
            startDate = Instant.now()

            // Add service certificates
            certificates = listOf(issuerCertificate)
        }
    }
    .build()

// Register custom list with trust service
trustListService.registerCustomList(customList)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Build a custom trust list
let customList = TrustedListBuilder()
    .schemeOperatorName(name: "My Organization")
    .schemeTerritory(territory: "XX")
    .tslVersionIdentifier(version: 5)
    .tslSequenceNumber(sequence: 1)
    .listIssueDateTime(date: Date())
    .nextUpdate(date: Date().addingTimeInterval(180 * 24 * 60 * 60))
    .trustServiceProvider { provider in
        provider.name = "Internal Identity Provider"
        provider.tradeName = "Internal IDP"
        provider.electronicAddress = "https://idp.example.com"

        provider.service { service in
            service.type = .qualifiedCertificateForElectronicSignature
            service.name = "Identity Credential Service"
            service.status = .granted
            service.startDate = Date()

            // Add service certificates
            service.certificates = [issuerCertificate]
        }
    }
    .build()

// Register custom list with trust service
trustListService.registerCustomList(list: customList)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Trust List Caching

Configure caching for performance:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val trustListService = TrustListService {
    // Enable caching
    cache {
        enabled = true
        directory = context.cacheDir.resolve("trust-lists")
        maxAge = Duration.ofHours(24)

        // Keep expired cache as fallback
        staleWhileRevalidate = true
    }

    // Background refresh
    refresh {
        enabled = true
        interval = Duration.ofHours(12)
        retryOnError = true
        maxRetries = 3
    }

    // Network settings
    http {
        timeout = Duration.ofSeconds(30)
        userAgent = "MyApp/1.0 IDK/0.13"
    }
}

// Force refresh if needed
trustListService.refresh()

// Check cache status
val cacheStatus = trustListService.cacheStatus
println("Last update: ${cacheStatus.lastUpdate}")
println("Next refresh: ${cacheStatus.nextRefresh}")
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let trustListService = TrustListService { config in
    // Enable caching
    config.cache { cache in
        cache.enabled = true
        cache.directory = FileManager.default.temporaryDirectory.appendingPathComponent("trust-lists")
        cache.maxAge = 24 * 60 * 60  // 24 hours

        // Keep expired cache as fallback
        cache.staleWhileRevalidate = true
    }

    // Background refresh
    config.refresh { refresh in
        refresh.enabled = true
        refresh.interval = 12 * 60 * 60  // 12 hours
        refresh.retryOnError = true
        refresh.maxRetries = 3
    }

    // Network settings
    config.http { http in
        http.timeout = 30
        http.userAgent = "MyApp/1.0 IDK/0.13"
    }
}

// Force refresh if needed
try await trustListService.refresh()

// Check cache status
let cacheStatus = trustListService.cacheStatus
print("Last update: \(cacheStatus.lastUpdate)")
print("Next refresh: \(cacheStatus.nextRefresh)")
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Configuration

Configure trust list handling via properties:

```properties
# ETSI Trust Lists
trust.etsi.enabled=true
trust.etsi.lotl.url=https://ec.europa.eu/tools/lotl/eu-lotl.xml

# Caching
trust.etsi.cache.enabled=true
trust.etsi.cache.directory=${app.data.dir}/trust-lists
trust.etsi.cache.max-age-hours=24

# Background refresh
trust.etsi.refresh.enabled=true
trust.etsi.refresh.interval-hours=12

# Validation
trust.etsi.minimum-status=QUALIFIED
trust.etsi.verify-signatures=true
```

## Best Practices

**Cache trust lists aggressively.** Trust lists are large and change infrequently. Use caching to improve performance and reduce network traffic.

**Enable background refresh.** Keep trust lists current by refreshing in the background, so validation is never blocked by network requests.

**Verify trust list signatures.** Trust lists are signed by the scheme operator. Always verify signatures to prevent tampering.

**Handle offline scenarios.** Use stale cache data when network is unavailable, but log warnings for monitoring.

**Monitor trust list updates.** Track when new versions are published and review changes that might affect your application.

---

# Certificate Validation

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Certificate Validation

The IDK provides comprehensive X.509 certificate validation capabilities, including chain building, signature verification, revocation checking, and policy enforcement. This is essential for validating mDoc issuer certificates and other PKI-based trust relationships.

## Certificate Validator

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val certificateValidator = session.component.certificateValidator
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let certificateValidator = session.component.certificateValidator
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Basic Validation

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Validate a certificate chain
val result = certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate = endEntityCertificate,
    intermediates = intermediateCertificates,
    trustAnchors = rootCertificates
)

when (result) {
    is ValidationResult.Valid -> {
        println("Certificate is valid")
        println("Chain: ${result.certPath.certificates.size} certificates")
        println("Trust anchor: ${result.trustAnchor.subject}")
    }
    is ValidationResult.Invalid -> {
        println("Validation failed: ${result.reason}")
        when (result.reason) {
            is CertificateExpired -> println("Certificate has expired")
            is CertificateNotYetValid -> println("Certificate not yet valid")
            is CertificateRevoked -> println("Certificate has been revoked")
            is SignatureInvalid -> println("Signature verification failed")
            is PathBuildingFailed -> println("Could not build chain to trust anchor")
            else -> println("Other error: ${result.reason}")
        }
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Validate a certificate chain
let result = try await certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate: endEntityCertificate,
    intermediates: intermediateCertificates,
    trustAnchors: rootCertificates
)

switch result {
case .valid(let validation):
    print("Certificate is valid")
    print("Chain: \(validation.certPath.certificates.count) certificates")
    print("Trust anchor: \(validation.trustAnchor.subject)")

case .invalid(let reason):
    print("Validation failed: \(reason)")
    switch reason {
    case .expired:
        print("Certificate has expired")
    case .notYetValid:
        print("Certificate not yet valid")
    case .revoked:
        print("Certificate has been revoked")
    case .signatureInvalid:
        print("Signature verification failed")
    case .pathBuildingFailed:
        print("Could not build chain to trust anchor")
    default:
        print("Other error: \(reason)")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Chain Building

The validator automatically builds certificate chains:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Configure chain building options
val options = ChainBuildingOptions(
    // Maximum chain depth
    maxPathLength = 5,

    // Include certificates from these URLs if needed
    fetchIntermediates = true,
    intermediateUrls = listOf(
        "https://certs.example.com/intermediates/"
    ),

    // Timeout for fetching
    fetchTimeout = Duration.ofSeconds(10)
)

val result = certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate = endEntityCertificate,
    options = options
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Configure chain building options
let options = ChainBuildingOptions(
    // Maximum chain depth
    maxPathLength: 5,

    // Include certificates from these URLs if needed
    fetchIntermediates: true,
    intermediateUrls: [
        "https://certs.example.com/intermediates/"
    ],

    // Timeout for fetching
    fetchTimeout: 10
)

let result = try await certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate: endEntityCertificate,
    options: options
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Revocation Checking

### OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol)

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Check revocation via OCSP
val result = certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate = endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors = rootCertificates,
    revocationOptions = RevocationOptions(
        checkOcsp = true,
        ocspResponderUrl = "https://ocsp.example.com",  // Optional override
        ocspTimeout = Duration.ofSeconds(5),
        allowOcspNoCheck = false,  // Require OCSP response
        cacheOcspResponses = true,
        ocspCacheDuration = Duration.ofHours(1)
    )
)

// Access OCSP details
if (result is ValidationResult.Valid) {
    val ocspResponse = result.ocspResponse
    println("OCSP status: ${ocspResponse?.certStatus}")
    println("Produced at: ${ocspResponse?.producedAt}")
    println("Next update: ${ocspResponse?.nextUpdate}")
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Check revocation via OCSP
let result = try await certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate: endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors: rootCertificates,
    revocationOptions: RevocationOptions(
        checkOcsp: true,
        ocspResponderUrl: "https://ocsp.example.com",  // Optional override
        ocspTimeout: 5,
        allowOcspNoCheck: false,  // Require OCSP response
        cacheOcspResponses: true,
        ocspCacheDuration: 60 * 60  // 1 hour
    )
)

// Access OCSP details
if case .valid(let validation) = result {
    if let ocspResponse = validation.ocspResponse {
        print("OCSP status: \(ocspResponse.certStatus)")
        print("Produced at: \(ocspResponse.producedAt)")
        print("Next update: \(ocspResponse.nextUpdate)")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### CRL (Certificate Revocation List)

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Check revocation via CRL
val result = certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate = endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors = rootCertificates,
    revocationOptions = RevocationOptions(
        checkCrl = true,
        crlDistributionPoints = listOf(
            "https://crl.example.com/ca.crl"
        ),
        crlTimeout = Duration.ofSeconds(10),
        cacheCrls = true,
        crlCacheDuration = Duration.ofHours(24)
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Check revocation via CRL
let result = try await certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate: endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors: rootCertificates,
    revocationOptions: RevocationOptions(
        checkCrl: true,
        crlDistributionPoints: [
            "https://crl.example.com/ca.crl"
        ],
        crlTimeout: 10,
        cacheCrls: true,
        crlCacheDuration: 24 * 60 * 60  // 24 hours
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Combined Revocation Checking

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val result = certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate = endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors = rootCertificates,
    revocationOptions = RevocationOptions(
        // Try OCSP first, fall back to CRL
        checkOcsp = true,
        checkCrl = true,
        preferOcsp = true,

        // Soft fail: continue if revocation check fails
        softFail = false,  // Set true to allow when revocation info unavailable

        // What to do if no revocation information
        unknownRevocationPolicy = UnknownRevocationPolicy.REJECT
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let result = try await certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate: endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors: rootCertificates,
    revocationOptions: RevocationOptions(
        // Try OCSP first, fall back to CRL
        checkOcsp: true,
        checkCrl: true,
        preferOcsp: true,

        // Soft fail: continue if revocation check fails
        softFail: false,  // Set true to allow when revocation info unavailable

        // What to do if no revocation information
        unknownRevocationPolicy: .reject
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Key Usage Validation

Validate certificate key usage extensions:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val result = certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate = endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors = rootCertificates,
    keyUsageOptions = KeyUsageOptions(
        // Required key usages
        requiredKeyUsages = setOf(
            KeyUsage.DIGITAL_SIGNATURE,
            KeyUsage.KEY_ENCIPHERMENT
        ),

        // Required extended key usages
        requiredExtendedKeyUsages = setOf(
            ExtendedKeyUsage.SERVER_AUTH,
            ExtendedKeyUsage.CLIENT_AUTH
        ),

        // Strict: fail if extension is missing
        strictKeyUsage = true
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let result = try await certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate: endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors: rootCertificates,
    keyUsageOptions: KeyUsageOptions(
        // Required key usages
        requiredKeyUsages: Set([.digitalSignature, .keyEncipherment]),

        // Required extended key usages
        requiredExtendedKeyUsages: Set([.serverAuth, .clientAuth]),

        // Strict: fail if extension is missing
        strictKeyUsage: true
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## mDoc Certificate Validation

Validate certificates for ISO 18013-5 mDoc:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Validate IACA (Issuing Authority Certificate Authority) certificate
val iacaResult = certificateValidator.validateIaca(
    certificate = iacaCertificate,
    trustAnchors = iacaRootCertificates
)

// Validate Document Signer certificate
val dsResult = certificateValidator.validateDocumentSigner(
    certificate = documentSignerCertificate,
    iacaCertificate = iacaCertificate
)

// Validate complete mDoc certificate chain
val mdocResult = certificateValidator.validateMdocChain(
    mso = mobileSecurityObject,
    iacaTrustAnchors = iacaRootCertificates
)

when (mdocResult) {
    is MdocValidationResult.Valid -> {
        println("mDoc issuer chain is valid")
        println("Issuing country: ${mdocResult.issuingCountry}")
        println("Issuing authority: ${mdocResult.issuingAuthority}")
    }
    is MdocValidationResult.Invalid -> {
        println("mDoc validation failed: ${mdocResult.reason}")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Validate IACA (Issuing Authority Certificate Authority) certificate
let iacaResult = try await certificateValidator.validateIaca(
    certificate: iacaCertificate,
    trustAnchors: iacaRootCertificates
)

// Validate Document Signer certificate
let dsResult = try await certificateValidator.validateDocumentSigner(
    certificate: documentSignerCertificate,
    iacaCertificate: iacaCertificate
)

// Validate complete mDoc certificate chain
let mdocResult = try await certificateValidator.validateMdocChain(
    mso: mobileSecurityObject,
    iacaTrustAnchors: iacaRootCertificates
)

switch mdocResult {
case .valid(let validation):
    print("mDoc issuer chain is valid")
    print("Issuing country: \(validation.issuingCountry)")
    print("Issuing authority: \(validation.issuingAuthority)")

case .invalid(let reason):
    print("mDoc validation failed: \(reason)")
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Time Validation

Control time-based validation:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val result = certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate = endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors = rootCertificates,
    timeOptions = TimeValidationOptions(
        // Use specific time for validation (e.g., historical validation)
        validationTime = Instant.now(),

        // Allow some clock skew
        clockSkew = Duration.ofMinutes(5),

        // Grace period for recently expired certificates
        expirationGracePeriod = Duration.ofDays(1)
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let result = try await certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate: endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors: rootCertificates,
    timeOptions: TimeValidationOptions(
        // Use specific time for validation (e.g., historical validation)
        validationTime: Date(),

        // Allow some clock skew
        clockSkew: 5 * 60,  // 5 minutes

        // Grace period for recently expired certificates
        expirationGracePeriod: 24 * 60 * 60  // 1 day
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Policy Constraints

Enforce certificate policies:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val result = certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate = endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors = rootCertificates,
    policyOptions = PolicyValidationOptions(
        // Required certificate policies
        requiredPolicies = setOf(
            "2.16.840.1.101.2.1.11.5",  // Example policy OID
            "1.3.6.1.4.1.12345.1.1"
        ),

        // Inhibit policy mapping
        inhibitPolicyMapping = false,

        // Require explicit policy
        requireExplicitPolicy = true,

        // Inhibit any policy
        inhibitAnyPolicy = false
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let result = try await certificateValidator.validate(
    certificate: endEntityCertificate,
    trustAnchors: rootCertificates,
    policyOptions: PolicyValidationOptions(
        // Required certificate policies
        requiredPolicies: Set([
            "2.16.840.1.101.2.1.11.5",  // Example policy OID
            "1.3.6.1.4.1.12345.1.1"
        ]),

        // Inhibit policy mapping
        inhibitPolicyMapping: false,

        // Require explicit policy
        requireExplicitPolicy: true,

        // Inhibit any policy
        inhibitAnyPolicy: false
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Certificate Parsing

Parse and inspect certificate details:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Parse a certificate from PEM
val certificate = certificateValidator.parseCertificate(pemString)

// Or from DER bytes
val certificate = certificateValidator.parseCertificate(derBytes)

// Inspect certificate details
println("Subject: ${certificate.subject}")
println("Issuer: ${certificate.issuer}")
println("Serial: ${certificate.serialNumber}")
println("Not Before: ${certificate.notBefore}")
println("Not After: ${certificate.notAfter}")
println("Public Key: ${certificate.publicKey.algorithm}")

// Extensions
certificate.extensions.forEach { ext ->
    println("Extension: ${ext.oid} (critical: ${ext.isCritical})")
}

// Subject Alternative Names
certificate.subjectAltNames?.forEach { san ->
    println("SAN: ${san.type} = ${san.value}")
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Parse a certificate from PEM
let certificate = try certificateValidator.parseCertificate(pem: pemString)

// Or from DER bytes
let certificate = try certificateValidator.parseCertificate(der: derBytes)

// Inspect certificate details
print("Subject: \(certificate.subject)")
print("Issuer: \(certificate.issuer)")
print("Serial: \(certificate.serialNumber)")
print("Not Before: \(certificate.notBefore)")
print("Not After: \(certificate.notAfter)")
print("Public Key: \(certificate.publicKey.algorithm)")

// Extensions
for ext in certificate.extensions {
    print("Extension: \(ext.oid) (critical: \(ext.isCritical))")
}

// Subject Alternative Names
if let sans = certificate.subjectAltNames {
    for san in sans {
        print("SAN: \(san.type) = \(san.value)")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Configuration

Configure certificate validation via properties:

```properties
# Trust anchors
certificate.trust-anchors.path=/path/to/trust-anchors/
certificate.trust-anchors.include-system=true

# Chain building
certificate.chain.max-depth=10
certificate.chain.fetch-intermediates=true

# Revocation checking
certificate.revocation.check-ocsp=true
certificate.revocation.check-crl=true
certificate.revocation.prefer-ocsp=true
certificate.revocation.soft-fail=false
certificate.revocation.cache-enabled=true
certificate.revocation.cache-duration-hours=1

# Time validation
certificate.time.clock-skew-minutes=5
certificate.time.expiration-grace-days=0

# mDoc/IACA validation
certificate.iaca.trust-anchors.path=/path/to/iaca-roots/
```

## Best Practices

**Always validate complete chains.** Don't just validate the end-entity certificate; ensure the entire chain to a trust anchor is valid.

**Enable revocation checking** for production systems. Use OCSP for real-time status and CRL as a fallback.

**Cache revocation information.** OCSP responses and CRLs can be cached to improve performance and reduce network traffic.

**Use appropriate trust anchors.** Only include root certificates you explicitly trust. Don't blindly trust system certificates for high-security applications.

**Monitor certificate expiration.** Track certificate validity periods and plan for renewal before expiration.

---

# OpenID Federation Trust

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# OpenID Federation Trust

The IDK supports [OpenID Federation](https://openid.net/specs/openid-federation-1_0.html) trust chain resolution and verification. OpenID Federation defines a hierarchical trust model where entities publish self-signed Entity Statements, and trust is established by resolving a chain of statements from an entity up to a recognized trust anchor.

This is particularly useful in ecosystems like the European Digital Identity Wallet (EUDI), where relying parties and credential issuers must prove membership in a federation before interactions can take place.

## How It Works

The `OidfTrustValidationService` implements the `TrustValidationService` interface and is automatically contributed to the session scope via `@ContributesIntoSet(SessionScope::class)`. It handles the `TrustContext.TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION` trust type.

When you request trust validation for an entity, the service executes the following flow:

1. **Extract entity identifier.** The `entityIdentifier` is read from the request context parameters. This is the OpenID Federation entity URL you want to validate (for example, `https://wallet-provider.example.com`).

2. **Resolve trust anchors.** The configured trust anchors are loaded from `OidfTrustConfig`. Request-level overrides can be supplied to use different anchors per validation call.

3. **Check cache.** The service checks the `trust.oidfed.chains` cache namespace. Cached results have a 30-minute TTL and are returned immediately when available.

4. **Resolve trust chain** (`ResolveTrustChainCommand`). Starting from the entity's well-known endpoint, the service fetches Entity Statements and Subordinate Statements, building a JWT chain from the target entity up to the trust anchor.

5. **Verify trust chain** (`VerifyTrustChainCommand`). Each JWT in the chain is cryptographically validated. Signatures are verified, expiration is checked, and issuer/subject constraints are enforced.

6. **Verify trust marks** (`VerifyTrustMarkCommand`, optional). If required trust marks are configured, the service validates that the entity holds the specified trust marks and that those marks are issued by a recognized trust mark issuer.

7. **Cache and return.** The `TrustValidationResult` is cached and returned to the caller.

## Usage

Access the trust validation service from the session graph and call `validate()` with a `TrustContext` of type `TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION`:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val trustValidationService = session.graph.trustValidationService

// Build a trust context for OpenID Federation
val context = TrustContext(
    type = TrustContext.TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION,
    parameters = mapOf(
        "entityIdentifier" to "https://wallet-provider.example.com"
    )
)

val result = trustValidationService.validate(context)

when (result.status) {
    TrustStatus.TRUSTED -> {
        println("Entity is trusted")
        println("Trust chain depth: ${result.validationPath?.size}")
        println("Trust anchor: ${result.trustAnchor?.name}")
    }
    TrustStatus.UNTRUSTED -> {
        println("Entity is not trusted: ${result.details}")
    }
    TrustStatus.VALIDATION_ERROR -> {
        println("Validation error: ${result.details}")
    }
    else -> {
        println("Status: ${result.status}, details: ${result.details}")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let trustValidationService = session.graph.trustValidationService

// Build a trust context for OpenID Federation
let context = TrustContext(
    type: TrustContext.TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION,
    parameters: [
        "entityIdentifier": "https://wallet-provider.example.com"
    ]
)

let result = try await trustValidationService.validate(context: context)

if result.trusted {
    print("Entity is trusted")
    print("Validation path: \(result.validationPath ?? [])")
    print("Trust anchor: \(result.trustAnchor?.name ?? "unknown")")
} else if result.status == .validationError {
    print("Validation error: \(result.details ?? "unknown error")")
} else {
    print("Entity is not trusted: \(result.details ?? "no details")")
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Overriding Trust Anchors Per Request

You can override the configured trust anchors on a per-request basis by passing them as a comma-separated list in the context parameters:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val context = TrustContext(
    type = TrustContext.TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION,
    parameters = mapOf(
        "entityIdentifier" to "https://issuer.example.com",
        "trustAnchors" to "https://anchor1.example.com,https://anchor2.example.com",
        "maxChainDepth" to "3"
    )
)

val result = trustValidationService.validate(context)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let context = TrustContext(
    type: TrustContext.TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION,
    parameters: [
        "entityIdentifier": "https://issuer.example.com",
        "trustAnchors": "https://anchor1.example.com,https://anchor2.example.com",
        "maxChainDepth": "3"
    ]
)

let result = try await trustValidationService.validate(context: context)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Context Parameters

| Parameter | Required | Description |
|-----------|----------|-------------|
| `entityIdentifier` | Yes | The OpenID Federation entity identifier (URL) to validate |
| `trustAnchors` | No | Comma-separated list of trust anchor URLs; overrides the configured anchors |
| `requiredTrustMarks` | No | Comma-separated list of trust mark identifiers that the entity must hold |
| `maxChainDepth` | No | Maximum number of intermediaries allowed in the chain (default: 5) |

## Trust Marks

Trust marks are signed assertions that an entity meets certain criteria defined by a trust mark issuer. They are optional but can be required through configuration or request parameters.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Require specific trust marks during validation
val context = TrustContext(
    type = TrustContext.TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION,
    parameters = mapOf(
        "entityIdentifier" to "https://issuer.example.com",
        "requiredTrustMarks" to "https://registry.example.com/marks/qualified-issuer,https://registry.example.com/marks/eudi-wallet"
    )
)

val result = trustValidationService.validate(context)

if (result.trusted) {
    // The entity holds all required trust marks
    println("Trust anchor: ${result.trustAnchor?.name}")
    println("Details: ${result.details}")
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Require specific trust marks during validation
let context = TrustContext(
    type: TrustContext.TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION,
    parameters: [
        "entityIdentifier": "https://issuer.example.com",
        "requiredTrustMarks": "https://registry.example.com/marks/qualified-issuer,https://registry.example.com/marks/eudi-wallet"
    ]
)

let result = try await trustValidationService.validate(context: context)

if result.trusted {
    // The entity holds all required trust marks
    print("Trust anchor: \(result.trustAnchor?.name ?? "unknown")")
    print("Details: \(result.details ?? "none")")
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

If any required trust mark is missing or fails verification, the result will have `trusted = false` with a status of `TrustStatus.UNTRUSTED`.

## Using the Command Directly

You can also invoke the validation command directly via the command ID `trust.oidfed.validate`:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val commandManager = session.graph.commandManager

val result = commandManager.execute(
    ValidateOidfTrustCommand(
        entityIdentifier = "https://issuer.example.com",
        trustAnchors = listOf("https://federation.example.com"),
        requiredTrustMarks = listOf("https://registry.example.com/marks/qualified-issuer"),
        maxChainDepth = 5
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let commandManager = session.graph.commandManager

let result = try await commandManager.execute(
    command: ValidateOidfTrustCommand(
        entityIdentifier: "https://issuer.example.com",
        trustAnchors: ["https://federation.example.com"],
        requiredTrustMarks: ["https://registry.example.com/marks/qualified-issuer"],
        maxChainDepth: 5
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Configuration

Enable and configure OpenID Federation trust validation via properties:

```properties
# Enable OpenID Federation trust validation
trust.anchors.oidfed.enabled=false

# Trusted federation anchor URLs (comma-separated)
trust.anchors.oidfed.trust-anchors=https://federation.example.com

# Maximum depth of the trust chain (number of intermediaries)
trust.anchors.oidfed.max-chain-depth=5

# Required trust marks (comma-separated; empty means none required)
trust.anchors.oidfed.required-trust-marks=https://example.com/trust-mark
```

### Caching

The service maintains two internal caches:

| Cache | Namespace | Default TTL | Purpose |
|-------|-----------|-------------|---------|
| Chain results | `trust.oidfed.chains` | 30 minutes | Caches resolved and verified trust chain outcomes |
| Trust anchor configs | `trust.oidfed.anchors` | 30 minutes | Caches fetched trust anchor Entity Statements |

Caching avoids redundant network requests and cryptographic verification when validating the same entity multiple times within a short window.

## Module Dependencies

The OpenID Federation trust module requires the `openid-federation-client` module on the classpath. Add the following to your `build.gradle.kts`:

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-trust-oidfed:<version>")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:openid-federation-client:<version>")
}
```

The `OidfTrustValidationService` is automatically discovered and registered when the module is present on the classpath. No additional wiring is needed beyond enabling the feature in configuration.

---

# DID-Based Trust

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# DID-Based Trust

Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) are self-sovereign identifiers that resolve to DID Documents containing public keys and service endpoints. While DIDs are self-issued by design, real-world applications still need to answer the question: "Should I trust this DID?"

The IDK provides a DID trust validation layer that applies configurable policies to determine whether a given DID should be trusted. This is separate from DID resolution itself; the trust layer decides *policy*, while the DID resolver handles *resolution*.

## How It Works

The `DidTrustValidationService` implements the `TrustValidationService` interface and is automatically contributed to the session scope via `@ContributesIntoSet(SessionScope::class)`. It handles the `TrustContext.TYPE_DID` trust type.

Validation follows a two-layer approach:

### Layer 1: Method Allow-List Gate

Before any other checks, the service verifies that the DID method (the second segment of a DID, such as `web` in `did:web:example.com`) is in the configured list of allowed methods. If the method is not allowed, validation fails immediately. This provides a coarse-grained first filter. For example, you might allow `web` and `key` methods but reject `peer` DIDs.

### Layer 2: Trust List Check

If the DID method passes the allow-list gate, the service checks whether the specific DID appears in the configured trusted DIDs list. This is a fine-grained check that lets you enumerate exactly which DIDs your application trusts. When no trusted DIDs list is configured, any DID with an allowed method passes this layer.

### Layer 3: Controller Chain Validation

Finally, the service validates the DID controller chain. A DID Document may declare a `controller` field pointing to another DID. The service verifies that the controller chain is valid and terminates at a trusted DID or at the DID itself (self-controlled).

## Usage

Access the trust validation service from the session graph and call `validate()` with a `TrustContext` of type `TYPE_DID`:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val trustValidationService = session.graph.trustValidationService

// Build a trust context for DID trust
val context = TrustContext(
    type = TrustContext.TYPE_DID,
    parameters = mapOf(
        "did" to "did:web:issuer.example.com"
    )
)

val result = trustValidationService.validate(context)

when (result.status) {
    TrustStatus.TRUSTED -> {
        println("DID is trusted")
        println("Trust anchor: ${result.trustAnchor?.name}")
    }
    TrustStatus.UNTRUSTED -> {
        println("DID is not trusted: ${result.details}")
    }
    TrustStatus.VALIDATION_ERROR -> {
        println("Validation error: ${result.details}")
    }
    else -> {
        println("Status: ${result.status}, details: ${result.details}")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let trustValidationService = session.graph.trustValidationService

// Build a trust context for DID trust
let context = TrustContext(
    type: TrustContext.TYPE_DID,
    parameters: [
        "did": "did:web:issuer.example.com"
    ]
)

let result = try await trustValidationService.validate(context: context)

if result.trusted {
    print("DID is trusted")
    print("Trust anchor: \(result.trustAnchor?.name ?? "unknown")")
} else if result.status == .validationError {
    print("Validation error: \(result.details ?? "unknown error")")
} else {
    print("DID is not trusted: \(result.details ?? "no details")")
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Overriding Allowed Methods and Trusted DIDs

You can override the configured allow-lists on a per-request basis:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val context = TrustContext(
    type = TrustContext.TYPE_DID,
    parameters = mapOf(
        "did" to "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK",
        "allowedMethods" to "key,web",
        "trustedDids" to "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK,did:web:trusted.example.com"
    )
)

val result = trustValidationService.validate(context)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let context = TrustContext(
    type: TrustContext.TYPE_DID,
    parameters: [
        "did": "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK",
        "allowedMethods": "key,web",
        "trustedDids": "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK,did:web:trusted.example.com"
    ]
)

let result = try await trustValidationService.validate(context: context)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Context Parameters

| Parameter | Required | Description |
|-----------|----------|-------------|
| `did` | Yes | The DID to validate |
| `allowedMethods` | No | Comma-separated list of allowed DID methods; overrides config |
| `trustedDids` | No | Comma-separated list of explicitly trusted DIDs; overrides config |
| `identifierJson` | No | Pre-resolved DID Document as a JSON string (avoids re-resolution) |

### Using the Command Directly

You can also invoke the validation command directly via the command ID `trust.did.validate`:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val commandManager = session.graph.commandManager

val result = commandManager.execute(
    ValidateDidTrustCommand(
        did = "did:web:issuer.example.com",
        allowedMethods = listOf("web", "key", "jwk"),
        trustedDids = listOf(
            "did:web:issuer.example.com",
            "did:web:another-trusted.example.com"
        )
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let commandManager = session.graph.commandManager

let result = try await commandManager.execute(
    command: ValidateDidTrustCommand(
        did: "did:web:issuer.example.com",
        allowedMethods: ["web", "key", "jwk"],
        trustedDids: [
            "did:web:issuer.example.com",
            "did:web:another-trusted.example.com"
        ]
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Configuration

Enable and configure DID trust validation via properties:

```properties
# Enable DID trust validation
trust.anchors.did.enabled=false

# Explicitly trusted DIDs (comma-separated)
trust.anchors.did.trusted-dids=did:web:example.com,did:key:z6Mk...

# Allowed DID methods (comma-separated, without the "did:" prefix)
trust.anchors.did.allowed-methods=web,key,jwk
```

When `trust.anchors.did.enabled` is set to `true` but no `trusted-dids` are configured, the service will trust any DID whose method appears in `allowed-methods`. When `trusted-dids` is configured, only DIDs that match both the method allow-list and the trusted DIDs list are considered trusted.

## Module Dependencies

The DID trust module requires `lib-trust-did` and `lib-did-resolver` on the classpath. Add the following to your `build.gradle.kts`:

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-trust-did:<version>")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-resolver:<version>")
}
```

The `DidTrustValidationService` is automatically discovered and registered when these modules are present on the classpath. No additional wiring is needed beyond enabling the feature in configuration.

---

# Working with Designs

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Working with Designs

The IDK manages three types of design entities: credential designs for claim presentation, issuer designs for provider branding, and verifier designs for relying party display. This guide covers creating, querying, and updating these entities, along with their displays, claim definitions, and render variants.

## Credential Designs

A credential design describes how a credential type should be presented to users. It combines localized display names, claim presentation rules, bindings that connect it to specific credential types, and render variants for different visual contexts.

### Creating a Credential Design

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val design = designService.createCredentialDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = CreateCredentialDesignInput(
        alias = "identity-credential",
        bindings = listOf(
            DesignBinding(
                key = DesignBindingKey.VCT,
                value = "https://issuer.example.com/identity"
            ),
            DesignBinding(
                key = DesignBindingKey.CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION_ID,
                value = "IdentityCredential"
            )
        ),
        displays = listOf(
            LocalizedCredentialDisplay(
                locale = "en",
                name = "Identity Credential",
                description = "Government-issued digital identity"
            ),
            LocalizedCredentialDisplay(
                locale = "nl",
                name = "Identiteitsbewijs",
                description = "Door de overheid uitgegeven digitale identiteit"
            )
        ),
        claims = listOf(
            ClaimPresentation(
                path = DesignClaimPath(listOf(ClaimPathSegment.Property("given_name"))),
                labels = listOf(
                    ClaimLabel(locale = "en", label = "First Name"),
                    ClaimLabel(locale = "nl", label = "Voornaam")
                ),
                mandatory = true,
                order = 1,
                valueKind = ClaimValueKind.STRING,
                widgetHint = ClaimWidgetHint.TEXT
            ),
            ClaimPresentation(
                path = DesignClaimPath(listOf(ClaimPathSegment.Property("family_name"))),
                labels = listOf(
                    ClaimLabel(locale = "en", label = "Last Name"),
                    ClaimLabel(locale = "nl", label = "Achternaam")
                ),
                mandatory = true,
                order = 2,
                valueKind = ClaimValueKind.STRING,
                widgetHint = ClaimWidgetHint.TEXT
            ),
            ClaimPresentation(
                path = DesignClaimPath(listOf(ClaimPathSegment.Property("birth_date"))),
                labels = listOf(
                    ClaimLabel(locale = "en", label = "Date of Birth"),
                    ClaimLabel(locale = "nl", label = "Geboortedatum")
                ),
                mandatory = true,
                order = 3,
                valueKind = ClaimValueKind.DATE,
                widgetHint = ClaimWidgetHint.DATE
            ),
            ClaimPresentation(
                path = DesignClaimPath(listOf(ClaimPathSegment.Property("portrait"))),
                labels = listOf(ClaimLabel(locale = "en", label = "Photo")),
                mandatory = false,
                order = 4,
                valueKind = ClaimValueKind.IMAGE,
                widgetHint = ClaimWidgetHint.IMAGE,
                sdPolicy = SdPolicy.ALLOWED
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let design = try await designService.createCredentialDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: CreateCredentialDesignInput(
        alias: "identity-credential",
        bindings: [
            DesignBinding(key: .vct, value: "https://issuer.example.com/identity"),
            DesignBinding(key: .credentialConfigurationId, value: "IdentityCredential")
        ],
        displays: [
            LocalizedCredentialDisplay(
                locale: "en",
                name: "Identity Credential",
                description: "Government-issued digital identity"
            ),
            LocalizedCredentialDisplay(
                locale: "nl",
                name: "Identiteitsbewijs",
                description: "Door de overheid uitgegeven digitale identiteit"
            )
        ],
        claims: [
            ClaimPresentation(
                path: DesignClaimPath([.property("given_name")]),
                labels: [
                    ClaimLabel(locale: "en", label: "First Name"),
                    ClaimLabel(locale: "nl", label: "Voornaam")
                ],
                mandatory: true,
                order: 1,
                valueKind: .string,
                widgetHint: .text
            ),
            ClaimPresentation(
                path: DesignClaimPath([.property("family_name")]),
                labels: [
                    ClaimLabel(locale: "en", label: "Last Name"),
                    ClaimLabel(locale: "nl", label: "Achternaam")
                ],
                mandatory: true,
                order: 2,
                valueKind: .string,
                widgetHint: .text
            ),
            ClaimPresentation(
                path: DesignClaimPath([.property("birth_date")]),
                labels: [
                    ClaimLabel(locale: "en", label: "Date of Birth"),
                    ClaimLabel(locale: "nl", label: "Geboortedatum")
                ],
                mandatory: true,
                order: 3,
                valueKind: .date,
                widgetHint: .date
            ),
            ClaimPresentation(
                path: DesignClaimPath([.property("portrait")]),
                labels: [ClaimLabel(locale: "en", label: "Photo")],
                mandatory: false,
                order: 4,
                valueKind: .image,
                widgetHint: .image,
                sdPolicy: .allowed
            )
        ]
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

The `bindings` list is key: it determines which credentials this design applies to. A design with both a `VCT` and `CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION_ID` binding will match credentials identified by either property.

### Querying Designs

Designs can be retrieved by ID, binding, or listed with filters.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// By ID
val design = designService.getCredentialDesign(tenantId, designId)

// By exact binding
val result = designService.findCredentialDesignByBinding(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    binding = DesignBinding(
        key = DesignBindingKey.VCT,
        value = "https://issuer.example.com/identity"
    )
)
val designs = result.value  // IdkResult<List<CredentialDesignRecord>, IdkError>

// By binding key and value (returns first match)
val result = designService.findCredentialDesignByBindingKey(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    bindingKey = DesignBindingKey.CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION_ID,
    bindingValue = "IdentityCredential"
)
val designs = result.value  // IdkResult<List<CredentialDesignRecord>, IdkError>

// List all designs
val designs = designService.listCredentialDesigns(tenantId)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// By ID
let design = try await designService.getCredentialDesign(tenantId: tenantId, designId: designId)

// By exact binding
let result = try await designService.findCredentialDesignByBinding(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    binding: DesignBinding(key: .vct, value: "https://issuer.example.com/identity")
)
let designs = result.value  // IdkResult<List<CredentialDesignRecord>, IdkError>

// By binding key and value (returns first match)
let result = try await designService.findCredentialDesignByBindingKey(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    bindingKey: .credentialConfigurationId,
    bindingValue: "IdentityCredential"
)
let designs = result.value  // IdkResult<List<CredentialDesignRecord>, IdkError>

// List all designs
let designs = try await designService.listCredentialDesigns(tenantId: tenantId)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Claim Presentation

Claims are the most detailed part of a credential design. Each `ClaimPresentation` controls how a single claim is displayed to the user.

### Claim Paths

Claims are identified by their path within the credential structure. Paths use segments that can be property names, array indices, or wildcard array elements:

```kotlin
// Simple property: "family_name"
DesignClaimPath(listOf(ClaimPathSegment.Property("family_name")))

// Nested property: "address.city"
DesignClaimPath(listOf(
    ClaimPathSegment.Property("address"),
    ClaimPathSegment.Property("city")
))

// mDoc namespace: "org.iso.18013.5.1.family_name"
DesignClaimPath(listOf(
    ClaimPathSegment.Property("org.iso.18013.5.1"),
    ClaimPathSegment.Property("family_name")
))

// Array element: "addresses[0].city"
DesignClaimPath(listOf(
    ClaimPathSegment.Property("addresses"),
    ClaimPathSegment.Index(0),
    ClaimPathSegment.Property("city")
))
```

### Value Kinds and Widget Hints

The `valueKind` tells the wallet what type of data the claim contains, while `widgetHint` suggests how to render it. These work together to produce appropriate UI:

| Value Kind | Widget Hints | Typical Rendering |
|------------|-------------|-------------------|
| `STRING` | `TEXT`, `MULTILINE_TEXT`, `BADGE` | Text field, text area, or colored badge |
| `DATE` | `DATE` | Formatted date with locale-aware formatting |
| `DATE_TIME` | `DATE_TIME` | Formatted timestamp |
| `BOOLEAN` | `CHECKBOX` | Toggle or checkmark |
| `IMAGE` | `IMAGE` | Rendered image (base64 or URI) |
| `URI` | `URI` | Clickable link |
| `NUMBER` | `TEXT` | Formatted number with optional unit |
| `ARRAY` | `LIST`, `TABLE` | List items or table rows |
| `OBJECT` | `GROUP` | Nested group of sub-claims |
| `MARKDOWN` | `MARKDOWN` | Rendered markdown content |

### Selective Disclosure Policy

For SD-JWT credentials, the `sdPolicy` controls whether a claim can be selectively disclosed:

| Policy | Meaning |
|--------|---------|
| `ALWAYS` | This claim is always selectively disclosable and must be individually consented |
| `ALLOWED` | The claim may be disclosed selectively if the wallet and verifier support it |
| `NEVER` | This claim is always included in presentations (e.g., credential type identifiers) |

### Claim Groups and Ordering

Claims can be organized into groups and ordered within those groups. The `order` field controls display sequence, and the `group` field allows visual grouping in wallet UIs:

```kotlin
ClaimPresentation(
    path = DesignClaimPath(listOf(ClaimPathSegment.Property("given_name"))),
    labels = listOf(ClaimLabel(locale = "en", label = "First Name")),
    order = 1,
    group = "personal-info"
)
```

## Issuer Designs

Issuer designs store branding information for credential issuers: display names, descriptions, and logos. They are linked to issuers through bindings or a `partyId` reference.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val issuerDesign = designService.createIssuerDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = CreateIssuerDesignInput(
        alias = "example-issuer",
        bindings = listOf(
            DesignBinding(
                key = DesignBindingKey.ISSUER_ID,
                value = "https://issuer.example.com"
            )
        ),
        displays = listOf(
            EntityLocaleDesign(
                locale = "en",
                displayName = "Example Government Agency",
                description = "Official credential issuer"
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let issuerDesign = try await designService.createIssuerDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: CreateIssuerDesignInput(
        alias: "example-issuer",
        bindings: [
            DesignBinding(key: .issuerId, value: "https://issuer.example.com")
        ],
        displays: [
            EntityLocaleDesign(
                locale: "en",
                displayName: "Example Government Agency",
                description: "Official credential issuer"
            )
        ]
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

A credential design can reference an issuer design through its `issuerDesignId` field, linking the credential's display metadata to the issuer's branding.

## Verifier Designs

Verifier designs follow the same structure as issuer designs but are used when displaying information about relying parties in consent screens:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val verifierDesign = designService.createVerifierDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = CreateVerifierDesignInput(
        alias = "airport-verifier",
        bindings = listOf(
            DesignBinding(key = DesignBindingKey.CUSTOM, value = "airport-border-control")
        ),
        displays = listOf(
            EntityLocaleDesign(
                locale = "en",
                displayName = "Airport Border Control",
                description = "Identity verification at border crossing"
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let verifierDesign = try await designService.createVerifierDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: CreateVerifierDesignInput(
        alias: "airport-verifier",
        bindings: [
            DesignBinding(key: .custom, value: "airport-border-control")
        ],
        displays: [
            EntityLocaleDesign(
                locale: "en",
                displayName: "Airport Border Control",
                description: "Identity verification at border crossing"
            )
        ]
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Render Variants

Render variants define how a credential is visually represented. A single design can have multiple variants for different contexts: a simple card for list views, an SVG template for detail views, and a PDF template for printing.

### Simple Card

The simplest render variant defines colors and an optional logo:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val variant = designService.createRenderVariant(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = CreateRenderVariantInput(
        kind = RenderVariantKind.SIMPLE_CARD,
        alias = "identity-card-light",
        localeApplicability = listOf("en", "nl"),
        colors = CardColors(
            background = "#1a365d",
            text = "#ffffff",
            accent = "#63b3ed"
        ),
        logo = AssetReference(
            uri = "https://issuer.example.com/logo-white.png",
            altText = "Issuer Logo"
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let variant = try await designService.createRenderVariant(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: CreateRenderVariantInput(
        kind: .simpleCard,
        alias: "identity-card-light",
        localeApplicability: ["en", "nl"],
        colors: CardColors(
            background: "#1a365d",
            text: "#ffffff",
            accent: "#63b3ed"
        ),
        logo: AssetReference(
            uri: "https://issuer.example.com/logo-white.png",
            altText: "Issuer Logo"
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### SVG Template

SVG templates provide rich credential visuals with placeholder substitution. The template can reference claim values using placeholder syntax, and the IDK handles substitution at render time:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val svgVariant = designService.createRenderVariant(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = CreateRenderVariantInput(
        kind = RenderVariantKind.SVG_TEMPLATE,
        alias = "identity-svg-portrait",
        svgTemplate = SvgTemplate(
            uri = "https://issuer.example.com/templates/identity.svg",
            orientation = SvgOrientation.PORTRAIT,
            colorScheme = SvgColorScheme.LIGHT,
            contrast = SvgContrast.NORMAL
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let svgVariant = try await designService.createRenderVariant(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: CreateRenderVariantInput(
        kind: .svgTemplate,
        alias: "identity-svg-portrait",
        svgTemplate: SvgTemplate(
            uri: "https://issuer.example.com/templates/identity.svg",
            orientation: .portrait,
            colorScheme: .light,
            contrast: .normal
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### W3C Render Method

For credentials following the W3C VC Render Method specification, you can reference external render method definitions:

```kotlin
val w3cVariant = designService.createRenderVariant(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = CreateRenderVariantInput(
        kind = RenderVariantKind.W3C_RENDER_METHOD,
        alias = "w3c-html-render",
        w3cRenderMethod = W3cRenderMethodReference(
            type = "SvgRenderingTemplate2024",
            uri = "https://issuer.example.com/renders/identity.svg",
            mediaType = "image/svg+xml",
            name = "Identity Credential Card",
            digestMultibase = "zQmWvQ..."
        )
    )
)
```

## Asset Management

Design assets (logos, backgrounds, SVG templates) can be uploaded and managed through the design service. Assets are stored in the IDK's blob store and referenced from designs via `AssetReference`.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Upload a logo
val assetRef = designService.uploadDesignAsset(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = UploadDesignAssetInput(
        designId = design.id,
        assetType = DesignAssetType.LOGO,
        content = logoPngBytes,
        contentType = "image/png",
        altText = "Issuer Logo"
    )
)

// Retrieve the asset
val asset = designService.getDesignAsset(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = GetDesignAssetInput(
        designId = design.id,
        assetType = DesignAssetType.LOGO
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Upload a logo
let assetRef = try await designService.uploadDesignAsset(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: UploadDesignAssetInput(
        designId: design.id,
        assetType: .logo,
        content: logoPngBytes,
        contentType: "image/png",
        altText: "Issuer Logo"
    )
)

// Retrieve the asset
let asset = try await designService.getDesignAsset(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: GetDesignAssetInput(
        designId: design.id,
        assetType: .logo
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

Supported asset types are `LOGO`, `BACKGROUND_IMAGE`, `SVG_TEMPLATE`, and `PDF_TEMPLATE`.

## Data Types

### ClaimPresentation

```kotlin
data class ClaimPresentation(
    val path: DesignClaimPath,              // Claim path segments
    val labels: List<ClaimLabel>,           // Localized labels
    val mandatory: Boolean = false,         // Required claim
    val sdPolicy: SdPolicy? = null,         // Selective disclosure policy
    val order: Int? = null,                 // Display ordering
    val group: String? = null,              // Visual grouping
    val svgId: String? = null,              // SVG template placeholder ID
    val valueKind: ClaimValueKind? = null,  // Data type hint
    val widgetHint: ClaimWidgetHint? = null, // UI rendering hint
    val markdownAllowed: Boolean = false,   // Allow markdown rendering
    val entryCodes: List<String>? = null,   // Enumerated valid values
    val unit: String? = null                // Unit of measurement
)
```

### RenderVariantRecord

```kotlin
data class RenderVariantRecord(
    val id: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val kind: RenderVariantKind,            // SIMPLE_CARD, SVG_TEMPLATE, etc.
    val alias: String? = null,
    val localeApplicability: List<String>? = null,
    val logo: AssetReference? = null,
    val backgroundImage: AssetReference? = null,
    val colors: CardColors? = null,
    val svgTemplate: SvgTemplate? = null,
    val w3cRenderMethod: W3cRenderMethodReference? = null,
    val pdfTemplate: AssetReference? = null
)
```

---

# Resolution and Import

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Resolution and Import

The design resolution engine is the core of the credential design system. Rather than relying on a single source for display metadata, it combines information from multiple providers in a defined priority order, producing a complete design that reflects the best available metadata for any credential.

## How Resolution Works

<img src="/img/diagrams/credential-design-resolution.svg" alt="Design Resolution Flow" style={{maxWidth: '650px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

When you resolve a design, the engine follows these steps:

1. **Find the base design** by matching the input's binding keys against stored designs
2. **Run the provider pipeline**: each provider contributes displays, claims, and render variants from its metadata source
3. **Merge the layers**: displays are merged by locale, claims by path, render variants collected. Higher-priority providers override lower-priority ones
4. **Apply field locks**: authoritative providers can lock fields, preventing lower-priority sources from overwriting them
5. **Return the result** as a `ResolvedCredentialDesign` with full tracking of which layers contributed what

The result includes not just the merged design, but also metadata about the resolution process: which providers contributed, which fields are locked, and the ETag for cache validation.

## Resolving a Design

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Resolve by binding
val result = designService.resolveCredentialDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = ResolveCredentialDesignInput(
        bindingKey = DesignBindingKey.VCT,
        bindingValue = "https://issuer.example.com/identity",
        preferredLocales = listOf("en", "nl"),
        renderTarget = RenderVariantKind.SIMPLE_CARD
    )
)
val resolved = result.value  // IdkResult<ResolvedCredentialDesign, IdkError>

// Access the merged design
val display = resolved.design.displays.first()  // Best locale match
println("Credential: ${display.name}")
println("Description: ${display.description}")

// Access claim labels for UI rendering
resolved.design.claims.sortedBy { it.order }.forEach { claim ->
    val label = claim.labels.firstOrNull { it.locale == "en" }
    println("${label?.label}: ${claim.valueKind} (${claim.widgetHint})")
}

// Access the matched render variant
resolved.renderVariants.forEach { variant ->
    println("Render: ${variant.kind} - ${variant.alias}")
}

// See which providers contributed
resolved.appliedLayers.forEach { layer ->
    println("Layer: ${layer.sourceType} (priority ${layer.priority})")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Resolve by binding
let result = try await designService.resolveCredentialDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: ResolveCredentialDesignInput(
        bindingKey: .vct,
        bindingValue: "https://issuer.example.com/identity",
        preferredLocales: ["en", "nl"],
        renderTarget: .simpleCard
    )
)
let resolved = result.value  // IdkResult<ResolvedCredentialDesign, IdkError>

// Access the merged design
let display = resolved.design.displays.first!  // Best locale match
print("Credential: \(display.name)")
print("Description: \(display.description ?? "")")

// Access claim labels for UI rendering
for claim in resolved.design.claims.sorted(by: { ($0.order ?? 0) < ($1.order ?? 0) }) {
    let label = claim.labels.first { $0.locale == "en" }
    print("\(label?.label ?? ""): \(claim.valueKind) (\(claim.widgetHint))")
}

// Access the matched render variant
for variant in resolved.renderVariants {
    print("Render: \(variant.kind) - \(variant.alias ?? "")")
}

// See which providers contributed
for layer in resolved.appliedLayers {
    print("Layer: \(layer.sourceType) (priority \(layer.priority))")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

You can also resolve by design ID directly if you already know which design to use, or resolve issuer and verifier designs the same way:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Resolve by design ID
val result = designService.resolveCredentialDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = ResolveCredentialDesignInput(designId = knownDesignId)
)
val resolved = result.value  // IdkResult<ResolvedCredentialDesign, IdkError>

// Resolve issuer design
val issuerResolved = designService.resolveIssuerDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = ResolveIssuerDesignInput(
        bindingKey = DesignBindingKey.ISSUER_ID,
        bindingValue = "https://issuer.example.com"
    )
)

// Resolve verifier design
val verifierResolved = designService.resolveVerifierDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = ResolveVerifierDesignInput(designId = verifierDesignId)
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Resolve by design ID
let result = try await designService.resolveCredentialDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: ResolveCredentialDesignInput(designId: knownDesignId)
)
let resolved = result.value  // IdkResult<ResolvedCredentialDesign, IdkError>

// Resolve issuer design
let issuerResolved = try await designService.resolveIssuerDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: ResolveIssuerDesignInput(
        bindingKey: .issuerId,
        bindingValue: "https://issuer.example.com"
    )
)

// Resolve verifier design
let verifierResolved = try await designService.resolveVerifierDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: ResolveVerifierDesignInput(designId: verifierDesignId)
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Design Layer Providers

The resolution engine uses an ordered pipeline of providers. Each provider is specialized for a particular metadata source and contributes the information it can extract.

### Provider Priority (Credentials)

Providers run in this order, from lowest to highest priority. Later providers override earlier ones on conflict:

| Priority | Provider | What It Contributes |
|----------|----------|-------------------|
| 1 | Schema Inference | Claims derived from JSON schemas (names, types, cardinality) |
| 2 | JSON-LD Context | Display hints from linked JSON-LD contexts |
| 3 | Credential Template | Claims and displays from IDK credential templates |
| 4 | OID4VCI Metadata | Full display info from OID4VCI `credential_configurations_supported` |
| 5 | SD-JWT VCT | Type metadata from SD-JWT Verifiable Credential Type definitions |
| 6 | W3C Render Method | Render variants from W3C VC Render Method references |
| 7 | Local Override | User-defined designs stored in the IDK (highest priority) |

### Provider Priority (Issuers)

| Priority | Provider | What It Contributes |
|----------|----------|-------------------|
| 1 | OID4VCI Issuer Metadata | Display info from `.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` |
| 2 | Party Store | Entity branding from the IDK party management system |
| 3 | Local Override | User-defined issuer designs (highest priority) |

The local override provider always wins, which means you can always customize how a credential or issuer is displayed in your application regardless of what the external metadata says.

### Field Locking

When a provider is marked as **authoritative**, the fields it contributes are locked; lower-priority providers can add new fields but cannot overwrite locked ones. This is useful when an issuer's own metadata (via OID4VCI or SD-JWT) should be considered the definitive source for certain display properties, while still allowing local customizations for fields the issuer didn't specify.

## Importing External Designs

Instead of manually creating designs, you can import them from external metadata sources. The design service fetches the metadata, converts it using format mappers, and stores the result locally.

### From OID4VCI Issuer Metadata

Import credential and issuer designs from an OID4VCI issuer's `.well-known` endpoint:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Import credential designs from OID4VCI metadata
val imported = designService.importExternalDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = ImportExternalDesignInput(
        sourceUrl = "https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer",
        sourceType = DesignSourceType.OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION,
        entityType = DesignEntityType.CREDENTIAL,
        bindings = listOf(
            DesignBinding(
                key = DesignBindingKey.CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION_ID,
                value = "IdentityCredential"
            )
        )
    )
)

// Import the issuer's branding
val issuerImported = designService.importIssuerDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = ImportIssuerDesignInput(
        sourceUrl = "https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer",
        sourceType = DesignSourceType.OID4VCI_ISSUER_METADATA,
        bindings = listOf(
            DesignBinding(
                key = DesignBindingKey.ISSUER_ID,
                value = "https://issuer.example.com"
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Import credential designs from OID4VCI metadata
let imported = try await designService.importExternalDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: ImportExternalDesignInput(
        sourceUrl: "https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer",
        sourceType: .oid4vciCredentialConfiguration,
        entityType: .credential,
        bindings: [
            DesignBinding(
                key: .credentialConfigurationId,
                value: "IdentityCredential"
            )
        ]
    )
)

// Import the issuer's branding
let issuerImported = try await designService.importIssuerDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: ImportIssuerDesignInput(
        sourceUrl: "https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer",
        sourceType: .oid4vciIssuerMetadata,
        bindings: [
            DesignBinding(key: .issuerId, value: "https://issuer.example.com")
        ]
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

When importing from OID4VCI metadata, the `Oid4vciDesignMapper` extracts credential names, descriptions, logos, claim definitions, and locale-specific displays from the `credential_configurations_supported` structure. This means a wallet can automatically pick up display metadata from any OID4VCI-compliant issuer without manual design creation.

### From SD-JWT VCT Metadata

For SD-JWT credentials, type metadata can be fetched from the VCT URL:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val imported = designService.importExternalDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = ImportExternalDesignInput(
        sourceUrl = "https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/vct/identity",
        sourceType = DesignSourceType.SD_JWT_VCT_METADATA,
        entityType = DesignEntityType.CREDENTIAL,
        bindings = listOf(
            DesignBinding(
                key = DesignBindingKey.VCT,
                value = "https://issuer.example.com/identity"
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let imported = try await designService.importExternalDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    input: ImportExternalDesignInput(
        sourceUrl: "https://issuer.example.com/.well-known/vct/identity",
        sourceType: .sdJwtVctMetadata,
        entityType: .credential,
        bindings: [
            DesignBinding(key: .vct, value: "https://issuer.example.com/identity")
        ]
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Refreshing Imported Designs

Imported designs can be refreshed to pick up changes from the external source:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val refreshed = designService.refreshCredentialDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    designId = importedDesign.id
)
// Uses ETag for conditional fetches to minimize network traffic
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let refreshed = try await designService.refreshCredentialDesign(
    tenantId: tenantId,
    designId: importedDesign.id
)
// Uses ETag for conditional fetches to minimize network traffic
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Source Snapshots

When a design is imported or refreshed, the raw external metadata is stored as a **source snapshot**. This serves as a cache and audit trail, allowing the IDK to re-derive the design without another network fetch and to compare against future versions.

```kotlin
val snapshot = designService.getSourceSnapshot(tenantId, snapshotId)
// snapshot.sourceUrl - Where it was fetched from
// snapshot.sourceType - OID4VCI, SD-JWT, etc.
// snapshot.content - Raw fetched content
// snapshot.etag - For conditional refreshes
// snapshot.fetchedAt - Timestamp
```

## Configuration

The design module's behavior is controlled through `CredentialDesignModuleConfig`, which has three sections:

### Resolution Policy

Controls how the resolution engine aggregates metadata from multiple sources:

```yaml
credential-design:
  policy:
    schema-hints-enabled: true           # Derive claims from JSON schemas
    json-ld-context-hints-enabled: true   # Extract hints from JSON-LD contexts
    markdown-rendering-enabled: false     # Allow markdown in claim values
    issuer-metadata-preference: OID4VCI_FIRST  # OID4VCI_FIRST | SD_JWT_FIRST | MERGE | LOCAL_ONLY
    credential-metadata-preference: MERGE      # How to combine format-specific metadata
    prefer-integrity-protected-sources: true   # Prefer sources with integrity protection
    allow-remote-template-fetch: false         # Fetch SVG/PDF templates from remote URLs
    allow-remote-asset-fetch: false            # Fetch logos/images from remote URLs
```

The `issuerMetadataPreference` setting is important when the same issuer has metadata available in multiple formats. `OID4VCI_FIRST` prioritizes OID4VCI issuer metadata, `SD_JWT_FIRST` prioritizes SD-JWT issuer metadata, `MERGE` combines both, and `LOCAL_ONLY` ignores external sources entirely.

### Refresh Settings

Controls automatic refresh behavior for imported designs:

```yaml
credential-design:
  refresh:
    enabled: false                # Enable automatic refresh
    default-ttl-seconds: 86400    # Re-fetch after 24 hours
    rehost-remote-assets: true    # Download and store remote assets locally
    max-asset-size-bytes: 5242880 # 5 MB limit per asset
```

When `rehost-remote-assets` is enabled, logos and images referenced by imported designs are downloaded and stored in the IDK's blob store. This avoids runtime dependencies on external servers and ensures assets remain available even if the source goes offline.

### Validation Limits

Guards against malformed or excessively large designs:

```yaml
credential-design:
  validation:
    max-bindings-per-design: 16
    max-displays-per-design: 64
    max-claims-per-design: 256
    max-render-variants-per-design: 32
    max-entry-codes-per-claim: 1024
    fail-on-unknown-source-type: true
    validate-on-read: false       # Re-validate designs when reading from store
```

## Security

External metadata fetching includes built-in SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) protection. The `DesignExternalFetcher` blocks requests to private IP ranges and local network addresses, preventing imported design URLs from being used to probe internal infrastructure. This protection is always enabled and cannot be disabled.

Fetched content is also size-limited (configurable, default 10 MB) to prevent denial-of-service through oversized responses.

## Data Types

### ResolvedCredentialDesign

```kotlin
data class ResolvedCredentialDesign(
    val design: CredentialDesignRecord,         // Merged credential design
    val issuerDesign: IssuerDesignRecord?,       // Associated issuer branding
    val verifierDesign: VerifierDesignRecord?,   // Associated verifier display
    val renderVariants: List<RenderVariantRecord>, // Matched render variants
    val derivedRenderHints: DerivedRenderHintsRecord?, // Auto-derived field hints
    val appliedLayers: List<AppliedDesignLayer>, // Which providers contributed
    val lockedFields: Set<String>,              // Fields locked by authoritative sources
    val resolvedAt: Instant,                    // Resolution timestamp
    val etag: String?                           // Cache validation tag
)
```

### AppliedDesignLayer

```kotlin
data class AppliedDesignLayer(
    val sourceType: DesignSourceType,   // OID4VCI, SD_JWT, LOCAL_OVERRIDE, etc.
    val sourceUrl: String?,             // Where the metadata came from
    val priority: Int,                  // Provider priority (higher wins)
    val authoritative: Boolean          // Whether this layer can lock fields
)
```

---

# SD-JWT Issuance

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# SD-JWT Issuance

The IDK provides tools for creating SD-JWT credentials with selective disclosure. This guide covers credential creation using the payload builder extensions and the SD-JWT service.

## Building the Payload

SD-JWT issuance starts with building a JWT payload using `JwsPayloadBuilder` combined with selective disclosure extensions. Claims marked with `claimSd()` become selectively disclosable in the issued credential.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.crypto.jose.jws.jwsPayload
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.claimSd
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.subSd
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.objClaimSd

// Build payload with selective disclosure
val payload = jwsPayload {
    iss("https://issuer.example.com")
    sub("user-123")
    iat(System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000)
    exp(System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000 + 86400)

    // Selectively disclosable claims
    claimSd("email", "user@example.com")
    claimSd("given_name", "John")
    claimSd("family_name", "Doe")
    claimSd("age", 25)

    // Regular claims (always visible)
    custom("credential_type", "IdentityCredential")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonCrypto
import SphereonSdJwt

// Build payload with selective disclosure
let payload = JwsPayloadBuilder()
    .iss("https://issuer.example.com")
    .sub("user-123")
    .iat(Int64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970))
    .exp(Int64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970) + 86400)

    // Selectively disclosable claims
    .claimSd(name: "email", value: "user@example.com")
    .claimSd(name: "given_name", value: "John")
    .claimSd(name: "family_name", value: "Doe")
    .claimSd(name: "age", value: 25)

    // Regular claims (always visible)
    .custom("credential_type", "IdentityCredential")
    .build()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Selective Disclosure Extensions

The IDK provides several extension functions for marking claims as selectively disclosable:

| Function | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `claimSd(name, value)` | Mark a custom claim as selectively disclosable |
| `subSd(value)` | Mark the subject claim as selectively disclosable |
| `iatSd(value)` | Mark the issued-at claim as selectively disclosable |
| `jtiSd(value)` | Mark the JWT ID as selectively disclosable |
| `objClaimSd(name) { }` | Mark an entire nested object as selectively disclosable |

Security-sensitive claims like `iss`, `aud`, `exp`, `nbf`, and `cnf` should not be made selectively disclosable per RFC 9901 recommendations.

## Issuing the SD-JWT

Once the payload is built, use `SdJwtService` to issue the credential:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.IssueSdJwtArgs
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.SdJwtSpec

// Get the SD-JWT service from the session
val sdJwtService = session.component.sdJwtService

// Create issuer identifier from managed key
val issuer = ManagedOptsKeyInfo(
    identifier = issuerKeyInfo,
    context = IdentifierContext(
        clientId = "issuer-001",
        issuer = "https://issuer.example.com"
    )
)

// Issue the SD-JWT
val result = sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(
    IssueSdJwtArgs(
        payload = payload,
        issuer = issuer,
        spec = SdJwtSpec.Default
    )
)

if (result.isOk) {
    val sdJwtResult = result.value

    // Complete SD-JWT string: JWT~disclosure1~disclosure2~...
    println("SD-JWT: ${sdJwtResult.sdJwt}")

    // Individual components
    println("JWT: ${sdJwtResult.jwt}")
    println("Disclosures: ${sdJwtResult.disclosures.size}")

    sdJwtResult.disclosures.forEach { disclosure ->
        println("  ${disclosure.key}: ${disclosure.value}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonSdJwt

// Get the SD-JWT service from the session
let sdJwtService = session.component.sdJwtService

// Create issuer identifier from managed key
let issuer = ManagedOptsKeyInfo(
    identifier: issuerKeyInfo,
    context: IdentifierContext(
        clientId: "issuer-001",
        issuer: "https://issuer.example.com"
    )
)

// Issue the SD-JWT
let result = try await sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(
    args: IssueSdJwtArgs(
        payload: payload,
        issuer: issuer,
        spec: SdJwtSpec.default
    )
)

if result.isOk {
    let sdJwtResult = result.value

    // Complete SD-JWT string: JWT~disclosure1~disclosure2~...
    print("SD-JWT: \(sdJwtResult.sdJwt)")

    // Individual components
    print("JWT: \(sdJwtResult.jwt)")
    print("Disclosures: \(sdJwtResult.disclosures.count)")

    for disclosure in sdJwtResult.disclosures {
        print("  \(disclosure.key): \(disclosure.value)")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Nested Object Disclosure

Use `objClaimSd()` to make entire nested objects selectively disclosable:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val payload = jwsPayload {
    iss("https://issuer.example.com")
    sub("user-123")

    // Simple selectively disclosable claims
    claimSd("given_name", "John")
    claimSd("family_name", "Doe")

    // Nested object as selectively disclosable
    objClaimSd("address") {
        custom("street", "123 Main St")
        custom("city", "Springfield")
        custom("postal_code", "12345")
        custom("country", "US")
    }

    // Nested object with inner selective disclosure
    objClaimSd("company") {
        custom("name", "Acme Corp")
        custom("department", "Engineering")
        claimSd("employee_id", "EMP-12345")  // Nested SD claim
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let payload = JwsPayloadBuilder()
    .iss("https://issuer.example.com")
    .sub("user-123")

    // Simple selectively disclosable claims
    .claimSd(name: "given_name", value: "John")
    .claimSd(name: "family_name", value: "Doe")

    // Nested object as selectively disclosable
    .objClaimSd(name: "address") { builder in
        builder.custom("street", "123 Main St")
        builder.custom("city", "Springfield")
        builder.custom("postal_code", "12345")
        builder.custom("country", "US")
    }
    .build()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Decoy Digests

Add decoy digests to the `_sd` array to prevent correlation attacks. Decoys make it harder to determine how many claims are actually selectively disclosable.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.minimumDigests
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.DecoyConfig
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.DecoyMode

// Using minimumDigests in the payload builder
val payload = jwsPayload {
    iss("https://issuer.example.com")
    claimSd("email", "user@example.com")
    claimSd("phone", "+1234567890")

    // Ensure at least 5 digests in _sd array (adds decoys if needed)
    minimumDigests(5)
}

// Or configure via SdJwtSpec
val result = sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(
    IssueSdJwtArgs(
        payload = payload,
        issuer = issuer,
        spec = SdJwtSpec(
            decoyConfig = DecoyConfig(
                mode = DecoyMode.MINIMUM,
                count = 5
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Configure decoys via SdJwtSpec
let result = try await sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(
    args: IssueSdJwtArgs(
        payload: payload,
        issuer: issuer,
        spec: SdJwtSpec(
            decoyConfig: DecoyConfig(
                mode: .minimum,
                count: 5
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

Available decoy modes:

| Mode | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `NONE` | No decoy digests (default) |
| `FIXED` | Add exactly `count` decoy digests |
| `MINIMUM` | Ensure at least `count` total digests |
| `RANDOM` | Add random number of decoys up to `count` |

## Hash Algorithm Configuration

Configure the hash algorithm used for disclosure digests:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.crypto.core.generic.DigestAlg

val result = sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(
    IssueSdJwtArgs(
        payload = payload,
        issuer = issuer,
        spec = SdJwtSpec(
            digestAlg = DigestAlg.SHA256,  // Default per RFC 9901
            includeAlgClaim = true         // Include _sd_alg in payload
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let result = try await sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(
    args: IssueSdJwtArgs(
        payload: payload,
        issuer: issuer,
        spec: SdJwtSpec(
            digestAlg: .sha256,  // Default per RFC 9901
            includeAlgClaim: true
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Complete Issuance Example

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.crypto.jose.jws.jwsPayload
import com.sphereon.crypto.core.generic.SignatureAlgorithm
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.*

class CredentialIssuer(
    private val sdJwtService: SdJwtService,
    private val keyManager: KeyManagerService
) {
    suspend fun issueIdentityCredential(
        subjectId: String,
        givenName: String,
        familyName: String,
        email: String,
        birthDate: String
    ): String {
        // Generate or retrieve issuer key
        val keyPair = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
            alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ECDSA_SHA256
        )
        val keyInfo = keyPair.joseToManagedKeyInfo()

        val issuer = ManagedOptsKeyInfo(
            identifier = keyInfo,
            context = IdentifierContext(
                clientId = "identity-issuer",
                issuer = "https://issuer.example.com"
            )
        )

        // Build payload with selective disclosure
        val payload = jwsPayload {
            iss("https://issuer.example.com")
            sub(subjectId)
            iat(System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000)
            exp(System.currentTimeMillis() / 1000 + 31536000)  // 1 year

            // All personal data is selectively disclosable
            claimSd("given_name", givenName)
            claimSd("family_name", familyName)
            claimSd("email", email)
            claimSd("birth_date", birthDate)

            // Credential metadata is always visible
            custom("vct", "IdentityCredential")
            custom("credential_schema", "https://schemas.example.com/identity/v1")
        }

        // Issue with decoy protection
        val result = sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(
            IssueSdJwtArgs(
                payload = payload,
                issuer = issuer,
                spec = SdJwtSpec(
                    decoyConfig = DecoyConfig(
                        mode = DecoyMode.MINIMUM,
                        count = 8
                    )
                )
            )
        )

        return if (result.isOk) {
            result.value.sdJwt
        } else {
            throw IllegalStateException("Issuance failed: ${result.error}")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonCrypto
import SphereonSdJwt

class CredentialIssuer {
    private let sdJwtService: SdJwtService
    private let keyManager: KeyManagerService

    init(sdJwtService: SdJwtService, keyManager: KeyManagerService) {
        self.sdJwtService = sdJwtService
        self.keyManager = keyManager
    }

    func issueIdentityCredential(
        subjectId: String,
        givenName: String,
        familyName: String,
        email: String,
        birthDate: String
    ) async throws -> String {
        // Generate or retrieve issuer key
        let keyPair = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
            alg: .ecdsaSha256
        )
        let keyInfo = keyPair.joseToManagedKeyInfo()

        let issuer = ManagedOptsKeyInfo(
            identifier: keyInfo,
            context: IdentifierContext(
                clientId: "identity-issuer",
                issuer: "https://issuer.example.com"
            )
        )

        let now = Int64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970)

        // Build payload with selective disclosure
        let payload = JwsPayloadBuilder()
            .iss("https://issuer.example.com")
            .sub(subjectId)
            .iat(now)
            .exp(now + 31536000)  // 1 year
            .claimSd(name: "given_name", value: givenName)
            .claimSd(name: "family_name", value: familyName)
            .claimSd(name: "email", value: email)
            .claimSd(name: "birth_date", value: birthDate)
            .custom("vct", "IdentityCredential")
            .custom("credential_schema", "https://schemas.example.com/identity/v1")
            .build()

        // Issue with decoy protection
        let result = try await sdJwtService.issueSdJwt(
            args: IssueSdJwtArgs(
                payload: payload,
                issuer: issuer,
                spec: SdJwtSpec(
                    decoyConfig: DecoyConfig(
                        mode: .minimum,
                        count: 8
                    )
                )
            )
        )

        guard result.isOk else {
            throw NSError(domain: "Issuance", code: -1,
                userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: "Issuance failed"])
        }

        return result.value.sdJwt
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Result Types

The issuance result contains all components of the SD-JWT:

| Property | Type | Description |
|----------|------|-------------|
| `sdJwt` | `String` | Complete SD-JWT string (`JWT~disclosure1~disclosure2~...`) |
| `jwt` | `String` | The signed JWT component |
| `disclosures` | `List<Disclosure>` | List of disclosure objects |

Each `Disclosure` contains:

| Property | Type | Description |
|----------|------|-------------|
| `salt` | `String` | Random salt value |
| `key` | `String` | Claim name |
| `value` | `JsonElement` | Claim value |
| `encoded` | `String` | Base64url-encoded disclosure |
| `digest` | `String?` | Hash of the encoded disclosure |

---

# SD-JWT Presentation

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# SD-JWT Presentation

The IDK provides tools for holders to create presentations with selective disclosure and for verifiers to validate those presentations.

## Creating Presentations

Holders use `SdJwtService.presentSdJwt()` to create presentations from issued credentials, selecting which claims to disclose.

### Basic Presentation

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.PresentSdJwtArgs
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.SdMap
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.SdField

val sdJwtService = session.component.sdJwtService

// Create presentation with all disclosures included
val result = sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(
    PresentSdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt = issuedSdJwt,
        disclosureSelection = null  // null = include all disclosures
    )
)

if (result.isOk) {
    val presentation = result.value
    println("Presentation: ${presentation.presentation}")
    println("Disclosed claims: ${presentation.disclosedClaims}")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonSdJwt

let sdJwtService = session.component.sdJwtService

// Create presentation with all disclosures included
let result = try await sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(
    args: PresentSdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt: issuedSdJwt,
        disclosureSelection: nil  // nil = include all disclosures
    )
)

if result.isOk {
    let presentation = result.value
    print("Presentation: \(presentation.presentation)")
    print("Disclosed claims: \(presentation.disclosedClaims)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Selective Disclosure

Choose which claims to reveal by providing an `SdMap`:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Select specific claims to disclose
val disclosureSelection = SdMap(
    fields = mapOf(
        "email" to SdField(sd = true),       // Disclose email
        "given_name" to SdField(sd = true)   // Disclose given_name
        // family_name, age, etc. are NOT disclosed
    )
)

val result = sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(
    PresentSdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt = issuedSdJwt,
        disclosureSelection = disclosureSelection
    )
)

if (result.isOk) {
    // Presentation contains only email and given_name disclosures
    println("Disclosed: ${result.value.disclosedClaims}")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Select specific claims to disclose
let disclosureSelection = SdMap(
    fields: [
        "email": SdField(sd: true),       // Disclose email
        "given_name": SdField(sd: true)   // Disclose given_name
        // family_name, age, etc. are NOT disclosed
    ]
)

let result = try await sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(
    args: PresentSdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt: issuedSdJwt,
        disclosureSelection: disclosureSelection
    )
)

if result.isOk {
    // Presentation contains only email and given_name disclosures
    print("Disclosed: \(result.value.disclosedClaims)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Key Binding JWT

For credentials with holder key binding, include a Key Binding JWT (KB-JWT) to prove possession of the holder key:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val result = sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(
    PresentSdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt = issuedSdJwt,
        disclosureSelection = SdMap(
            fields = mapOf(
                "given_name" to SdField(sd = true),
                "family_name" to SdField(sd = true)
            )
        ),
        // Key binding parameters
        audience = "https://verifier.example.com",
        nonce = verifierProvidedNonce,
        holderKey = holderManagedKeyInfo
    )
)

if (result.isOk) {
    // Presentation format: JWT~disclosure1~disclosure2~KeyBindingJWT
    val presentation = result.value.presentation
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let result = try await sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(
    args: PresentSdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt: issuedSdJwt,
        disclosureSelection: SdMap(
            fields: [
                "given_name": SdField(sd: true),
                "family_name": SdField(sd: true)
            ]
        ),
        // Key binding parameters
        audience: "https://verifier.example.com",
        nonce: verifierProvidedNonce,
        holderKey: holderManagedKeyInfo
    )
)

if result.isOk {
    // Presentation format: JWT~disclosure1~disclosure2~KeyBindingJWT
    let presentation = result.value.presentation
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

The Key Binding JWT contains:

| Claim | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `aud` | Verifier's identifier (audience) |
| `nonce` | Fresh nonce from verifier |
| `iat` | Issued-at timestamp |
| `sd_hash` | Hash of the presentation (binds KB-JWT to specific disclosures) |

## Verifying Presentations

Verifiers use `SdJwtService.verifySdJwt()` to validate presentations.

### Basic Verification

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.VerifySdJwtArgs

val sdJwtService = session.component.sdJwtService

val result = sdJwtService.verifySdJwt(
    VerifySdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt = presentation,
        identifier = issuerIdentifier
    )
)

if (result.isOk) {
    val verification = result.value

    if (verification.isValid) {
        println("Signature valid: ${verification.signatureValid}")
        println("Disclosures valid: ${verification.disclosuresValid}")

        // Access disclosed claims
        val fullPayload = verification.sdJwt.payload.fullPayload
        val email = fullPayload["email"]?.toString()?.trim('"')
        val givenName = fullPayload["given_name"]?.toString()?.trim('"')
    } else {
        println("Verification failed: ${verification.errorMessages}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonSdJwt

let sdJwtService = session.component.sdJwtService

let result = try await sdJwtService.verifySdJwt(
    args: VerifySdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt: presentation,
        identifier: issuerIdentifier
    )
)

if result.isOk {
    let verification = result.value

    if verification.isValid {
        print("Signature valid: \(verification.signatureValid)")
        print("Disclosures valid: \(verification.disclosuresValid)")

        // Access disclosed claims
        let fullPayload = verification.sdJwt.payload.fullPayload
        let email = fullPayload["email"]?.description
        let givenName = fullPayload["given_name"]?.description
    } else {
        print("Verification failed: \(verification.errorMessages)")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Verifying Key Binding

When validating presentations with holder binding:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val result = sdJwtService.verifySdJwt(
    VerifySdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt = presentation,
        identifier = issuerIdentifier,
        expectedAudience = "https://verifier.example.com",
        expectedNonce = providedNonce
    )
)

if (result.isOk) {
    val verification = result.value

    if (verification.isValid) {
        // All checks passed: signature, disclosures, and key binding
        println("Key binding valid: ${verification.keyBindingValid}")

        // Access KB-JWT details
        verification.sdJwt.keyBindingJwt?.let { kbJwt ->
            println("KB-JWT audience: ${kbJwt.audience}")
            println("KB-JWT nonce: ${kbJwt.nonce}")
            println("KB-JWT sd_hash: ${kbJwt.sdHash}")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let result = try await sdJwtService.verifySdJwt(
    args: VerifySdJwtArgs(
        sdJwt: presentation,
        identifier: issuerIdentifier,
        expectedAudience: "https://verifier.example.com",
        expectedNonce: providedNonce
    )
)

if result.isOk {
    let verification = result.value

    if verification.isValid {
        // All checks passed: signature, disclosures, and key binding
        print("Key binding valid: \(verification.keyBindingValid)")

        // Access KB-JWT details
        if let kbJwt = verification.sdJwt.keyBindingJwt {
            print("KB-JWT audience: \(kbJwt.audience ?? "")")
            print("KB-JWT nonce: \(kbJwt.nonce ?? "")")
            print("KB-JWT sd_hash: \(kbJwt.sdHash ?? "")")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Accessing Verified Data

The verification result provides access to both the undisclosed and full payloads:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
if (result.isOk && result.value.isValid) {
    val sdJwt = result.value.sdJwt

    // JWT header
    val algorithm = sdJwt.algorithm  // e.g., "ES256"
    val keyId = sdJwt.keyId          // "kid" from header

    // Payload views
    val undisclosed = sdJwt.payload.undisclosedPayload  // Contains _sd array
    val full = sdJwt.payload.fullPayload                 // All disclosed claims resolved

    // Disclosures
    sdJwt.disclosures.forEach { disclosure ->
        println("${disclosure.key} = ${disclosure.value}")
    }

    // Digest to disclosure mapping
    sdJwt.payload.digestedDisclosures.forEach { (digest, disclosure) ->
        println("$digest -> ${disclosure.key}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
if result.isOk && result.value.isValid {
    let sdJwt = result.value.sdJwt

    // JWT header
    let algorithm = sdJwt.algorithm  // e.g., "ES256"
    let keyId = sdJwt.keyId          // "kid" from header

    // Payload views
    let undisclosed = sdJwt.payload.undisclosedPayload  // Contains _sd array
    let full = sdJwt.payload.fullPayload                 // All disclosed claims resolved

    // Disclosures
    for disclosure in sdJwt.disclosures {
        print("\(disclosure.key) = \(disclosure.value)")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Complete Example

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.sdjwt.*

class PresentationService(
    private val sdJwtService: SdJwtService
) {
    // Holder: Create presentation for verifier
    suspend fun createPresentation(
        credential: String,
        verifierAudience: String,
        verifierNonce: String,
        claimsToDisclose: Set<String>,
        holderKey: ManagedIdentifierOptsOrResult
    ): String {
        val disclosureSelection = SdMap(
            fields = claimsToDisclose.associateWith { SdField(sd = true) }
        )

        val result = sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(
            PresentSdJwtArgs(
                sdJwt = credential,
                disclosureSelection = disclosureSelection,
                audience = verifierAudience,
                nonce = verifierNonce,
                holderKey = holderKey
            )
        )

        return if (result.isOk) {
            result.value.presentation
        } else {
            throw IllegalStateException("Presentation failed: ${result.error}")
        }
    }

    // Verifier: Validate presentation
    suspend fun verifyPresentation(
        presentation: String,
        issuerIdentifier: IdentifierOptsOrResult,
        expectedAudience: String,
        expectedNonce: String,
        requiredClaims: Set<String>
    ): VerifiedClaims {
        val result = sdJwtService.verifySdJwt(
            VerifySdJwtArgs(
                sdJwt = presentation,
                identifier = issuerIdentifier,
                expectedAudience = expectedAudience,
                expectedNonce = expectedNonce
            )
        )

        if (!result.isOk) {
            throw IllegalStateException("Verification error: ${result.error}")
        }

        val verification = result.value

        if (!verification.isValid) {
            throw SecurityException(
                "Verification failed: ${verification.errorMessages.joinToString()}"
            )
        }

        // Check required claims are present
        val disclosedClaims = verification.sdJwt.payload.fullPayload
        val missingClaims = requiredClaims.filter { !disclosedClaims.containsKey(it) }

        if (missingClaims.isNotEmpty()) {
            throw IllegalArgumentException("Missing required claims: $missingClaims")
        }

        return VerifiedClaims(
            issuer = disclosedClaims["iss"]?.toString()?.trim('"') ?: "",
            subject = disclosedClaims["sub"]?.toString()?.trim('"'),
            claims = disclosedClaims,
            keyBindingVerified = verification.keyBindingValid
        )
    }
}

data class VerifiedClaims(
    val issuer: String,
    val subject: String?,
    val claims: Map<String, Any?>,
    val keyBindingVerified: Boolean
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonSdJwt

class PresentationService {
    private let sdJwtService: SdJwtService

    init(sdJwtService: SdJwtService) {
        self.sdJwtService = sdJwtService
    }

    // Holder: Create presentation for verifier
    func createPresentation(
        credential: String,
        verifierAudience: String,
        verifierNonce: String,
        claimsToDisclose: Set<String>,
        holderKey: ManagedIdentifierOptsOrResult
    ) async throws -> String {
        var fields: [String: SdField] = [:]
        for claim in claimsToDisclose {
            fields[claim] = SdField(sd: true)
        }
        let disclosureSelection = SdMap(fields: fields)

        let result = try await sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(
            args: PresentSdJwtArgs(
                sdJwt: credential,
                disclosureSelection: disclosureSelection,
                audience: verifierAudience,
                nonce: verifierNonce,
                holderKey: holderKey
            )
        )

        guard result.isOk else {
            throw NSError(domain: "Presentation", code: -1)
        }

        return result.value.presentation
    }

    // Verifier: Validate presentation
    func verifyPresentation(
        presentation: String,
        issuerIdentifier: IdentifierOptsOrResult,
        expectedAudience: String,
        expectedNonce: String,
        requiredClaims: Set<String>
    ) async throws -> VerifiedClaims {
        let result = try await sdJwtService.verifySdJwt(
            args: VerifySdJwtArgs(
                sdJwt: presentation,
                identifier: issuerIdentifier,
                expectedAudience: expectedAudience,
                expectedNonce: expectedNonce
            )
        )

        guard result.isOk else {
            throw NSError(domain: "Verification", code: -1)
        }

        let verification = result.value

        guard verification.isValid else {
            throw NSError(domain: "Verification", code: -2,
                userInfo: [NSLocalizedDescriptionKey: verification.errorMessages.joined(separator: ", ")])
        }

        return VerifiedClaims(
            issuer: verification.sdJwt.payload.fullPayload["iss"]?.description ?? "",
            subject: verification.sdJwt.payload.fullPayload["sub"]?.description,
            claims: verification.sdJwt.payload.fullPayload,
            keyBindingVerified: verification.keyBindingValid
        )
    }
}

struct VerifiedClaims {
    let issuer: String
    let subject: String?
    let claims: [String: Any]
    let keyBindingVerified: Bool
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Verification Result

The `SdJwtVerificationResult` contains:

| Property | Type | Description |
|----------|------|-------------|
| `sdJwt` | `SdJwtCompact` | The parsed SD-JWT structure |
| `signatureValid` | `Boolean` | JWT signature verification result |
| `disclosuresValid` | `Boolean` | All disclosure digests match |
| `keyBindingValid` | `Boolean` | KB-JWT validation result (if present) |
| `errorMessages` | `List<String>` | Validation error details |
| `isValid` | `Boolean` | Combined validation result |

## Presentation Arguments

The `PresentSdJwtArgs` accepts:

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-----------|------|-------------|
| `sdJwt` | `String` | Full SD-JWT from issuer |
| `disclosureSelection` | `SdMap?` | Claims to disclose (null = all) |
| `audience` | `String?` | Verifier identifier for KB-JWT |
| `nonce` | `String?` | Verifier nonce for KB-JWT |
| `holderKey` | `ManagedIdentifierOptsOrResult?` | Key for signing KB-JWT |
| `kbJwtOpts` | `CreateJwsOpts` | Additional JWS options |

---

# Engagement Manager

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Engagement Manager

The `MdocEngagementManager` is the primary entry point for mDoc operations in the IDK. It manages the complete lifecycle from creating engagements through completing data transfers.

## Obtaining the Engagement Manager

The engagement manager is available from the session component:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val engagementManager = session.component.mdocEngagementManager
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let engagementManager = session.component.mdocEngagementManager
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Key Properties

The engagement manager provides access to engagement instances and events:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Event hub for UI integration (primary integration point)
val eventHub: MdocEventHub = engagementManager.eventHub

// Shared parameters (BLE UUIDs, ephemeral keys)
val sharedParameters: SharedParameters = engagementManager.sharedParameters

// Engagement instances by type (only ONE per type at a time)
val engagementsByType: StateFlow<Map<EngagementType, EngagementInstance>>

// Direct access to specific engagement types
val qrEngagement: StateFlow<EngagementInstance?> = engagementManager.qrEngagement
val nfcEngagement: StateFlow<EngagementInstance?> = engagementManager.nfcEngagement
val toAppEngagement: StateFlow<EngagementInstance?> = engagementManager.toAppEngagement

// Currently active engagement (ONE at a time)
val activeEngagement: StateFlow<EngagementInstance?> = engagementManager.activeEngagement

// Active transfer instances
val transferInstances: StateFlow<Map<Uuid, TransferInstance>>
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Event hub for UI integration (primary integration point)
let eventHub: MdocEventHub = engagementManager.eventHub

// Shared parameters (BLE UUIDs, ephemeral keys)
let sharedParameters: SharedParameters = engagementManager.sharedParameters

// Engagement instances by type (only ONE per type at a time)
let engagementsByType: StateFlow<Map<EngagementType, EngagementInstance>>

// Direct access to specific engagement types
let qrEngagement: StateFlow<EngagementInstance?> = engagementManager.qrEngagement
let nfcEngagement: StateFlow<EngagementInstance?> = engagementManager.nfcEngagement
let toAppEngagement: StateFlow<EngagementInstance?> = engagementManager.toAppEngagement

// Currently active engagement (ONE at a time)
let activeEngagement: StateFlow<EngagementInstance?> = engagementManager.activeEngagement

// Active transfer instances
let transferInstances: StateFlow<Map<Uuid, TransferInstance>>
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Engagement Types

The manager supports three engagement types:

| Type | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `QR` | ISO 18013-5 QR code-based engagement |
| `NFC` | ISO 18013-5 proximity-based engagement |
| `TO_APP` | ISO 18013-7 app-to-app / reverse engagement |

## Creating TO_APP Engagement

Create a TO_APP engagement from an incoming URI:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Handle incoming mdoc:// URI
val uri = "mdoc://..."  // or "mdoc:" or "mdoc-openid4vp://"

val result = engagementManager.toApp(
    mdocUri = uri,
    autoStart = true  // Automatically start the engagement
)

when (result) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val engagementInstance = result.value
        // Engagement created successfully
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        val error = result.error
        // Handle error
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Handle incoming mdoc:// URI
let uri = "mdoc://..."  // or "mdoc:" or "mdoc-openid4vp://"

let result = engagementManager.toApp(
    mdocUri: uri,
    autoStart: true  // Automatically start the engagement
)

switch result {
case .success(let engagementInstance):
    // Engagement created successfully
case .failure(let error):
    // Handle error
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### URI Scheme Patterns

The `toApp()` method supports three URI patterns:

| Scheme | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `mdoc:` (opaque) | Classic reverse engagement with BLE/NFC |
| `mdoc://` (hierarchical) | REST API / Website retrieval |
| `mdoc-openid4vp://` | OID4VP with OAuth 2.0 |

## Working with EngagementInstance

The `EngagementInstance` represents a single engagement session:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val engagement: EngagementInstance = engagementManager.qrEngagement.value!!

// Access engagement properties
val id: Uuid = engagement.id
val data: EngagementData = engagement.data
val isActive: StateFlow<Boolean> = engagement.isActive

// Get engagement URI for QR code
val uri: String = engagement.getEngagementUri()

// Get ephemeral key
val ephemeralKey: CoseKeyType = engagement.getEphemeralKey()

// Get device engagement object
val deviceEngagement: CborEncodedItem<DeviceEngagement> = engagement.getDeviceEngagement()

// Get current state
val state: MdocEngagementStateType = engagement.getCurrentState()

// Get available retrieval methods
val retrievalMethods: Set<DeviceRetrievalMethod> = engagement.getRetrievalMethods()

// Check if transfer is initialized
val isTransferReady: Boolean = engagement.isTransferInitialized()

// Subscribe to events
engagement.events.collect { event ->
    // Handle engagement events
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let engagement: EngagementInstance = engagementManager.qrEngagement.value!

// Access engagement properties
let id: Uuid = engagement.id
let data: EngagementData = engagement.data
let isActive: StateFlow<Bool> = engagement.isActive

// Get engagement URI for QR code
let uri: String = try await engagement.getEngagementUri()

// Get ephemeral key
let ephemeralKey: CoseKeyType = try await engagement.getEphemeralKey()

// Get device engagement object
let deviceEngagement: CborEncodedItem<DeviceEngagement> = try await engagement.getDeviceEngagement()

// Get current state
let state: MdocEngagementStateType = engagement.getCurrentState()

// Get available retrieval methods
let retrievalMethods: Set<DeviceRetrievalMethod> = engagement.getRetrievalMethods()

// Check if transfer is initialized
let isTransferReady: Bool = engagement.isTransferInitialized()

// Subscribe to events
for await event in engagement.events {
    // Handle engagement events
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Starting a Transfer

Once an engagement is established, start the transfer to get a `TransferManager`:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Start engagement and get transfer manager
val transferManager: TransferManager = engagement.start()

// Or using Try interface for result-based error handling
val result = engagement.tryOps().start()

when (result) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val transferManager = result.value
        // Use transfer manager
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        val error = result.error
        // Handle error
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Start engagement and get transfer manager
let transferManager: TransferManager = try await engagement.start()

// Or using Try interface for result-based error handling
let result = try await engagement.tryOps().start()

switch result {
case .success(let transferManager):
    // Use transfer manager
case .failure(let error):
    // Handle error
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Event Hub Integration

The `MdocEventHub` is the primary integration point for UI:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val eventHub: MdocEventHub = engagementManager.eventHub

// Combined stream of all events
eventHub.allEvents.collect { event ->
    when (event) {
        is MdocEngagementEvent -> handleEngagementEvent(event)
        is MdocRetrievalEvent -> handleRetrievalEvent(event)
    }
}

// Or subscribe to specific event types
eventHub.engagementEvents.collect { event ->
    val state = event.state
    val engagementId = event.engagementId
    val isActive = event.isActive
    // Handle engagement-specific events
}

eventHub.retrievalEvents.collect { event ->
    // Handle transfer/retrieval events
}

// Get recent events for debugging
val recentEvents: List<SequencedEvent> = eventHub.getRecentEvents(count = 10)

// Get current state by engagement ID
val statesByEngagement: StateFlow<Map<Uuid, MdocEngagementState>> =
    eventHub.getCurrentStateByEngagement()
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let eventHub: MdocEventHub = engagementManager.eventHub

// Combined stream of all events
for await event in eventHub.allEvents {
    if let engagementEvent = event as? MdocEngagementEvent {
        handleEngagementEvent(event: engagementEvent)
    } else if let retrievalEvent = event as? MdocRetrievalEvent {
        handleRetrievalEvent(event: retrievalEvent)
    }
}

// Or subscribe to specific event types
for await event in eventHub.engagementEvents {
    let state = event.state
    let engagementId = event.engagementId
    let isActive = event.isActive
    // Handle engagement-specific events
}

// Get recent events for debugging
let recentEvents: [SequencedEvent] = eventHub.getRecentEvents(count: 10)

// Get current state by engagement ID
let statesByEngagement: StateFlow<Map<Uuid, MdocEngagementState>> =
    eventHub.getCurrentStateByEngagement()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Closing Engagements

Close engagements when done:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Close specific engagement types
engagementManager.closeNfcEngagement()
engagementManager.closeQrEngagement()
engagementManager.closeToAppEngagement()

// Close by instance
engagementManager.closeEngagementByInstance(engagementInstance)

// Close by ID
engagementManager.closeEngagementById(engagementId)

// Close all engagements
engagementManager.closeAll()
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Close specific engagement types
engagementManager.closeNfcEngagement()
engagementManager.closeQrEngagement()
engagementManager.closeToAppEngagement()

// Close by instance
engagementManager.closeEngagementByInstance(engagement: engagementInstance)

// Close by ID
engagementManager.closeEngagementById(id: engagementId)

// Close all engagements
engagementManager.closeAll()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Auto Restart Configuration

Enable automatic cleanup and NFC restart:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Enable auto-restart for NFC engagements
engagementManager.enableAutoRestart(backgroundNfcConfig)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Enable auto-restart for NFC engagements
engagementManager.enableAutoRestart(config: backgroundNfcConfig)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Shared Parameters

The `SharedParameters` manage parameters shared across engagements:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val sharedParams: SharedParameters = engagementManager.sharedParameters

// Access BLE UUIDs
val centralClientUuid: StateFlow<Uuid> = sharedParams.bleCentralClientUuid
val peripheralServerUuid: StateFlow<Uuid> = sharedParams.blePeripheralServerUuid

// Access shared ephemeral key
val ephemeralKey: StateFlow<CoseKeyType> = sharedParams.ephemeralKey

// Regenerate parameters for new session
sharedParams.regenerate()

// Use same UUID for both BLE modes
sharedParams.useSameUuidForBothModes()
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let sharedParams: SharedParameters = engagementManager.sharedParameters

// Access BLE UUIDs
let centralClientUuid: StateFlow<Uuid> = sharedParams.bleCentralClientUuid
let peripheralServerUuid: StateFlow<Uuid> = sharedParams.blePeripheralServerUuid

// Access shared ephemeral key
let ephemeralKey: StateFlow<CoseKeyType> = sharedParams.ephemeralKey

// Regenerate parameters for new session
sharedParams.regenerate()

// Use same UUID for both BLE modes
sharedParams.useSameUuidForBothModes()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Engagement Lifecycle States

Engagements progress through these states:

| State | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `INITIALIZING` | Engagement is being set up |
| `CONNECTING` | Establishing transport connection |
| `CONNECTED` | Transport connected, ready for transfer |
| `TRANSFERRING` | Data exchange in progress |
| `COMPLETED` | Transfer completed successfully |
| `ERROR` | An error occurred |

## Complete Example

Here's a complete example of handling an incoming mDoc URI:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
class MdocPresentationHandler(
    private val engagementManager: MdocEngagementManager,
    private val documentProvider: DocumentProvider
) {
    private val scope = CoroutineScope(Dispatchers.Main + SupervisorJob())

    fun handleIncomingUri(uri: String) {
        scope.launch {
            // Create engagement from URI
            val result = engagementManager.toApp(mdocUri = uri, autoStart = false)

            when (result) {
                is IdkResult.Success -> {
                    val engagement = result.value
                    observeEngagement(engagement)

                    // Start the engagement
                    val transferManager = engagement.start()
                    handleTransfer(transferManager)
                }
                is IdkResult.Failure -> {
                    handleError(result.error)
                }
            }
        }
    }

    private suspend fun observeEngagement(engagement: EngagementInstance) {
        engagement.events.collect { event ->
            when (event.state) {
                is MdocEngagementState.Connected -> {
                    updateUi("Connected to verifier")
                }
                is MdocEngagementState.Error -> {
                    val error = (event.state as MdocEngagementState.Error).error
                    handleError(error)
                }
            }
        }
    }

    private suspend fun handleTransfer(transferManager: TransferManager) {
        // Receive device request
        val deviceRequest = transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()

        // Show consent UI to user
        val userApproved = showConsentDialog(deviceRequest)

        if (userApproved) {
            // Create and send response
            val deviceResponse = transferManager.createResponse(
                deviceRequest = deviceRequest,
                documentProvider = documentProvider
            )
            transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse)
        } else {
            // Send error response
            val errorResponse = DeviceResponse.Builder()
                .withStatus(DeviceResponseStatus(20u))  // User cancelled
                .build()
            transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(errorResponse)
        }
    }

    fun cleanup() {
        engagementManager.closeAll()
        scope.cancel()
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
class MdocPresentationHandler {
    private let engagementManager: MdocEngagementManager
    private let documentProvider: DocumentProvider
    private var observationTask: Task<Void, Never>?

    init(engagementManager: MdocEngagementManager, documentProvider: DocumentProvider) {
        self.engagementManager = engagementManager
        self.documentProvider = documentProvider
    }

    func handleIncomingUri(uri: String) async {
        // Create engagement from URI
        let result = engagementManager.toApp(mdocUri: uri, autoStart: false)

        switch result {
        case .success(let engagement):
            observeEngagement(engagement: engagement)

            do {
                // Start the engagement
                let transferManager = try await engagement.start()
                try await handleTransfer(transferManager: transferManager)
            } catch {
                handleError(error: error)
            }

        case .failure(let error):
            handleError(error: error)
        }
    }

    private func observeEngagement(engagement: EngagementInstance) {
        observationTask = Task {
            for await event in engagement.events {
                switch event.state {
                case .connected:
                    await updateUi(message: "Connected to verifier")
                case .error(let error):
                    handleError(error: error)
                default:
                    break
                }
            }
        }
    }

    private func handleTransfer(transferManager: TransferManager) async throws {
        // Receive device request
        let deviceRequest = try await transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()

        // Show consent UI to user
        let userApproved = await showConsentDialog(request: deviceRequest)

        if userApproved {
            // Create and send response
            let deviceResponse = try await transferManager.createResponse(
                deviceRequest: deviceRequest,
                documentProvider: documentProvider
            )
            try await transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse: deviceResponse)
        } else {
            // Send error response
            let errorResponse = DeviceResponse.Builder()
                .withStatus(DeviceResponseStatus(value: 20))  // User cancelled
                .build()
            try await transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse: errorResponse)
        }
    }

    func cleanup() {
        observationTask?.cancel()
        engagementManager.closeAll()
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

---

# Engagement and Retrieval

# Engagement and Retrieval

## Overview

The Identity Development Kit implements ISO/IEC 18013-5 device engagement and data retrieval protocols for mobile credentials (mDL and other mdoc documents). The SDK provides two primary integration approaches:

1. **Session UI Projection Layer** (Recommended) - Simplified, opinionated state management for quick UI integration
2. **Direct EventHub Access** - Full control over raw events for custom state management

Both approaches work with the same underlying `MdocEngagementManager`, which orchestrates the complete mdoc interaction lifecycle across both ISO 18013-5 phases:
- **Phase 1: Engagement** - Establishing connection (QR, NFC, TO_APP)
- **Phase 2: Retrieval/Transfer** - Exchanging device requests and responses (BLE, NFC, HTTP/WebSocket)

## Engagement Manager

The Engagement Manager is the primary entry point for creating and managing mdoc engagement sessions. Access it through the presentation service:

```kotlin
val engagementManager = presentationService.engagementManager
```

### Key Features

**Typed Engagement Access**: Direct property access without UUID tracking
```kotlin
val qrEngagement = manager.qrEngagement.value
val nfcEngagement = manager.nfcEngagement.value
val toAppEngagement = manager.toAppEngagement.value
val activeEngagement = manager.activeEngagement.value
```

**EventHub Architecture**: Centralized event management with filtering and projection
```kotlin
// Access all events
manager.eventHub.allEvents.collect { event -> /* ... */ }

// Or filter by type
manager.eventHub.engagementEvents.collect { event -> /* ... */ }
manager.eventHub.transferEvents.collect { event -> /* ... */ }
```

**Session UI Projection**: Single state flow for simple UI integration (see [Session UI Projection](#session-ui-projection) below)
```kotlin
manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
    when (state.phase) {
        UiPhase.ENGAGEMENT -> handleEngagement(state)
        UiPhase.TRANSFER -> handleTransfer(state)
        UiPhase.TERMINAL -> handleTerminal(state)
    }
}
```

**SharedParameters**: Automatic BLE UUID and ephemeral key management
```kotlin
val bleCentralUuid = manager.sharedParameters.bleCentralClientUuid.value
val blePeripheralUuid = manager.sharedParameters.blePeripheralServerUuid.value
manager.sharedParameters.regenerate()  // Generate new UUIDs
```

**Engagement Suspension**: Automatic suspension/resumption when switching between engagements
```kotlin
// NFC engagement automatically suspends when QR becomes active
manager.nfcEngagement.value?.isActive?.collect { isActive ->
    if (!isActive) showNfcInBackground()
}
```

### Creating Engagement Instances

Create a new `EngagementInstance` using the DSL configuration. The instance manages the engagement phase and transitions to the transfer phase:

```kotlin
val engagementInstance = engagementManager.createEngagement {
    // Engagement phase: How reader discovers holder
    engagement {
        // Option 1: Device-initiated (Holder creates engagement)
        device {
            qr {
                scheme = "mdoc://"  // Default, can be customized
            }
            nfc { }  // Enable NFC engagement
        }

        // Option 2: Reader-initiated (Reverse engagement via app link)
        // Note: Cannot be mixed with device engagement
        reader {
            uri = "mdoc://example-base64-url"  // From deep link
        }
    }

    // Retrieval/Transfer phase: How data is transferred
    retrieval {
        ble {
            centralClientMode = true   // Act as BLE central (scan for peripherals)
            peripheralServerMode = false
        }
        nfc { }  // Enable NFC transfer
        // oid4vp { }  // OpenID4VP support
    }
}
```

:::note Engagement Methods
**Device Engagement** (QR, NFC): Holder creates engagement and displays/broadcasts it for reader to connect
**Reverse Engagement** (TO_APP via URI): Reader creates engagement and shares via app link; holder connects

These cannot be mixed in a single engagement configuration.
:::

### Starting the Engagement

Get QR code data before calling `start()` if needed:
```kotlin
val qrCodeData = engagementInstance.getEngagementUri()
displayQrCode(qrCodeData)  // Show to user

// Start the engagement and get transfer manager
val transferManager = engagementInstance.start()
```

:::warning Important
Call `start()` ideally before or immediately after showing the QR code. The actual hardware calls (BLE scanning, NFC listening) begin when `start()` is called.
:::

## Session UI Projection

The Session UI Projection layer provides a simplified, single state flow for quick UI integration. Perfect for standard wallet applications with typical UI patterns.

### Quick Example

```kotlin
// Collect single state flow
manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
    when (state.phase) {
        UiPhase.ENGAGEMENT -> {
            // Handle QR display, NFC prompts based on state.qrMode and state.nfcMode
            if (state.qrMode == QrMode.DISPLAY) showQrCode()
            if (state.nfcMode == NfcMode.FOREGROUND) showNfcPrompt()
        }
        UiPhase.TRANSFER -> {
            // Handle user consent, progress
            if (state.userInteractionRequired) showConsentDialog(state.deviceRequest!!)
        }
        UiPhase.TERMINAL -> {
            // Show result based on state.terminalOutcome
            when (state.terminalOutcome) {
                TerminalOutcome.SUCCESS -> showSuccess()
                TerminalOutcome.ERROR -> showError(state.terminalMessage)
                else -> handleOtherOutcomes()
            }
        }
    }
}
```

:::info Complete UI Integration Guide
For comprehensive documentation including SessionUiState properties, NFC/QR mode management, state transitions, code examples, and best practices, see the [Session UI Events Guide](./events-ui).
:::

<details>
<summary><strong>EngagementInstance Interface</strong></summary>

```kotlin
/**
 * Represents an instance of an engagement process with associated data, events, and operations.
 */
interface EngagementInstance : MdocEngagementEvent.Handlers {
    /**
     * Unique identifier for this engagement instance
     */
    val id: Uuid

    /**
     * The engagement data containing connection details, ephemeral keys, and retrieval methods
     */
    val data: MdocEngagementData

    /**
     * Whether this engagement is currently active (not suspended by another engagement)
     */
    val isActive: StateFlow<Boolean>

    /**
     * Transfer instance associated with this engagement (available after start() is called)
     */
    val transferInstance: TransferInstance?

    /**
     * Current state of the engagement
     */
    fun getCurrentState(): MdocEngagementState

    /**
     * Starts the engagement process and initializes the transfer
     *
     * @return The transfer manager for handling device request/response exchange
     */
    suspend fun start(): TransferManager

    /**
     * Retrieves the QR engagement data as a string (for generating QR code)
     *
     * @return QR code data encoded as mdoc:// URI
     */
    suspend fun getEngagementUri(): String

    /**
     * Stream of engagement events for this instance
     */
    val events: Flow<MdocEngagementEvent>
}
```

</details>

## Direct EventHub Access

For applications requiring fine-grained control, bypass the UI projection and access raw events directly:

```kotlin
class CustomStateManager(private val manager: MdocEngagementManager) {
    private val eventHub = manager.eventHub

    fun observeEvents() {
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Option 1: All events (engagement + transfer)
            eventHub.allEvents.collect { event ->
                when (event) {
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.QrShow -> handleQrShow(event)
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.Connected -> handleConnected(event)
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.DocumentsSelectionProcessStart -> handleUserConsent(event)
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.SessionDataSend -> handleTransferComplete(event)
                }
            }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Option 2: Engagement events only
            eventHub.engagementEvents.collect { event -> /* ... */ }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Option 3: Transfer events only
            eventHub.transferEvents.collect { event -> /* ... */ }
        }
    }

    fun useBuiltInFilters() {
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Filter: Only final state events (order >= 200)
            eventHub.finalStateEvents().collect { event ->
                handleSessionCompletion(event)
            }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Filter: Only active transfer events (order 100-199)
            eventHub.activeTransferEvents().collect { event ->
                updateTransferProgress(event)
            }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Filter: Custom state order range
            eventHub.eventsInStateRange(minOrder = 100, maxOrder = 150).collect { event ->
                log("Mid-transfer event: ${event::class.simpleName}")
            }
        }
    }
}
```

**EventHub Features:**
- Filtered event streams by state order ranges
- State tracking helpers (`latestEventByEngagement()`, `getCurrentStateByEngagement()`)
- Event history and debugging (`getRecentEvents()`, `getEventTimeline()`)
- Standard Flow operators for custom filtering

## Engagement and Transfer Events

### Engagement Events

<details>
<summary><strong>MdocEngagementEvent Types</strong></summary>

```kotlin
sealed interface MdocEngagementEvent {
    val role: EngagementRole
    val engagementId: Uuid
    val state: MdocEngagementState
    val time: LocalDateTimeKMP

    data class Initializing(override val role: EngagementRole, override val engagementId: Uuid) : MdocEngagementEvent

    data class QrShow(
        override val role: EngagementRole,
        val qrCodeData: String,
        val engagement: DeviceEngagementCbor,
        override val engagementId: Uuid
    ) : MdocEngagementEvent

    data class NfcEngagement(
        override val role: EngagementRole,
        val engagement: DeviceEngagementCbor,
        override val engagementId: Uuid
    ) : MdocEngagementEvent

    data class Connecting(
        override val role: EngagementRole,
        val identifier: String,
        override val engagementId: Uuid,
        val dataRetrievalMethod: DataRetrievalTransmissionType
    ) : MdocEngagementEvent

    data class Connected(
        override val role: EngagementRole,
        override val engagementId: Uuid,
        val dataRetrievalMethod: DataRetrievalTransmissionType
    ) : MdocEngagementEvent

    data class Canceled(
        override val role: EngagementRole,
        val reason: String? = null,
        override val engagementId: Uuid
    ) : MdocEngagementEvent

    data class Disconnected(
        override val role: EngagementRole,
        val reason: String,
        override val engagementId: Uuid
    ) : MdocEngagementEvent

    data class Error(
        override val role: EngagementRole,
        val reason: String,
        val error: Throwable? = null,
        override val engagementId: Uuid
    ) : MdocEngagementEvent

    data class Data(
        override val role: EngagementRole,
        override val engagementId: Uuid,
        val data: ByteArray,
        val direction: Direction
    ) : MdocEngagementEvent {
        enum class Direction { INCOMING, OUTGOING }
    }
}
```

</details>

### Engagement States

<details>
<summary><strong>MdocEngagementState Values</strong></summary>

```kotlin
enum class MdocEngagementState(override val order: Int) : MdocEngagementStateEnum {
    INIT(10),                    // Initial state
    BLE_SCANNING(30),            // BLE scanning in progress
    BLE_ADVERTISING(30),         // BLE advertising active
    NFC_ENABLED(30),             // NFC enabled and ready
    CONNECTING(50),              // Connection process starting
    CONNECTED(70),               // Connection established, data transfer can begin
    CANCELED(80),                // Engagement canceled
    ERROR(90),                   // Error occurred
    DISCONNECTED(100)            // Connection terminated
}
```

States progress from lower to higher order values. Not every state is guaranteed to occur.

</details>

### Transfer/Retrieval Events

<details>
<summary><strong>MdocRetrievalEvent Types</strong></summary>

```kotlin
sealed interface MdocRetrievalEvent {
    val data: ByteArray
    val time: LocalDateTimeKMP
    val state: MdocRetrievalStateType
    val engagementId: Uuid
    fun toCbor(): CborBaseItem

    class Initializing : MdocRetrievalEvent

    data class SessionEstablishmentReceived(override val data: ByteArray) : MdocRetrievalEvent
    // Contains encrypted session establishment from reader
    // Holder extracts DeviceRequest and prepares for document selection

    data class DeviceRequestReady(override val data: ByteArray) : MdocRetrievalEvent
    // DeviceRequest has been decrypted and is ready for processing

    data class DocumentsSelectionProcessStart(override val data: ByteArray) : MdocRetrievalEvent
    // User interaction required - show consent dialog

    data class DocumentsSelectionProcessAccepted(override val data: ByteArray) : MdocRetrievalEvent
    // User accepted - contains DeviceResponse

    data class DocumentsSelectionProcessDeclined(override val data: ByteArray) : MdocRetrievalEvent
    // User declined - will return error to reader

    data class SessionDataSend(override val data: ByteArray) : MdocRetrievalEvent
    // DeviceResponse is being sent to reader

    data class SessionTerminationSend(override val data: ByteArray) : MdocRetrievalEvent
    // Session termination message sent

    data class SessionTerminationReceived(override val data: ByteArray) : MdocRetrievalEvent
    // Session termination received from reader

    data class Error(override val data: ByteArray, val error: Throwable) : MdocRetrievalEvent
}
```

</details>

### Transfer States

<details>
<summary><strong>MdocRetrievalStateType Values</strong></summary>

```kotlin
enum class MdocRetrievalStateType(override val order: Int) : IMdocRetrievalState {
    INIT(10),                                      // Initial state
    SESSION_ESTABLISHMENT_RECEIVED(30),             // Session establishment received from reader
    DOCUMENTS_SELECTION_PROCESS_START(50),          // User consent required
    DOCUMENTS_SELECTION_PROCESS_ACCEPTED(60),       // User accepted request
    SESSION_DATA_SEND(70),                          // Sending DeviceResponse
    DOCUMENTS_SELECTION_PROCESS_DECLINED(80),       // User declined request
    ERROR(90),                                      // Error occurred
    TERMINATED(100)                                 // Session terminated successfully
}
```

</details>

## Transfer Manager

The `TransferManager` handles the device request/response exchange after engagement is established.

### Typical Flow

1. Receive device request from reader
2. Show consent dialog to user
3. Create response with selected documents
4. Send response back to reader
5. Handle termination

```kotlin
// 1. Start transfer (automatically done by engagement manager)
val transferManager = engagementInstance.start()

// 2. Receive device request
val deviceRequest = transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()

// 3. Show to user and get consent
showConsentDialog(deviceRequest) { accepted ->
    if (accepted) {
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // 4. Create response with document provider
            val response = transferManager.createResponse(
                deviceRequest = deviceRequest,
                documentProvider = myDocumentProvider
            )

            // 5. Send response
            transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(response)
        }
    } else {
        // User declined
        engagementManager.closeAll()
    }
}
```

<details>
<summary><strong>TransferManager Interface</strong></summary>

```kotlin
interface TransferManager : MdocRetrievalEvent.Handlers, RequestResponseProcessor {
    /**
     * The engagement instance associated with this transfer
     */
    val engagement: EngagementInstance

    /**
     * The transfer session managing transmission state
     */
    val session: TransferSession

    /**
     * The data channel for raw data transmission
     */
    val datachannel: MdocDataRetrievalChannelService

    /**
     * Receives device request from reader
     *
     * @return DeviceRequest object containing requested documents and elements
     */
    suspend fun receiveDeviceRequest(): DeviceRequest

    /**
     * Sends device response back to reader
     *
     * @param deviceResponse Response containing documents or error status
     */
    suspend fun sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse: DeviceResponse)

    /**
     * Creates response based on device request and document provider
     *
     * @param deviceRequest The request from the reader
     * @param documentProvider Provider that supplies requested documents
     * @return Result containing DeviceResponse or error
     */
    override fun createResponse(
        deviceRequest: DeviceRequest,
        documentProvider: DocumentProvider
    ): IdkResult<DeviceResponse, IdkError>
}
```

</details>

## Document Selection and Response Creation

When a device request is received, you need to select appropriate documents and create a response. The SDK provides functional interfaces for customization:

### Default Implementation

```kotlin
// Use default document selection
val deviceResponse = transferManager.createResponse(
    deviceRequest = deviceRequest,
    documentProvider = myDocumentProvider
)
```

The default implementation:
- Automatically performs selective disclosure (only returns requested elements)
- Returns the first matching document if multiple are available
- Handles namespace filtering and element intentToRetain flags

### Custom Document Selection

Register custom selectors for fine-grained control:

```kotlin
presentationService.registerCustomResponseSelectors(
    requestResponseProcessor = null,  // Use default
    requestDocumentsSelector = null,  // Use default
    docRequestSingleDocumentSelector = MyCustomSelector()  // Custom single doc selector
)
```

<details>
<summary><strong>Document Selection Interfaces</strong></summary>

```kotlin
/**
 * Selects a single document from available documents based on a request
 */
fun interface DocumentRequestSingleDocumentSelector {
    fun select(
        docRequest: DocRequestCbor,
        availableDocuments: (customSelectorData: Any?) -> Set<DocumentCbor>
    ): IdkResult<DocumentCbor, IdkError>
}

/**
 * Selects documents based on the complete device request
 */
fun interface RequestDocumentsSelector {
    fun selectDocuments(deviceRequest: DeviceRequest): IdkResult<List<DocumentCbor>, IdkError>
}

/**
 * Processes request and creates complete response
 */
fun interface RequestResponseProcessor {
    fun createResponse(deviceRequest: DeviceRequest): IdkResult<DeviceResponse, IdkError>
}
```

</details>

## Transport Methods

### BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy)

**Holder Configuration:**
```kotlin
retrieval {
    ble {
        centralClientMode = true   // Holder scans for reader's peripheral
        peripheralServerMode = false
    }
}
```

**Reader Configuration:**
```kotlin
retrieval {
    ble {
        centralClientMode = false
        peripheralServerMode = true  // Reader advertises peripheral
    }
}
```

### NFC (Near Field Communication)

**Holder (Android only):**
```kotlin
engagement {
    device {
        nfc { }  // Enables NFC engagement
    }
}
retrieval {
    nfc { }  // Enables NFC data transfer
}
```

:::warning iOS NFC Limitation
NFC engagement is not available for iOS mdoc holders due to Apple's NFC restrictions. Only mdoc readers can use NFC on iOS.
:::

### QR Code with BLE Transfer

**Common Pattern:**
```kotlin
engagement {
    device {
        qr { scheme = "mdoc://" }
    }
}
retrieval {
    ble {
        centralClientMode = true  // Holder acts as BLE central
    }
}
```

Reader scans QR code (engagement), then connects via BLE (transfer).

## Best Practices

### 1. Use Session UI Projection for Standard Wallets

For typical wallet applications with standard UI patterns, use the Session UI Projection layer:

```kotlin
manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
    // Single state object with all UI-relevant information
    // Deterministic phase transitions
    // Automatic QR hiding on transfer start
}
```

### 2. Favor NFC for Engagement (Android)

NFC provides better security and user experience:
- Tap-to-share familiar from payments
- Prevents QR code hijacking/shoulder surfing
- Faster connection establishment

### 3. Favor BLE for Transfer

BLE is better for data transfer than NFC:
- Higher throughput
- No need to keep devices touching during transfer
- Better for larger payloads

### 4. Always Show Consent Dialog

Display what will be shared before calling `sendDeviceResponse()`:

```kotlin
val parsed = state.parseDeviceRequest()
val summary = parsed.documents.joinToString("\n\n") { doc ->
    val attrs = doc.nameSpaces.flatMap { (ns, attributes) ->
        attributes.map { "$ns/$it" }
    }
    "${doc.docType}:\n${attrs.joinToString("\n")}"
}

showConsentDialog(summary) { accepted ->
    if (accepted) sendResponse()
    else manager.closeAll()
}
```

### 5. Handle Engagement Suspension

When using multiple engagement types (e.g., NFC + QR), handle suspension properly:

```kotlin
manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
    if (state.isSuspended) {
        showSuspendedOverlay()
        statusText.text = "Suspended - another session active"
    }
}
```

### 6. Clean Up Resources

Always close engagement manager when done:

```kotlin
override fun onDestroy() {
    super.onDestroy()
    engagementManager.close()  // Closes all engagements and transfers
}
```

## Platform-Specific Notes

### Android

- **Min SDK**: 27 (Android 8)
- **Target SDK**: 35 (Android 15)
- **Permissions**: BLUETOOTH, BLUETOOTH_ADMIN, BLUETOOTH_ADVERTISE, BLUETOOTH_CONNECT, BLUETOOTH_SCAN, NFC
- **NFC HCE**: Extend `AbstractMdocNfcService` for host card emulation

### iOS

- **NFC Limitation**: NFC engagement not available for holders (only readers)
- **CoreBluetooth**: Required for BLE operations
- **Async/Await**: Kotlin coroutines bridge to Swift's async/await
- **Memory**: Always call `.close()` on managers to prevent leaks

## Additional Resources

- [ISO/IEC 18013-5:2021](https://www.iso.org/standard/69084.html) - Official standard
- [Identity Development Kit Documentation](https://docs.sphereon.com/idk/v0.10/intro)

For questions or support, open an issue at: https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/identity-development-kit/issues

---

# Event and UI handling

import Tabs from "@theme/Tabs";
import TabItem from "@theme/TabItem";



## Overview

This guide covers **two approaches** for integrating mdoc engagement and transfer events into your UI:

### 1. UI Projection Layer (Recommended for most apps)

The Session UI Projection layer provides a simplified, opinionated view of the mdoc engagement and transfer lifecycle, specifically designed for quick UI integration. Instead of handling complex raw engagement and retrieval events, UIs can bind to a single state flow (`sessionState`) that provides deterministic, UI-friendly state information.

**Best for:**
- Standard wallet applications with typical UI patterns
- Quick integration with sensible defaults
- Developers who want deterministic QR visibility and phase transitions
- Teams that prefer a single state object over coordinating multiple event streams

### 2. Direct EventHub Access (Advanced)

For applications requiring fine-grained control, you can bypass the UI projection layer and access raw events directly from the `MdocEventHub`. This approach gives you complete control over event handling and state management.

**Best for:**
- Integration with existing state management frameworks (Redux, MVI, etc.)
- Custom UI logic that differs from the opinionated projection
- Applications that need to track multiple engagements simultaneously
- Advanced debugging and event inspection
- Full control over every event in the lifecycle

---

**Implementation details:**
-  `SessionUiState.kt` - All types implemented and verified
-  `SessionUiProjector.kt` - Full projection logic implemented
-  `MdocEventHub.kt` - Exposes both `sessionState`/`sessionEvents` (projection) and `allEvents`/`engagementEvents`/`transferEvents` (direct access)
-  `MdocEngagementManager.kt` The starting point providing access to the above

## Key Concepts

### Design Principles

1. **Deterministic State Transitions** - Clear, predictable phase progression: ENGAGEMENT → TRANSFER → TERMINAL
2. **Single Source of Truth** - One state flow to bind, no need to coordinate multiple event streams
3. **UI-Centric Events** - Simplified events that map directly to UI actions
4. **Built-in Logic** - QR visibility, suspension tracking, and progress hints handled automatically
5. **Non-Breaking** - Optional layer on top of existing event system

### Architecture

**Approach 1: UI Projection (Recommended)**

```
Raw Events (Engagement + Retrieval)
            ↓
    SessionUiProjector
            ↓
    SessionEvent (simplified)
            ↓
    SessionUiState (deterministic)
            ↓
        Your UI
```

**Approach 2: Direct EventHub Access**

```
MdocEngagementManager
            ↓
      MdocEventHub
            ↓
    ┌───────┴───────┐
    │               │
allEvents    engagementEvents + transferEvents
    │               │
    └───────┬───────┘
            ↓
   Your Custom State Management
            ↓
        Your UI
```

Both approaches are fully supported and can be used simultaneously if needed (e.g., using `sessionState` for main UI while observing raw events for analytics).

## Core Types

### UiPhase

High-level phases of the session lifecycle:

- **ENGAGEMENT** - QR display, NFC handover preparation
- **TRANSFER** - Connection, data exchange, user interaction
- **TERMINAL** - Session finished (success, error, declined, etc.)

### TerminalOutcome

Classification of terminal states for appropriate UI feedback:

- **SUCCESS** - Transfer completed successfully, data was shared
- **DECLINED** - User declined to share the requested data
- **CANCELED** - Session was canceled (by user or system)
- **ERROR** - An error occurred during the session

### NfcMode

NFC engagement state for UI display logic, determined by whether an NFC engagement exists and whether it is the active engagement:

- **DISABLED** - No NFC engagement exists
- **BACKGROUND** - NFC engagement exists but is not the active engagement
- **FOREGROUND** - NFC engagement exists and is the active engagement

### QrMode

QR display state for UI:

- **NONE** - No QR engagement active, no scanning in progress
- **DISPLAY** - Regular QR engagement active (display QR code for reader to scan)
- **SCAN** - **UI-managed scanning mode** (user is scanning reader's QR code)

**IMPORTANT:** `SCAN` mode is different from the other modes:
- `NONE` and `DISPLAY` are set automatically by the projector based on engagements
- `SCAN` is **UI-managed** and set manually by your code
- Scanning happens *before* creating a TO_APP engagement
- The UI opens a scanner, user scans to get a URI, then UI creates the engagement

### SessionUiState

The main state object containing all UI-relevant information:

```kotlin
data class SessionUiState(
    val phase: UiPhase,                       // Current phase
    val substateLabel: String,                // Human-readable label
    val nfcMode: NfcMode,                     // NFC mode (DISABLED/BACKGROUND/FOREGROUND)
    val qrMode: QrMode,                       // QR mode (NONE/DISPLAY/SCAN)
    val isSuspended: Boolean,                 // Engagement suspended?
    val progressHint: Float?,                 // Progress (0.0-1.0)
    val terminalOutcome: TerminalOutcome?,    // Terminal classification
    val terminalMessage: String?,             // Terminal details
    val userInteractionRequired: Boolean,     // User must act?
    val deviceRequest: ByteArray?             // Device Request from Reader to review
)
```

### SessionEvent

Simplified events that drive state transitions. These are mapped from raw `MdocEngagementEvent` and `MdocRetrievalEvent`:

- `QrShow` - QR code is being shown (from `MdocEngagementEvent.QrShow`)
- `NfcPromptShown` - NFC prompt should be shown (from `MdocEngagementEvent.NfcEngagement`)
- `NfcHandoverSuccess` - NFC handover succeeded (from `MdocEngagementEvent.Connected` when NFC)
- `TransferConnecting` - Transfer is connecting (from `MdocEngagementEvent.Connecting` or `MdocRetrievalEvent.TransmissionTypeSelected`)
- `TransferConnected` - Transfer connected successfully (from `MdocEngagementEvent.Connected` non-NFC or retrieval connected)
- `UserInteractionRequired(deviceRequest)` - User must review and accept/decline (from `MdocRetrievalEvent.DocumentsSelectionProcessStart`)
- `UserAccepted` - User accepted the document request (from `MdocRetrievalEvent.DocumentsSelectionProcessAccepted`)
- `UserDeclined` - User declined the document request (from `MdocRetrievalEvent.DocumentsSelectionProcessDeclined`)
- `TransferProgress(fraction)` - Transfer progress update (from `MdocRetrievalEvent.SessionDataReceived` at 0.3, `SessionDataSend` at 0.7)
- `Terminal(outcome, message)` - Session reached terminal state (from various terminal events with appropriate outcome classification)

## Usage Examples

> **Real-World Example:** For a complete sample app implementation using `sessionState` and the UI projection layer, see the [Kiwa Sample Holder App](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/kiwa-sample/blob/develop/example/holder/ui/elicense/impl/src/commonMain/kotlin/com/sphereon/kiwa/sample/ui/elicense/engagement/qr/MdocEngagementPresenterImpl.kt).
>
> This example demonstrates:
> - Collecting `sessionState` with `collectAsState()` in Jetpack Compose
> - Handling all three phases (ENGAGEMENT, TRANSFER, TERMINAL)
> - QR code generation based on `qrMode`
> - User consent dialogs with document selection
> - Proper cleanup and error handling
> - Integration with a sample document provider

<!-- @formatter:off -->
<Tabs>
<TabItem value="Android" label="Kotlin/Android">
```kotlin
class WalletActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
    private lateinit var manager: MdocEngagementManager
    private var currentTransferManager: TransferManager? = null

    override fun onCreate(savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState)

        // Track active transfer manager
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            manager.activeEngagement.collect { engagement ->
                currentTransferManager = engagement?.transferManager
            }
        }

        // Collect session state
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
                updateUI(state)
            }
        }
    }

    private fun updateUI(state: SessionUiState) {
        when (state.phase) {
            UiPhase.ENGAGEMENT -> handleEngagement(state)
            UiPhase.TRANSFER -> handleTransfer(state)
            UiPhase.TERMINAL -> handleTerminal(state)
        }
    }

    private fun handleEngagement(state: SessionUiState) {
        // Update status
        statusText.text = state.substateLabel

        // Handle QR based on mode
        when (state.qrMode) {
            QrMode.DISPLAY -> {
                // Show QR code for reader to scan
                qrCodeView.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                qrScannerView.visibility = View.GONE
                showQrButton.text = "Show QR"
            }
            QrMode.SCAN -> {
                // Show scanner for scanning reader's QR
                qrCodeView.visibility = View.GONE
                qrScannerView.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                showQrButton.text = "Scan QR"
            }
            QrMode.NONE -> {
                qrCodeView.visibility = View.GONE
                qrScannerView.visibility = View.GONE
            }
        }

        // Handle NFC based on mode
        when (state.nfcMode) {
            NfcMode.DISABLED -> {
                // No NFC available
                nfcPrompt.visibility = View.GONE
                nfcIcon.visibility = View.GONE
            }
            NfcMode.BACKGROUND -> {
                // Show icon but not active prompt
                nfcPrompt.visibility = View.GONE
                nfcIcon.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                nfcIcon.alpha = 0.5f  // Dimmed to indicate background
            }
            NfcMode.FOREGROUND -> {
                // Show active "tap to share" prompt
                nfcPrompt.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                nfcIcon.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                nfcIcon.alpha = 1.0f
                nfcPrompt.text = "Hold near reader to share"
            }
        }

        // Handle suspension
        if (state.isSuspended) {
            overlayView.visibility = View.VISIBLE
            statusText.text = "Suspended - another session active"
        }
    }

    private fun handleTransfer(state: SessionUiState) {
        statusText.text = state.substateLabel

        // QR and scanner hidden during transfer
        qrCodeView.visibility = View.GONE
        qrScannerView.visibility = View.GONE

        when {
            state.userInteractionRequired -> {
                // User must review and accept/decline
                currentTransferManager?.let { transferMgr ->
                    showConsentDialog(state.deviceRequest!!, transferMgr)
                }
            }
            state.progressHint != null -> {
                // Show progress
                progressBar.progress = (state.progressHint * 100).toInt()
                progressBar.visibility = View.VISIBLE
            }
            else -> {
                // Show spinner for connecting/processing
                progressBar.isIndeterminate = true
                progressBar.visibility = View.VISIBLE
            }
        }
    }

    private fun handleTerminal(state: SessionUiState) {
        progressBar.visibility = View.GONE

        when (state.terminalOutcome) {
            TerminalOutcome.SUCCESS -> {
                showSuccessDialog(
                    title = "Success!",
                    message = "Your data was shared successfully"
                )
            }
            TerminalOutcome.DECLINED -> {
                showInfoDialog(
                    title = "Request Declined",
                    message = "You chose not to share your data"
                )
            }
            TerminalOutcome.CANCELED -> {
                showInfoDialog(
                    title = "Canceled",
                    message = state.terminalMessage ?: "Session was canceled"
                )
            }
            TerminalOutcome.ERROR -> {
                showErrorDialog(
                    title = "Error",
                    message = state.terminalMessage ?: "An error occurred"
                )
            }
        }
    }

    private fun showConsentDialog(deviceRequestBytes: ByteArray, transferManager: TransferManager) {
        // Parse the device request using the helper extension
        val tempState = SessionUiState(
            phase = UiPhase.TRANSFER,
            substateLabel = "",
            nfcMode = NfcMode.DISABLED,
            qrMode = QrMode.NONE,
            isSuspended = false,
            progressHint = null,
            terminalOutcome = null,
            terminalMessage = null,
            userInteractionRequired = true,
            deviceRequest = deviceRequestBytes
        )
        val parsed = tempState.parseDeviceRequest()

        if (parsed == null) {
            // Handle parse error
            return
        }

        // Decode the device request for creating response
        val deviceRequest = DeviceRequest.Decoder.decodeCbor(deviceRequestBytes)

        // Display requested documents and attributes
        val requestSummary = parsed.documents.joinToString("\n\n") { doc ->
            val attrs = doc.nameSpaces.flatMap { (ns, attributes) ->
                attributes.map { "$ns/$it" }
            }
            "${doc.docType}:\n${attrs.joinToString("\n")}"
        }

        AlertDialog.Builder(this)
            .setTitle("Share your data?")
            .setMessage("The verifier is requesting:\n\n$requestSummary")
            .setPositiveButton("Share") { _, _ ->
                // User accepted - create and send response with documents
                lifecycleScope.launch {
                    val response = transferManager.createResponse(
                        deviceRequest = deviceRequest,
                        documentProvider = myDocumentProvider // Provides requested documents
                    )
                    transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(response)
                    // This will trigger DocumentsSelectionProcessAccepted event
                }
            }
            .setNegativeButton("Decline") { _, _ ->
                // User declined - close the session without sending documents
                lifecycleScope.launch {
                    manager.closeAll()
                    // This will trigger DocumentsSelectionProcessDeclined event
                }
            }
            .setCancelable(false)
            .show()
    }
}
```
</TabItem>
<TabItem value="iOS" label="iOS/Swift">
```swift
class WalletViewController: UIViewController {
    private var manager: MdocEngagementManager!
    private var stateObserver: Task<Void, Never>?

    override func viewDidLoad() {
        super.viewDidLoad()

        // Observe session state using Kotlin Flow adapter
        stateObserver = Task {
            for await state in manager.eventHub.sessionState {
                await updateUI(state: state)
            }
        }
    }

    deinit {
        stateObserver?.cancel()
    }

    @MainActor
    private func updateUI(state: SessionUiState) {
        switch state.phase {
        case .engagement:
            handleEngagement(state: state)
        case .transfer:
            handleTransfer(state: state)
        case .terminal:
            handleTerminal(state: state)
        }
    }

    private func handleEngagement(state: SessionUiState) {
        statusLabel.text = state.substateLabel

        // Handle QR mode
        switch state.qrMode {
        case .display:
            qrCodeView.isHidden = false
        case .none, .scan:
            qrCodeView.isHidden = true
        }

        // Handle NFC mode
        switch state.nfcMode {
        case .disabled:
            nfcPromptView.isHidden = true
            nfcIcon.isHidden = true
        case .background:
            nfcPromptView.isHidden = true
            nfcIcon.isHidden = false
            nfcIcon.alpha = 0.5
        case .foreground:
            nfcPromptView.isHidden = false
            nfcIcon.isHidden = false
            nfcIcon.alpha = 1.0
        }

        // Handle suspension
        if state.isSuspended {
            overlayView.isHidden = false
            statusLabel.text = "Suspended - another session active"
        }
    }

    private func handleTransfer(state: SessionUiState) {
        statusLabel.text = state.substateLabel
        qrCodeView.isHidden = true

        if state.userInteractionRequired {
            showConsentSheet(deviceRequest: state.deviceRequest!)
        } else if let progress = state.progressHint {
            progressView.progress = progress
            progressView.isHidden = false
        } else {
            activityIndicator.startAnimating()
        }
    }

    private func handleTerminal(state: SessionUiState) {
        activityIndicator.stopAnimating()

        switch state.terminalOutcome {
        case .success:
            showAlert(title: "Success!", message: "Data shared successfully")
        case .declined:
            showAlert(title: "Declined", message: "You chose not to share")
        case .canceled:
            showAlert(title: "Canceled", message: state.terminalMessage ?? "Session canceled")
        case .error:
            showAlert(title: "Error", message: state.terminalMessage ?? "An error occurred")
        default:
            break
        }
    }
}
```
</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Compose" label="Compose">
```kotlin
@Composable
fun WalletScreen(manager: MdocEngagementManager) {
    val sessionState by manager.eventHub.sessionState.collectAsState()

    WalletContent(state = sessionState)
}

@Composable
fun WalletContent(state: SessionUiState) {
    Box(modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize()) {
        when (state.phase) {
            UiPhase.ENGAGEMENT -> EngagementView(state)
            UiPhase.TRANSFER -> TransferView(state)
            UiPhase.TERMINAL -> TerminalView(state)
        }

        if (state.isSuspended) {
            SuspendedOverlay()
        }
    }
}

@Composable
fun EngagementView(state: SessionUiState) {
    Column(
        modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize(),
        horizontalAlignment = Alignment.CenterHorizontally,
        verticalArrangement = Arrangement.Center
    ) {
        Text(text = state.substateLabel, style = MaterialTheme.typography.h6)

        Spacer(modifier = Modifier.height(16.dp))

        // Show QR code when in DISPLAY mode
        if (state.qrMode == QrMode.DISPLAY) {
            QRCodeDisplay()
        }

        // Show NFC prompt when in FOREGROUND mode
        if (state.nfcMode == NfcMode.FOREGROUND) {
            NfcPromptDisplay()
        }

        // Show small NFC icon when in BACKGROUND mode
        if (state.nfcMode == NfcMode.BACKGROUND) {
            NfcBackgroundIcon()
        }
    }
}

@Composable
fun TransferView(state: SessionUiState) {
    Column(
        modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize(),
        horizontalAlignment = Alignment.CenterHorizontally,
        verticalArrangement = Arrangement.Center
    ) {
        Text(text = state.substateLabel)

        when {
            state.userInteractionRequired -> {
                ConsentDialog(deviceRequest = state.deviceRequest!!)
            }
            state.progressHint != null -> {
                LinearProgressIndicator(progress = state.progressHint)
            }
            else -> {
                CircularProgressIndicator()
            }
        }
    }
}

@Composable
fun TerminalView(state: SessionUiState) {
    val (icon, color, title) = when (state.terminalOutcome) {
        TerminalOutcome.SUCCESS -> Triple(
            Icons.Default.CheckCircle,
            Color.Green,
            "Success!"
        )
        TerminalOutcome.DECLINED -> Triple(
            Icons.Default.Cancel,
            Color.Orange,
            "Declined"
        )
        TerminalOutcome.ERROR -> Triple(
            Icons.Default.Error,
            Color.Red,
            "Error"
        )
        else -> Triple(
            Icons.Default.Info,
            Color.Gray,
            "Completed"
        )
    }

    Column(
        modifier = Modifier.fillMaxSize(),
        horizontalAlignment = Alignment.CenterHorizontally,
        verticalArrangement = Arrangement.Center
    ) {
        Icon(
            imageVector = icon,
            contentDescription = null,
            tint = color,
            modifier = Modifier.size(64.dp)
        )

        Spacer(modifier = Modifier.height(16.dp))

        Text(text = title, style = MaterialTheme.typography.h5)

        state.terminalMessage?.let { message ->
            Spacer(modifier = Modifier.height(8.dp))
            Text(text = message, style = MaterialTheme.typography.body2)
        }
    }
}
```
</TabItem>
</Tabs>
<!-- @formatter:on -->

## State Transition Flow

### QR Display Flow (Regular QR)

```
ENGAGEMENT (qrMode=DISPLAY, nfcMode=BACKGROUND)
    ↓ QrShow
ENGAGEMENT (qrMode=DISPLAY, "Scan the QR with reader")
    ↓ TransferConnecting
TRANSFER (qrMode=NONE, "Connecting…")  ← QR automatically switched to NONE
    ↓ TransferConnected
TRANSFER ("Connected")
    ↓ UserInteractionRequired
TRANSFER (userInteractionRequired=true, "Review request")
    ↓ UserAccepted
TRANSFER (userInteractionRequired=false, "Sharing credentials…")
    ↓ TransferProgress(0.7)
TRANSFER (progressHint=0.7, "Transferring…")
    ↓ Terminal(SUCCESS, "Transfer completed successfully")
TERMINAL (terminalOutcome=SUCCESS, qrMode=NONE, "Completed")
```

### Reverse/ToApp Flow (Scan Then Engage)

**Important:** Scanning happens *before* creating the engagement, so it's not reflected in session state.

```
[UI-managed scanning - not in sessionState]
    ↓ User opens scanner (your code manages this)
    ↓ User scans reader's QR code
    ↓ Get URI from scanned QR
    ↓ Create TO_APP engagement with URI
ENGAGEMENT (qrMode=NONE, nfcMode=BACKGROUND)
    ↓ TransferConnecting (engagement starts immediately)
TRANSFER (qrMode=NONE, "Connecting…")
    ↓ TransferConnected
TRANSFER ("Connected")
    ↓ [continues as normal transfer flow]
```

**Note:** The `qrMode` stays `NONE` throughout because there's no QR code to *display*. The scanning was done before the engagement existed.

### NFC Foreground Flow

```
ENGAGEMENT (nfcMode=FOREGROUND, qrMode=NONE)
    ↓ NfcPromptShown
ENGAGEMENT ("Hold near reader")
    ↓ User taps phone to reader
    ↓ NfcHandoverSuccess
TRANSFER (nfcMode=FOREGROUND, "Connecting…")
    ↓ TransferConnected
TRANSFER ("Connected")
    ↓ UserInteractionRequired
TRANSFER (userInteractionRequired=true, "Review request")
    ↓ UserDeclined
TERMINAL (terminalOutcome=DECLINED, "User declined to share data")
```

### NFC Background Flow (QR active, NFC available)

```
ENGAGEMENT (nfcMode=BACKGROUND, qrMode=DISPLAY)
    ↓ User shows QR to reader, but reader uses NFC instead
    ↓ NfcHandoverSuccess (NFC takes over)
TRANSFER (nfcMode=FOREGROUND, qrMode=NONE, "Connecting…")
    ↓ [continues as above]
```

## Key Rules & Behaviors

### NFC Mode Management

The `nfcMode` property automatically tracks NFC engagement status based on whether an NFC engagement exists and whether it is the currently active engagement:

**DISABLED** - No NFC engagement exists:
- No NFC engagement has been created
- Typical scenarios: iOS mdoc holder (NFC not available for holder apps), Android with NFC hardware disabled
- UI should not show any NFC elements

**BACKGROUND** - NFC engagement exists but is not the active engagement:
- An NFC engagement has been created but another engagement (QR or TO_APP) is currently active
- The system can still respond to NFC taps, but focus is on the other engagement
- UI should show a small NFC icon/indicator (dimmed/inactive state)
- Don't show active "tap to share" prompt
- User can tap their phone to a reader to switch NFC to foreground

**FOREGROUND** - NFC engagement exists and is the active engagement:
- The NFC engagement is currently the active engagement (no other engagement is active, or NFC became active)
- UI should show prominent "tap to share" prompt
- This is the primary engagement method the user should use

### QR Mode Management

The `qrMode` property tracks QR display state:

**NONE** - No QR engagement active (default state)

**DISPLAY** - Regular QR engagement active (ISO 18013-5)
- Automatically set when QR engagement is created
- Display QR code for reader to scan
- Reader scans holder's QR

**SCAN** - UI-managed scanning mode (ISO 18013-7 pre-engagement)
- **NOT set automatically** - you manage this yourself
- Used for reverse/ToApp engagement flow
- User scans reader's QR to get URI
- Then you create TO_APP engagement with that URI

**Important:** For reverse/ToApp engagements, scanning happens *before* creating the engagement:

```kotlin
// Your own scanning state (not from sessionState)
var isScanningQr by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }

// User taps "Scan QR"
Button(onClick = { isScanningQr = true }) {
    Text("Scan QR")
}

// Show scanner when YOUR state says so
if (isScanningQr) {
    QrScanner { scannedUri ->
        isScanningQr = false
        // NOW create the engagement with scanned URI
        manager.createEngagement(
            EngagementType.TO_APP,
            config.copy(readerEngagementUri = scannedUri)
        )
        // state.qrMode stays NONE (no QR to display)
    }
}

// Show QR code when engagement says so
if (state.qrMode == QrMode.DISPLAY) {
    QrCodeDisplay()
}
```

The projector only sets qrMode to DISPLAY (for QR engagements). You handle the scanning UI yourself.

### User Interaction

- `userInteractionRequired=true` when `DocumentsSelectionProcessStart` received
- `deviceRequest` contains CBOR-encoded DeviceRequest for decoding
- UI should display consent dialog and wait for user decision
- User response handled by transfer manager (accept/decline methods)
- `UserAccepted` → continue transfer
- `UserDeclined` → immediate transition to TERMINAL with DECLINED outcome

### Suspension

- `isSuspended` mirrors `activeEngagement?.isActive == false`
- Suspended engagements won't respond to connection attempts
- UI should show overlay or disabled state when suspended

### Progress Tracking

- `progressHint` is `null` during connection/setup phases
- `progressHint` is `0.0-1.0` during data transfer
- Use indeterminate progress indicator when `progressHint == null`

### Terminal States

Always check `terminalOutcome` to provide appropriate feedback:

- **SUCCESS** → Show success message, confetti, checkmark
- **DECLINED** → Show neutral message, explain user choice
- **CANCELED** → Show neutral message, allow retry
- **ERROR** → Show error dialog with details, offer retry

## Advanced Usage

### Observing Raw Events (Optional)

If you need access to detailed events alongside the UI state:

```kotlin
// Observe simplified session events
launch {
    manager.eventHub.sessionEvents.collect { event ->
        when (event) {
            is SessionEvent.UserInteractionRequired -> {
                logAnalytics("consent_shown")
            }
            is SessionEvent.Terminal -> {
                logAnalytics("session_ended", mapOf(
                    "outcome" to event.outcome.name
                ))
            }
            else -> {}
        }
    }
}

// Observe UI state
launch {
    manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
        updateUI(state)
    }
}
```

### Direct EventHub Access (Alternative to UI Projection)

If you need more control or prefer to build your own state management, you can bypass the UI projection layer entirely and access the raw event streams directly from the EventHub. The EventHub provides powerful filtering capabilities through built-in methods and standard Flow operators:

```kotlin
class CustomStateManager(private val manager: MdocEngagementManager) {
    private val eventHub = manager.eventHub

    // Build your own state management by observing raw events
    fun observeEvents() {
        // Option 1: Observe all events (engagement + transfer)
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            eventHub.allEvents.collect { event ->
                when (event) {
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.QrShow -> handleQrShow(event)
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.Connected -> handleConnected(event)
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.DocumentsSelectionProcessStart -> handleUserConsent(event)
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.SessionDataSend -> handleTransferComplete(event)
                    // ... handle all other events
                }
            }
        }

        // Option 2: Observe engagement events only
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            eventHub.engagementEvents.collect { event ->
                when (event) {
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.QrShow -> {
                        // Show QR code
                        displayQrCode(event.qrCodeData)
                    }
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.NfcEngagement -> {
                        // Show NFC prompt
                        showNfcPrompt()
                    }
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.Connecting -> {
                        // Connection starting
                        showConnectingState()
                    }
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.Connected -> {
                        // Connection established
                        showConnectedState()
                    }
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.Error -> {
                        // Handle error
                        showError(event.reason)
                    }
                    // ... other engagement events
                }
            }
        }

        // Option 3: Observe transfer/retrieval events only
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            eventHub.transferEvents.collect { event ->
                when (event) {
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.TransmissionTypeSelected -> {
                        // Transfer type selected
                        log("Transfer starting with ${event.transmissionType}")
                    }
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.DocumentsSelectionProcessStart -> {
                        // User needs to consent
                        val deviceRequest = DeviceRequest.Decoder.decodeCbor(event.data)
                        showConsentDialog(deviceRequest)
                    }
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.DocumentsSelectionProcessAccepted -> {
                        // User accepted
                        log("User accepted request")
                    }
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.SessionDataSend -> {
                        // Data sent
                        log("Response sent to reader")
                    }
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.SessionTerminationSend -> {
                        // Session completed successfully
                        showSuccess()
                    }
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.Error -> {
                        // Transfer error
                        showError(event.error.message ?: "Transfer failed")
                    }
                    // ... other transfer events
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // Use state tracking helpers for building custom state
    fun trackState() {
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Track latest engagement events per engagement
            eventHub.latestEventByEngagement().collect { eventsMap ->
                eventsMap.forEach { (engagementId, event) ->
                    log("Engagement $engagementId: ${event::class.simpleName}")
                }
            }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Track latest transfer events per engagement
            eventHub.latestTransferEventByEngagement().collect { transfersMap ->
                transfersMap.forEach { (engagementId, event) ->
                    log("Transfer for engagement $engagementId: ${event::class.simpleName}")
                }
            }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Track current engagement state per engagement
            eventHub.getCurrentStateByEngagement().collect { statesMap ->
                statesMap.forEach { (engagementId, state) ->
                    log("Engagement $engagementId state: $state")
                }
            }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Track current transfer state per engagement
            eventHub.getCurrentTransferStateByEngagement().collect { transferStatesMap ->
                transferStatesMap.forEach { (engagementId, state) ->
                    log("Transfer state for engagement $engagementId: $state")
                }
            }
        }
    }

    // Built-in event filtering methods
    fun useBuiltInFilters() {
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Filter: Only final state events (order >= 200)
            // Detects when engagements or transfers finish
            eventHub.finalStateEvents().collect { event ->
                log("Session ended: ${event::class.simpleName}")
                handleSessionCompletion(event)
            }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Filter: Only active transfer events (order 100-199)
            // Track ongoing data exchange
            eventHub.activeTransferEvents().collect { event ->
                log("Active transfer: ${event::class.simpleName}")
                updateTransferProgress(event)
            }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Filter: Events within custom state order range
            // State orders: 0-99 (engagement), 100-199 (transfer), 200+ (final)
            eventHub.eventsInStateRange(minOrder = 100, maxOrder = 150).collect { event ->
                log("Mid-transfer event: ${event::class.simpleName}")
            }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Filter: Transfer completion events only
            eventHub.onTransferCompletion.collect { event ->
                log("Transfer completed: ${event::class.simpleName}")
                handleCompletion(event)
            }
        }
    }

    // Standard Flow operators for custom filtering
    fun customFiltering() {
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Filter by event type using Flow operators
            eventHub.allEvents
                .filter { it is MdocEngagementEvent.Connected || it is MdocEngagementEvent.Error }
                .collect { event ->
                    log("Connection-related event: ${event::class.simpleName}")
                }
        }

        lifecycleScope.launch {
            // Filter by engagement ID
            val targetEngagementId = manager.activeEngagement.value?.id
            eventHub.allEvents
                .filter { it.engagementId == targetEngagementId }
                .collect { event ->
                    log("Event for active engagement: ${event::class.simpleName}")
                }
        }
    }

    // Access event history for debugging
    fun debugEventHistory() {
        // Get recent events from buffer
        val recentEvents = eventHub.getRecentEvents(count = 20)
        recentEvents.forEach { event ->
            log("${event::class.simpleName} at ${event.time}")
        }

        // Get recent engagement events only
        val recentEngagementEvents = eventHub.getRecentEngagementEvents(count = 10)
        recentEngagementEvents.forEach { event ->
            log("Engagement: ${event::class.simpleName}")
        }

        // Get recent transfer events only
        val recentTransferEvents = eventHub.getRecentTransferEvents(count = 10)
        recentTransferEvents.forEach { event ->
            log("Transfer: ${event::class.simpleName}")
        }

        // Get complete event timeline with sequence numbers
        val timeline = eventHub.getEventTimeline()
        timeline.forEach { sequencedEvent ->
            log("#${sequencedEvent.sequenceNumber}: ${sequencedEvent.event::class.simpleName}")
        }

        // Configure buffer size if needed
        eventHub.setEventBufferSize(50)
        val currentSize = eventHub.getEventBufferSize()
        log("Event buffer size: $currentSize")
    }

    // State cleanup
    fun cleanup() {
        // Clear all state when closing all engagements
        eventHub.clearAllState()

        // Or clear state for a specific engagement
        val engagementId = manager.activeEngagement.value?.id
        if (engagementId != null) {
            eventHub.clearStateForEngagement(engagementId)
        }
    }
}
```

**When to use direct EventHub access:**

- You need fine-grained control over every event
- You're integrating with existing state management (Redux, MVI, etc.)
- You want to build custom UI logic that differs from the opinionated projection
- You need to track multiple engagements simultaneously with custom logic
- You're debugging complex state transitions

**When to use UI Projection (sessionState/sessionEvents):**

- You want quick, simple integration with sensible defaults
- You're building a standard mdoc holder wallet UI
- You want deterministic QR visibility and phase transitions
- You prefer a single state object over coordinating multiple event streams

**Example: Custom State Machine using EventHub**

```kotlin
class CustomStateMachine(private val eventHub: MdocEventHub) {
    sealed class AppState {
        object Idle : AppState()
        data class ShowingQR(val qrData: String, val hasNfcBackground: Boolean) : AppState()
        object Connecting : AppState()
        data class WaitingForConsent(val request: DeviceRequest) : AppState()
        object Transferring : AppState()
        data class Completed(val success: Boolean, val message: String?) : AppState()
    }

    private val _state = MutableStateFlow<AppState>(AppState.Idle)
    val state: StateFlow<AppState> = _state.asStateFlow()

    init {
        // Build state machine from raw events
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            eventHub.allEvents.collect { event ->
                _state.value = when (event) {
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.QrShow -> {
                        val hasNfc = eventHub.getCurrentStateByEngagement().value.any { (_, state) ->
                            state.name.contains("NFC", ignoreCase = true)
                        }
                        AppState.ShowingQR(event.qrCodeData, hasNfc)
                    }
                    is MdocEngagementEvent.Connecting -> AppState.Connecting
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.DocumentsSelectionProcessStart -> {
                        AppState.WaitingForConsent(DeviceRequest.Decoder.decodeCbor(event.data))
                    }
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.SessionDataSend -> AppState.Transferring
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.SessionTerminationSend -> {
                        AppState.Completed(success = true, message = "Transfer successful")
                    }
                    is MdocRetrievalEvent.Error -> {
                        AppState.Completed(success = false, message = event.error.message)
                    }
                    else -> _state.value // Keep current state for other events
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

### Handling Multiple Sessions

The UI projection automatically handles active engagement switching:

```kotlin
// Manager automatically updates sessionState based on activeEngagement
// You don't need to track which engagement is active
manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
    // This state is always for the currently active engagement
    updateUI(state)

    if (state.isSuspended) {
        // Current engagement is suspended, another is active
        showSuspendedOverlay()
    }
}
```

### Decoding Device Request

When `userInteractionRequired=true`, use the built-in helper:

```kotlin
// Simple parsing using the extension function
manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
    if (state.userInteractionRequired) {
        val parsed = state.parseDeviceRequest()
        if (parsed != null) {
            // Display consent dialog
            val summary = parsed.documents.joinToString("\n\n") { doc ->
                val attrs = doc.nameSpaces.flatMap { (ns, attributes) ->
                    attributes.map { "$ns/$it" }
                }
                "${doc.docType}:\n${attrs.joinToString("\n")}"
            }
            showConsentDialog(summary)
        } else {
            // Handle parse error
            showError("Invalid device request")
        }
    }
}
```

## Common UI Patterns

### Pattern 1: NFC-Only App (Android Wallet)

```kotlin
class WalletActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
    override fun onCreate(savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState)

        // Create background NFC on app start
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            manager.createEngagement(EngagementType.NFC, nfcConfig)
        }

        // Observe session state
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
                when (state.nfcMode) {
                    NfcMode.DISABLED -> {
                        // Should not happen on Android, but handle it
                        showNfcDisabledDialog()
                    }
                    NfcMode.BACKGROUND -> {
                        // On secondary screens, show small NFC icon
                        nfcIcon.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                        nfcIcon.alpha = 0.5f
                        nfcPrompt.visibility = View.GONE
                    }
                    NfcMode.FOREGROUND -> {
                        // On main screen, show prominent NFC prompt
                        nfcIcon.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                        nfcIcon.alpha = 1.0f
                        nfcPrompt.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

### Pattern 2: QR-Primary with Background NFC (Android/iOS)

```kotlin
class ShareActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
    override fun onCreate(savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState)

        // Create background NFC if available (Android only)
        if (isAndroid && nfcAvailable) {
            lifecycleScope.launch {
                manager.createEngagement(EngagementType.NFC, nfcConfig)
            }
        }

        // Main screen with QR buttons
        showQrButton.setOnClickListener {
            lifecycleScope.launch {
                manager.createEngagement(EngagementType.QR, qrConfig)
            }
        }

        scanQrButton.setOnClickListener {
            // Open QR scanner (UI-managed, not engagement-driven)
            openQrScanner { scannedUri ->
                // After scanning, create TO_APP engagement with the URI
                lifecycleScope.launch {
                    manager.createEngagement(
                        EngagementType.TO_APP,
                        toAppConfig.copy(readerEngagementUri = scannedUri)
                    )
                }
            }
        }

        // Observe session state
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
                // Handle NFC indicator
                when (state.nfcMode) {
                    NfcMode.DISABLED -> nfcIcon.visibility = View.GONE
                    NfcMode.BACKGROUND -> {
                        nfcIcon.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                        nfcIcon.alpha = 0.5f
                    }
                    NfcMode.FOREGROUND -> {
                        nfcIcon.visibility = View.VISIBLE
                        nfcIcon.alpha = 1.0f
                    }
                }

                // Handle QR modal (only DISPLAY mode shows engagement QR)
                when (state.qrMode) {
                    QrMode.NONE -> {
                        hideQrModal()
                    }
                    QrMode.DISPLAY -> {
                        showQrDisplayModal()
                    }
                    QrMode.SCAN -> {
                        // SCAN is UI-managed, not set by projector
                        // This case typically won't occur from sessionState
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

### Pattern 3: QR-Only App (iOS mdoc Holder)

```swift
class ShareViewController: UIViewController {
    private var isScanning = false

    override func viewDidLoad() {
        super.viewDidLoad()

        // No NFC on iOS holder - state.nfcMode will always be DISABLED

        // Observe session state
        Task {
            for await state in manager.eventHub.sessionState {
                await MainActor.run {
                    // NFC always disabled
                    nfcIcon.isHidden = true

                    // Handle engagement-driven QR display
                    if state.qrMode == .display {
                        showQrCodeView()
                    } else if !isScanning {
                        hideQrView()
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    @IBAction func showQrPressed() {
        // Create QR engagement to display QR code
        Task {
            try await manager.createEngagement(type: .QR, config: qrConfig)
            // state.qrMode will become DISPLAY
        }
    }

    @IBAction func scanQrPressed() {
        // Open scanner (UI-managed, before engagement)
        isScanning = true
        showQrScanner { [weak self] scannedUri in
            guard let self = self else { return }
            self.isScanning = false

            // NOW create TO_APP engagement with scanned URI
            Task {
                try await self.manager.createEngagement(
                    type: .TO_APP,
                    config: self.toAppConfig.copy(readerEngagementUri: scannedUri)
                )
                // state.qrMode stays NONE (no QR to display)
            }
        }
    }

    private func showQrScanner(onScan: @escaping (String) -> Void) {
        // Show camera-based QR scanner
        let scanner = QRScannerViewController()
        scanner.onScanComplete = onScan
        present(scanner, animated: true)
    }
}
```

### Pattern 4: Modal QR with Persistent NFC

```kotlin
// Main activity with background NFC
class MainActivity : AppCompatActivity() {
    override fun onCreate(savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState)

        // Background NFC throughout app lifetime
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            manager.createEngagement(EngagementType.NFC, nfcConfig)
        }

        showQrButton.setOnClickListener {
            // Show modal fragment with QR
            QrModalFragment().show(supportFragmentManager, "qr")
        }
    }
}

// Modal fragment for QR
class QrModalFragment : DialogFragment() {
    override fun onViewCreated(view: View, savedInstanceState: Bundle?) {
        super.onViewCreated(view, savedInstanceState)

        // Create QR engagement when modal opens
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            manager.createEngagement(EngagementType.QR, qrConfig)
        }

        // Observe state
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            manager.eventHub.sessionState.collect { state ->
                // NFC stays BACKGROUND while QR modal is open
                // qrMode switches to DISPLAY

                when (state.phase) {
                    UiPhase.TRANSFER -> {
                        // Transfer started, dismiss modal
                        dismiss()
                    }
                    UiPhase.TERMINAL -> {
                        // Show result and close
                        showResult(state)
                        dismiss()
                    }
                    else -> {
                        // Show QR code
                        renderQrCode(state)
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

    override fun onDismiss(dialog: DialogInterface) {
        super.onDismiss(dialog)
        // Close QR engagement when modal dismissed
        lifecycleScope.launch {
            manager.closeQrEngagement()
        }
    }
}
```

## Troubleshooting

### NFC Shows Wrong Mode

**Issue:** NFC shows as FOREGROUND when it should be BACKGROUND

**Solution:** Check that you're creating the correct engagement as active. Only one engagement can be active at a time. The `nfcMode` is automatically determined based on which engagement is active.

```kotlin
// Correct - QR becomes active, NFC goes to background
manager.createEngagement(EngagementType.NFC, config)  // Creates NFC in background
manager.createEngagement(EngagementType.QR, config)   // QR becomes active, NFC stays background

// The nfcMode is automatically computed:
// - DISABLED if no NFC engagement exists
// - FOREGROUND if NFC engagement is the active engagement
// - BACKGROUND if NFC engagement exists but another engagement is active
```

### QR Mode Confusion

**Issue:** Expecting `qrMode` to automatically become SCAN for reverse engagements

**Solution:** Remember that SCAN mode is UI-managed, not engagement-managed. The projector will never set `qrMode` to SCAN. You manage scanning in your UI code before creating the TO_APP engagement.

```kotlin
// Correct - UI manages scanning before engagement
var isScanningQr by remember { mutableStateOf(false) }

Button(onClick = { isScanningQr = true }) { Text("Scan QR") }

if (isScanningQr) {
    QrScanner { uri ->
        isScanningQr = false
        // Create TO_APP engagement with scanned URI
        manager.createEngagement(EngagementType.TO_APP, config.copy(readerEngagementUri = uri))
        // state.qrMode will be NONE (no QR to display)
    }
}

// Display QR when engagement says so
if (state.qrMode == QrMode.DISPLAY) {
    QrCodeDisplay()
}

// Wrong - expecting sessionState.qrMode to be SCAN
// The projector doesn't set SCAN mode - you control it
```

### User Interaction Not Triggered

**Issue:** Consent dialog never appears

**Solution:** Check that you're handling `userInteractionRequired` in TRANSFER phase:

```kotlin
when (state.phase) {
    UiPhase.TRANSFER -> {
        if (state.userInteractionRequired) {
            showConsentDialog(state.deviceRequest!!)
        }
    }
    // ...
}
```

### Terminal State Shows Wrong Outcome

**Issue:** Success shows as error, or vice versa

**Solution:** Ensure you're checking `terminalOutcome`, not just `terminalMessage`:

```kotlin
// Correct
when (state.terminalOutcome) {
    TerminalOutcome.SUCCESS -> showSuccess()
    TerminalOutcome.ERROR -> showError()
}

// Wrong
if (state.terminalMessage?.contains("error") == true) {
    showError() // Message might not contain "error"
}
```

## Best Practices

1. **Trust the State** - Don't try to replicate the projector's logic. Trust `qrMode`, `nfcMode`, `userInteractionRequired`, etc.

2. **Use `substateLabel`** - Display it to users for real-time feedback about what's happening

3. **Check `terminalOutcome`** - Always use the enum, not string matching on messages

4. **Handle Suspension** - Always check `isSuspended` and show appropriate UI

5. **Decode Lazily** - Only decode `deviceRequest` when needed (when showing consent dialog)

6. **One Collector** - Collect `sessionState` once and route to different handlers based on phase

7. **Null Progress** - Use indeterminate progress when `progressHint == null`, determinate when present

---

# Transfer Manager

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Transfer Manager

The `TransferManager` handles the data transfer phase of the mDoc protocol, managing the exchange of device requests and responses between holder and verifier.

## Obtaining the Transfer Manager

The transfer manager is obtained by starting an engagement:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val engagementManager = session.component.mdocEngagementManager
val engagement = engagementManager.activeEngagement.value

// Start engagement and get transfer manager
val transferManager: TransferManager = engagement!!.start()

// Or using Try interface for result-based error handling
val result = engagement.tryOps().start()

when (result) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val transferManager = result.value
        // Use transfer manager
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        val error = result.error
        // Handle error
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let engagementManager = session.component.mdocEngagementManager
let engagement = engagementManager.activeEngagement.value

// Start engagement and get transfer manager
let transferManager: TransferManager = try await engagement!.start()

// Or using Try interface for result-based error handling
let result = try await engagement!.tryOps().start()

switch result {
case .success(let transferManager):
    // Use transfer manager
case .failure(let error):
    // Handle error
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Receiving Device Requests

Receive and process the verifier's request:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Receive the device request from verifier
val deviceRequest: DeviceRequest = transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()

// Examine what's being requested
for (docRequest in deviceRequest.docRequests) {
    println("Document type: ${docRequest.docType}")

    // Get requested namespaces and elements
    val namespaces = docRequest.itemsRequest.nameSpaces
    for ((namespace, elements) in namespaces) {
        println("  Namespace: $namespace")
        for ((elementId, intentToRetain) in elements) {
            println("    - $elementId (retain: $intentToRetain)")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Receive the device request from verifier
let deviceRequest: DeviceRequest = try await transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()

// Examine what's being requested
for docRequest in deviceRequest.docRequests {
    print("Document type: \(docRequest.docType)")

    // Get requested namespaces and elements
    let namespaces = docRequest.itemsRequest.nameSpaces
    for (namespace, elements) in namespaces {
        print("  Namespace: \(namespace)")
        for (elementId, intentToRetain) in elements {
            print("    - \(elementId) (retain: \(intentToRetain))")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Creating Device Responses

Create a response with the requested data:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Create response using a document provider
val deviceResponse = transferManager.createResponse(
    deviceRequest = deviceRequest,
    documentProvider = documentProvider
)

// The response contains signed documents
println("Response has ${deviceResponse.documents?.size ?: 0} documents")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Create response using a document provider
let deviceResponse = try await transferManager.createResponse(
    deviceRequest: deviceRequest,
    documentProvider: documentProvider
)

// The response contains signed documents
print("Response has \(deviceResponse.documents?.count ?? 0) documents")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Sending Responses

Send the response to the verifier:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Send the device response
transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Send the device response
try await transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse: deviceResponse)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Complete Transfer Flow

Here's a complete holder-side transfer flow:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
class MdocTransferHandler(
    private val engagementManager: MdocEngagementManager,
    private val documentProvider: DocumentProvider
) {
    suspend fun handleTransfer(engagement: EngagementInstance) {
        try {
            // 1. Start the transfer
            val transferManager = engagement.start()

            // 2. Receive device request
            val deviceRequest = transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()

            // 3. Show consent UI to user
            val userApproved = showConsentDialog(deviceRequest)

            if (userApproved) {
                // 4. Create response with user-approved data
                val deviceResponse = transferManager.createResponse(
                    deviceRequest = deviceRequest,
                    documentProvider = documentProvider
                )

                // 5. Send response to verifier
                transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse)
            } else {
                // User declined - send error response
                val errorResponse = DeviceResponse.Builder()
                    .withStatus(DeviceResponseStatus(20u))  // User cancelled
                    .build()
                transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(errorResponse)
            }
        } catch (e: Exception) {
            handleError(e)
        } finally {
            // Clean up engagement
            engagementManager.closeEngagementByInstance(engagement)
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
class MdocTransferHandler {
    private let engagementManager: MdocEngagementManager
    private let documentProvider: DocumentProvider

    init(engagementManager: MdocEngagementManager, documentProvider: DocumentProvider) {
        self.engagementManager = engagementManager
        self.documentProvider = documentProvider
    }

    func handleTransfer(engagement: EngagementInstance) async {
        do {
            // 1. Start the transfer
            let transferManager = try await engagement.start()

            // 2. Receive device request
            let deviceRequest = try await transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()

            // 3. Show consent UI to user
            let userApproved = await showConsentDialog(request: deviceRequest)

            if userApproved {
                // 4. Create response with user-approved data
                let deviceResponse = try await transferManager.createResponse(
                    deviceRequest: deviceRequest,
                    documentProvider: documentProvider
                )

                // 5. Send response to verifier
                try await transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse: deviceResponse)
            } else {
                // User declined - send error response
                let errorResponse = DeviceResponse.Builder()
                    .withStatus(DeviceResponseStatus(value: 20))  // User cancelled
                    .build()
                try await transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse: errorResponse)
            }
        } catch {
            handleError(error: error)
        }

        // Clean up engagement
        engagementManager.closeEngagementByInstance(engagement: engagement)
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Transfer Instance Tracking

The engagement manager tracks active transfer instances:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Track all active transfers
lifecycleScope.launch {
    engagementManager.transferInstances.collect { transfers: Map<Uuid, TransferInstance> ->
        for ((id, transfer) in transfers) {
            println("Active transfer: $id")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Track all active transfers
Task {
    for await transfers in engagementManager.transferInstances {
        for (id, transfer) in transfers {
            print("Active transfer: \(id)")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## DeviceResponse Builder

Build custom device responses:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Build a device response manually
val response = DeviceResponse.Builder()
    .withVersion("1.0")
    .withStatus(DeviceResponseStatus(0u))  // Success
    .withDocuments(listOf(document))
    .build()

// Build an error response
val errorResponse = DeviceResponse.Builder()
    .withStatus(DeviceResponseStatus(10u))  // General error
    .build()
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Build a device response manually
let response = DeviceResponse.Builder()
    .withVersion("1.0")
    .withStatus(DeviceResponseStatus(value: 0))  // Success
    .withDocuments([document])
    .build()

// Build an error response
let errorResponse = DeviceResponse.Builder()
    .withStatus(DeviceResponseStatus(value: 10))  // General error
    .build()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Response Status Codes

Standard device response status codes:

| Code | Meaning |
|------|---------|
| 0 | Success |
| 10 | General error |
| 11 | CBOR decoding error |
| 20 | User cancelled |

## Transfer Lifecycle

The transfer phase follows this sequence:

<img src="/img/diagrams/mdoc-transfer-lifecycle.svg" alt="mDoc Transfer Lifecycle" style={{maxWidth: '400px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Best Practices

When implementing transfer handling:

- **Always get user consent**: Never send data without explicit user approval
- **Use the document provider**: Let the IDK handle credential signing
- **Handle errors gracefully**: Network interruptions and timeouts can occur during transfer
- **Clean up after transfer**: Close the engagement when complete
- **Send appropriate status codes**: Use correct status codes for error responses

---

# BLE Transport

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# BLE Transport

Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is the most common transport for mobile-to-mobile mDoc presentations. This guide covers platform setup and usage patterns.

## BLE Modes

The IDK supports two BLE modes per ISO 18013-5:

| Mode | Device Role | Description |
|------|-------------|-------------|
| Central Client | BLE Central | Device connects to a peripheral (reader) |
| Peripheral Server | BLE Peripheral | Device advertises and accepts connections |

Most holder apps use Central Client mode, where the wallet connects to the verifier's device.

## Checking BLE Availability

Check if BLE transport is available on the engagement:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val engagement = engagementManager.activeEngagement.value
val retrievalMethods = engagement?.getRetrievalMethods() ?: emptySet()

for (method in retrievalMethods) {
    if (method is DeviceRetrievalMethod.Ble) {
        println("BLE available")
        println("  Central client: ${method.centralClientMode}")
        println("  Peripheral server: ${method.peripheralServerMode}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let engagement = engagementManager.activeEngagement.value
let retrievalMethods = engagement?.getRetrievalMethods() ?? []

for method in retrievalMethods {
    if let ble = method as? DeviceRetrievalMethod.Ble {
        print("BLE available")
        print("  Central client: \(ble.centralClientMode)")
        print("  Peripheral server: \(ble.peripheralServerMode)")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## BLE UUIDs

The shared parameters manage BLE UUIDs used for service discovery:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val sharedParams = engagementManager.sharedParameters

// Access BLE UUIDs
val centralClientUuid = sharedParams.bleCentralClientUuid.value
val peripheralServerUuid = sharedParams.blePeripheralServerUuid.value

// Use same UUID for both modes (required by some verifiers)
sharedParams.useSameUuidForBothModes()

// Regenerate UUIDs for new session
sharedParams.regenerate()
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let sharedParams = engagementManager.sharedParameters

// Access BLE UUIDs
let centralClientUuid = sharedParams.bleCentralClientUuid.value
let peripheralServerUuid = sharedParams.blePeripheralServerUuid.value

// Use same UUID for both modes (required by some verifiers)
sharedParams.useSameUuidForBothModes()

// Regenerate UUIDs for new session
sharedParams.regenerate()
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Android Setup

### Permissions

Add to `AndroidManifest.xml`:

```xml
<!-- Bluetooth permissions -->
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADMIN" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADVERTISE" />
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN" />

<!-- Location (required for BLE scanning on Android 6-11) -->
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION" />

<uses-feature
    android:name="android.hardware.bluetooth_le"
    android:required="false" />
```

### Runtime Permission Request

```kotlin
private val requiredPermissions = if (Build.VERSION.SDK_INT >= Build.VERSION_CODES.S) {
    arrayOf(
        Manifest.permission.BLUETOOTH_CONNECT,
        Manifest.permission.BLUETOOTH_SCAN,
        Manifest.permission.BLUETOOTH_ADVERTISE
    )
} else {
    arrayOf(
        Manifest.permission.ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION
    )
}

private fun requestBluetoothPermissions() {
    ActivityCompat.requestPermissions(this, requiredPermissions, REQUEST_BLE)
}
```

## iOS Setup

### Info.plist

```xml
<key>NSBluetoothAlwaysUsageDescription</key>
<string>This app uses Bluetooth to transfer credentials</string>

<key>NSBluetoothPeripheralUsageDescription</key>
<string>This app uses Bluetooth to transfer credentials</string>

<key>UIBackgroundModes</key>
<array>
    <string>bluetooth-central</string>
    <string>bluetooth-peripheral</string>
</array>
```

## Connection Flow

### Central Client Mode

<img src="/img/diagrams/ble-central-flow.svg" alt="BLE Central Client Flow" style={{maxWidth: '550px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

### Peripheral Server Mode

The peripheral server mode is similar but with roles reversed - the holder advertises and the verifier connects.

## Monitoring Connection State

Use the event hub to monitor BLE connection status:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
engagementManager.eventHub.engagementEvents.collect { event ->
    when (event.state) {
        is MdocEngagementState.Connecting -> {
            showMessage("Connecting via Bluetooth...")
        }
        is MdocEngagementState.Connected -> {
            showMessage("Connected via Bluetooth")
        }
        is MdocEngagementState.Error -> {
            val error = (event.state as MdocEngagementState.Error).error
            if (error.message.contains("bluetooth", ignoreCase = true)) {
                showMessage("Bluetooth connection failed")
            }
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
for await event in engagementManager.eventHub.engagementEvents {
    switch event.state {
    case .connecting:
        showMessage(text: "Connecting via Bluetooth...")
    case .connected:
        showMessage(text: "Connected via Bluetooth")
    case .error(let error):
        if error.message.lowercased().contains("bluetooth") {
            showMessage(text: "Bluetooth connection failed")
        }
    default:
        break
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Troubleshooting

Common BLE issues and solutions:

| Issue | Cause | Solution |
|-------|-------|----------|
| Can't find device | Service UUID mismatch | Verify UUIDs match between devices |
| Connection fails | Device out of range | Move devices closer (within 10m) |
| Slow transfer | Small MTU | BLE MTU is negotiated automatically |
| Disconnects | Timeout | Keep devices in range during transfer |
| Permissions denied | Missing runtime permissions | Request permissions before use |

## Best Practices

When implementing BLE transport:

- **Keep devices close**: BLE range is typically 10-30 meters but varies by environment
- **Handle background transitions**: BLE behavior changes when apps go to background, especially on iOS
- **Test on physical devices**: BLE behavior on emulators is not reliable
- **Regenerate parameters**: Use fresh UUIDs for each session via `sharedParams.regenerate()`

---

# NFC Transport

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# NFC Transport

NFC (Near Field Communication) provides a tap-and-go experience for mDoc presentations. This guide covers platform setup and usage patterns.

## NFC in mDoc

NFC can be used for both engagement and data transfer:

| Scenario | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| NFC Engagement | Holder taps device to initiate connection |
| NFC Data Transfer | Credential data exchanged via NFC |
| NFC to BLE Handover | Engage via NFC, transfer via BLE |

## Checking NFC Availability

Check if NFC transport is available on the engagement:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val engagement = engagementManager.activeEngagement.value
val retrievalMethods = engagement?.getRetrievalMethods() ?: emptySet()

for (method in retrievalMethods) {
    if (method is DeviceRetrievalMethod.Nfc) {
        println("NFC available")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let engagement = engagementManager.activeEngagement.value
let retrievalMethods = engagement?.getRetrievalMethods() ?? []

for method in retrievalMethods {
    if method is DeviceRetrievalMethod.Nfc {
        print("NFC available")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## NFC Engagement Flow

Observe NFC engagement state:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
lifecycleScope.launch {
    engagementManager.nfcEngagement.collect { engagement ->
        if (engagement != null) {
            // NFC tap detected, engagement created
            println("NFC engagement: ${engagement.id}")

            engagement.events.collect { event ->
                when (event.state) {
                    is MdocEngagementState.Connected -> {
                        // Start transfer
                        val transferManager = engagement.start()
                        handleTransfer(transferManager)
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
Task {
    for await engagement in engagementManager.nfcEngagement {
        guard let engagement = engagement else { continue }

        // NFC tap detected, engagement created
        print("NFC engagement: \(engagement.id)")

        for await event in engagement.events {
            switch event.state {
            case .connected:
                // Start transfer
                let transferManager = try await engagement.start()
                try await handleTransfer(transferManager: transferManager)
            default:
                break
            }
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Android Setup

### Host Card Emulation (HCE)

Android uses Host Card Emulation to present credentials via NFC.

#### Manifest Configuration

```xml
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.NFC" />
<uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.nfc" android:required="false" />
<uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.nfc.hce" android:required="false" />

<application>
    <!-- HCE Service for mDoc -->
    <service
        android:name=".MdocNfcService"
        android:exported="true"
        android:permission="android.permission.BIND_NFC_SERVICE">
        <intent-filter>
            <action android:name="android.nfc.cardemulation.action.HOST_APDU_SERVICE" />
        </intent-filter>
        <meta-data
            android:name="android.nfc.cardemulation.host_apdu_service"
            android:resource="@xml/mdoc_nfc_service" />
    </service>
</application>
```

#### Service Configuration

Create `res/xml/mdoc_nfc_service.xml`:

```xml
<host-apdu-service xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android"
    android:description="@string/nfc_service_description"
    android:requireDeviceUnlock="true">
    <aid-group
        android:category="other"
        android:description="@string/nfc_aid_description">
        <!-- mDoc AID per ISO 18013-5 -->
        <aid-filter android:name="A0000002480400" />
    </aid-group>
</host-apdu-service>
```

## iOS Setup

### Info.plist Configuration

```xml
<key>NFCReaderUsageDescription</key>
<string>Present your credentials via NFC tap</string>

<key>com.apple.developer.nfc.readersession.formats</key>
<array>
    <string>TAG</string>
</array>

<key>com.apple.developer.nfc.readersession.iso7816.select-identifiers</key>
<array>
    <!-- mDoc AID -->
    <string>A0000002480400</string>
</array>
```

### Entitlements

Add the NFC Tag Reading capability to your app's entitlements.

## NFC Protocol Flow

```
Holder Device                      Verifier Reader
     │                                    │
     │  1. Tap device on reader           │
     │────────────────────────────────────►│
     │                                    │
     │  2. SELECT command (AID)           │
     │◄────────────────────────────────────│
     │                                    │
     │  3. SELECT response                │
     │────────────────────────────────────►│
     │                                    │
     │  4. APDU commands (request/response)│
     │◄───────────────────────────────────►│
     │                                    │
     │  5. Complete                       │
     │────────────────────────────────────►│
```

## Monitoring NFC State

Use the event hub to monitor NFC status:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
engagementManager.eventHub.engagementEvents.collect { event ->
    when (event.state) {
        is MdocEngagementState.Connecting -> {
            showMessage("NFC connection in progress...")
        }
        is MdocEngagementState.Connected -> {
            showMessage("Connected via NFC")
        }
        is MdocEngagementState.Transferring -> {
            showMessage("Transferring data via NFC...")
        }
        is MdocEngagementState.Error -> {
            showMessage("NFC error occurred")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
for await event in engagementManager.eventHub.engagementEvents {
    switch event.state {
    case .connecting:
        showMessage(text: "NFC connection in progress...")
    case .connected:
        showMessage(text: "Connected via NFC")
    case .transferring:
        showMessage(text: "Transferring data via NFC...")
    case .error:
        showMessage(text: "NFC error occurred")
    default:
        break
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## NFC to BLE Handover

NFC engagement with BLE data transfer provides the best of both worlds:

1. Quick NFC tap for engagement (no QR scanning)
2. Higher bandwidth BLE for actual data transfer

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Observe NFC engagement
lifecycleScope.launch {
    engagementManager.nfcEngagement.collect { engagement ->
        if (engagement != null) {
            // Check available retrieval methods
            val methods = engagement.getRetrievalMethods()

            // If BLE is available, it will be used for transfer
            if (methods.any { it is DeviceRetrievalMethod.Ble }) {
                println("NFC engagement with BLE transfer")
            }
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
Task {
    for await engagement in engagementManager.nfcEngagement {
        guard let engagement = engagement else { continue }

        // Check available retrieval methods
        let methods = engagement.getRetrievalMethods()

        // If BLE is available, it will be used for transfer
        if methods.contains(where: { $0 is DeviceRetrievalMethod.Ble }) {
            print("NFC engagement with BLE transfer")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Large Data Considerations

NFC has limited bandwidth compared to BLE. For credentials with photos:

- Transfer may take several seconds
- Keep devices in contact until transfer completes
- Consider NFC-to-BLE handover for large payloads
- Provide visual feedback during transfer

## Troubleshooting

| Issue | Cause | Solution |
|-------|-------|----------|
| NFC not detected | Device not NFC-enabled | Check device capabilities |
| Tap not recognized | AID not registered | Verify manifest configuration |
| Transfer interrupted | Tap released too early | Keep devices in contact |
| Permission denied | Missing permissions | Add NFC permission to manifest |
| HCE not working | Background restrictions | Ensure app is in foreground |

## Best Practices

When implementing NFC transport:

- **Keep devices in contact**: NFC disconnects as soon as devices separate
- **Provide visual feedback**: Show progress so users know to maintain the tap
- **Handle background case**: NFC HCE may not work when app is in background
- **Test with real hardware**: NFC behavior varies between manufacturers
- **Consider handover**: Use NFC engagement with BLE transfer for large credentials

---

# HTTP/WebSocket Transport

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# HTTP/WebSocket Transport

HTTP and WebSocket transports enable remote mDoc presentations over the network. These are used with TO_APP (reverse) engagement for online verification scenarios.

## Use Cases

Remote transports are used for:

- Online identity verification during account registration
- Remote document verification for digital services
- Integration with OID4VP presentation flows
- Server-based verification without physical proximity

## TO_APP Engagement with HTTP

The TO_APP engagement type uses HTTP-based retrieval:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val engagementManager = session.component.mdocEngagementManager

// Handle incoming mdoc:// URI from verifier
fun handleIncomingUri(uri: String) {
    lifecycleScope.launch {
        val result = engagementManager.toApp(
            mdocUri = uri,
            autoStart = true
        )

        when (result) {
            is IdkResult.Success -> {
                val engagement = result.value
                handleEngagement(engagement)
            }
            is IdkResult.Failure -> {
                showError(result.error)
            }
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let engagementManager = session.component.mdocEngagementManager

// Handle incoming mdoc:// URI from verifier
func handleIncomingUri(uri: String) async {
    let result = engagementManager.toApp(
        mdocUri: uri,
        autoStart: true
    )

    switch result {
    case .success(let engagement):
        await handleEngagement(engagement: engagement)
    case .failure(let error):
        showError(error: error)
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## URI Scheme Patterns

The `toApp()` method supports three URI patterns:

| Scheme | Transport | Description |
|--------|-----------|-------------|
| `mdoc:` (opaque) | BLE/NFC | Classic reverse engagement |
| `mdoc://` (hierarchical) | REST API | Website/server retrieval |
| `mdoc-openid4vp://` | OID4VP | OAuth 2.0 integration |

## Protocol Flow

### REST API Mode

```
Holder                              Verifier Server
  │                                        │
  │  1. Parse mdoc:// URI                  │
  │                                        │
  │  2. GET /request                       │
  │────────────────────────────────────────►│
  │                                        │
  │  3. 200 OK (DeviceRequest)             │
  │◄────────────────────────────────────────│
  │                                        │
  │  4. User consent                       │
  │                                        │
  │  5. POST /response (DeviceResponse)    │
  │────────────────────────────────────────►│
  │                                        │
  │  6. 200 OK                             │
  │◄────────────────────────────────────────│
```

## Handling TO_APP Flow

Complete TO_APP flow with HTTP retrieval:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
class ToAppHandler(
    private val engagementManager: MdocEngagementManager,
    private val documentProvider: DocumentProvider
) {
    suspend fun handleUri(uri: String) {
        // Create engagement from URI
        val result = engagementManager.toApp(
            mdocUri = uri,
            autoStart = false
        )

        when (result) {
            is IdkResult.Success -> {
                val engagement = result.value

                // Monitor engagement events
                engagement.events.collect { event ->
                    when (event.state) {
                        is MdocEngagementState.Connected -> {
                            // Start transfer
                            val transferManager = engagement.start()

                            // Handle the transfer
                            val deviceRequest = transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()
                            val approved = showConsentDialog(deviceRequest)

                            if (approved) {
                                val response = transferManager.createResponse(
                                    deviceRequest = deviceRequest,
                                    documentProvider = documentProvider
                                )
                                transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(response)
                            }
                        }
                    }
                }
            }
            is IdkResult.Failure -> {
                handleError(result.error)
            }
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
class ToAppHandler {
    private let engagementManager: MdocEngagementManager
    private let documentProvider: DocumentProvider

    func handleUri(uri: String) async {
        // Create engagement from URI
        let result = engagementManager.toApp(
            mdocUri: uri,
            autoStart: false
        )

        switch result {
        case .success(let engagement):
            // Monitor engagement events
            for await event in engagement.events {
                switch event.state {
                case .connected:
                    do {
                        // Start transfer
                        let transferManager = try await engagement.start()

                        // Handle the transfer
                        let deviceRequest = try await transferManager.receiveDeviceRequest()
                        let approved = await showConsentDialog(request: deviceRequest)

                        if approved {
                            let response = try await transferManager.createResponse(
                                deviceRequest: deviceRequest,
                                documentProvider: documentProvider
                            )
                            try await transferManager.sendDeviceResponse(deviceResponse: response)
                        }
                    } catch {
                        handleError(error: error)
                    }
                default:
                    break
                }
            }
        case .failure(let error):
            handleError(error: error)
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## OID4VP Integration

For `mdoc-openid4vp://` URIs, the IDK integrates with OID4VP:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// OID4VP URIs are handled the same way
val uri = "mdoc-openid4vp://authorize?..."

val result = engagementManager.toApp(
    mdocUri = uri,
    autoStart = true
)

// The IDK handles the OID4VP protocol internally
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// OID4VP URIs are handled the same way
let uri = "mdoc-openid4vp://authorize?..."

let result = engagementManager.toApp(
    mdocUri: uri,
    autoStart: true
)

// The IDK handles the OID4VP protocol internally
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Deep Link Registration

### Android

Register to handle mDoc URIs in `AndroidManifest.xml`:

```xml
<activity
    android:name=".MdocHandlerActivity"
    android:exported="true">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
        <data android:scheme="mdoc" />
    </intent-filter>
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
        <data android:scheme="mdoc-openid4vp" />
    </intent-filter>
</activity>
```

### iOS

Register URL schemes in `Info.plist`:

```xml
<key>CFBundleURLTypes</key>
<array>
    <dict>
        <key>CFBundleURLSchemes</key>
        <array>
            <string>mdoc</string>
            <string>mdoc-openid4vp</string>
        </array>
    </dict>
</array>
```

## Monitoring Transfer State

Monitor HTTP-based transfer progress:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
engagementManager.eventHub.allEvents.collect { event ->
    when (event) {
        is MdocEngagementEvent -> {
            when (event.state) {
                is MdocEngagementState.Connecting -> {
                    showMessage("Connecting to verifier...")
                }
                is MdocEngagementState.Connected -> {
                    showMessage("Connected")
                }
                is MdocEngagementState.Transferring -> {
                    showMessage("Transferring credentials...")
                }
                is MdocEngagementState.Completed -> {
                    showMessage("Transfer complete")
                }
                is MdocEngagementState.Error -> {
                    val error = (event.state as MdocEngagementState.Error).error
                    showError("Error: ${error.message}")
                }
            }
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
for await event in engagementManager.eventHub.allEvents {
    if let engagementEvent = event as? MdocEngagementEvent {
        switch engagementEvent.state {
        case .connecting:
            showMessage(text: "Connecting to verifier...")
        case .connected:
            showMessage(text: "Connected")
        case .transferring:
            showMessage(text: "Transferring credentials...")
        case .completed:
            showMessage(text: "Transfer complete")
        case .error(let error):
            showError(text: "Error: \(error.message)")
        default:
            break
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Error Handling

Handle network errors gracefully:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
when (result) {
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        val error = result.error
        val message = when {
            error.message.contains("timeout", ignoreCase = true) ->
                "Connection timed out. Please try again."
            error.message.contains("network", ignoreCase = true) ->
                "Network error. Check your connection."
            error.message.contains("ssl", ignoreCase = true) ->
                "Security error. The connection is not secure."
            else -> error.message
        }
        showError(message)
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
case .failure(let error):
    let message: String
    if error.message.lowercased().contains("timeout") {
        message = "Connection timed out. Please try again."
    } else if error.message.lowercased().contains("network") {
        message = "Network error. Check your connection."
    } else if error.message.lowercased().contains("ssl") {
        message = "Security error. The connection is not secure."
    } else {
        message = error.message
    }
    showError(message: message)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Best Practices

When implementing HTTP/WebSocket transport:

- **Use HTTPS**: Never use plain HTTP for credential exchange
- **Handle errors gracefully**: Network requests can fail for many reasons
- **Set appropriate timeouts**: Balance user experience with reliability
- **Validate server certificates**: Ensure secure connections
- **Clean up on completion**: Close engagements when transfer completes

---

# OAuth 2.0 Client

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# OAuth 2.0 Client

The IDK provides a comprehensive OAuth 2.0 client implementation supporting authorization code flow, token management, and modern security extensions like PKCE and DPoP.

## Overview

The OAuth 2.0 client handles:

- Authorization server metadata discovery
- Authorization code flow with PKCE
- Token exchange and refresh
- DPoP token binding
- Token introspection

## Obtaining the Client

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val oauth2Client = session.component.oauth2Client
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let oauth2Client = session.component.oauth2Client
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Authorization Server Discovery

Fetch authorization server metadata:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Discover server metadata from well-known endpoint
val metadata = oauth2Client.discoverMetadata(
    issuer = "https://auth.example.com"
)

// Access discovered endpoints
val authorizationEndpoint = metadata.authorizationEndpoint
val tokenEndpoint = metadata.tokenEndpoint
val jwksUri = metadata.jwksUri

// Check supported features
val supportsPkce = metadata.codeChallengeMethodsSupported.contains("S256")
val supportsDpop = metadata.dpopSigningAlgValuesSupported.isNotEmpty()
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Discover server metadata from well-known endpoint
let metadata = try await oauth2Client.discoverMetadata(
    issuer: "https://auth.example.com"
)

// Access discovered endpoints
let authorizationEndpoint = metadata.authorizationEndpoint
let tokenEndpoint = metadata.tokenEndpoint
let jwksUri = metadata.jwksUri

// Check supported features
let supportsPkce = metadata.codeChallengeMethodsSupported.contains("S256")
let supportsDpop = !metadata.dpopSigningAlgValuesSupported.isEmpty
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Authorization Code Flow

### Starting Authorization

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Build authorization request
val authRequest = oauth2Client.buildAuthorizationRequest {
    clientId = "my-client-id"
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback"
    scopes = setOf("openid", "profile", "email")

    // PKCE is enabled by default
    usePkce = true

    // Optional: request specific claims
    claims {
        idToken {
            claim("email") { essential = true }
            claim("email_verified")
        }
    }
}

// Get the authorization URL
val authUrl = authRequest.authorizationUrl

// Open in browser or WebView
openBrowser(authUrl)

// Store state and code verifier for later
saveState(authRequest.state, authRequest.codeVerifier)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Build authorization request
let authRequest = try await oauth2Client.buildAuthorizationRequest { builder in
    builder.clientId = "my-client-id"
    builder.redirectUri = "myapp://callback"
    builder.scopes = Set(["openid", "profile", "email"])

    // PKCE is enabled by default
    builder.usePkce = true

    // Optional: request specific claims
    builder.claims { claims in
        claims.idToken { idToken in
            idToken.claim(name: "email") { c in c.essential = true }
            idToken.claim(name: "email_verified")
        }
    }
}

// Get the authorization URL
let authUrl = authRequest.authorizationUrl

// Open in browser
openBrowser(url: authUrl)

// Store state and code verifier for later
saveState(state: authRequest.state, codeVerifier: authRequest.codeVerifier)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Handling the Callback

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Parse the callback URL
val callbackUrl = "myapp://callback?code=abc123&state=xyz789"
val authResponse = oauth2Client.parseAuthorizationResponse(callbackUrl)

// Validate state matches
val savedState = loadState()
if (authResponse.state != savedState.state) {
    throw SecurityException("State mismatch - possible CSRF attack")
}

// Exchange code for tokens
val tokenResponse = oauth2Client.exchangeCode(
    code = authResponse.code,
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback",
    codeVerifier = savedState.codeVerifier,
    clientId = "my-client-id"
)

// Access tokens
val accessToken = tokenResponse.accessToken
val idToken = tokenResponse.idToken
val refreshToken = tokenResponse.refreshToken
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Parse the callback URL
let callbackUrl = "myapp://callback?code=abc123&state=xyz789"
let authResponse = try oauth2Client.parseAuthorizationResponse(url: callbackUrl)

// Validate state matches
let savedState = loadState()
guard authResponse.state == savedState.state else {
    throw SecurityError.stateMismatch
}

// Exchange code for tokens
let tokenResponse = try await oauth2Client.exchangeCode(
    code: authResponse.code,
    redirectUri: "myapp://callback",
    codeVerifier: savedState.codeVerifier,
    clientId: "my-client-id"
)

// Access tokens
let accessToken = tokenResponse.accessToken
let idToken = tokenResponse.idToken
let refreshToken = tokenResponse.refreshToken
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Token Refresh

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Refresh tokens before expiry
val newTokens = oauth2Client.refreshTokens(
    refreshToken = currentRefreshToken,
    clientId = "my-client-id"
)

// Update stored tokens
saveTokens(newTokens)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Refresh tokens before expiry
let newTokens = try await oauth2Client.refreshTokens(
    refreshToken: currentRefreshToken,
    clientId: "my-client-id"
)

// Update stored tokens
saveTokens(tokens: newTokens)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## ID Token Validation

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Validate ID token
val validationResult = oauth2Client.validateIdToken(
    idToken = tokenResponse.idToken,
    expectedIssuer = "https://auth.example.com",
    expectedAudience = "my-client-id",
    expectedNonce = savedNonce  // If nonce was used
)

if (validationResult.isValid) {
    val claims = validationResult.claims
    val subject = claims["sub"] as String
    val email = claims["email"] as String?
} else {
    throw SecurityException("ID token validation failed: ${validationResult.error}")
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Validate ID token
let validationResult = try await oauth2Client.validateIdToken(
    idToken: tokenResponse.idToken,
    expectedIssuer: "https://auth.example.com",
    expectedAudience: "my-client-id",
    expectedNonce: savedNonce  // If nonce was used
)

if validationResult.isValid {
    let claims = validationResult.claims
    let subject = claims["sub"] as! String
    let email = claims["email"] as? String
} else {
    throw SecurityError.idTokenValidationFailed(error: validationResult.error)
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Token Introspection

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Check if token is still valid
val introspection = oauth2Client.introspectToken(
    token = accessToken,
    tokenTypeHint = "access_token",
    clientId = "my-client-id",
    clientSecret = "my-client-secret"  // If required
)

if (introspection.active) {
    val expiresAt = introspection.exp
    val scopes = introspection.scope
    val subject = introspection.sub
} else {
    // Token is no longer valid
    handleInvalidToken()
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Check if token is still valid
let introspection = try await oauth2Client.introspectToken(
    token: accessToken,
    tokenTypeHint: "access_token",
    clientId: "my-client-id",
    clientSecret: "my-client-secret"  // If required
)

if introspection.active {
    let expiresAt = introspection.exp
    let scopes = introspection.scope
    let subject = introspection.sub
} else {
    // Token is no longer valid
    handleInvalidToken()
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Configuration

Configure the OAuth 2.0 client via properties:

```properties
# Authorization server
oauth2.issuer=https://auth.example.com
oauth2.client-id=my-client-id
oauth2.client-secret=my-client-secret

# Redirect URI
oauth2.redirect-uri=myapp://callback

# Token settings
oauth2.token.refresh.margin.seconds=60

# Security features
oauth2.pkce.enabled=true
oauth2.dpop.enabled=false
```

## Error Handling

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
try {
    val tokens = oauth2Client.exchangeCode(code, redirectUri, codeVerifier, clientId)
} catch (e: OAuth2Exception) {
    when (e.error) {
        "invalid_grant" -> showError("Authorization expired. Please try again.")
        "invalid_client" -> showError("Client authentication failed.")
        "invalid_request" -> showError("Invalid request: ${e.errorDescription}")
        else -> showError("OAuth error: ${e.error}")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
do {
    let tokens = try await oauth2Client.exchangeCode(
        code: code,
        redirectUri: redirectUri,
        codeVerifier: codeVerifier,
        clientId: clientId
    )
} catch let error as OAuth2Exception {
    switch error.error {
    case "invalid_grant":
        showError(message: "Authorization expired. Please try again.")
    case "invalid_client":
        showError(message: "Client authentication failed.")
    case "invalid_request":
        showError(message: "Invalid request: \(error.errorDescription ?? "")")
    default:
        showError(message: "OAuth error: \(error.error)")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

---

# Authorization Server

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Authorization Server

The IDK provides components for building OAuth 2.0 authorization servers, including token issuance, client management, and standards-compliant metadata endpoints.

## Overview

The authorization server module supports:

- Client registration and authentication
- Authorization code and token endpoints
- Token generation with configurable signing
- Metadata endpoint (`.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`)
- PKCE and DPoP validation

## Server Configuration

Configure the authorization server:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val authServer = AuthorizationServerBuilder()
    .issuer("https://auth.example.com")
    .signingKey(signingKeyPair)
    .tokenLifetime(Duration.ofHours(1))
    .refreshTokenLifetime(Duration.ofDays(30))
    .build()
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let authServer = AuthorizationServerBuilder()
    .issuer(issuer: "https://auth.example.com")
    .signingKey(key: signingKeyPair)
    .tokenLifetime(duration: 3600)  // 1 hour
    .refreshTokenLifetime(duration: 2592000)  // 30 days
    .build()
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Client Registration

Register OAuth 2.0 clients:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Register a public client (mobile app)
val mobileClient = authServer.registerClient {
    clientId = "mobile-app"
    clientType = ClientType.PUBLIC
    redirectUris = listOf("myapp://callback")
    grantTypes = setOf(GrantType.AUTHORIZATION_CODE, GrantType.REFRESH_TOKEN)
    scopes = setOf("openid", "profile", "email")
    requirePkce = true
}

// Register a confidential client (server-side app)
val webClient = authServer.registerClient {
    clientId = "web-app"
    clientSecret = generateSecureSecret()
    clientType = ClientType.CONFIDENTIAL
    redirectUris = listOf("https://app.example.com/callback")
    grantTypes = setOf(GrantType.AUTHORIZATION_CODE, GrantType.CLIENT_CREDENTIALS)
    scopes = setOf("openid", "profile", "api:read", "api:write")
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Register a public client (mobile app)
let mobileClient = try authServer.registerClient { builder in
    builder.clientId = "mobile-app"
    builder.clientType = .public_
    builder.redirectUris = ["myapp://callback"]
    builder.grantTypes = Set([.authorizationCode, .refreshToken])
    builder.scopes = Set(["openid", "profile", "email"])
    builder.requirePkce = true
}

// Register a confidential client (server-side app)
let webClient = try authServer.registerClient { builder in
    builder.clientId = "web-app"
    builder.clientSecret = generateSecureSecret()
    builder.clientType = .confidential
    builder.redirectUris = ["https://app.example.com/callback"]
    builder.grantTypes = Set([.authorizationCode, .clientCredentials])
    builder.scopes = Set(["openid", "profile", "api:read", "api:write"])
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Authorization Endpoint

Handle authorization requests:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
fun handleAuthorizationRequest(request: HttpRequest): HttpResponse {
    // Parse and validate the authorization request
    val authRequest = authServer.parseAuthorizationRequest(request)

    // Validate client
    val client = authServer.getClient(authRequest.clientId)
        ?: return errorResponse("invalid_client", "Unknown client")

    // Validate redirect URI
    if (!client.redirectUris.contains(authRequest.redirectUri)) {
        return errorResponse("invalid_request", "Invalid redirect URI")
    }

    // Validate PKCE if required
    if (client.requirePkce && authRequest.codeChallenge == null) {
        return redirectError(authRequest, "invalid_request", "PKCE required")
    }

    // At this point, authenticate the user and get consent
    // Then generate the authorization code
    val authCode = authServer.generateAuthorizationCode(
        clientId = authRequest.clientId,
        subject = authenticatedUser.id,
        scopes = approvedScopes,
        redirectUri = authRequest.redirectUri,
        codeChallenge = authRequest.codeChallenge,
        codeChallengeMethod = authRequest.codeChallengeMethod,
        nonce = authRequest.nonce
    )

    // Redirect back to client
    val redirectUrl = buildRedirectUrl(
        redirectUri = authRequest.redirectUri,
        code = authCode,
        state = authRequest.state
    )

    return HttpResponse.redirect(redirectUrl)
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
func handleAuthorizationRequest(request: HttpRequest) async throws -> HttpResponse {
    // Parse and validate the authorization request
    let authRequest = try authServer.parseAuthorizationRequest(request: request)

    // Validate client
    guard let client = authServer.getClient(clientId: authRequest.clientId) else {
        return errorResponse(error: "invalid_client", description: "Unknown client")
    }

    // Validate redirect URI
    guard client.redirectUris.contains(authRequest.redirectUri) else {
        return errorResponse(error: "invalid_request", description: "Invalid redirect URI")
    }

    // Validate PKCE if required
    if client.requirePkce && authRequest.codeChallenge == nil {
        return redirectError(request: authRequest, error: "invalid_request", description: "PKCE required")
    }

    // At this point, authenticate the user and get consent
    // Then generate the authorization code
    let authCode = try await authServer.generateAuthorizationCode(
        clientId: authRequest.clientId,
        subject: authenticatedUser.id,
        scopes: approvedScopes,
        redirectUri: authRequest.redirectUri,
        codeChallenge: authRequest.codeChallenge,
        codeChallengeMethod: authRequest.codeChallengeMethod,
        nonce: authRequest.nonce
    )

    // Redirect back to client
    let redirectUrl = buildRedirectUrl(
        redirectUri: authRequest.redirectUri,
        code: authCode,
        state: authRequest.state
    )

    return HttpResponse.redirect(url: redirectUrl)
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Token Endpoint

Handle token requests:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
fun handleTokenRequest(request: HttpRequest): HttpResponse {
    val tokenRequest = authServer.parseTokenRequest(request)

    return when (tokenRequest.grantType) {
        GrantType.AUTHORIZATION_CODE -> handleAuthorizationCodeGrant(tokenRequest)
        GrantType.REFRESH_TOKEN -> handleRefreshTokenGrant(tokenRequest)
        GrantType.CLIENT_CREDENTIALS -> handleClientCredentialsGrant(tokenRequest)
        else -> errorResponse("unsupported_grant_type", "Grant type not supported")
    }
}

private fun handleAuthorizationCodeGrant(request: TokenRequest): HttpResponse {
    // Validate authorization code
    val codeData = authServer.validateAuthorizationCode(request.code)
        ?: return errorResponse("invalid_grant", "Invalid authorization code")

    // Validate PKCE
    if (codeData.codeChallenge != null) {
        if (!authServer.validateCodeVerifier(
            codeVerifier = request.codeVerifier,
            codeChallenge = codeData.codeChallenge,
            method = codeData.codeChallengeMethod
        )) {
            return errorResponse("invalid_grant", "Invalid code verifier")
        }
    }

    // Generate tokens
    val tokens = authServer.issueTokens(
        subject = codeData.subject,
        clientId = codeData.clientId,
        scopes = codeData.scopes,
        nonce = codeData.nonce
    )

    return jsonResponse(tokens)
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
func handleTokenRequest(request: HttpRequest) async throws -> HttpResponse {
    let tokenRequest = try authServer.parseTokenRequest(request: request)

    switch tokenRequest.grantType {
    case .authorizationCode:
        return try await handleAuthorizationCodeGrant(request: tokenRequest)
    case .refreshToken:
        return try await handleRefreshTokenGrant(request: tokenRequest)
    case .clientCredentials:
        return try await handleClientCredentialsGrant(request: tokenRequest)
    default:
        return errorResponse(error: "unsupported_grant_type", description: "Grant type not supported")
    }
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Token Generation

Generate access tokens and ID tokens:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
val tokens = authServer.issueTokens(
    subject = userId,
    clientId = clientId,
    scopes = scopes,
    nonce = nonce,
    additionalClaims = mapOf(
        "email" to userEmail,
        "name" to userName
    )
)

// tokens.accessToken - JWT access token
// tokens.idToken - OIDC ID token (if openid scope)
// tokens.refreshToken - Refresh token
// tokens.expiresIn - Seconds until access token expires
// tokens.tokenType - "Bearer" or "DPoP"
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let tokens = try await authServer.issueTokens(
    subject: userId,
    clientId: clientId,
    scopes: scopes,
    nonce: nonce,
    additionalClaims: [
        "email": userEmail,
        "name": userName
    ]
)

// tokens.accessToken - JWT access token
// tokens.idToken - OIDC ID token (if openid scope)
// tokens.refreshToken - Refresh token
// tokens.expiresIn - Seconds until access token expires
// tokens.tokenType - "Bearer" or "DPoP"
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Metadata Endpoint

Serve authorization server metadata:

```kotlin
fun handleMetadataRequest(): HttpResponse {
    val metadata = authServer.getMetadata()
    return jsonResponse(metadata)
}
```

Example metadata response:

```json
{
    "issuer": "https://auth.example.com",
    "authorization_endpoint": "https://auth.example.com/authorize",
    "token_endpoint": "https://auth.example.com/token",
    "jwks_uri": "https://auth.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
    "scopes_supported": ["openid", "profile", "email"],
    "response_types_supported": ["code"],
    "grant_types_supported": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
    "code_challenge_methods_supported": ["S256"],
    "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["client_secret_basic", "client_secret_post"]
}
```

## JWKS Endpoint

Serve the JSON Web Key Set:

```kotlin
fun handleJwksRequest(): HttpResponse {
    val jwks = authServer.getJwks()
    return jsonResponse(jwks)
}
```

---

# DPoP and PKCE

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# DPoP and PKCE

The IDK supports modern OAuth 2.0 security extensions that protect against token theft and interception attacks.

## PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange)

PKCE (RFC 7636) protects the authorization code flow from interception attacks. It's essential for public clients like mobile apps.

### How PKCE Works

1. Client generates a random `code_verifier`
2. Client creates a `code_challenge` by hashing the verifier
3. Authorization request includes the challenge
4. Token request includes the original verifier
5. Server verifies that `hash(verifier) == challenge`

### Using PKCE

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// PKCE is enabled by default
val authRequest = oauth2Client.buildAuthorizationRequest {
    clientId = "my-client"
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback"
    scopes = setOf("openid", "profile")
    usePkce = true  // Default: true
    // challengeMethod = "S256"  // Default: S256
}

// The code verifier is generated automatically
val codeVerifier = authRequest.codeVerifier

// Code challenge is included in authorization URL
val authUrl = authRequest.authorizationUrl
// ...includes code_challenge and code_challenge_method parameters

// When exchanging the code, include the verifier
val tokens = oauth2Client.exchangeCode(
    code = authorizationCode,
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback",
    codeVerifier = codeVerifier,  // Must match the challenge
    clientId = "my-client"
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// PKCE is enabled by default
let authRequest = try await oauth2Client.buildAuthorizationRequest { builder in
    builder.clientId = "my-client"
    builder.redirectUri = "myapp://callback"
    builder.scopes = Set(["openid", "profile"])
    builder.usePkce = true  // Default: true
    // builder.challengeMethod = "S256"  // Default: S256
}

// The code verifier is generated automatically
let codeVerifier = authRequest.codeVerifier

// Code challenge is included in authorization URL
let authUrl = authRequest.authorizationUrl
// ...includes code_challenge and code_challenge_method parameters

// When exchanging the code, include the verifier
let tokens = try await oauth2Client.exchangeCode(
    code: authorizationCode,
    redirectUri: "myapp://callback",
    codeVerifier: codeVerifier,  // Must match the challenge
    clientId: "my-client"
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### PKCE Challenge Methods

| Method | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| S256 | SHA-256 hash (recommended) |
| plain | No transformation (not recommended) |

Always use S256 unless the server only supports plain.

## DPoP (Demonstration of Proof of Possession)

DPoP (RFC 9449) binds access tokens to a specific client by requiring proof of key possession for each request.

### How DPoP Works

1. Client generates a DPoP key pair
2. Token request includes a DPoP proof JWT
3. Server issues a DPoP-bound access token
4. Each API request includes a fresh DPoP proof
5. Resource server verifies the token is bound to the proof

### Enabling DPoP

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Generate or retrieve a DPoP key
val dpopKey = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ES256,
    keyId = "dpop-key"
)

// Build authorization request with DPoP
val authRequest = oauth2Client.buildAuthorizationRequest {
    clientId = "my-client"
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback"
    scopes = setOf("openid", "api:read")
    useDpop = true
    dpopKey = dpopKey
}

// Exchange code with DPoP proof
val tokens = oauth2Client.exchangeCodeWithDpop(
    code = authorizationCode,
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback",
    codeVerifier = codeVerifier,
    clientId = "my-client",
    dpopKey = dpopKey,
    tokenEndpoint = "https://auth.example.com/token"
)

// The access token is now DPoP-bound
// tokens.tokenType == "DPoP"
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Generate or retrieve a DPoP key
let dpopKey = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alg: .es256,
    keyId: "dpop-key"
)

// Build authorization request with DPoP
let authRequest = try await oauth2Client.buildAuthorizationRequest { builder in
    builder.clientId = "my-client"
    builder.redirectUri = "myapp://callback"
    builder.scopes = Set(["openid", "api:read"])
    builder.useDpop = true
    builder.dpopKey = dpopKey
}

// Exchange code with DPoP proof
let tokens = try await oauth2Client.exchangeCodeWithDpop(
    code: authorizationCode,
    redirectUri: "myapp://callback",
    codeVerifier: codeVerifier,
    clientId: "my-client",
    dpopKey: dpopKey,
    tokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/token"
)

// The access token is now DPoP-bound
// tokens.tokenType == "DPoP"
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Making DPoP-Protected Requests

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Create a DPoP proof for each request
val dpopProof = oauth2Client.createDpopProof(
    key = dpopKey,
    httpMethod = "GET",
    httpUri = "https://api.example.com/resource",
    accessToken = tokens.accessToken  // Optional: for token binding
)

// Include both the token and proof in the request
val request = HttpRequest.builder()
    .url("https://api.example.com/resource")
    .header("Authorization", "DPoP ${tokens.accessToken}")
    .header("DPoP", dpopProof)
    .build()

val response = httpClient.execute(request)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Create a DPoP proof for each request
let dpopProof = try await oauth2Client.createDpopProof(
    key: dpopKey,
    httpMethod: "GET",
    httpUri: "https://api.example.com/resource",
    accessToken: tokens.accessToken  // Optional: for token binding
)

// Include both the token and proof in the request
var request = URLRequest(url: URL(string: "https://api.example.com/resource")!)
request.setValue("DPoP \(tokens.accessToken)", forHTTPHeaderField: "Authorization")
request.setValue(dpopProof, forHTTPHeaderField: "DPoP")

let response = try await urlSession.data(for: request)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### DPoP Proof Structure

A DPoP proof is a JWT with these claims:

```json
{
    "typ": "dpop+jwt",
    "alg": "ES256",
    "jwk": { /* public key */ }
}
{
    "jti": "unique-id",
    "htm": "POST",
    "htu": "https://auth.example.com/token",
    "iat": 1234567890,
    "ath": "base64url(sha256(access_token))"  // If binding to token
}
```

### DPoP Nonce Handling

Some servers require a nonce in DPoP proofs:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
try {
    val tokens = oauth2Client.exchangeCodeWithDpop(...)
} catch (e: DpopNonceRequiredException) {
    // Server provided a nonce, retry with it
    val tokens = oauth2Client.exchangeCodeWithDpop(
        code = authorizationCode,
        redirectUri = "myapp://callback",
        codeVerifier = codeVerifier,
        clientId = "my-client",
        dpopKey = dpopKey,
        tokenEndpoint = "https://auth.example.com/token",
        dpopNonce = e.nonce  // Use the provided nonce
    )
}
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
do {
    let tokens = try await oauth2Client.exchangeCodeWithDpop(...)
} catch let error as DpopNonceRequiredException {
    // Server provided a nonce, retry with it
    let tokens = try await oauth2Client.exchangeCodeWithDpop(
        code: authorizationCode,
        redirectUri: "myapp://callback",
        codeVerifier: codeVerifier,
        clientId: "my-client",
        dpopKey: dpopKey,
        tokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/token",
        dpopNonce: error.nonce  // Use the provided nonce
    )
}
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Combining PKCE and DPoP

For maximum security, use both PKCE and DPoP:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
    <TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/kotlin">

```kotlin
// Generate DPoP key
val dpopKey = keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alg = SignatureAlgorithm.ES256,
    keyId = "dpop-key"
)

// Authorization request with both
val authRequest = oauth2Client.buildAuthorizationRequest {
    clientId = "my-client"
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback"
    scopes = setOf("openid", "api:read")
    usePkce = true   // Protect authorization code
    useDpop = true   // Bind tokens to key
    dpopKey = dpopKey
}

// After callback, exchange with both protections
val tokens = oauth2Client.exchangeCodeWithDpop(
    code = authorizationCode,
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback",
    codeVerifier = authRequest.codeVerifier,  // PKCE
    clientId = "my-client",
    dpopKey = dpopKey,  // DPoP
    tokenEndpoint = "https://auth.example.com/token"
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Generate DPoP key
let dpopKey = try await keyManager.generateKeyAsync(
    alg: .es256,
    keyId: "dpop-key"
)

// Authorization request with both
let authRequest = try await oauth2Client.buildAuthorizationRequest { builder in
    builder.clientId = "my-client"
    builder.redirectUri = "myapp://callback"
    builder.scopes = Set(["openid", "api:read"])
    builder.usePkce = true   // Protect authorization code
    builder.useDpop = true   // Bind tokens to key
    builder.dpopKey = dpopKey
}

// After callback, exchange with both protections
let tokens = try await oauth2Client.exchangeCodeWithDpop(
    code: authorizationCode,
    redirectUri: "myapp://callback",
    codeVerifier: authRequest.codeVerifier,  // PKCE
    clientId: "my-client",
    dpopKey: dpopKey,  // DPoP
    tokenEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/token"
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Best Practices

Always use PKCE for public clients. This protects against authorization code interception.

Use S256 challenge method. Plain challenge method provides no security benefit.

Consider DPoP for high-security scenarios. DPoP prevents token theft even if the token is leaked.

Protect DPoP keys appropriately. Use hardware-backed storage when available.

Handle nonce requirements gracefully. Some servers require nonces; be prepared to retry.

Generate fresh proofs for each request. Reusing DPoP proofs is a security risk.

---

# JWT Validation

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# JWT Validation

The IDK provides a flexible JWT validation framework for validating access tokens from OAuth 2.0 authorization servers. The validation module supports JWKS-based signature verification, claims validation, and integrates with the IDK's key management system.

## Modules

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-oauth2-jwt-validation-api` | Validation interfaces and models |
| `lib-oauth2-jwt-validation-impl` | Default implementation with JWKS support |

:::note EDK Framework Integration
For Ktor and Spring Boot integrations, see the EDK documentation:
- `lib-oauth2-jwt-validation-ktor` - Ktor server plugin
- `lib-oauth2-jwt-validation-spring` - Spring Boot auto-configuration
:::

## Installation

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-oauth2-jwt-validation-api:0.13.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-oauth2-jwt-validation-impl:0.13.0")
}
```

## Core Concepts

### JwtValidator

The main interface for validating JWTs:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.oauth2.jwt.validation.JwtValidator
import com.sphereon.oauth2.jwt.validation.JwtValidationResult

val validator: JwtValidator = sessionComponent.jwtValidator

val result = validator.validate(accessToken)
when (result) {
    is JwtValidationResult.Valid -> {
        val claims = result.claims
        val subject = claims.subject
        val scopes = claims.getStringListClaim("scope")
        // Token is valid, proceed with request
    }
    is JwtValidationResult.Invalid -> {
        val error = result.error
        // Token validation failed
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonIDK

let validator = sessionComponent.jwtValidator

let result = try await validator.validate(accessToken: accessToken)
switch result {
case .valid(let claims):
    let subject = claims.subject
    let scopes = claims.getStringListClaim(name: "scope")
    // Token is valid, proceed with request
case .invalid(let error):
    // Token validation failed
    break
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Validation Options

Configure validation behavior:

```kotlin
data class JwtValidationOptions(
    val issuer: String?,                    // Expected issuer (iss claim)
    val audience: String?,                  // Expected audience (aud claim)
    val clockSkewSeconds: Long = 60,        // Tolerance for exp/nbf checks
    val requiredClaims: List<String> = emptyList(),  // Claims that must be present
    val validateSignature: Boolean = true,  // Verify cryptographic signature
    val validateExpiration: Boolean = true, // Check exp claim
    val validateNotBefore: Boolean = true   // Check nbf claim
)
```

## JWKS Integration

The validator fetches and caches JSON Web Key Sets from the authorization server:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.oauth2.jwt.validation.JwksJwtValidator
import com.sphereon.oauth2.jwt.validation.JwksConfig

val jwksConfig = JwksConfig(
    jwksUri = "https://auth.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
    cacheDurationSeconds = 3600,    // Cache keys for 1 hour
    refreshBeforeExpiry = 300,      // Refresh 5 minutes before expiry
    maxRetries = 3,
    retryDelayMs = 1000
)

val validator = JwksJwtValidator(
    jwksConfig = jwksConfig,
    httpClient = httpClient,
    options = JwtValidationOptions(
        issuer = "https://auth.example.com",
        audience = "my-api"
    )
)
```

### Key Rotation

The JWKS validator automatically handles key rotation by:

1. Caching fetched keys with configurable TTL
2. Refreshing keys before cache expiration
3. Retrying fetch on validation failure with unknown key ID

```kotlin
// When a token uses an unknown key ID, the validator will:
// 1. Attempt to refresh JWKS from the server
// 2. Retry validation with the new keys
// 3. Fail only if the key is still not found
```

## Claims Access

Access validated claims with type-safe methods:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val claims = result.claims

// Standard claims
val issuer: String? = claims.issuer
val subject: String? = claims.subject
val audience: List<String>? = claims.audience
val expirationTime: Instant? = claims.expirationTime
val issuedAt: Instant? = claims.issuedAt
val notBefore: Instant? = claims.notBefore
val jwtId: String? = claims.jwtId

// Custom claims
val userId: String? = claims.getStringClaim("user_id")
val roles: List<String>? = claims.getStringListClaim("roles")
val metadata: Map<String, Any>? = claims.getObjectClaim("metadata")
val isAdmin: Boolean? = claims.getBooleanClaim("is_admin")
val score: Long? = claims.getLongClaim("score")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let claims = result.claims

// Standard claims
let issuer = claims.issuer
let subject = claims.subject
let audience = claims.audience
let expirationTime = claims.expirationTime
let issuedAt = claims.issuedAt

// Custom claims
let userId = claims.getStringClaim(name: "user_id")
let roles = claims.getStringListClaim(name: "roles")
let isAdmin = claims.getBooleanClaim(name: "is_admin")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Validation Errors

Handle specific validation failures:

```kotlin
sealed class JwtValidationError {
    object Expired : JwtValidationError()
    object NotYetValid : JwtValidationError()
    object InvalidSignature : JwtValidationError()
    object InvalidIssuer : JwtValidationError()
    object InvalidAudience : JwtValidationError()
    object MalformedToken : JwtValidationError()
    data class MissingClaim(val claim: String) : JwtValidationError()
    data class KeyNotFound(val keyId: String) : JwtValidationError()
    data class JwksFetchFailed(val cause: Throwable) : JwtValidationError()
}

when (val error = result.error) {
    is JwtValidationError.Expired -> {
        // Token has expired, client should refresh
        respondUnauthorized("Token expired")
    }
    is JwtValidationError.InvalidSignature -> {
        // Possible tampering or wrong issuer
        respondUnauthorized("Invalid signature")
    }
    is JwtValidationError.MissingClaim -> {
        // Required claim not present
        respondUnauthorized("Missing claim: ${error.claim}")
    }
    else -> {
        respondUnauthorized("Token validation failed")
    }
}
```

## Configuration

Configure JWT validation via settings:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.conf.settings.SettingsBuilder

val settings = SettingsBuilder {
    oauth2 {
        jwt {
            validation {
                issuer = "https://auth.example.com"
                audience = "my-api"
                clockSkewSeconds = 60
                requiredClaims = listOf("sub", "scope")
            }
            jwks {
                uri = "https://auth.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json"
                cacheDurationSeconds = 3600
                refreshBeforeExpiry = 300
            }
        }
    }
}
```

## Best Practices

**Always validate signatures.** Never disable signature validation in production.

**Configure appropriate clock skew.** Allow 30-60 seconds to handle clock drift between systems.

**Require essential claims.** Specify claims that must be present for your authorization logic.

**Handle JWKS fetch failures gracefully.** Cache keys and implement fallback behavior when the auth server is unavailable.

**Log validation failures.** Monitor for patterns that might indicate attacks or misconfiguration.

---

# OID4VP Holder

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# OID4VP Holder

The OID4VP holder component enables wallet applications to receive and respond to credential presentation requests. This guide covers parsing authorization requests, resolving verifier identity, creating presentations, and submitting responses.

## Obtaining the Holder

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val holder: Oid4vpHolder = session.component.oid4vpHolder
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let holder: Oid4vpHolder = session.component.oid4vpHolder
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Processing Authorization Requests

When a user scans a QR code or follows a deep link, the wallet receives an authorization request URI. Processing involves parsing, resolving, and validating the request.

### Parsing the Request

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Parse the incoming authorization request
val parseResult = holder.parseAuthorizationRequest(
    requestUri = "openid4vp://authorize?client_id=https://verifier.example.com&...",
    walletConfig = WalletConfig(
        audience = "https://wallet.example.com",
        decryptionKey = null  // For encrypted request objects (JWE)
    )
)

if (parseResult.isOk) {
    val authRequest = parseResult.value

    // Access request details
    val clientId = authRequest.clientId
    val nonce = authRequest.nonce
    val state = authRequest.state
    val responseUri = authRequest.responseUri
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Parse the incoming authorization request
let parseResult = try await holder.parseAuthorizationRequest(
    requestUri: "openid4vp://authorize?client_id=https://verifier.example.com&...",
    walletConfig: WalletConfig(
        audience: "https://wallet.example.com",
        decryptionKey: nil  // For encrypted request objects (JWE)
    )
)

if parseResult.isOk {
    let authRequest = parseResult.value

    // Access request details
    let clientId = authRequest.clientId
    let nonce = authRequest.nonce
    let state = authRequest.state
    let responseUri = authRequest.responseUri
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Resolving the Request

After parsing, resolve the request to fetch verifier metadata and validate the client identity:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val resolveResult = holder.resolveAuthorizationRequest(authRequest)

if (resolveResult.isOk) {
    val resolved = resolveResult.value

    // Access the DCQL query
    val dcqlQuery = resolved.dcqlQuery

    // Get verifier information for UI display
    val verifierInfo = resolved.verifierInfo
    println("Verifier: ${verifierInfo.displayName}")
    println("Client ID: ${verifierInfo.clientId}")
    println("Scheme: ${verifierInfo.clientIdScheme}")
    println("Valid: ${verifierInfo.clientIdValid}")

    // Check for validation errors
    if (verifierInfo.clientIdValidationErrors.isNotEmpty()) {
        println("Warnings: ${verifierInfo.clientIdValidationErrors}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let resolveResult = try await holder.resolveAuthorizationRequest(
    request: authRequest
)

if resolveResult.isOk {
    let resolved = resolveResult.value

    // Access the DCQL query
    let dcqlQuery = resolved.dcqlQuery

    // Get verifier information for UI display
    let verifierInfo = resolved.verifierInfo
    print("Verifier: \(verifierInfo.displayName ?? "")")
    print("Client ID: \(verifierInfo.clientId)")
    print("Scheme: \(verifierInfo.clientIdScheme)")
    print("Valid: \(verifierInfo.clientIdValid)")

    // Check for validation errors
    if !verifierInfo.clientIdValidationErrors.isEmpty {
        print("Warnings: \(verifierInfo.clientIdValidationErrors)")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Building the Consent UI

Use the resolved request to build the consent UI showing what the verifier is requesting:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Display verifier information
val verifierInfo = resolved.verifierInfo
displayVerifierCard(
    name = verifierInfo.displayName ?: verifierInfo.clientId,
    logo = verifierInfo.logoUri,
    trusted = verifierInfo.clientIdValid
)

// Display requested credentials from DCQL query
resolved.dcqlQuery?.credentials?.forEach { credentialQuery ->
    println("Credential: ${credentialQuery.id}")
    println("Format: ${credentialQuery.format}")

    // Show requested claims
    credentialQuery.claims?.forEach { claim ->
        println("  Claim: ${claim.path.joinToString(".")}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Display verifier information
let verifierInfo = resolved.verifierInfo
displayVerifierCard(
    name: verifierInfo.displayName ?? verifierInfo.clientId,
    logo: verifierInfo.logoUri,
    trusted: verifierInfo.clientIdValid
)

// Display requested credentials from DCQL query
for credentialQuery in resolved.dcqlQuery?.credentials ?? [] {
    print("Credential: \(credentialQuery.id)")
    print("Format: \(credentialQuery.format ?? "")")

    // Show requested claims
    for claim in credentialQuery.claims ?? [] {
        print("  Claim: \(claim.path.joined(separator: "."))")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Creating the Response

After user consent, create the authorization response with selected credentials:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Build list of selected credentials
val selectedCredentials = listOf(
    SelectedCredential(
        credentialQueryId = "identity_credential",  // Matches DCQL query ID
        credentialId = "wallet-cred-001",           // Local wallet ID
        presentation = sdJwtPresentation,            // Serialized presentation
        format = "dc+sd-jwt",
        disclosedClaims = mapOf(
            "given_name" to "John",
            "family_name" to "Doe"
        )
    )
)

// Create the authorization response
val responseResult = holder.createAuthorizationResponse(
    request = resolved,
    selectedCredentials = selectedCredentials
)

if (responseResult.isOk) {
    val response = responseResult.value
    // response.vpToken contains the VP token for submission
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Build list of selected credentials
let selectedCredentials = [
    SelectedCredential(
        credentialQueryId: "identity_credential",  // Matches DCQL query ID
        credentialId: "wallet-cred-001",           // Local wallet ID
        presentation: sdJwtPresentation,            // Serialized presentation
        format: "dc+sd-jwt",
        disclosedClaims: [
            "given_name": "John",
            "family_name": "Doe"
        ]
    )
]

// Create the authorization response
let responseResult = try await holder.createAuthorizationResponse(
    request: resolved,
    selectedCredentials: selectedCredentials
)

if responseResult.isOk {
    let response = responseResult.value
    // response.vpToken contains the VP token for submission
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Submitting the Response

Send the authorization response to the verifier:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val submitResult = holder.submitAuthorizationResponse(
    resolvedRequest = resolved,
    response = response,
    responseMode = ResponseMode.DIRECT_POST  // or null to use request default
)

if (submitResult.isOk) {
    when (val result = submitResult.value) {
        is SubmissionResult.Success -> {
            // Presentation accepted
            result.redirectUri?.let { uri ->
                // Redirect user if verifier provided a redirect
                openUrl(uri)
            }
        }
        is SubmissionResult.Error -> {
            // Verifier returned an error
            showError("Error: ${result.error} - ${result.errorDescription}")
        }
        is SubmissionResult.Redirect -> {
            // For fragment/query response modes
            openUrl(result.redirectUri)
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let submitResult = try await holder.submitAuthorizationResponse(
    resolvedRequest: resolved,
    response: response,
    responseMode: .directPost  // or nil to use request default
)

if submitResult.isOk {
    switch submitResult.value {
    case let success as SubmissionResult.Success:
        // Presentation accepted
        if let redirectUri = success.redirectUri {
            openUrl(url: redirectUri)
        }
    case let error as SubmissionResult.Error:
        // Verifier returned an error
        showError(message: "\(error.error): \(error.errorDescription ?? "")")
    case let redirect as SubmissionResult.Redirect:
        // For fragment/query response modes
        openUrl(url: redirect.redirectUri)
    default:
        break
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Complete Flow Example

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
class WalletPresentationHandler(
    private val holder: Oid4vpHolder,
    private val credentialStore: CredentialStore,
    private val sdJwtService: SdJwtService
) {
    suspend fun handlePresentationRequest(requestUri: String): PresentationResult {
        // 1. Parse the authorization request
        val parseResult = holder.parseAuthorizationRequest(
            requestUri = requestUri,
            walletConfig = WalletConfig(audience = "https://wallet.example.com")
        )

        if (!parseResult.isOk) {
            return PresentationResult.Error("Failed to parse request")
        }

        // 2. Resolve request (fetch metadata, validate client)
        val resolveResult = holder.resolveAuthorizationRequest(parseResult.value)

        if (!resolveResult.isOk) {
            return PresentationResult.Error("Failed to resolve request")
        }

        val resolved = resolveResult.value

        // 3. Check if we have matching credentials
        val matchingCredentials = findMatchingCredentials(
            resolved.dcqlQuery,
            credentialStore.getAllCredentials()
        )

        if (matchingCredentials.isEmpty()) {
            return PresentationResult.NoMatchingCredentials
        }

        // 4. Show consent UI and wait for user decision
        val userConsent = showConsentUI(
            verifier = resolved.verifierInfo,
            requestedCredentials = resolved.dcqlQuery,
            availableCredentials = matchingCredentials
        )

        if (!userConsent.approved) {
            return PresentationResult.UserDeclined
        }

        // 5. Create presentations for selected credentials
        val selectedCredentials = userConsent.selectedCredentials.map { selection ->
            val presentation = when (selection.format) {
                "dc+sd-jwt" -> createSdJwtPresentation(
                    credential = selection.credential,
                    claims = selection.disclosedClaims,
                    audience = resolved.verifierInfo.clientId,
                    nonce = resolved.request.nonce
                )
                "mso_mdoc" -> createMdocPresentation(
                    credential = selection.credential,
                    claims = selection.disclosedClaims
                )
                else -> throw UnsupportedOperationException("Unknown format: ${selection.format}")
            }

            SelectedCredential(
                credentialQueryId = selection.queryId,
                credentialId = selection.credential.id,
                presentation = presentation,
                format = selection.format,
                disclosedClaims = selection.disclosedClaims
            )
        }

        // 6. Create and submit response
        val responseResult = holder.createAuthorizationResponse(
            request = resolved,
            selectedCredentials = selectedCredentials
        )

        if (!responseResult.isOk) {
            return PresentationResult.Error("Failed to create response")
        }

        val submitResult = holder.submitAuthorizationResponse(
            resolvedRequest = resolved,
            response = responseResult.value
        )

        return when {
            !submitResult.isOk -> PresentationResult.Error("Failed to submit")
            submitResult.value is SubmissionResult.Success -> {
                PresentationResult.Success(
                    (submitResult.value as SubmissionResult.Success).redirectUri
                )
            }
            else -> PresentationResult.Error("Submission rejected")
        }
    }

    private suspend fun createSdJwtPresentation(
        credential: StoredCredential,
        claims: Map<String, String>,
        audience: String,
        nonce: String?
    ): String {
        val result = sdJwtService.presentSdJwt(
            PresentSdJwtArgs(
                sdJwt = credential.serialized,
                disclosureSelection = SdMap(
                    fields = claims.keys.associateWith { SdField(sd = true) }
                ),
                audience = audience,
                nonce = nonce,
                holderKey = credential.holderKeyInfo
            )
        )
        return result.value.presentation
    }
}

sealed class PresentationResult {
    data class Success(val redirectUri: String?) : PresentationResult()
    data class Error(val message: String) : PresentationResult()
    object NoMatchingCredentials : PresentationResult()
    object UserDeclined : PresentationResult()
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
class WalletPresentationHandler {
    private let holder: Oid4vpHolder
    private let credentialStore: CredentialStore
    private let sdJwtService: SdJwtService

    init(holder: Oid4vpHolder, credentialStore: CredentialStore, sdJwtService: SdJwtService) {
        self.holder = holder
        self.credentialStore = credentialStore
        self.sdJwtService = sdJwtService
    }

    func handlePresentationRequest(requestUri: String) async throws -> PresentationResult {
        // 1. Parse the authorization request
        let parseResult = try await holder.parseAuthorizationRequest(
            requestUri: requestUri,
            walletConfig: WalletConfig(audience: "https://wallet.example.com")
        )

        guard parseResult.isOk else {
            return .error("Failed to parse request")
        }

        // 2. Resolve request (fetch metadata, validate client)
        let resolveResult = try await holder.resolveAuthorizationRequest(
            request: parseResult.value
        )

        guard resolveResult.isOk else {
            return .error("Failed to resolve request")
        }

        let resolved = resolveResult.value

        // 3. Check if we have matching credentials
        let matchingCredentials = findMatchingCredentials(
            query: resolved.dcqlQuery,
            credentials: credentialStore.getAllCredentials()
        )

        guard !matchingCredentials.isEmpty else {
            return .noMatchingCredentials
        }

        // 4. Show consent UI and wait for user decision
        let userConsent = await showConsentUI(
            verifier: resolved.verifierInfo,
            requestedCredentials: resolved.dcqlQuery,
            availableCredentials: matchingCredentials
        )

        guard userConsent.approved else {
            return .userDeclined
        }

        // 5. Create presentations for selected credentials
        var selectedCredentials: [SelectedCredential] = []

        for selection in userConsent.selectedCredentials {
            let presentation: String

            switch selection.format {
            case "dc+sd-jwt":
                presentation = try await createSdJwtPresentation(
                    credential: selection.credential,
                    claims: selection.disclosedClaims,
                    audience: resolved.verifierInfo.clientId,
                    nonce: resolved.request.nonce
                )
            case "mso_mdoc":
                presentation = try await createMdocPresentation(
                    credential: selection.credential,
                    claims: selection.disclosedClaims
                )
            default:
                throw NSError(domain: "Unsupported format", code: -1)
            }

            selectedCredentials.append(SelectedCredential(
                credentialQueryId: selection.queryId,
                credentialId: selection.credential.id,
                presentation: presentation,
                format: selection.format,
                disclosedClaims: selection.disclosedClaims
            ))
        }

        // 6. Create and submit response
        let responseResult = try await holder.createAuthorizationResponse(
            request: resolved,
            selectedCredentials: selectedCredentials
        )

        guard responseResult.isOk else {
            return .error("Failed to create response")
        }

        let submitResult = try await holder.submitAuthorizationResponse(
            resolvedRequest: resolved,
            response: responseResult.value
        )

        guard submitResult.isOk else {
            return .error("Failed to submit")
        }

        if let success = submitResult.value as? SubmissionResult.Success {
            return .success(redirectUri: success.redirectUri)
        } else {
            return .error("Submission rejected")
        }
    }
}

enum PresentationResult {
    case success(redirectUri: String?)
    case error(String)
    case noMatchingCredentials
    case userDeclined
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Data Types

### SelectedCredential

```kotlin
data class SelectedCredential(
    val credentialQueryId: String,    // Must match DCQL credential query ID
    val credentialId: String,         // Local wallet credential identifier
    val presentation: String,         // Serialized credential presentation
    val format: String,               // e.g., "dc+sd-jwt", "mso_mdoc"
    val disclosedClaims: Map<String, String>? = null
)
```

### VerifierInfo

```kotlin
data class VerifierInfo(
    val clientId: String,
    val clientIdScheme: ClientIdScheme,
    val clientIdValid: Boolean = true,
    val clientIdValidationErrors: List<ClientIdValidationError> = emptyList(),
    val displayName: String? = null,
    val logoUri: String? = null,
    val trustRoot: String? = null
)
```

### SubmissionResult

```kotlin
sealed interface SubmissionResult {
    data class Success(
        val redirectUri: String? = null,
        val responseBody: JsonObject? = null
    ) : SubmissionResult

    data class Error(
        val error: String,
        val errorDescription: String? = null
    ) : SubmissionResult

    data class Redirect(
        val redirectUri: String
    ) : SubmissionResult
}
```

---

# OID4VP Verifier

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# OID4VP Verifier

The OID4VP verifier component enables relying party applications to request and verify credential presentations. This guide covers creating authorization requests, processing responses, and validating presented credentials.

## Obtaining the Verifier Service

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val rp: Oid4vpRpService = session.component.oid4vpRpService
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let rp: Oid4vpRpService = session.component.oid4vpRpService
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Creating Authorization Requests

Build an authorization request specifying what credentials you need from the holder using DCQL.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Build the DCQL query
val dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
    credentials = listOf(
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id = "identity_credential",
            format = "mso_mdoc",
            meta = buildJsonObject {
                put("doctype_value", "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL")
            },
            claims = listOf(
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "family_name")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "given_name")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "birth_date"))
            )
        )
    )
)

// Create the authorization request
val createResult = rp.createAuthorizationRequest(
    CreateAuthorizationRequestArgs(
        dcqlQuery = dcqlQuery,
        clientId = "https://verifier.example.com",
        responseUri = "https://verifier.example.com/callback",
        responseMode = ResponseMode.DIRECT_POST,
        nonce = generateSecureNonce(),  // Minimum 8 characters
        state = generateSessionId(),
        clientIdScheme = ClientIdScheme.REDIRECT_URI
    )
)

if (createResult.isOk) {
    val created = createResult.value
    val authRequest = created.request
    val sessionId = created.sessionId  // For correlating responses
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Build the DCQL query
let dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
    credentials: [
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id: "identity_credential",
            format: "mso_mdoc",
            meta: ["doctype_value": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"],
            claims: [
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "family_name"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "given_name"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "birth_date"])
            ]
        )
    ]
)

// Create the authorization request
let createResult = try await rp.createAuthorizationRequest(
    args: CreateAuthorizationRequestArgs(
        dcqlQuery: dcqlQuery,
        clientId: "https://verifier.example.com",
        responseUri: "https://verifier.example.com/callback",
        responseMode: .directPost,
        nonce: generateSecureNonce(),  // Minimum 8 characters
        state: generateSessionId(),
        clientIdScheme: .redirectUri
    )
)

if createResult.isOk {
    let created = createResult.value
    let authRequest = created.request
    let sessionId = created.sessionId  // For correlating responses
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Building the Request URI

Generate the URI for QR code or redirect:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val uriResult = rp.buildAuthorizationRequestUri(
    BuildAuthorizationRequestUriArgs(
        request = authRequest,
        scheme = Oid4vpUriScheme.OPENID4VP  // openid4vp://
    )
)

if (uriResult.isOk) {
    val requestUri = uriResult.value
    // requestUri: openid4vp://authorize?client_id=...&response_uri=...&dcql_query=...

    // Generate QR code for cross-device flow
    val qrBitmap = QRCodeGenerator.generate(requestUri)

    // Or use as deep link for same-device flow
    openWallet(requestUri)
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let uriResult = try await rp.buildAuthorizationRequestUri(
    args: BuildAuthorizationRequestUriArgs(
        request: authRequest,
        scheme: .openid4vp  // openid4vp://
    )
)

if uriResult.isOk {
    let requestUri = uriResult.value
    // requestUri: openid4vp://authorize?client_id=...&response_uri=...&dcql_query=...

    // Generate QR code for cross-device flow
    let qrImage = generateQRCode(from: requestUri)

    // Or use as deep link for same-device flow
    openWallet(uri: requestUri)
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Signed Request Objects

For enhanced security, create a signed authorization request:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val signedResult = rp.createSignedAuthorizationRequest(
    CreateSignedAuthorizationRequestArgs(
        request = authRequest,
        signingKey = verifierKeyInfo,
        clientIdScheme = ClientIdScheme.X509_SAN_DNS
    )
)

if (signedResult.isOk) {
    val signedRequest = signedResult.value
    // signedRequest.jwt contains the signed request object (JAR)

    // Build URI with signed request
    val uriResult = rp.buildAuthorizationRequestUri(
        BuildAuthorizationRequestUriArgs(
            request = signedRequest,
            scheme = Oid4vpUriScheme.OPENID4VP
        )
    )
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let signedResult = try await rp.createSignedAuthorizationRequest(
    args: CreateSignedAuthorizationRequestArgs(
        request: authRequest,
        signingKey: verifierKeyInfo,
        clientIdScheme: .x509SanDns
    )
)

if signedResult.isOk {
    let signedRequest = signedResult.value
    // signedRequest.jwt contains the signed request object (JAR)

    // Build URI with signed request
    let uriResult = try await rp.buildAuthorizationRequestUri(
        args: BuildAuthorizationRequestUriArgs(
            request: signedRequest,
            scheme: .openid4vp
        )
    )
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Parsing Authorization Responses

Handle the response from the holder's wallet:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// For direct_post response mode - handle POST to your callback endpoint
fun handleCallback(request: HttpRequest): HttpResponse {
    val responseParams = mapOf(
        "vp_token" to request.formParam("vp_token"),
        "state" to request.formParam("state")
    )

    // Parse the response
    val parseResult = rp.parseAuthorizationResponse(
        ParseAuthorizationResponseArgs(
            responseParams = responseParams,
            originalRequest = authRequest  // The original request for correlation
        )
    )

    if (parseResult.isOk) {
        val parsed = parseResult.value
        val vpToken = parsed.vpToken
        val state = parsed.state
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// For direct_post response mode - handle POST to your callback endpoint
func handleCallback(request: HttpRequest) async throws -> HttpResponse {
    let responseParams = [
        "vp_token": request.formParam(name: "vp_token"),
        "state": request.formParam(name: "state")
    ]

    // Parse the response
    let parseResult = try await rp.parseAuthorizationResponse(
        args: ParseAuthorizationResponseArgs(
            responseParams: responseParams,
            originalRequest: authRequest  // The original request for correlation
        )
    )

    if parseResult.isOk {
        let parsed = parseResult.value
        let vpToken = parsed.vpToken
        let state = parsed.state
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Validating Authorization Responses

Validate the response against the original request:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val validateResult = rp.validateAuthorizationResponse(
    ValidateAuthorizationResponseArgs(
        parsedResponse = parsed,
        originalRequest = authRequest,
        dcqlQuery = dcqlQuery,
        expectedNonce = originalNonce
    )
)

if (validateResult.isOk) {
    val validation = validateResult.value

    if (validation.valid) {
        // Access matched credentials
        validation.matchedCredentials.forEach { matched ->
            println("Credential: ${matched.credentialQueryId}")
            println("Format: ${matched.format}")

            // Access disclosed claims
            matched.disclosedClaims.forEach { (key, value) ->
                println("  $key: $value")
            }
        }
    } else {
        // Handle validation errors
        validation.errors.forEach { error ->
            println("Validation error: $error")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let validateResult = try await rp.validateAuthorizationResponse(
    args: ValidateAuthorizationResponseArgs(
        parsedResponse: parsed,
        originalRequest: authRequest,
        dcqlQuery: dcqlQuery,
        expectedNonce: originalNonce
    )
)

if validateResult.isOk {
    let validation = validateResult.value

    if validation.valid {
        // Access matched credentials
        for matched in validation.matchedCredentials {
            print("Credential: \(matched.credentialQueryId)")
            print("Format: \(matched.format)")

            // Access disclosed claims
            for (key, value) in matched.disclosedClaims {
                print("  \(key): \(value)")
            }
        }
    } else {
        // Handle validation errors
        for error in validation.errors {
            print("Validation error: \(error)")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Verifying Holder Binding

Verify cryptographic holder binding for each credential:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// For each matched credential, verify holder binding
for (matched in validation.matchedCredentials) {
    val bindingResult = rp.verifyHolderBinding(
        VerifyHolderBindingArgs(
            presentation = matched.presentation,
            format = matched.format,
            expectedNonce = originalNonce,
            expectedAudience = "https://verifier.example.com"
        )
    )

    if (bindingResult.isOk) {
        val binding = bindingResult.value

        if (binding.verified) {
            println("Holder binding verified for ${matched.credentialQueryId}")
            println("Signature valid: ${binding.signatureValid}")
            println("Nonce valid: ${binding.nonceValid}")
            println("Audience valid: ${binding.audienceValid}")

            // For SD-JWT, also check sd_hash
            binding.sdHashValid?.let { sdHashValid ->
                println("SD Hash valid: $sdHashValid")
            }
        } else {
            println("Holder binding failed: ${binding.errors}")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// For each matched credential, verify holder binding
for matched in validation.matchedCredentials {
    let bindingResult = try await rp.verifyHolderBinding(
        args: VerifyHolderBindingArgs(
            presentation: matched.presentation,
            format: matched.format,
            expectedNonce: originalNonce,
            expectedAudience: "https://verifier.example.com"
        )
    )

    if bindingResult.isOk {
        let binding = bindingResult.value

        if binding.verified {
            print("Holder binding verified for \(matched.credentialQueryId)")
            print("Signature valid: \(binding.signatureValid)")
            print("Nonce valid: \(binding.nonceValid)")
            print("Audience valid: \(binding.audienceValid)")

            // For SD-JWT, also check sd_hash
            if let sdHashValid = binding.sdHashValid {
                print("SD Hash valid: \(sdHashValid)")
            }
        } else {
            print("Holder binding failed: \(binding.errors)")
        }
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Response Code Protection

For `direct_post` mode, use response codes to protect against response theft:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Backend receives direct_post response
fun handleDirectPost(request: HttpRequest): HttpResponse {
    val responseParams = mapOf(
        "vp_token" to request.formParam("vp_token"),
        "state" to request.formParam("state")
    )

    // Handle response and generate response code
    val handleResult = rp.handleDirectPostResponse(
        HandleDirectPostResponseArgs(
            responseParams = responseParams,
            originalRequest = authRequest,
            redirectUri = "https://frontend.example.com/callback",
            responseCodeTtlSeconds = 300  // 5 minutes
        )
    )

    if (handleResult.isOk) {
        val handled = handleResult.value
        // Return redirect with response_code
        // Browser redirects to: https://frontend.example.com/callback?response_code=xxx
        return HttpResponse.redirect(handled.redirectUri)
    }
}

// Frontend retrieves the actual response using the code
fun retrieveResponse(responseCode: String) {
    val retrieveResult = rp.retrieveAuthorizationResponse(
        RetrieveAuthorizationResponseArgs(
            responseCode = responseCode,
            markAsUsed = true  // Single use
        )
    )

    if (retrieveResult.isOk) {
        val response = retrieveResult.value
        // Now validate the response
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Backend receives direct_post response
func handleDirectPost(request: HttpRequest) async throws -> HttpResponse {
    let responseParams = [
        "vp_token": request.formParam(name: "vp_token"),
        "state": request.formParam(name: "state")
    ]

    // Handle response and generate response code
    let handleResult = try await rp.handleDirectPostResponse(
        args: HandleDirectPostResponseArgs(
            responseParams: responseParams,
            originalRequest: authRequest,
            redirectUri: "https://frontend.example.com/callback",
            responseCodeTtlSeconds: 300  // 5 minutes
        )
    )

    if handleResult.isOk {
        let handled = handleResult.value
        // Return redirect with response_code
        return HttpResponse.redirect(url: handled.redirectUri)
    }
}

// Frontend retrieves the actual response using the code
func retrieveResponse(responseCode: String) async throws {
    let retrieveResult = try await rp.retrieveAuthorizationResponse(
        args: RetrieveAuthorizationResponseArgs(
            responseCode: responseCode,
            markAsUsed: true  // Single use
        )
    )

    if retrieveResult.isOk {
        let response = retrieveResult.value
        // Now validate the response
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Complete Flow Example

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
class VerifierService(
    private val rp: Oid4vpRpService
) {
    private val sessionStore = mutableMapOf<String, VerificationSession>()

    // Step 1: Create authorization request
    suspend fun startVerification(): String {
        val nonce = generateSecureNonce()
        val state = generateSessionId()

        val dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
            credentials = listOf(
                DcqlCredentialQuery(
                    id = "identity",
                    format = "dc+sd-jwt",
                    claims = listOf(
                        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("given_name")),
                        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("family_name"))
                    )
                )
            )
        )

        val createResult = rp.createAuthorizationRequest(
            CreateAuthorizationRequestArgs(
                dcqlQuery = dcqlQuery,
                clientId = "https://verifier.example.com",
                responseUri = "https://verifier.example.com/callback",
                responseMode = ResponseMode.DIRECT_POST,
                nonce = nonce,
                state = state
            )
        )

        val request = createResult.value.request

        // Store session for later validation
        sessionStore[state] = VerificationSession(
            request = request,
            dcqlQuery = dcqlQuery,
            nonce = nonce
        )

        // Build URI for QR code
        val uriResult = rp.buildAuthorizationRequestUri(
            BuildAuthorizationRequestUriArgs(
                request = request,
                scheme = Oid4vpUriScheme.OPENID4VP
            )
        )

        return uriResult.value
    }

    // Step 2: Handle callback
    suspend fun handleCallback(vpToken: String, state: String): VerificationResult {
        val session = sessionStore[state]
            ?: return VerificationResult.Error("Unknown session")

        // Parse response
        val parseResult = rp.parseAuthorizationResponse(
            ParseAuthorizationResponseArgs(
                responseParams = mapOf("vp_token" to vpToken, "state" to state),
                originalRequest = session.request
            )
        )

        if (!parseResult.isOk) {
            return VerificationResult.Error("Failed to parse response")
        }

        // Validate response
        val validateResult = rp.validateAuthorizationResponse(
            ValidateAuthorizationResponseArgs(
                parsedResponse = parseResult.value,
                originalRequest = session.request,
                dcqlQuery = session.dcqlQuery,
                expectedNonce = session.nonce
            )
        )

        if (!validateResult.isOk || !validateResult.value.valid) {
            return VerificationResult.Error("Validation failed")
        }

        // Verify holder binding for each credential
        for (matched in validateResult.value.matchedCredentials) {
            val bindingResult = rp.verifyHolderBinding(
                VerifyHolderBindingArgs(
                    presentation = matched.presentation,
                    format = matched.format,
                    expectedNonce = session.nonce,
                    expectedAudience = "https://verifier.example.com"
                )
            )

            if (!bindingResult.isOk || !bindingResult.value.verified) {
                return VerificationResult.Error("Holder binding verification failed")
            }
        }

        // Clean up session
        sessionStore.remove(state)

        return VerificationResult.Success(
            claims = validateResult.value.matchedCredentials
                .flatMap { it.disclosedClaims.entries }
                .associate { it.key to it.value }
        )
    }
}

sealed class VerificationResult {
    data class Success(val claims: Map<String, Any?>) : VerificationResult()
    data class Error(val message: String) : VerificationResult()
}

data class VerificationSession(
    val request: AuthorizationRequest,
    val dcqlQuery: DcqlQuery,
    val nonce: String
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
class VerifierService {
    private let rp: Oid4vpRpService
    private var sessionStore: [String: VerificationSession] = [:]

    init(rp: Oid4vpRpService) {
        self.rp = rp
    }

    // Step 1: Create authorization request
    func startVerification() async throws -> String {
        let nonce = generateSecureNonce()
        let state = generateSessionId()

        let dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
            credentials: [
                DcqlCredentialQuery(
                    id: "identity",
                    format: "dc+sd-jwt",
                    claims: [
                        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["given_name"]),
                        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["family_name"])
                    ]
                )
            ]
        )

        let createResult = try await rp.createAuthorizationRequest(
            args: CreateAuthorizationRequestArgs(
                dcqlQuery: dcqlQuery,
                clientId: "https://verifier.example.com",
                responseUri: "https://verifier.example.com/callback",
                responseMode: .directPost,
                nonce: nonce,
                state: state
            )
        )

        let request = createResult.value.request

        // Store session for later validation
        sessionStore[state] = VerificationSession(
            request: request,
            dcqlQuery: dcqlQuery,
            nonce: nonce
        )

        // Build URI for QR code
        let uriResult = try await rp.buildAuthorizationRequestUri(
            args: BuildAuthorizationRequestUriArgs(
                request: request,
                scheme: .openid4vp
            )
        )

        return uriResult.value
    }

    // Step 2: Handle callback
    func handleCallback(vpToken: String, state: String) async throws -> VerificationResult {
        guard let session = sessionStore[state] else {
            return .error("Unknown session")
        }

        // Parse response
        let parseResult = try await rp.parseAuthorizationResponse(
            args: ParseAuthorizationResponseArgs(
                responseParams: ["vp_token": vpToken, "state": state],
                originalRequest: session.request
            )
        )

        guard parseResult.isOk else {
            return .error("Failed to parse response")
        }

        // Validate response
        let validateResult = try await rp.validateAuthorizationResponse(
            args: ValidateAuthorizationResponseArgs(
                parsedResponse: parseResult.value,
                originalRequest: session.request,
                dcqlQuery: session.dcqlQuery,
                expectedNonce: session.nonce
            )
        )

        guard validateResult.isOk, validateResult.value.valid else {
            return .error("Validation failed")
        }

        // Verify holder binding for each credential
        for matched in validateResult.value.matchedCredentials {
            let bindingResult = try await rp.verifyHolderBinding(
                args: VerifyHolderBindingArgs(
                    presentation: matched.presentation,
                    format: matched.format,
                    expectedNonce: session.nonce,
                    expectedAudience: "https://verifier.example.com"
                )
            )

            guard bindingResult.isOk, bindingResult.value.verified else {
                return .error("Holder binding verification failed")
            }
        }

        // Clean up session
        sessionStore.removeValue(forKey: state)

        var claims: [String: Any] = [:]
        for matched in validateResult.value.matchedCredentials {
            for (key, value) in matched.disclosedClaims {
                claims[key] = value
            }
        }

        return .success(claims: claims)
    }
}

enum VerificationResult {
    case success(claims: [String: Any])
    case error(String)
}

struct VerificationSession {
    let request: AuthorizationRequest
    let dcqlQuery: DcqlQuery
    let nonce: String
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Data Types

### CreateAuthorizationRequestArgs

```kotlin
data class CreateAuthorizationRequestArgs(
    val dcqlQuery: DcqlQuery,
    val clientId: String,
    val responseUri: String? = null,
    val redirectUri: String? = null,
    val responseMode: ResponseMode = ResponseMode.DIRECT_POST,
    val nonce: String,  // Required, minimum 8 characters
    val state: String? = null,
    val clientMetadata: ClientMetadata? = null,
    val clientIdScheme: ClientIdScheme = ClientIdScheme.REDIRECT_URI
)
```

### ValidationResult

```kotlin
data class ValidationResult(
    val valid: Boolean,
    val matchedCredentials: List<MatchedCredential> = emptyList(),
    val errors: List<String> = emptyList()
)

data class MatchedCredential(
    val credentialQueryId: String,
    val format: String,
    val presentation: String,
    val disclosedClaims: Map<String, Any?> = emptyMap()
)
```

### HolderBindingResult

```kotlin
data class HolderBindingResult(
    val verified: Boolean,
    val holderKey: String? = null,
    val bindingMethod: String? = null,
    val signatureValid: Boolean = false,
    val nonceValid: Boolean = false,
    val audienceValid: Boolean = false,
    val sdHashValid: Boolean? = null,
    val errors: List<String> = emptyList()
)
```

---

# Universal OID4VP

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Universal OID4VP

The Universal OID4VP module provides a backend-focused API for web applications and services that need to verify credentials without managing the low-level protocol details.

## Overview

While the standard [Verifier API](./verifier) gives you full control over the OID4VP protocol, the Universal API simplifies common use cases:

- **Session Management** - Automatic session creation and lifecycle
- **QR Code Generation** - Built-in QR code creation with customizable styling
- **Status Polling** - Simple endpoint to check verification status
- **Webhook Callbacks** - Receive notifications when verification completes

## Use Cases

The Universal API is ideal for:

| Scenario | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| **Web Applications** | Display QR code, poll for result, redirect on success |
| **Kiosk Systems** | Stateless verification with QR display |
| **Backend Services** | Webhook-based verification for async workflows |
| **Mobile Web** | Same-device flows with deep links |

## Architecture

<img src="/img/diagrams/oid4vp-universal-architecture.svg" alt="Universal OID4VP Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## REST Endpoints

### Create Authorization Request

Creates a new OID4VP authorization session.

```http
POST /oid4vp/backend/auth/requests
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "query_id": "age-verification",
  "client_id": "https://verifier.example.com",
  "callback": {
    "url": "https://my-app.example.com/webhook",
    "statuses": ["AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_VERIFIED"],
    "include_verified_data": true
  },
  "ttl_seconds": 600,
  "qr_code": {
    "size": 400,
    "color_dark": "#000000",
    "color_light": "#ffffff"
  }
}
```

**Request Fields:**

| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|-------|------|----------|-------------|
| `query_id` | string | Either query_id or dcql_query | Reference to pre-configured DCQL query |
| `dcql_query` | object | Either query_id or dcql_query | Inline DCQL query |
| `client_id` | string | No | Override default client ID |
| `callback` | object | No | Webhook configuration |
| `ttl_seconds` | number | No | Session TTL (default: 600) |
| `qr_code` | object | No | QR code styling options |

**Response:**

```json
{
  "correlation_id": "sess-abc123",
  "query_id": "age-verification",
  "request_uri": "openid4vp://authorize?request_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fverifier.example.com%2Foid4vp%2Frequests%2Fsess-abc123",
  "qr_code_content": "openid4vp://authorize?request_uri=...",
  "qr_code_data_uri": "...",
  "status_uri": "https://verifier.example.com/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/sess-abc123",
  "expires_at": 1704200400000,
  "status": "CREATED"
}
```

### Get Authorization Request Status

Check the current status of an authorization session.

```http
GET /oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/{correlationId}
```

**Response:**

```json
{
  "correlation_id": "sess-abc123",
  "query_id": "age-verification",
  "status": "AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_VERIFIED",
  "created_at": 1704199800000,
  "last_updated": 1704199850000,
  "expires_at": 1704200400000,
  "verified_data": {
    "credentials": [
      {
        "id": "age_over_18",
        "format": "dc+sd-jwt",
        "type": "VerifiedPerson",
        "claims": {
          "age_over_18": true,
          "given_name": "John"
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

### Delete Authorization Request

Clean up an authorization session.

```http
DELETE /oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/{correlationId}
```

## Session Status Values

| Status | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `CREATED` | Session created, waiting for wallet scan |
| `REQUEST_RETRIEVED` | Wallet has retrieved the authorization request |
| `AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_RECEIVED` | Wallet submitted response, verification in progress |
| `AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_VERIFIED` | Credentials verified successfully |
| `ERROR` | Verification failed |
| `EXPIRED` | Session timed out |

## Usage Examples

### Web Application Flow

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="kotlin" label="Kotlin/JVM">

```kotlin
// 1. Create session and get QR code
val createCommand: CreateAuthRequestEndpointCommand = session.component.createAuthRequestCommand

val result = createCommand.execute(
    CreateAuthorizationRequestInput(
        queryId = "age-verification",
        qrCodeOptions = QrCodeOptions(size = 300)
    ),
    sessionContext
)

val output = result.getOrThrow()
println("Display QR: ${output.qrCodeDataUri}")
println("Poll status at: ${output.statusUri}")

// 2. Poll for completion
val statusCommand: GetAuthRequestStatusEndpointCommand = session.component.getAuthRequestStatusCommand

while (true) {
    delay(2000)
    val status = statusCommand.execute(
        correlationId = output.correlationId,
        sessionContext
    ).getOrThrow()

    when (status.status) {
        AuthorizationSessionStatus.AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_VERIFIED -> {
            println("Verified: ${status.verifiedData}")
            break
        }
        AuthorizationSessionStatus.ERROR -> {
            println("Error: ${status.error}")
            break
        }
        AuthorizationSessionStatus.EXPIRED -> {
            println("Session expired")
            break
        }
        else -> continue
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="javascript" label="JavaScript">

```javascript
// 1. Create session and get QR code
const response = await fetch('/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
  body: JSON.stringify({
    query_id: 'age-verification',
    qr_code: { size: 300 }
  })
});

const session = await response.json();

// Display QR code
document.getElementById('qr').src = session.qr_code_data_uri;

// 2. Poll for completion
const pollStatus = async () => {
  const statusResponse = await fetch(session.status_uri);
  const status = await statusResponse.json();

  switch (status.status) {
    case 'AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_VERIFIED':
      handleSuccess(status.verified_data);
      break;
    case 'ERROR':
      handleError(status.error);
      break;
    case 'EXPIRED':
      handleExpired();
      break;
    default:
      setTimeout(pollStatus, 2000);
  }
};

pollStatus();
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Webhook Integration

Configure a webhook to receive verification results:

```kotlin
val result = createCommand.execute(
    CreateAuthorizationRequestInput(
        queryId = "kyc-verification",
        callback = CallbackConfig(
            url = "https://my-app.example.com/webhook/oid4vp",
            statuses = listOf(
                AuthorizationSessionStatus.AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_VERIFIED,
                AuthorizationSessionStatus.ERROR
            ),
            includeVerifiedData = true
        )
    ),
    sessionContext
)
```

Your webhook endpoint will receive:

```json
{
  "correlation_id": "sess-abc123",
  "status": "AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_VERIFIED",
  "verified_data": {
    "credentials": [...]
  }
}
```

## Dependencies

```kotlin
dependencies {
    // Universal OID4VP
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-openid-oid4vp-universal-impl:0.13.0")

    // Required dependencies
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-openid-oid4vp-verifier-impl:0.13.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-openid-oid4vp-dcql:0.13.0")
}
```

## Configuration

Configure default DCQL queries for reuse:

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
class Oid4vpQueryRegistry {
    val queries = mapOf(
        "age-verification" to DcqlQuery(
            credentials = listOf(
                DcqlCredential(
                    id = "age_over_18",
                    format = "dc+sd-jwt",
                    claims = listOf(
                        DcqlClaim(path = listOf("age_over_18"))
                    )
                )
            )
        ),
        "kyc-verification" to DcqlQuery(
            credentials = listOf(
                DcqlCredential(
                    id = "identity",
                    format = "dc+sd-jwt",
                    claims = listOf(
                        DcqlClaim(path = listOf("given_name")),
                        DcqlClaim(path = listOf("family_name")),
                        DcqlClaim(path = listOf("birth_date"))
                    )
                )
            )
        )
    )
}
```

## Next Steps

- [Verifier Implementation](./verifier) - Full control over OID4VP protocol
- [DCQL Queries](./dcql) - Define credential requirements
- [Holder Implementation](./holder) - Build wallet functionality

---

# DCQL Queries

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language)

DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) is the query language for specifying credential requirements in OID4VP 1.0. It provides a structured way for verifiers to express what credentials and claims they need from a holder's wallet.

## Overview

DCQL enables verifiers to precisely describe their credential requirements:

- Which credential types and formats are needed
- What specific claims must be disclosed
- Alternative credentials that can satisfy a requirement
- Trusted authorities for issuer validation

## Query Structure

A DCQL query has a hierarchical structure:

<img src="/img/diagrams/dcql-query-structure.svg" alt="DCQL Query Structure" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Basic Query

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.openid.oid4vp.dcql.*

// Create a DCQL query for an mDL credential
val dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
    credentials = listOf(
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id = "mDL",
            format = "mso_mdoc",
            meta = buildJsonObject {
                put("doctype_value", "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL")
            },
            claims = listOf(
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "family_name")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "given_name")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "birth_date")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "portrait"))
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonOid4vp

// Create a DCQL query for an mDL credential
let dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
    credentials: [
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id: "mDL",
            format: "mso_mdoc",
            meta: ["doctype_value": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"],
            claims: [
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "family_name"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "given_name"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "birth_date"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "portrait"])
            ]
        )
    ]
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## JSON Representation

The above query serializes to:

```json
{
  "credentials": [
    {
      "id": "mDL",
      "format": "mso_mdoc",
      "meta": {
        "doctype_value": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"
      },
      "claims": [
        { "path": ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "family_name"] },
        { "path": ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "given_name"] },
        { "path": ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "birth_date"] },
        { "path": ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "portrait"] }
      ]
    }
  ]
}
```

## Credential Formats

DCQL supports multiple credential formats:

| Format | Description | Meta Fields |
|--------|-------------|-------------|
| `mso_mdoc` | ISO 18013-5 mobile documents | `doctype_value`, `namespace_values` |
| `dc+sd-jwt` | SD-JWT Verifiable Credentials | `vct_values`, `sd_jwt_alg_values`, `kb_jwt_alg_values` |
| `jwt_vc_json` | JWT-encoded W3C VC | `type_values`, `alg_values` |
| `ldp_vc` | JSON-LD W3C VC | `type_values`, `proof_type_values` |

### mDoc Credentials

For ISO 18013-5 mDoc credentials, specify the document type and namespaced claims:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val mdocQuery = DcqlCredentialQuery(
    id = "driving_license",
    format = "mso_mdoc",
    meta = buildJsonObject {
        put("doctype_value", "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL")
    },
    claims = listOf(
        // Claims use namespace as first path element
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "family_name")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "given_name")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "birth_date")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "issue_date")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "expiry_date")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "issuing_country")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "document_number")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "portrait")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "driving_privileges")),

        // Age attestation claims
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "age_over_18")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "age_over_21")),

        // Domestic namespace (country-specific)
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1.US", "domestic_category"))
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let mdocQuery = DcqlCredentialQuery(
    id: "driving_license",
    format: "mso_mdoc",
    meta: ["doctype_value": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"],
    claims: [
        // Claims use namespace as first path element
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "family_name"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "given_name"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "birth_date"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "issue_date"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "expiry_date"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "issuing_country"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "document_number"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "portrait"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "driving_privileges"]),

        // Age attestation claims
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "age_over_18"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "age_over_21"]),

        // Domestic namespace
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1.US", "domestic_category"])
    ]
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### SD-JWT Credentials

For SD-JWT Verifiable Credentials, specify the credential type and claim paths:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val sdJwtQuery = DcqlCredentialQuery(
    id = "identity_credential",
    format = "dc+sd-jwt",
    meta = buildJsonObject {
        putJsonArray("vct_values") {
            add("https://credentials.example.com/identity")
        }
    },
    claims = listOf(
        // Top-level claims
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("family_name")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("given_name")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("birth_date")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("nationalities")),

        // Nested claims using path
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("address", "street_address")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("address", "locality")),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("address", "country"))
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let sdJwtQuery = DcqlCredentialQuery(
    id: "identity_credential",
    format: "dc+sd-jwt",
    meta: ["vct_values": ["https://credentials.example.com/identity"]],
    claims: [
        // Top-level claims
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["family_name"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["given_name"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["birth_date"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["nationalities"]),

        // Nested claims using path
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["address", "street_address"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["address", "locality"]),
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["address", "country"])
    ]
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Claim Configuration

### Value Constraints

Request claims with specific expected values:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val claims = listOf(
    // Claim must have this exact value
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "issuing_country"),
        values = listOf(JsonPrimitive("US"))
    ),

    // Claim must be one of these values
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "vehicle_category_code"),
        values = listOf(JsonPrimitive("A"), JsonPrimitive("B"), JsonPrimitive("C"))
    ),

    // Boolean value constraint
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "age_over_21"),
        values = listOf(JsonPrimitive(true))
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let claims = [
    // Claim must have this exact value
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "issuing_country"],
        values: ["US"]
    ),

    // Claim must be one of these values
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "vehicle_category_code"],
        values: ["A", "B", "C"]
    ),

    // Boolean value constraint
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "age_over_21"],
        values: [true]
    )
]
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Intent to Retain

Indicate whether the verifier intends to store the claim:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val claims = listOf(
    // Verifier will store this claim
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path = listOf("email"),
        intent_to_retain = true
    ),

    // Verifier will only use for verification, not store
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path = listOf("age_over_21"),
        intent_to_retain = false
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let claims = [
    // Verifier will store this claim
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path: ["email"],
        intentToRetain: true
    ),

    // Verifier will only use for verification, not store
    DcqlClaimQuery(
        path: ["age_over_21"],
        intentToRetain: false
    )
]
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Multiple Credentials

Request multiple credentials in a single query:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
    credentials = listOf(
        // Request mDL for identity verification
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id = "identity",
            format = "mso_mdoc",
            meta = buildJsonObject {
                put("doctype_value", "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL")
            },
            claims = listOf(
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "family_name")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "given_name")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "portrait"))
            )
        ),

        // Request proof of address
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id = "address_proof",
            format = "dc+sd-jwt",
            meta = buildJsonObject {
                putJsonArray("vct_values") { add("AddressCredential") }
            },
            claims = listOf(
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("street_address")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("locality")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("postal_code")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("country"))
            )
        ),

        // Request employment verification
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id = "employment",
            format = "dc+sd-jwt",
            meta = buildJsonObject {
                putJsonArray("vct_values") { add("EmploymentCredential") }
            },
            claims = listOf(
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("employer_name")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("job_title")),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("employment_status"))
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
    credentials: [
        // Request mDL for identity verification
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id: "identity",
            format: "mso_mdoc",
            meta: ["doctype_value": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"],
            claims: [
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "family_name"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "given_name"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "portrait"])
            ]
        ),

        // Request proof of address
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id: "address_proof",
            format: "dc+sd-jwt",
            meta: ["vct_values": ["AddressCredential"]],
            claims: [
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["street_address"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["locality"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["postal_code"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["country"])
            ]
        ),

        // Request employment verification
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id: "employment",
            format: "dc+sd-jwt",
            meta: ["vct_values": ["EmploymentCredential"]],
            claims: [
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["employer_name"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["job_title"]),
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["employment_status"])
            ]
        )
    ]
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Credential Sets (Alternatives)

When multiple credential types can satisfy the same requirement, use credential sets to define alternatives:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
    credentials = listOf(
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id = "mdl_age",
            format = "mso_mdoc",
            meta = buildJsonObject {
                put("doctype_value", "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL")
            },
            claims = listOf(
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.18013.5.1", "age_over_21"))
            )
        ),
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id = "age_attestation",
            format = "dc+sd-jwt",
            meta = buildJsonObject {
                putJsonArray("vct_values") { add("AgeAttestation") }
            },
            claims = listOf(
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("age_over_21"))
            )
        ),
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id = "national_id_age",
            format = "mso_mdoc",
            meta = buildJsonObject {
                put("doctype_value", "org.iso.23220.1.nid")
            },
            claims = listOf(
                DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("org.iso.23220.1", "age_over_21"))
            )
        )
    ),
    // Group them as alternatives - holder provides any ONE
    credential_sets = listOf(
        DcqlCredentialSetQuery(
            required = true,
            options = listOf(
                DcqlCredentialSetOption(credential_ids = listOf("mdl_age")),
                DcqlCredentialSetOption(credential_ids = listOf("age_attestation")),
                DcqlCredentialSetOption(credential_ids = listOf("national_id_age"))
            )
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
    credentials: [
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id: "mdl_age",
            format: "mso_mdoc",
            meta: ["doctype_value": "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"],
            claims: [
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.18013.5.1", "age_over_21"])
            ]
        ),
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id: "age_attestation",
            format: "dc+sd-jwt",
            meta: ["vct_values": ["AgeAttestation"]],
            claims: [
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["age_over_21"])
            ]
        ),
        DcqlCredentialQuery(
            id: "national_id_age",
            format: "mso_mdoc",
            meta: ["doctype_value": "org.iso.23220.1.nid"],
            claims: [
                DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["org.iso.23220.1", "age_over_21"])
            ]
        )
    ],
    // Group them as alternatives - holder provides any ONE
    credentialSets: [
        DcqlCredentialSetQuery(
            required: true,
            options: [
                DcqlCredentialSetOption(credentialIds: ["mdl_age"]),
                DcqlCredentialSetOption(credentialIds: ["age_attestation"]),
                DcqlCredentialSetOption(credentialIds: ["national_id_age"])
            ]
        )
    ]
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Combined Credentials Per Option

An option can require multiple credentials together:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Either present diploma OR (university_id AND transcript together)
val credentialSets = listOf(
    DcqlCredentialSetQuery(
        required = true,
        options = listOf(
            // Option 1: Just a diploma
            DcqlCredentialSetOption(credential_ids = listOf("diploma")),
            // Option 2: University ID AND transcript together
            DcqlCredentialSetOption(credential_ids = listOf("university_id", "transcript"))
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Either present diploma OR (university_id AND transcript together)
let credentialSets = [
    DcqlCredentialSetQuery(
        required: true,
        options: [
            // Option 1: Just a diploma
            DcqlCredentialSetOption(credentialIds: ["diploma"]),
            // Option 2: University ID AND transcript together
            DcqlCredentialSetOption(credentialIds: ["university_id", "transcript"])
        ]
    )
]
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Trusted Authorities

Constrain which issuers are acceptable:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val credentialQuery = DcqlCredentialQuery(
    id = "identity",
    format = "dc+sd-jwt",
    trusted_authorities = listOf(
        // OpenID Federation trust anchor
        DcqlTrustedAuthority(
            type = DcqlTrustedAuthority.TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION,
            values = listOf("https://federation.example.com")
        ),
        // ETSI Trusted List
        DcqlTrustedAuthority(
            type = DcqlTrustedAuthority.TYPE_ETSI_TRUSTED_LIST,
            values = listOf("https://eidas.europa.eu/TL/EN_TL.xml")
        ),
        // X.509 Authority Key Identifier
        DcqlTrustedAuthority(
            type = DcqlTrustedAuthority.TYPE_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER,
            values = listOf("0a1b2c3d4e5f...")
        )
    ),
    claims = listOf(
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("family_name"))
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let credentialQuery = DcqlCredentialQuery(
    id: "identity",
    format: "dc+sd-jwt",
    trustedAuthorities: [
        // OpenID Federation trust anchor
        DcqlTrustedAuthority(
            type: .openidFederation,
            values: ["https://federation.example.com"]
        ),
        // ETSI Trusted List
        DcqlTrustedAuthority(
            type: .etsiTrustedList,
            values: ["https://eidas.europa.eu/TL/EN_TL.xml"]
        ),
        // X.509 Authority Key Identifier
        DcqlTrustedAuthority(
            type: .authorityKeyIdentifier,
            values: ["0a1b2c3d4e5f..."]
        )
    ],
    claims: [
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["family_name"])
    ]
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Holder Binding

Require cryptographic proof that the presenter controls the credential:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val credentialQuery = DcqlCredentialQuery(
    id = "identity",
    format = "dc+sd-jwt",
    require_cryptographic_holder_binding = true,  // Default is true
    claims = listOf(
        DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("family_name"))
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let credentialQuery = DcqlCredentialQuery(
    id: "identity",
    format: "dc+sd-jwt",
    requireCryptographicHolderBinding: true,  // Default is true
    claims: [
        DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["family_name"])
    ]
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Scope-to-DCQL Mapping

The IDK supports mapping OAuth scopes to DCQL queries for simplified request flows:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.openid.oid4vp.common.ScopeRegistry
import com.sphereon.openid.oid4vp.common.ScopeDefinition
import com.sphereon.openid.oid4vp.common.ScopeResolver

// Define scope mappings
val registry = ScopeRegistry(
    definitions = listOf(
        ScopeDefinition(
            scopeValue = "com.example.identity",
            description = "Basic identity information",
            dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
                credentials = listOf(
                    DcqlCredentialQuery(
                        id = "identity",
                        format = "dc+sd-jwt",
                        claims = listOf(
                            DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("given_name")),
                            DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("family_name"))
                        )
                    )
                )
            )
        ),
        ScopeDefinition(
            scopeValue = "com.example.age_verification",
            description = "Age verification",
            dcqlQuery = DcqlQuery(
                credentials = listOf(
                    DcqlCredentialQuery(
                        id = "age",
                        format = "dc+sd-jwt",
                        claims = listOf(
                            DcqlClaimQuery(path = listOf("age_over_18"))
                        )
                    )
                )
            )
        )
    )
)

// Resolve scopes to DCQL
val resolver = ScopeResolver(registry)
val result = resolver.resolve("com.example.identity com.example.age_verification")

if (result.fullyResolved) {
    // Use merged DCQL query
    val dcqlQuery = result.dcqlQuery
    println("Resolved scopes: ${result.resolvedScopes}")
} else {
    println("Unresolved scopes: ${result.unresolvedScopes}")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonOid4vp

// Define scope mappings
let registry = ScopeRegistry(
    definitions: [
        ScopeDefinition(
            scopeValue: "com.example.identity",
            description: "Basic identity information",
            dcqlQuery: DcqlQuery(
                credentials: [
                    DcqlCredentialQuery(
                        id: "identity",
                        format: "dc+sd-jwt",
                        claims: [
                            DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["given_name"]),
                            DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["family_name"])
                        ]
                    )
                ]
            )
        ),
        ScopeDefinition(
            scopeValue: "com.example.age_verification",
            description: "Age verification",
            dcqlQuery: DcqlQuery(
                credentials: [
                    DcqlCredentialQuery(
                        id: "age",
                        format: "dc+sd-jwt",
                        claims: [
                            DcqlClaimQuery(path: ["age_over_18"])
                        ]
                    )
                ]
            )
        )
    ]
)

// Resolve scopes to DCQL
let resolver = ScopeResolver(registry: registry)
let result = resolver.resolve(scopeString: "com.example.identity com.example.age_verification")

if result.fullyResolved {
    // Use merged DCQL query
    let dcqlQuery = result.dcqlQuery
    print("Resolved scopes: \(result.resolvedScopes)")
} else {
    print("Unresolved scopes: \(result.unresolvedScopes)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Using DCQL in Authorization Requests

Pass the DCQL query when creating an OID4VP authorization request:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val rp = session.component.oid4vpRpService

val createResult = rp.createAuthorizationRequest(
    CreateAuthorizationRequestArgs(
        dcqlQuery = dcqlQuery,
        clientId = "https://verifier.example.com",
        responseUri = "https://verifier.example.com/callback",
        responseMode = ResponseMode.DIRECT_POST,
        nonce = generateSecureNonce()
    )
)

when (createResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val request = createResult.value.request
        // Build URI for QR code or redirect
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        handleError(createResult.error)
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let rp = session.component.oid4vpRpService

let createResult = try await rp.createAuthorizationRequest(
    args: CreateAuthorizationRequestArgs(
        dcqlQuery: dcqlQuery,
        clientId: "https://verifier.example.com",
        responseUri: "https://verifier.example.com/callback",
        responseMode: .directPost,
        nonce: generateSecureNonce()
    )
)

switch createResult {
case .success(let value):
    let request = value.request
    // Build URI for QR code or redirect
case .failure(let error):
    handleError(error)
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Data Types Reference

### DcqlQuery

```kotlin
data class DcqlQuery(
    val credentials: List<DcqlCredentialQuery>? = null,
    val credential_sets: List<DcqlCredentialSetQuery>? = null
)
// At least one of credentials or credential_sets must be present
```

### DcqlCredentialQuery

```kotlin
data class DcqlCredentialQuery(
    val id: String,
    val format: String? = null,
    val meta: JsonObject? = null,
    val claims: List<DcqlClaimQuery>? = null,
    val claim_sets: List<DcqlClaimSet>? = null,
    val require_cryptographic_holder_binding: Boolean = true,
    val multiple: Boolean = false,
    val trusted_authorities: List<DcqlTrustedAuthority>? = null
)
```

### DcqlClaimQuery

```kotlin
data class DcqlClaimQuery(
    val path: List<String>,
    val values: List<JsonElement>? = null,
    val intent_to_retain: Boolean? = null
)
```

### DcqlCredentialSetQuery

```kotlin
data class DcqlCredentialSetQuery(
    val required: Boolean = false,
    val options: List<DcqlCredentialSetOption>
)

data class DcqlCredentialSetOption(
    val credential_ids: List<String>
)
```

### DcqlTrustedAuthority

```kotlin
data class DcqlTrustedAuthority(
    val type: String,
    val values: List<String>
) {
    companion object {
        const val TYPE_AUTHORITY_KEY_IDENTIFIER = "authority_key_identifier"
        const val TYPE_ETSI_TRUSTED_LIST = "etsi_trusted_list"
        const val TYPE_OPENID_FEDERATION = "openid_federation"
    }
}
```

## Best Practices

**Request only necessary claims.** Minimize data collection by requesting only the claims you actually need. This respects user privacy and simplifies consent.

**Use meaningful credential IDs.** Choose descriptive IDs that help with debugging and logging, such as `identity_verification` rather than `cred1`.

**Use intent_to_retain appropriately.** Be transparent about whether claims will be stored, helping users make informed consent decisions.

**Provide alternatives with credential_sets.** When multiple credential types can satisfy a requirement, define alternatives to maximize compatibility with different wallets.

**Validate queries.** Use the DCQL validation utilities to catch errors before sending requests to wallets.

---

# OID4VCI Holder

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# OID4VCI Holder

The OID4VCI holder component enables wallet applications to receive credential offers, exchange tokens, and obtain verifiable credentials from issuers. This guide covers the full holder-side issuance flow, from parsing an offer to storing the credential.

The holder role in OID4VCI mirrors the holder role in [OID4VP](../oid4vp/overview): the entity that possesses credentials in a wallet. In the issuance lifecycle, the holder receives credentials from an issuer; in the presentation lifecycle, the holder presents them to a verifier.

## Obtaining the Holder

The holder service is the main entry point for all wallet-side OID4VCI operations. Grab it from the dependency graph once the OID4VCI module is loaded.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val holder: Oid4vciHolderService = session.graph.oid4vciHolderService
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let holder: Oid4vciHolderService = session.graph.oid4vciHolderService
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Configuration

The holder behavior is controlled through `Oid4vciHolderConfig`:

| Property | Type | Default | Description |
|----------|------|---------|-------------|
| `clientId` | `String?` | `null` | OAuth 2.0 client identifier for token requests |
| `preferredFormat` | `String?` | `null` | Preferred credential format (e.g., `dc+sd-jwt`) |
| `autoRequestNonce` | `Boolean` | `true` | Automatically fetch a `c_nonce` before creating proofs |
| `defaultDeferredPollingInterval` | `Int` | `5` | Seconds between deferred credential polling attempts |
| `maxDeferredPollingAttempts` | `Int` | `60` | Maximum number of polling attempts before giving up |
| `requireVerifiedSignedMetadata` | `Boolean` | `false` | Require cryptographic verification of signed issuer metadata |

When `autoRequestNonce` is enabled (the default), the holder automatically fetches a fresh nonce from the issuer's nonce endpoint before creating proofs. This simplifies the flow since you don't need to manage nonces manually.

When `requireVerifiedSignedMetadata` is enabled, the holder rejects issuer metadata that advertises `signed_metadata` but provides an invalid or missing signature. This is recommended for production wallets that need to verify issuer authenticity.

## Parsing Credential Offers

When a user scans a QR code or follows a deep link, the wallet receives a credential offer URI. The URI uses the `openid-credential-offer://` scheme and contains either an inline JSON payload or a reference URL pointing to one. The first step is to parse it into a structured object.

A credential offer contains three key pieces of information: the issuer identifier, the credential configuration IDs indicating which credentials are being offered, and the grant information describing how to obtain an access token. The grant object determines the rest of the flow: a pre-authorized code means the issuer has already approved issuance, while an authorization code means the holder will need to authenticate first.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Raw offer from QR code or deep link
val rawOffer = "openid-credential-offer://credential_offer=..."

val offer = holder.parseCredentialOffer(rawOffer)

// Inspect what's being offered
println("Issuer: ${offer.credentialIssuer}")
println("Credentials: ${offer.credentialConfigurationIds}")

// Check which grant types are available
offer.grants?.preAuthorizedCode?.let { grant ->
    println("Pre-authorized code available")
    println("TX code required: ${grant.txCodeRequired}")
}
offer.grants?.authorizationCode?.let { grant ->
    println("Authorization code available")
    println("Issuer state: ${grant.issuerState}")
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Raw offer from QR code or deep link
let rawOffer = "openid-credential-offer://credential_offer=..."

let offer = try await holder.parseCredentialOffer(rawOffer: rawOffer)

// Inspect what's being offered
print("Issuer: \(offer.credentialIssuer)")
print("Credentials: \(offer.credentialConfigurationIds)")

// Check which grant types are available
if let preAuth = offer.grants?.preAuthorizedCode {
    print("Pre-authorized code available")
    print("TX code required: \(preAuth.txCodeRequired)")
}
if let authCode = offer.grants?.authorizationCode {
    print("Authorization code available")
    print("Issuer state: \(authCode.issuerState ?? "")")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Resolving the Offer

After parsing, the wallet needs to discover the issuer's capabilities. Resolving the offer fetches the issuer's metadata from its `.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` endpoint. This tells the wallet what credential formats are supported, which endpoints to use, and what proof types are accepted.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val resolved = holder.resolveCredentialOffer(offer)

// Access issuer metadata
val metadata = resolved.issuerMetadata
println("Credential endpoint: ${metadata.credentialEndpoint}")
println("Nonce endpoint: ${metadata.nonceEndpoint}")

// Inspect available credential configurations
metadata.credentialConfigurationsSupported.forEach { (id, config) ->
    println("$id: format=${config.format}, scope=${config.scope}")
    config.display?.firstOrNull()?.let { display ->
        println("  Name: ${display.name}, Logo: ${display.logo?.uri}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let resolved = try await holder.resolveCredentialOffer(offer: offer)

// Access issuer metadata
let metadata = resolved.issuerMetadata
print("Credential endpoint: \(metadata.credentialEndpoint)")
print("Nonce endpoint: \(metadata.nonceEndpoint ?? "")")

// Inspect available credential configurations
for (id, config) in metadata.credentialConfigurationsSupported {
    print("\(id): format=\(config.format), scope=\(config.scope ?? "")")
    if let display = config.display?.first {
        print("  Name: \(display.name ?? ""), Logo: \(display.logo?.uri ?? "")")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

The resolved offer combines the original offer with the fetched metadata, providing everything the wallet needs to proceed with the token exchange.

## Obtaining an Access Token

No credential request will succeed without a valid access token. The token proves to the issuer that the wallet is authorized to receive the offered credentials. The method for obtaining one depends on which grant type the offer includes.

### Pre-Authorized Code Flow

This is the simplest flow. The issuer has already prepared a code, and the wallet exchanges it for a token. If the issuer requires a transaction code, the wallet must prompt the user for it first.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val grant = offer.grants!!.preAuthorizedCode!!

// If a transaction code is required, prompt the user
val txCode = if (grant.txCodeRequired) {
    promptUserForPin()  // Show PIN entry UI
} else null

val tokenResponse = holder.exchangePreAuthorizedCode(
    tokenEndpoint = resolved.tokenEndpoint,
    code = grant.preAuthorizedCode,
    txCode = txCode,
    clientId = "my-wallet-app"
)

val accessToken = tokenResponse.accessToken
val cNonce = tokenResponse.cNonce  // For proof creation
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let grant = offer.grants!.preAuthorizedCode!

// If a transaction code is required, prompt the user
let txCode: String? = grant.txCodeRequired ? await promptUserForPin() : nil

let tokenResponse = try await holder.exchangePreAuthorizedCode(
    tokenEndpoint: resolved.tokenEndpoint,
    code: grant.preAuthorizedCode,
    txCode: txCode,
    clientId: "my-wallet-app"
)

let accessToken = tokenResponse.accessToken
let cNonce = tokenResponse.cNonce  // For proof creation
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Authorization Code Flow

When the offer uses an authorization code grant, the wallet redirects the user to the authorization server for authentication. This is a three-step process: build the authorization URL, let the user log in via a browser, then exchange the resulting code for tokens. PKCE is used throughout to prevent authorization code interception.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// 1. Select the authorization server
val authServer = holder.selectAuthorizationServer(
    issuerMetadata = resolved.issuerMetadata,
    preferredAuthorizationServer = null  // Use default
)

// 2. Build the authorization URL with PKCE
val authRequest = holder.buildAuthorizationRequest(
    authorizationEndpoint = authServer.authorizationEndpoint,
    clientId = "my-wallet-app",
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback",
    scope = "openid credential_identity",
    issuerState = offer.grants?.authorizationCode?.issuerState
)
// authRequest.url - Open in browser
// authRequest.codeVerifier - Store for token exchange

// 3. After user authenticates and is redirected back
val tokenResponse = holder.exchangeAuthorizationCode(
    tokenEndpoint = authServer.tokenEndpoint,
    code = callbackCode,               // From redirect callback
    codeVerifier = authRequest.codeVerifier,
    redirectUri = "myapp://callback",
    clientId = "my-wallet-app"
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// 1. Select the authorization server
let authServer = try await holder.selectAuthorizationServer(
    issuerMetadata: resolved.issuerMetadata,
    preferredAuthorizationServer: nil  // Use default
)

// 2. Build the authorization URL with PKCE
let authRequest = try await holder.buildAuthorizationRequest(
    authorizationEndpoint: authServer.authorizationEndpoint,
    clientId: "my-wallet-app",
    redirectUri: "myapp://callback",
    scope: "openid credential_identity",
    issuerState: offer.grants?.authorizationCode?.issuerState
)
// authRequest.url - Open in browser
// authRequest.codeVerifier - Store for token exchange

// 3. After user authenticates and is redirected back
let tokenResponse = try await holder.exchangeAuthorizationCode(
    tokenEndpoint: authServer.tokenEndpoint,
    code: callbackCode,               // From redirect callback
    codeVerifier: authRequest.codeVerifier,
    redirectUri: "myapp://callback",
    clientId: "my-wallet-app"
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Interactive Authorization Exchange (IAE)

Unlike the standard authorization code flow where the user just logs in, IAE adds an extra challenge step controlled by the issuer. Some issuers require additional verification before issuing a credential. Interactive Authorization Exchange (IAE) is an OID4VCI 1.1 mechanism that allows the authorization server to challenge the holder with an interactive step, typically presenting an existing credential via OID4VP, or completing a web-based authentication flow.

This creates a "present-to-obtain" pattern: for example, a holder might need to present their national ID credential (via OID4VP) in order to receive a university degree credential (via OID4VCI).

### Interaction Types

| Type | URN | Description |
|------|-----|-------------|
| OID4VP Presentation | `urn:openid:dcp:iae:openid4vp_presentation` | Present an existing credential to prove identity |
| Redirect to Web | `urn:openid:dcp:iae:redirect_to_web` | Complete authentication in a browser |

### IAE Flow

The IAE flow is a multi-step exchange between the holder and the authorization server's IAE endpoint:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// 1. Initiate IAE using the DSL
val initiateArgs = initiateIaeArgs {
    iaeEndpoint("https://auth.example.com/iae")
    clientId("my-wallet-app")
    redirectUri("myapp://callback")
    interactionTypes(
        IaeInteractionType.OPENID4VP_PRESENTATION,
        IaeInteractionType.REDIRECT_TO_WEB
    )
    scope("openid credential_identity")
}
val iaeResult = holder.initiateIae(initiateArgs)

// 2. Handle the result
when (iaeResult) {
    is IaeHolderResult.InteractionRequired -> {
        when (iaeResult.type) {
            Oid4vciInteractionTypes.OPENID4VP_PRESENTATION -> {
                // Present a credential via OID4VP
                val vpRequest = iaeResult.openid4vpRequest!!
                val vpResponse = performOid4vpPresentation(vpRequest)

                // 3. Follow up with the VP response
                val followUpArgs = followUpIaeArgs {
                    iaeEndpoint("https://auth.example.com/iae")
                    authSession(iaeResult.authSession)
                    vpResponse(vpResponse)
                }
                val followUp = holder.followUpIae(followUpArgs)
                // followUp is another IaeHolderResult - may be AuthorizationCode or another interaction
            }
            Oid4vciInteractionTypes.REDIRECT_TO_WEB -> {
                // Redirect to browser for web-based auth
                openBrowser(iaeResult.requestUri!!)
            }
        }
    }
    is IaeHolderResult.AuthorizationCode -> {
        // Exchange the code for an access token
        val tokenResponse = holder.exchangeAuthorizationCode(
            tokenEndpoint = authServer.tokenEndpoint,
            code = iaeResult.code,
            codeVerifier = codeVerifier,
            redirectUri = "myapp://callback",
            clientId = "my-wallet-app"
        )
    }
    is IaeHolderResult.Error -> {
        showError("IAE failed: ${iaeResult.error} - ${iaeResult.errorDescription}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// 1. Initiate IAE
let iaeResult = try await holder.initiateIae(
    args: InitiateIaeArgs(
        iaeEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/iae",
        clientId: "my-wallet-app",
        redirectUri: "myapp://callback",
        interactionTypesSupported: [
            Oid4vciInteractionTypes.OPENID4VP_PRESENTATION,
            Oid4vciInteractionTypes.REDIRECT_TO_WEB
        ],
        scope: "openid credential_identity"
    )
)

// 2. Handle the result
switch iaeResult {
case let interaction as IaeHolderResult.InteractionRequired:
    if interaction.type == Oid4vciInteractionTypes.OPENID4VP_PRESENTATION {
        // Present a credential via OID4VP
        let vpRequest = interaction.openid4vpRequest!
        let vpResponse = try await performOid4vpPresentation(vpRequest)

        // 3. Follow up with the VP response
        let followUp = try await holder.followUpIae(
            args: FollowUpIaeArgs(
                iaeEndpoint: "https://auth.example.com/iae",
                authSession: interaction.authSession,
                openid4vpResponse: vpResponse
            )
        )
    } else if interaction.type == Oid4vciInteractionTypes.REDIRECT_TO_WEB {
        openBrowser(url: interaction.requestUri!)
    }

case let authCode as IaeHolderResult.AuthorizationCode:
    // Exchange the code for an access token
    let tokenResponse = try await holder.exchangeAuthorizationCode(
        tokenEndpoint: authServer.tokenEndpoint,
        code: authCode.code,
        codeVerifier: codeVerifier,
        redirectUri: "myapp://callback",
        clientId: "my-wallet-app"
    )

case let error as IaeHolderResult.Error:
    showError("IAE failed: \(error.error) - \(error.errorDescription ?? "")")

default:
    break
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

The IAE flow may require multiple rounds of interaction. Each `InteractionRequired` result includes an `authSession` token that must be passed back in the follow-up request to maintain the session. The `expiresIn` field indicates how long the session remains valid.

## Requesting a Credential

With an access token in hand, the wallet can request the credential. This involves two steps: creating a proof of possession and sending the credential request.

The proof demonstrates to the issuer that the wallet controls the key that the credential should be bound to. It is a signed JWT containing the issuer URL and the nonce from the token response. The issuer checks this signature to confirm the credential will be bound to a key the wallet actually holds, preventing credential theft if the access token were leaked.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// 1. Create the proof of possession
val proofArgs = createProofArgs {
    issuerUrl(offer.credentialIssuer)
    nonce(tokenResponse.cNonce!!)
    signingKey(walletKeyId, JwaAlgorithm.ES256)
    clientId("my-wallet-app")
}
val proof = holder.createCredentialRequestProof(proofArgs)

// 2. Request the credential
val requestArgs = requestCredentialArgs {
    endpoint(resolved.issuerMetadata.credentialEndpoint, accessToken)
    credentialConfigurationId(offer.credentialConfigurationIds.first())
    proof {
        proofType = "jwt"
        jwt = proof.jwt
    }
}
val credentialResponse = holder.requestCredential(requestArgs)

// 3. Handle the response
if (credentialResponse.credential != null) {
    // Credential issued immediately
    storeCredential(credentialResponse.credential!!)
} else if (credentialResponse.transactionId != null) {
    // Deferred issuance - credential not ready yet
    handleDeferredIssuance(credentialResponse.transactionId!!)
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// 1. Create the proof of possession
let proof = try await holder.createCredentialRequestProof(
    issuerUrl: offer.credentialIssuer,
    cNonce: tokenResponse.cNonce,
    signingKeyId: walletKeyId,          // Key to bind the credential to
    signingAlgorithm: "ES256",
    clientId: "my-wallet-app"
)

// 2. Request the credential
let credentialResponse = try await holder.requestCredential(
    credentialEndpoint: resolved.issuerMetadata.credentialEndpoint,
    accessToken: accessToken,
    configId: offer.credentialConfigurationIds.first!,
    proof: proof
)

// 3. Handle the response
if let credential = credentialResponse.credential {
    // Credential issued immediately
    storeCredential(credential)
} else if let transactionId = credentialResponse.transactionId {
    // Deferred issuance - credential not ready yet
    handleDeferredIssuance(transactionId)
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Deferred Credential Retrieval

A credential is not always ready the moment you ask for it. The issuer may need to run background checks, wait for manual approval, or perform asynchronous signing. In these cases, the issuer returns a `transactionId` instead of a credential, and the wallet must poll the deferred credential endpoint until the credential is ready. The IDK provides a flow orchestrator that handles the polling loop automatically.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val orchestrator: Oid4vciIssuanceFlowOrchestrator = session.graph.oid4vciIssuanceFlowOrchestrator

val pollArgs = pollDeferredArgs {
    endpoint(resolved.issuerMetadata.deferredCredentialEndpoint!!, accessToken)
    transactionId(transactionId)
    sessionId(sessionId)
    polling(interval = 5, maxAttempts = 60)  // 5s between attempts, give up after 5 min
}
val pollResult = orchestrator.pollDeferredCredential(pollArgs)

when (pollResult) {
    is PollDeferredCredentialResult.Ready -> {
        storeCredential(pollResult.credential)
    }
    is PollDeferredCredentialResult.Exhausted -> {
        showError("Credential issuance timed out")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let orchestrator: Oid4vciIssuanceFlowOrchestrator = session.graph.oid4vciIssuanceFlowOrchestrator

let pollResult = try await orchestrator.pollDeferredCredential(
    deferredCredentialEndpoint: resolved.issuerMetadata.deferredCredentialEndpoint!,
    accessToken: accessToken,
    transactionId: transactionId,
    interval: 5,         // seconds between attempts
    maxAttempts: 60       // give up after 5 minutes
)

switch pollResult {
case let .ready(credential):
    storeCredential(credential)
case .exhausted:
    showError("Credential issuance timed out")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

If you need more control over timing or want to integrate polling into your own scheduling logic, use the lower-level `requestDeferredCredential` method directly:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val response = holder.requestDeferredCredential(
    deferredEndpoint = resolved.issuerMetadata.deferredCredentialEndpoint!!,
    accessToken = accessToken,
    transactionId = transactionId
)

if (response.credential != null) {
    // Credential is ready
} else {
    // Still pending - try again later
    // response.interval indicates suggested wait time in seconds
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let response = try await holder.requestDeferredCredential(
    deferredEndpoint: resolved.issuerMetadata.deferredCredentialEndpoint!,
    accessToken: accessToken,
    transactionId: transactionId
)

if let credential = response.credential {
    // Credential is ready
} else {
    // Still pending - try again later
    // response.interval indicates suggested wait time in seconds
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Sending Notifications

Notifications are optional but recommended. After receiving a credential, the wallet should notify the issuer about the outcome: whether the credential was accepted, rejected, or deleted. This helps issuers track success rates and handle failures.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val notifyArgs = notifyWithRetryArgs {
    endpoint(resolved.issuerMetadata.notificationEndpoint!!, accessToken)
    notificationId(credentialResponse.notificationId!!)
    event(CredentialNotificationEvent.CREDENTIAL_ACCEPTED)
    retryPolicy(maxRetries = 3, initialBackoffMs = 1000L)
}
orchestrator.sendNotificationWithRetry(notifyArgs)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
try await holder.sendNotification(
    notificationEndpoint: resolved.issuerMetadata.notificationEndpoint!,
    accessToken: accessToken,
    notificationId: credentialResponse.notificationId!,
    event: .credentialAccepted,
    description: nil
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

The `notifyWithRetryArgs` DSL configures automatic retry with exponential backoff, which is recommended for production use. The `retryPolicy` defaults to 3 retries with 1 second initial backoff.

## End-to-End Flow Orchestration

The individual steps above give you full control, but most wallet implementations follow the same sequence. For the common case of requesting a credential through the entire pre-authorized code flow, the orchestrator provides a single method that handles token exchange, proof creation, credential request, and deferred polling:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val flowArgs = credentialFlowArgs {
    sessionId(sessionId)
    endpoint(resolved.issuerMetadata.credentialEndpoint, accessToken)
    issuerUrl(offer.credentialIssuer)
    signingKey(walletKeyId, JwaAlgorithm.ES256)
    credentialConfigurationId(offer.credentialConfigurationIds.first())
    nonceEndpoint(resolved.issuerMetadata.nonceEndpoint!!)
    deferredEndpoint(resolved.issuerMetadata.deferredCredentialEndpoint!!)
    notificationEndpoint(resolved.issuerMetadata.notificationEndpoint!!)
}
val result = orchestrator.requestCredentialWithFlow(flowArgs)

when (result) {
    is CredentialFlowResult.Immediate -> {
        storeCredential(result.credential)
    }
    is CredentialFlowResult.DeferredCompleted -> {
        storeCredential(result.credential)
    }
    is CredentialFlowResult.DeferredExhausted -> {
        showError("Issuance timed out after polling")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let result = try await orchestrator.requestCredentialWithFlow(
    tokenEndpoint: resolved.tokenEndpoint,
    credentialEndpoint: resolved.issuerMetadata.credentialEndpoint,
    deferredCredentialEndpoint: resolved.issuerMetadata.deferredCredentialEndpoint,
    preAuthorizedCode: grant.preAuthorizedCode,
    txCode: userPin,
    clientId: "my-wallet-app",
    credentialConfigurationId: offer.credentialConfigurationIds.first!,
    signingKeyId: walletKeyId,
    signingAlgorithm: "ES256",
    issuerUrl: offer.credentialIssuer
)

switch result {
case let .immediate(credential):
    storeCredential(credential)
case let .deferredCompleted(credential):
    storeCredential(credential)
case .deferredExhausted:
    showError("Issuance timed out after polling")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Session Tracking

The holder tracks issuance progress through `Oid4vciHolderSession`, which transitions through these states:

| Status | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `CREATED` | Session initialized |
| `OFFER_RESOLVED` | Issuer metadata fetched and offer validated |
| `TOKEN_OBTAINED` | Access token acquired from authorization server |
| `CREDENTIAL_REQUESTED` | Credential request sent to issuer |
| `CREDENTIAL_RECEIVED` | Credential received (immediate issuance) |
| `DEFERRED_PENDING` | Waiting for deferred credential |
| `COMPLETED` | Credential stored and notification sent |
| `FAILED` | An error occurred during issuance |

Sessions are persisted through the `Oid4vciHolderSessionStore`, allowing the wallet to resume interrupted flows after app restarts or network failures.

## Data Types

These are the primary data classes you will work with on the holder side. They are listed here for quick reference.

### CredentialOffer

```kotlin
data class CredentialOffer(
    val credentialIssuer: String,                    // Issuer identifier (HTTPS URL)
    val credentialConfigurationIds: List<String>,    // Which credentials are offered
    val grants: CredentialOfferGrants? = null        // How to obtain an access token
)
```

### CredentialResponse

```kotlin
data class CredentialResponse(
    val credential: JsonElement? = null,             // Issued credential (if immediate)
    val transactionId: String? = null,               // For deferred issuance
    val cNonce: String? = null,                      // Fresh nonce for subsequent requests
    val cNonceExpiresIn: Int? = null,                // Nonce expiry in seconds
    val notificationId: String? = null,              // For sending notifications
    val interval: Int? = null                        // Suggested deferred polling interval
)
```

---

# OID4VCI Issuer

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# OID4VCI Issuer

The OID4VCI issuer component enables credential providers to issue verifiable credentials to holders. This guide covers setting up issuer metadata using the DSL, configuring issuance policies, handling credential requests, and extending the issuer with custom format handlers and attribute contributors.

## Obtaining the Issuer Service

The issuer service is available through the IDK's dependency graph once the OID4VCI module is loaded. All issuer operations (creating offers, handling credential requests, deferred issuance) go through this service.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val issuer: Oid4vciIssuerService = session.graph.oid4vciIssuerService
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let issuer: Oid4vciIssuerService = session.graph.oid4vciIssuerService
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Issuer Metadata DSL

Issuer metadata is the JSON document that wallets fetch from `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` to discover what credentials you offer, which endpoints to call, and what proof types you accept. Without it, a holder has no way to start an issuance flow.

The IDK provides a Kotlin DSL for building issuer metadata. The DSL automatically derives standard endpoints from the issuer URL and provides a type-safe way to define credential configurations, display properties, and encryption settings.

### Basic Metadata

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val metadata = issuerMetadata("https://issuer.example.com") {
    authorizationServer("https://auth.example.com")

    credentialConfiguration("IdentityCredential", CredentialFormat.SD_JWT_DC) {
        vct = "https://issuer.example.com/identity"
        scope = "identity"
        bindingMethod("jwk")
        signingAlg(JwaAlgorithm.ES256)
        proofType(ProofType.JWT, JwaAlgorithm.ES256)

        display {
            name = "Identity Credential"
            locale = "en-US"
            logo("https://issuer.example.com/logo.png", "Issuer Logo")
            backgroundColor = "#1a365d"
            textColor = "#ffffff"
        }
    }

    display {
        name = "Example Issuer"
        locale = "en-US"
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

The `issuerMetadata` function takes the issuer URL and derives the standard endpoints automatically:
- Credential endpoint: `{issuerUrl}/credential`
- Deferred credential endpoint: `{issuerUrl}/credential_deferred`
- Notification endpoint: `{issuerUrl}/notification`
- Nonce endpoint: `{issuerUrl}/nonce`

You can override any endpoint explicitly if your deployment uses different paths.

### Multiple Credential Configurations

An issuer typically offers several credential types. Each configuration defines the format, claims, proof requirements, and display properties for one type of credential:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val metadata = issuerMetadata("https://university.example.edu") {
    authorizationServer("https://auth.university.example.edu")

    // SD-JWT credential with selective disclosure
    credentialConfiguration("UniversityDegree", CredentialFormat.SD_JWT_DC) {
        vct = "https://credentials.example.com/university_degree"
        scope = "degree"
        bindingMethods("jwk", "did:key")
        signingAlgs(JwaAlgorithm.ES256, JwaAlgorithm.ES384)
        proofType(ProofType.JWT, JwaAlgorithm.ES256)

        display {
            name = "University Degree"
            locale = "en-US"
            logo("https://university.example.edu/logo.png")
            backgroundColor = "#12107c"
            textColor = "#FFFFFF"
        }
    }

    // mDoc credential for mobile driving license
    credentialConfiguration("MobileDrivingLicense", CredentialFormat.MSO_MDOC) {
        doctype = "org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL"
        bindingMethod("jwk")
        signingAlg(JwaAlgorithm.ES256)

        display {
            name = "Mobile Driving License"
            locale = "en-US"
        }
    }

    // JWT VC JSON credential with W3C types
    credentialConfiguration("MembershipCard", CredentialFormat.JWT_VC_JSON) {
        scope = "membership"
        signingAlg(JwaAlgorithm.ES256)

        credentialDefinition {
            type("VerifiableCredential", "MembershipCredential")
        }

        display {
            name = "Membership Card"
            locale = "en-US"
        }
    }

    display {
        name = "Example University"
        locale = "en-US"
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Claim Metadata

Claim metadata tells wallets which attributes a credential contains, whether they are mandatory, and how to display them to the user. The DSL supports two styles of claim metadata, matching the OID4VCI specification versions.

**OID4VCI 1.0 style** uses map-based claims with `claim()` directly on the credential configuration:

```kotlin
credentialConfiguration("IdentityCredential", CredentialFormat.SD_JWT_DC) {
    vct = "https://issuer.example.com/identity"

    claim("given_name") {
        mandatory = true
        valueType = "string"
        display("First Name", "en-US")
    }
    claim("family_name") {
        mandatory = true
        valueType = "string"
        display("Last Name", "en-US")
    }
    claim("birth_date") {
        mandatory = true
        valueType = "string"
        display("Date of Birth", "en-US")
    }
}
```

**OID4VCI 1.1 style** uses path-based claims via `credentialMetadata`, supporting nested paths and array indices:

```kotlin
credentialConfiguration("IdentityCredential", CredentialFormat.SD_JWT_DC) {
    vct = "https://issuer.example.com/identity"

    credentialMetadata {
        display {
            name = "Identity Credential"
            locale = "en-US"
        }

        claim("given_name") {
            mandatory = true
            display("First Name", "en-US")
        }
        claim("address", "street_address") {
            mandatory = false
            display("Street Address", "en-US")
        }
        claim("nationalities", 0) // Array index path
    }
}
```

### Response Encryption

Some deployments require the credential response to be encrypted so it cannot be read by intermediaries. You can configure encryption at the issuer level (applying to all credentials) or override it per credential configuration.

Configure credential response encryption at the issuer level or per credential configuration:

```kotlin
val metadata = issuerMetadata("https://issuer.example.com") {
    // Issuer-level encryption settings
    credentialResponseEncryption {
        alg("ECDH-ES", "RSA-OAEP")
        enc("A256GCM")
        encryptionRequired = true
    }

    credentialConfiguration("SensitiveCredential", CredentialFormat.SD_JWT_DC) {
        // Per-credential encryption override
        credentialResponseEncryption {
            alg("ECDH-ES")
            enc("A256GCM")
            zip("DEF")
            encryptionRequired = true
        }
    }
}
```

### Batch Issuance

Batch issuance lets a holder request several credentials in one round trip instead of making separate requests for each one. The `maxBatchSize` value sets the upper bound on how many credentials the issuer will produce per request.

```kotlin
val metadata = issuerMetadata("https://issuer.example.com") {
    batchCredentialIssuance(maxBatchSize = 10)
    // ...
}
```

## Configuration-Driven Setup

As an alternative to the DSL, the issuer can be configured entirely through YAML configuration or environment variables, using the IDK's hierarchical configuration system. This is useful for deployments where the issuer configuration is managed externally.

### Issuer Configuration Provider

The `Oid4vciIssuerConfigProvider` interface defines what the issuer needs at runtime:

| Property | Type | Description |
|----------|------|-------------|
| `issuerIdentifier` | `String` | The issuer's HTTPS URL, used as the `credential_issuer` in offers |
| `credentialConfigurations` | `Map` | Supported credential types with their format, claims, and display info |
| `authorizationServers` | `List<String>?` | Authorization server identifiers (if different from issuer) |
| `display` | `List<DisplayProperties>?` | Issuer display information (name, logo, locale) |
| `signingKey` | `ManagedIdentifierOptsOrResult?` | Key for signing metadata JWTs |

The IDK ships two implementations:

**ConfigDrivenOid4vciIssuerConfigProvider** reads from YAML, environment variables, and the IDK settings store. It uses the DSL builders internally to construct the credential configurations from flat properties:

```yaml
oid4vci:
  issuer:
    identifier: https://issuer.example.com
    authorizationServers: https://auth.example.com
    credentialConfigurationIds: UniversityDegree,MembershipCard
    display:
      name: Example University
      locale: en-US
    credentials:
      "[UniversityDegree]":
        format: dc+sd-jwt
        scope: degree
        signingAlgorithms: ES256,ES384
        bindingMethods: jwk,did:key
        proofTypes:
          jwt:
            signingAlgorithms: ES256
        display:
          name: University Degree
          locale: en-US
```

The same configuration can be provided via environment variables:

```bash
OID4VCI_ISSUER_IDENTIFIER=https://issuer.example.com
OID4VCI_ISSUER_CREDENTIALS_UNIVERSITYDEGREE_FORMAT=dc+sd-jwt
OID4VCI_ISSUER_CREDENTIALS_UNIVERSITYDEGREE_SCOPE=degree
```

**DesignBackedOid4vciIssuerConfigProvider** reads from the [credential design](../credential-design/overview) store, deriving credential configurations from stored designs. This is useful when you manage credential metadata through the design system and want the issuer metadata to stay in sync automatically.

To wire a config provider, register it in your DI module:

```kotlin
@ContributesTo(AppScope::class)
interface MyIssuerModule {
    @Provides
    fun provideIssuerConfigProvider(
        impl: ConfigDrivenOid4vciIssuerConfigProvider,
    ): Oid4vciIssuerConfigProvider = impl
}
```

### Per-Credential Issuance Policy

Each credential configuration has its own issuance policy that controls grant types, nonce behavior, deferred issuance, and encryption requirements:

```yaml
oid4vci:
  issuer:
    credentials:
      "[IdentityCredential]":
        iae:
          enabled: false
          interaction-type: urn:openid:dcp:iae:openid4vp_presentation
          dcql-query-id: national-id-presentation
        grants:
          pre-authorized-code:
            allowed: true
            tx-code-required: true    # Require a PIN for issuance
          authorization-code:
            allowed: true
        nonce:
          ttl-seconds: 300            # Nonce validity (default: 5 min)
        deferred:
          retry-interval-seconds: 5   # Suggested polling interval
        encryption:
          response-required: false    # Require encrypted responses
```

This policy is evaluated at the credential configuration level, allowing different security requirements for different credential types. For instance, a government identity credential might require transaction codes and response encryption, while a loyalty card might allow pre-authorized issuance without additional security.

### Interactive Authorization Exchange (IAE)

IAE is an OID4VCI 1.1 mechanism that adds an interactive verification step before issuing a credential. The issuer's authorization server challenges the holder to perform an additional action (typically presenting an existing credential via [OID4VP](../oid4vp/overview)) before granting an authorization code.

This creates a "present-to-obtain" pattern. For example, a university issuer can require holders to present their government-issued national ID before receiving a degree credential. The IAE policy is configured per credential configuration:

```yaml
oid4vci:
  issuer:
    credentials:
      "[UniversityDegree]":
        iae:
          enabled: true
          interaction-type: urn:openid:dcp:iae:openid4vp_presentation
          dcql-query-id: national-id-presentation
      "[GovernmentPID]":
        iae:
          enabled: true
          interaction-type: urn:openid:dcp:iae:redirect_to_web
```

| IAE Property | Type | Default | Description |
|-------------|------|---------|-------------|
| `enabled` | `Boolean` | `false` | Whether IAE is required for this credential |
| `interaction-type` | `String` | `openid4vp_presentation` | The interaction URN the AS will request |
| `dcql-query-id` | `String?` | `null` | DCQL query to use for VP presentation challenges |

Two interaction types are supported:

| Type | URN | Description |
|------|-----|-------------|
| OID4VP Presentation | `urn:openid:dcp:iae:openid4vp_presentation` | Holder presents an existing credential |
| Redirect to Web | `urn:openid:dcp:iae:redirect_to_web` | Holder authenticates via browser redirect |

When `interaction-type` is `openid4vp_presentation`, the `dcql-query-id` specifies which DCQL query the authorization server uses to build the OID4VP request. This lets you define exactly what credential the holder must present and which claims are required.

The IAE policy is resolved at runtime through the `CredentialIssuancePolicyResolver`, which reads the configuration for each credential configuration ID and determines whether IAE is needed and what interaction type to use. See the [Holder documentation](./holder#interactive-authorization-exchange-iae) for the holder-side flow.

## Publishing Issuer Metadata

Whether you use the DSL or configuration-driven setup, the metadata needs to be served from the `.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` endpoint. Wallets will HTTP GET this URL when they first encounter your issuer identifier, so it must be publicly reachable. You can also build it programmatically:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val metadata = issuer.buildIssuerMetadata(
    BuildIssuerMetadataArgs(
        issuerIdentifier = "https://issuer.example.com",
        baseUrl = "https://issuer.example.com",
        authorizationServers = listOf("https://auth.example.com"),
        credentialConfigurations = configProvider.credentialConfigurations,
        display = configProvider.display
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let metadata = try await issuer.buildIssuerMetadata(
    args: BuildIssuerMetadataArgs(
        issuerIdentifier: "https://issuer.example.com",
        baseUrl: "https://issuer.example.com",
        authorizationServers: ["https://auth.example.com"],
        credentialConfigurations: configProvider.credentialConfigurations,
        display: configProvider.display
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

The metadata object is serializable and can be served directly from your HTTP endpoint.

### Signed Metadata

For additional trust, the issuer can sign its metadata as a JWT. Holders that enable `requireVerifiedSignedMetadata` will verify this signature before proceeding.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val signedMetadata = issuer.buildSignedIssuerMetadata(
    BuildSignedIssuerMetadataArgs(
        metadata = metadata,
        signingKey = issuerSigningKey
    )
)
// signedMetadata.jwt - Include as "signed_metadata" in the metadata response
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let signedMetadata = try await issuer.buildSignedIssuerMetadata(
    args: BuildSignedIssuerMetadataArgs(
        metadata: metadata,
        signingKey: issuerSigningKey
    )
)
// signedMetadata.jwt - Include as "signed_metadata" in the metadata response
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Creating Credential Offers

A credential offer is a JSON object that tells a holder's wallet "here are the credentials I can issue you, and here is how to get an access token to claim them." The holder typically receives the offer as a `openid-credential-offer://` URI, either scanned from a QR code or opened via a deep link.

To initiate issuance, the issuer creates a credential offer and delivers it to the holder. The offer specifies which credentials are available and how the holder can obtain an access token.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val offerArgs = createOfferArgs {
    issuerId("https://issuer.example.com")
    credentials("IdentityCredential")
    preAuthorizedCodeGrant(txCodeRequired = true)
    offerTtl(600)  // Offer expires in 10 minutes
}
val createdOffer = issuer.createCredentialOffer(offerArgs)

// Deliver the offer to the holder
val offerUri = createdOffer.offerUri       // openid-credential-offer://...
val qrCodeContent = offerUri               // Encode as QR code
val txCode = createdOffer.txCode           // Send to holder via SMS/email
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let createdOffer = try await issuer.createCredentialOffer(
    args: CreateCredentialOfferArgs(
        issuerId: "https://issuer.example.com",
        credentialConfigurationIds: ["IdentityCredential"],
        preAuthorizedCodeGrant: true,
        txCodeRequired: true,             // Require PIN entry
        offerTtlSeconds: 600              // Offer expires in 10 minutes
    )
)

// Deliver the offer to the holder
let offerUri = createdOffer.offerUri       // openid-credential-offer://...
let qrCodeContent = offerUri               // Encode as QR code
let txCode = createdOffer.txCode           // Send to holder via SMS/email
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

The issuer can also pre-seed attributes into the offer using the `attributes` block. These are stored in the issuance session and made available to the credential format handler during issuance:

```kotlin
val offerArgs = createOfferArgs {
    issuerId("https://issuer.example.com")
    credentials("IdentityCredential")
    preAuthorizedCodeGrant(txCodeRequired = true)
    attributes {
        put("given_name", JsonPrimitive("Jane"))
        put("family_name", JsonPrimitive("Doe"))
    }
}
```

## Handling Credential Requests

This is the server-side handler for your `/credential` endpoint. When a holder redeems an offer, their wallet sends a credential request containing an access token and a proof-of-possession JWT. The issuer validates the access token, verifies the proof of possession, resolves the credential attributes, and issues the credential using the appropriate format handler.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// In your credential endpoint handler
val credentialResponse = issuer.handleCredentialRequest(
    HandleCredentialRequestArgs(
        accessToken = bearerToken,
        credentialRequest = request,
        issuerIdentifier = "https://issuer.example.com",
        credentialConfigurations = metadata.credentialConfigurationsSupported
    )
)

// Return the response to the holder
// credentialResponse.credential - The issued credential (or null if deferred)
// credentialResponse.transactionId - For deferred issuance
// credentialResponse.notificationId - For notification tracking
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// In your credential endpoint handler
let credentialResponse = try await issuer.handleCredentialRequest(
    args: HandleCredentialRequestArgs(
        accessToken: bearerToken,
        credentialRequest: request,
        issuerIdentifier: "https://issuer.example.com",
        credentialConfigurations: metadata.credentialConfigurationsSupported
    )
)

// Return the response to the holder
// credentialResponse.credential - The issued credential (or null if deferred)
// credentialResponse.transactionId - For deferred issuance
// credentialResponse.notificationId - For notification tracking
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

The issuer performs several validations automatically:
1. **Access token validation** via the `AuthorizationServerBridge`
2. **Proof verification**: checks the JWT signature, nonce validity, and issuer URL
3. **Credential configuration matching**: ensures the request matches a supported configuration
4. **Format handler dispatch**: delegates to the appropriate `CredentialFormatHandler`

## Extension Points

The issuer module provides three extension points (SPIs) that let you customize credential issuance without modifying the core protocol logic.

### Credential Format Handlers

A `CredentialFormatHandler` is responsible for building the actual credential in a specific format. It receives the resolved claims and the holder's binding key, and returns the signed credential bytes. The IDK ships with handlers for `jwt_vc_json`, `mso_mdoc`, and `dc+sd-jwt`, but you can register additional ones.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
class CustomFormatHandler : CredentialFormatHandler {
    override val supportedFormat = "custom+jwt"

    override suspend fun canHandle(
        request: CredentialRequest,
        configuration: CredentialConfigurationSupported
    ): Boolean {
        return request.format == supportedFormat ||
               configuration.format == supportedFormat
    }

    override suspend fun issueCredential(
        request: CredentialRequest,
        context: IssuanceContext
    ): IdkResult<CredentialEnvelope, IdkError> {
        val credential = buildCustomCredential(
            claims = context.resolvedAttributes,
            holderKey = context.verifiedProof.holderKey,
            signingKey = context.issuerSigningKey
        )
        return IdkResult.Ok(CredentialEnvelope(credential))
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
class CustomFormatHandler: CredentialFormatHandler {
    let supportedFormat = "custom+jwt"

    func canHandle(
        request: CredentialRequest,
        configuration: CredentialConfigurationSupported
    ) async -> Bool {
        return request.format == supportedFormat ||
               configuration.format == supportedFormat
    }

    func issueCredential(
        request: CredentialRequest,
        context: IssuanceContext
    ) async throws -> IdkResult<CredentialEnvelope, IdkError> {
        let credential = buildCustomCredential(
            claims: context.resolvedAttributes,
            holderKey: context.verifiedProof.holderKey,
            signingKey: context.issuerSigningKey
        )
        return .ok(CredentialEnvelope(credential))
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Credential Attribute Contributors

A `CredentialAttributeContributor` is called during issuance to provide the claims that go into the credential. This is where you connect your business logic, such as querying a user database, calling an external identity provider, or enriching attributes from a verification result.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
class UserDatabaseAttributeContributor(
    private val userService: UserService
) : CredentialAttributeContributor {

    override suspend fun contribute(
        session: IssuanceSession,
        tokenContext: ValidatedTokenContext,
        credentialConfigurationId: String
    ): IdkResult<Map<String, JsonElement>, IdkError> {
        val userId = tokenContext.subject
        val user = userService.findById(userId)
            ?: return IdkResult.Err(IdkError("User not found"))

        return IdkResult.Ok(mapOf(
            "given_name" to JsonPrimitive(user.firstName),
            "family_name" to JsonPrimitive(user.lastName),
            "birth_date" to JsonPrimitive(user.dateOfBirth.toString())
        ))
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
class UserDatabaseAttributeContributor: CredentialAttributeContributor {
    private let userService: UserService

    init(userService: UserService) {
        self.userService = userService
    }

    func contribute(
        session: IssuanceSession,
        tokenContext: ValidatedTokenContext,
        credentialConfigurationId: String
    ) async throws -> IdkResult<[String: JsonElement], IdkError> {
        let userId = tokenContext.subject
        guard let user = userService.findById(userId) else {
            return .err(IdkError("User not found"))
        }

        return .ok([
            "given_name": JsonPrimitive(user.firstName),
            "family_name": JsonPrimitive(user.lastName),
            "birth_date": JsonPrimitive(user.dateOfBirth.description)
        ])
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

Multiple attribute contributors can be registered. Their results are merged, with later contributors overriding earlier ones for overlapping keys.

### Authorization Server Bridge

The `Oid4vciAuthorizationServerBridge` connects the issuer to your OAuth 2.0 authorization server. It validates access tokens and manages authorization sessions. You must implement this bridge to integrate with your existing auth infrastructure.

The bridge has two key responsibilities:

- **Token validation**: Validate the access token from the credential request, extract the subject, scopes, and any authorization details
- **Session management**: Create and manage authorization sessions for the authorization code flow

## Deferred Credential Handling

Not every credential can be issued on the spot. If your issuance pipeline involves manual approval, background checks, or asynchronous signing, you can defer the response. When the issuer cannot produce a credential immediately, it returns a `transactionId` instead. The holder polls the deferred endpoint with that ID, and the issuer responds with the credential once it is ready.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// In your deferred credential endpoint handler
val response = issuer.handleDeferredCredentialRequest(
    HandleDeferredCredentialRequestArgs(
        accessToken = bearerToken,
        deferredRequest = DeferredCredentialRequest(
            transactionId = requestedTransactionId
        )
    )
)

// response.credential - The credential if ready, null if still pending
// response.transactionId - Same ID if still pending
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// In your deferred credential endpoint handler
let response = try await issuer.handleDeferredCredentialRequest(
    args: HandleDeferredCredentialRequestArgs(
        accessToken: bearerToken,
        deferredRequest: DeferredCredentialRequest(
            transactionId: requestedTransactionId
        )
    )
)

// response.credential - The credential if ready, null if still pending
// response.transactionId - Same ID if still pending
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

Deferred credentials are managed through the `DeferredCredentialStore`. When the credential is ready (e.g., after an asynchronous approval process), store it with the transaction ID so the next polling request returns it.

## Notification Handling

After a holder receives a credential, it can send a notification back to the issuer indicating whether it was accepted, rejected, or deleted. The notification endpoint receives these events, allowing the issuer to track whether credentials were successfully stored or if there were errors.

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
issuer.handleNotification(
    HandleNotificationArgs(
        accessToken = bearerToken,
        notification = CredentialNotification(
            notificationId = notificationId,
            event = CredentialNotificationEvent.CREDENTIAL_ACCEPTED
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
try await issuer.handleNotification(
    args: HandleNotificationArgs(
        accessToken: bearerToken,
        notification: CredentialNotification(
            notificationId: notificationId,
            event: .credentialAccepted
        )
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

Notifications are processed idempotently through the `NotificationStateStore`, so duplicate deliveries from holder retries are handled gracefully.

## Issuer Stores

The issuer module uses several stores to persist state. All stores are backed by the IDK's key-value store abstraction and can be backed by any storage provider.

| Store | Purpose |
|-------|---------|
| `CredentialOfferStore` | Stores credential offers with TTL for expiration |
| `CredentialNonceStore` | Manages single-use nonces with TTL |
| `CredentialIssuanceSessionStore` | Tracks the full issuance session lifecycle |
| `DeferredCredentialStore` | Holds credentials waiting for deferred retrieval |
| `NotificationStateStore` | Ensures idempotent notification processing |

## Data Types

These are the primary data classes you will encounter when working with the issuer API. They are listed here for quick reference.

### CreatedCredentialOffer

```kotlin
data class CreatedCredentialOffer(
    val offerId: String,             // Unique identifier for the offer
    val offer: CredentialOffer,      // The offer object
    val offerUri: String,            // URI for QR code / deep link
    val txCode: String? = null       // Transaction code (if required)
)
```

### CredentialConfigurationSupported

```kotlin
data class CredentialConfigurationSupported(
    val format: String,                                       // jwt_vc_json, mso_mdoc, dc+sd-jwt
    val scope: String? = null,                                // OAuth scope
    val cryptographicBindingMethodsSupported: List<String>?,  // e.g., ["jwk", "did"]
    val credentialSigningAlgValuesSupported: List<String>?,   // e.g., ["ES256"]
    val proofTypesSupported: Map<String, ProofTypeSupported>?,
    val display: List<DisplayProperties>? = null,
    val claims: Map<String, ClaimMetadata>? = null,
    val vct: String? = null,                                  // For SD-JWT
    val doctype: String? = null                               // For mso_mdoc
)
```

### IssuanceContext

```kotlin
data class IssuanceContext(
    val session: IssuanceSession,
    val verifiedProof: VerifiedProof,          // Validated proof with holder key
    val resolvedAttributes: Map<String, JsonElement>,  // From attribute contributors
    val credentialConfiguration: CredentialConfigurationSupported,
    val issuerSigningKey: ManagedIdentifierOptsOrResult
)
```

---

# HTTP Client

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# HTTP Client

The IDK provides a multiplatform `HttpClientFactory` that creates pre-configured Ktor `HttpClient` instances with support for TLS, mutual TLS (mTLS), content negotiation, logging, and caching. The factory is injected via DI and selects the appropriate engine for the current platform automatically.

## HttpClientFactory

The factory interface is simple: you pass options and get back a ready-to-use `HttpClient`:

```kotlin
interface HttpClientFactory {
    fun createClient(options: HttpClientOptions): HttpClient
    fun isSupportedOptions(options: HttpClientOptions): Boolean
    fun getEngineTypesSupported(): List<HttpClientEngineType>
    fun getEngineTypeDefault(): HttpClientEngineType
}
```

The factory is registered as a `SessionScope` singleton, so each user session gets its own factory instance with access to the session's key management services (needed for loading mTLS certificates).

### Getting the Factory

In a Ktor route handler:

```kotlin
get("/proxy") {
    val clientFactory = call.getSessionService<HttpClientFactory>()
    val client = clientFactory.createClient(HttpClientOptions())
    // use client...
}
```

In a DI-injected service:

```kotlin
@Inject
class MyApiClient(private val httpClientFactory: HttpClientFactory) {
    private val client = httpClientFactory.createClient(
        HttpClientOptions(enableContentNegotiation = true)
    )

    suspend fun fetchData(): MyResponse {
        return client.get("https://api.example.com/data").body()
    }
}
```

## Client Options

`HttpClientOptions` configures every aspect of the created client:

```kotlin
data class HttpClientOptions(
    val engine: HttpClientEngineType? = null,
    val enableContentNegotiation: Boolean = false,
    val contentNegotiationConfig: (ContentNegotiationConfig.() -> Unit)? = null,
    val enableHttpCache: Boolean = false,
    val httpCacheConfig: (HttpCache.Config.() -> Unit)? = null,
    val enableLogging: Boolean = true,
    val loggingConfig: LoggerConfig = LoggerConfig.Default,
    val sslConfig: SslConfig = SslConfig(),
    val defaultRequest: (DefaultRequest.DefaultRequestBuilder.() -> Unit)? = null,
    val additionalConfig: (HttpClientConfig<*>.() -> Unit)? = null
)
```

| Option | Default | Description |
|--------|---------|-------------|
| `engine` | Platform default | Override the HTTP engine (see below) |
| `enableContentNegotiation` | `false` | Install JSON serialization (`kotlinx.serialization`) |
| `contentNegotiationConfig` | - | Customize the JSON configuration |
| `enableHttpCache` | `false` | Enable Ktor's `HttpCache` plugin |
| `enableLogging` | `false` | Log HTTP requests and responses |
| `sslConfig` | No TLS customization | TLS and mTLS configuration |
| `defaultRequest` | - | Default headers, auth, base URL for every request |
| `additionalConfig` | - | Arbitrary Ktor client configuration block |

### Engine Types

| Engine | Platforms | Notes |
|--------|-----------|-------|
| `CIO` | JVM, Native | Coroutine-based, HTTP/1.x only. RSA/DSS certificates only (no EC). |
| `OKHTTP` | JVM, Android | Full TLS support including EC certificates. **Default on JVM.** |
| `DARWIN` | iOS, macOS | Native NSURLSession. Uses iOS keychain for mTLS. |
| `JS` | Browser, Node.js | Delegates TLS entirely to the platform. |

When no engine is specified, the factory picks the platform default: `OKHTTP` on JVM, `DARWIN` on Apple, `JS` on JavaScript.

## Content Negotiation

Enable JSON serialization for request/response bodies:

```kotlin
val client = factory.createClient(HttpClientOptions(
    enableContentNegotiation = true
))

// Bodies are automatically serialized/deserialized
val response: MyData = client.get("https://api.example.com/data").body()
client.post("https://api.example.com/data") {
    contentType(ContentType.Application.Json)
    setBody(MyRequest(name = "test"))
}
```

The default JSON configuration uses:
- `encodeDefaults = true`
- `ignoreUnknownKeys = true`
- `prettyPrint = false`

Override with `contentNegotiationConfig` if you need different settings.

## Default Request Configuration

Set headers, authentication, or a base URL that apply to every request:

```kotlin
val client = factory.createClient(HttpClientOptions(
    defaultRequest = {
        header("Authorization", "Bearer $accessToken")
        header("X-API-Key", apiKey)
        header("X-Tenant-Id", tenantId)
    }
))
```

## Logging

Enable request/response logging for debugging:

```kotlin
val client = factory.createClient(HttpClientOptions(
    enableLogging = true,
    loggingConfig = LoggerConfig(
        // configure log level, sanitization, etc.
    )
))
```

## TLS Configuration

The `SslConfig` class controls both client-side certificates (for mTLS) and server certificate validation (custom CAs):

```kotlin
data class SslConfig(
    val client: ClientSslConfig = ClientSslConfig(),
    val server: ServerSslConfig = ServerSslConfig()
)
```

### Server Certificate Validation (Custom CAs)

By default the platform's built-in CA store is used. To add custom CA certificates (e.g., for internal PKI), configure the `server` section:

```kotlin
val client = factory.createClient(HttpClientOptions(
    sslConfig = SslConfig(
        server = ServerSslConfig(
            ca = CaOpts(
                includePlatformDefaults = true,  // keep system CAs
                additionalCAs = setOf(
                    KeystoreCertificateOpts(
                        certificateAlias = "internal-ca",
                        keyStoreId = "my-trust-store"
                    )
                )
            )
        )
    )
))
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `includePlatformDefaults` | `true` | Include the system CA trust store |
| `additionalCAs` | empty | Additional CA certificates from your keystores |

The factory loads referenced keystores from the key management system (KMS) at all configuration levels (APP, TENANT, PRINCIPAL) and merges them into a `CompositeTrustManager` that accepts a server certificate if **any** of the trust managers trusts it.

## Mutual TLS (mTLS)

mTLS lets the server verify the client's identity via a client certificate. The IDK supports **per-host certificate routing**, where different backend servers can require different client certificates, and the factory selects the right one automatically based on the target hostname.

### Configuration

```kotlin
val client = factory.createClient(HttpClientOptions(
    sslConfig = SslConfig(
        client = ClientSslConfig(
            // Default certificate for any host without a specific mapping
            defaultCertificate = KeystoreCertificateOpts(
                certificateAlias = "default-client-cert",
                keyStoreId = "client-keystore"
            ),
            // Per-host certificate overrides
            perHostCertificate = mapOf(
                "partner-a.example.com" to KeystoreCertificateOpts(
                    certificateAlias = "partner-a-cert",
                    keyStoreId = "partner-keystores"
                ),
                "partner-b.example.com" to KeystoreCertificateOpts(
                    certificateAlias = "partner-b-cert",
                    keyStoreId = "partner-keystores"
                )
            )
        )
    )
))
```

| Property | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `defaultCertificate` | Client certificate used when no per-host match exists |
| `perHostCertificate` | Map of hostname to client certificate. During TLS handshake the factory checks the target hostname and selects the matching entry. |

Each `KeystoreCertificateOpts` references:
- `certificateAlias`: the alias of the certificate (and its private key) within the keystore
- `keyStoreId`: the identifier of the keystore in the IDK key management system

### How Per-Host Routing Works

On JVM (OkHttp engine), the factory builds a `HostBasedKeyManager` that wraps the standard `X509KeyManager`. During the TLS handshake:

1. The JVM calls `chooseClientAlias()` on the key manager
2. The `HostBasedKeyManager` extracts the target hostname from the socket
3. It looks up the hostname in the `perHostCertificate` map
4. If found, it returns that certificate's alias; otherwise it falls back to `defaultCertificate`
5. The underlying key manager provides the certificate chain and private key for the selected alias

Multiple keystores are supported transparently. The factory loads all referenced keystores and merges them into a `CompositeKeyManager`.

### Checking mTLS Status

```kotlin
val sslConfig: SslConfig = // ...

// Check if any mTLS is configured
val hasMtls = sslConfig.client.isMtls()

// Check for a specific host
val needsCert = sslConfig.client.isMtls("partner-a.example.com")
```

## Platform-Specific Behaviour

<Tabs>
<TabItem value="jvm" label="JVM" default>

The JVM factory (`HttpClientFactoryJvmImpl`) defaults to the **OkHttp** engine, which supports:

- EC, RSA, and DSS client certificates
- Per-host certificate routing via `HostBasedKeyManager`
- Custom CA trust stores via `CompositeTrustManager`
- Full SSLContext configuration

Keystores are loaded from the IDK key management system (`KeyManagerService`) across all scopes (APP, TENANT, PRINCIPAL) and from any registered KMS providers.

The CIO engine is also available but limited to RSA/DSS certificates (no EC support due to ktor-network-tls constraints).

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="ios" label="iOS / macOS">

The Apple factory (`HttpClientFactoryIosImpl`) uses the **Darwin** engine backed by `NSURLSession`. mTLS works via the iOS keychain:

1. Certificate chains and private keys are loaded from the IDK key management system
2. Private keys are stored in the iOS keychain (never exported as raw bytes)
3. `SecIdentityRef` objects are created linking each certificate to its keychain key
4. During TLS challenges, the factory responds with the appropriate identity based on hostname

Custom CA validation has limited support on iOS due to Kotlin/Native interop constraints. The platform's default CA validation is used when custom CAs are configured.

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="js" label="JavaScript">

The JS factory (`HttpClientFactoryJsImpl`) uses the **JS** engine, which delegates TLS entirely to the Node.js or browser runtime. mTLS configuration in `HttpClientOptions` is accepted but not applied; the platform handles TLS natively. A warning is logged if mTLS configuration is provided.

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Combining Options

A typical production client configuration:

```kotlin
val client = factory.createClient(HttpClientOptions(
    enableContentNegotiation = true,
    enableLogging = true,
    sslConfig = SslConfig(
        client = ClientSslConfig(
            defaultCertificate = KeystoreCertificateOpts(
                certificateAlias = "my-service",
                keyStoreId = "service-keystore"
            )
        ),
        server = ServerSslConfig(
            ca = CaOpts(
                includePlatformDefaults = true,
                additionalCAs = setOf(
                    KeystoreCertificateOpts(
                        certificateAlias = "corp-ca",
                        keyStoreId = "trust-store"
                    )
                )
            )
        )
    ),
    defaultRequest = {
        header("X-Tenant-Id", currentTenantId)
    }
))
```

## Config-Driven HTTP Clients

Instead of (or in addition to) building `HttpClientOptions` in code, you can drive HTTP client settings from config files. The HTTP client uses the [module/service/command override](../config/configuration#module-service-and-command-overrides) mechanism, so you can set global defaults and then override specific settings for individual modules or commands.

### Available properties

All properties live under the `http.client` config suffix:

```properties
# Engine selection (optional, platform default is used otherwise)
http.client.engine=OKHTTP

# Content negotiation (JSON serialization)
http.client.content.negotiation=true

# Base URL for all requests
http.client.base.url=https://api.example.com

# Timeouts (milliseconds)
http.client.timeout.connect.ms=30000
http.client.timeout.request.ms=60000
http.client.timeout.socket.ms=60000

# Retry
http.client.retry.max.retries=3
http.client.retry.delay.ms=1000

# Caching
http.client.cache.enabled=false

# Logging
http.client.logging.enabled=true
http.client.logging.min.level=INFO
http.client.logging.tag=HTTP
http.client.logging.output.format=TEXT
http.client.logging.include.timestamp=false

# URL validation (none, block.private)
http.client.url.validation.policy=block.private

# Default headers
http.client.headers.X-Tenant-Id=acme-corp
http.client.headers.X-API-Version=2

# TLS / mTLS
http.client.ssl.include.platform.cas=true
http.client.ssl.default.certificate.keystore.id=client-keystore
http.client.ssl.default.certificate.certificate.alias=default-cert
```

Or in YAML:

```yaml title="application.yml"
http:
  client:
    content:
      negotiation: true
    timeout:
      connect:
        ms: 30000
      request:
        ms: 60000
    logging:
      enabled: true
      min:
        level: INFO
    base:
      url: https://api.example.com
```

### Per-module and per-command overrides

Different parts of your application often need different HTTP settings. The KMS might need shorter timeouts than the OID4VP module. A specific command might need verbose logging while everything else stays quiet.

Use the `cmd.*` prefix to override at the module, service, or command level:

```properties
# Global defaults
http.client.timeout.connect.ms=30000
http.client.logging.enabled=false

# KMS module: shorter timeouts for key operations
cmd.kms.default.default.http.client.timeout.connect.ms=5000
cmd.kms.default.default.http.client.timeout.request.ms=10000

# OID4VP module: different base URL
cmd.oid4vp.default.default.http.client.base.url=https://oid4vp.example.com

# Specific command: enable logging for debugging token exchange
cmd.oauth2.token.exchange.http.client.logging.enabled=true
cmd.oauth2.token.exchange.http.client.logging.min.level=DEBUG
```

The resolution merges from least-specific to most-specific. In the example above, the `oauth2.token.exchange` command gets `logging.enabled=true` and `logging.min.level=DEBUG` from its command-level override, but inherits the global `timeout.connect.ms=30000` because no module or command override sets a different timeout.

### Tenant-level overrides

Because config cascades through APP, TENANT, and PRINCIPAL scopes, different tenants can have different HTTP client settings:

```properties title="config/tenant/partner-a/tenant.properties"
http.client.base.url=https://partner-a-api.example.com
http.client.ssl.default.certificate.keystore.id=partner-a-keystore
http.client.ssl.default.certificate.certificate.alias=partner-a-cert
```

This gives partner-a its own base URL and mTLS certificate without affecting other tenants.

### Using HttpClientConfigResolver

The `HttpClientConfigResolver` ties config resolution to HTTP client creation. It's injected in the session scope and resolves `HttpClientProperties` for a given command:

```kotlin
@Inject
class MyOAuth2Service(
    private val httpClientFactory: HttpClientFactory,
    private val configResolver: HttpClientConfigResolver,
) {
    suspend fun exchangeToken(code: String): TokenResponse {
        // Resolves config for "oauth2.token.exchange" command:
        // global defaults, merged with module overrides, merged with command overrides
        val props = configResolver.resolve("oauth2.token.exchange")
        val client = httpClientFactory.createClient(props.toOptions())

        return try {
            client.post("/token") { /* ... */ }.body()
        } finally {
            client.close()
        }
    }
}
```

Or use the extension functions that combine resolution and client creation:

```kotlin
// Create a client with config resolved for a command
val client = httpClientFactory.createClient(configResolver, "oauth2.token.exchange")

// Create, use, and auto-close
val response = httpClientFactory.withClient(configResolver, "oauth2.token.exchange") { client ->
    client.post("/token") { /* ... */ }.body<TokenResponse>()
}

// Global config (no command scoping)
val globalClient = httpClientFactory.createClientFromConfig(configResolver)
```

The resolved `HttpClientProperties` is converted to `HttpClientOptions` via `toOptions()`. Lambda-based options (like `additionalConfig` or `contentNegotiationConfig`) can't come from config files, so you pass them as programmatic overrides on top of the config-resolved base.

## Extending with Additional Configuration

The `additionalConfig` block gives you full access to Ktor's `HttpClientConfig` DSL for anything not covered by the standard options:

```kotlin
val client = factory.createClient(HttpClientOptions(
    additionalConfig = {
        install(HttpTimeout) {
            requestTimeoutMillis = 60_000
            connectTimeoutMillis = 10_000
        }
        install(HttpRequestRetry) {
            retryOnServerErrors(maxRetries = 3)
            exponentialDelay()
        }
    }
))
```

---

# Ktor Server Integration

# Ktor Server Integration

The IDK provides a Ktor server plugin that integrates the three-scope architecture (App, User, Session) with Ktor's request handling. This enables dependency injection and service access within your Ktor routes.

## Installation

Add the Ktor server plugin to your dependencies:

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.oss.idk:ktor-server-kotlin-inject:0.13.0")
}
```

## Plugin Setup

Install the `KotlinInjectPlugin` in your Ktor application:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.ktor.server.inject.KotlinInjectPlugin
import io.ktor.server.application.*
import io.ktor.server.cio.*
import io.ktor.server.engine.*

fun main() {
    embeddedServer(CIO, port = 8080) {
        configureKotlinInject()
        configureRouting()
    }.start(wait = true)
}

fun Application.configureKotlinInject() {
    // Create your AppComponent
    val appComponent = MyAppComponent.init(
        application = this,
        appId = "my-app",
        profile = "production",
        version = "1.0.0"
    )

    // Install the plugin
    install(KotlinInjectPlugin) {
        this.appComponent = appComponent
        // Optional: custom tenant/principal resolvers
        // tenantResolver = MyTenantResolver()
        // principalResolver = MyPrincipalResolver()
    }
}
```

## Accessing Services in Routes

Use extension functions to access services from different scopes:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.ktor.server.inject.*
import io.ktor.server.routing.*
import io.ktor.server.response.*

fun Application.configureRouting() {
    routing {
        get("/config") {
            // Access app-scoped services
            val config = call.getAppService<AppConfigEnvironment>()
            call.respondText("App: ${config.getAppName()}")
        }

        get("/user/{userId}") {
            // Access user-scoped services
            val userLogger = call.getUserService<UserContextLogManager>()
            userLogger.withTag("API").info("User endpoint accessed")

            // Access user context directly
            val userInstance = call.userInstance
            call.respondText("Tenant: ${userInstance.context.tenant}")
        }

        get("/session") {
            // Access session-scoped services
            val sessionLogger = call.getSessionService<SessionLogManager>()
            val sessionInstance = call.sessionInstance

            call.respondText("Session: ${sessionInstance.sessionId}")
        }
    }
}
```

## Universal HTTP Adapters

For API endpoints that need to work across both Ktor and Spring, use the Universal HTTP Adapter pattern. Install the adapter dispatcher to automatically route requests to registered adapters:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.ktor.server.inject.installUniversalHttpAdapters

fun Application.module() {
    install(KotlinInjectPlugin) {
        appComponent = myAppComponent
    }

    // Mount adapters under /api prefix
    installUniversalHttpAdapters {
        pathPrefix = "/api"
        verboseLogging = true
    }
}
```

Or mount adapters within a specific route:

```kotlin
routing {
    route("/api/v1") {
        installUniversalHttpAdapters()
    }
}
```

The dispatcher automatically converts Ktor requests to `GenericHttpRequest`, delegates to registered `HttpAdapter` implementations, and converts responses back to Ktor responses.

## Platform Support

The Ktor server plugin is multiplatform and works on:

- **JVM** - Standard server deployments
- **Native** - GraalVM native images for fast startup
- **JavaScript** - Node.js server deployments

## Next Steps

- See the [EDK documentation](/edk/guides/http/universal-adapter) for comprehensive details on creating Universal HTTP Adapters
- Review [Dependency Injection](../di/scopes) for understanding the scope architecture

---

# Key-Value Store

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Key-Value Store

The IDK provides a cross-platform key-value store (`KvStore`) for persisting application data with support for namespacing, TTL (time-to-live), and multiple storage backends.

## Overview

The key-value store is designed for storing structured application data with:

- **Namespaced storage** with type-safe codecs for serialization
- **TTL support** for automatic expiration of entries
- **Scope binding** for multi-tenant partitioning
- **Multiple backends** including in-memory and persistent storage
- **Result-based error handling** via `IdkResult`

## Core Concepts

### Namespaces

All KvStore operations require a namespace. A namespace combines a name with a codec that handles serialization:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.data.store.kv.*
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable

@Serializable
data class SessionData(
    val userId: String,
    val token: String,
    val createdAt: Long
)

// Create a namespace with JSON codec
val sessionNamespace = KvNamespace(
    name = "session.data",
    codec = KotlinxSerializationJsonKvCodec(
        json = Json { ignoreUnknownKeys = true },
        serializer = SessionData.serializer()
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
import SphereonDataStore

struct SessionData: Codable {
    let userId: String
    let token: String
    let createdAt: Int64
}

// Create a namespace with JSON codec
let sessionNamespace = KvNamespace(
    name: "session.data",
    codec: KotlinxSerializationJsonKvCodec(
        json: Json.Default,
        serializer: SessionData.serializer()
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Obtaining the Store

Access the KvStore through the `KvStoreService`:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get the KvStoreService from session
val kvStoreService = session.component.kvStoreService

// Get a store by ID
val store: KvStore = kvStoreService.getStore("my-store")

// List available store IDs
val storeIds: Array<String> = kvStoreService.getStoreIds()

// Get store configuration
val config: KvStoreConfig = kvStoreService.getStoreConfig("my-store")
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get the KvStoreService from session
let kvStoreService = session.component.kvStoreService

// Get a store by ID
let store: KvStore = kvStoreService.getStore(storeId: "my-store")

// List available store IDs
let storeIds: [String] = kvStoreService.getStoreIds()

// Get store configuration
let config: KvStoreConfig = kvStoreService.getStoreConfig(storeId: "my-store")
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Basic Operations

### Storing Values

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
import kotlin.time.Duration
import kotlin.time.Duration.Companion.hours
import kotlin.time.Duration.Companion.seconds

// Store with TTL
val result = store.put(
    namespace = sessionNamespace,
    key = "user-123",
    value = SessionData(
        userId = "user-123",
        token = "abc123",
        createdAt = System.currentTimeMillis()
    ),
    ttl = 1.hours
)

when (result) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val metadata = result.value.metadata
        println("Stored at: ${metadata.createdAtEpochMillis}")
        println("Expires at: ${metadata.expiresAtEpochMillis}")
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Failed to store: ${result.error}")
    }
}

// Store with infinite TTL (never expires)
store.put(
    namespace = settingsNamespace,
    key = "app-config",
    value = appConfig,
    ttl = Duration.INFINITE
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Store with TTL
let result = try await store.put(
    namespace: sessionNamespace,
    key: "user-123",
    value: SessionData(
        userId: "user-123",
        token: "abc123",
        createdAt: Int64(Date().timeIntervalSince1970 * 1000)
    ),
    ttl: Duration.hours(1)
)

switch result {
case .success(let putResult):
    let metadata = putResult.metadata
    print("Stored at: \(metadata.createdAtEpochMillis)")
    print("Expires at: \(metadata.expiresAtEpochMillis)")
case .failure(let error):
    print("Failed to store: \(error)")
}

// Store with infinite TTL (never expires)
try await store.put(
    namespace: settingsNamespace,
    key: "app-config",
    value: appConfig,
    ttl: Duration.INFINITE
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Retrieving Values

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Get value only
val result = store.get(sessionNamespace, "user-123")

when (result) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val sessionData: SessionData? = result.value
        if (sessionData != null) {
            println("Token: ${sessionData.token}")
        } else {
            println("Key not found")
        }
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Error: ${result.error}")
    }
}

// Get entry with metadata
val entryResult = store.getEntry(sessionNamespace, "user-123")

when (entryResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val entry: KvEntry<SessionData>? = entryResult.value
        if (entry != null) {
            println("Value: ${entry.value}")
            println("Created: ${entry.metadata.createdAtEpochMillis}")
            println("Expires: ${entry.metadata.expiresAtEpochMillis}")
        }
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Error: ${entryResult.error}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Get value only
let result = try await store.get(namespace: sessionNamespace, key: "user-123")

switch result {
case .success(let sessionData):
    if let sessionData = sessionData {
        print("Token: \(sessionData.token)")
    } else {
        print("Key not found")
    }
case .failure(let error):
    print("Error: \(error)")
}

// Get entry with metadata
let entryResult = try await store.getEntry(namespace: sessionNamespace, key: "user-123")

switch entryResult {
case .success(let entry):
    if let entry = entry {
        print("Value: \(entry.value)")
        print("Created: \(entry.metadata.createdAtEpochMillis)")
        print("Expires: \(entry.metadata.expiresAtEpochMillis)")
    }
case .failure(let error):
    print("Error: \(error)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Checking Existence

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val existsResult = store.exists(sessionNamespace, "user-123")

when (existsResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        if (existsResult.value) {
            println("Key exists")
        } else {
            println("Key not found")
        }
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Error: ${existsResult.error}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let existsResult = try await store.exists(namespace: sessionNamespace, key: "user-123")

switch existsResult {
case .success(let exists):
    if exists {
        print("Key exists")
    } else {
        print("Key not found")
    }
case .failure(let error):
    print("Error: \(error)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Deleting Values

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val deleteResult = store.delete(sessionNamespace, "user-123")

when (deleteResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        if (deleteResult.value) {
            println("Deleted successfully")
        } else {
            println("Key did not exist")
        }
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Error: ${deleteResult.error}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let deleteResult = try await store.delete(namespace: sessionNamespace, key: "user-123")

switch deleteResult {
case .success(let deleted):
    if deleted {
        print("Deleted successfully")
    } else {
        print("Key did not exist")
    }
case .failure(let error):
    print("Error: \(error)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Extending TTL

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Extend TTL without modifying the value
val touchResult = store.touch(
    namespace = sessionNamespace,
    key = "user-123",
    ttl = 2.hours
)

when (touchResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        if (touchResult.value) {
            println("TTL extended")
        } else {
            println("Key not found")
        }
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Error: ${touchResult.error}")
    }
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Extend TTL without modifying the value
let touchResult = try await store.touch(
    namespace: sessionNamespace,
    key: "user-123",
    ttl: Duration.hours(2)
)

switch touchResult {
case .success(let touched):
    if touched {
        print("TTL extended")
    } else {
        print("Key not found")
    }
case .failure(let error):
    print("Error: \(error)")
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Listing Operations

Stores that implement `KvStoreListing` support key enumeration:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Check if store supports listing
if (store is KvStoreListing) {
    // List all keys in a namespace
    val keysResult = store.listKeys(sessionNamespace)

    when (keysResult) {
        is IdkResult.Success -> {
            keysResult.value.forEach { key ->
                println("Key: $key")
            }
        }
        is IdkResult.Failure -> {
            println("Error: ${keysResult.error}")
        }
    }

    // Get all values in a namespace
    val allResult = store.getAll(sessionNamespace)

    when (allResult) {
        is IdkResult.Success -> {
            allResult.value.forEach { (key, value) ->
                println("$key: $value")
            }
        }
        is IdkResult.Failure -> {
            println("Error: ${allResult.error}")
        }
    }

    // Get all entries with metadata
    val entriesResult = store.getAllEntries(sessionNamespace)
}
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Check if store supports listing
if let listingStore = store as? KvStoreListing {
    // List all keys in a namespace
    let keysResult = try await listingStore.listKeys(namespace: sessionNamespace)

    switch keysResult {
    case .success(let keys):
        for key in keys {
            print("Key: \(key)")
        }
    case .failure(let error):
        print("Error: \(error)")
    }

    // Get all values in a namespace
    let allResult = try await listingStore.getAll(namespace: sessionNamespace)
}
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Cleanup Expired Entries

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
// Clean up expired entries in a specific namespace
val cleanupResult = store.cleanupExpired(sessionNamespace)

when (cleanupResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        println("Cleaned up ${cleanupResult.value} expired entries")
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Error: ${cleanupResult.error}")
    }
}

// Clean up all namespaces
val fullCleanupResult = store.cleanupExpired(namespace = null)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
// Clean up expired entries in a specific namespace
let cleanupResult = try await store.cleanupExpired(namespace: sessionNamespace)

switch cleanupResult {
case .success(let count):
    print("Cleaned up \(count) expired entries")
case .failure(let error):
    print("Error: \(error)")
}

// Clean up all namespaces
let fullCleanupResult = try await store.cleanupExpired(namespace: nil)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Store Configuration

Stores are configured with `KvStoreConfig`:

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val config = KvStoreConfig(
    id = "my-store",
    scopeBinding = KvStoreScopeBinding.TENANT,  // Data partitioned by tenant
    backendId = "memory",                        // In-memory backend
    enabled = true,
    order = 0,
    defaultConfigValues = mapOf(
        "custom.setting" to "value"
    )
)
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let config = KvStoreConfig(
    id: "my-store",
    scopeBinding: .tenant,    // Data partitioned by tenant
    backendId: "memory",      // In-memory backend
    enabled: true,
    order: 0,
    defaultConfigValues: [
        "custom.setting": "value"
    ]
)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Scope Bindings

| Scope Binding | Description |
|---------------|-------------|
| `APP` | Single partition for entire application |
| `TENANT` | Partitioned by tenant ID |
| `PRINCIPAL_TENANT` | Partitioned by principal and tenant |
| `SESSION` | Partitioned by session ID |

## Storage Backends

### In-Memory Backend

The in-memory backend stores data in memory. Data is lost when the application terminates.

```kotlin
val config = KvStoreConfig(
    id = "cache-store",
    backendId = "memory",
    scopeBinding = KvStoreScopeBinding.SESSION
)
```

### Kottage Backend

The Kottage backend provides persistent storage using the Kottage multiplatform library:

```kotlin
val config = KvStoreConfig(
    id = "persistent-store",
    backendId = "kottage",
    scopeBinding = KvStoreScopeBinding.TENANT
)
```

## Configuration via Properties

Configure stores using properties:

```properties
# Define a store
kv.stores.sessions.type=memory
kv.stores.sessions.scopebinding=SESSION
kv.stores.sessions.enabled=true
kv.stores.sessions.order=0

# Persistent store
kv.stores.credentials.type=kottage
kv.stores.credentials.scopebinding=TENANT
kv.stores.credentials.enabled=true
```

## Data Models

### KvEntry

```kotlin
data class KvEntry<V>(
    val value: V,
    val metadata: KvEntryMetadata
)
```

### KvEntryMetadata

```kotlin
data class KvEntryMetadata(
    val createdAtEpochMillis: Long,
    val expiresAtEpochMillis: Long?  // null for infinite TTL
)
```

### KvPutResult

```kotlin
data class KvPutResult(
    val metadata: KvEntryMetadata
)
```

## Best Practices

**Use meaningful namespace names** to organize data logically and prevent key collisions across features.

**Set appropriate TTLs** for temporary data like session tokens and cached responses to prevent stale data accumulation.

**Choose the right scope binding** based on data isolation requirements: APP for shared data, TENANT for tenant-specific data, SESSION for session-scoped data.

**Handle errors with IdkResult** - all operations return result types that must be checked for success or failure.

**Implement cleanup routines** by periodically calling `cleanupExpired()` if your backend doesn't automatically purge expired entries.

---

# Blob Store

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Blob Store

The IDK provides a blob storage abstraction for managing binary data: documents, images, certificates, credential payloads, or any other file-like content. The `BlobStore` interface offers a consistent API across backends (in-memory, filesystem, KV-backed, HTTP remote), with support for content-addressable storage, metadata indexing, temporary URLs, and tenant isolation.

## Architecture

The blob storage system has two main layers:

- **`BlobStore`**: Low-level interface for individual storage backends. Each backend implements this directly.
- **`BlobService`**: High-level service that manages multiple stores, routes operations to the right backend, and adds content-addressable storage (CAS) and metadata search on top.

In most cases you should use `BlobService` rather than calling `BlobStore` directly. The service layer handles backend routing, CAS indexing, and metadata search for you. You only need to drop down to `BlobStore` if you are implementing a custom backend or need fine-grained control over a specific storage driver.

Both are session-scoped. The `BlobService` is the primary entry point for application code.

## Core Concepts

### Blob Info

Every blob operation uses a `BlobInfo` to identify the target:

```kotlin
val info = BlobInfo(
    storeId = "documents",       // Which store to use
    path = "credentials/mdl.cbor", // Path within the store
    tenantId = "acme-corp",      // Tenant isolation (optional)
    contentType = "application/cbor",
    metadata = mapOf("issuer" to "gov.example.com")
)
```

The `path` follows filesystem-like conventions with `/` as delimiter. Paths are validated and sanitized to prevent directory traversal attacks.

### Blob Descriptor

After storing a blob, you get a `BlobDescriptor` with metadata about the stored object:

```kotlin
data class BlobDescriptor(
    val path: String,
    val storeId: String,
    val sizeBytes: Long,
    val contentType: String?,
    val filename: String?,
    val etag: String?,
    val createdAt: Instant?,
    val lastModified: Instant?,
    val metadata: BlobMetadata,
    val contentHash: String?
)
```

### Resolved Blob Info

When you read a blob, you get a `ResolvedBlobInfo` that includes the descriptor and the actual data:

```kotlin
val resolved: ResolvedBlobInfo = blobService.getBlob(info).getOrThrow()
val bytes: ByteArray = resolved.data
val size: Long = resolved.sizeBytes
val descriptor: BlobDescriptor = resolved.descriptor
```

## Basic Operations

<Tabs groupId="platform">
<TabItem value="Kotlin" label="Android/Kotlin">

```kotlin
val blobService = session.graph.blobService

// Store a blob
val info = BlobInfo.of(storeId = "documents", path = "credentials/mdl.cbor")
val descriptor = blobService.storeBlob(
    target = info.copy(contentType = "application/cbor"),
    data = cborBytes
).getOrThrow()

println("Stored ${descriptor.sizeBytes} bytes at ${descriptor.path}")

// Retrieve a blob
val resolved = blobService.getBlob(info).getOrThrow()
val data = resolved.data

// Check existence
val exists = blobService.getBlobInfo(info).isOk

// Delete a blob
blobService.deleteBlob(info).getOrThrow()
```

</TabItem>
<TabItem value="Swift" label="iOS/Swift">

```swift
let blobService = session.graph.blobService

// Store a blob
let info = BlobInfo.of(storeId: "documents", path: "credentials/mdl.cbor")
let descriptor = try await blobService.storeBlob(
    target: info,
    data: cborBytes
).getOrThrow()

// Retrieve a blob
let resolved = try await blobService.getBlob(info: info).getOrThrow()
let data = resolved.data

// Delete a blob
try await blobService.deleteBlob(info: info)
```

</TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Listing and Pagination

List blobs with prefix filtering and pagination:

```kotlin
val blobService = session.graph.blobService

// List all credentials
val result = blobService.listBlobs(
    info = BlobInfo.of("documents", "credentials/"),
    options = ListOptions(
        prefix = "credentials/",
        delimiter = "/",
        maxResults = 50,
        recursive = false
    )
).getOrThrow()

for (descriptor in result.descriptors) {
    println("${descriptor.path} (${descriptor.sizeBytes} bytes)")
}

// Paginate if there are more results
if (result.hasMore) {
    val nextPage = blobService.listBlobs(
        info = BlobInfo.of("documents", "credentials/"),
        options = ListOptions(pageToken = result.nextPageToken)
    ).getOrThrow()
}
```

## Copy and Move

```kotlin
val source = BlobInfo.of("documents", "inbox/new-credential.cbor")
val destination = BlobInfo.of("documents", "credentials/verified/mdl.cbor")

// Copy (keeps the original)
blobService.copyBlob(source, destination).getOrThrow()

// Move (removes the original)
blobService.moveBlob(source, destination).getOrThrow()
```

Not all backends support copy and move, so check `capabilities.supportsCopy` and `capabilities.supportsMove` before calling.

## Content-Addressable Storage (CAS)

CAS stores blobs by their content hash rather than a path. This gives you two things for free: deduplication (storing identical content twice returns the same address without writing a second copy) and integrity verification (you can re-hash the data at any time and compare it to the address). CAS is a good fit for credential payloads and other content where you want to detect tampering or avoid storing duplicates.

```kotlin
val blobService = session.graph.blobService

// Store by content hash
val casResult = blobService.casStore(
    info = BlobInfo.of("cas-store", ""),
    data = credentialBytes,
    algorithm = DigestAlg.SHA256
).getOrThrow()

val address: ContentAddress = casResult.address
println("Stored at: ${address.toDigestString()}")  // "sha256:a1b2c3..."

// Retrieve by address
val resolved = blobService.casGet(
    info = BlobInfo.of("cas-store", ""),
    address = address
).getOrThrow()

// Verify integrity
val valid = blobService.casVerify(
    info = BlobInfo.of("cas-store", ""),
    address = address
).getOrThrow()
```

Content addresses can be encoded as multibase strings or hashlinks for interoperability:

```kotlin
val multibase = address.toMultibaseString()  // "z..." (base58btc)
val hashlink = address.toHashlink()          // "hl:z..."
val digestStr = address.toDigestString()     // "sha256:a1b2c3..."

// Parse back
val parsed = ContentAddress.fromDigestString("sha256:a1b2c3...")
```

## Metadata and Search

Blobs carry structured metadata for classification and search:

```kotlin
val info = BlobInfo(
    storeId = "documents",
    path = "credentials/mdl.cbor",
    contentType = "application/cbor",
    metadata = mapOf(
        "credentialType" to "mDL",
        "issuer" to "gov.example.com",
        "issuedAt" to "2025-01-15"
    )
)

blobService.storeBlob(target = info, data = cborBytes)

// Search by metadata
val results = blobService.findByMetadata(
    info = BlobInfo.of("documents", ""),
    query = MetadataSearchQuery(
        contentType = "application/cbor",
        customMetadata = mapOf("credentialType" to "mDL"),
        pathPrefix = "credentials/",
        maxResults = 100
    )
).getOrThrow()

for (descriptor in results) {
    println("Found: ${descriptor.path}")
}
```

## Temporary URLs

Temporary URLs let you hand out a short-lived, pre-signed link that grants direct access to a blob. This is useful when a client needs to download or display a file (such as a credential image or document) without routing every byte through your application server. The URL expires after the configured duration, so you do not have to worry about revoking access manually.

```kotlin
val tempUrl = blobService.createTempUrl(
    info = BlobInfo.of("documents", "credentials/mdl.cbor"),
    options = TempUrlOptions(
        expiresIn = 1.hours,
        method = TempUrlMethod.GET,
        contentDisposition = "attachment; filename=\"mdl.cbor\""
    )
).getOrThrow()

println("Download URL: ${tempUrl.url}")
println("Expires at: ${tempUrl.expiresAt}")
```

Check `capabilities.supportsTempUrls` before using this feature.

## Store Capabilities

Each backend declares what operations it supports:

```kotlin
data class BlobStoreCapabilities(
    val supportsEtag: Boolean,
    val supportsCopy: Boolean,
    val supportsMove: Boolean,
    val supportsFolders: Boolean,
    val supportsBulkDelete: Boolean,
    val supportsTempUrls: Boolean,
    val supportsListing: Boolean,
    val supportsMetadata: Boolean,
    val maxBlobSizeBytes: Long,
    val maxTempUrlDuration: Duration?
)
```

Always check capabilities before using optional operations to keep your code portable across backends.

## Put Options

Control overwrite behavior and integrity checking:

```kotlin
// Prevent overwriting existing blobs
blobService.storeBlob(
    target = info,
    data = bytes,
    options = PutOptions(overwrite = false)
)

// Compute content hash on store
blobService.storeBlob(
    target = info,
    data = bytes,
    options = PutOptions(digestAlgorithm = DigestAlg.SHA256)
)
```

## Scope Binding

Scope binding controls how blob paths are partitioned. In a multi-tenant deployment, `TENANT` scoping means each tenant's blobs live in an isolated partition, so path collisions between tenants are impossible and access control is enforced at the storage layer.

| Scope | Behavior |
|-------|----------|
| `APP` | Shared across all tenants, serving as global storage |
| `TENANT` | Isolated per tenant; each tenant has its own storage partition |

Scope binding is configured when the store is created and determines how paths are partitioned.

## Storage Backends

Choose a backend based on where your data needs to live. In-memory is good for tests and short-lived caches. Filesystem works for server-side deployments where you have local disk. KV-backed is convenient when you already have a KvStore set up and want to avoid introducing another storage dependency. The HTTP client backend lets mobile or edge apps access a remote blob service over the network.

### In-Memory

Stores blobs in memory. Data is lost when the application exits. Useful for testing and development.

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-impl-memory:0.25.0")
}
```

### Filesystem

Stores blobs as files on disk. Supports directory-based organization, auto-creates directories, and works on JVM and native targets.

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-impl-fs:0.25.0")
}
```

Configuration:
```properties
blob.stores.documents.backend=filesystem
blob.stores.documents.root-dir=/var/data/blobs
blob.stores.documents.auto-create-dirs=true
blob.stores.documents.scope-binding=TENANT
```

### KV-Backed

Uses an existing `KvStore` as the blob backend. Convenient when you already have a KV store configured and don't want a separate blob backend.

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-impl-kv:0.25.0")
}
```

### HTTP Client

Accesses blobs from a remote HTTP endpoint. Useful for accessing centralized blob storage from client applications.

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-client-http:0.25.0")
}
```

## Error Handling

Blob operations return `IdkResult` and throw typed `BlobStoreError` exceptions:

| Error | When |
|-------|------|
| `NotFound` | Blob does not exist at the given path |
| `AlreadyExists` | `PutOptions(overwrite = false)` and the path is taken |
| `IoError` | Filesystem or network failure |
| `Unsupported` | Backend doesn't support the requested operation |
| `QuotaExceeded` | Storage limit reached |
| `IntegrityError` | Content hash mismatch |
| `PermissionDenied` | Access control violation |
| `PreconditionFailed` | ETag or if-none-match condition not met |

```kotlin
val result = blobService.getBlob(info)
when {
    result.isOk -> {
        val data = result.getOrThrow().data
    }
    result.isErr -> {
        val error = result.unwrapErr()
        println("Failed: ${error.message}")
    }
}
```

## Module Dependencies

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    // Public API (always needed)
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-public:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-impl:0.25.0")

    // Include one or more backends
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-impl-memory:0.25.0")   // In-memory
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-impl-fs:0.25.0")       // Filesystem
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-impl-kv:0.25.0")       // KV-backed
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-blob-client-http:0.25.0")   // HTTP remote
}
```

---

# Theming & Branding

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Theming & Branding

The IDK includes a cross-platform theming system that manages colors, typography, spacing, motion, and branding from a single token-based configuration. Themes are defined once and consumed by Jetpack Compose, React, and web applications through platform-specific integrations.

The system is built around **design tokens**, named values like `color.primary` or `spacing.4` that are resolved at runtime based on scope, variant (light/dark), and accessibility preferences. Instead of scattering hex codes and pixel values throughout your components, you reference tokens by name. The theming system resolves those names to concrete values based on who is viewing the app, which tenant they belong to, and whether they prefer dark mode or high contrast.

## Core Concepts

### Theme Definitions

A `ThemeDefinition` is a named collection of tokens:

```kotlin
data class ThemeDefinition(
    val id: String,
    val name: String,
    val variant: ThemeVariant,       // LIGHT, DARK, HIGH_CONTRAST
    val scope: ThemeScope,           // SYSTEM, APP, TENANT, PRINCIPAL
    val tokens: List<ThemeToken>,
    val parentId: String?,           // Inherit from parent definition
    val appId: String?,
    val version: Long,
)
```

Definitions are layered by scope. A `TENANT` definition overrides an `APP` definition, which overrides `SYSTEM` defaults. Within each scope, tokens are merged; you only need to define the tokens you want to override.

### Theme Tokens

Every visual property is expressed as a token with a type:

```kotlin
data class ThemeToken(
    val key: String,          // e.g., "color.primary"
    val value: String,        // e.g., "#6750A4" or "{color.primaryContainer}"
    val type: ThemeTokenType, // COLOR, DIMENSION, FONT_FAMILY, SPACING, DURATION, etc.
)
```

Token values can reference other tokens using `{token.key}` syntax. References are expanded during resolution, so `{color.primary}` resolves to whatever the current theme's primary color is.

### Token Categories

| Category | Key Pattern | Examples |
|----------|-------------|---------|
| **Colors** | `color.*` | `color.primary`, `color.onPrimary`, `color.surface`, `color.error` |
| **Typography** | `typography.*` | `typography.fontFamily`, `typography.displayLarge.fontSize`, `typography.bodyMedium.lineHeight` |
| **Spacing** | `spacing.*` | `spacing.0` (0px) through `spacing.48` (192px), 4px grid with 17 stops |
| **Border** | `border.*` | `border.none`, `border.thin` (1px), `border.medium` (2px), `border.thick` (4px) |
| **Shape** | `shape.radius.*` | `shape.radius.none` through `shape.radius.full` (9999px) |
| **Elevation** | `elevation.*` | `elevation.none`, `elevation.xs`, `elevation.sm` through `elevation.xl` |
| **Motion** | `motion.*` | `motion.duration.fast` (100ms), `motion.duration.normal` (250ms), `motion.easing.standard` |
| **Branding** | `branding.*` | `branding.appName`, `branding.primaryColor`, `branding.logoUrl`, `branding.faviconUrl` |

### Scope Hierarchy

The scope hierarchy is how the theming system supports multi-tenant white-labeling without duplicating entire theme definitions. Each scope layer only needs to define the tokens it wants to override; everything else falls through to the parent scope. For example, a tenant can change the primary color and logo without redefining every spacing and typography token.

Tokens resolve in order of specificity:

| Scope | Purpose |
|-------|---------|
| `SYSTEM` | IDK defaults: Material Design 3 baseline theme |
| `APP` | Application-level branding: your app's color scheme and typography |
| `TENANT` | Tenant-level overrides: white-labeling for multi-tenant applications |
| `PRINCIPAL` | User-level preferences: individual user customizations |

Lower scopes override higher ones. A tenant can override the app's primary color without redefining the entire theme.

### Variants

Each scope can define tokens for multiple variants. You do not need to define all three; the resolver falls back to `LIGHT` if a variant-specific token is missing. The `HIGH_CONTRAST` variant is specifically for accessibility, where contrast ratios are boosted beyond the standard WCAG AA thresholds.

- **`LIGHT`**: standard light theme
- **`DARK`**: dark theme
- **`HIGH_CONTRAST`**: accessibility variant with boosted contrast ratios

The active variant is selected at runtime based on platform preferences (e.g., `prefers-color-scheme` on web, system dark mode on iOS/Android).

## Color Configuration

The theming system supports four approaches to color configuration, from simple to fully custom:

### Seed Color

Generate a full Material Design 3 palette from a single brand color:

```kotlin
val colorConfig = ThemeColorConfig.SeedColor(
    seed = "#1a73e8"  // Your brand color
)
```

The seed is converted to the HCT (Hue, Chroma, Tone) color space to generate tonal palettes for primary, secondary, tertiary, neutral, and error roles.

### Multi-Seed

Provide separate seed colors for each role:

```kotlin
val colorConfig = ThemeColorConfig.MultiSeed(
    primary = "#1a73e8",
    secondary = "#34a853",
    tertiary = "#fbbc04",
    neutral = "#5f6368",
    error = "#ea4335",
)
```

### Explicit Palettes

Hand-craft every palette stop. This is useful when your design system specifies exact values (e.g., exported from Figma):

```kotlin
val colorConfig = ThemeColorConfig.ExplicitPalettes(
    palettes = DesignSystemPalette(
        brand = PaletteScale(
            s50 = "#e8f0fe", s100 = "#d2e3fc", s200 = "#aecbfa",
            s300 = "#8ab4f8", s400 = "#669df6", s500 = "#4285f4",
            s600 = "#1a73e8", s700 = "#1967d2", s800 = "#185abc",
            s900 = "#174ea6"
        ),
        // secondary, neutral, error, success, warning, info, pending...
    )
)
```

Palette scales use **role-based names** (brand, secondary, neutral) rather than color names (blue, green, gray) to keep the design system independent of specific hues.

### Hybrid

Use explicit palettes for brand colors (from your design system) and M3-generated palettes for everything else:

```kotlin
val colorConfig = ThemeColorConfig.Hybrid(
    explicitPalettes = DesignSystemPalette(
        brand = myBrandPalette,
        // only define the roles you have explicit values for
    ),
    fallbackSeed = "#1a73e8"  // M3 generation for missing roles
)
```

## Theme Resolution

The `ThemeResolver` combines definitions from all scopes into a `ResolvedTheme`:

```kotlin
val resolver: ThemeResolver = session.graph.themeResolver

val resolved: ResolvedTheme = resolver.resolve(
    variant = ThemeVariant.LIGHT,
    scope = ThemeScope.TENANT,
    tenantId = "acme-corp"
)

// Access resolved tokens
val primaryColor: String? = resolved.tokens["color.primary"]  // "#1a73e8"
val fontFamily: String? = resolved.tokens["typography.fontFamily"]
val branding: BrandingMetadata = resolved.branding
```

Resolution applies token references, flattens scope layers, and validates the final token set.

The `ThemeResolver` and `ThemeStore` are session-scoped and injected via Metro:

```kotlin
@ContributesBinding(SessionScope::class, binding = binding<ThemeResolver>())
class DefaultThemeResolver(private val store: ThemeStore) : ThemeResolver
```

## Compose Integration

On Android and Kotlin Multiplatform, the Compose integration translates IDK tokens into native Material 3 types (`ColorScheme`, `Typography`, `Shapes`). Your composables use standard M3 APIs like `MaterialTheme.colorScheme.primary` and the values come from the IDK token system automatically.

The `lib-conf-theme-compose` module maps resolved tokens to Jetpack Compose's Material 3 theme system.

### Basic Setup

```kotlin
@Composable
fun MyApp() {
    DefaultTheme {
        // Material 3 theme is configured from IDK tokens
        // All M3 components use the themed colors, typography, and shapes
        Scaffold {
            Text("Themed content")
        }
    }
}
```

With zero configuration, `DefaultTheme` uses the M3 baseline (purple seed, `#6750A4`). To apply your brand:

```kotlin
@Composable
fun MyApp() {
    DefaultTheme(
        colorConfig = ThemeColorConfig.SeedColor("#1a73e8"),
        appName = "My App",
        logoUrl = "https://example.com/logo.svg"
    ) {
        MyContent()
    }
}
```

### CompositionLocals

`DefaultTheme` provides several `CompositionLocal` values that components can read:

| Local | Type | Content |
|-------|------|---------|
| `LocalThemeTokens` | `Map<String, String>` | Raw flat token map |
| `LocalResolvedTheme` | `ResolvedTheme?` | Full resolved theme object |
| `LocalThemeVariant` | `ThemeVariant?` | Current variant (light/dark) |
| `LocalBrandingTokens` | `BrandingTokens` | App name, logo URLs, primary color |
| `LocalSpacingTokens` | `SpacingTokens` | Spacing scale values |
| `LocalMotionTokens` | `MotionTokens` | Animation durations and easings |
| `LocalShadowTokens` | `ShadowTokens` | Elevation shadow values |
| `LocalBorderTokens` | `BorderTokens` | Border width and radius values |
| `LocalPaletteTokens` | `PaletteTokens` | Raw palette primitives (tier 0) |
| `LocalAccessibilityState` | `AccessibilityState` | OS accessibility preferences |
| `LocalWindowWidthSizeClass` | `WindowWidthSizeClass` | Responsive breakpoint class |

### Token Mappers

Under the hood, `DefaultTheme` uses a pipeline of mappers to convert IDK tokens into Compose types:

- **`ThemeTokenMapper`**: tokens to M3 `ColorScheme`
- **`TypographyTokenMapper`**: tokens to M3 `Typography` (font size, weight, line height, letter spacing)
- **`ElevationTokenMapper`**: tokens to elevation values
- **`SpacingTokenMapper`** / **`ShadowTokenMapper`** / **`BorderTokenMapper`** / **`MotionTokenMapper`**: tokens to structured data classes

### Accessibility

The Compose integration automatically adapts to platform accessibility settings:

- **High contrast mode**: `HighContrastTokenResolver` boosts color contrast ratios when the OS reports high-contrast preference
- **Reduced motion**: `MotionTokens` reflect the user's reduced-motion preference
- **Adaptive sizing**: `AdaptiveTokenResolver` adjusts tokens based on `WindowWidthSizeClass` for responsive layouts

## UI Components

The `lib-ui-compose` module provides pre-built Compose components that consume theme tokens:

| Component | Variants |
|-----------|----------|
| `Button` | Primary, Secondary, Ghost, Outline |
| `Card` | Default, interactive (with click) |
| `Input` | Text input with focus states |
| `Select` | Dropdown select with menu |
| `Checkbox` | Checked/unchecked with label |
| `Radio` / `RadioGroup` | Single and grouped selection |
| `Badge` | Primary, Error |
| `Modal` | Dialog overlay with backdrop |
| `Tabs` | Tab bar with active indicator |
| `Toast` | Primary, Success, Error, Warning, Info |
| `BlobExplorer` | File tree browser component |

Components are styled through a `ComponentTheme` composable that maps resolved tokens to component-specific token data classes:

```kotlin
@Composable
fun MyApp() {
    DefaultTheme(colorConfig = ThemeColorConfig.SeedColor("#1a73e8")) {
        ComponentTheme {
            // Components now read their tokens from CompositionLocals
            Button(onClick = { }) { Text("Submit") }
            Card { Text("Card content") }
        }
    }
}
```

Each component reads its styling from a dedicated `CompositionLocal` (e.g., `LocalButtonTokens`, `LocalCardTokens`), so you can override individual component tokens without affecting others.

## Web and React Integration

The web integration takes a different approach from Compose. Instead of mapping tokens to framework-specific theme objects, it generates CSS custom properties (e.g., `--color-primary`) that you consume in your stylesheets. This means the same token definitions drive both Compose and web UIs, but the integration mechanism matches what each platform expects.

### React ThemeProvider

The React theme SDK provides a `ThemeProvider` that generates CSS custom properties from the same token system:

```tsx
import { ThemeProvider } from '@sphereon/theme-react';

function App() {
    return (
        <ThemeProvider
            colorConfig={{ type: 'seed', seed: '#1a73e8' }}
            appName="My App"
            logoUrl="/logo.svg"
            defaultMode="system"
        >
            <MyContent />
        </ThemeProvider>
    );
}
```

The provider:
- Generates M3 palettes from the color config (same HCT algorithm as the Kotlin implementation)
- Injects CSS custom properties onto `:root` (e.g., `--color-primary`, `--spacing-4`)
- Resolves token references
- Persists the selected mode (light/dark) in `localStorage`
- Respects `prefers-color-scheme` media query when mode is `"system"`

### CSS Custom Properties

IDK token keys map to CSS variables by replacing dots with dashes:

| Token Key | CSS Variable |
|-----------|-------------|
| `color.primary` | `--color-primary` |
| `typography.bodyMedium.fontSize` | `--typography-body-medium-font-size` |
| `spacing.4` | `--spacing-4` |
| `motion.duration.normal` | `--motion-duration-normal` |

Use them in your CSS or styled components:

```css
.my-button {
    background-color: var(--color-primary);
    padding: var(--spacing-3) var(--spacing-4);
    border-radius: var(--shape-radius-md);
    transition: background-color var(--motion-duration-fast) var(--motion-easing-standard);
}
```

### Kotlin/JS Web Utilities

The `lib-conf-theme-web` module provides Kotlin/JS utilities for server-rendered or non-React web applications:

- **`CssTokenMapper`**: converts token keys to CSS variable names and handles unit conversion (`dp`/`sp` to `px`)
- **`WebSystemDefaults`**: pre-resolved token maps for light and dark baselines
- **`FoucPreventionScript`**: generates a blocking inline `<script>` that applies the stored theme mode before first paint, preventing flash of unstyled content

### React UI Components

A parallel React component library mirrors the Compose components, styled with CSS modules that read from the injected CSS custom properties:

- Button, Card, Input, Select, Checkbox, Radio, RadioGroup
- Modal, Tabs, Badge, Toast
- BlobExplorer

## Branding

The branding subsystem provides structured metadata for application chrome (logo, app name, favicon, and custom fonts):

```kotlin
data class BrandingMetadata(
    val appName: String?,
    val primaryColor: String?,
    val logoUrl: String?,
    val logoDarkUrl: String?,       // Separate logo for dark mode
    val faviconUrl: String?,
    val fontResourceId: String?,    // Custom font reference
    val logoResourceId: String?,
    val logoDarkResourceId: String?,
)
```

Branding tokens are set through the standard token system (`branding.appName`, `branding.logoUrl`, etc.) and resolved alongside other tokens. In Compose, access them via `LocalBrandingTokens`; in React/web, read the corresponding CSS variables or the `ThemeContext`.

For web applications, `WebBrandingMetadata` adds web-specific fields:

```kotlin
data class WebBrandingMetadata(
    val customCssUrl: String?,          // External CSS for further customization
    val fontStylesheetUrls: List<String>, // Google Fonts or self-hosted font URLs
    val assetBaseUrl: String?,          // Base URL for logo/favicon assets
)
```

Custom CSS is sanitized with a configurable policy (`CssPolicyConfig`) that blocks dangerous selectors and restricts allowed properties.

## Multi-Tenant White-Labeling

The scope hierarchy makes multi-tenant white-labeling straightforward. Define your base theme at `APP` scope, then override per tenant:

```kotlin
val store: ThemeStore = session.graph.themeStore

// App-level base theme
store.save(ThemeDefinition(
    id = "app-light",
    name = "App Light",
    variant = ThemeVariant.LIGHT,
    scope = ThemeScope.APP,
    tokens = buildTokens {
        color(TokenKeyConstants.COLOR_PRIMARY, "#1a73e8")
        string(TokenKeyConstants.BRANDING_APP_NAME, "My Platform")
        string(TokenKeyConstants.BRANDING_LOGO_URL, "/logos/platform.svg")
    }
))

// Tenant override - only the tokens that differ
store.save(ThemeDefinition(
    id = "acme-light",
    name = "Acme Corp Light",
    variant = ThemeVariant.LIGHT,
    scope = ThemeScope.TENANT,
    tokens = buildTokens {
        color(TokenKeyConstants.COLOR_PRIMARY, "#ff5722")
        string(TokenKeyConstants.BRANDING_APP_NAME, "Acme Corp Portal")
        string(TokenKeyConstants.BRANDING_LOGO_URL, "/logos/acme.svg")
    }
))
```

When resolving for tenant "acme-corp", the primary color is `#ff5722` and the logo is Acme's. All other tokens (typography, spacing, secondary colors) fall through to the app-level definition and system defaults.

## Dependencies

For Compose applications:

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-conf-theme-core-public:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-conf-theme-core-impl:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-conf-theme-compose:0.25.0")

    // Optional: pre-built UI components
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-ui-compose:0.25.0")
}
```

For web applications, install the React packages:

```bash
npm install @sphereon/theme-react @sphereon/ui-react
```

For Kotlin/JS web applications without React:

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-conf-theme-core-public:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-conf-theme-web:0.25.0")
}
```

---

# Services

# Services

IDK services are pre-built, deployable components that expose IDK functionality as HTTP endpoints. Each service is a separate Gradle module you can include in your server application. They use the [Ktor integration plugin](../guides/http/ktor) and a command-based HTTP adapter pattern to translate incoming HTTP requests into IDK operations.

## Available Services

| Service | Module | Description |
|---------|--------|-------------|
| [KMS REST API](./services-kms) | `services/kms` | Exposes key generation/import, provider capabilities, signing, encryption, certificate, and resolver operations as REST endpoints |
| [OAuth2 Authorization Server](./services-oauth2-as) | `services/oauth2-as` | Full OAuth2/OIDC authorization server with token, authorize, introspect, revoke, PAR, and JWKS endpoints |
| [OID4VCI Issuer](./services-oid4vci-issuer) | `services/oid4vci-issuer` | Holder-facing OID4VCI issuance endpoints plus issuer-side integration APIs for creating and managing issuance flows |
| [OID4VCI Holder](./services-oid4vci-holder) | `services/oid4vci-holder` | Holder (wallet) endpoints for credential acquisition: session management, auth code exchange, proof creation, and credential requests |
| [OID4VP Verifier](./services-oid4vp-verifier) | `services/oid4vp-verifier` | Wallet-facing OID4VP verifier endpoints plus the verifier-facing Universal OID4VP adapter |
| [Ktor Plugin](./services-ktor) | `services/ktor` | The `KotlinInjectPlugin` that bridges IDK's Metro DI with Ktor's request pipeline. Used by all other services |

## CommandBackedHttpAdapter Pattern

Every service follows the same structural pattern. HTTP endpoints are implemented as individual `HttpEndpointCommand` instances. Each command handles a single operation: parsing the inbound request, invoking the relevant IDK service, and returning a response.

Commands are grouped into a `CommandBackedHttpAdapter`, which maps URL paths and HTTP methods to the appropriate command. At startup, the DI system auto-discovers all adapters contributed to the service's scope and registers them with the HTTP adapter dispatcher. This means adding a new endpoint is a matter of writing a command class and contributing it to the adapter. No manual route wiring required.

## Composing Services

You can run multiple services in a single Ktor server by including their Gradle modules and installing their adapters. For example, a server that provides both credential issuance and verification would include the `services/oid4vci-issuer` and `services/oid4vp-verifier` modules. The Ktor plugin merges all contributed adapters into one dispatcher, so there is no conflict between services as long as their endpoint paths do not overlap.

```kotlin
fun Application.module() {
    install(KotlinInjectPlugin) {
        appGraph = myAppGraph
    }

    // All adapters from included service modules
    // are auto-discovered and mounted
    installUniversalHttpAdapters {
        pathPrefix = "/api"
    }
}
```

## Next Steps

- [Ktor Server Integration](../guides/http/ktor): Details on the `KotlinInjectPlugin` and Universal HTTP Adapters
- [Dependency Injection](../guides/di/scopes): Understanding the App/User/Session scope architecture
- [Examples](../examples/examples-overview): Working applications that combine multiple services

---

# KMS REST API

# KMS REST API

The KMS REST API service exposes the `KeyManagerService` over HTTP, turning every key management operation into a REST call. This is the service to use when mobile or browser clients need to delegate key operations to a server, for example when signing with a hardware-backed key that lives in AWS KMS or Azure Key Vault, or when a backend service needs a centralized key management layer.

Under the hood, the service routes each request to the appropriate KMS provider. If your server has multiple providers registered (software, AWS, Azure, mobile), the REST API respects the same provider-selection logic as the local `KeyManagerService`: explicit provider ID, algorithm-based lookup, or default provider fallback.

## Key Endpoints

### Keys (`/keys`)

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/keys` | Generate a new key pair. Accepts the signature algorithm, optional provider ID, and an alias. Returns the generated key metadata including the key ID and public key. |
| `POST` | `/keys/import` | Import externally supplied key material into the selected provider. |
| `POST` | `/keys/register` | Register an existing provider-side key reference without importing key material. |
| `GET` | `/keys` | List all keys visible to the current session. Supports optional filtering by provider or algorithm. |
| `GET` | `/keys/{keyId}` | Retrieve metadata and the public key for a specific key by its ID. |
| `DELETE` | `/keys/{keyId}` | Delete a key. The underlying KMS provider handles the actual removal. |

Provider-scoped key routes mirror the global flow: `POST /providers/{providerId}/keys` generates a key in that provider, and `POST /providers/{providerId}/keys/import` imports externally supplied key material into that provider.

### Signatures (`/signatures`)

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/signatures` | Create a signature. Accepts the key ID, the data to sign (base64-encoded), and the signature algorithm. Returns the signature bytes. |
| `POST` | `/signatures/verify` | Verify a signature. Accepts the key ID (or public key), the original data, the signature, and the algorithm. Returns a boolean result. |

### Providers (`/providers`)

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/providers` | List all registered KMS providers and their capabilities (supported algorithms, hardware backing, etc.). |
| `GET` | `/capabilities` | List capability reports for all providers. Use `includeDisabled=true` to include disabled providers. |
| `GET` | `/providers/{providerId}/capabilities` | Get the capability report for one provider. |
| `POST` | `/providers/query` | Find all providers matching an operation, algorithm, storage, hardware, or identifier-method requirement. |
| `POST` | `/providers/query/best` | Find the best provider match for a capability query. |

### Encryption (`/encryption`)

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/encryption/encrypt` | Encrypt bytes with a KMS-managed key. Binary JSON fields are base64-encoded. |
| `POST` | `/encryption/decrypt` | Decrypt bytes with a KMS-managed key. |
| `POST` | `/encryption/wrap` | Wrap key material with a KMS-managed wrapping key. |
| `POST` | `/encryption/unwrap` | Unwrap key material with a KMS-managed unwrapping key. |
| `POST` | `/encryption/key-agreement` | Perform key agreement and return the shared secret. |

### Certificates (`/certificates`, `/certificate-chains`)

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/certificates/csr` | Generate a certificate signing request. |
| `POST` | `/certificates/issue` | Issue a certificate from issuer and subject key information. |
| `POST` | `/certificates/issue-from-csr` | Issue a certificate from a CSR. |
| `GET` | `/certificates` | List trusted certificate aliases. Accepts optional `providerId`. |
| `GET` / `POST` / `DELETE` | `/certificates/{alias}` | Read, store, or delete a trusted certificate. Accepts optional `providerId`. |
| `GET` | `/certificate-chains` | List certificate-chain aliases. Accepts optional `providerId`. |
| `GET` / `POST` / `DELETE` | `/certificate-chains/{alias}` | Read, store, or delete a certificate chain. Accepts optional `providerId`. |

### Resolvers (`/resolvers`)

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/resolvers` | Resolve an identifier (DID, key alias, JWK thumbprint) to its key material. Useful for looking up keys by external reference. |

## Including in Your Server

Add the KMS REST server module to your dependencies:

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:services-kms-rest:0.25.0")
}
```

The service auto-registers its adapter with the DI graph. Once the module is on the classpath and the `KotlinInjectPlugin` is installed, calling `installUniversalHttpAdapters()` mounts the KMS endpoints automatically.

## Configuration

The KMS REST API inherits its behavior from the underlying `KeyManagerService` configuration. The key configuration points are:

- **KMS providers**: Register the providers you need (software, AWS, Azure, mobile) through the DI graph. See [KMS Providers](../guides/crypto/kms-providers) for setup details.
- **Default provider**: Set which provider handles requests that do not specify a `providerId`.
- **Access control**: The service runs within the IDK's tenant and principal scoping, so keys are isolated per tenant/principal by default. Use the `KotlinInjectPlugin`'s tenant and principal resolvers to control who can access which keys.

See [Key Management](../guides/crypto/key-management) for the full `KeyManagerService` API reference.

## Docker

Each service ships with a Dockerfile and docker-compose configuration in its `container/` directory.

### Building the image

```bash
# Build the fat JAR first
./gradlew :services-kms-rest:buildFatJar

# Build the Docker image
docker compose -f services/kms/container/docker-compose.yaml build
```

### Running with Docker Compose

```bash
docker compose -f services/kms/container/docker-compose.yaml up
```

The service starts on port 8080. Configuration is loaded from `container/config/` inside the image. Override settings via environment variables in a `.env` file next to the docker-compose.yaml.

### Image details

| Property | Value |
|----------|-------|
| Base image | `eclipse-temurin:21-jre` |
| Docker image | `sphereon/idk-kms-rest:latest` |
| Exposed port | 8080 |
| Config location | `/app/config/` |

## Next Steps

- [Services Overview](./services-overview) for an introduction to all available IDK services and the `CommandBackedHttpAdapter` pattern
- [Key Management Guide](../guides/crypto/key-management) for the full `KeyManagerService` API reference
- [KMS Providers](../guides/crypto/kms-providers) for configuring software, AWS, Azure, and mobile key providers
- [Ktor Integration](../guides/http/ktor) for details on installing and configuring the `KotlinInjectPlugin`

---

# OAuth2 Authorization Server

# OAuth2 Authorization Server

The OAuth2 AS service provides a standards-compliant authorization server that you can embed in your Ktor application. It handles the protocol mechanics of OAuth2 and OpenID Connect while delegating authentication and consent to your application through the `UserAuthenticationProvider` and `ConsentProvider` interfaces. You provide the UI and the user database; the service takes care of the rest.

## Supported Standards

| Standard | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| RFC 6749 | OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework |
| RFC 7636 | Proof Key for Code Exchange (PKCE) |
| RFC 8693 | OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange |
| RFC 9449 | Demonstrating Proof of Possession (DPoP) |
| RFC 9126 | Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR) |
| RFC 7662 | Token Introspection |
| RFC 7009 | Token Revocation |
| RFC 8414 | Authorization Server Metadata |
| OpenID Connect Core | ID Tokens, UserInfo, JWKS |
| draft-ietf-oauth-attestation-based-client-auth | Attestation-based client authentication |

## Key Endpoints

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `GET/POST` | `/authorize` | Authorization endpoint for the code flow. Parses the request, validates the client and redirect URI, then hands control to your authentication and consent logic. After the user approves, it generates an authorization code and redirects back. |
| `POST` | `/token` | Token endpoint for all grant types: authorization code, refresh token, client credentials, token exchange (RFC 8693), and pre-authorized code (OID4VCI). Follows a parse-then-branch pattern internally. |
| `POST` | `/introspect` | Token introspection (RFC 7662). Accepts an access or refresh token and returns its active/inactive status along with associated metadata (scopes, subject, expiration). |
| `POST` | `/revoke` | Token revocation (RFC 7009). Accepts a token and invalidates it. Responds with 200 regardless of whether the token existed, per the spec. |
| `POST` | `/par` | Pushed Authorization Requests (RFC 9126). The client posts its authorization parameters to this endpoint first, receives a `request_uri`, then redirects the user to `/authorize` with that URI instead of inline parameters. |
| `GET` | `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` | Server metadata (RFC 8414). Returns a JSON document describing supported grant types, scopes, endpoints, signing algorithms, and other capabilities. |
| `GET` | `/.well-known/jwks.json` | JSON Web Key Set. Returns the public keys used by the server for signing tokens. Clients and resource servers use this to verify token signatures. |

## Including in Your Server

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:services-oauth2-as-rest:0.25.0")
}
```

The OAuth2 AS adapter registers itself in the DI graph and is picked up automatically by `installUniversalHttpAdapters()`.

## Configuration

The authorization server is configured through a combination of the IDK property system and provider interfaces:

- **Server metadata**: Set the issuer identifier, supported scopes, grant types, and response types through YAML configuration or programmatically via `AuthorizationServerMetadata`.
- **Client registration**: Implement the `ClientStore` interface to provide client records (client ID, secret, redirect URIs, allowed grant types). The IDK ships an in-memory implementation for development.
- **Token settings**: Configure access token TTL, refresh token TTL, and ID token TTL.
- **Signing keys**: The server uses the `KeyManagerService` to sign tokens. Configure which key alias or key ID the server uses for JWT signing.
- **DPoP**: DPoP support is enabled automatically when clients include a `DPoP` header. No separate configuration is needed.
- **PKCE**: PKCE is enforced by default for public clients and optional for confidential clients. You can make it mandatory for all clients via configuration.

The core API follows a **parse, verify, create** pattern: you parse raw HTTP input into a typed request, verify it (checking clients, scopes, PKCE, etc.), then create the output (tokens, codes, responses). The gaps between these steps are where your application-specific logic lives: authenticating the user, collecting consent, or enforcing custom policies.

See [Authorization Server](../guides/oauth2/authorization-server) for the full API reference, including code examples for each grant type.

## Docker

Each service ships with a Dockerfile and docker-compose configuration in its `container/` directory.

### Building the image

```bash
# Build the fat JAR first
./gradlew :services-oauth2-as-rest:buildFatJar

# Build the Docker image
docker compose -f services/oauth2-as/container/docker-compose.yaml build
```

### Running with Docker Compose

```bash
docker compose -f services/oauth2-as/container/docker-compose.yaml up
```

The service starts on port 8080. Configuration is loaded from `container/config/` inside the image. Override settings via environment variables in a `.env` file next to the docker-compose.yaml.

### Image details

| Property | Value |
|----------|-------|
| Base image | `eclipse-temurin:21-jre` |
| Docker image | `sphereon/idk-oauth2-as:latest` |
| Exposed port | 8080 |
| Config location | `/app/config/` |

## Next Steps

- [Services Overview](./services-overview) for an introduction to all available IDK services and the `CommandBackedHttpAdapter` pattern
- [Authorization Server Guide](../guides/oauth2/authorization-server) for the full API reference and code examples for each grant type
- [OID4VCI Issuer](./services-oid4vci-issuer) to see how credential issuance integrates with the authorization server
- [Ktor Integration](../guides/http/ktor) for details on installing and configuring the `KotlinInjectPlugin`

---

# OID4VCI Issuer Service

# OID4VCI Issuer Service

The OID4VCI Issuer service implements the OpenID for Verifiable Credential Issuance specification. It handles the server-side protocol for issuing verifiable credentials to holder wallets. The service supports SD-JWT, mDoc (ISO 18013-5), and JWT VC JSON credential formats, multiple grant types (authorization code and pre-authorized code), deferred issuance for asynchronous workflows, and batch issuance for requesting multiple credentials in one round trip. In practice it exposes both holder-facing OID4VCI endpoints and a separate issuer-integration surface used by issuer backend apps and web apps to create and manage issuance flows.

## Holder (Wallet) Endpoints

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` | Issuer metadata. Returns a JSON document describing the issuer's capabilities: supported credential types, endpoints, proof types, display information, and encryption settings. Wallets fetch this to discover how to interact with the issuer. |
| `GET` | `/credential-offers/{offerId}` | Retrieve a credential offer by ID. When the issuer creates an offer, it generates a URI that points here. The wallet resolves the offer to learn which credentials are available and which grant types to use. |
| `POST` | `/nonce` | Issue a `c_nonce` for proof generation. The wallet calls this to get a fresh nonce before creating the proof-of-possession JWT it includes in the credential request. |
| `POST` | `/credential` | Handle credential requests. The wallet submits an access token and a proof-of-possession JWT. The service validates the token, verifies the proof, resolves credential attributes via registered `CredentialAttributeContributor` instances, and delegates to the appropriate `CredentialFormatHandler` to build the signed credential. |
| `POST` | `/deferred-credential` | Handle deferred credential polling. When immediate issuance is not possible (pending approval, background checks), the issuer returns a `transactionId` from `/credential`. The wallet polls this endpoint with that ID until the credential is ready. |
| `POST` | `/notification` | Receive holder notifications. After storing a credential, the wallet can notify the issuer whether it was accepted, rejected, or deleted. Processed idempotently, so duplicate deliveries from retries are safe. |

## Issuer Integration Endpoints

These are the three issuer-facing endpoints used by issuer backend apps or web apps to initiate and manage issuance sessions:

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/oid4vci/backend/credential/offers` | Create a credential offer session. Accepts `credential_configuration_ids`, optional pre-seeded `credential_subject_data`, optional `grants`, `issuer_id`, `correlation_id`, deeplink `scheme`, QR code options, callback configuration, opaque `state`, and `ttl_seconds`. Returns the `correlation_id`, `offer_uri`, optional `status_uri`, optional QR data URI, and optional `tx_code`. |
| `GET` | `/oid4vci/backend/credential/offers/{correlationId}` | Get credential offer session status for the issuer app. Returns `credential_offer_created`, `credential_offer_retrieved`, `token_requested`, `credential_requested`, `credential_issued`, or `error`, plus issuance data when a credential has been issued. |
| `DELETE` | `/oid4vci/backend/credential/offers/{correlationId}` | Delete a credential offer session created through the issuer-facing backend API. Useful when an issuance flow is cancelled or should be cleaned up explicitly before TTL expiry. |

These issuer-integration endpoints are separate from the holder-facing OID4VCI spec endpoints. They are deployment-specific because they depend on your issuer UX and business process, while the holder-facing routes remain standardized for wallet interoperability.

## Including in Your Server

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:services-oid4vci-issuer-rest:0.25.0")
}
```

## Configuration

The issuer is configured through the issuer metadata DSL or YAML. There are two main approaches:

**DSL approach**: build issuer metadata programmatically in Kotlin:

```kotlin
val metadata = issuerMetadata("https://issuer.example.com") {
    authorizationServer("https://auth.example.com")

    credentialConfiguration("IdentityCredential", CredentialFormat.SD_JWT_DC) {
        vct = "https://issuer.example.com/identity"
        scope = "identity"
        bindingMethod("jwk")
        signingAlg(JwaAlgorithm.ES256)
        proofType(ProofType.JWT, JwaAlgorithm.ES256)

        display {
            name = "Identity Credential"
            locale = "en-US"
        }
    }
}
```

**YAML approach**: define everything in configuration files:

```yaml
oid4vci:
  issuer:
    identifier: https://issuer.example.com
    authorizationServers: https://auth.example.com
    credentialConfigurationIds: IdentityCredential
    credentials:
      "[IdentityCredential]":
        format: dc+sd-jwt
        scope: identity
        signingAlgorithms: ES256
        bindingMethods: jwk
        proofTypes:
          jwt:
            signingAlgorithms: ES256
        display:
          name: Identity Credential
          locale: en-US
```

Additional configuration points include:

- **Config provider**: Choose between `ConfigDrivenOid4vciIssuerConfigProvider` (reads from YAML/env vars) or `DesignBackedOid4vciIssuerConfigProvider` (reads from the credential design store).
- **Per-credential issuance policy**: Control grant types, nonce TTL, deferred retry intervals, encryption requirements, and Interactive Authorization Exchange (IAE) settings per credential type.
- **Extension points**: Register custom `CredentialFormatHandler` implementations for additional credential formats, `CredentialAttributeContributor` implementations to supply claims from your business logic, and an `Oid4vciAuthorizationServerBridge` to connect to your OAuth2 infrastructure.

See [OID4VCI Issuer](../guides/oid4vci/issuer) for the full guide, including credential offer creation, attribute contributors, deferred handling, and signed metadata.

## Docker

Each service ships with a Dockerfile and docker-compose configuration in its `container/` directory.

### Building the image

```bash
# Build the fat JAR first
./gradlew :services-oid4vci-issuer-rest:buildFatJar

# Build the Docker image
docker compose -f services/oid4vci-issuer/container/docker-compose.yaml build
```

### Running with Docker Compose

```bash
docker compose -f services/oid4vci-issuer/container/docker-compose.yaml up
```

The service starts on port 8080. Configuration is loaded from `container/config/` inside the image. Override settings via environment variables in a `.env` file next to the docker-compose.yaml.

### Image details

| Property | Value |
|----------|-------|
| Base image | `eclipse-temurin:21-jre` |
| Docker image | `sphereon/idk-oid4vci-issuer:latest` |
| Exposed port | 8080 |
| Config location | `/app/config/` |

## Next Steps

- [Services Overview](./services-overview) for an introduction to all available IDK services and the `CommandBackedHttpAdapter` pattern
- [OID4VCI Issuer Guide](../guides/oid4vci/issuer) for the full guide on credential offer creation, issuer integration, attribute contributors, and deferred handling
- [OID4VCI Holder](./services-oid4vci-holder) for the wallet-side credential acquisition service
- [OAuth2 Authorization Server](./services-oauth2-as) for the authorization server that works alongside the issuer
- [Ktor Integration](../guides/http/ktor) for details on installing and configuring the `KotlinInjectPlugin`

---

# OID4VCI Holder Service

# OID4VCI Holder Service

The OID4VCI Holder service provides wallet-side endpoints for acquiring credentials. It acts as a backend-for-frontend service: a mobile wallet or web wallet calls these endpoints to orchestrate the entire issuance flow without implementing the OID4VCI protocol directly. The service handles offer parsing, issuer metadata resolution, token exchange, proof creation, credential requests, and deferred polling.

## Holder (Wallet) Endpoints

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/sessions` | Create a new issuance session from a credential offer URI. Parses the `openid-credential-offer://` URI, fetches the issuer's metadata from its `.well-known` endpoint, and returns a session object with resolved metadata, available credentials, and grant information. |
| `POST` | `/auth/code` | Exchange an authorization code for tokens. Used after the user authenticates through the authorization code flow. Accepts the code, PKCE code verifier, and redirect URI. Returns an access token and optional `c_nonce`. |
| `POST` | `/auth/pre-authorized` | Exchange a pre-authorized code for tokens. Used when the issuer provides a pre-authorized code grant. Accepts the code and optional transaction code (PIN). Returns an access token and optional `c_nonce`. |
| `POST` | `/credentials` | Request a credential from the issuer. Builds the proof-of-possession JWT, sends the credential request to the issuer's credential endpoint, and returns either the issued credential or a `transactionId` for deferred issuance. |
| `POST` | `/nonce` | Request a fresh `c_nonce` from the issuer's nonce endpoint. Typically called automatically when `autoRequestNonce` is enabled, but available as an explicit endpoint for flows that need manual nonce management. |
| `POST` | `/auth/request` | Build an authorization request URL for the authorization code flow. Returns the URL the wallet should open in a browser, along with the PKCE code verifier to store for the token exchange step. |

## Including in Your Server

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:services-oid4vci-holder-rest:0.25.0")
}
```

## Configuration

The holder service is configured through `Oid4vciHolderConfig`:

| Property | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `clientId` | `null` | OAuth 2.0 client identifier sent in token requests |
| `preferredFormat` | `null` | Preferred credential format (e.g., `dc+sd-jwt`, `mso_mdoc`) |
| `autoRequestNonce` | `true` | Automatically fetch a `c_nonce` before creating proofs |
| `defaultDeferredPollingInterval` | `5` | Seconds between deferred credential polling attempts |
| `maxDeferredPollingAttempts` | `60` | Maximum polling attempts before giving up |
| `requireVerifiedSignedMetadata` | `false` | Require cryptographic verification of signed issuer metadata |

When `requireVerifiedSignedMetadata` is enabled, the holder rejects issuer metadata with an invalid or missing signature. This is recommended for production wallets that need to verify issuer authenticity.

See [OID4VCI Holder](../guides/oid4vci/holder) for the full guide, including authorization code flow, pre-authorized code flow, IAE (Interactive Authorization Exchange), deferred polling, and notification handling.

## Docker

Each service ships with a Dockerfile and docker-compose configuration in its `container/` directory.

### Building the image

```bash
# Build the fat JAR first
./gradlew :services-oid4vci-holder-rest:buildFatJar

# Build the Docker image
docker compose -f services/oid4vci-holder/container/docker-compose.yaml build
```

### Running with Docker Compose

```bash
docker compose -f services/oid4vci-holder/container/docker-compose.yaml up
```

The service starts on port 8080. Configuration is loaded from `container/config/` inside the image. Override settings via environment variables in a `.env` file next to the docker-compose.yaml.

### Image details

| Property | Value |
|----------|-------|
| Base image | `eclipse-temurin:21-jre` |
| Docker image | `sphereon/idk-oid4vci-holder:latest` |
| Exposed port | 8080 |
| Config location | `/app/config/` |

## Next Steps

- [Services Overview](./services-overview) for an introduction to all available IDK services and the `CommandBackedHttpAdapter` pattern
- [OID4VCI Holder Guide](../guides/oid4vci/holder) for the full guide on authorization code flow, pre-authorized code flow, and deferred polling
- [OID4VCI Issuer](./services-oid4vci-issuer) for the holder-facing issuer endpoints and issuer-side integration surface
- [Ktor Integration](../guides/http/ktor) for details on installing and configuring the `KotlinInjectPlugin`

---

# OID4VP Verifier Service

# OID4VP Verifier Service

The OID4VP Verifier service implements the verifier (relying party) side of OpenID for Verifiable Presentations. It handles both same-device and cross-device verification flows, supports DCQL queries and presentation definitions for specifying which credentials to request, and exposes two API surfaces for different callers: wallet-facing OID4VP endpoints and a verifier-facing Universal OID4VP adapter.

## Wallet-Facing OID4VP Endpoints

These endpoints face the holder wallet. They serve request objects to wallets and process the `direct_post` responses that come back. They are the verifier-side OID4VP protocol endpoints, not a lower layer that the Universal OID4VP adapter builds on top of.

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `GET` | `/request/{id}` | Serve an authorization request object. The wallet fetches this URL (from the `request_uri` in the QR code or deep link) to retrieve the full request parameters, including the DCQL query or presentation definition, nonce, and response URI. |
| `POST` | `/request/{id}` | Same as GET but accepts POST, for wallets that prefer it. |
| `POST` | `/response` | Receive the holder's `direct_post` response containing the verifiable presentation(s). The service validates the presentation, checks the nonce, verifies credential signatures, and evaluates the DCQL query or presentation definition against the submitted data. |

## Universal OID4VP Adapter

The Universal OID4VP adapter is the verifier-facing API for the party web app or backend that is initiating verification. It follows the Universal OID4VP model and manages verification sessions, QR code creation, and status polling. This is the recommended integration point for verifier applications that do not want to manage low-level OID4VP message exchange themselves.

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests` | Create a verification session. Accepts a DCQL query (inline or by `query_id` reference), optional webhook callback configuration, TTL, and QR code styling. Returns the session correlation ID, QR code data URI, status polling URL, and the `openid4vp://` request URI. |
| `GET` | `/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/{correlationId}` | Check verification session status. Returns the current state (`CREATED`, `REQUEST_RETRIEVED`, `AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_RECEIVED`, `AUTHORIZATION_RESPONSE_VERIFIED`, `ERROR`, `EXPIRED`) and, when verification succeeds, the verified credential data. |
| `DELETE` | `/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/{correlationId}` | Delete a verification session. Sessions expire automatically based on their TTL, but you can remove them explicitly if a user cancels or navigates away. |

## Including in Your Server

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    // Includes both the wallet-facing OID4VP endpoints and the Universal OID4VP adapter
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:services-oid4vp-verifier-rest:0.25.0")
}
```

## Configuration

- **DCQL queries**: Pre-configure named queries that can be referenced by `query_id` in the Universal OID4VP adapter, so your frontend does not need to construct queries itself.
- **Client ID and scheme**: Set the verifier's `clientId` and `clientIdScheme` (e.g., `redirect_uri`, `x509_san_dns`). When using X.509 schemes, configure the signing key for JAR (JWT-Secured Authorization Requests).
- **Response mode**: Defaults to `direct_post`. The wallet posts its presentation to the wallet-facing verifier response endpoint.
- **Webhook callbacks**: In the Universal OID4VP adapter, configure a callback URL and specify which status transitions trigger the webhook. You can include the verified credential data in the callback payload.
- **Session TTL**: Set the default time-to-live for verification sessions (default: 600 seconds).
- **QR code styling**: Configure default QR code size, foreground color, and background color for the Universal OID4VP adapter.

See [OID4VP Verifier](../guides/oid4vp/verifier) for the wallet-facing OID4VP API and [Universal OID4VP](../guides/oid4vp/universal) for the verifier-facing Universal OID4VP adapter.

## Docker

Each service ships with a Dockerfile and docker-compose configuration in its `container/` directory.

### Building the image

```bash
# Build the fat JAR first
./gradlew :services-oid4vp-verifier-rest:buildFatJar

# Build the Docker image
docker compose -f services/oid4vp-verifier/container/docker-compose.yaml build
```

### Running with Docker Compose

```bash
docker compose -f services/oid4vp-verifier/container/docker-compose.yaml up
```

The service starts on port 8080. Configuration is loaded from `container/config/` inside the image. Override settings via environment variables in a `.env` file next to the docker-compose.yaml.

### Image details

| Property | Value |
|----------|-------|
| Base image | `eclipse-temurin:21-jre` |
| Docker image | `sphereon/idk-oid4vp-verifier:latest` |
| Exposed port | 8080 |
| Config location | `/app/config/` |

## Next Steps

- [Services Overview](./services-overview) for an introduction to all available IDK services and the `CommandBackedHttpAdapter` pattern
- [OID4VP Verifier Guide](../guides/oid4vp/verifier) for the wallet-facing OID4VP API reference
- [Universal OID4VP Guide](../guides/oid4vp/universal) for the verifier-facing Universal OID4VP adapter
- [OID4VCI Issuer](./services-oid4vci-issuer) for credential issuance, the complement to verification
- [Ktor Integration](../guides/http/ktor) for details on installing and configuring the `KotlinInjectPlugin`

---

# Ktor Integration

# Ktor Integration Plugin

The `KotlinInjectPlugin` bridges IDK's Metro DI system with Ktor's request pipeline. It is not an application-level service in its own right, but the foundation that all other IDK HTTP services run on. Every IDK HTTP service depends on this plugin being installed.

## What It Does

On every incoming request, the plugin runs a `UserContextInterceptor` before your route handlers:

1. **Resolves the tenant** from the request via `TenantResolver` (default: reads the `X-Tenant-ID` header, falls back to `"default"`)
2. **Resolves the principal** from the request via `PrincipalResolver` (default: checks `X-User-ID` header, then Ktor auth plugin, falls back to `"anonymous"`)
3. **Creates or retrieves the `UserContextInstance`** for that tenant+principal pair
4. **Creates a `SessionInstance`** scoped to this specific request
5. **Makes all session-scoped services** available to route handlers through `call.getSessionService<T>()`, `call.getUserService<T>()`, and `call.getAppService<T>()`

All of this happens automatically. By the time your handler runs, the DI scopes are set up and every service is ready to use.

## Auto-Discovery of Adapters

When you call `installUniversalHttpAdapters()`, the plugin discovers all `CommandBackedHttpAdapter` instances contributed to the DI graph and mounts them as routes. This is how services register their endpoints without manual route wiring. Each adapter declares a mount point and a list of endpoint commands; the dispatcher indexes them and routes incoming requests by path and HTTP method.

## Including in Your Server

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:ktor-server-kotlin-inject:0.25.0")
}
```

## Configuration

```kotlin
install(KotlinInjectPlugin) {
    appGraph = myAppGraph
    tenantResolver = JwtTenantResolver()       // optional: custom tenant extraction
    principalResolver = JwtPrincipalResolver() // optional: custom principal extraction
}
```

| Option | Default | Description |
|--------|---------|-------------|
| `appGraph` | *(required)* | Your root IDK `AppGraph` |
| `tenantHeader` | `"X-Tenant-ID"` | HTTP header for tenant ID extraction (used by default resolver) |
| `principalHeader` | `"X-User-ID"` | HTTP header for principal ID extraction (used by default resolver) |
| `tenantResolver` | `DefaultTenantResolver` | Custom strategy for resolving the tenant from a request |
| `principalResolver` | `DefaultPrincipalResolver` | Custom strategy for resolving the principal from a request |

The plugin also integrates with the YAML configuration system on JVM. It registers property sources that load `application.yml` from the working directory, config directory, or classpath. These participate in the IDK configuration system at all three scope levels (app, tenant, principal).

See [Ktor Integration](../guides/http/ktor) for full configuration details, including custom resolvers, YAML scope layering, and route-level adapter mounting.

## Next Steps

- [Services Overview](./services-overview) for an introduction to all available IDK services and the `CommandBackedHttpAdapter` pattern
- [Ktor Integration Guide](../guides/http/ktor) for full configuration details, including custom resolvers and YAML scope layering
- [Dependency Injection](../guides/di/scopes) for understanding the App/User/Session scope architecture
- [KMS REST API](./services-kms), [OAuth2 Authorization Server](./services-oauth2-as), and other service pages for services that build on this plugin

---

# Examples

# Examples

The IDK ships with example applications that demonstrate how to combine its services into working systems. These are intended as reference implementations you can study, run locally, and adapt for your own deployments.

:::warning Example, not production
Everything under `examples/` is a didactic, working demo of the IDK wiring. It is **not** a production-ready stack. Auth is disabled on the internal REST ports, signing keys are generated locally with hardcoded passwords, the OAuth2 AS accepts any public client, VCT metadata is served as static files instead of from a blob store, and there is no real identity provider behind the login form. Treat the code as a reference for how the pieces fit together, and build your own deployment on top of the IDK services directly.
:::

## OID4VC Demo

The `examples/oid4vc` directory contains a demo application that ties together three IDK services into a complete credential issuance and verification flow:

- **OID4VCI Issuer**: creates credential offers and issues credentials to holders
- **OID4VP Verifier**: creates authorization requests and verifies presented credentials
- **OAuth2 Authorization Server**: handles the authorization code flow with PKCE

### Screenshots

<div style={{display: 'flex', gap: '1rem', flexWrap: 'wrap', margin: '1rem 0'}}>
  <a href="/img/examples/oid4vc/Issue-credential.png" target="_blank" rel="noopener">
    <img src="/img/examples/oid4vc/Issue-credential.png" alt="Issue credential selection" style={{width: '240px', height: '260px', objectFit: 'cover', objectPosition: 'top', border: '1px solid #e5e7eb', borderRadius: '6px', display: 'block'}} />
    <div style={{fontSize: '0.85rem', textAlign: 'center', marginTop: '0.25rem'}}>Issue credential</div>
  </a>
  <a href="/img/examples/oid4vc/Issue-credential-qr.png" target="_blank" rel="noopener">
    <img src="/img/examples/oid4vc/Issue-credential-qr.png" alt="Credential offer QR code" style={{width: '240px', height: '260px', objectFit: 'cover', objectPosition: 'top', border: '1px solid #e5e7eb', borderRadius: '6px', display: 'block'}} />
    <div style={{fontSize: '0.85rem', textAlign: 'center', marginTop: '0.25rem'}}>Credential offer QR</div>
  </a>
  <a href="/img/examples/oid4vc/Verify-credential.png" target="_blank" rel="noopener">
    <img src="/img/examples/oid4vc/Verify-credential.png" alt="Verify credential" style={{width: '240px', height: '260px', objectFit: 'cover', objectPosition: 'top', border: '1px solid #e5e7eb', borderRadius: '6px', display: 'block'}} />
    <div style={{fontSize: '0.85rem', textAlign: 'center', marginTop: '0.25rem'}}>Verify credential</div>
  </a>
</div>

Click any thumbnail to open the full-size screenshot.

### Prerequisites

Before running the demo, make sure you have the following installed:

- **JDK 17 or later**: the IDK targets Java 17+. OpenJDK distributions like Eclipse Temurin and Amazon Corretto both work.
- **Gradle**: included via the Gradle wrapper (`gradlew` / `gradlew.bat`) in the repository root, so you do not need a separate Gradle installation.
- **Node.js 18+**: required for building the React frontend. Install it from [nodejs.org](https://nodejs.org/) or use a version manager like `nvm`.
- **A modern browser**: Chrome, Firefox, Safari, or Edge.

Verify your environment:

```bash
java -version    # Should print 17 or higher
node -v          # Should print v18.x or later
```

### Project Structure

```
examples/oid4vc/
  webapp/
    server/        # Ktor web application (API + React SPA serving)
    client/        # React SPA source
  services/
    docker-compose.yaml         # Full environment definition
    Caddyfile                   # Reverse proxy routing rules
    Dockerfile.service          # Shared service image definition
    start.sh / start.bat        # Pulls published sphereon/idk-* images and runs them
    start-dev.sh / start-dev.bat  # Builds fat JARs + images from local source
    build-images.sh / .bat      # Builds Docker images without starting anything
    publish-images.sh / .bat    # Pushes images to a registry (with SNAPSHOT/dirty guards)
    lib/                        # Shared helpers (base-URL, VCT templating, keystore gen) in bash + PowerShell
    config/                     # Per-service YAML configuration
    keystores/                  # Generated PKCS12 keystores (created on first start)
    jars/                       # Fat JARs produced by Gradle (dev mode only)
    vct/                        # SD-JWT VC type metadata templates
    well-known/                 # Static well-known metadata served by Caddy
    assets/                     # Static assets (logos, backgrounds) served by Caddy
    postman/                    # Postman collection for manual testing
```

### Architecture

The demo runs as a set of Docker containers behind a Caddy reverse proxy. Each IDK service runs in its own container, and Caddy routes requests to the right service based on the URL path.

| Container | Image | Role |
|-----------|-------|------|
| **Caddy** | `caddy:2-alpine` | Reverse proxy on port 8080. Routes `/oid4vci/*` to the issuer, `/oid4vp/*` to the verifier, `/.well-known/*` to the appropriate service, `/webapp/*` to the web app, and everything else to the OAuth2 AS. Also serves static VCT metadata and assets. |
| **Webapp** | `sphereon/idk-oid4vc-webapp` | Ktor web application serving the React SPA and providing API endpoints for the frontend. |
| **OAuth2 AS** | `sphereon/idk-oauth2-as` | Authorization server handling login, consent, token issuance, and OIDC discovery. |
| **OID4VCI Issuer** | `sphereon/idk-oid4vci-issuer` | Credential issuer with offer creation, nonce, credential request, and deferred issuance endpoints. |
| **OID4VP Verifier** | `sphereon/idk-oid4vp-verifier` | Presentation verifier with authorization request creation, request object serving, and direct_post response handling. |

All containers communicate over an internal Docker network. Only Caddy exposes port 8080 to the host.

### HTTPS Is Usually Required

Before you run the demo, decide how wallets will reach it. **Most production wallets refuse to talk to HTTP issuers and verifiers**. The OID4VCI / OID4VP specs allow `http://` for loopback and localhost only, and in practice mobile wallets reject anything that isn't `https://` with a trusted certificate. If you plan to test with a real wallet on a phone, you need TLS termination in front of the demo.

The demo itself does not run a TLS listener. Caddy is configured for plain HTTP on port 8080 because the CA, hostname, and ports would otherwise have to be pinned per developer. Terminate TLS externally and hand the demo your public `https://` URL via the `start.sh` / `start-dev.sh` argument.

The easiest path during development is a tunnel service that gives you a public HTTPS hostname backed by a trusted cert:

**ngrok:**

```bash
# In one terminal: open a public HTTPS tunnel to localhost:8080
ngrok http 8080
# Forwarding: https://abc123.ngrok-free.app -> http://localhost:8080

# In another terminal: start the demo with that URL
cd examples/oid4vc/services
./start.sh https://abc123.ngrok-free.app
```

The URL becomes the `EXTERNAL_BASE_URL` everywhere: issuer identifier, AS issuer, VCT URIs, credential offer `openid-credential-offer://` URIs embedded in QR codes. Wallets see a valid HTTPS URL with a cert they already trust, and all spec-level same-origin and issuer-identifier checks pass.

Other tunnel services that work the same way: Cloudflare Tunnel (`cloudflared tunnel --url http://localhost:8080`), localtunnel (`lt --port 8080`), Tailscale Funnel, or any reverse proxy in front of the demo (nginx, Caddy, Traefik) with a real cert from Let's Encrypt. Whichever you choose, the rule is the same: pass the public HTTPS URL to the start script as the first argument.

LAN IP (`http://192.168.x.x:8080`) works for a narrow subset of wallets and for bespoke dev wallets that allow HTTP. It is fine for exploring the flows with the built-in web wallet on the same machine, but as soon as you pull out a phone with a production wallet the HTTP URL will be rejected. Plan for HTTPS from the start, it avoids spending hours on "why doesn't my wallet load this offer" debugging.

:::tip Keep the URL stable across restarts
Free ngrok URLs rotate every session. Use a reserved subdomain (`ngrok http --hostname=myidk.ngrok-free.app 8080`) or a Cloudflare Tunnel backed by your own domain so you don't have to re-issue QR codes and update VCT metadata on every demo run. The start scripts re-template `vct/resolved/*.json` with whatever URL you pass, so changing domains mid-session is safe, but any credentials already issued against the old URL will fail the VCT fetch on next wallet sync.
:::

### Running the Demo

There are two entrypoints. Pick the one that matches your situation:

| Script | Purpose | Requires IDK source? | Builds images? | Pulls from Docker Hub? |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `start.sh` / `start.bat` | Run published `sphereon/idk-*` images | no | no | yes (`docker compose pull`) |
| `start-dev.sh` / `start-dev.bat` | Iterate on local IDK source | yes | yes (via `docker compose up --build`) | no |
| `build-images.sh` / `.bat` | Build release-candidate images locally | yes | yes | no |
| `publish-images.sh` / `.bat` | Push release images to a registry | yes | pushes pre-built tags | push |

**End-users / demos (published images):**

```bash
cd examples/oid4vc/services
./start.sh https://abc123.ngrok-free.app     # Recommended: public HTTPS URL
IDK_VERSION=0.25.0 ./start.sh https://...    # Pin a specific release
./start.sh                                   # Fallback: auto-detect LAN IP (HTTP only, most wallets reject)
```

`start.sh` resolves `IDK_VERSION` from (1) the environment, (2) `vdx/edk/idk/gradle.properties` `version=` if the source tree is present, (3) `latest`. It does not run Gradle, so an end-user can clone just the `examples/oid4vc/services/` directory plus the IDK source checkout is optional.

**Contributors iterating on IDK source (local build):**

```bash
cd examples/oid4vc/services
./start-dev.sh
```

`start-dev.sh` runs Gradle to rebuild fat JARs, generates keystores, templates VCTs, and does `docker compose up -d --build`, so every change you make to IDK source becomes a new image on the next run. Image tags produced: `sphereon/idk-<svc>:<IDK_VERSION>` plus `:latest`.

Both scripts:
1. Resolve `EXTERNAL_BASE_URL` from (in order) the first positional argument, the `EXTERNAL_BASE_URL` env var, or LAN IP auto-detection. For anything beyond local-machine testing, pass a public `https://` URL (see [HTTPS Is Usually Required](#https-is-usually-required)).
2. Generate PKCS12 keystores with EC P-256 signing keys (pre-seeded aliases `TestCredential`, `PID`, `AgeOver18`, `oauth2-server-signing`, `oid4vp-verifier-signing`) via shared helpers in `lib/`.
3. Template VCT type metadata with the resolved external URL (safeguards against a silent sed failure that would otherwise produce stale `vct/resolved/*.json`; see the script comments).
4. Write a `.env` file (`EXTERNAL_BASE_URL`, `IDK_VERSION`) consumed by `docker-compose.yaml`.
5. Bring up the Caddy + four IDK containers.

Once running:
- Open `http://<your-ip>:8080` in a browser (Caddy redirects `/` to `/webapp/issuer`)
- Issuer identifier: `http://<your-ip>:8080/oid4vci`
- Issuer metadata (RFC 8615 insert form): `http://<your-ip>:8080/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer/oid4vci`
- OAuth2 AS issuer: `http://<your-ip>:8080/auth`
- AS discovery: `http://<your-ip>:8080/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/auth`

The `EXTERNAL_BASE_URL` matters because wallets on other devices (phones) need to reach the demo over the network, not via `localhost`, and for almost all production wallets that reach must be over HTTPS, so this is typically a tunnel URL like `https://abc123.ngrok-free.app` rather than a LAN IP.

#### Versioning

Docker image tags track IDK's own version from `vdx/edk/idk/gradle.properties` (`version=...`). There is no separate example version: a release of IDK becomes an image release of the four services (`sphereon/idk-oauth2-as`, `sphereon/idk-oid4vci-issuer`, `sphereon/idk-oid4vp-verifier`, `sphereon/idk-oid4vc-webapp`).

`IDK_VERSION` resolution order used by both start scripts:
1. `IDK_VERSION` environment variable (explicit override).
2. `vdx/edk/idk/gradle.properties` `version=` field, when the IDK source tree is available next to `examples/`.
3. `latest` (with a warning) when neither is present.

### Building and Publishing Images

If you are packaging a release of the example for distribution, use `build-images.sh` and `publish-images.sh` rather than driving `docker push` directly. They handle version resolution, three-tag tagging (`:<IDK_VERSION>`, `:latest`, `:<git-sha>`), and publish-time safety checks.

**Build images without starting anything:**

```bash
cd examples/oid4vc/services
./build-images.sh                        # sphereon/idk-* (default registry)
REGISTRY=ghcr.io/sphereon ./build-images.sh   # private registry
```

The default registry prefix is `sphereon` on Docker Hub. Override with `REGISTRY` (any path prefix works: `ghcr.io/myorg`, `myregistry.example.com/team`, etc.). The version comes from `vdx/edk/idk/gradle.properties`, so there is no separate version string to maintain.

**Push images to a registry:**

```bash
docker login docker.io

./publish-images.sh                      # Release build
./publish-images.sh --allow-snapshot     # Internal preview of a SNAPSHOT
./publish-images.sh --dirty              # Allow uncommitted changes in the tree
REGISTRY=ghcr.io/sphereon ./publish-images.sh
```

Safety defaults:
- Refuses to push a `*-SNAPSHOT` version unless `--allow-snapshot` is passed.
- Refuses to push if the IDK source tree has uncommitted changes unless `--dirty` is passed.
- `:latest` is only pushed for non-SNAPSHOT releases, so the stable tag is not polluted by preview builds. Per-version and git-SHA tags are always pushed.

Image names published: `sphereon/idk-oauth2-as`, `sphereon/idk-oid4vci-issuer`, `sphereon/idk-oid4vp-verifier`, `sphereon/idk-oid4vc-webapp`.

### Caddy Reverse Proxy

Caddy routes incoming requests by path prefix:

| Path | Destination |
|------|-------------|
| `/` (and `/webapp`, `/webapp/`) | Redirects to `/webapp/issuer` |
| `/webapp/*` | Webapp container (React SPA + API), `/webapp` prefix stripped |
| `/assets/*` | Static assets (logos, backgrounds) served by Caddy |
| `/oid4vci/vct/*` | Static VCT metadata JSON served by Caddy |
| `/oid4vci/*` | OID4VCI Issuer (protocol + backend routes) |
| `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer/oid4vci` | OID4VCI Issuer (RFC 8615 insert form, spec-correct) |
| `/oid4vci/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` | OID4VCI Issuer (pre-1.0 append form, compatibility) |
| `/.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer`, `/.well-known/jwt-vc-issuer/oid4vci` | OID4VCI Issuer (SD-JWT VC issuer metadata) |
| `/oid4vp/*` | OID4VP Verifier |
| `/auth/*` | OAuth2 AS (login, authorize, token, etc.), `/auth` prefix stripped |
| `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/auth` | OAuth2 AS (RFC 8414 insert form) |
| `/.well-known/openid-configuration/auth` | OAuth2 AS (OIDC Discovery insert form) |
| `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`, `/.well-known/openid-configuration` | OAuth2 AS (root fallback) |
| `/.well-known/jwks.json` | OAuth2 AS (JWT access token verification keys) |

All services share a single external hostname and port. The issuer is path-scoped at `/oid4vci` and the OAuth2 AS at `/auth`, so their well-known metadata follows the RFC 8615 / RFC 8414 insert form. Wallets see one server; the services are isolated internally.

### What Happens When You Run It

The breakdown differs slightly by entrypoint:

**`start-dev.sh`** (local build):

1. Gradle builds fat JARs for the OAuth2 AS, OID4VCI issuer, OID4VP verifier, and webapp.
2. PKCS12 keystores are generated with EC P-256 signing keys (one per service, pre-seeded aliases like `TestCredential`, `PID`, `AgeOver18` for the issuer).
3. `docker compose up -d --build` builds each image from `Dockerfile.service` using the fresh JARs, tagging them `sphereon/idk-<svc>:<IDK_VERSION>` and `:latest`.
4. Caddy waits for all services to become healthy, then starts accepting connections on port 8080.

**`start.sh`** (published images):

1. PKCS12 keystores are generated if they do not already exist (keystores persist across runs).
2. `docker compose pull` fetches `sphereon/idk-*:${IDK_VERSION}` from Docker Hub.
3. `docker compose up -d` starts the containers without rebuilding.
4. Caddy waits for health checks, then opens port 8080.

In both cases, open `http://<your-ip>:8080` in a browser. Caddy redirects `/` to `/webapp/issuer`.

If any port is already in use, the server will fail to bind and print an error. Stop the conflicting process or change the port in the configuration (see [Configuration](#configuration) below).

### Issuance Flow

The demo walks through a full OID4VCI credential issuance. Here is what happens step by step as you use it:

1. **Create a credential offer.** On the issuer page, select a credential type (for example, `IdentityCredential` or `UniversityDegree`). The issuer calls `createCredentialOffer()` with the selected credential configuration ID and generates a pre-authorized code grant. The result is an `openid-credential-offer://` URI.

2. **Display the offer.** The frontend renders the offer URI as a QR code. In a production deployment, a mobile wallet would scan this QR code. In the demo, the web frontend also shows a clickable link so you can proceed without a phone.

3. **Resolve issuer metadata.** When the holder (simulated by the demo's built-in wallet page) receives the offer, it fetches the issuer's `.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` metadata to discover available credential configurations, supported formats, proof types, and the authorization server URL.

4. **Exchange the pre-authorized code for an access token.** The holder sends the pre-authorized code to the OAuth2 token endpoint. If the offer requires a transaction code (PIN), the user enters it first. The authorization server validates the code, issues an access token (with optional DPoP binding), and returns it to the holder.

5. **Request the credential.** The holder creates a proof-of-possession JWT, binding the credential to its key pair, and sends a credential request to the issuer's `/credential` endpoint with the access token. The issuer validates the token, verifies the proof, resolves the credential attributes from its configured `CredentialAttributeContributor`, and signs the credential using the appropriate format handler.

6. **Receive the credential.** The issuer returns the signed credential (SD-JWT, mDoc, or JWT VC depending on the configuration). The demo displays the raw credential and its decoded claims in the browser.

### Verification Flow

After issuance, the demo lets you verify the credential through OID4VP:

1. **Create an authorization request.** On the verifier page, select which claims you want to verify. The verifier builds a DCQL query specifying the credential format, document type, and required claims. It calls `createAuthorizationRequest()` with `direct_post` response mode and generates an `openid4vp://` URI containing the request.

2. **Display the request.** The frontend renders the authorization request URI as a QR code. As with issuance, the demo also provides a clickable link for same-device testing.

3. **Select credentials to present.** The holder (the demo's wallet page) parses the authorization request, matches it against held credentials, and shows the user which credentials satisfy the query and which claims will be disclosed. The user selects which credential to present.

4. **Submit the presentation.** The holder creates a verifiable presentation containing the selected credential with only the requested claims disclosed (using selective disclosure for SD-JWT or IssuerAuth namespaces for mDoc). It POSTs the `vp_token` and `state` to the verifier's `direct_post` endpoint.

5. **Validate the presentation.** The verifier parses the response, validates it against the original DCQL query, checks that the nonce matches, and verifies holder binding (proving the presenter holds the private key the credential was bound to). The result includes the disclosed claims and the verification status.

6. **View the result.** The demo displays whether verification succeeded, which claims were disclosed, and the details of the holder binding check (signature validity, nonce match, audience match).

### Configuration

The demo uses the IDK's layered configuration system. Each service has its own YAML config file in `services/config/`, and a small set of environment variables supply the values that differ per deployment (hostname, keystore password, internal client secret). Environment variables override anything in the file, and `${env:NAME}` placeholders inside the YAML are resolved from the process environment at startup.

There are three service config files, one per container: `oid4vci-issuer.yml`, `oid4vp-verifier.yml`, and `oauth2-as.yml`. All three share a common top-level block for the HTTP server and the KMS provider, and then carry their own service-specific section.

#### Shared blocks

Every service binds a REST port and loads a PKCS12 keystore from the path mounted into the container:

```yaml
server:
  rest:
    port: 8080
    auth:
      enabled: false
      anonymous:
        allowed: true

kms:
  providers:
    software:
      type: software
      enabled: true
      keystore:
        type: pkcs12
        id: software
        password: "${env:KEYSTORE_PASSWORD}"
        path: /app/keystore/keystore.p12
```

Auth is disabled in the demo so you can exercise the flows without a frontdoor login. Real deployments flip `auth.enabled` on and wire in OIDC. The keystore is generated by `start.sh` with pre-seeded aliases (`TestCredential`, `PID`, `AgeOver18`, `oid4vp-verifier-signing`) that the other configuration blocks reference by name.

#### Issuer (`oid4vci-issuer.yml`)

The issuer defines its identity, the authorization server it trusts for tokens, and one entry per credential it can issue:

```yaml
oid4vci:
  issuer:
    identifier: "${env:EXTERNAL_BASE_URL}/oid4vci"
    authorization-servers: "${env:EXTERNAL_BASE_URL}/auth"
    signing-key-alias: TestCredential
    credential-configuration-ids: TestCredential,EuPid,AgeOver18

    # Back-channel OAuth2 client credentials the issuer uses to call the AS
    # for token introspection and nonce validation.
    as-bridge:
      internal-url: "${env:OAUTH2_AS_INTERNAL_URL}"
      client-id: issuer-service
      client-secret: "${env:INTERNAL_CLIENT_SECRET}"

    credentials:
      "[TestCredential]":
        format: "dc+sd-jwt"
        vct: "${env:EXTERNAL_BASE_URL}/oid4vci/vct/TestCredential"
        scope: test_credential
        signing-key-alias: TestCredential
        signing-key-mode: "did:jwk"
        signing-algorithms: ES256
        expiration-in-days: 365
        binding-methods: jwk,did:jwk,did:key
        proof-types:
          jwt:
            signing-algorithms: ES256
        claims:
          given_name: { mandatory: false }
          family_name: { mandatory: false }
          email: { mandatory: true }

      "[AgeOver18]":
        format: "mso_mdoc"
        doctype: "eu.europa.ec.av.1"
        scope: age_verification
        signing-key-alias: AgeOver18
        signing-algorithms: ES256
        expiration-in-days: 365
        binding-methods: cose_key
        claims:
          age_over_18: { mandatory: true }

  rest:
    external-base-url: "${env:EXTERNAL_BASE_URL}"
```

`identifier` and `authorization-servers` are resolved from `EXTERNAL_BASE_URL` so the service graph reaches the same hostname the wallet does; mixing up internal and external URLs is the most common cause of metadata mismatch errors in OID4VCI. `signing-key-alias` at the issuer level names the key used to sign issuer metadata (OID4VCI §13.2.4), while each credential entry can pin its own signing key to rotate them independently. `signing-key-mode: did:jwk` drives how the signing key identifies itself in JOSE headers; the `binding-methods` list declares what the holder side may bind to (for SD-JWT: raw JWK and DID-based, for mDoc: COSE keys). `as-bridge` is the back-channel the issuer uses to talk to the AS for token validation, using `client_credentials` against a registered internal client. The demo ships with three credential configurations (one SD-JWT, one EU PID SD-JWT, one mDoc age attestation) to exercise both mainstream formats.

Credential configuration IDs are wrapped in square brackets (`[TestCredential]`) so the IDK's key normalizer treats them as literal map keys rather than folding the CamelCase into dotted segments. See [Literal Key Segments](../guides/config/configuration#literal-key-segments) for the underlying rule.

#### Verifier (`oid4vp-verifier.yml`)

The verifier declares its external base URL, the response endpoint wallets should POST presentations back to, and how it signs JAR (JWT-secured) authorization requests:

```yaml
oid4vp:
  universal:
    external-base-url: "${env:EXTERNAL_BASE_URL}"
    response-uri: "${env:EXTERNAL_BASE_URL}/oid4vp/auth/response"
  verifier:
    request-object:
      signing:
        enabled: true
        key-alias: oid4vp-verifier-signing
        mode: "did:jwk"            # or x509_san_dns, x509_hash
        include-iss: false
        audience: "https://self-issued.me/v2"
        expiration-seconds: 300
```

The verifier has no explicit `client-id`. It is derived from `mode` per OID4VP §5.9.3 (Client Identifier Prefixes): `did:jwk` yields a `decentralized_identifier:<did>` prefix and puts the DID verification method URL in the JOSE `kid`; `x509_san_dns` requires a matching `san-dns-name` entry and takes the x5c chain from the KMS key; `x509_hash` pins a SHA-256 of the leaf cert as a trust anchor. The demo uses `did:jwk` because it works out of the box from any key without certificate plumbing. `include-iss` defaults to `false` (spec-correct, §5.10 lists `iss` as SHOULD not MUST) and can be flipped on for older wallets that still require it. `audience` is the wallet-side audience claim on the signed request; `expiration-seconds` bounds the request object validity window.

#### Authorization server (`oauth2-as.yml`)

The AS runs in hosted mode with PKCE mandatory and JWT access tokens:

```yaml
oauth2:
  servers:
    default:
      mode: HOSTED
      issuer: "${env:EXTERNAL_BASE_URL}/auth"
      oidc: SUPPORTED
      pkce: REQUIRED
      token-format: JWT
      access-token-lifetime-seconds: 3600
      authorization-code-lifetime-seconds: 600
      grant-types-enabled: "authorization_code,urn:ietf:params:oauth:grant-type:pre-authorized_code,client_credentials,refresh_token"
      public-clients:
        allow-any: true
      internal-clients:
        issuer:
          client-id: issuer-service
          client-secret: "${env:INTERNAL_CLIENT_SECRET}"
```

`mode: HOSTED` means the IDK runs the AS in-process: it serves the full authorization, token, and discovery endpoints itself. The alternative, `EXTERNAL`, makes the IDK act as an OAuth2 client against a separately deployed AS (in that case the endpoint overrides and client credentials under `oauth2.servers.default` apply instead). `pkce: REQUIRED` rejects public-client flows that omit the code challenge, which is the correct default for anything that will run on a mobile wallet. The four grant types enabled cover: the user-facing authorization code flow (wallet via browser), the OID4VCI pre-authorized code flow (scanned from a QR), the back-channel client-credentials flow (the issuer calls the AS, matching `as-bridge` above), and refresh tokens. `public-clients.allow-any: true` is a demo convenience: any `client_id` is accepted as a public client. Production deployments switch this off and register clients explicitly. `internal-clients.issuer` is the only registered confidential client, used by the issuer service to authenticate its AS calls.

#### Environment variables

The demo reads five environment variables, and every `${env:...}` reference in the YAML resolves to one of them:

| Variable | Used by | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `EXTERNAL_BASE_URL` | all three | The hostname wallets and browsers reach (for example `https://abc123.ngrok-free.app`, or a LAN IP like `http://192.168.1.10:8080` for HTTP-tolerant dev wallets). Issuer identifier, AS issuer, verifier base URL, and VCT URIs all hang off this. Production wallets require HTTPS (see [HTTPS Is Usually Required](#https-is-usually-required)). |
| `KEYSTORE_PASSWORD` | all three | PKCS12 keystore password. Generated by `start.sh`. |
| `OAUTH2_AS_INTERNAL_URL` | issuer | Docker-network URL the issuer uses to reach the AS back-channel. Usually `http://oauth2-as:8080`. |
| `INTERNAL_CLIENT_SECRET` | issuer, AS | Shared secret between the issuer and the AS for `client_credentials`. Both sides must match. |
| `SERVER_REST_PORT` | any | Overrides `server.rest.port` if you need a service on a different port. Rarely needed in the demo because Caddy hides the internals. |

Setting `EXTERNAL_BASE_URL` correctly is the one thing the demo script cares about. `start.sh` auto-detects a LAN IP as a fallback, but for anything beyond a same-machine web wallet you almost always want to pass a public HTTPS tunnel URL explicitly: `./start.sh https://abc123.ngrok-free.app`. See [HTTPS Is Usually Required](#https-is-usually-required) for why, and [Running the Demo](#running-the-demo) for the resolution order.

### End-to-End Tests

The `e2e/` directory contains automated test scenarios that exercise the full issuance and verification flow programmatically. These tests start the services, perform the protocol exchanges, and assert on the results:

```bash
./gradlew :examples:oid4vc:e2e:test
```

The E2E tests are useful both as a validation tool and as additional code examples showing how to call the IDK services directly without the HTTP layer.

### Extending the Demo

The demo is designed to be a starting point. Here are common modifications:

#### Adding a New Credential Type

Walk-through for an SD-JWT credential. Adapt step 2 for `mso_mdoc` (use `doctype` instead of `vct`, `binding-methods: cose_key`).

1. **Create the VCT type metadata.** Add `vct/MyNewCredential.json` describing the claims, top-level display, and per-claim display. Include every locale you want wallets to render; the shipped examples carry `en-US`, `de-DE`, `es-ES`, `nl-NL`, `fr-FR`, `zh-CN`, `ja-JP`. Wallets pick the best match for the user's preferred locale; a claim with no matching locale falls back to the first entry. Use `vct/TestCredential.json` as a template. The VCT URL must literally equal the URL the wallet fetches it from; the start scripts substitute `EXTERNAL_BASE_URL` into the `vct` field at boot, so reference it as `EXTERNAL_BASE_URL` in the source file and leave the resolved form to the templater.

2. **Add a credential configuration block** to `config/oid4vci-issuer.yml` under `oid4vci.issuer.credentials`. Note the literal-key bracket form; it prevents the IDK key normalizer from folding CamelCase into dotted segments:

   ```yaml
   oid4vci:
     issuer:
       credential-configuration-ids: TestCredential,EuPid,AgeOver18,MyNewCredential
       credentials:
         "[MyNewCredential]":
           format: "dc+sd-jwt"
           vct: "${env:EXTERNAL_BASE_URL}/oid4vci/vct/MyNewCredential"
           scope: my_credential
           signing-key-alias: MyNewCredential
           signing-key-mode: "did:jwk"
           signing-algorithms: ES256
           expiration-in-days: 365
           binding-methods: jwk,did:jwk,did:key
           proof-types:
             jwt:
               signing-algorithms: ES256
           claims:
             name: { mandatory: true }
             age:  { mandatory: false }
   ```

3. **Provision a signing key** for the new credential. Append the alias to the `oid4vci-issuer` keystore generation in `lib/generate-keystores.sh` (and `lib/generate-keystores.ps1` for Windows parity): `generate_keystore "oid4vci-issuer" "TestCredential" "PID" "AgeOver18" "MyNewCredential"`. If the keystore already exists the script skips it; delete `keystores/oid4vci-issuer/keystore.p12` on first change, or add the alias via `keytool -importkeystore` manually. Re-using `signing-key-alias: TestCredential` (or any other existing alias) is also fine for a shared key.

4. **Implement a `CredentialAttributeContributor`** to return the claims at issuance time, or add static attributes to the offer using the `attributes` block on the offer request. See [Custom Claim Sources](#custom-claim-sources) below.

5. If you need a format not already covered by the built-in handlers (`dc+sd-jwt`, `mso_mdoc`, `jwt_vc_json`), implement a custom `CredentialFormatHandler` and register it in the DI graph.

6. **Rebuild and restart.** In dev: `./start-dev.sh` rebuilds the issuer image and picks up both the YAML change and the new VCT file. In published-image mode: you must republish the issuer image (or bind-mount the updated `config/` directory; the compose file already does this for `oid4vci-issuer.yml`).

#### Custom Claim Sources

The demo uses a simple in-memory attribute contributor that returns hardcoded claims. To pull claims from an external system:

1. Create a class implementing `CredentialAttributeContributor`.
2. In its `contribute()` method, query your user database, identity provider, or external API.
3. Register it with `@ContributesIntoSet(AppScope::class)` so the issuer picks it up automatically. Multiple contributors can be registered; their results are merged.

#### Using a Real KMS

The demo uses the software KMS provider, which stores keys in memory. For production:

- **AWS KMS**: Add `lib-crypto-kms-provider-aws` to your dependencies and configure the provider ID, region, and credentials.
- **Azure Key Vault**: Add `lib-crypto-kms-provider-azure` and configure the vault URL and authentication.

See the [KMS Providers](../guides/crypto/kms-providers) guide for configuration details.

## Next Steps

- [Services Overview](../services/services-overview): Details on the individual services used in the demo
- [OID4VCI Issuer Guide](../guides/oid4vci/issuer): How credential issuance works under the hood
- [OID4VP Verifier Guide](../guides/oid4vp/verifier): How presentation verification works
- [Configuration](../guides/config/configuration): The layered configuration system used by the demo
- [Application Setup](../guides/di/app-setup): Defining your application graph and initializing the IDK

---

# Module Reference

# Module Reference

All IDK modules follow the `com.sphereon.idk:<artifact-id>` naming convention and are versioned together. Use the [BOM](installation#bill-of-materials-bom) to align versions, or specify `0.25.0` explicitly.

Modules marked with **-public** contain interfaces, data classes, and common logic. Modules marked with **-impl** (or **-default**) contain injectable implementations. See [Installation](installation#module-architecture) for details on this pattern.

## Core

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-core-api-public` | Core interfaces, `IdkResult`, error types, scope definitions (`AppScope`, `UserScope`, `SessionScope`), `AbstractAppGraph` base class |
| `lib-core-api-default` | Default implementations: root scope provider, session context manager, graph factories |
| `lib-conf-settings` | Configuration system: property sources, property resolution, secrets, multi-tenancy |
| `lib-core-events-public` | Event bus interfaces and event types |
| `lib-core-events-impl` | Event bus implementation and DI contributions |
| `lib-core-loggers-mobile-logger` | Mobile logging provider with in-memory buffer, platform-native output (Logcat / NSLog), and log export |
| `lib-core-test` | Test utilities and helpers for IDK-based tests |
| `lib-core-compat` | Compatibility layer for cross-platform APIs |

## HTTP Client

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-data-link-http-client-public` | HTTP client factory interface and configuration |
| `lib-data-link-http-client-impl` | Ktor-based HTTP client implementation |

## Cryptography

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-crypto-core-public` | Identifier resolution (`IIdentifierService`), signing/verification interfaces, COSE/JOSE types, X.509 models |
| `lib-crypto-core-impl` | Identifier resolution implementations, JWS/JWE/COSE operations, X.509 chain validation |

### KMS Providers

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-crypto-kms-provider-software` | Software-based key storage using in-memory or file-backed keys. Available on all platforms |
| `lib-crypto-kms-provider-mobile` | iOS Secure Enclave and Android Keystore integration |
| `lib-crypto-kms-provider-aws` | AWS KMS integration |
| `lib-crypto-kms-provider-azure` | Azure Key Vault integration |
| `lib-crypto-kms-provider-rest` | Remote KMS via REST API |
| `lib-crypto-kms-rest-api` | KMS REST API models (shared between client and server) |
| `lib-crypto-kms-rest-server` | KMS REST server (expose a KMS over HTTP) |

## Decentralized Identifiers (DID)

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-did-core-public` | DID Document model, DID URL parsing, verification method types |
| `lib-did-resolver-public` | `DidResolver` interface, resolution metadata, resolution options |
| `lib-did-resolver-impl` | Composite DID resolver, resolution caching, DI contributions |
| `lib-did-manager-public` | `DidManager` interface for creating, updating, and deactivating DIDs |
| `lib-did-manager-impl` | DID management implementation |

### DID Methods

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-did-methods-key` | `did:key` method: self-contained key-based DIDs |
| `lib-did-methods-jwk` | `did:jwk` method: JWK-encoded DIDs |
| `lib-did-methods-web` | `did:web` method: DNS-anchored DIDs resolved over HTTPS |

### DID Persistence

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-did-persistence-api` | Persistence interface for DID document storage |
| `lib-did-persistence-memory` | In-memory DID persistence (development/testing) |
| `lib-did-persistence-sqlite` | SQLite-backed DID persistence |

### DID Server

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-did-rest-resolver-server` | Universal Resolver compatible REST server |

## Trust Establishment

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-trust-core-public` | `TrustValidationService` interface, `TrustContext`, `TrustStatus`, `TrustAnchor`, revocation interfaces |
| `lib-trust-core-impl` | Composite trust validator, composite revocation checker (OCSP + CRL), caching |
| `lib-trust-etsi-entities-public` | ETSI TS 119 612/602 entity models (trust service providers, services, service history) |
| `lib-trust-etsi` | ETSI trust list parsing (XML TSL + JSON LoTE), trust list resolution, XML signature verification |
| `lib-trust-x509` | X.509 trust validation: CA bundle matching, fingerprint comparison, chain building |
| `lib-trust-did` | DID-based trust: method allow-lists, trusted DID lists, controller chain validation |
| `lib-trust-oidfed` | OpenID Federation trust: trust chain resolution, trust mark verification |

## SD-JWT

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-sdjwt-public` | SD-JWT interfaces, disclosure models, CNF builder, holder binding types |
| `lib-sdjwt-impl` | SD-JWT issuance, verification, and selective disclosure implementation |

## OAuth 2.0

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-oauth2-common-public` | Shared OAuth2 types: token models, error types, grant types |
| `lib-oauth2-common-impl` | Shared OAuth2 implementations |
| `lib-oauth2-client-public` | `OAuth2Client` interface, `DpopService`, `PkceService`, token request/response models |
| `lib-oauth2-client-impl` | OAuth2 client implementation: authorization code, client credentials, pre-authorized code, token exchange, DPoP, PKCE |
| `lib-oauth2-server-authorization-public` | `AuthorizationServerService` interface, command models for all grant types, storage interfaces |
| `lib-oauth2-server-authorization-impl` | Authorization server implementation: RFC 6749, 7636, 8693, 9449, 9126, 7662, 7009, 8414, OIDC |
| `lib-oauth2-server-resource-public` | Resource server token validation interfaces |
| `lib-oauth2-server-resource-impl` | Resource server implementation |

### JWT Validation

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-oauth2-jwt-validation-api` | `JwtValidationService` interface, `IdpConfig` with factory methods for OIDC/Keycloak/Azure AD/Auth0/Okta |
| `lib-oauth2-jwt-validation-impl` | JWT validation implementation with JWKS fetching, caching, and multi-tenant support |

## OpenID4VP

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-dcql` | DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) query parser and evaluator |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-common-public` | Shared OID4VP types: authorization request/response, presentation definition models |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-common-impl` | Shared OID4VP implementations |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-holder-public` | Holder/wallet interfaces for processing authorization requests and creating presentations |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-holder-impl` | Holder implementation |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-verifier-public` | Verifier/relying-party interfaces for creating requests and validating presentations |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-verifier-impl` | Verifier implementation |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-universal-public` | Combined holder + verifier with HTTP adapter for same-device and cross-device flows |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-universal-impl` | Universal OID4VP implementation |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-auth-bridge-public` | Authentication bridge: converts OID4VP presentations into OAuth2 token responses |
| `lib-openid-oid4vp-auth-bridge-impl` | Auth bridge implementation |

## Credential Claims Mapping

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-credential-claims-mapper-public` | Interfaces for mapping and transforming credential claims across formats |
| `lib-credential-claims-mapper-impl` | Claims mapper implementation |

## Mobile Credentials (mDoc)

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-cbor-public` | CBOR encoding/decoding types |
| `lib-mdoc-core-public` | mDoc/mDL data models, device request/response, issuer-signed items |
| `lib-mdoc-core-impl` | mDoc core implementation: CBOR encoding, session encryption, MSO verification |
| `lib-mdoc-datatransfer-public` | Engagement manager, transfer manager, event hub interfaces |
| `lib-mdoc-datatransfer-impl` | Data transfer orchestration implementation |
| `lib-mdoc-reader` | Reader/verifier utilities for mDoc presentation verification |

### mDoc Transports

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-mdoc-transport-ble-public` | BLE transport interfaces |
| `lib-mdoc-transport-ble-impl` | Bluetooth Low Energy transport (central and peripheral mode) |
| `lib-mdoc-transport-nfc` | NFC transport with Host Card Emulation (HCE) |
| `lib-mdoc-transport-restapi` | HTTP/WebSocket transport for server-based relay |
| `lib-mdoc-transport-oid4vp` | OID4VP-based mDoc transport |

### mDoc Data Link

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-data-link-ble-public` | Low-level BLE data link interfaces |
| `lib-data-link-nfc-public` | Low-level NFC data link interfaces |
| `lib-data-link-nfc-impl` | NFC data link implementation |

## Data Storage

### Key-Value Store

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-data-store-kv-public` | `KvStore` interface, query options, scope binding |
| `lib-data-store-kv-impl` | KV store service and DI wiring |
| `lib-data-store-kv-impl-memory` | In-memory KV backend (development/testing) |
| `lib-data-store-kv-impl-kottage` | [Kottage](https://github.com/nicklasw/Kottage)-backed persistent KV store |

### Blob Store

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-data-store-blob-public` | `BlobStore` and `BlobService` interfaces, CAS, metadata search |
| `lib-data-store-blob-impl` | Blob service orchestration and DI wiring |
| `lib-data-store-blob-impl-memory` | In-memory blob backend |
| `lib-data-store-blob-impl-fs` | Filesystem blob backend |
| `lib-data-store-blob-impl-kv` | KV-backed blob backend |
| `lib-data-store-blob-client-http` | Remote HTTP blob client |

### Party Data

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-data-store-party-public` | Party, Identity, Tenant, and `CorrelationIdentifier` data models |

## Identity

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-identity-matching-public` | `IdentityMatch`, `IdentifierType`, `IdentityMatchStore`, `ReconciliationCryptoService` interfaces |
| `lib-identity-matching-impl` | In-memory and Kottage-backed match store implementations |
| `lib-identity-resolution-public` | `IdentityResolver` interface, `IdentityResolutionResult`, resolution config |
| `lib-identity-resolution-impl` | Matching-based identity resolver implementation |
| `lib-identity-reconciliation-public` | `ReconciliationPlan`, `ReconciliationSelectorRule`, session model, commands |
| `lib-identity-reconciliation-impl` | Reconciliation orchestrator, KMS-backed crypto, session stores |
| `lib-idv-public` | IDV workflow models: use case definitions, graph nodes, method definitions, materialization rules, assurance/compliance profiles |
| `lib-idv-oidc` | OIDC method driver for IDV workflows |
| `lib-idv-wallet` | Wallet/OID4VP method driver for IDV workflows |

## Theme and UI

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-conf-theme-core-public` | Theme configuration interfaces (colors, typography, spacing) |
| `lib-conf-theme-core-impl` | Theme configuration implementation |
| `lib-conf-theme-compose` | Jetpack Compose theme integration |
| `lib-conf-theme-web` | Web theme integration |
| `lib-ui-compose` | Reusable Jetpack Compose UI components |

## Framework Integration

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `ktor-server-kotlin-inject` | Ktor server plugin for IDK DI integration |

## Convenience

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-all` | Includes all IDK modules transitively. Use for quick starts or when binary size is not a concern |
| `idk-bom` | Bill of Materials for version alignment across selective dependencies |

---

# IDK FAQ

# IDK FAQ

## General Questions

**Q:** What is the Identity Development Kit?<br/>
**A:** The Identity Development Kit (IDK) is a foundational SDK providing core identity technologies and APIs used in Sphereon products and which also can be used in
your products. They are multiplatform and cater for both web, mobile and server applications.

---

**Q:** How does IDK relate to other Sphereon products?<br/>
**A:** IDK serves as the foundation layer for other products like the Kiwa eLicense SDK and VDX platform, providing core identity functionality.

---

**Q:** Where can I find the complete API documentation?<br/>
**A:** In the **Kotlin API** section (generated via Dokka).

## Technical Questions

**Q:** What identity protocols are supported?<br/>
**A:** IDK supports major identity protocols but is mostly focused on ISO 18013-5 and 18013-7 at present.

---

# KMS REST Server API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/kms-openapi.yml" />

---

# DID REST API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/did-openapi.yml" />

---

# DID Hosting API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/did-hosting-openapi.yml" />

---

# OID4VCI Issuer Session API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/idk/v0.25/oid4vci-issuer-session-openapi.yml" />

---

# OID4VP Universal Verifier Session API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/idk/v0.25/oid4vp-universal-openapi.yml" />

---

# OID4VP DCQL Query Configuration Admin API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/idk/v0.25/dcql-openapi.yml" />

---

# Credential Status List Hosting API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/statuslist-hosting-openapi.yml" />

---

# BlobStore API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/blob-store-openapi.yml" />

---

# Vault API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/vault-openapi.yml" />

---

# eduID Wallet Matching Portal

# eduID Wallet Matching Portal

The eduID Wallet Matching Portal enables Dutch educational institutions to authenticate users via their eduID wallet credentials, seamlessly linking wallet-based digital identities to institutional accounts. At its core, the portal performs privacy-preserving HMAC-based identity matching and leverages the SURFconext federation for institutional authentication. Whether a user logs in through the traditional federated path (via eduID and SURFconext) or through a wallet-based path (via the OID4VP protocol), the Security Token Service produces identical OIDC tokens. This means downstream systems -- student information systems, learning management platforms, document repositories -- never need to know which authentication method was used. They simply receive a standard access token and ID token containing the user's canonical identity attributes.

---

## The Problem

Students and staff at Dutch educational institutions already have institutional accounts that are accessible through the SURFconext federation and their eduID. These accounts carry institutional identifiers -- the eduID (unique to the institution) and the eduPersonPrincipalName -- that are woven into every layer of institutional IT infrastructure. Student information systems use them. Learning management systems use them. Document management, library access, exam platforms, grade registries -- they all depend on these identifiers to know who a user is.

At the same time, the world is moving toward digital wallet credentials. Students increasingly carry verifiable credentials in mobile wallet applications, including eduID credentials issued by SURFconext. These wallet credentials are cryptographically bound to the holder's device through a public-private key pair and contain identity attributes like the eduPersonPrincipalName. The wallet proves identity by presenting a Verifiable Presentation signed with the holder's private key.

Here lies the fundamental challenge: while the wallet credential does contain useful identity attributes (like the eduPersonPrincipalName), it does not contain the institution-scoped eduID that backend systems depend on. The credential's holder key -- the cryptographic key that signed the presentation -- has no inherent connection to the institution-scoped eduID. The institution's entire infrastructure expects that eduID, and the only way to obtain it is through SURFconext federation.

Crucially, the system does not accept just any wallet credential. The portal defines exactly which credentials are trusted for authentication via DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) queries. Only a valid eduID credential from a trusted issuer triggers the matching and reconciliation process. An arbitrary credential from an unknown issuer is rejected before any identity resolution begins.

A naive solution would be to store a mapping table: "public key X belongs to eduid Y." But this creates a privacy risk -- plaintext identifiers sitting in a database, vulnerable to breach, creating a permanent link between a person's wallet identity and their institutional identity. It also creates a dependency problem: what happens when the mapping service is unavailable? What about GDPR compliance -- how do you honor a right-to-erasure request when identifiers are scattered in plaintext?

The eduID Wallet Matching Portal solves this with a cryptographic approach. It never stores plaintext identifiers. All lookups happen via HMAC-hashed values with domain-separated keys. Cached identity attributes are encrypted at rest with separate encryption keys. Compromise of one cryptographic key does not affect others. The entire architecture is designed so that deleting a single set of key material renders all associated identity data irrecoverable -- true crypto-shredding that satisfies GDPR requirements by design, not by policy.

---

## System Overview

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-system-architecture.svg" alt="System Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The portal is composed of four services that collaborate to authenticate users, match identities, and issue standardized tokens:

- **Portal (Next.js BFF)** -- The user-facing application running on port 3000. It implements the Backend-for-Frontend pattern: the browser communicates only with the Portal, which proxies all requests to backend services. It renders the login page, displays QR codes for wallet authentication, and manages user sessions through NextAuth.js v5.

- **Service-STS (Security Token Service)** -- A full OAuth2/OIDC authorization server running on port 8080. It handles the standard OIDC protocol dance (authorize, token, userinfo), supports upstream federation to SURFconext, and delegates wallet authentication to the Auth Bridge. Regardless of how authentication occurs, the STS mints the final tokens that downstream systems consume.

- **Service-Auth-Bridge (Authentication Bridge)** -- The identity matching and reconciliation engine running on port 8090. It manages OID4VP sessions, verifies Verifiable Presentations from wallets, performs HMAC-based identity matching against the database, and orchestrates the reconciliation flow when a wallet holder is encountered for the first time.

- **PostgreSQL** -- The shared persistence layer storing identity matches, link bindings, sessions, and encrypted auxiliary data. All sensitive data is encrypted at rest. All identifier lookups use HMAC hashes rather than plaintext values.

---

## Three Authentication Paths

The portal supports three distinct authentication paths, all of which converge on the same output: a standard OIDC token from the STS.

### Federated Login

The traditional path. A user clicks "Login with institution account," is redirected through SURFconext to their institutional identity provider, authenticates, and returns with a set of claims that the STS projects into a canonical token. This is the baseline experience that institutions already know from existing SURFconext integrations.

### Wallet Login (Known Holder) -- Fast Path

For returning wallet users. The user scans a QR code and presents their eduID credential from their wallet. The Auth Bridge verifies the credential (checking it is from a trusted issuer), extracts the holder key, and finds an existing identity match. The cached canonical attributes -- including the institution-scoped eduID obtained during the original reconciliation -- are decrypted and used to issue a token immediately. No external calls to SURFconext are required. This path resolves in sub-second time, making wallet login faster than traditional federation.

### Wallet Login (New Holder) -- Reconciliation

For first-time wallet users. The user scans the QR code and presents their eduID credential. The credential is verified and the holder key is extracted, but the Auth Bridge has never seen this holder key before. Although the credential contains the eduPersonPrincipalName, it does not contain the institution-scoped eduID. The user is asked to perform a one-time institutional login through SURFconext, which provides the institution-scoped eduID. This links their wallet's holder key to their institutional identity. Once this reconciliation is complete, every subsequent wallet login uses the fast path. The user never needs to authenticate through SURFconext again for wallet-based access.

For a detailed technical walkthrough of each flow, including sequence diagrams and step-by-step descriptions, see the [Authentication Flows](./authentication-flows) page.

---

## Key Design Principles

The architecture of the portal is guided by several non-negotiable design principles that prioritize privacy, security, and interoperability.

### Zero Plaintext Identifiers in the Database

No eduid, no email address, no name is ever stored in plaintext in the database. All identifier lookups use HMAC-SHA256 hashes. Cached identity attributes are encrypted using AES-256-GCM. If you dump the database, you see hashes and ciphertext -- never a human-readable identifier.

### Domain-Separated Cryptographic Keys

The system uses three distinct cryptographic keys for three distinct purposes: Key A for hashing holder key fingerprints, Key B for hashing institutional identifiers, and Key C for encrypting cached attributes. These keys are managed in a KMS (Key Management Service) and never coexist in application memory. Compromise of Key A does not help an attacker decrypt attributes protected by Key C, nor does it allow them to reverse hashes created with Key B.

### GDPR-by-Architecture

Privacy compliance is achieved through architectural decisions, not through policy documents alone. Data minimization is enforced by only caching the specific claims needed for token issuance. Crypto-shredding is available by deleting key material, which renders all associated encrypted data irrecoverable. Right-to-erasure requests can be honored by deleting a user's identity match and link binding records, with the cryptographic guarantee that no residual plaintext exists anywhere in the system.

### Standard OIDC Token Output

Downstream systems receive standard OAuth2 access tokens and OIDC ID tokens. The claims schema is identical regardless of whether the user authenticated via federation or via their wallet. This means institutions can adopt wallet authentication without modifying any of their existing service provider integrations. The portal is a drop-in enhancement, not a disruptive change.

### Configuration-Driven Reconciliation

The reconciliation logic -- how the system handles an unknown wallet holder -- is driven entirely by configuration. Reconciliation selector rules determine which plan to execute based on contextual attributes (credential type, issuer, assurance level). New reconciliation providers can be added without code changes. This makes the system adaptable to future credential ecosystems without engineering effort.

---

## Technology Stack

| Component | Technology |
|---|---|
| Portal (Frontend + BFF) | Next.js 15, React 19, NextAuth.js v5 |
| Service-STS | Kotlin/JVM, Ktor, IDK OAuth2 |
| Service-Auth-Bridge | Kotlin/JVM, Ktor, IDK OID4VP, IDK Reconciliation |
| Database | PostgreSQL 15, SqlDelight |
| Cryptography | KMS (Software / Azure Key Vault / AWS KMS) |
| Standards | OID4VP (DIIP v4), OIDC, RFC 8693, DCQL, SD-JWT |

The Kotlin services are built on the Ktor framework, a lightweight asynchronous server framework well-suited for microservice architectures. SqlDelight generates type-safe Kotlin data access code directly from SQL definitions, eliminating raw SQL strings from the application codebase and catching schema mismatches at compile time. The KMS abstraction supports multiple backends -- a software-based KMS for development and testing, Azure Key Vault for Azure-hosted deployments, and AWS KMS for AWS-hosted deployments -- all behind a unified API.

---

## Quick Links

- **[Architecture](./architecture)** -- Service topology, inter-service communication, and deployment architecture
- **[Authentication Flows](./authentication-flows)** -- Detailed sequence diagrams for all three authentication paths
- **[Database Schema](./database/overview)** -- Table definitions, encryption strategy, and multi-tenancy model
- **[Encryption & Key Management](./encryption/overview)** -- HMAC hashing, AES encryption, KMS integration
- **[Identity Matching](./matching/overview)** -- How holder keys and institutional identifiers are matched
- **[Reconciliation](./reconciliation/overview)** -- The one-time linking flow for new wallet holders
- **[REST API Reference](./rest-api/overview)** -- External API endpoints for third-party integration
- **[Security & Privacy](./security/privacy-architecture)** -- Threat model, trust boundaries, and security controls
- **[Operations Guide](./operations/deployment)** -- Deployment, configuration, monitoring, and troubleshooting

---

## Built on the IDK

The eduID Wallet Matching Portal is not built from scratch. It is built on the open-source Sphereon Identity Development Kit (IDK), which provides the foundational building blocks for identity, cryptography, and credential handling.

The IDK provides the low-level building blocks that the portal's services depend on. This includes: cryptographic primitives for hashing, encryption, and digital signatures; KMS integration with pluggable backends (software, Azure Key Vault, AWS KMS); full OID4VP protocol support including request object creation, Verifiable Presentation verification, and the Universal Verifier; DID (Decentralized Identifier) resolution and management; SD-JWT (Selective Disclosure JWT) handling for credential presentation; DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) support for specifying which credential attributes to request from a wallet; the identity matching engine that performs HMAC-based lookups and manages identity link bindings; the reconciliation orchestration framework that evaluates selector rules and executes reconciliation plans; and encrypted attribute persistence with envelope encryption.

The IDK ensures that the portal speaks the right cryptographic and protocol languages without reimplementing standards from scratch. For more details, see the [IDK documentation](/idk/guides/getting-started).

The portal's application code focuses on user experience and institutional integration, while the foundational identity, cryptography, matching, and reconciliation logic is handled by the well-tested, reusable IDK libraries.

---

# Amazon App Platform, Kotlin module structure, and Dependency Injection

We standardize our Kotlin Gradle module structures on Amazon App Platform and use kotlin-inject along with kotlin-inject-anvil for dependency injection. This page provides an overview and links to the official resources.

## Amazon App Platform

Amazon App Platform provides opinionated, scalable foundations for modular Kotlin applications (multi-module Gradle setup, conventions, and build tooling).

:::note
- Website: [amzn.github.io/app-platform](https://amzn.github.io/app-platform/)
- GitHub: [amzn/app-platform](https://github.com/amzn/app-platform)
:::

:::info
Why we use app platform:

- Consistent Kotlin Gradle module conventions across the codebase
- Scaffolding and patterns for modularization and reuse
- Guidance that plays well with modern DI and codegen
:::

## Dependency Injection

We use a lightweight, compile-time DI approach with kotlin-inject, augmented by Amazon's kotlin-inject-anvil integration where appropriate.

### kotlin-inject

kotlin-inject is a Kotlin-first, compile-time DI library that generates factories and wiring based on annotations. It avoids runtime reflection and keeps runtime fast.

:::note
- Website: [kotlin-inject.dev](https://kotlin-inject.dev)
- GitHub: [evant/kotlin-inject](https://github.com/evant/kotlin-inject)
:::

### kotlin-inject-anvil (Amazon)

kotlin-inject-anvil provides tooling and integrations that complement kotlin-inject in larger modular setups, aligning well with Amazon App Platform module conventions.

:::note
- GitHub: [amzn/kotlin-inject-anvil](https://github.com/amzn/kotlin-inject-anvil)
:::

## How this fits together

- Amazon App Platform defines the module structure, build plugins, and conventions we follow.
- kotlin-inject provides the compile-time DI primitives (annotations, codegen) for our services/components.
- kotlin-inject-anvil offers additional integration capabilities to scale DI across many modules following the platform conventions.

## Quick links

- Amazon App Platform — Website: https://amzn.github.io/app-platform/
- Amazon App Platform — GitHub: https://github.com/amzn/app-platform
- kotlin-inject — Website: https://kotlin-inject.dev
- kotlin-inject — GitHub: https://github.com/evant/kotlin-inject
- kotlin-inject-anvil — GitHub: https://github.com/amzn/kotlin-inject-anvil

---

# The Party Model

# The Party Model

Every system that touches people eventually has to answer the same question: who, or what, is on the other side? A customer signing up, a company you do business with, a department inside that company, a background service calling an API, an AI agent acting for a person. Most platforms model each of these with a different table, a different identifier, and a different login path, then spend years reconciling them.

The party model takes the opposite approach. Everything that participates is a party. A person is a party, an organization is a party, and so are a department, a service, a group, and the tenant itself. Each one is a single typed object that carries its own data and shares a common contract, so you describe your real world once and the platform routes, relates, and authenticates against that one description.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-party-model.svg" alt="A shared Party base contract inherited by Person, Organization, Organization Unit, Service, and Group" style={{maxWidth: '860px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## What a Party Is

A party is any participant in your ecosystem, discriminated by its `partyType`. There are five concrete types. A `Person` is a human individual that carries a name and date of birth. An `Organization` is a company, institution, or other legal entity with a legal name, an industry, and contact details. An `Organization Unit` is a nesting container such as a department, a faculty, a location, or a workspace, and it holds the branding and terms a part of your organization presents. A `Service` is a software-backed participant such as an application, an endpoint, an integration, or an automated actor, and a service that people sign in to is also a login surface. A `Group` is a set of members used for addressing and authorization.

The thing that makes this more than a naming convention is that each type is a complete object rather than a thin row pointing at detail tables. When you read a person back, the name is on the same object. There is no second request to a detail record and no join to reassemble on the client. The API speaks in the same nouns you use when you describe your business, which is what keeps the model legible as it grows.

## Modelling Your World

Because the five types share one base contract, you compose them the way reality is composed. An organization contains organization units, units nest inside other units, and people and services live in a unit. Groups gather members from anywhere. The structure of a tenant is therefore expressed in parties, so an organization chart, a campus with faculties, or a marketplace with buyers and sellers is a graph of parties you can read and walk.

Two capabilities turn that static picture into a living model, and each has its own page. Parties can be extended with your own properties through specializations, so a person can be a student and a staff member at the same time, each with its own validated attribute set; that is covered under [Persons and Organizations](./persons-and-organizations). Parties can also form typed relationships with each other, so you can express employment, membership, delegation, or the fact that two records are the same entity; that is covered under [Relationships](./relationships). Organization units carry enough weight in this model to warrant their own treatment in [Organization Units](./organization-units).

## Identity Is a Separate Layer

A party is the directory entry: it says who or what exists. Identity is a separate layer on top that describes how a party is recognised, discovered, and, when it is permitted, how it signs in. One party can hold several identities, and an identity carries identifiers such as an email address, a phone number, a decentralized identifier, or a federated subject.

Keeping the two apart is deliberate, because many parties in a real tenant will never log in. A contact you imported, a supplier you only invoice, an organization you keep on file: each needs to be discoverable and relatable, but none needs to authenticate. Authentication is a capability you grant explicitly, per application, rather than something every identifier implies. The page on [Identities and Identifiers](./identities-and-identifiers) covers discovery, how identifiers are protected at rest, and how the same email address can belong to three different identities in one tenant without any of them being able to log in where they should not.

## One Tenant, Three Use Cases

Because participants, their structure, their roles, and their login surfaces are all parties, identities, and bindings, a single tenant can run consumer, business, and agent scenarios at once instead of as three separate stacks.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-party-use-cases.svg" alt="One tenant hosting B2C consumer logins, B2B organizations and units, and AI agent identities side by side" style={{maxWidth: '860px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

In a consumer (B2C) setting, a customer-facing application is a service party with a login surface. Customer persons hold a customer role and are bound to authenticate only at that service, using passkeys, social login, or one-time codes, with self-registration and step-up verification configured on the surface. In a business (B2B) setting, organizations and nested organization units carry their own branding and terms, employees live in units and hold an employee role bound to internal services, enterprise single sign-on is gated per surface, and the same organization can act as both a customer and a supplier. For software and AI agents, a service (and, in time, a dedicated agent type) is a first-class identity with its own identifiers, credentials, and authenticable bindings rather than a credential stored on a human's account, and it delegates to a human owner through a typed relationship so that every action remains attributable.

The behaviour that ties these together is that the same email address can resolve to an employee at the internal application, a customer at the consumer site, and a contact that never logs in anywhere, all inside one tenant. That is the [login resolution](./identities-and-identifiers#authentication-fan-out-then-filter) described later, and it falls out of the model rather than being bolted on.

## Roles, Attributes, and Relationships Drive Authorization

The same model feeds every common authorization style, so you are not forced to choose one up front. A party's role labels are the basis for role-based access control, its validated attributes are the basis for attribute-based access control, and the typed relationships between parties are the basis for relationship-based access control.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-party-access-models.svg" alt="Attributes drive RBAC and ABAC; typed relationships drive ReBAC" style={{maxWidth: '820px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

Roles and attributes answer questions about a single party from its own data, such as whether someone is staff or whether their faculty is Law. Relationships answer questions that follow the graph from one party to another, such as whether the requester is the manager of the resource's owner. You choose the style per decision, and the party model supplies the facts for all of them.

## What This Section Covers

[Persons and Organizations](./persons-and-organizations) covers the party types in depth, how a party is extended with custom properties through specializations, how one record can wear several hats at once, and the contact data and registrations that hang off a party. [Organization Units](./organization-units) covers nesting, containment, branding inheritance, and how a unit gives a tenant its internal structure. [Relationships](./relationships) covers typed edges between any two parties, the link that ties personas of one real-world entity together, and how relationships become the basis for relationship-based access control. [Identities and Identifiers](./identities-and-identifiers) covers the decoupled identity layer, identifiers for discovery and authentication, protected identifiers, and application-bound login. The [Party REST API](./rest-api) covers the `/api/party/v1` surface, with each operation shown as an abstract, a REST call, a service command, and a gRPC envelope.

The semantic profiles and catalogs that give attributes their meaning are part of the [semantic model](/edk/guides/semantic-model-walkthrough/overview); this section shows where a party's specialization binds to a profile, not how profiles are authored. The engines that evaluate authorization rules live in the [authorization](/edk/guides/authorization/overview) layer; this section supplies the party facts they read.

---

# Persons and Organizations

# Persons and Organizations

This page covers the party types you work with most, the data that hangs off them, the way you extend them with your own properties, and how that data becomes the basis for role- and attribute-based authorization. It assumes you have read [The Party Model](./overview) for the "everything is a party" framing. Organization units carry enough weight to have their own page, [Organization Units](./organization-units).

## The Typed Party Types

Every party shares the same base contract: an identifier, the tenant it belongs to, a display name, an origin that records whether it was created here or synced from outside, the single home organization unit it lives in, the specializations it bears, its addresses, and the standard audit fields. On top of that contract each type adds the fields that only make sense for it.

| Type | `partyType` | What it adds | Typical use |
|------|-------------|--------------|-------------|
| Person | `natural_person` | first, middle, last name; birth date | a human individual |
| Organization | `organization` | legal name, organization type, industry, contact email, website, privacy and terms URIs | a company, institution, or legal entity |
| Organization Unit | `organization_unit` | parent unit, name, terms URI, branding, inheritance policy | departments, faculties, locations, workspaces |
| Service | `service` | service type, endpoint URI, OAuth client id | applications, endpoints, integrations, agents |
| Group | `group` | name, members | addressing and authorization sets |

Each type has its own REST resource (`/persons`, `/organizations`, and so on) that returns the typed object directly, and there is a polymorphic `/parties` view for when you do not know a party's type in advance. Both are covered on the [REST API](./rest-api) page.

## Persons

A person is the human in your model. Beyond the shared base it carries the name parts and a birth date, and it is the type that most often becomes a login identity. It does not have to, though: a person can exist purely as a contact or as the endpoint of a relationship, with no ability to authenticate anywhere. That separation between being known and being able to log in is the subject of [Identities and Identifiers](./identities-and-identifiers).

## Organizations

An organization is a legal entity. Alongside its registered legal name it carries the operational details you advertise about it, including a contact email, a website, a privacy policy, and terms of service. Organizations are full participants rather than lookup rows: they hold relationships, own other parties, act as a customer in one context and a supplier in another, and can themselves be the subject of credentials.

Organizations also carry their formal **registrations**, the registered numbers that prove an entity is who it claims to be. A VAT number, a Legal Entity Identifier, a DUNS number, or a Chamber of Commerce entry each lives as a registration attached to the organization, with the issuing scheme recorded alongside the value. Because registrations are first-class records rather than free-text fields, you can list them, add new ones as an entity is verified in more jurisdictions, and reason about which schemes an organization has been registered under. They are managed through the organization's `registrations` sub-resource on the [REST API](./rest-api#organizations).

## Services and Groups

A service is a software-backed participant: an integration, an endpoint, an automated actor, or an application. A service that people sign in to additionally carries a login configuration, which is what makes it a login surface, covered under [Identities and Identifiers](./identities-and-identifiers#applications-are-services). The same service party is the natural home for the future agent type, so an MCP endpoint or an autonomous worker is modelled the same way as any other service, with its own identifiers and its own bindings.

A group is the simplest type: a named set of members, with no specializations or attributes of its own. Because a group is itself owned by an organization unit and can gather any mix of party types, including persons and organizations in the same group, it is covered in depth alongside units in [Organization Units](./organization-units#groups-within-a-unit).

## Contact Points: Addresses

Any party can carry electronic and physical addresses, and they are modelled as records attached to the party rather than as fields baked into each type. An electronic address holds something like an email address, a phone number, or a messaging handle together with its kind, while a physical address holds the postal detail. Keeping addresses separate from the typed body means a person and an organization attach addresses the same way, a party can hold several of each, and the set can grow or change without touching the party itself.

Addresses are hydrated on demand rather than returned on every read. When you fetch a party you can ask for its addresses to be included; when you do not, the address fields come back empty, which keeps ordinary reads small. The address sub-resources on the [REST API](./rest-api#addresses) cover listing, adding, updating, and removing them.

## Extending a Party With Your Own Properties

Out of the box a party carries only the fields above. Your world has more, such as a student number, an employee's cost centre, or a supplier's onboarding tier. You add these through specializations.

A specialization is a role a party plays, named by a subtype label such as `employee`, `customer`, `supplier`, or `student`. On its own a subtype is just a label you can declare and filter on. When you bind it to a semantic profile it gains a validated set of attributes: the profile defines which fields exist, their types, and their constraints, and the values you store are checked against the exact profile version they were captured under.

```jsonc
// A person bearing one typed specialization
{
  "partyType": "natural_person",
  "displayName": "Lena Vos",
  "firstName": "Lena", "lastName": "Vos",
  "specializations": [
    {
      "subtype": "student",
      "profileId": "student",
      "profileVersion": "2",
      "attributes": { "studentNumber": "S1029384", "faculty": "Law", "enrolmentYear": 2024 }
    }
  ]
}
```

A few rules keep this safe to depend on. A bare subtype with no attributes is always allowed and needs no license; the role label is recorded either way. Storing validated attributes is the part that requires the semantic license; without it, an attempt to store attributes is rejected rather than quietly kept in an ungoverned bag. The profile is the schema. There is no second schema to author or host: the bound profile decides which fields a role may carry and which are required, so a value for a field the profile does not define is rejected, and a required field that is missing is rejected. The profile identifier and version are stored with the values, so the data stays reproducible against the exact profile it was validated against, and a newer profile version never silently re-validates older data. Attributes are namespaced per specialization rather than flattened into one object, so several roles can carry overlapping field names without colliding, and reading the party back returns each role's values grouped under that role. This is how a party is extended with your own properties: you define a profile for the role, bind the subtype to it, and the party carries validated values for that role from then on.

## Multi-Typing: One Record, Several Hats

The base contract holds a list of specializations, so a single party can play several roles at once. A person can be both an employee and a customer; an organization can be both a customer and a supplier. Each role binds to a distinct profile and carries its own attribute set, all on one party and one identity.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-party-specializations.svg" alt="Modelling one person as several roles: either multiple specializations on one party, or separate parties linked by a same-entity relationship" style={{maxWidth: '820px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

Each role can also live in its own part of the organization. A specialization can name the organization unit that role belongs to, separate from the party's own home unit, so a person who is a student in the Faculty of Law and an employee in IT Services is one party whose two roles sit in two different units. The party keeps a single home unit, and each role can sit where it belongs without forcing you to split the record.

There is one invariant worth holding onto: a party may bear at most one specialization per profile. You cannot pin the same profile twice on one party, because that would be two personas rather than two roles. When you genuinely need the same role held twice, attribute sets that should not share a record, or separate login identities, you model them as separate parties linked by a `same_entity` relationship instead, which is covered under [Relationships](./relationships#same-entity-linking-personas).

The student-and-staff example shows both choices. When it is one record, Lena is one person who is both a student and a staff member, with one identity, two validated attribute sets side by side, and each role placed in its own unit if the two belong in different parts of the school. You keep them as two parties only when the personas need separate login identities, or attribute sets that should not share a record, and then a governed and auditable `same_entity` link ties them back together. Choosing between them is a modelling decision rather than a system limitation, and a tenant can use both at once.

## Roles and Attributes Drive RBAC and ABAC

The roles and attributes a party carries are exactly what role- and attribute-based authorization need. Role-based access keys on the label, so a party whose specializations include `staff` can be granted the staff permission set, and because roles are a list a party can hold several such grants at once. Attribute-based access keys on the validated values, so a rule such as "faculty equals Law" or "onboarding tier is at least gold" reads the attributes on the relevant specialization and decides from them.

Both of these answer questions about a single party from its own data. Questions that follow the graph from one party to another, such as whether someone is the manager of a resource's owner, are relationship-based, and those are the subject of the next page. The engine that evaluates these rules is the [authorization layer](/edk/guides/authorization/overview); the party model is where the roles and attributes it reads come from.

---

# Organization Units

# Organization Units

An organization unit is the type that gives a tenant its internal shape. Where a person or an organization is a participant, a unit is a place: a department, a division, a faculty, a region, a workspace, or any grouping a customer wants to carve their world into. Because a unit is a party like any other, it inherits identity, relationships, ownership, audit, and soft-delete without any special casing, and it adds the few things a structural container needs.

This page assumes the framing in [The Party Model](./overview). It goes deeper than the type summary in [Persons and Organizations](./persons-and-organizations) because units behave differently from the other types in two important ways: they take part in two separate hierarchies, and they carry configuration that the parties beneath them inherit.

## Two Hierarchies, Not One

The single most important thing to understand about units is that there are two distinct hierarchies in play, and they answer different questions.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-party-org-units.svg" alt="Unit nesting through parentOuId on the left, party containment through organizationUnitId on the right, with branding resolving upward" style={{maxWidth: '860px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The first is **nesting**, which is how units relate to other units. Each unit has an optional `parentOuId` pointing at the unit it sits inside, so a department sits inside a division, a faculty inside a university, and the units form a tree of their own. A unit with no parent sits directly under the tenant root. This is the hierarchy you walk to answer "what is below this unit" or "what does this unit roll up into."

The second is **containment**, which is how every other party relates to units. Each party has an `organizationUnitId` naming the single home unit it lives in, and a null value means it lives at the tenant root. This is a single, indexed reference rather than a relationship, so "everything that lives in this unit" is a direct lookup, and a party lives in exactly one unit at a time.

Keeping these apart matters because they are genuinely different. Nesting is unit-to-unit and forms the organizational skeleton; containment is party-to-unit and places people, services, and organizations onto that skeleton. A faculty nests under a university (nesting), while a student and a case-handling service live in that faculty (containment). The two together let you express both the shape of an organization and where each participant belongs in it.

Containment places a party as a whole in one home unit, but a party that plays several roles can also place each role in its own unit. A role a party bears can name the organization unit that role belongs to, so a person who is a student in one faculty and an employee in another department is a single party whose two roles live in two different units, with one base home unit underneath them. This is how someone wearing several hats sits in several parts of the organization at once without becoming several records. The roles a party plays are covered under [Persons and Organizations](./persons-and-organizations#extending-a-party-with-your-own-properties).

## Branding and Terms

Each unit carries the things a part of an organization presents to the people inside it: a terms-of-service URI and a branding configuration, alongside a policy that says how it draws configuration from the units above it. This is what lets a workspace, a faculty, or a regional division look and behave like itself without becoming a separate tenant.

Branding is resolved rather than copied. When the effective branding for a party is needed, the platform starts at the party's home unit and walks up the nesting chain through each `parentOuId` until it finds a value, so a faculty can override the university's theme for everyone beneath it while a department that sets nothing simply inherits what the faculty, and then the university, provides. Because the value is resolved on read rather than duplicated onto every descendant, changing a unit's branding takes effect for everything below it at once, and there is no stale copy to reconcile. The inheritance policy on a unit governs how much it takes from its ancestors, which is the control point when a unit needs to stop inheriting and stand on its own.

## A Unit Is a Full Party

It is worth restating that a unit is not a lightweight grouping bolted onto the side of the model. It is a party, so it has its own identifier, can hold relationships to other parties, can own parties, carries the same audit and soft-delete behaviour as everything else, and can itself be specialized with roles and validated attributes when you need a unit to carry structured properties of its own. A unit is one of the schema-bearing types, alongside persons and organizations, so a profile can give a unit's attributes meaning in the same way it does for a person.

This is also why units are the natural anchor for tenant structure rather than a parallel concept. The same machinery that lists a person's relationships lists a unit's, the same ownership model that ties an identity to a person ties one to a unit, and the same polymorphic read that returns a person returns a unit. You do not learn a second model to work with structure; you use the party model and set `partyType` to `organization_unit`.

## Groups Within a Unit

A group is the other way to gather parties, and it complements containment rather than competing with it. A group is itself a party, so like every party it has a home organization unit, which means groups are organized per unit: a unit owns its groups the same way it owns the people and services that live in it, and "the groups in this unit" is a direct read off the unit.

What sets a group apart from containment is that its membership is explicit and unrestricted by type. Containment places each party in exactly one home unit and answers "where does this party live." A group, by contrast, is a free-form set you assemble for addressing or authorization, and it can hold any mix of party types at once. A single group can contain people and organizations together, services alongside them, and even other groups nested inside. A data-protection working group in the Legal unit might hold several staff persons, an external auditor organization, and a reporting service as members, all in one group, while each of those members keeps its own separate home unit elsewhere in the tenant.

That freedom is what makes groups useful for authorization. Because a group is a party, it can be the subject or object of relationships, so a rule such as "a member of the group that owns this resource may read it" walks membership the same way any other relationship is walked, which is the relationship-based access described in [Relationships](./relationships#relationships-are-the-basis-for-rebac). A group carries only a name and its members; it never bears specializations or attributes, which keeps it a pure set. Membership is managed through the group's members sub-resource on the [REST API](./rest-api#groups-and-membership), and because a member can be any party, including another group, you can build nested groupings where that helps.

## Working With Units Over REST

Units are created, read, updated, listed, and soft-deleted through `/ou` exactly like the other typed resources, and they add two reads that reflect the two hierarchies. The children read walks the nesting tree to return the units directly beneath a given unit, and the members read walks containment to return the parties whose home unit is the given one. Both are described, with the rest of the surface, on the [REST API](./rest-api#organization-units) page.

A practical pattern for standing up a tenant's structure is to create the top unit first, then create child units that reference it through `parentOuId`, and finally place people and services by setting their `organizationUnitId` as you create them. From that point the children and members reads let you navigate the structure in either direction, and branding set high in the tree flows down to everything you placed.

---

# Relationships

# Relationships

A party on its own is a directory entry. The reason to model your whole world as parties is that you can then connect them, and connect them with meaning. Relationships are what turn a list of parties into a graph you can reason over, and they are the complementary axis to the roles and attributes covered in [Persons and Organizations](./persons-and-organizations): not what a party is, but how it is connected.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-party-relationships.svg" alt="A graph of parties connected by typed edges: has_unit, enrolled_in, employed_by, same_entity, member_of, and delegates_to" style={{maxWidth: '860px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Typed Edges Between Any Two Parties

A relationship connects two parties and carries a type that says what the connection means, such as `employed_by`, `member_of`, `manages`, `delegates_to`, or `same_entity`, drawn from a catalog your deployment registers. Because every participant is a party, a relationship can link any two of them: a person to an organization, an organization to another organization, a service to its owner, a unit to a unit.

Relationships are records in their own right rather than flags tucked inside another object, and three properties make them dependable. The type comes from a registered catalog, so a relationship means the same thing everywhere and can be queried by type. Each type carries a reading in both directions, which is what the diagram above shows: the single edge between Lena and the university is `studies_at` read from her side and `has_student` read from the university's side, and `employed_by` from one side is `employs` from the other. Some types are symmetric, like `same_entity`, where both readings are the same. A relationship can also carry a validity window together with full audit, so a question like "who managed whom last March" has an answer. Adding a new kind of connection is registering a type, not migrating a schema, which is what lets the model keep up with how your world actually fits together.

## Relationships Model the World

Once both participants and their connections are expressed in one graph, the structures you care about are simply shapes in it. An organization chart is `employed_by` and `manages` edges between people and organizations, with units providing the containment. A marketplace is buyer and seller organizations linked to the parties they transact with. Delegation is a `delegates_to` edge from an agent service to the human who is accountable for it. A campus is a university organization with faculty units nested beneath it, students and staff contained in those units, and enrolment or membership edges where you need them.

The value shows up when you walk the graph to answer questions a single record cannot: every party an organization employs, every group a person belongs to, every service that delegates to a given owner. The graph in the diagram above reads this way. The university has its units, the Faculty of Law and IT Services, so each unit is `part_of` the university. Lena exists as two personas: a student whose home unit is the Faculty of Law and who `studies_at` the university, and a staff member whose home unit is IT Services and who is `employed_by` it. The two personas are the same human, which a symmetric `same_entity` link records explicitly. Notice the two axes at work together: containment places each persona in exactly one home unit, while typed relationships connect the personas to the university and to each other.

## Same Entity: Linking Personas {#same-entity-linking-personas}

One relationship type deserves its own treatment, because it solves a problem every real directory runs into: the same real-world person or organization existing as more than one record. The `same_entity` relationship links two parties, or several pairwise, that represent the same real-world entity across organization units or login surfaces. The human case of two person records that are the same human is only one use of it; it equally ties two organization records that are the same legal entity, such as a supplier organization under procurement and a customer organization under sales.

This is the second way to model "one person, several roles" introduced under [multi-typing](./persons-and-organizations#multi-typing-one-record-several-hats). When the personas need different home units, separate attribute sets, or separate login identities, you keep them as distinct parties and connect them with `same_entity` rather than collapsing them onto one record.

What makes it the right tool is that it is the intentional, governed link. Joining two personas is an explicit administrative or onboarding act that is recorded and can be revoked, and it is deliberately different from any incidental equality that might be inferred from a shared email address, which the platform actively suppresses at the data layer (see [protected identifiers](./identities-and-identifiers#protected-identifiers)). Because it correlates personas on purpose, it is itself privacy-sensitive: who may create or read it is an authorization concern, and it should not be exposed on low-trust surfaces. In return it gives you consolidated views and cross-persona reasoning, such as "show me all personas of this human" or "the employee and the customer are the same subject," without forcing the personas to share an identifier, a home unit, an attribute set, or a login identity.

## Relationships Are the Basis for ReBAC

Roles and attributes let you decide about a single party, which is role- and attribute-based access control. Relationships let you decide based on how parties are connected, which is relationship-based access control. The pattern is that a permission follows an edge. A manager of the request's owner may approve it, walking a `manages` edge from the requester to the owner. A member of the group that owns a resource may read it, walking `member_of` from the principal to the group. An agent may act only for the owner it delegates to, walking `delegates_to` from the agent to the human.

Because relationships are typed and directional, these rules are expressed against edge types and traversal rather than against ad-hoc joins. The `same_entity` link extends this reasoning across personas, letting a rule treat the employee and the customer as one subject precisely when an explicit link says they are, and not otherwise. The engine that evaluates these rules lives in the [authorization layer](/edk/guides/authorization/overview); the relationship graph on this page is the fact base it traverses. Creating, reading, listing by party, updating, and deleting relationships over REST is covered on the [Party REST API](./rest-api#relationships) page.

---

# Identities and Identifiers

# Identities and Identifiers

A party says who or what exists. An identity is how that party is recognised, discovered, and, when it is explicitly permitted, how it signs in. The two are separate layers on purpose, and that separation is what lets one tenant hold contacts that never log in, employees that log in internally, and customers that log in on a public site, without any of it contradicting.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-party-identity-layers.svg" alt="Parties hold identities; identities carry identifiers; identifiers drive discovery and, when permitted, authentication" style={{maxWidth: '820px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Three Layers, Decoupled

A party is the directory entry, whether a person, an organization, or a service. An identity belongs to a party, and a party can hold several: a work persona and a separately discovered contact record can both sit on the same person. The identity is the unit that carries a per-identity salt and the bindings that decide where, if anywhere, it may authenticate. An identifier in turn belongs to an identity and names it to the outside world, such as an email address, a phone number, a decentralized identifier, a federated subject, or an issuer URL, and an identity can carry several of these.

The reason the layers are kept apart is that identity is not the same thing as login. Many parties in a real tenant should be discoverable and relatable but never sign in. An imported contact, a supplier you only invoice, an organization you keep on file: each has an identity and identifiers so you can find and connect it, but no authentication capability. Being able to log in is something you grant explicitly, per application, rather than something an identifier carries on its own.

## Identifiers Drive Discovery

The first job of an identifier is discovery, which is resolving a real-world value back to the party it belongs to. Given an email address, a phone number, or a decentralized identifier, the platform finds the matching identity and through it the party, so you can attach a verified contact, deduplicate an inbound record, or link a presentation to a subject you already know. None of this requires that the party ever authenticate, which is what makes discovery useful in its own right.

Identity verification is integrated with this discovery step. A verification flow that establishes a real-world value resolves it through the identifier layer to the right identity, records that the value is verified, and attaches it where it belongs. Discovery and verification therefore stand on their own in situations that are purely about knowing who a party is, independent of any future sign-in.

## Protected Identifiers {#protected-identifiers}

Identifiers are among the most sensitive data in the system, because an email address or phone number is both personal data and a correlation key, so they are never stored in the clear. Each identifier is held as a reversible encrypted value, which an authorised reader can decrypt to display, and where matching is needed it also carries a blind index, a keyed hash you can match against without reading the value. Which protection applies is chosen per identifier type, because different identifiers have different needs.

| Mode | At rest | Searchable | Protects against | Used for |
|------|---------|------------|------------------|----------|
| Plaintext | value and index in the clear | trivially | nothing | genuinely public identifiers, such as an issuer URL |
| Searchable blind index | encrypted value plus a tenant-wide keyed hash | yes, by exact match | reading the value at rest, casual scans | login identifiers such as email, phone, DID |
| Salted blinded | encrypted value plus a per-identity-salted hash | no, verify only | reading the value and correlating one person across roles | sensitive identifiers that must never be a login key or a correlation handle |

The tension this resolves is real. A tenant-wide index lets you look an email address up in a single step, but it also lets anyone with database access see that two rows share that address. A per-identity salt removes that correlation but breaks global lookup. Rather than pick one answer for everything, the platform decides per identifier type: login identifiers accept bounded, in-tenant equality so they can be looked up, while identifiers that must never correlate are salted so they cannot. This is why the same email address can sit on several identities without a database reader being able to prove they belong to the same person, and why the only way to assert that they do is the explicit, governed [`same_entity` relationship](./relationships#same-entity-linking-personas).

Normalization is part of the protection policy rather than a separate step. Each identifier type's resolved policy couples its storage mode with a normalization profile, so a value is canonicalized identically before it is encrypted on a write and before its blind index is computed on a lookup, and the two always agree. The machinery is KMS-backed: the blind index is a keyed HMAC and the reversible value is AES-GCM ciphertext, both produced by the `IdentifierProtector` in `com.sphereon.identity.matching.protection`.

What a reader sees depends on the surface. Every surface that turns an identifier back into a claim, OIDC userinfo, the issuance pipeline's identity resolver, credential claim mapping, resolves it through the `ProtectedClaimResolver`: a plaintext or reversible value is revealed and emitted, while a non-reversible blinded value is omitted entirely, because the stored lookup column carries the blind index and a blind index must never leak as a claim value. Verified flags derived from the row, such as `email_verified`, are kept either way. The administrative API works the same way in the other direction: it accepts raw identifier values and protects them server-side, and its read responses expose only the protection mode and the lookup value, never ciphertext, HMAC material, or key references.

## Applications Are Services {#applications-are-services}

A login surface, the place a party signs in, is itself a party: a service with a login configuration attached (`ApplicationLoginConfig`). That configuration says which authentication methods the surface accepts (`allowedMethods`), which identifier types count as logins there (`loginIdentifierTypes`), which identity providers may back it (`allowedIdpIds`), and whether self-registration is allowed (`selfRegistration`). An OAuth client id or a public host maps to that service party, so the application a user is signing in to is a participant in the model rather than a separate registry.

Resolving the application from a request is direct: the OAuth `client_id` resolves to the service party carrying it as its OAuth client id, and a tenant can name a fallback application with the `oauth2.application.default-id` configuration key for requests that arrive without a distinct client id. Application-bound login is the platform default, governed by `auth.login.require-application` (default `true`); setting it to `false` permits credential login without an application, a development convenience rather than a production mode.

An identity authenticates at a service only through an explicit application binding. The binding is the relation between an identity and an application, and it means one thing: this identity may sign in here, using these methods. That is all a binding has to carry. An identity that should sign in to two applications simply has two bindings, and an identity with no binding at all, like a contact-list entry, cannot log in anywhere. A binding can also carry a role label such as employee or customer (its `specializationSubtype`), for the case where an application wants the login to say which role the person is acting as, but that label is optional and most bindings do not need it. The identity may carry such a subtype of its own as well; when both are set, the binding's value wins for that application. Granting the ability to sign in is therefore an explicit act, scoped to a single application.

## Modelling Identities Across Applications

How a person spreads across several applications is a modelling choice, not a fixed rule, and the model supports three shapes side by side. You pick the one that matches how separate the personas really are, and a single tenant can use all three at once.

The first shape is **one identity used everywhere**. A person has a single identity, with one set of identifiers and one credential, and a binding to each application it may use. They sign in to every surface with the same email and the same password, and the application they reached decides what they can do there. This needs no roles at all; two bindings to two applications is the whole of it. When an application also wants the role, the binding to that application carries the label, and a person can be an employee at one and a customer at another while still being one identity.

The second shape is **a separate identity per application**. Sometimes the logins should share nothing. A person can hold a distinct identity for each application, each with its own identifiers and its own credential, and each can even be backed by a different identity provider. The work login and the customer login are then genuinely separate accounts on the same person. You can still tie them together for reporting and reasoning with a `same_entity` link, but neither shares a credential or an identifier with the other.

The third shape is **identifiers per role**. Between the two sits the case where a person plays distinct roles that each need their own identifiers or credentials. Here you give the person one identity per role, each scoped to its specialization and carrying the identifiers and credential that belong to that role. The employee identity and the student identity are separate logins on one person, split along the roles rather than along the applications.

None of these is more correct than the others. A contact that never logs in has an identity and no binding. An employee who is also a customer might be one identity with two bindings, or two identities, depending only on whether those logins should share a credential. The choice is yours to make per person, and you can change it as a relationship deepens.

## Authentication: Fan Out, Then Filter {#authentication-fan-out-then-filter}

Login resolves by identifier and application together, never by identifier alone, and this is what makes the headline case work: one email address shared by an employee, a customer, and a contact in the same tenant.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-party-login-resolution.svg" alt="A login email fans out to three candidate identities and is filtered down to the one with an authenticable binding to this application" style={{maxWidth: '820px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

Given the identifier value, its type, the application that the OAuth client id or host resolves to, and the method, resolution happens in two moves. First it fans out: the platform computes the blind index for the value and finds every identity in the tenant that holds it, so the shared email correctly surfaces all three. Then it filters down: it keeps only the identities that have an active, in-validity binding to this application granting `authenticable` and allowing the requested method. The contact has no binding and drops out, the customer is bound to a different surface and drops out, and the employee remains.

The result must be exactly one identity. Zero permitted identities is a clean rejection, and a uniqueness guard prevents more than one. Every way a login can fail is rejected with its own machine-readable reason (`LoginRejectionReason` in `com.sphereon.data.store.party.login`): an identifier type whose protection policy is not searchable cannot be a login key at all, an unknown application, an identifier type the surface does not accept, a method the surface does not allow, no authenticable identity, and an ambiguous match are each distinct outcomes, so a caller can tell a misconfigured surface from a missing binding.

Only once a single identity is resolved does the method-specific check run against it: a password is verified against that identity's credential, a one-time code or magic link is confirmed through a verification flow, a federated login maps the upstream subject back through the same fan-out, and a wallet presentation resolves the presented decentralized identifier the same way. The authenticated user id is the resolved identity's id; the session and the tokens minted from it identify the identity, not the party or the identifier. The effect is that where a party may log in is a property of its binding, not of its identifier, so you can hand the same person a customer login on your public site and an employee login on your internal application, keep a third record as a pure contact, and each one resolves correctly because the application decides which identity is permitted.

## Federated Login and Self-Registration

Federated login follows the same resolution. The application's login configuration lists the identity providers that may back login there, and a login through any other provider is refused before the upstream subject is considered. What happens to a subject the tenant has never seen depends on the surface's `selfRegistration` flag. On a surface with self-registration enabled, the first federated login materializes the identity, attaches the verified identifiers from the provider, and creates the authenticable binding in the same step, so the user is signed in at the end of their first round trip. On a surface with self-registration disabled, the upstream subject must resolve to an existing identity that already holds a binding to this application; an unknown subject is rejected and nothing is created.

Identity verification feeds the same machinery. A completed verification materializes its verified identifiers as protected correlation identifiers under the tenant's protection policies. When the verification targeted an application, the resolved or created identity is also bound authenticable to that application, with the allowed methods taken from the application's login configuration. A verification with no application in scope is a contact-only materialization: the identity and its identifiers are persisted, but no binding is created, so verification alone never grants the ability to log in.

## Password Credentials at Rest

A password credential never stores its login handle in the clear. The username is held as a deterministic HMAC blind index, which is the credential store's only matching value, plus a reversible ciphertext kept for administrative and recovery surfaces (`UsernameProtection` in `com.sphereon.identity.auth`). The derivation inherits the tenant's normalization for email identifiers but always uses a searchable blind-index mode regardless of the tenant's email policy, because the credential lookup that precedes identity resolution has nothing else to match on. The password itself is hashed with Argon2id in PHC string format, hash comparison is constant-time, and repeated failures drive a time-bound lockout that escalates after repeated lockout cycles.

## Where to Next

The parties that hold these identities are covered across [Persons and Organizations](./persons-and-organizations) and [Organization Units](./organization-units). The link that lets you assert two identities are the same human, intentionally and auditably, is on the [Relationships](./relationships#same-entity-linking-personas) page. The login configuration and application binding endpoints are on the [Party REST API](./rest-api#application-login-and-bindings) page.

---

# Semantics Walkthrough Overview

# Semantics Walkthrough

This walkthrough builds one concrete use case end to end: **an organization (Acme Corp) issues employee credentials and later verifies a subset of them**. Acme issues two credentials to its people, an Employee credential as an SD-JWT VC and a Business Card as an mdoc, and stands up a standalone verifier that asks a wallet to present claims from both in a single request.

What makes this an *enterprise* walkthrough is not the protocols. The OpenID4VCI issuance and OpenID4VP verification flows are the same ones documented in the [OpenID4VCI](/edk/guides/oid4vci/overview) and [OpenID4VP](/edk/guides/oid4vp/overview) guides. What changes is that none of the wire forms are typed by hand. The issuer's credential design and the verifier's DCQL query are both **derived** from a shared semantic model, so the issued credential and the requested credential agree on attribute identity by construction.

The pages that follow take you from modeling your world to the REST calls that drive the flow. They focus on the public EDK REST API and the JSON it exchanges. You author every layer over these REST APIs; in VDX the same layers are also presented through a guided UI, so an operator can build and govern the model without writing requests by hand.

## The Mental Model

The naive way to stand up an issuer and a verifier is to hand-author both wire forms:

- The issuer POSTs a credential design with a literal `claims[]` array. Each claim carries its own path, selective-disclosure policy, label, and ordering, all typed by hand.
- The verifier POSTs a DCQL query with a literal `credentials[]` array, its claim paths typed by hand, independently of the issuer.

That works for a single credential, but it does not scale across an organization. There is no shared definition of what `given_name` *is*, so the issuer's `given_name` and the verifier's `given_name` can drift apart with nothing to catch it. Selective-disclosure policy, data classification, legal basis, and retention are retyped on every design. And nothing records *which* attributes a given design or query actually consumed, so no one can later answer "where do we issue or request this personal attribute?".

The enterprise semantic model inverts this. A canonical, organization-owned model is authored once, and the issuer design and verifier DCQL are **renderings derived from it**. The model is the source of truth; the wire forms are outputs.

## The Layered Model

The model is a layered authoring stack. Each layer is authoritative for the layer above it, narrowing what downstream layers admit and never widening it.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-layered-model.svg" alt="The four-layer semantic authoring stack: L1 Semantic Catalog defines PREDEFINED party-type entities (Person, Address, Organization) and SPECIALIZATION entities (Employee, Employer) plus first-class relationships (residentialAddress, employment). L2 Attribute Profile binds catalog entities via use-case roles (employee, employer) with optional specializes narrowing, and selects which relationships the use case includes. L3 Attribute Set is a role-scoped traversal subselection of one profile, where each selected entry is a roleRef plus an array path that may traverse a relationship. L4 channels are set-bound artifacts that map set traversal paths to wire claim paths; both the issuer design and the verifier DCQL derive from the same VC channel, and usage lineage rows carry role_ref, source_entity, traversal_path, role (ISSUE or REQUEST), and artifact_kind." style={{maxWidth: '620px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

- **L1 Semantic Catalog** is the canonical layer. It describes the world for the organization: the party-type entities, their attributes, their relationships, and their governance. A catalog is owned (by a Party) and versioned. Entities are either **PREDEFINED** party types (for example, `natural_person`, `address`, or `organization`, each with its own attribute list) or **SPECIALIZATIONS** that subtype a predefined entity and add attributes (for example, Employee specializes Person, Employer specializes Organization). Relationships between entities are first-class objects with named ends, a `relationType`, and per-end cardinality: for example, `residentialAddress` links a Person (source) to an Address entity (target, role `home`, cardinality 1..1). A catalog is created as a shell, entities and relationships are appended, then it is published.
- **L2 Attribute Profile** is the use-case layer. The "Acme Employee" profile pins the catalog version it draws from, declares use-case **roles** (each bound to a catalog entity and optionally narrowed to a specialization via `specializes`), selects which catalog relationships the use case includes, and may narrow a small allow-list of per-attribute fields such as conformance. It never widens the catalog.
- **L3 Attribute Set** is a role-scoped **traversal subselection** of exactly one profile. Each selected entry is a `{ roleRef, path: [...] }` pair where the path is an array that may traverse a relationship: for example, `{ roleRef: "employee", path: ["residentialAddress", "country"] }` reaches the `country` attribute of the Address entity via the `residentialAddress` relationship from the employee role. The set resolves to a flat list of typed, governed attribute entries that downstream channels consume.
- **L4** is the channel-rendering layer. The same resolved attribute set can drive many outputs, not just credentials: a data-capture form, a portal page, a generated PDF document, an API payload, or a verifiable credential, each authored at `/api/attributes/v1/channels/{channel}`. Because this is an issuer and verifier walkthrough, it uses the channel. A **set-bound VC channel** binds exactly one attribute set, a credential format (`dc+sd-jwt` or `mso_mdoc`), a credential-type identity (`vct` for SD-JWT or `doctype` for mdoc), shared branding, and a `claimMappings` table that maps each set traversal path to its wire claim path. This is the artifact the issuer design and the verifier DCQL both derive from. An **OID4VCI issuance channel** then composes one or more VC channels under a single `credentialConfigurationId` and carries the offer configuration; it has no `setRef` of its own.

[Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world) goes deeper into the world model and each layer.

## Channel Modes

A channel exists in one of two modes:

| Mode | Claim source | Where it lives | License gate |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Free-form** | hand-written claim list | IDK (open source) | ungated |
| **Set-bound / semantic** | derived from a set-bound VC channel | EDK / VDX (enterprise) | gated on `semantic-attribute-binding` |

The **free-form** mode is a hand-written claim list with no semantic provenance. It is the simple, open-source path and is not license-gated. Use it when you just want a credential and have no model behind it.

The **set-bound / semantic** mode derives the claim list, selective-disclosure policy, and credential-type identity from a set-bound VC channel. The governance flows down from the catalog, usage lineage is recorded per consumed traversal path, and the verifier's DCQL is derived from the same VC channel the issuer used. This is the enterprise, license-gated mode, and it is the mode this walkthrough uses.

:::tip
Every enterprise write (catalog, profile, set, and branding authoring; VC channel create; design-from-channel render; and the DCQL `authored` call) is gated behind a single license feature, `semantic-attribute-binding`. Reads, resolves, and the DCQL `preview` derivation are never gated. The free-form path is entirely ungated. The gate is fail-open by design: a deployment with no license features set (the unbounded default) applies no gating at all. HTTP-exposed VDX semantic-binding operations also carry per-operation `x-license-protection` metadata in OpenAPI and matching `ServiceCommandContract.licenseProtection` descriptors. See [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world#the-license-gate).
:::

## What the Model Drives

The model is not a passive input. From the catalog, profile, set, and VC channels, the platform derives, transparently:

- **The wire form of the issued credential.** The claim list and the credential-type identity (format, `vct` or `doctype`) come from the VC channel's `claimMappings` table, not from a hand-typed design field.
- **Selective-disclosure and governance policy.** Selective-disclosure policy, data classification, legal basis, and retention flow down from the catalog attribute, through the profile and set, to the issued wire form.
- **The verifier DCQL.** The verifier's credential queries are derived from the same VC channels the issuer used, so issuer and verifier agree on attribute identity by construction.
- **Usage lineage.** Every derivation records which traversal paths a given artifact (a credential design or a DCQL query) consumed, in which role (ISSUE or REQUEST), so an operator can audit where each attribute is issued or requested.

## What We Will Build

The walkthrough authors the whole model through the **layered** authoring API under `/api/attributes/v1`: one explicit REST call per layer, which is exactly how a real authoring UI drives it.

| Step | Layer / surface | REST entry point | Page |
|---|---|---|---|
| L1: create the catalog shell | Catalog | `POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs` | [Catalog](./catalog) |
| L1: add 5 entities | Catalog entities | `POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{id}/entities` (x5) | [Catalog](./catalog) |
| L1: add 2 relationships | Catalog relationships | `POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{id}/relationships` (x2) | [Catalog](./catalog) |
| L1: publish and resolve | Catalog lifecycle | `PUT /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{id}/status` then `GET .../resolved` | [Catalog](./catalog) |
| L2: create, publish, resolve the profile | Profile | `POST /api/attributes/v1/profiles` (+ `.../status`, `.../resolved`) | [Attribute Profile](./attribute-profile) |
| Branding: create and publish | Presentation overlay | `POST /api/attributes/v1/branding` (+ `.../status`) | [Channels](./credential-definitions) |
| L3: create, publish, resolve the set | Attribute set | `POST /api/attributes/v1/sets` (+ `.../status`, `.../resolved`) | [Attribute Set](./attribute-set) |
| L4: two set-bound VC channels | VC channels | `POST /api/attributes/v1/channels/credentials` (x2) | [Channels](./credential-definitions) |
| L4: OID4VCI issuance channel | OID4VCI channel | `POST /api/attributes/v1/channels/oid4vci` | [Channels](./credential-definitions) |
| Render both issuer designs from channels | Issuer design | `POST /api/v1/designs/credentials/fromchannel` (x2) | [Issuing](./issuing) |
| Create one offer per credential | Issuer offer | `POST /oid4vci/backend/credential/offers` (x2) | [Issuing](./issuing) |
| Preview then author a multi-credential DCQL | Verifier DCQL | `POST /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/preview` then `.../authored` | [Verifying](./verifying) |
| Create the OID4VP auth request | Verifier presentation | `POST /oid4vp/backend/auth/requests` | [Verifying](./verifying) |
| Poll verifier status, read verified data | Verifier presentation | `GET /oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/{id}` | [Verifying](./verifying) |
| Audit usage lineage | Provenance | (lineage rows) | [Provenance & Operations](./provenance-and-operations) |

The two set-bound VC channels are what turn the layered semantic model into something issuable and verifiable: the issuer's design and the verifier's DCQL are both derived from those same channels.

All authoring and backend calls authenticate with an OIDC bearer token issued by the tenant's Authorization Server; the tenant is resolved from the token's `tenant_id` claim, never from a client-supplied header. The wallet-facing protocol endpoints (`/oid4vci/credential`, `/oid4vp/request-uri/...`) are driven by a wallet and need no operator token.

## Next Steps

- [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world): the world model, the four layers, usage lineage, and the license gate
- [Catalog (L1)](./catalog): seed the catalog with entities and relationships, then continue through profile, set, and channels
- [Issuing](./issuing): render issuer designs from the VC channels and create the offer
- [Verifying](./verifying): author a multi-credential DCQL, request a presentation, read verified data
- [Provenance & Operations](./provenance-and-operations): usage lineage, governance flow-through, versioning, and operational boundaries
- Related guides: [OpenID4VCI](/edk/guides/oid4vci/overview), [OpenID4VP](/edk/guides/oid4vp/overview), [Credential Design](/edk/guides/credential-design/overview), [OCA Bundles](/edk/guides/oca/overview)

---

# Modeling Your World

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# Modeling Your World

The [overview](./overview) introduced the four layers (L1 catalog, L2 profile, L3 set, L4 channel). This page explains how the model describes an organization's world, how governance flows through every layer, and how wire forms are derived from it. The model is the authoritative source that drives wire forms; the issuer design and the verifier DCQL are both derived from it, not authored beside it.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-layered-model.svg" alt="Four-layer semantic model: L1 catalog declares entities (PREDEFINED and SPECIALIZATION) and first-class relationships; L2 profile binds catalog entities to use-case roles and selects relationships; L3 set is a role-scoped traversal subselection of one profile; L4 channels are the set-bound artifacts that issuer designs and verifier DCQL both derive from." style={{maxWidth: '800px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Modeling Your World

Before any credential is designed, the catalog lets an organization describe **its world**: the kinds of party it deals with, the attributes those parties carry, and the relationships between them. Everything downstream derives from this, so it is worth modeling deliberately rather than per credential.

**The catalog is bound to a Party.** Every catalog is owned by a Party through `ownerPartyRef`. In most organizations that owner is the tenant or the organization itself, though it can just as well be a local subsidiary that keeps its own catalog. Whoever owns it, a catalog is typically used as the organization's single source of truth for its world: one governed place where the meaning, classification, and structure of every attribute is defined once and reused everywhere.

**Entities are party types.** Each entity in the catalog is a kind of party. The platform ships a rich set of built-in party types, including `natural_person`, `organization`, `address`, and `group`, alongside platform roles such as `identity`, `credential_template`, `resource`, and `user`; the `partyType` token is extensible for anything else your world needs. A `PREDEFINED` entity names one of these party types and is modelled up front as first-class data.

**Specializations are use-case subtypes you do not model up front.** In a given use case a natural person may be an employee, a student, or a customer; an organization may be an employer or a supplier. These are `SPECIALIZATION` entities: each extends a predefined entity with extra attributes for the use case, without the platform having to predefine "student" or "customer" as their own party types. A specialization inherits the attributes of what it specializes and adds its own.

**Relationships connect entities.** Relationships are first-class: a Person *has* an Address, an Employee is *employed by* an Employer. Each relationship has a type and two ends, and each end carries its own cardinality, so the model captures how many addresses a person may have and that the address in that relationship belongs to exactly one resident.

## The Four Layers

The model is structured into four layers that build on each other: the **[Catalog (L1)](./catalog)** defines the canonical party types, attributes, and relationships; the **[Attribute Profile (L2)](./attribute-profile)** assembles catalog entities into named use-case roles; the **[Attribute Set (L3)](./attribute-set)** is a role-scoped traversal subselection of one profile; and **[Channels (L4)](./credential-definitions)** are the set-bound artifacts that both the issuer design and the verifier DCQL derive from. Each layer is versioned and uses the same `DRAFT | PUBLISHED` lifecycle.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-governance-flowthrough.svg" alt="Governance flow from L1 catalog through L2 profile to L3 set and L4 channel: jurisdiction, classification, and sdPolicy values set at the catalog entity flow through role bindings and role-scoped traversal selections, narrowing at each layer but never widening, reaching the wire form with full provenance." style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

**Governance overlays flow through every layer.** The four governance overlays on an attribute (`classification`, `processing`, `residency`, `assurance`) are authored once on the catalog attribute and flow down every layer into the wire form, never retyped per credential. They are grounded in W3C DPV, GDPR, NIST FIPS 199, ISO 27001, and eIDAS2. Personal-data classification is `overlays.classification.pii` (with `specialCategory` for Article 9 data); like all governance, it lives in the overlays bag. Each layer may narrow what the layer above admits but never widen it.

### What the governance overlays drive

Rendering a set to different output formats is only half of what the rich model does. The governance overlays on each attribute are operational, not decorative: they determine how the platform protects, uses, keeps, and erases the data, and they travel with the value wherever it flows.

- **`classification`** sets the protection posture. The `pii` flag and `specialCategory` marker, the ISO 27001 label, and the NIST FIPS 199 impact triad decide how strictly a value is guarded, masked, and access-controlled, and which attributes count as personal or special-category data for audit.
- **`processing`** governs lawful use and lifecycle. Each purpose carries its GDPR Article 6 legal basis and its own retention rule, so the model knows *why* a value may be used and, through the retention `duration`, `trigger`, and `action`, *when* it must be cleaned up or erased.
- **`residency`** governs where a value may live: the allowed and denied regions, whether it must stay in-region, and the Chapter V transfer mechanism for any permitted cross-border movement.
- **`assurance`** governs the trust level: the eIDAS level of assurance, the attestation type, and the authentic source the value is asserted against.

Because these travel with the attribute down every layer, the same protection, retention, residency, and assurance rules apply consistently to a form, a PDF, an API payload, and a credential, without being restated per artifact. The model is not just a rendering source; it is where data-handling policy is declared once and enforced everywhere the attribute appears.

## How the Wire Forms Are Derived

Wire forms are derivations from VC channels, not a separate authoring tier.

**Issuer credential design** = a VC channel + issuance-only overlays the channel does not carry (`displays`, optional `alias`, `hostingMode`). Created at `POST /api/v1/designs/credentials/fromchannel` with `channelRef: { channelId, channelVersion }`. The claim list, selective-disclosure posture, ordering, and credential-type identity are all derived from the VC channel and its set, profile, and catalog chain. No `claims[]` or `bindings[]` are authored on the design itself. Each consumed traversal path writes one `ISSUE`-role lineage row. See [Issuing](./issuing).

**Verifier DCQL query** = one or more VC channels. DCQL spans multiple credentials, one credential query per channel, so a single DCQL can request both the Employee SD-JWT and the Business Card mdoc simultaneously. Created at `POST /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/authored` with `channelRefs: [ { channelId, channelVersion } ]`. Each consumed traversal path writes one `REQUEST`-role lineage row. See [Verifying](./verifying).

The through-line from semantic model to wire form: a set traversal entry `{ roleRef: "employee", path: ["residentialAddress", "country"] }` maps in the SD-JWT VC channel to `claimPath: ["address", "country"]`, surfaces as a selectively-disclosable verified claim in the issued credential, and is recorded in lineage with its `traversal_path` value. The verifier's DCQL query carries the same `claimPath`, so issuer and verifier agree on field identity without any out-of-band coordination.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-credential-definition-lineage.svg" alt="Provenance chain of the set-bound VC channel: a credential design or DCQL query derives from a VC channel, which pins an attribute set (L3) via setRef, which pins an attribute profile (L2) via profileRef, which pins a semantic catalog (L1) via catalogRefs. Lineage rows carry role_ref, source_entity, and traversal_path, recording which role (ISSUE or REQUEST) consumed which path through which entity chain." style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Override and Version-Pinning Precedence

When a value is resolved for a wire form, these layers apply in order. Each layer narrows what the layer above admits; no layer widens it:

1. **Catalog entity attribute (L1)** is canonical: `valueType`, `overlays.i18n` labels, `sdPolicy`, governance metadata.
2. **Profile override (L2)** is the profile's narrow-only effective value for the override allow-list (`conformance`, `sdPolicy`, `entryCodesSubset`, `sensitive`, ...). The profile also pins the catalog version via `catalogRefs`. Anything outside the allow-list reads through to the catalog.
3. **Set override (L3)** tightens further per selected (role, path) entry (`conformance`, `cardinality`, `entryCodesSubset`, `sensitive`). The set pins the profile version via `profileRef`.
4. **VC channel** is selection and mapping only (which traversal entries, which `claimPath`, which `disclosure` value). It does not override governance.
5. **Issuer design overlay** is issuance-only (`displays`, `alias`, `hostingMode`).

Each layer's version pin is what keeps derivation deterministic: a channel authored against set v2 keeps rendering the v2 shape even after the set is revised to v3.

## Usage Lineage

Every render that consumes a traversal path records a usage-lineage row. One row has this shape:

| Column | Meaning / values |
|---|---|
| `role_ref` | The role that contributed the path (e.g. `employee`, `employer`). |
| `source_entity` | The entity the path originates from (e.g. `Person`, `Employee`). |
| `traversal_path` | The full traversal path as consumed from the set (e.g. `["residentialAddress","country"]`). |
| `role` | `ISSUE` (written by a design-from-channel render) or `REQUEST` (written by a DCQL author call). |
| `artifact_kind` | `CREDENTIAL_DESIGN` or `DCQL_QUERY`. |
| `artifact_id`, `artifact_version` | The rendered artifact and the version it was captured at. |
| `channel_id`, `channel_version` | The VC channel the render derived from. |

The lineage row carries enough identity in `role_ref`, `source_entity`, `traversal_path`, and the channel reference to answer cross-role questions directly, and the path back to the profile and catalog runs through that channel reference.

The issuer's design-from-channel render writes `role = ISSUE` rows; the verifier's DCQL author call writes `role = REQUEST` rows. For relationship-traversal paths, the row captures the full traversal, so `["residentialAddress","country"]` is one traceable entry.

Because the rows carry the channel identity, the role, and the traversal path together, the platform can answer questions the opaque per-service stores cannot:

- Which credentials issue, and which verifier requests touch, a given attribute or traversal path?
- Under which VC channel and at which versions?
- Which `source_entity` contributes a given traversal path, and does any verifier request it?

That cross-role reasoning over meaning, classification, and provenance is the deliverable of the enterprise tier. See [Provenance & Operations](./provenance-and-operations).

## The License Gate

Every WRITE in the enterprise tier is gated behind a single license feature, `semantic-attribute-binding`:

- **Gated**: catalog, profile, set, branding, and channel authoring; the issuer design-from-channel render; the verifier DCQL `authored` call.
- **Never gated**: reads (get, list, resolve) and the DCQL `preview` derivation, which derives a query but persists nothing and records no lineage.
- **Never gated**: the free-form / lite channel path in the IDK.

The gate is **fail-open by design**. Behaviour depends on the deployment's license:

| License features | Behaviour |
|---|---|
| empty set (unbounded default) | no gating applies; every gated write passes |
| non-empty, contains `semantic-attribute-binding` | gated writes pass |
| non-empty, missing `semantic-attribute-binding` | gated writes return `FORBIDDEN` |

With no license features set (the unbounded default), no gating applies and the `FORBIDDEN` response does not occur. In VDX, semantic-binding REST operations declare their operation-level license metadata with `x-license-protection`, and the service command contracts expose matching `licenseProtection` descriptors. This makes the OpenAPI reference, command registry, and runtime license checks use the same entitlement keys.

See [Provenance & Operations](./provenance-and-operations#operational-boundaries).

## Pagination

Every list endpoint under `/api/attributes/v1/{catalogs,profiles,sets,channels,branding}` is paginated and filterable uniformly. A list call accepts these query parameters:

| Parameter | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `limit` | Page size, clamped to `[1, 100]`, default `20`. |
| `offset` | Number of items to skip. |
| `page` | Zero-based page index (alternative to `offset`). |
| `size` | Page size (alias of `limit`). |
| `sort` | Field to sort by, default `createdAt`. |
| `sortDirection` | `ASC` or `DESC`, default `DESC`. |
| per-entity filters | `nameContains` (case-insensitive substring), `status` on catalogs/profiles/sets/branding, and `channel` / `setId` on channels. |

Every list response uses the same paginated envelope:

```jsonc
{
  "data": [ /* the page of entities (never a bare top-level array) */ ],
  "pagination": {
    "limit": 20,
    "offset": 0,
    "page": 0,
    "size": 20,
    "total": 7,
    "totalPages": 1,
    "hasMore": false
  }
}
```

Read the page from `.data` (always an array, never the top-level object) and the counts from `.pagination`. The channel list returns `.data` as an array of `ChannelEnvelope` items; read `.data[].channel` for each concrete channel. See [Channels](./credential-definitions) for paged list, filter, and sort parameters in action.

## Next Steps

- [Catalog (L1)](./catalog): define your catalog shell, add entities and relationships, and publish
- [Issuing](./issuing): render issuer designs from the VC channels and create the offer
- [Verifying](./verifying): author the multi-credential DCQL and verify a presentation

---

# Provenance & Operations

# Provenance & Operations

The first four pages authored a model and drove the issuer and verifier from it. This page covers what the model gives you operationally: the usage lineage recorded along the way, how governance flows from the catalog into the wire forms, how versioning and pinning behave in practice, and the boundaries that shape the public API surface.

## Usage Lineage

Every derivation writes lineage. The issuer's design-from-channel call ([Issuing](./issuing)) wrote `role = ISSUE` rows; the verifier's DCQL author call ([Verifying](./verifying)) wrote `role = REQUEST` rows. Each row in `semantic_attribute_usage` carries the full path from the consumed traversal entry to the artifact:

| Column | Meaning / values |
|---|---|
| `role_ref` | The role from the attribute set that provided this path (e.g. `employee`, `employer`). |
| `source_entity` | The catalog entity where the traversal starts (e.g. `Person`, `Organization`). |
| `traversal_path` | The path array that was consumed, as a serialised form. For a direct attribute this is a single-element path (e.g. `["email"]`); for a relationship traversal this is the full path (e.g. `["residentialAddress","country"]`). |
| `role` | `ISSUE` (written by the issuer design-from-channel) or `REQUEST` (written by the DCQL author). |
| `artifact_kind` | `CREDENTIAL_DESIGN` or `DCQL_QUERY`. |
| `artifact_id`, `artifact_version` | The rendered artifact and the version it was captured at. |
| `channel_id`, `channel_version` | The VC channel (L4) that was rendered. |

The path back to the profile and catalog runs through the `channel_id` reference on the row, so the lineage table stays compact while remaining fully traceable to the model behind each artifact.

For a relationship traversal, the row records the full `traversal_path` together with `source_entity` and `role_ref`, so a query by attribute path (including traversed paths) still reaches the row. For example, the path `["residentialAddress","country"]` sourced from `Person` via the `employee` role appears as its own row, distinct from the direct `["country"]` path on the Address entity, so by-attribute reasoning can distinguish direct from traversed usage.

### The cross-role questions it answers

Because every row carries `role_ref`, `source_entity`, `traversal_path`, `role`, and the artifact identity, the platform can reason across both roles in ways that opaque per-service stores cannot:

| Question | How lineage answers it |
|---|---|
| Where do we *issue* a given traversal path? | All `role = ISSUE` rows where `traversal_path` matches and `source_entity` matches. |
| Where do verifiers *request* a given traversal path? | All `role = REQUEST` rows for the same path and source entity. |
| Which artifact and channel version consumed a path? | The `artifact_id`/`artifact_version` and `channel_id`/`channel_version` on every matching row. |
| Which roles and source entities contribute to a given artifact? | All rows for `artifact_id = A`, grouped by `role_ref` and `source_entity`. |
| Which artifacts touch a sensitive or special-category path? | Join rows on the catalog attribute's `overlays.classification` and other governance overlays. |

In the walkthrough, the Employee design and the multi-credential DCQL both touch `email` (via `role_ref = employee`, `source_entity = Person`, `traversal_path = ["email"]`). A by-path query for that row returns both the ISSUE-role design row and the REQUEST-role query row. The same applies to the traversed path `["residentialAddress","country"]`: the issuer maps it to `address.country` in the SD-JWT and the verifier requests it in the DCQL, and both facts appear in lineage under the same traversal path. This cross-role reasoning over meaning, security classification, and provenance is the operational deliverable of the enterprise tier.

:::note Reading lineage
The provenance read APIs (by-path, by-artifact, by-channel) are part of the VDX platform layer. The EDK writes the `semantic_attribute_usage` rows on every derivation but does not expose a public REST read endpoint for them.
:::

## Governance Flow-Through

The catalog attribute is canonical, and its governance metadata flows down the tiers and into the wire forms without being retyped at each layer:

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-governance-flowthrough.svg" alt="Governance flow-through: the catalog attribute given_name carries its classification, sdPolicy, and other governance overlays (retention, legal basis); these flow into the issued credential (SD-JWT or mdoc) as the same attribute identity and selective-disclosure entry, and into the verifier DCQL as the same attribute identity and nested claim path." style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

- **Selective disclosure.** The catalog attribute's `sdPolicy` overlay (`ALWAYS`, `NEVER`, or `OPTIONAL`-style) is what the VC channel's `claimMappings` records as the `disclosure` value, and what the issuer design uses to decide which claims are independently disclosable. The wallet can present `given_name` without revealing `employment_status` because the policy was set at the catalog and flowed through. The verifier requests exactly the claims the DCQL names, derived from the same channel.
- **Data classification.** The `overlays.classification` overlay on the catalog attribute (its `pii` flag and `specialCategory` marker) travels with the attribute through every derived artifact. An operator can audit which issued credentials and which verifier requests touch personal or special-category data by joining lineage rows against the catalog's attribute metadata.
- **Governance overlays.** Retention, legal basis, and jurisdiction constraints are authored once in the catalog's `governance` block and per-attribute governance overlays. They flow into every credential design and DCQL query derived from that catalog, rather than being re-specified on each artifact.

The point: governance is authored once at the catalog (L1) and is derived into every downstream artifact rather than retyped per artifact.

## Versioning and Pinning in Practice

Each layer is versioned, and each layer pins the version of the layer below it. Resolution and lineage flow through the whole stack:

- A **catalog (L1)** is versioned; publishing a revised catalog increments the version.
- An **attribute profile (L2)** pins one catalog version per referenced catalog via `catalogRefs` (each entry carries `catalogId` and `catalogVersion`). The Acme Employee profile v1 pins catalog v1.
- An **attribute set (L3)** pins the profile version it was authored against via `profileRef.profileVersion`.
- A **VC channel (L4)** pins the set version via `setRef.setVersion`. The two channels in the walkthrough (Employee SD-JWT and Business Card mdoc) each pin set v1.
- A rendered **design** or **authored DCQL** captures the VC channel id and version it derived from.

The practical effect: a VC channel authored against set v1 keeps rendering the v1 attribute shape even after the catalog and profile are revised to v2. To adopt v2, you re-author the channel against the new pin. This is what makes derivation deterministic and auditable across a changing model, and it is why issuer and verifier stay in agreement: both derive from the same pinned VC channels.

:::tip Rolling forward
Because the verifier's DCQL is persisted in the versioned DCQL store and an auth request references a `query_id`, you can publish a new DCQL version and repoint verifiers to it on a planned cutover, without disturbing in-flight requests. See [Verifier Bindings](/edk/guides/oid4vp/verifier-bindings) for per-verifier version pinning and scheduled activations.
:::

## How This Differs From Hand-Authored Flows

For contrast, the naive flow hand-authors both wire forms: a literal `claims[]` on the design and a literal `credentials[]` on the DCQL, each typed independently. The enterprise model inverts this:

- The semantic model drives the wire form; you do not type `claims[]` on the design or `credentials[]` on the DCQL.
- Selective-disclosure policy, data classification, and governance flow from the catalog, not from hand-typed design fields.
- Issuer and verifier agree by construction, because both derive from the same VC channels.
- Usage lineage is recorded, so an operator can audit where any traversal path is issued or requested.

The free-form path still exists for callers that want a hand-written claim list with no model behind it; it is ungated and bypasses derivation and lineage. The layered path is the license-gated, governed default.

## Operational Boundaries

Two boundaries are important when reading the walkthrough against a running deployment.

The license gate returns `FORBIDDEN` only when a license carries a non-empty feature set that omits `semantic-attribute-binding`. With no license features set, the unbounded default applies and every gated write passes. See [the license gate](./modeling-your-world#the-license-gate).

Usage lineage is written by the EDK on every derivation. The public read surface for by-path, by-artifact, and by-channel queries is part of the VDX platform layer, so EDK library consumers should treat the lineage store as an internal persistence contract unless they expose their own admin surface.

## The Full Sequence

Here is the complete call sequence the reader followed across the pages, in order:

1. **Operator token.** The issuer's embedded authorization server issued an OIDC bearer JWT via auth-code and PKCE. The JWT carries the tenant identity; all subsequent calls pass it as the bearer credential.
2. **Catalog shell.** A catalog shell was created with a name, owner party reference, and governance overlays (jurisdictions, data classification scheme, controller). Five entities were added: Person, Address, and Organization as predefined party types, then Employee as a specialization of Person and Employer as a specialization of Organization. Two relationships were added: `residentialAddress` from Person to Address and `employment` from Employee to Employer. The catalog was published and resolved.
3. **Attribute profile.** A profile was created over the published catalog, binding the `employee` role to Person (specializing Employee) and the `employer` role to Organization (specializing Employer), selecting both relationships, and applying a narrow override (employee email made mandatory). The profile was published and resolved.
4. **Branding.** A shared credential branding overlay was created with layout, locales, logo, and color scheme. It was published and referenced by both VC channels.
5. **Attribute set.** A set was created over the published profile, selecting nine traversal paths: six direct employee attributes (`given_name`, `family_name`, `employee_id`, `job_title`, `employment_status`, `email`), two relationship traversals (`residentialAddress.postal_code` and `residentialAddress.country`), and one employer attribute (`legal_name`). An override narrowed `employment_status` to the active and suspended codes. The set was published and resolved.
6. **Two VC channels.** The Employee SD-JWT channel (`dc+sd-jwt`, vct `https://issuer.acme.example/employee`) was created with eight claim mappings that map each set traversal path to a wire claim path, including the relationship traversal `["residentialAddress","country"]` mapped to `["address","country"]`. The Business Card mdoc channel (`mso_mdoc`, doctype `org.acme.businesscard.1`) was created with five claim mappings using namespace-qualified two-segment mdoc paths. Both channels reference the same set version and the same branding.
7. **OID4VCI issuance channel.** An issuance channel was created composing both VC channels by reference (no set reference on this artifact). It carries the `credentialConfigurationId` and offer configuration.
8. **Two designs from channels.** The issuer rendered each credential design by posting display overlays and an alias alongside a `channelRef` pointing at each VC channel. The claims list, selective-disclosure values, credential-type identity, and ordering were all derived. Each call wrote ISSUE-role lineage rows for every consumed traversal path.
9. **Credential offers.** One offer was created per credential configuration (a wallet obtains one credential per offer), each returning its own `correlation_id` and `offer_uri`. An offer URI can be rendered as a QR code, a link, an NFC payload, or a deeplink.
10. **DCQL preview and author.** The verifier first previewed a two-credential DCQL from both VC channels (ungated, persists nothing). The verifier then authored and persisted the same query with a `queryId`, writing REQUEST-role lineage rows.
11. **Authorization request.** The verifier created an auth request referencing the authored `query_id`, returning a `correlation_id` and an `openid4vp://` `request_uri`.
12. **Holder obtains and presents.** The wallet obtained each credential from its own offer via the auth-code grant, then presented both against the two-credential DCQL in a single response (SD-JWT with KB-JWT holder binding; mdoc with DeviceAuth COSE_Sign1 over the OpenID4VP session transcript).
13. **Poll to verified.** The verifier was polled until status reached `authorization_response_verified`. The response carried `credential_claims` for both credentials, with SD-JWT claims as plain keys and mdoc disclosed elements under their namespace-qualified keys.
14. **Lineage rows.** Each design-from-channel render and the authored DCQL write `semantic_attribute_usage` rows: `ISSUE`-role rows from the two designs and `REQUEST`-role rows from the DCQL, each carrying `role_ref`, `source_entity`, and `traversal_path`.

See the per-page sections for the full request and response details at each step.

## Next Steps

- [Overview](./overview): the use case and the mental model, from the top
- [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world): the world model, the layers, lineage, and license gate in depth
- Related: [Credential Design](/edk/guides/credential-design/overview), [OpenID4VP Verifier Bindings](/edk/guides/oid4vp/verifier-bindings)

---

# Tenant and Onboarding Overview

---
id: overview
title: Tenant and Onboarding Overview
sidebar_label: Tenant Overview
description: How the EDK models tenants, how a request is matched to a tenant, how registration journeys work, and where the application tenant fits.
---

# Tenant and Onboarding

Every service the EDK ships is multi-tenant. The issuer, verifier, AS, DID resolver, and KMS containers each run as a single process that serves any number of tenants. The tenant is the unit that scopes routing, authorization, persistence isolation, and configuration: a request is resolved to a tenant before anything tenant-scoped runs, and from that point on every read, write, signing key, and advertised URL is bound to that tenant.

This section is for the developer or operator who deploys the EDK, onboards tenants, calls the admin APIs, and customises behaviour. It covers the tenant model that matters at the API surface, the registration journeys that land a tenant in the system, the order in which a request is matched to a tenant, the URLs a tenant advertises, per-tenant configuration and secrets, and the isolation guarantees.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-tenant-stack.svg" alt="EDK tenant stack" style={{maxWidth: '740px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## What the Tenant Subsystem Gives a Deployment

The tenant subsystem provides multi-tenant request routing (matching an incoming request to the right tenant), per-tenant configuration and secret storage, per-tenant isolation of data and signing keys, the four registration journeys that bring a tenant into existence, and a Platform Admin API for managing tenants, domains, public endpoints, federation, and onboarding policy. Everything below the API is wired automatically by the runtime; a consumer interacts with it through the REST surface and a handful of configuration keys.

## The Tenant Model

A tenant carries the fields a multi-tenant deployment needs to route, scope, and license:

- A **slug**: a globally unique, URL-safe label (lowercase, hyphen-separated, matching `^[a-z][a-z0-9-]{0,62}$`, no consecutive hyphens). The slug doubles as the platform subdomain label and as a path segment in protocol URLs.
- A **parent** (`parentTenantId`): `null` for a root tenant, or the id of a parent for a child tenant. The hierarchy scopes administration and licensing, not data sharing.
- A **status**: `ACTIVE` (reachable), `SUSPENDED` (registered but the resolver rejects requests), or `PENDING_VERIFICATION` (registered but a required step such as owner email verification or a domain DNS challenge is still outstanding).
- A **system flag**: marks a tenant as not a customer tenant. System tenants are excluded from default listings and from slug- and parent-based resolution.

Each tenant has zero or more **domains** (a platform subdomain of the form `<slug>.<platform-base>`, auto-created and verified at registration; and customer custom domains the tenant brings and verifies by DNS) and zero or more **public endpoints**, one per service type, that say what URLs the tenant advertises for its issuer, verifier, and authorization server. See [Tenant Model](./model) and [Domains and Public Endpoints](./domains-and-endpoints).

## Registration Journeys

A tenant comes into existence through one of four journeys. All four converge on the same atomic registration that validates the slug and owner, sets up routing and isolation, provisions the default authorization server, creates the owner account, and mints a one-time owner invitation token. The journeys differ only in how the caller proves it is allowed to register:

- **Admin direct creation.** An authenticated admin posts to `/tenants` and the tenant is created immediately. The only journey that works with no email service configured. See [Registration Journeys](./journeys#admin-direct).
- **Admin invite by email.** Same as direct creation, except the owner invitation token is sent to the owner as an activation email. Requires an email service. See [Registration Journeys](./journeys#admin-invite).
- **Self-service signup.** A prospective owner requests a tenant through the public signup endpoint, verifies their email, optionally waits for operator approval, and the tenant is registered. Requires an email service and the `self-signup` license feature. See [Registration Journeys](./journeys#self-service).
- **Bootstrap.** The one-shot first-tenant claim on a fresh deployment, gated by a durable database flag. See [Application Tenant and Bootstrap](./application-tenant).

License gates apply across all journeys: `maxRootTenants`, `maxTotalTenants`, `maxHierarchyDepth`, `subtenantsAllowed`, and the `subtenants` / `self-signup` / `custom-domains` / `federation` feature flags. Without a license service installed, registration is unconstrained. See [License, Quota, and Policy](./license-and-policy).

## Tenant Resolution

Every request is matched to a tenant in a fixed order: the bearer JWT's tenant claim first (the only signal that proves who the caller acts for), then a verified custom domain, then a platform subdomain, then a tenant slug in the URL path. The first signal that resolves wins. A service advertises only the URLs explicitly bound for the resolved tenant; it never falls back to the request host. See [Tenant Resolution](./resolution).

## Application Tenant

One tenant administers the deployment itself: it activates the license, selects the secret backend, configures onboarding policy and the email service, and registers tenants. It always keeps a hosted authorization server so the operator can sign in even when a customer's external IdP is broken. See [Application Tenant and Bootstrap](./application-tenant).

## What This Section Covers

- [Onboarding Walkthrough](../../deployment/onboarding-walkthrough). The ordered runbook to stand up a deployment and onboard a tenant.
- [Application Tenant and Bootstrap](./application-tenant). The tenant that administers the deployment, license activation, secret backend selection, and onboarding policy.
- [License, Quota, and Policy](./license-and-policy). License limits and features, what they gate, and the extension points that decide who may register.
- [Registration Journeys](./journeys). The four ways a tenant lands in the system and the signup state machine.
- [Owner Activation](./owner-activation). How a new tenant's owner redeems the invitation token and signs in.
- [Tenant Federation](./federation). How a tenant configures platform-hosted or external OIDC sign-in.
- [Domains and Public Endpoints](./domains-and-endpoints). Platform subdomains, custom domains and DNS verification, and the per-service URL bindings.
- [Instance Deployment](../../deployment/instance-deployment). Binding a tenant's issuer, verifier, and AS to its public URLs.
- [Tenant Model](./model). The tenant shape, status lifecycle, hierarchy, slugs, and system tenants.
- [Tenant Resolution](./resolution). The order a request is matched to a tenant and the well-known URL forms.
- [Per-Tenant Configuration](./configuration). Per-tenant config and secret references and the App / Tenant / Principal scope chain.
- [Tenant Isolation](./isolation). Row-level vs database-per-tenant isolation, per-tenant signing keys, encryption at rest, and admin scope.

## What This Section Does Not Cover

- Running more than one issuer, verifier, or AS per tenant. The EDK runs at most one of each per tenant; multiple instances per tenant is a VDX capability.
- Operator dashboards and UIs. The EDK exposes the REST API; the UI is a layer above.

---

# Application Tenant and Bootstrap

# Application Tenant and Bootstrap

Every EDK deployment has exactly one application tenant. It is the tenant the operator signs in to in order to configure the deployment itself: inspect the installed license, choose the secret backend, configure the email service and onboarding policy, and register tenants.

The application tenant differs from a customer tenant in three ways:

- It always has a hosted authorization server. Even after a customer tenant configures its own external IdP, the application tenant keeps its hosted AS so the operator can sign in to fix a broken external-IdP setup without becoming locked out.
- It is the only tenant that can claim the one-shot bootstrap. Once claimed, the bootstrap is permanently closed.
- It is a system tenant, so it is excluded from default tenant listings and from slug- or parent-based resolution.

The application admin API lives at `/application` under the Platform Admin API on the AS image. The request and response shapes for every operation below are documented interactively in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-application-tenant.svg" alt="EDK application tenant and bootstrap flow" style={{maxWidth: '740px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Why a separate application tenant

A production deployment separates the operator running the deployment from the tenant operating their issuer, verifier, or AS. The two have different scope. The operator can touch every tenant, while a tenant touches only its own. They have different authentication. The operator never depends on a customer's IdP, while a customer can configure any IdP. They have different failure modes. A misconfigured customer IdP breaks that tenant, not the operator's ability to fix it. Modelling the operator's access as its own tenant keeps those distinctions consistent. The operator signs in through the application tenant's hosted AS, holds a JWT bound to the application tenant, and acts on other tenants through the platform-admin role rather than a back-channel bypass.

## The bootstrap

A fresh deployment has no platform tenant yet. The platform tenant is created or reconciled through a one-shot bootstrap, gated by a durable flag in the database so the first-run setup can be claimed only once even if two operators try at once. Once the platform tenant and operator login exist, the bootstrap is closed and tenants are created through the regular registration journeys.

The bootstrap is gated for good once claimed. There is no API to reopen it, because it is not a routine operation. A self-hoster rebuilding a deployment from a database backup can reopen the gate with a direct SQL update on the `tenant_bootstrap` row (set `completed_at` back to `NULL`), so the platform tenant can be converged again without manual surgery. This is the only place a self-hoster touches that table directly.

Read the bootstrap state with `GET /application/tenant` (`getApplicationTenant`). It reports whether the gate is still open. Open means the platform tenant bootstrap is still available. Closed means the platform tenant already exists. See the reference for the full snapshot.

## Application admin API

The application admin API is mounted at `/application` under the Platform Admin API. The application tenant is implicit. The acting tenant always comes from the JWT.

```text
GET    /application/tenant                    # getApplicationTenant
POST   /application/tenant/bootstrap          # bootstrapApplicationTenant

GET    /application/license                   # getApplicationLicense
PUT    /application/license                   # putApplicationLicense
POST   /application/license/verify            # verifyApplicationLicense

GET    /application/secrets/backend           # getSecretBackend
PUT    /application/secrets/backend           # putSecretBackend

GET    /application/onboarding                # getApplicationOnboarding
PUT    /application/onboarding                # putApplicationOnboarding
GET    /application/onboarding/availability   # getApplicationOnboardingAvailability
```

### Tenant bootstrap

`GET /application/tenant` returns the bootstrap status plus the application tenant's id, slug, and primary domain when set. `POST /application/tenant/bootstrap` creates or reconciles the application tenant and hosted AS, claiming the bootstrap gate when needed. Tenant registration happens afterwards through the regular `/tenants` endpoint.

A container deployment can also converge the application tenant from configuration at startup, idempotently on every boot. `application.tenant.id` names the application tenant, `application.tenant.hosted-as.issuer` sets the hosted authorization server issuer, and `application.tenant.owner.email` with `application.tenant.owner.display-name` seed the operator owner identity.

### License

The license decides what the rest of onboarding can do. Its signed claims carry a grant, the entitlement authority, composed of four parts:

- Products: the licensed products and editions the customer holds (for example the Enterprise Development Kit, enterprise edition).
- Features: the resolved feature map. Each licensed feature key is mapped to its typed value (enabled, a quota number, or a configuration string).
- Quotas: the quota map. Each quota key is mapped to its limit, kind, and window.
- Command overrides: the definitive per-command allow and deny rules layered over the coarse feature grants.

The grant is fully resolved before it is signed, so the runtime uses the signed feature set directly. The grant is bound to a specific installation through the `installationId` in the license's installation binding, so a license issued for one deployment cannot be replayed against another.

The admin API never exposes the grant itself. It exposes a sanitized status projection: the effective `status` (`ACTIVE`, `GRACE`, `RECOVERY`, `MISSING`, `INVALID`, `EXPIRED`, or `BLOCKED`), one summary per licensed product (product, edition, licensed module names, and quota projections), the customer id and `installationId`, the issuer, the hex SHA-256 fingerprint of the leaf signing certificate, the expiry instant with days to expiry, the recovery and grace flags, and warnings. Each quota projection carries the hard limit, the current usage, the metering window for metered quotas, and an at-cap flag, so the admin console can render capacity meters and disable Create when a cardinality cap is reached. The projection exposes nothing else: not the raw license token, not the decoded claims, not the entitlement graph, and not command-override patterns. Entitlement and quota decisions read the full grant internally. The projection reports only enough for an operator to see whether the deployment is licensed, for which products, how much of each quota is used, and when the license expires. The exact wire shape is in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

Signup, subtenant, and tenant-count gating is enforced from the licensed entitlements, and the availability endpoint reports each journey's evaluated state. Until a valid license is installed, the availability endpoint reports root-tenant registration, self-signup, and subtenant creation as blocked.

Activate a license by submitting the signed license token with `PUT /application/license` (`putApplicationLicense`). The response is the status projection of the installed license. Read the projection of the active license with `GET /application/license` (`getApplicationLicense`). Check a token without installing it with `POST /application/license/verify` (`verifyApplicationLicense`), which returns whether the token is valid plus its projection.

Container deployments may provide the installed license service with a mounted license envelope instead of treating the REST call as the only source. In that setup the service reads its envelope, recipient key, and trust bundle from configured file paths during runtime startup and exposes the same projection through `GET /application/license`. Secret material stays in the deployment's secret backend or Kubernetes objects. The admin API reports only the sanitized status projection. The `license.*` configuration keys and the trust model are documented in [License, Quota, and Policy](./license-and-policy).

Without a license service installed, a bare EDK build runs with no entitlement ceiling, so the standard surface is available for local development. A production deployment installs a license service that reads the actual signed license and resolves the grant the customer holds. See [License, Quota, and Policy](./license-and-policy).

### Secret backend

The secret backend decides where per-tenant secrets (IdP client secrets, SMTP passwords, webhook signing keys) are stored. Secrets are write-only. A value goes in once, and only an opaque reference is stored and returned. Nothing reads a secret back out. The `backend` choices:

- `azure-key-vault`: store secrets in Azure Key Vault. Use this on Azure.
- `hashicorp-vault`: store secrets in HashiCorp Vault. Use this for a Vault-centric or cloud-neutral deployment.
- `kubernetes-secret-mount`: read secrets that Kubernetes mounts into the pod as files.
- `config-system-dev-only`: keep secrets in the config system. Local and development only, never production, because the config system is not a secret store.

Set or reconfigure the backend with `PUT /application/secrets/backend` (`putSecretBackend`) and read the current selection with `GET /application/secrets/backend` (`getSecretBackend`). The non-secret configuration (Vault address, Key Vault URL, namespace) travels in the request. The credential the backend itself needs is a secret reference the deployment seeds at startup.

The backend choice gates production onboarding. The availability endpoint reports invite and self-service signup journeys as blocked until a non-dev backend is selected, so a deployment cannot accidentally store tenant IdP secrets, SMTP passwords, or webhook signing keys in the config system.

### Onboarding

The onboarding policy is the set of toggles that decide which registration journeys exist on this deployment: root-tenant creation, admin invite, self-service signup, subtenant signup, and whether a journey requires operator approval. It also carries the email service binding and the public link base URL the invite and signup emails use.

Read the policy with `GET /application/onboarding` (`getApplicationOnboarding`) and update it with `PUT /application/onboarding` (`putApplicationOnboarding`). Updates propagate to every service replica without a restart.

A toggle being on does not mean the journey is usable. `GET /application/onboarding/availability` (`getApplicationOnboardingAvailability`) returns the evaluated result, combining the policy with the license features and limits, email readiness, and the secret backend selection. Each journey reports whether it is enabled and, when not, a `reason`. A self-service subtenant journey can be on yet blocked because the `subtenants` license feature is absent, or an invite journey can be blocked because no email service is configured. The admin UI uses this endpoint to decide which journey buttons to show, hide, or show with a "blocked because ..." note.

## The bootstrap sequence

Standing up the application tenant on a fresh deployment, end to end:

1. Containers come up. The platform service starts against the platform database; AS, KMS, DID, Issuer, and Verifier start against the tenant workload database with schema-per-tenant routing. The setup gate is open.
2. License request. The setup API creates a signed local license request with the installation base domain, deployment owner/operator data, KMS-held key, and local instance certificate.
3. License activation. The operator receives a license from the issuer, installs it through the setup API, and enables platform bootstrap.
4. Platform bootstrap. The setup API creates or reconciles the application tenant, hosted AS, natural-person operator identity, protected email identifier, and credential, then closes the setup gate.
5. Operator sign-in. The operator signs in through the platform-integrated AS and receives a token with platform-admin scope.
6. Secret backend and policy. The operator PUTs the backend to `/application/secrets/backend`, configures onboarding policy through `/application/onboarding`, and optionally configures email.
7. Tenants. Tenants come in through `/tenants` (admin direct or admin invite) or the public signup endpoint. The setup gate is no longer involved.

## When the operator risks a lockout

The application tenant is designed to stay usable in degraded states:

- Customer external IdP misconfigured. A customer's IdP setup is broken and their users cannot sign in. The operator signs in through the application tenant's hosted AS, fixes the customer's federation provider, and the customer is unblocked. The application tenant's access does not depend on any customer's IdP.
- License expired. New registrations are blocked, but the application tenant remains accessible regardless of license state, so the operator can upload a renewed license.
- Secret backend unreachable. Existing operations continue against cached secrets where possible. New secret writes fail. The operator switches backends or restores connectivity.
- Email service down. Invite and signup journeys fail fast with a clear error, but admin direct creation still works, so the operator can bring up new tenants without waiting for email to recover.

---

# License, Quota, and Policy

# License, Quota, and Policy

Three checks decide whether a tenant registration is admitted. The license must allow it. The quota must be available. The onboarding policy must accept the caller. All three run before any change is made. Each has a documented default, and each is an extension point a deployment can replace.

## License

A license carries a signed set of claims: an identity, the parties it binds (issuer, licensee, installation owner), a validity window, the installation binding, the grant itself, the policies it asserts, and revocation material. The grant is the entitlement authority. It carries the licensed products, the resolved feature set, command-level overrides, and the quotas. The runtime uses this signed grant directly. The installed license service parses the signed envelope the deployment uses, and the rest of the EDK consumes the resolved snapshot.

The license service reads a signed envelope as its runtime source. On JVM deployments it reads a compact license envelope, decrypts it with the configured recipient private key, validates the embedded signature against the mounted root CA bundle, and checks revocation material when a CRL bundle is configured. The EDK consumes the parsed snapshot. The service that produces it runs the cryptographic checks before any tenant or entitlement decision sees the license.

License runtime failures are fail-closed. A missing source reports `MISSING`. An invalid, malformed, untrusted, or clock-unsafe source reports a blocked status. An expired license reports `EXPIRED`. Entitlement checks only pass for `ACTIVE`, `GRACE`, or `RECOVERY` snapshots. Recovery mode can reuse a last-good snapshot when the current source cannot be read, but only before the original signed expiry and only within the configured recovery window. Expiry grace is also bounded by the signed license. `license.runtime.expiry-grace-cap-days` is a local maximum. It is not a way to extend a license beyond the grace period granted in the signed claims.

### License material

A server or container deployment requires a license that is both signed and encrypted. The license token is a JWS whose signing certificate chains to the configured EDK licensing root CA, wrapped in a JWE addressed to the deployment's recipient key. The runtime decrypts the envelope with the configured recipient private key, validates the signing chain against the mounted root CA bundle, checks revocation material when a CRL bundle is configured, and then parses the claims.

The license source resolves in a fixed order. An operator-activated license installed through the admin API wins, then `license.path`, then `license.token`, then the development license behind the explicit `license.dev.enabled` opt-in. The `license.*` keys:

| Key | Purpose |
|-----|---------|
| `license.path` | File path of the license envelope. |
| `license.token` | Inline license token, used when no file path is set. |
| `license.recipient.key-id` | Identifier of the recipient key the license is encrypted to. |
| `license.recipient.private-key-path` | File path of the recipient private key that decrypts the envelope. |
| `license.trust.root-ca-bundle-path` | File path of the EDK licensing root CA bundle supplied through the distribution channel. Required: without a bundle, every license is denied. |
| `license.dev.enabled` / `license.dev.path` | Explicit opt-in for a development license file as a last-resort source. A development license is an alternative source only. It passes the same trust-chain validation and may be valid for at most 31 days. |
| `license.runtime.recovery-days` | How long a last-good snapshot may stand in when the current source cannot be read, never beyond the original signed expiry. |
| `license.runtime.expiry-grace-cap-days` | Local cap on the post-expiry grace window, bounded by the grace granted in the signed claims. |
| `license.runtime.last-good-snapshot-path` | Where the last successfully verified snapshot is persisted for recovery mode. |
| `license.runtime.last-seen-time-path` | Where the last observed wall-clock time is persisted for clock-rollback detection. |
| `license.runtime.clock-rollback-tolerance` | How far the clock may move backwards before the license is reported clock-unsafe and blocked. |

### Trust model

License signing certificates chain to the configured EDK licensing root CA, either through distribution-service intermediates or through partner intermediates. Partner intermediates carry constrained certificate policy OIDs, so a partner CA can sign licenses only for the products its policy allows. The system trust store is never consulted. The only trust anchor is the configured root bundle.

Four keys tune the chain checks. Each accepts a comma-separated OID list, and setting a key to an empty value disables that individual check. Disabling a check never removes the requirement for the root bundle itself.

| Key | Check |
|-----|-------|
| `license.trust.license-signing-eku` | Extended key usage the leaf signing certificate must carry. Defaults to the EDK license-signing EKU. |
| `license.trust.required-policy-oids` | Certificate policies the leaf must assert. Defaults to the EDK license-signing policy. |
| `license.trust.partner-ca-policy-oid` | Policy OID that marks an intermediate as a partner CA. Defaults to the EDK partner-CA policy. |
| `license.trust.partner-allowed-policy-oids` | Product policies a partner CA may sign for. Defaults to the EDK product policies. |

### Tenant quotas

The tenant subsystem reads cardinality quotas from the license to cap how much tenant structure a deployment may stand up:

| Quota | What it caps |
|-------|--------------|
| Root-tenant count | The number of customer (non-system) root tenants. |
| Total-tenant count | The total number of customer tenants across the tree. |
| Hierarchy depth | How deep the tenant tree can go (a root is depth 1, its child depth 2). |

Each is a cardinality quota. The runtime reads the live count and refuses a registration that would exceed the cap. Whether a tenant may have a parent at all is governed by the `subtenants` feature below.

### Onboarding features

Features are the coarse capability gates the onboarding policy reads against a registration. The licensing-relevant ones for tenant onboarding:

| Feature | What it gates |
|---------|---------------|
| `subtenants` | Whether a tenant may have a parent. Without it, every registration with a parent is refused. This is useful for root-only editions. |
| `custom-domains` | Whether custom-domain records are allowed. Without it, only platform subdomains. |
| `self-signup` | Whether the public signup endpoints accept requests. Without it, they report unavailable. |
| `federation` | Whether external-IdP owners are accepted. Without it, only local owners. |

Features are namespaced, versioned keys carried in the signed grant, and the catalog is extensible. An enterprise or VDX deployment contributes its own features and the policy reads them the same way. [Features](../concepts/features) explains how features are declared and enabled. [The Catalog](../concepts/feature-registry-and-product-catalog) covers what the deployment exposes.

### The default posture

Without a license service installed, a bare or development build runs with no entitlement ceiling, so the standard surface works for local development. A production deployment installs a license service that reads the actual signed license and resolves the entitlements and quotas the customer holds. See [Application Tenant and Bootstrap](./application-tenant) for installing and verifying a license.

### Command-level enforcement and audit

Entitlement checks run per command. A service command's contract can carry a license-protection descriptor. Its entitlement key has exactly four segments, `{product}.{module}.{service}.{command}`, and its protection mode decides what enforcement does. `NONE`, `INTERNAL_SYSTEM`, and `DEVELOPMENT_ONLY` commands execute without consulting the license. A `LICENSED` command requires its entitlement key to be granted by an `ACTIVE`, `GRACE`, or `RECOVERY` license snapshot. A denial surfaces to the caller as a forbidden error carrying a machine-readable reason plus safe license identifiers only, never the raw license payload or key material.

The descriptor also carries the inputs the runtime needs to meter and gate the command:

- `featureKeys`: the coarse feature gates the active license must grant for the command to run. A command with feature keys is allowed when every key resolves to a truthy value in the effective entitlement set.
- `costWeight`: the relative weight a single invocation consumes against any metered quota. `0` is exempt and is never tracked. `1` is the baseline. A heavier operation declares a higher weight so one call draws down more of a metered window.
- `quotaKeys`: the quotas a successful invocation counts against (see [Quota](#quota) below).
- `deploymentShapePredicates`: the deployment shapes (for example `packaging=container`, `environment=production`) where enforcement applies, so a command can be licensed in production yet unrestricted in development.

#### The denial model

Every entitlement decision resolves to a single canonical machine-readable reason, so callers, audit reports, and the admin console all speak the same vocabulary. The reasons fall into two families. Decision reasons describe why an installed, valid license did not entitle the command. Envelope reasons describe a missing or unusable license.

| Reason | Meaning |
|--------|---------|
| `UNKNOWN_FEATURE_KEY` | The command requires a feature the catalog does not list. |
| `NOT_ENTITLED` | The effective entitlement set does not grant the required feature or command. |
| `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` | A metered quota window is exhausted, or a cardinality cap is reached, for this scope. |
| `CEILING_EXCEEDED` | The request exceeds what the signed license itself permits, a limit that activation or a subscription cannot raise. |
| `COMMAND_DENIED` | A command-override deny rule matched. A deny always wins. |
| `PARTY_RESOLUTION_FAILED` | The issuer, licensee, or installation-owner party could not be resolved. |
| `MISSING_CONTRACT` | The command has no registered contract. |
| `MISSING_DESCRIPTOR` | The contract carries no license descriptor. |
| `MALFORMED_DESCRIPTOR` | The license descriptor failed structural validation. |
| `LICENSE_MISSING` | No license is installed for this installation. |
| `LICENSE_EXPIRED` | The installed license is past expiry, beyond any grace. |
| `LICENSE_INVALID` | The installed license is structurally or cryptographically invalid. |

The decision is deterministic and fail-closed. Deny rules are evaluated before allow rules, an unavailable ceiling denies everything, and a command whose declared feature is unknown to the catalog is denied rather than waved through. [Entitlement Resolution](../concepts/entitlement-resolution) walks the full decide flow end to end.

Two keys tune the enforcer. `license.command-enforcement.enabled` (default `true`) switches per-command enforcement on or off as a whole. `license.command-enforcement.missing-descriptor-mode` decides what happens when a command has no registered contract or no license descriptor. The default `warn` logs the gap and lets the command run. `deny` fails closed so an uncovered command cannot execute. Warn mode is for rolling coverage out across a large command inventory. A hardened deployment runs `deny`.

Coverage is observable before it is enforced. In warn mode, the runtime inspects the command inventory and reports commands with no registered contract, contracts without a license descriptor, malformed descriptors (including entitlement keys that are not four segments), and entitlement keys claimed by more than one contract. Commands that are intentionally outside licensing, such as health checks, go on an allowlist with a recorded reason, per command id or per id prefix. Individual command-id prefixes can be flipped to hard-fail so a coverage regression in a protected module breaks loudly rather than warning.

Every denial is also an audit event. The enforcer emits exactly one `license.command.denied` event per denial, with a policy-denied result, the denial reason as the error code, and metadata limited to the entitlement key, license id, deployment id, and license status. In warn mode, a command missing its descriptor emits a single `license.command.descriptor-missing` warning event the first time it is seen, so the gap is visible in the audit trail without flooding it. Descriptor defects carry their own reason codes (`MISSING_CONTRACT`, `MISSING_DESCRIPTOR`, `MALFORMED_DESCRIPTOR`). An audit failure never blocks the enforcement decision itself. The denial still reaches the caller.

## Quota

A quota is a named cap the license grants, identified by a quota key and carrying a hard limit. Quotas come in two kinds. The kind decides how the runtime measures consumption.

- Cardinality quotas count live state. The limit caps how many of a thing may exist at once: root tenants, total tenants, protocol-surface instances. When a command that creates such a thing runs, the runtime reads the current live count and refuses the create when it is already at the cap. Deleting the thing frees the slot again, so the count tracks reality rather than a running tally. Two creates racing for the last available slot are serialised at the database level, and the loser is denied.
- Metered quotas count usage within a window. The limit caps how many units may be consumed within a rolling window (for example one month), and consumption accrues rather than freeing up. The window resets, not individual operations. Each invocation draws down the command's `costWeight` units from the window. A command that fails never leaves usage charged against the window. If the window cannot fund an invocation, the command is denied with `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` and never executes.

A quota's `consumeOn` setting decides when the charge sticks. The default, `SUCCESS`, only charges on a successful invocation. `ATTEMPT` charges even when the invocation fails, which is appropriate for rate-limiting expensive work whose cost is incurred regardless of outcome. Quota enforcement is fail-closed. A missing provider for a required cardinality quota, or a counter-store error, denies rather than silently allowing.

Quotas apply at two scopes at once. The same charge is checked against the platform-wide bucket and the per-tenant bucket, so neither a single tenant nor the deployment as a whole can exceed its allowance. The current limit and usage for every quota key are visible to operators as a read-only projection. See the capacity meters described in [Application Tenant and Bootstrap](./application-tenant#license).

## Onboarding policy

The onboarding policy is the authorization chokepoint for tenant registration. It runs first, before any database query or slug-uniqueness check, so an unauthorized caller cannot probe the registration endpoint to enumerate slugs. Returning a rejection short-circuits the whole registration. Nothing is created and nothing leaks about the deployment's existing tenant inventory.

The policy decides per registration source:

- Operator registration (an authenticated admin call). The policy checks the acting tenant and roles. Is this the application tenant (platform admin can act on any tenant)? Is it the parent of the subtenant being created (a parent admin acts on its children)? Are the roles sufficient? Are the licensed features and tenant quotas satisfied?
- Self-service signup (the materialisation of a confirmed signup request). The policy validates that the request was confirmed, that the email, slug, and parent match the request, that any required approval was granted, and that the relevant license features are present.
- Bootstrap (the one-shot platform tenant claim). Accepted unconditionally, because the durable bootstrap gate has already proved the deployment is in its first-run state.

### The fail-closed default and the extension point

By default the onboarding policy fails closed. It rejects every operator and self-service registration and accepts only the durable-gated bootstrap. A deployment must provide an onboarding policy that decides who may register or sign up. Without one, only the very first bootstrap tenant can be created. The replacement interprets roles, parent-tenant scope, license features, and signup state. Installing the production onboarding module automatically swaps in its policy.

## Signup protection

Self-service signup has its own layer of protection on top of the onboarding policy, because its lifecycle (request, resend, confirm, approve, reject) is richer than a single registration check.

- Signup policy. Decides whether root and child signup are enabled, whether they require operator approval, the rate limits per email and per IP, and the verification-token TTL. The default reads the `tenant.signup.platform.*` and `tenant.signup.children.*` configuration keys. A deployment can replace it to read, for example, per-parent-tenant approval overrides.
- Challenge verification. A bot challenge sits in front of the public signup endpoint. To enable public signup, provide a challenge verifier integrating with reCAPTCHA, Cloudflare Turnstile, hCaptcha, or your standard. The EDK ships no default. With no verifier installed, every public signup request is rejected.
- Approval authorization. Decides who can approve or reject pending signups. The default lets platform admins act on any pending request and parent-tenant admins act on requests scoped to their tenant.
- Token hashing. Signup verification tokens are stored hashed. The plaintext goes to the email service at issue time and is then forgotten by the EDK. The default is SHA-256 with constant-time comparison. A deployment can substitute a different hash if its security posture requires it.

## Extension points

To customise a behaviour, provide the matching component. The default does what the right column says.

| To customise | Provide | The default |
|--------------|---------|-------------|
| Quota and entitlement enforcement | A license service that reads your signed license | No ceiling: the standard surface for local development |
| Who may register or sign up | An onboarding policy | Fails closed: only bootstrap is accepted |
| Whether the entitlement resolver decides | An entitlement resolver | Fails closed: nothing is entitled until a resolver is installed |
| Bot protection on public signup | A signup challenge verifier | Fails closed: no verifier rejects every public signup |
| Signup enablement, approval, rate limits, TTL | A signup policy | Reads the `tenant.signup.*` config keys |
| Who can approve/reject signups | A signup approval policy | Platform admin and parent-tenant admin |
| Signup token hashing | A token hasher | SHA-256, constant-time |

The defaults are chosen so a bare EDK build either works correctly (quota, token hashing) or fails closed (onboarding policy, challenge verifier). A production deployment explicitly provides the parts it wants to enable.

---

# Registration Journeys

---
id: journeys
title: Registration Journeys
sidebar_label: Registration Journeys
description: The tenant registration journeys plus the separate platform bootstrap. Admin direct creation, admin invite by email, public self-service signup, license gates, and the signup state machine.
---

import ApiCapability from '@site/src/components/ApiCapability';

# Registration Journeys

tenants come into existence through three journeys: admin direct creation, admin invite by email, and public self-service signup. The one-shot bootstrap is separate: it brings up the platform/application tenant and operator login on a fresh deployment. The production journeys end in the same atomic registration; they differ in how the caller proves it is allowed to register and how the owner is activated.

Every journey honours the same contract:

- Tenant creation does not collect tenant IdP client credentials. A tenant configures its own IdP after the owner is active.
- Secrets are never embedded inline in registration payloads. SMTP credentials, IdP client secrets, webhook secrets, and integration secrets always go through the selected secret backend as references.
- License gates run before signup policy. Policy can turn off or constrain a licensed route, but it cannot enable a route the license disallows.
- Email delivery, when enabled, is server-side. The browser never receives raw signup or invitation tokens.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-tenant-journeys.svg" alt="EDK tenant registration journeys" style={{maxWidth: '760px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Prerequisites at the Deployment Level

Before any production root-tenant journey is offered, the deployment must be configured with:

- **License activation.** A license is installed and its feature/limit snapshot is loaded. Root creation checks `maxRootTenants` and `maxTotalTenants`; self-signup and subtenant availability come from the `self-signup` and `subtenants` features and `subtenantsAllowed`.
- **Optional email service.** When email transport is enabled, the deployment runs the email service, which owns SMTP configuration, template rendering, send, test-send, and delivery status. Onboarding calls it server-side. Without it, admin direct creation remains available but invite and self-service signup do not.
- **Secret management.** One active backend is selected. Tenant config stores secret references, not values.
- **Public URL settings.** The application base URL for activation and signup links, and the tenant public-endpoint base host settings.
- **Signup policy.** Whether root self-service signup is enabled, whether it requires approval, rate limits, and verification-token TTL.
- **Application tenant.** Exists before tenants, has a hosted AS, and owns the operator access path. See [Application Tenant and Bootstrap](./application-tenant) and [License, Quota, and Policy](./license-and-policy).

## Admin Direct Creation {#admin-direct}

An authenticated administrator posts to `/tenants` and the tenant is created immediately, with no email roundtrip. This is the only journey that works with no email service configured, and it is the safe-mode operator path during initial onboarding or after an outage.

License gates:

- Root creation requires an active license plus available root and total tenant quota.
- Subtenant creation additionally requires the `subtenants` feature, `subtenantsAllowed = true`, available total quota, and hierarchy depth within `maxHierarchyDepth`.

Create the tenant with `POST /tenants` (`registerTenant`). The `ownerDelivery.mode` field controls how the owner is activated:

- `none`: the platform sends nothing; the operator completes owner activation out of band. Use this with no email service, or when handing the activation token to the owner through another channel.
- `email`: the platform emails the owner an invitation (the admin invite journey below).

A root tenant leaves `parentTenantId` null; a subtenant sets it to the parent's id and scopes the slug accordingly. The owner shape, the platform-subdomain flag, and the remaining fields are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-admin-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="registerTenant"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform-admin/v1/tenants"
  commandId="tenant.admin.register"
  argsType="RegisterTenantArgs"
  resultType="RegisterTenantResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin">

Supply the tenant `name`, `slug`, `tenantType`, an `owner`, and `ownerDelivery.mode` (`none` here for a no-email direct creation). A root tenant leaves `parentTenantId` null. The result carries the new tenant id and a `correlationId`.

</ApiCapability>

Flow:

1. The admin submits `POST /tenants` with a bearer JWT carrying platform-admin scope and `ownerDelivery.mode = none`.
2. The onboarding policy asserts the call is allowed.
3. The registration runs the full atomic bootstrap: routing, isolation provisioning, schema setup, the default AS, the owner account, and a one-time owner invitation token.
4. When email is configured and requested, the owner invitation token is handed to the email service server-side; otherwise the admin completes owner onboarding through authenticated admin flows.
5. The API returns `201` with the tenant id, slug, primary domain, the issuer URL when available, and a registration correlation id.

The registration call does not accept federation provider configuration, OIDC issuer URLs, or OAuth client secrets. Those belong to the post-activation tenant IdP setup the owner performs through their own admin REST. See [Tenant Federation](./federation).

## Admin Invite By Email {#admin-invite}

The administrator creates the tenant exactly as in direct creation, and the owner invitation token is handed to the email service server-side so the owner receives an activation email. This is the default for local-owner onboarding when email is configured.

Availability: only when the email service is deployed, SMTP is configured, and template/test-send verification has passed. License gates: same as admin direct creation.

The request is the same `registerTenant` call with `ownerDelivery.mode = email`. The difference is the post-create step:

1. The admin submits `POST /tenants` with `ownerDelivery.mode = email`.
2. The tenant and owner bootstrap state are created.
3. The owner invitation token is minted server-side.
4. The email service is called with the owner-invitation template and server-side token context.
5. The email service renders and sends the activation email via SMTP.
6. The API and admin UI report invite delivery status.
7. The owner opens the activation link and completes owner activation through the AS.

The token never leaves the server side. API responses redact it; the admin UI shows "invite sent", not the link. The SMTP password the email service uses is a secret reference through the selected backend.

## Self-Service Signup {#self-service}

A prospective owner starts onboarding from a public signup page or API client. The EDK validates the request, mints a verification token, and hands it to the email service for delivery. The user clicks the link, the EDK confirms possession of the token, and the tenant is registered (or queued for operator approval, depending on policy).

Availability: the email service is required, because email-token delivery is required.

License gates:

- Root self-service signup requires an active license, the `self-signup` feature, and available root/total quota.
- Subtenant self-service signup additionally requires the `subtenants` feature, `subtenantsAllowed = true`, available total quota, and hierarchy depth within `maxHierarchyDepth`.

A prospective owner starts with `POST /tenants/signup/request` (`requestTenantSignup`), supplying the desired slug, the owner email, and a bot-challenge proof. A root request leaves `parentTenantId` null; a subtenant request sets it to the parent's id. See the [reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin) for the schema.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-admin-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="requestTenantSignup"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform-admin/v1/tenants/signup/request"
  commandId="tenant.signup.request"
  argsType="RequestTenantSignupArgs"
  resultType="RequestTenantSignupResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin">

Supply the `email`, desired `slug`, optional `parentTenantId`, and a `challengeProof`. The public HTTP response is `202` with the request id and expiry only. The plaintext verification token in the command result is for the email channel server-side and is never returned over REST.

</ApiCapability>

Flow:

1. A public client submits `POST /tenants/signup/request`.
2. The backend validates signup policy, the bot challenge, slug constraints, and rate limits.
3. The backend creates a `PENDING_EMAIL` request, stores the verification token hashed, and persists the row.
4. The plaintext verification token is handed to the email service server-side.
5. The email service renders and sends the verification email via SMTP.
6. The response returns `202` without the plaintext token.
7. The owner opens the verification link and submits `POST /tenants/signup/confirm` with the token.
8. If approval is not required, the tenant is registered and the row transitions to `REGISTERED`.
9. If approval is required, the row transitions to `PENDING_APPROVAL`.
10. An operator approves or rejects through `POST /tenants/signup/{signupRequestId}/approve` or `/reject`.
11. Approval registers the tenant and the row transitions to `REGISTERED`.

The owner confirms possession of the emailed token with `POST /tenants/signup/confirm` (`confirmTenantSignup`):

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-admin-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="confirmTenantSignup"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform-admin/v1/tenants/signup/confirm"
  commandId="tenant.signup.confirm"
  argsType="ConfirmTenantSignupArgs"
  resultType="ConfirmTenantSignupResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin">

The body is the `plainVerificationToken` the owner clicked through. The result `status` is `REGISTERED` (with the `registration` payload) when no approval is required, or `PENDING_APPROVAL` when the parent tenant's policy holds it for an operator.

</ApiCapability>

### Signup State Machine

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-tenant-signup-states.svg" alt="Tenant signup state transitions" style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

- `PENDING_EMAIL`. Request created; verification token issued; waiting for the owner to click the email link.
- `PENDING_APPROVAL`. Email verified, but signup policy requires operator approval before registration runs.
- `CONFIRMED`. Verification and any required approval cleared; registration is allowed to proceed.
- `REGISTERED`. Registration succeeded; `registeredTenantId` is populated.
- `REJECTED`. Operator declined before confirmation.
- `EXPIRED`. The reconcile pass closed the row past its expiry without confirmation.
- `FAILED`. Registration was attempted but failed; `failureReason` carries the operator diagnostic.

### Signup Policy Keys

```text
tenant.signup.platform.enabled
tenant.signup.platform.requires-approval
tenant.signup.platform.rate-limit.per-email-per-hour
tenant.signup.platform.rate-limit.per-ip-per-hour
tenant.signup.platform.token-ttl-minutes

tenant.signup.children.enabled
tenant.signup.children.requires-approval
tenant.signup.children.rate-limit.per-email-per-hour
tenant.signup.children.rate-limit.per-ip-per-hour
tenant.signup.children.token-ttl-minutes
```

License is evaluated before policy. Policy can disable or constrain a licensed route, but it cannot enable a route the license disallows.

### Resend, Expiry, and Reconciliation

A signup that expires before the user clicks the link can be resent with `POST /tenants/signup/{signupRequestId}/resend`. The resend mints a new verification token and updates the expiry, the last-resend timestamp, and the resend count atomically; the per-row minimum interval and maximum resend count are enforced at the database level, so two replicas racing for the same row cannot bypass the limit.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-admin-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="resendTenantSignupVerification"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform-admin/v1/tenants/signup/{signupRequestId}/resend"
  commandId="tenant.signup.resend"
  argsType="ResendTenantSignupVerificationArgs"
  resultType="ResendTenantSignupVerificationResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin">

The `signupRequestId` comes from the path. The command refuses unless the row is still `PENDING_EMAIL` and within the rate-limit window, then re-mints the token; the fresh plaintext goes to the email channel server-side, not the REST response.

</ApiCapability>

`POST /tenants/signup/reconcile/expired` runs the reconcile pass that moves stale `PENDING_EMAIL` rows past their expiry to `EXPIRED`, and rows that started but never completed registration to `FAILED`.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-admin-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="reconcileExpiredTenantSignups"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform-admin/v1/tenants/signup/reconcile/expired"
  commandId="tenant.signup.reconcile-expired"
  argsType="ReconcileExpiredTenantSignupsArgs"
  resultType="ReconcileExpiredTenantSignupsResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin">

A maintenance sweep, typically run on a schedule. The result reports `expiredCount`. The evaluation instant is supplied by the adapter, so there is no request body to send.

</ApiCapability>

## Bootstrap {#bootstrap}

The bootstrap is the one-shot platform/application tenant claim, used to bring up the internal platform tenant and operator login on a fresh deployment after the license is activated.

A durable flag in the database carries the gate. On a fresh deployment the gate is open. Claiming it creates or reconciles the platform/application tenant atomically, and a database-level guard prevents two concurrent calls from both winning. Once claimed, the gate is closed for good. Reopening requires a direct operator SQL action (set the `tenant_bootstrap` row's `completed_at` back to `NULL`), which is intentionally not exposed at the REST surface.

The bootstrap is the only path the fail-closed onboarding policy accepts unconditionally: by the time it runs, the durable gate has already proved the deployment is in its first-run state. tenant registration happens afterwards with an authenticated platform-admin token.

The authenticated confirmation path is invoked through `POST /application/tenant/bootstrap` on the application admin surface, rather than `/tenants`, because the caller acts as the application operator rather than a customer tenant administrator. After bootstrap, tenants register through one of the other three journeys.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-admin-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="bootstrapApplicationTenant"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform-admin/v1/application/tenant/bootstrap"
  commandId="application.tenant.bootstrap"
  argsType="ApplicationTenantBootstrapRequest"
  resultType="ApplicationTenantStatusSnapshot"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin">

Creates or reconciles the application tenant and its hosted AS, optionally setting the operator contact. Idempotent: a second call returns the current status rather than failing. The result reports the tenant id, hosted-AS availability, and whether tenants can be registered.

</ApiCapability>

## Operator Approval Queue

For signup journeys that require operator approval:

```text
GET  /tenants/signup/pending                          # root signups
GET  /tenants/signup/pending?parentTenantId=acme      # subtenant signups under acme
POST /tenants/signup/{signupRequestId}/approve
POST /tenants/signup/{signupRequestId}/reject
```

Platform administrators see root-level pending rows. Parent tenant administrators see child signup rows scoped to their tenant. Each row carries `email`, `slug`, `displayName`, `parentTenantId`, `status`, `createdAt`, `expiresAt`, `resendCount`, and the failure/rejection diagnostics where applicable. Approve immediately attempts registration; reject records a reason and transitions to `REJECTED`.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-admin-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="approveTenantSignup"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform-admin/v1/tenants/signup/{signupRequestId}/approve"
  commandId="tenant.signup.approve"
  argsType="ApproveTenantSignupArgs"
  resultType="ApproveTenantSignupResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin">

The `signupRequestId` comes from the path; optional `notes` record the operator decision. Approval drives the row through to registration and returns the resulting `status` with the `registration` payload when it succeeds.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-admin-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="rejectTenantSignup"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform-admin/v1/tenants/signup/{signupRequestId}/reject"
  commandId="tenant.signup.reject"
  argsType="RejectTenantSignupArgs"
  resultType="RejectTenantSignupResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin">

The `signupRequestId` comes from the path; an optional `reason` is recorded. The row transitions to `REJECTED` and no tenant is created.

</ApiCapability>

## When the Email Service Is Absent

A deployment can run without an email service, but the operating mode changes:

- Admin direct creation: works. The admin completes owner onboarding through authenticated admin flows.
- Admin invite by email: unavailable. The admin UI hides or disables the invite flow.
- Self-service signup: unavailable. The public signup endpoints reject with a `503` and the signup screens are hidden.
- Bootstrap: works. It does not depend on email.

A minimal on-prem or early-bootstrap deployment typically runs in this mode initially, then enables the email service once the team is ready to operate the signup queues.

---

# Tenant Federation

---
id: federation
title: Tenant Federation
sidebar_label: Tenant Federation
description: How a tenant configures its identity provider after the owner is active. Platform-hosted IdP versus external OIDC federation, the IdP admin REST, write-only client secrets, and claims mapping.
---

import ApiCapability from '@site/src/components/ApiCapability';

# Tenant Federation

Once the tenant owner is active, the tenant decides how its users sign in. There are two modes.

- **Platform-hosted (default)**: the platform's hosted Authorisation Server acts as the tenant's IdP. Nothing to configure; the tenant's users authenticate against the hosted AS.
- **External**: the tenant federates to its own OIDC identity provider (Azure AD, Okta, Keycloak, or any OIDC IdP). The tenant registers that IdP through the federation admin REST.

Tenant context comes from the JWT, so a tenant configures only its own identity providers. External federation is gated by the `federation` license feature; without it the federation endpoints are unavailable for the tenant.

## The IdP Admin REST

External identity providers are managed under the platform-admin federation surface, scoped to the acting tenant from the JWT:

```text
GET    /api/platform-admin/v1/federation/idps                 # listTenantIdps
POST   /api/platform-admin/v1/federation/idps                 # createTenantIdp
GET    /api/platform-admin/v1/federation/idps/{idpId}         # getTenantIdp
PUT    /api/platform-admin/v1/federation/idps/{idpId}         # replaceTenantIdp
DELETE /api/platform-admin/v1/federation/idps/{idpId}         # deleteTenantIdp
POST   /api/platform-admin/v1/federation/idps/{idpId}/test    # probe connectivity and metadata
POST   /api/platform-admin/v1/federation/idps/{idpId}/enable  # enable for sign-in
POST   /api/platform-admin/v1/federation/idps/{idpId}/disable # disable
```

List the tenant's identity providers with `GET /federation/idps` (`listTenantIdps`). Each record carries its `issuer`, `clientId`, scopes, `claimsMapping`, and `enabled` state, plus a `clientSecretRef` (never the plaintext secret). See the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin) for the response schema.

## Creating an External IdP

Create an IdP with `POST /federation/idps`. The decision here is what to put in `clientSecret`: supply the plaintext OIDC client secret exactly once. It is write-only in, stored through the selected secret backend, and returned only as a `clientSecretRef`; the plaintext is never echoed in any response. Supply the non-secret metadata (`issuer`, `clientId`, `scopes`, `claimsMapping`) alongside it, and leave `enabled` false so the IdP is probed before it goes live.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-admin-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="createTenantIdp"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform-admin/v1/federation/idps"
  commandId="federation.admin.create-idp"
  argsType="CreateTenantIdpArgs"
  resultType="TenantIdpRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin">

Supply the non-secret IdP metadata (`issuer`, `clientId`, `scopes`, `claimsMapping`) plus the write-only `clientSecret`. The response returns only `clientSecretRef`. Leave `enabled` false so the IdP is probed before it goes live.

</ApiCapability>

On a `PUT` replacement (`replaceTenantIdp`), supply `clientSecret` to rotate it, supply `clientSecretRef` to preserve the existing reference, or omit both to clear it. The request and response schemas for both operations are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

## Claims Mapping

`claimsMapping` maps the external IdP's token claims onto the tenant user identity the EDK uses:

- `subject` is the IdP claim that carries the stable user identifier (typically `sub`).
- `email` is the IdP claim that carries the user's email.
- `displayName` is the IdP claim that carries the human-readable name (typically `name`).

A deployment whose IdP emits non-standard claim names overrides these so the EDK reads the right fields.

## Test, Enable, Disable

A new IdP starts disabled. Probe it first with `POST /federation/idps/{idpId}/test`, which checks that the issuer is reachable and its metadata is valid. When the probe passes, enable the IdP for sign-in with `POST /federation/idps/{idpId}/enable`; suspend it later with `POST /federation/idps/{idpId}/disable` without deleting the record. Both return the updated IdP. The probe response and the enable/disable schemas are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

The application tenant always keeps its hosted AS regardless of a customer tenant's external-IdP choice, so an operator can still sign in to repair a broken external-IdP setup. See [Application Tenant and Bootstrap](./application-tenant).

---

# Domains and Public Endpoints

# Domains and Public Endpoints

A tenant's network identity has two parts. **Domains** say which hostnames resolve to the tenant. **Public endpoints** say, per service (OID4VCI issuer, OID4VP verifier, OAuth AS), what host and path layout that tenant's metadata advertises. Both are managed through the [Platform Admin API](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin); the services read both at runtime.

## Domains: Who Resolves Here

A domain binds a tenant to a fully-qualified host that resolves to it. Two kinds:

- **Platform subdomain.** A host of the form `<slug>.<platform-base>`, owned by the deployment. Auto-created at tenant registration and verified immediately, because the platform controls DNS for `<platform-base>`. The tenant administrator does nothing for it to work.
- **Custom domain.** A host the tenant brings, such as `wallet.acme.com`. Added unverified; the tenant completes a DNS challenge to prove ownership. The resolver skips unverified custom domains, so the record can sit in place through the verification window without routing traffic prematurely.

A tenant can have many domains; a domain belongs to exactly one tenant, and the host is globally unique. The host is stored lowercased, without scheme or port.

### Verification Flow

Custom domains follow a DNS challenge:

1. The tenant administrator adds the domain with `POST /tenants/{tenantId}/domains` (kind `CUSTOM_DOMAIN`). The EDK mints a verification token and stores the record unverified.
2. The administrator publishes the token as a DNS TXT record (the exact record format is defined by the deployment).
3. Verification (operator-triggered through `POST /tenants/{tenantId}/domains/{domain}/verify`, or a deployment's verification worker) checks DNS and, on success, marks the domain verified. From that point the resolver returns the tenant for that host.

The EDK ships the token field and the verify operation so a deployment can plug in its DNS verification worker without re-inventing the model.

### Primary Domain

One domain per tenant can be marked primary. This is the canonical host the AS metadata renders when no service-specific public-endpoint binding overrides it. Typical patterns:

- Single platform subdomain: `acme.saas.com` is automatically primary.
- Migration to a custom domain: the operator marks `wallet.acme.com` primary; the platform subdomain stays as a fallback.
- Multiple custom domains: only one is primary; the others are valid resolution targets but do not appear in advertised URLs unless they also carry a public-endpoint binding.

## Public Endpoints: What URLs the Tenant Advertises

A public-endpoint binding is the source of truth for what URLs the services put in metadata, in `credential_offer_uri`, in OID4VP `request_uri_base`, in the OAuth `issuer`, in `jwks_uri`, and so on. The services consult these bindings rather than synthesising URLs from the request host.

Each binding ties a `(tenant, serviceType)` pair to:

- **`serviceType`.** One of `OID4VCI_ISSUER`, `OID4VP_VERIFIER`, or `OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER`. The set is closed because each service type has its own URL grammar.
- **`host`.** The lowercased host without scheme or port. When set, it must be a verified custom domain for the same tenant. When unset, the endpoint uses the runtime host or the default base.
- **`pathPrefix`.** The protocol route prefix, for example `/acme/oid4vci` to root the tenant's issuer endpoints under a per-tenant slug.
- **`wellKnownPath`.** The well-known route, for example `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer/acme`.
- **`enabled`.** Lets an operator disable a binding without deleting it.
- **`primaryEndpoint`.** A primary marker for service types that benefit from one (typically the AS).

The full request and response shapes are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

### Why a Separate Binding

A binding is separate from the domain because one host can carry several services and one service can be advertised on a non-domain-shaped URL. A tenant `acme` registered with `acme.saas.com` might split issuer, verifier, and AS onto distinct ingress hosts (`acme.issuer.saas.com`, `acme.verifier.saas.com`, `acme.as.saas.com`). The three bindings make those choices explicit, per service type, independently of which host a request landed on. For a simpler topology where everything lives at `acme.saas.com`, all three bindings point at the same host. The model handles both uniformly.

### Fail-Closed Default

When no binding exists for the resolved tenant and service type, the runtime refuses to advertise anything rather than falling back to the request host. This is the deliberate production default: the request host is often the cluster's internal host or the CDN's origin host, neither suitable for wallet-facing metadata. A development deployment may flip the runtime to use the request host by setting `tenant.public_endpoint.fallback_to_request_host = true`; the published Helm chart keeps the fail-closed default.

### What the Services Advertise

Each service advertises its URLs from the tenant binding:

- **Issuer.** The `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer/{tenant}` document advertises the tenant-bound `credential_issuer`, credential endpoint, nonce endpoint, deferred endpoint, and notification endpoint. The credential-offer endpoint produces `credential_offer_uri` and `status_uri` rooted at the same binding.
- **Verifier.** The authorization request carries `request_uri_base` rooted at the tenant's OID4VP base, `direct_post` responses carry `response_uri` at the tenant's response endpoint, and `status_uri` is rooted at the tenant's OID4VP backend base.
- **AS.** The `issuer`, `jwks_uri`, `authorization_endpoint`, `token_endpoint`, `userinfo_endpoint`, `end_session_endpoint`, and federation callback URLs all come from the tenant binding.

## REST Surface

Domains and public endpoints are managed under the Platform Admin API. See the [reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin) for request and response schemas.

```text
# Domains
GET    /tenants/{tenantId}/domains
POST   /tenants/{tenantId}/domains
DELETE /tenants/{tenantId}/domains/{domain}
POST   /tenants/{tenantId}/domains/{domain}/verify

# Public endpoints
GET    /tenants/{tenantId}/public-endpoints
PUT    /tenants/{tenantId}/public-endpoints/{serviceType}
DELETE /tenants/{tenantId}/public-endpoints/{serviceType}
```

The `{tenantId}` in the path is the operation target; the acting tenant comes from the JWT. A JWT bound to tenant A asking to mutate tenant B is rejected by the cross-tenant authorization check.

`upsertTenantPublicEndpoint` is a `PUT` against `{serviceType}` because at most one binding per `(tenant, serviceType)` is allowed. Asking to `PUT` against `OID4VCI_ISSUER` with a body that names `OID4VP_VERIFIER` is rejected with a `400`.

## Hardening

The public-endpoint surface is security-relevant: a wrong update could redirect a tenant's wallet flows to an attacker-controlled host. The guarantees:

- **Cross-tenant mutation is rejected.** A JWT bound to tenant A cannot mutate tenant B's bindings, even with B's tenant id.
- **Unverified domains are rejected.** A binding's host must reference a verified custom domain for the same tenant.
- **Default-host collisions are rejected.** A binding cannot point at the deployment's default host in a way that would shadow another tenant's primary.
- **Duplicates are rejected.** At most one enabled binding per `(tenant, serviceType)`.
- **Route/body mismatches are rejected.** The service type in the path must match the body.

---

# Tenant Model

---
id: model
title: Tenant Model
sidebar_label: Tenant Model
description: The tenant entity as it appears at the API surface. Slugs, the parent/child hierarchy, the status lifecycle, and system tenants.
---

# Tenant Model

The tenant is the central entity in the EDK. Every record that is not deployment-wide (configuration, integrations, credential designs, DCQL queries, AS clients, federation providers, signing key aliases, webhooks, sessions, audit events) belongs to exactly one tenant. The fields below are the ones that matter when you create, list, and manage tenants through the Platform Admin API.

## Slugs

The slug is a globally unique, URL-safe label. It does a lot of work:

- It is the platform subdomain label. `acme` is reachable at `acme.<platform-base>`.
- It is the path segment for path-based routing. `/acme/oid4vci/...` resolves to the `acme` tenant.
- It appears in the `.well-known` URL forms for OID4VCI (`/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer/acme`), OAuth AS metadata (`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/acme`), and OIDC Discovery (`/acme/.well-known/openid-configuration`).

Because slugs are globally unique, any tenant is reachable by direct subdomain regardless of where it sits in the hierarchy: `tenantc.saas.com` resolves to `tenantc` even when `tenantc` is a child of `tenanta`. Service-specific labels such as `issuer`, `verifier`, or `auth` may sit to the left of the tenant slug without changing the result: `issuer.tenantc.saas.com` still resolves to `tenantc`.

Validation rules:

- Length 1 to 63 characters (the DNS label limit).
- Character set `[a-z0-9-]`, must start with `[a-z]`.
- No consecutive hyphens.
- A small reserved-word denylist (`admin`, `api`, `www`, `system`, plus deployment-specific entries an operator can extend).

Slugs are globally unique. The admin API rejects a collision with a `409`.

## Hierarchy

A tenant is either a root (`parentTenantId = null`) or a child pointing at its parent. The hierarchy is used for two things:

- **Administration scope.** A parent tenant's admin sees and manages its child tenants; a child tenant's admin sees only its own resources.
- **License limits.** `maxHierarchyDepth` caps how deep the tree can go (a root is depth 1, one child is depth 2, and so on).

The hierarchy does not share data. A child tenant's configuration, integrations, signing keys, designs, queries, and sessions are independent of the parent's. Registration walks the proposed parent's ancestry and refuses a cycle or a tree deeper than `maxHierarchyDepth` before any change is made.

## Status Lifecycle

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-tenant-status-lifecycle.svg" alt="Tenant status lifecycle" style={{maxWidth: '620px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

- **`ACTIVE`.** Fully provisioned. The resolver returns the tenant; admin and protocol surfaces work.
- **`SUSPENDED`.** The tenant's records remain (no data loss), but the resolver rejects requests with a `tenant_suspended` error. Use it to disable a tenant without deleting its data, for example during a billing dispute, a security incident, or a manual hold.
- **`PENDING_VERIFICATION`.** Registered, but a required verification step (owner email verification, a custom-domain DNS challenge, or another deployment-specific gate) is still outstanding. The resolver returns the tenant so the verification flow can run, but commands gated by verification refuse until it clears.

Change a tenant's status with `PATCH /api/platform-admin/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/lifecycle/status`. The change propagates to every service replica without a restart, so resolution reflects it immediately. Soft delete is separate from status: a soft-deleted tenant disappears from listings and from resolution while its data remains in storage. Hard delete is not exposed through the API.

## System Tenants

A system tenant is marked as not a customer tenant. System tenants:

- Are excluded from tenant listings by default (pass an explicit flag to include them).
- Are not returned by slug- or parent-based resolution.
- Do not count toward `maxRootTenants` or `maxTotalTenants` (those limit customer tenants only).

The EDK does not assign any privilege to the flag; it is a marker that higher layers and operators use for their own administration patterns. The application tenant that administers an EDK deployment is a system tenant. The flag is set only at registration; there is no API to convert a customer tenant into a system tenant afterward, so tenant counts do not change meaning under the operator's feet.

## Audit Fields

Every tenant carries `createdAt`/`createdById`, `updatedAt`/`updatedById`, and `deletedAt`/`deletedById`. The `*ById` fields name the principal who performed the operation, derived from the calling JWT. For a self-service signup registration, the creator is a synthetic signup principal (the owner does not exist as a principal at registration time). Every admin operation also emits a structured audit event carrying the tenant id, the principal, the operation, the result, and the relevant business identifiers.

---

# Tenant Resolution

# Tenant Resolution

Every request that lands on an EDK service is matched to a tenant before anything tenant-scoped runs. Resolution happens early in request handling; once a tenant is determined, the request descends into that tenant's scope and every tenant-bound read, write, and signing key sees the right tenant.

Four signals can identify a tenant, and they are tried in a fixed priority order. The first signal that resolves wins.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-tenant-resolution.svg" alt="EDK tenant resolution order" style={{maxWidth: '760px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## The Resolution Order

### 1. Bearer JWT

For any authenticated call (admin REST, OID4VCI `/credential`, OID4VP `/direct_post` with a wallet token, AS-issued tokens carrying the tenant claim), the bearer JWT's `tenant_id` claim is authoritative. When present it is used immediately and no other signal is consulted. The JWT is the only signal that proves the caller is acting on behalf of the tenant; the other three say where the request landed, not who the caller is.

The `X-Tenant-Id` header is informational only. The resolver never consults it to determine a tenant. Logs and traces may carry it for diagnostics, but it does not influence routing or authorization. Treating it as authoritative would let any caller act as any tenant they name.

### 2. Custom Domain

The incoming `Host` header is looked up against the tenant's verified custom domains. A verified `wallet.acme.com` resolves to its tenant. Unverified custom domains are skipped, so a tenant can register a domain in advance and keep the record while the DNS verification challenge completes, without the resolver routing traffic to a host the tenant does not yet control. Custom domain takes priority over platform subdomain.

### 3. Platform Subdomain

The host is parsed as `<labels>.<platform-base>`, where `<platform-base>` is the configured `tenant.resolution.platform_base_host`. The label immediately to the left of the platform base is the tenant slug. Two shapes resolve:

- `<tenant>.<platform-base>`: `acme.saas.com` resolves to `acme`.
- `<service>.<tenant>.<platform-base>`: a service-specific label (`issuer`, `verifier`, `auth`, `did`) may sit to the left of the slug without changing the result. `issuer.acme.saas.com` resolves to `acme`.

### 4. Path Slug

For the protocol surfaces that carry the tenant slug in the URL path (`/{tenant}/oid4vci/...`, `/{tenant}/oid4vp/...`, `/{tenant}/.well-known/openid-configuration`), the leading path segment is taken as the tenant slug.

Admin endpoints are a special case: a `{tenantId}` in an admin path (such as `/tenants/{tenantId}/domains`) is the operation target, not the acting tenant. The acting tenant still comes from the JWT, and a JWT bound to tenant A asking to mutate tenant B is rejected by the cross-tenant authorization check.

## Well-Known URL Forms

The metadata endpoints support more than one URL form because clients in the field use both the spec form and the legacy slug-before form:

- **OID4VCI** issuer metadata. Spec form `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer/{tenant-slug}`; legacy form `/{tenant-slug}/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer`. Both point at the same tenant-aware endpoint.
- **OAuth AS** metadata. Spec form `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/{tenant-slug}`; legacy form available. The slug insertion follows RFC 8414.
- **OIDC Discovery**. `/{tenant-slug}/.well-known/openid-configuration` (slug-before is the OIDC spec form; clients do not expect a slug-after form).

The URLs a service advertises (the `credential_issuer` in OID4VCI metadata, the `issuer` in OAuth metadata, the `request_uri_base` in an OID4VP authorization request) come from the tenant's public-endpoint bindings, not from the request host. Resolution determines which tenant a request belongs to; the public-endpoint binding determines what URLs that tenant advertises. See [Domains and Public Endpoints](./domains-and-endpoints).

## Resolution Within a Hierarchy

A request that matches a child tenant's slug or domain resolves to the child, never the parent. There is no automatic walk-up: `acme-nl.saas.com` resolves to `acme-nl` regardless of its parent.

When no signal resolves (the host matches no domain or subdomain, the path carries no slug, and the JWT carries no tenant claim) the behaviour depends on the surface:

- A public protocol endpoint bound to a deployment-wide URL (the application tenant's root AS metadata form, for example) treats the absence of a tenant as the application tenant.
- Other public protocol endpoints refuse the call with a `400`.
- Admin REST endpoints refuse the call with a `401` (the JWT is missing or invalid).

There is no implicit fallback to a default tenant. A request that fails to resolve is rejected explicitly.

## The Fail-Closed Advertising Rule

When a service needs to advertise a URL for the resolved tenant and service type but no public-endpoint binding exists, it refuses to advertise anything rather than falling back to the request host. In a production deployment the request host is often the cluster's internal host or the CDN's origin host, neither of which a wallet can reach. A development deployment may opt into host fallback (see [Domains and Public Endpoints](./domains-and-endpoints)); the published configuration keeps the fail-closed default.

## Caching and Propagation

Resolution results are cached in each service replica so a subdomain or path-slug lookup does not hit the database on every request. Unknown slugs and suspended tenants are cached too, so a flood of unknown-slug probes does not generate one database query per probe.

A routing change on one replica (a new tenant, a status change, a slug rename, a domain verification) reaches every replica's cache without a restart: the change propagates over the shared event channel and each replica invalidates the affected entry. A cache TTL is the safety net for a missed notification. Tune it with `tenant.resolution.cache_ttl_seconds`; the default is conservative because event propagation, not the TTL, is the primary invalidation path.

## Resolution Settings

The resolver reads four deployment-scoped keys at startup (these are app-scope, not per-tenant, because resolution runs before any tenant is in scope):

- `tenant.resolution.platform_base_host`. The host suffix subdomain resolution treats as the platform base. Required when platform subdomain resolution is enabled.
- `tenant.resolution.platform_subdomain_enabled`. Toggles platform-subdomain resolution. Typically on; off for deployments that use only custom domains.
- `tenant.resolution.trusted_proxy_hop_count`. How many `X-Forwarded-Host` hops to trust behind reverse proxies and CDNs.
- `tenant.resolution.cache_ttl_seconds`. The fallback cache TTL.

## Common Mistakes

- **Trusting `X-Tenant-Id`.** It is informational only; the JWT claim is the authority.
- **Falling back to the request host for advertised URLs.** When a tenant resolves, the service advertises the URLs bound for that tenant. Falling back to the request host produces metadata a wallet cannot reach behind a CDN or custom domain.
- **Mixing up the order.** Custom domain before platform subdomain before path slug; the JWT runs first whenever present.
- **Resolving with the cluster's internal hostname.** An internal call from one service to another (the issuer calling the AS, for example) should carry the host a wallet would see, not the cluster's own host.

---

# Tenant Isolation

# Tenant Isolation

Multi-tenant deployments stand or fall on isolation. The enterprise deployment uses two database roles: a platform database owned by the platform service, and a tenant workload database used by the tenant runtime services. Tenant workload data is isolated with one schema per tenant by default. The EDK also supports row-level isolation and database-per-tenant routing for custom assemblies or deployments that need a different operational model. Database isolation is only one layer; per-tenant signing keys and authorization scope on every admin and protocol call close different classes of failure.

## Enterprise Default: Schema-Per-Tenant

In the published enterprise deployment, each tenant has its own schema in the tenant workload database. The platform provisions the schema when the tenant is registered, and the database router sets the request's search path to the resolved tenant schema. Tenant runtime services then read and write their normal tables without co-locating tenant rows in one shared schema.

The platform service has its own database for setup state, license activation state, tenant registry, routing records, platform configuration, and the platform-only authorization server. Runtime services do not connect to that platform database.

## Row-Level Isolation

For custom deployments that choose one shared schema, every tenant-scoped record carries a tenant id; every query filters on it; every tenant-scoped uniqueness constraint includes the tenant id. It is enforced in three places: the schema requires a tenant id on every tenant-scoped row, the data layer always filters by the resolved tenant, and a tenant-scoped command runs inside a tenant context rather than accepting a tenant id as an argument. By construction a tenant cannot see another tenant's rows: a cross-tenant access either matches no constraint, returns an empty result, or is refused.

## Database-Per-Tenant Routing

For deployments that need stricter separation than schema-per-tenant, the EDK can route a request bound to a specific tenant to a specific database or PostgreSQL instance. The routing is configuration-driven:

```yaml
database:
  routing:
    default:
      url: jdbc:postgresql://postgres-shared:5432/edk
      username: edk_app
      password: ${secret:vault:edk/postgres/shared/password}
    tenants:
      acme:
        url: jdbc:postgresql://postgres-acme:5432/edk
        username: edk_app_acme
        password: ${secret:vault:edk/postgres/acme/password}
      regulated-customer:
        url: jdbc:postgresql://postgres-regulated:5432/edk
        username: edk_app_regulated
        password: ${secret:vault:edk/postgres/regulated/password}
```

Each target has its own connection pool. The application code is unchanged; the same operations route to whichever target the resolved tenant points at. Common patterns:

- **Tenant workload database with schema-per-tenant.** The enterprise default. One workload database contains separate schemas such as `tenant_acme` and `tenant_globex`.
- **Single shared schema, row-level isolation.** A custom assembly option. Cheaper and simple to operate, but tenants share one schema.
- **Database per tenant, shared instance.** One Postgres instance hosts a database per tenant. Database-level isolation with more per-tenant provisioning.
- **Postgres instance per tenant.** Maximum isolation, for regulated or contractual cases where a tenant's data must not share a server with another's.

The choice is per deployment and can mix and match, so a deployment can keep most tenants in the tenant workload database and route regulated tenants to a dedicated database or instance. Adding a routing entry takes effect on the next resolution without a restart.

## Provisioning Non-Shared Isolation

For schema-per-tenant isolation, tenant registration provisions the tenant schema, runs the schema migrations, creates the application grants, and seeds any deployment-wide defaults for that tenant. For database-per-tenant or instance-per-tenant isolation, the tenant's storage target has to be created first (create the database, run the schema migrations, create the application role and grants, seed any deployment-wide defaults).

This is an extension point. To run a non-default storage target, provide a provisioner that creates the per-tenant storage at registration time, and a strategy that decides which isolation a given registration gets (so `acme` can stay schema-per-tenant while `regulated-customer` is database-per-tenant).

## Per-Tenant Signing Keys

Every signing duty maps to a per-tenant key alias of the form `(tenant, service, purpose)`:

- Issuer credential signing: `(acme, issuer, credential-signing)`.
- AS access token signing: `(acme, as, access-token-signing)`.
- AS id token signing: `(acme, as, id-token-signing)`.
- Verifier request-object signing: `(acme, verifier, request-object-signing)`.
- Audit checkpoint signing: `(acme, audit, audit-checkpoint)`.
- Webhook HMAC: `(acme, <service>, webhook-signing)`.
- DID update keys: `(acme, did, did-update)`.

The KMS resolves each alias to a specific key in the configured provider. Two tenants with the same alias structure resolve to different keys; rotation is per alias and per tenant, so rotating `acme`'s credential signing key does not touch `beta`'s. The service never holds raw key material: the alias is the contract, and the key lives in the configured provider (software keystore, HSM, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Digidentity CSC). A compromised service container gains the signing capability for the duration of the compromise, not the key. See the [KMS container page](../../deployment/container-deployment/kms) for the full alias contract.

## Encryption At Rest

Several subsystems persist intermediate state carrying sensitive material (the assembled attribute bag in an OID4VCI session, the principal context in an OAuth session, an integration secret reference). These payloads are encrypted at rest with a per-tenant key. Three modes:

- **Plaintext.** Development only. Sessions stored as plain JSON.
- **Platform-encrypted.** The production default. Sessions are sealed with AEAD under a tenant-specific key derived from the deployment master with the tenant id as salt, so a compromise of one tenant's key does not yield another's plaintext.
- **Client-bound.** Additionally binds the encryption to the session's correlation id, so a session is unreadable except when the matching correlation id is presented (typically by the same wallet that started it).

The mode is configurable per tenant through tenant config, per subsystem (`oid4vci.session.encryption_mode` for the issuance session, `oauth2.session.encryption_mode` for the OAuth session). The default is platform-encrypted.

## Authorization Scope

Beyond data isolation, the admin API enforces that a tenant administrator can act only on their own tenant. The JWT is bound to a tenant, the request runs in that tenant's scope, data reads filter on it, and an admin operation compares the resolved tenant against the target named in the URL; a mismatch is refused with a `403`.

A platform admin acting on a specific tenant uses an impersonation token, not a "magic URL". The platform admin's JWT is bound to the application tenant; to act on `acme` they obtain a short-lived JWT bound to `acme` from the application admin API and use that for the subsequent calls. The same scope check applies; a platform admin is simply allowed to obtain the impersonation token where a normal admin is not. The one path-encoded tenant id that names the operation target rather than the acting tenant is `/tenants/{tenantId}/...` for managing the tenant entity, and even there the path is checked against the acting tenant: only platform admins (on the application tenant) can mutate another tenant's record.

## Suspension and Deletion

`SUSPENDED` is the explicit "exists but cannot serve traffic" state. The response to a suspended tenant depends on the surface: public protocol surfaces return `503` with a `tenant_suspended` error, admin REST returns `403`, and the platform admin can still see and modify the suspended tenant from the application tenant. Suspension is reversible: returning the tenant to `ACTIVE` brings it back online, and the change propagates to every replica.

Soft delete is the harder state: the tenant disappears from listings and from resolution while its data remains in storage. Hard delete is not exposed through the API; it requires direct database work.

## When Things Go Wrong

- **Cross-tenant read.** Returns an empty result, surfaced as a `404`; nothing leaks about whether the resource exists under another tenant.
- **Cross-tenant write.** Blocked at the database constraint, surfaced as a `409`, and recorded in the audit stream.
- **Resolver returns the wrong tenant.** The admin authorization check catches the mismatch and refuses with a `403`; a protocol call at worst returns the wrong tenant's metadata, which the wallet rejects on signature validation because the signing key resolves differently.
- **Per-tenant database unreachable.** That tenant's requests fail with a `503`; other tenants are unaffected.
- **Per-tenant KMS provider unreachable.** That tenant's signing paths fail immediately; tenants on other providers are unaffected.

---

# Features

# Features

A feature is the unit of licensing in the EDK. It is a namespaced, versioned key paired with a declared value type. Each feature names one capability the platform can grant. Everything the license model decides resolves to features. A product bundles features. A command requires features. The resolver checks the active license for the features a command needs.

## A feature key

A feature key is a dotted, versioned string such as `semantic-modeling.v1`. The version segment is part of the key. A capability can evolve to `…​.v2` without disturbing deployments still entitled to `…​.v1`. Keys are namespaced by capability area, so the set stays readable as it grows. Every key reads as the thing it gates.

Each feature declares a value type. The value type fixes the shape of the value the active license carries for it.

| Value type | What the license carries | Typical use |
|------------|--------------------------|-------------|
| Boolean | An enablement flag. The feature is on. | A capability that is either licensed or not. |
| Quota | A numeric cap, optionally with a metering window. | A counted or windowed allowance, paired with a quota key. |
| Config | A string or enum configuration value. | A licensed setting whose value the license supplies. |

A feature also records a short description and the set of products that may include it, so the catalog can present a complete inventory.

## What a deployment supports

A deployment exposes the features it supports as part of its catalog. The catalog lists the features the deployment knows about. A VDX deployment also includes VDX's features.

## Enablement per deployment

Listing a feature in the catalog makes it knowable. It does not make it granted. What a deployment can actually do is decided by the active license, which carries the resolved set of features the customer is entitled to. The platform baseline every tenant inherits, and any per-tenant additions, are composed against the signed license. A feature is only enabled when the signed license includes it. The catalog lists the features a deployment supports. The signed license decides which of them are granted.

An operator can read the catalog through the feature catalog surface on the Platform Admin API. Every entry carries the feature key, its value kind, its description, and the products that may include it. See the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin) for the exact shape.

## Where features fit

- [Products and SKUs](./products-and-skus) bundle features into purchasable editions.
- [The catalog](./feature-registry-and-product-catalog) is the read-only view over the features and products a deployment supports.
- [Entitlement Resolution](./entitlement-resolution) decides, per command, whether the active license grants the features the command requires.
- A command declares the features it needs in its [command contract](../contracts/overview). The resolver checks them at invocation.

---

# Products and SKUs

# Products and SKUs

A product is a sellable bundle of features. It groups a set of [features](./features) under a stable product id and a display name. It organises them into editions, which are the SKUs a customer buys. A product is pure data. It carries no behaviour, only the mapping from each edition to the feature keys that edition grants.

## Editions

An edition is a named tier within a product, mapped to the set of feature keys it includes. A product can offer several editions. The same feature can appear in more than one of them, so editions layer from a smaller bundle to a larger one.

For example, the Enterprise Development Kit product offers an `enterprise` edition that includes the enterprise semantic-modeling feature. A richer edition maps to a larger feature set. A leaner one maps to a smaller set. Because the mapping is many-to-many, a feature is never tied to a single edition. Editions compose feature keys freely.

## From purchase to signed grant

Products and editions describe what can be sold. They do not, by themselves, entitle anything at runtime. When a customer purchases a `(product, edition)`, that selection is expanded into the concrete set of feature keys the edition grants. That resolved feature set is what gets signed into the license.

The catalog drives this expansion at issue time, when the license is minted. From then on the signed feature set is authoritative. A deployment's runtime can reason about exactly the features the customer paid for, even if its local catalog later changes.

## Reading the catalog

An operator can list the products a deployment knows about through the Platform Admin API, each with its id, display name, and editions, alongside the feature catalog. The per-product summary in the license status projection reports, for each licensed product, its edition together with the licensed module and quota key names. An operator can see which products a deployment is licensed for. See the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin) for the wire shapes.

## Where products fit

- [Features](./features) are the keys a product's editions bundle.
- [The catalog](./feature-registry-and-product-catalog) is the read-only view over the products and features a deployment supports.
- [Entitlement Resolution](./entitlement-resolution) evaluates the signed grant against each command, not the product itself.

---

# The Catalog

# The Catalog

A deployment exposes the [features](./features) it knows about and the [products](./products-and-skus) that bundle them as one catalog. The catalog is read-only. It lists what the deployment supports, not what a given license grants. A VDX deployment also includes VDX's features in the same catalog.

## What the catalog answers

For features, the catalog answers two questions:

- the declared feature for a given key, with its value type, description, and the products that may include it, or nothing if the key is not in the catalog;
- every feature the deployment knows about, for inventory and admin surfaces.

A key the catalog does not list is unknown. The resolver treats an unknown required feature as a denial rather than an implicit grant.

For products, the catalog answers:

- the product for a given product id, with its display name and editions;
- the feature keys a given edition of a product grants, used when a purchased `(product, edition)` is expanded into the signed feature set at license-issue time.

## Reading it through the API

An operator can read the feature catalog through the Platform Admin API. Each entry carries the feature key, its value kind, a description, and the products that may include it. This is the surface the admin console uses to render its feature and entitlement views. See the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

## Where the catalog fits

- [Features](./features) and [Products and SKUs](./products-and-skus) are the data the catalog exposes.
- [Entitlement Resolution](./entitlement-resolution) consults the catalog when a command declares a feature key, denying any key the catalog does not list.

---

# Entitlement Resolution

# Entitlement Resolution

Entitlement resolution is where the platform decides whether a command may run. It composes the entitlements that apply to the current scope, bounds them by the signed license, and evaluates one command against the result. The decision is deterministic and ordered. It is fail-closed: when anything is missing or ambiguous, the command is denied.

## The effective set

Three sources feed every decision:

- The signed license sets the ceiling. It is the set of entitlements in the active, verified license. The platform never grants anything outside it.
- The platform baseline is the set of entitlements every tenant on the deployment inherits.
- The tenant additions are an optional [per-tenant subscription](./per-tenant-subscriptions) that grants more within what the ceiling already allows.

The resolver composes them as:

```text
effective = (platformBaseline ∪ tenantAdditions) ∩ ceiling
```

The union merges the baseline and any tenant additions. Features combine, command overrides combine, and a quota takes the larger allowance. The intersection then caps that union to the signed ceiling. Only features the ceiling carries survive, allow rules are capped to the ceiling's allow set, quotas are capped to the ceiling's limits, and denials accumulate. A tenant can be granted more than the baseline, but never more than the signed license permits.

## The decision

For one command, the resolver evaluates the effective set in a fixed order. The first match wins.

1. Ceiling unavailable. If the signed license is missing, expired, revoked, or otherwise unusable, the command is denied. Nothing is granted without a usable ceiling.
2. Unknown feature key. If the command requires a feature key the [catalog](./feature-registry-and-product-catalog) does not list, it is denied. An undeclared key is never an implicit grant.
3. Deny-override. If the command matches a deny rule from the platform baseline or the tenant additions, it is denied. A deny is definitive and cannot be overridden by any grant.
4. Outside the ceiling. If the command is not permitted by the signed ceiling, neither by a ceiling feature nor a ceiling allow rule, it is denied.
5. Allow-override. If the command matches an allow rule in the effective set, it is allowed, even without a matching feature.
6. Feature grant. If every feature key the command requires is present and truthy in the effective set, it is allowed.
7. Default deny. Otherwise the command is denied.

Command overrides are matched as patterns, so a single rule can cover a family of commands. Allow and deny rules are layered over the coarse feature grants. A deny rule always wins. See [Command Overrides](../contracts/overview#command-overrides) for the rule structure.

## The twelve denial reasons

Every denial carries one machine-readable reason, drawn from a single ordered enumeration. The first six are entitlement-decision outcomes. The last six describe a defective contract or license envelope.

| Reason | Meaning |
|--------|---------|
| `UNKNOWN_FEATURE_KEY` | The command requires a feature key the catalog does not list. |
| `NOT_ENTITLED` | The effective set does not grant the required feature or command. |
| `QUOTA_EXCEEDED` | A quota allowance is exhausted for this scope. |
| `CEILING_EXCEEDED` | The request exceeds the signed-license ceiling and cannot be raised by a baseline or subscription. |
| `COMMAND_DENIED` | A deny rule matched. A deny always wins. |
| `PARTY_RESOLUTION_FAILED` | The issuer, licensee, or installation-owner party could not be resolved. |
| `MISSING_CONTRACT` | The command has no registered contract. |
| `MISSING_DESCRIPTOR` | The contract carries no license descriptor. |
| `MALFORMED_DESCRIPTOR` | The license descriptor failed structural validation. |
| `LICENSE_MISSING` | No license is installed for this installation. |
| `LICENSE_EXPIRED` | The installed license is past its expiry, beyond any grace. |
| `LICENSE_INVALID` | The installed license is structurally or cryptographically invalid. |

A denial surfaces to the caller as a forbidden error carrying its reason plus safe license identifiers only. It never carries the raw license payload or key material.

## Fail-closed and deny-overrides

Two rules run through the whole decision.

Fail-closed. A missing source, an unavailable ceiling, an unknown feature key, or any resolution failure yields no grant. The default outcome of an undecided command is deny, so a gap in coverage or configuration cannot accidentally open access.

Deny-overrides. A deny rule from either the platform baseline or a tenant subscription is definitive. It beats every allow rule and feature grant. A deny is the way to refuse a command unconditionally.

## The effective license snapshot

What an operator sees of all this is a sanitized status projection, not the decision internals. It reports the effective status (`ACTIVE`, `GRACE`, `RECOVERY`, `MISSING`, `EXPIRED`, `REVOKED`, `SUSPENDED`, `INVALID`, or `BLOCKED`), one summary per licensed product, the customer and installation identifiers, the issuer, the signing-certificate fingerprint, the expiry instant with days remaining, the recovery and grace flags, and any warnings. Entitlement decisions read the full license internally. The projection exposes only enough for an operator to see whether the deployment is licensed, for which products, and when the license expires. The exact wire shape is in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

## Where resolution fits

- [Features](./features) and [The Catalog](./feature-registry-and-product-catalog) supply the feature set the resolver checks against.
- [Per-tenant Subscriptions](./per-tenant-subscriptions) are the optional tenant additions composed into the effective set.
- [Command Contracts](../contracts/overview) carry the per-command license descriptor the resolver evaluates.
- [License, Quota, and Policy](../tenant/license-and-policy) covers quota metering and command-level enforcement in depth.

---

# Per-tenant Subscriptions

# Per-tenant Subscriptions

A subscription is an optional per-tenant entitlement source. Every tenant already inherits the platform baseline. A subscription lets one tenant be granted more than that baseline without raising what any other tenant gets. Most deployments need no subscriptions at all. The platform baseline, bounded by the signed license, is enough.

## How a subscription is applied

A tenant's entitlements start from the platform baseline that every tenant inherits. A subscription is layered on top of it as a tenant addition. [Entitlement resolution](./entitlement-resolution) composes the two:

```text
effective = (platformBaseline ∪ tenantAdditions) ∩ ceiling
```

A subscription can grant additional [features](./features), add command allow or deny rules, and raise quota allowances for its tenant. It is additive within the ceiling. It never removes what the baseline grants except through a deny rule, and it never reaches outside the signed license.

## Always bounded by the license

A subscription is always bounded by the signed installation ceiling. The resolver enforces `tenant ⊆ ceiling`. A subscription that names a feature, command, or quota the signed license does not carry contributes nothing beyond what the ceiling allows. The subscription is a source, not an authority. It can only fill in what the signed license already permits. The signed license stays the hard limit on a deployment, no matter how its tenants are subscribed.

The composition takes the larger of two quota allowances and the union of features and overrides. A subscription is therefore a way to give one tenant a higher cap or an extra capability while the rest of the deployment stays on the baseline.

## What a subscription carries

A subscription is scoped to a single tenant and the party it belongs to. It carries:

- a status, one of `ACTIVE`, `SUSPENDED`, `EXPIRED`, or `CANCELLED`, and an optional validity window;
- the additional features it grants, each with its typed value;
- the command allow and deny rules it contributes;
- the quota allowances it raises;
- optional references to the plan it follows and the billing relationship behind it.

Only an `ACTIVE` subscription within its validity window contributes to the effective set. A suspended, expired, or cancelled subscription falls away and the tenant is back to the platform baseline.

## Where subscriptions fit

- [Entitlement Resolution](./entitlement-resolution) composes a subscription as the tenant-additions source, then caps it to the signed ceiling.
- [Features](./features) and [Products and SKUs](./products-and-skus) define what a subscription's grants reference.
- [License, Quota, and Policy](../tenant/license-and-policy) covers the quota model a subscription's allowances feed into.

---

# Authentication & Identity

# Authentication & Identity

The EDK provides a layered authentication and identity system that goes beyond simple token validation. It covers the full lifecycle from initial authentication through identity proofing, binding, and ongoing assurance.

| Layer | What it does | Key modules |
|-------|-------------|-------------|
| **JWT Validation** | Validate access tokens from multiple IdPs (OIDC, Keycloak, Azure AD, Auth0, Okta) | `lib-authn-jwt-validation` |
| **Identity Verification (IDV)** | Composable verification workflows, OIDC, wallet/OID4VP, document, biometric, OTP | `lib-identity-idv` |
| **Identity Matching** | Privacy-preserving HMAC-hashed links between external identifiers and internal identities, with LoA tracking | `lib-identity-matching` |
| **Identity Reconciliation** | Policy engine that decides whether to accept an existing identity, run IDV, step up, or reject | `lib-identity-reconciliation` |
| **Identity Resolution** | Pluggable resolver chain that maps external identifiers to internal identity IDs | `lib-identity-resolution` |
| **Auth Bridge** | Bridges OAuth2/OIDC authorization servers with wallet-based OID4VP credential presentation | `lib-oid4vp-auth-bridge` |

## How They Fit Together

A typical wallet-based authentication flow touches all layers:

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-auth-identity-flow.svg" alt="Authentication & Identity Flow" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

For simpler deployments without wallets, JWT validation alone is sufficient, the identity layers are opt-in based on which modules are on the classpath.

## Identity Modules at a Glance

### Identity Verification (IDV)

Graph-based verification workflows that compose method nodes into multi-step identity proofing. A `SequenceNode` might chain OIDC login → document verification → biometric check. A `ThresholdNode` might require 2-of-3 methods to succeed.

Each method is a pluggable driver: OIDC, Wallet/OID4VP, Document, Biometric, OTP, ClaimMatch, REST API. Results carry assurance levels (eIDAS LoA, NIST AAL), evidence records, and resolved identifiers that feed into identity matching.

See [Identity Verification](./idv).

### Identity Matching & Reconciliation

External identifiers (holder keys, subject IDs, email hashes, claim tuples) are linked to internal identities using HMAC-SHA256 hashing with domain-separated keys. Sensitive attributes are encrypted with AES-256-GCM. This means the identity store never holds plaintext external identifiers.

Each link binding stores an `AssuranceSummary`, the LoA, OIDC ACR/AMR, and evidence reference from the verification that established the link. This is what enables step-up decisions: the reconciliation engine compares the stored assurance against the required assurance for the current operation and decides whether to accept, step up, or re-verify.

See [Identity Matching & Reconciliation](./matching-reconciliation).

### Identity Resolution

A pluggable resolver chain that maps an external identifier to an internal identity ID. Resolvers are tried in priority order, the built-in `MatchingIdentityResolver` uses the identity matching store, but custom resolvers (LDAP lookup, OIDC introspection, directory service) can be added via multibinding.

See [Identity Resolution](./identity-resolution).

### Auth Bridge

The OID4VP Authentication Bridge connects wallet-based credential presentation to OAuth2/OIDC authorization servers. A user scans a QR code, presents credentials from their wallet, and the bridge handles verification, identity matching, optional IDV, and user resolution, then returns the result as OIDC claims to the authorization server.

See [Auth Bridge](./auth-bridge).

---

# Authorization Overview

# Authorization

The EDK provides a flexible authorization framework that integrates with external Policy Decision Points (PDPs) via the OpenID AuthZEN specification. This enables fine-grained, policy-based access control without embedding authorization logic in your application.

## Architecture

The authorization system follows a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) / Policy Decision Point (PDP) architecture:

<img src="/img/diagrams/authz-pep-pdp.svg" alt="PEP/PDP Authorization Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Key Components

### PolicyEngine

The generic interface for authorization decisions. Abstracts different policy engines:

```kotlin
interface PolicyEngine {
    val id: String
    val engineType: PolicyEngineType  // CEDAR, OPA, AUTHZEN, CUSTOM

    suspend fun isHealthy(): Boolean
    suspend fun evaluate(request: PolicyRequest): IdkResult<PolicyDecision, IdkError>
}
```

### AuthZenPdp

The OpenID AuthZEN-specific PDP interface:

```kotlin
interface AuthZenPdp {
    val id: String

    suspend fun isHealthy(): Boolean
    suspend fun evaluate(request: AuthZenEvaluationRequest): IdkResult<AuthZenEvaluationResponse, IdkError>
    suspend fun getConfiguration(): IdkResult<AuthZenConfiguration, IdkError>
}
```

### ResilientAuthZenPdp

Production-ready wrapper with resilience patterns:

- **Circuit breaker** - Prevents cascading failures when PDP is unavailable
- **Response caching** - Reduces PDP load for repeated requests
- **Fallback handling** - Configurable behavior when PDP fails

## Supported Policy Engines

| Engine | Protocol | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| **Cedarling** | AuthZEN | Cedar policy engine via Janssen sidecar |
| **OPA** | REST API | Open Policy Agent with Rego policies |
| **Generic** | AuthZEN | Any AuthZEN-compliant PDP |

## Request/Response Models

### PolicyRequest

The principal-action-resource model for authorization:

```kotlin
data class PolicyRequest(
    val principal: PolicyPrincipal,  // Who is requesting
    val action: PolicyAction,         // What operation
    val resource: PolicyResource,     // What target
    val context: PolicyContext        // Additional context
)

// Principal (the entity making the request)
data class PolicyPrincipal(
    val type: String,  // "User", "Workload", "Role"
    val id: String,
    val attributes: Map<String, JsonElement> = emptyMap()
)

// Action (the operation being requested)
data class PolicyAction(
    val name: String,  // Command ID like "party.create"
    val attributes: Map<String, JsonElement> = emptyMap()
)

// Resource (the target of the request)
data class PolicyResource(
    val type: String,
    val id: String? = null,
    val attributes: Map<String, JsonElement> = emptyMap()
)

// Context (environmental information)
data class PolicyContext(
    val tenantId: String? = null,
    val sessionId: String? = null,
    val timestamp: Long? = null,
    val attributes: Map<String, JsonElement> = emptyMap()
)
```

### PolicyDecision

The result of policy evaluation:

```kotlin
data class PolicyDecision(
    val decision: Decision,  // PERMIT or DENY
    val reasons: List<String> = emptyList(),
    val diagnostics: Map<String, JsonElement> = emptyMap()
) {
    val isPermitted: Boolean get() = decision == Decision.PERMIT
    val isDenied: Boolean get() = decision == Decision.DENY
}

enum class Decision {
    PERMIT,
    DENY
}
```

## AuthZEN Models

The OpenID AuthZEN protocol uses slightly different terminology:

```kotlin
// AuthZEN Subject (principal)
data class AuthZenSubject(
    val type: String,  // "user", "workload", "role"
    val id: String,
    val properties: Map<String, JsonElement> = emptyMap()
) {
    companion object {
        fun user(id: String) = AuthZenSubject("user", id)
        fun workload(id: String) = AuthZenSubject("workload", id)
        fun role(id: String) = AuthZenSubject("role", id)
    }
}

// AuthZEN Evaluation Request
data class AuthZenEvaluationRequest(
    val subject: AuthZenSubject,
    val action: AuthZenAction,
    val resource: AuthZenResource,
    val context: AuthZenContext
)

// AuthZEN Evaluation Response
data class AuthZenEvaluationResponse(
    val decision: Boolean,  // true = permit, false = deny
    val context: Map<String, JsonElement>? = null
)
```

## Basic Usage

### Evaluating Authorization

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.authz.policy.*
import jakarta.inject.Inject
import jakarta.inject.Singleton

@Singleton
class PartyService @Inject constructor(
    private val policyEngine: PolicyEngine
) {
    suspend fun createParty(userId: String, tenantId: String, input: PartyInput): Party {
        // Build authorization request
        val request = PolicyRequest(
            principal = PolicyPrincipal(type = "User", id = userId),
            action = PolicyAction(name = "party.create"),
            resource = PolicyResource(type = "Party"),
            context = PolicyContext(tenantId = tenantId)
        )

        // Evaluate policy
        val decision = policyEngine.evaluate(request)
            .getOrThrow()

        if (decision.isDenied) {
            throw AccessDeniedException("User $userId not authorized to create parties")
        }

        // Proceed with operation
        return createPartyInternal(input)
    }
}
```

### Using AuthZEN Directly

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.authz.authzen.pdp.AuthZenPdp
import com.sphereon.authz.authzen.model.*

@Singleton
class AuthorizationService @Inject constructor(
    private val pdp: AuthZenPdp
) {
    suspend fun checkAccess(
        userId: String,
        action: String,
        resourceType: String,
        resourceId: String?,
        tenantId: String,
        sessionId: String
    ): Boolean {
        val request = AuthZenEvaluationRequest(
            subject = AuthZenSubject.user(userId),
            action = AuthZenAction(name = action),
            resource = AuthZenResource(type = resourceType, id = resourceId),
            context = AuthZenContext(tenantId = tenantId, sessionId = sessionId)
        )

        val result = pdp.evaluate(request)
        return result.getOrNull()?.decision ?: false
    }
}
```

## Configuration

### AuthZenConfig

Configure the authorization subsystem:

```kotlin
data class AuthZenConfig(
    val enabled: Boolean = false,
    val pdp: AuthZenPdpConfig? = null,
    val fallbackPolicy: FallbackPolicy = FallbackPolicy.DENY,
    val cacheEnabled: Boolean = true,
    val cacheTtlSeconds: Long = 300,
    val excludePatterns: List<String> = listOf(
        "health.**",
        "discovery.**",
        "actuator.**"
    ),
    val includePatterns: List<String> = listOf("**"),
    val resilience: ResilienceConfig = ResilienceConfig()
)
```

### PDP Configuration

Configure the connection to your PDP:

```kotlin
// Cedarling (Cedar via Janssen)
val cedarlingConfig = AuthZenPdpConfig.Cedarling(
    baseUrl = "http://cedarling-sidecar:8080",
    evaluationPath = "/cedarling/evaluation",
    healthPath = "/health",
    timeoutMs = 5000
)

// Open Policy Agent
val opaConfig = AuthZenPdpConfig.Opa(
    baseUrl = "http://opa:8181",
    policyPath = "/v1/data/authz/allow",
    timeoutMs = 5000
)

// Generic AuthZEN-compliant PDP
val genericConfig = AuthZenPdpConfig.Generic(
    baseUrl = "https://pdp.example.com",
    evaluationPath = "/access/v1/evaluation",
    wellKnownPath = "/.well-known/authzen-configuration",
    timeoutMs = 5000
)
```

### Fallback Policies

Configure behavior when the PDP is unavailable:

| Policy | Behavior | Use Case |
|--------|----------|----------|
| `DENY` | Deny all requests (fail closed) | Production - secure default |
| `ALLOW` | Allow all requests (fail open) | Development/testing only |
| `FAIL` | Propagate error to caller | When explicit error handling needed |

### Resilience Configuration

```kotlin
data class ResilienceConfig(
    val circuitBreakerEnabled: Boolean = true,
    val failureThreshold: Int = 5,       // Failures before opening
    val resetTimeMs: Long = 30000,       // 30 seconds before retry
    val retryEnabled: Boolean = false,
    val maxRetries: Int = 2,
    val retryDelayMs: Long = 100
)
```

## Circuit Breaker

The circuit breaker prevents cascading failures when the PDP is unavailable:

<img src="/img/diagrams/circuit-breaker-states.svg" alt="Circuit Breaker State Diagram" style={{maxWidth: '550px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

### Monitoring Circuit State

```kotlin
val resilientPdp: ResilientAuthZenPdp = // injected

// Check circuit breaker state
val state = resilientPdp.getCircuitBreakerState()
// State.CLOSED, State.OPEN, or State.HALF_OPEN

// Get cache statistics
val stats = resilientPdp.getCacheStats()

// Manual operations
resilientPdp.invalidateCache()
resilientPdp.resetCircuitBreaker()
```

## Properties Configuration

Configure via application properties:

```yaml
sphereon:
  authz:
    enabled: true

    pdp:
      type: cedarling
      base-url: http://cedarling-sidecar:8080
      timeout-ms: 5000

    fallback-policy: deny
    cache-enabled: true
    cache-ttl-seconds: 300

    exclude-patterns:
      - "health.**"
      - "actuator.**"

    resilience:
      circuit-breaker-enabled: true
      failure-threshold: 5
      reset-time-ms: 30000
```

## Integration with Spring Boot

When using `@EnableSphereonRestApi`, authorization can be integrated via filters or interceptors:

```kotlin
import org.springframework.web.filter.OncePerRequestFilter
import jakarta.servlet.FilterChain
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse

class AuthorizationFilter(
    private val policyEngine: PolicyEngine,
    private val config: AuthZenConfig
) : OncePerRequestFilter() {

    override fun doFilterInternal(
        request: HttpServletRequest,
        response: HttpServletResponse,
        filterChain: FilterChain
    ) {
        if (!config.enabled) {
            filterChain.doFilter(request, response)
            return
        }

        // Build policy request from HTTP request
        val policyRequest = buildPolicyRequest(request)

        // Evaluate
        runBlocking {
            val decision = policyEngine.evaluate(policyRequest).getOrThrow()
            if (decision.isDenied) {
                response.sendError(403, "Access denied")
                return@runBlocking
            }
        }

        filterChain.doFilter(request, response)
    }
}
```

## Best Practices

**Use fail-closed in production.** Configure `fallbackPolicy: DENY` to ensure security when the PDP is unavailable.

**Enable caching for performance.** Authorization decisions for the same request can be cached to reduce PDP load.

**Monitor circuit breaker state.** Expose metrics for OPEN/HALF_OPEN states to detect PDP issues early.

**Exclude health endpoints.** Don't require authorization for health checks and actuator endpoints.

**Use command IDs as actions.** Map your service operations to hierarchical command IDs for consistent policy authoring.

---

# Decentralized Identifiers

# Decentralized Identifiers

Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) are the long-lived, self-controlled identifiers that anchor most of what runs through the EDK: issuer keys, verifier keys, holder bindings, OCA bundle authors, trust-list entries. Every DID resolves to a DID Document, which is the public artifact that other parties verify signatures against, look up service endpoints in, and use to bootstrap secure channels.

This section is about the REST surface the EDK provides on top of the IDK DID stack. It covers two things in particular:

1. how a DID gets resolved and where the resolver fits in the call graph, and
2. the two distinct REST APIs the EDK ships for creating and maintaining DIDs, what each one is good for, and how to pick between them.

The lower-level DID manager, providers, and DSL all live in the IDK and are documented under [IDK DID Overview](/idk/guides/did/overview). This guide focuses on the REST-facing parts that you wire into a tenant deployment.

## What ships with the EDK

The EDK builds on the IDK DID stack and adds the enterprise REST surface, persistence backends, and method providers needed for a production tenant.

| Concern | Module(s) | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| DID manager core | `lib-did-manager-public`, `lib-did-manager-impl` | DID lifecycle, providers, filter, projections; lives in the IDK |
| Provider SPI and DSL | `lib-did-manager-public` | `DidProvider`, `didCreateOptions { ... }` |
| Method providers | `lib-did-methods-key`, `lib-did-methods-jwk`, `lib-did-methods-web`, `lib-did-methods-webvh-*` | One module per supported DID method |
| Resolver | `lib-did-resolver-public`, `lib-did-resolver-impl` | Registry-based, accept-media-type aware, cache-enabled |
| Universal Resolver REST | `lib-did-rest-resolver-server` | DIF-compatible, base path `/1.0` |
| Universal Registrar REST | `lib-did-rest-registrar-server` | DIF-compatible, base path `/1.0` |
| Rich DID manager REST | `services-did-manager-rest` | EDK API, base path `/api/dids/v1` |
| Persistence | `lib-did-persistence-memory`, `lib-did-persistence-sqlite`, `lib-did-persistence-postgresql`, `lib-did-persistence-mysql` | Memory and SQLite are IDK; PostgreSQL and MySQL ship with the EDK |

The persistence split follows the wider IDK/EDK boundary: in-memory and SQLite stores live in the IDK so they work in any embedded scenario, while Postgres and MySQL ship with the EDK because they assume a JVM enterprise deployment.

## Choosing between the two REST APIs

The EDK exposes two DID management REST surfaces over the same underlying DID manager. They serve different jobs and you typically enable the one that matches the consumer.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-did-api-choice.svg" alt="Two REST API surfaces over a shared DID manager" style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The **Universal Registrar** implements the [DIF Universal Registrar](https://github.com/decentralized-identity/universal-registrar) spec. Five endpoints, document-level operations, and a stateless request and response shape that mirrors the spec line by line. It is the right choice when an existing tool, integration, or cross-vendor pipeline already speaks the DIF protocol, when you need predictable interop with other registrars, or when the operation you want to perform really is just "create / update / deactivate a document".

The **rich DID manager API** is an EDK-defined REST surface under `/api/dids/v1`. It exposes the same lifecycle operations plus everything the Universal Registrar omits: listing and filtering DIDs, paginating results, projecting only the fields you need, performing key-by-key changes through dedicated sub-resources, attaching aliases or equivalent identifiers, inspecting the KMS key mappings, and forcing or invalidating the resolved-document cache. It is the right choice for tenant admin UIs, internal control planes, automation that needs to enumerate DIDs, and any workflow that wants to mutate a single verification method, service, or controller without replaying the entire document.

The two surfaces are not exclusive. You can mount both in the same tenant: keep the rich API behind your internal ingress for operators, and expose the Universal Registrar through whichever path your DIF-speaking integration hits. They share state because they share the DID manager underneath.

For an at-a-glance comparison:

| Aspect | Universal Registrar | Rich DID manager API |
|---|---|---|
| Specification | DIF Universal Registrar 1.0 | EDK-specific, documented in OpenAPI |
| Base path | `/1.0` | `/api/dids/v1` |
| Operations | 5 endpoints | ~50 endpoints across 10 sub-adapters |
| Granularity | Document-level | Document + per-sub-resource |
| Listing / filtering | Not in the spec | Built in (pagination, sort, expand, filter) |
| KMS key mapping inspection | Hidden | First-class |
| Document cache control | Implicit | Explicit (`/document`, `/document/refresh`, `/document/cache`) |
| Best fit | Cross-vendor interop, DIF-aware integrations | Tenant admin UIs, automation, control planes |

The dedicated pages cover each in detail:

- [Universal Registrar](./universal-registrar) walks through the five DIF endpoints, request and response shapes, and how to wire it into a Spring Boot tenant.
- [Rich REST API](./rich-rest-api) covers the full `/api/dids/v1` surface, the list filter, the expand projection, and the sub-resource endpoints that exist precisely because document-level PUT cannot preserve KMS invariants.

## DID resolution

Resolution is the lookup step every credential issuance, verification, and trust evaluation depends on: take a DID, fetch its current DID Document, and use the public material in it. Unlike registration, resolution is read-only and almost always anonymous from the perspective of the host that publishes the document.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-did-resolution-flow.svg" alt="DID resolution path through the Universal Resolver, resolver registry, and method resolvers" style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The Universal Resolver REST surface is the same one that ships in the IDK. It exposes three endpoints under `/1.0`:

| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `GET` | `/1.0/identifiers/{identifier}` | Resolve a DID to its DID Document |
| `GET` | `/1.0/methods` | List DID methods this resolver understands |
| `GET` | `/1.0/properties` | Get resolver capability metadata |

`GET /1.0/identifiers/{did}` honors the standard `Accept` header so callers can ask for `application/did+ld+json`, `application/did+json`, or the result-envelope `application/ld+json;profile="https://w3id.org/did-resolution"`. The response carries the resolved DID Document plus `didResolutionMetadata` and `didDocumentMetadata` envelopes, in line with the DIF resolution result schema.

Behind the endpoint sits the **DID resolver registry**. The registry inspects the method prefix (`did:web`, `did:key`, ...) and dispatches to the registered method resolver. Method resolvers come from the `lib-did-methods-*` modules and register themselves through the same SPI the DID manager uses for creation, which keeps creation and resolution in sync: if a method can be created, it can be resolved, with identical semantics.

What this means in practice:

- `did:key` and `did:jwk` resolve locally, deriving the document from the identifier itself with no network call.
- `did:web` resolves by fetching `https://{domain}/.well-known/did.json` (or the path-encoded equivalent), following the W3C `did:web` rules.
- `did:webvh` resolves the verifiable history log from the publishing host and replays it to reconstruct the current document, validating each entry against the witness signatures.

The resolver caches results and honors invalidation: the cache is what `/api/dids/v1/dids/{did}/document/refresh` clears on the rich API, and what internal callers (issuer flows, OID4VP verifier bindings, trust evaluators) hit when they need the current public material for a DID without going back to the network on every call.

### When to call resolution directly

Most EDK code does not call resolution explicitly. The issuer, the verifier, and the trust stack inject the `DidResolver` interface and rely on it transparently. Direct REST calls to `/1.0/identifiers/{did}` are mostly useful for:

- diagnostic tooling that needs to see exactly what a third party would see when they look up your DID;
- integrations from another runtime that cannot embed the IDK and needs an HTTP-shaped resolver;
- cross-tenant or cross-host monitoring that periodically refreshes a published `did:web` document.

For the rich DID manager API, the `GET /api/dids/v1/dids/{did}/resolve` endpoint runs the same resolver but is scoped to a DID that is already tracked locally, which is convenient when you want resolution metadata alongside the locally-stored aliases, controllers, and key mappings.

## Sub-pages

- [Universal Registrar (DIF spec)](./universal-registrar)
- [Rich DID manager REST API](./rich-rest-api)

## Related material

- [IDK DID Overview](/idk/guides/did/overview) for the DID manager DSL, providers, and method-specific options.
- [Authentication and identity](../../authentication/overview) for how DIDs slot into the auth and matching pipelines.
- [Roles and Topology: DID services](../../../deployment/container-deployment/did) for how the REST surface lands inside the `enterprise-did` container.

---

# Digital Credentials

# Digital Credentials

The [IDK credential design guide](/idk/guides/credential-design/overview) explains the underlying model: credential designs that bind claim presentations, render variants, displays, and assets to a credential type; issuer and verifier designs for branding; and a layered resolution engine that combines metadata from OID4VCI, SD-JWT VCT, JSON Schema, OCA, and local overrides. That model is what your code reads from when it needs to render a credential or build issuer metadata. **The EDK does not change that model**. It takes the in-memory IDK service and makes it operable as a multi-tenant production service.

If you have never used the IDK design service before, read the IDK guide first. This section assumes you understand `CredentialDesignRecord`, `DesignBinding`, `ClaimPresentation`, `RenderVariant`, and `ResolvedCredentialDesign`. The EDK pages tell you what additional capabilities you get on top.

## Who Reads What

Pick the page that matches what you are trying to do:

**"I'm building a service that issues or verifies credentials."** You will use the `CredentialDesignService` interface exactly as documented in the IDK guide. In the EDK it is backed by PostgreSQL or MySQL instead of an in-memory store. There is nothing new to learn at the API level. Wire one of the persistence modules listed in [Persistence](../credential-design/persistence) and the rest of your code stays the same. The OID4VCI issuer in the EDK reads designs to build its `.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` metadata and to decide selective-disclosure policy per claim at issuance time; that path is fully wired and needs only the design content.

**"I need to manage designs from outside the application: from CI, from an admin UI, from a CLI."** Use the [REST API](../credential-design/rest-api). It is a faithful HTTP projection of the IDK service interface, mounted at `/api/v1/designs/...`. Authentication, tenant resolution, and authorization come from the standard EDK layers.

**"I want to mark approved snapshots of a design for audit or rollback purposes."** Use [Versioning](../credential-design/versioning). It is an explicit snapshot mechanism, not an auto-on-every-write change log. Call `createDesignVersion` when you want to commit a checkpoint; the EDK does not snapshot for you on regular create/update.

**"I'm building a wallet or verifier UI that needs to keep rendering credentials when the network is down."** Use the [caching wrapper](../credential-design/persistence#offline-cache). It is a failover cache: reads go to the remote first and fall back to the local copy if the remote is unreachable, so the cache only matters when something has gone wrong.

**"I want OCA bundles to drive my credential metadata."** Use the [OCA section](../oca/overview). OCA bundles can be imported as persistent designs or passed inline at resolution time without being stored.

## What the EDK Adds

Concretely, what you get on top of the IDK base:

**SQL-backed persistence**. The IDK ships a blob-store-backed `DefaultCredentialDesignService` that is fine for tests and single-process tools. The EDK ships `DefaultVersionedCredentialDesignService` which is wired to PostgreSQL or MySQL repositories generated by SQLDelight. The repository surface is the same; the EDK binding replaces the IDK default via Metro `replaces`, so dropping the EDK persistence module on the classpath is the only required change for a service to move from in-memory to SQL.

**A REST adapter**. The `CredentialDesignHttpAdapter` (VDX module `lib-data-store-credential-design-rest-vdx`) exposes the entire `CredentialDesignService` surface as HTTP endpoints under `/api/v1/designs/...`. Designs are managed from outside the JVM without writing controllers. The adapter is mounted automatically when the module is on the classpath of a host application that has the Universal HTTP Adapter wired.

**Explicit version snapshots**. `VersionedCredentialDesignService` (the EDK service interface that extends `CredentialDesignService`) adds four operations: `createDesignVersion` snapshots the current live state of one design into an immutable `config_version` row, `listDesignVersions` returns the history, `getDesignVersionContent` reads any historical snapshot, and `setLatestDesignVersion` updates the "this version is the blessed one" pointer. These are operator/audit operations; ordinary reads through `getCredentialDesign` continue to return the live row, not a historical snapshot.

**Offline failover cache**. `CachingCredentialDesignService` wraps a remote `CredentialDesignService` and a local `BlobService`. Reads go to the remote first and fall back to the local cache only when the remote call fails. Writes go through to the remote and update the cache on success. This is the right primitive for wallets and verifier UIs that need to keep rendering credentials during a network outage; it is not a performance cache for healthy traffic.

**OCA bundles as a metadata source**. OCA bundles can be parsed, processed, and SAID-verified through `OcaBundleService`. They feed credential design via `OcaBundleDesignProvider` (one layer in the IDK resolution pipeline) and `OcaDesignMapper` (the import path that produces a persistent design from a bundle). The original bundle is preserved natively for round-tripping.

## End-to-End: an OID4VCI Issuer

To make this concrete, here is how a real EDK consumer uses the design service. The OID4VCI issuer in the EDK builds `credential_configurations_supported` for its OID4VCI metadata endpoint from credential designs. At startup it calls:

```kotlin
val designs = designService.listCredentialDesigns(tenantId).getOrElse { return emptyMap() }
val result = mutableMapOf<String, CredentialConfigurationSupported>()
for (design in designs) {
    val configIdBindings = design.bindings.filter { it.credentialConfigurationId != null }
    if (configIdBindings.isEmpty()) continue
    val resolved = designService
        .resolveCredentialDesign(tenantId, ResolveCredentialDesignInput(designId = design.id))
        .getOrElse { continue }
    for (binding in configIdBindings) {
        val configId = binding.credentialConfigurationId!!
        val format = resolveFormat(binding)
        result[configId] = Oid4vciDesignMapper.toCredentialConfiguration(resolved, format)
    }
}
```

(From `DesignBackedOid4vciIssuerConfigProvider.buildCredentialConfigurationsAsync`.)

The issuer is treating the design store as the **source of truth** for what credential types it offers. Adding a new credential configuration means creating a new credential design with a `credentialConfigurationId` binding. There is no separate "issuer config" file to keep in sync.

Later, when the issuer actually issues a credential, it looks up the same design to decide which claims are mandatory and which are selectively disclosable (`DeferredPipelineReExecutor.resolveDesignContext`). The `ClaimPresentation.mandatory` and `ClaimPresentation.sdPolicy` fields are read straight from the resolved design and translated into the OID4VCI runtime policy. So the same edit that updates the metadata also updates issuance behaviour.

This is the pattern: **the design is the policy, not just the display metadata**. Putting your designs in SQL through the EDK persistence layer means the issuer's configuration is in SQL, edited through the design REST API, optionally snapshotted through versioning, and audited like any other data.

## Where the Modules Live

| Concern | Module |
|---------|--------|
| Service interface (IDK) | `com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-credential-design-public` |
| In-memory default impl (IDK) | `com.sphereon.idk:lib-data-store-credential-design-impl` |
| Versioned service interface (EDK) | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-data-store-credential-design-persistence-api` |
| Versioned service impl, OCA mappers (EDK) | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-data-store-credential-design-impl` |
| PostgreSQL repositories | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-data-store-credential-design-persistence-postgresql` |
| MySQL repositories | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-data-store-credential-design-persistence-mysql` |
| Offline caching wrapper + sync | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-data-store-credential-design-cache` |
| Routed-command transport (client) | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-data-store-credential-design-remote` |
| HTTP REST adapter (server) | `com.sphereon.vdx:lib-data-store-credential-design-rest-vdx` |
| OCA primitives | `com.sphereon.edk:lib-data-oca-public` / `-impl` |

## Next Steps

- [Design Overview](../credential-design/overview): the EDK service surface on top of the IDK `CredentialDesignService`
- [REST API](../credential-design/rest-api): how to drive the design service from outside the JVM
- [Versioning](../credential-design/versioning): how the explicit snapshot operations work and how rollback is done
- [Persistence](../credential-design/persistence): PostgreSQL and MySQL backends, and the offline failover cache
- [OCA Bundles](../oca/overview): OCA as a credential design source

---

# OCA Bundles

# OCA Bundles

OCA (Overlays Capture Architecture, [oca.colossi.network](https://oca.colossi.network/)) is a specification for describing credential metadata through a layered approach. A capture base names the attributes and their data types; a stack of overlays adds labels, formats, units, entry codes, sensitivity, descriptions, and per-locale display on top. The structure can be defined once and re-layered with different language packs, validation rules, or branding without touching the original schema.

The EDK ships OCA as a first-class metadata source. The `lib-data-oca-*` modules provide the OCA primitives (parser, overlay processor, SAID verifier, native records), and the `lib-data-store-credential-design-impl` module integrates them into the credential design system as a layer provider and a mapper so OCA bundles can drive credential display directly, without manual claim-by-claim translation. The same OCA records can be persisted natively alongside the canonical credential design, so the original bundle remains round-trippable for export or republication.

## Why OCA in the EDK?

A credential issuer who publishes an OCA bundle alongside their credential type gives every wallet and verifier in the ecosystem a standardised, ecosystem-neutral way to learn:

- Which attributes the credential carries and what shape each attribute's value has
- How to label each attribute in the user's language
- Which attributes are mandatory and which are optional
- Which values are valid for enumerated attributes, and how to display each enum code
- Which attributes contain sensitive data and should be treated accordingly
- The credential's own display name and description, per locale

Without OCA, every consumer of the credential has to manually map raw claim names (`given_name`, `family_name`, `org.iso.18013.5.1.birth_date`) into human-readable labels, figure out which are sensitive, and decide how to render enumerations. With OCA, that work is done once at the issuer and consumed automatically by any client that understands the spec. The EDK plugs OCA into the [credential design](../credential-design/overview) system, so the same `CredentialDesignService` calls that resolve display metadata from OID4VCI or SD-JWT VCT can also resolve from OCA.

## Architecture

<img src="/img/diagrams/oca-architecture.svg" alt="OCA Bundle Processing" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The OCA pipeline has three stages. The parser takes the raw bundle JSON and produces a `ParsedOcaBundle` (capture base SAID, bundle SAID, OCA version, attribute map, list of `ParsedOcaOverlay` entries with type, language, SAID, and the original payload). The overlay processor walks the parsed overlays and flattens them into an `OcaProcessedBundle`, a single typed structure that holds every piece of metadata in convenient maps (labels, descriptions, mandatory attributes, entry codes per attribute and locale, units, format patterns, and so on). Optional SAID verification operates on the parsed form at one of three levels (format, structural, cryptographic) depending on how strictly you need to check integrity.

The processed bundle is generic. Anything that wants to consume OCA data, the credential design system, a PDF renderer, a form builder, an admin UI that previews a bundle before importing it, reads from `OcaProcessedBundle` without re-parsing the raw JSON.

## OCA Bundle Structure

An OCA bundle is a JSON document containing a capture base and a list of overlays. Each object carries a SAID (Self-Addressing Identifier) under the `d` field for integrity.

### Capture Base

The capture base defines the attribute names and their OCA types. It is the stable structural layer:

```json
{
  "d": "ECaptureBaseSaid...",
  "type": "spec/capture_base/2.0.0",
  "attributes": {
    "given_name": "Text",
    "family_name": "Text",
    "birth_date": "DateTime",
    "portrait": "Binary",
    "age_over_18": "Boolean",
    "nationality": "Text",
    "document_number": "Numeric"
  }
}
```

### Attribute Types

OCA defines a small set of scalar types and array variants. The EDK maps each one to a canonical value-kind and a default widget hint that downstream consumers can use directly:

| OCA Type | Canonical Value Kind | Default Widget Hint |
|----------|---------------------|---------------------|
| `Text` | `STRING` | `TEXT` |
| `Numeric` | `NUMBER` | `TEXT` |
| `Boolean` | `BOOLEAN` | `CHECKBOX` |
| `Binary` | `BINARY` | `FILE` |
| `DateTime` | `DATE_TIME` | `DATE_TIME` |
| `Reference` | `REFERENCE` | `GROUP` |
| `[Text]`, `[Numeric]`, `[Boolean]` | `ARRAY` | `LIST` |

The mapping lives in `OcaTypeMapping` and is intentionally string-based so it can be reused by consumers (credential design, PDF rendering, form builders) without forcing them onto a single enum. When entry codes are present for an attribute, the widget hint is promoted to `PICKLIST` regardless of the underlying type, and the localized entry display values become the picklist options.

### Overlays

Overlays are divided into language-independent and language-specific kinds. Language-independent overlays apply globally:

| Overlay | What It Carries |
|---------|----------------|
| `character_encoding` | Encoding per attribute (e.g. `utf-8`) |
| `format` | Format patterns and regular expressions (e.g. `YYYY-MM-DD`, `^[A-Z]{2}$`) |
| `standard` | References to external standards (e.g. ISO 3166-1) |
| `conformance` | Mandatory / optional flags per attribute |
| `cardinality` | Value-count constraints (`1`, `1-5`, `0-*`) |
| `entry_code` | Valid enumeration codes per attribute |
| `unit` | Units of measurement |
| `sensitive` | Marks attributes containing sensitive data |

Language-specific overlays carry a `language` field (BCP-47) and produce per-locale data:

| Overlay | What It Carries |
|---------|----------------|
| `meta` | Credential-level display name and description |
| `label` | Per-attribute human-readable labels |
| `information` | Per-attribute extended descriptions |
| `entry` | Display values for entry codes (e.g. `"M"` to `"Male"`) |

The EDK's `OcaOverlayProcessor` handles both v1 (array-based) and v2 (object-based) overlay layouts, falls back gracefully when fields are missing or shaped unexpectedly, and produces a single `OcaProcessedBundle` with all this data flattened into maps keyed by attribute name and locale.

## OCA Bundle Example

A complete bundle for a driving license credential with English and Polish labels:

```json
{
  "d": "EBundleSaid...",
  "capture_base": {
    "d": "ECaptureBase...",
    "type": "spec/capture_base/2.0.0",
    "attributes": {
      "given_name": "Text",
      "family_name": "Text",
      "birth_date": "DateTime",
      "issuing_country": "Text"
    }
  },
  "overlays": [
    {
      "d": "EConformance...",
      "type": "spec/overlays/conformance/1.0",
      "capture_base": "ECaptureBase...",
      "attribute_conformance": {
        "given_name": "M",
        "family_name": "M",
        "birth_date": "M",
        "issuing_country": "M"
      }
    },
    {
      "d": "ELabelEn...",
      "type": "spec/overlays/label/1.0",
      "capture_base": "ECaptureBase...",
      "language": "en",
      "attribute_labels": {
        "given_name": "First Name",
        "family_name": "Last Name",
        "birth_date": "Date of Birth",
        "issuing_country": "Issuing Country"
      }
    },
    {
      "d": "ELabelPl...",
      "type": "spec/overlays/label/1.0",
      "capture_base": "ECaptureBase...",
      "language": "pl",
      "attribute_labels": {
        "given_name": "Imie",
        "family_name": "Nazwisko",
        "birth_date": "Data urodzenia",
        "issuing_country": "Kraj wydania"
      }
    },
    {
      "d": "EMetaEn...",
      "type": "spec/overlays/meta/1.0",
      "capture_base": "ECaptureBase...",
      "language": "en",
      "name": "Driving License",
      "description": "EU-compliant digital driving license"
    },
    {
      "d": "EFormat...",
      "type": "spec/overlays/format/1.0",
      "capture_base": "ECaptureBase...",
      "attribute_formats": {
        "birth_date": "YYYY-MM-DD",
        "issuing_country": "^[A-Z]{2}$"
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

Once processed, the resulting `OcaProcessedBundle` contains:

- Four attributes typed as Text, Text, DateTime, Text
- All four marked mandatory
- English labels: First Name, Last Name, Date of Birth, Issuing Country
- Polish labels: Imie, Nazwisko, Data urodzenia, Kraj wydania
- Meta display for English: name "Driving License", description "EU-compliant digital driving license"
- Format patterns: `birth_date` matches `YYYY-MM-DD`, `issuing_country` matches `^[A-Z]{2}$`

The same data feeds the credential design system through the layer provider described in [Credential Design Integration](./credential-design-integration), and is persisted natively for round-tripping as described there as well.

## Next Steps

- [Bundle Service](./bundle-service): parsing, processing, and the OCA service interface
- [SAID Verification](./said-verification): the three integrity-check levels for bundles and overlays
- [Credential Design Integration](./credential-design-integration): the mapper, the layer provider, and native persistence

---

# eIDAS Signature Framework

# eIDAS Signature Framework

The EDK provides a comprehensive eIDAS-compliant digital signature framework for creating, validating, and timestamping electronic signatures that meet EU regulatory requirements.

## Overview

The eIDAS signature framework provides:

- **Multiple signature formats** - CAdES (binary), PAdES (PDF), JAdES (JSON), XAdES (XML)
- **ETSI compliance** - Baseline levels B, T, LT, and LTA per EN 319 102-1
- **Document sovereignty** - Two-step signing keeps documents on-premise while using remote keys
- **Timestamping** - RFC 3161 TSA integration
- **Signature validation** - Certificate revocation and trust list checking
- **Multi-platform** - Core API runs on JVM and JavaScript
- **REST Client** - Call remote eIDAS servers using the same SignatureProvider interface

## Architecture

<img src="/img/diagrams/eidas-signature-architecture.svg" alt="eIDAS Signature Framework Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Signature Formats

| Format | Use Case | Standards |
|--------|----------|-----------|
| **CAdES** | Binary data, attachments | EN 319 122 |
| **PAdES** | PDF documents with visible signatures | EN 319 142 |
| **JAdES** | JSON data, APIs | TS 119 182 |
| **XAdES** | XML documents | EN 319 132 |

## Signature Levels

Each format supports ETSI baseline levels:

| Level | Description | Use Case |
|-------|-------------|----------|
| **B** | Basic signature | Short-term validity |
| **T** | With timestamp | Proves signing time |
| **LT** | Long-term validation | Certificate revocation data embedded |
| **LTA** | Long-term archival | Periodic timestamp renewal |

## EDK vs VDX

The eIDAS functionality is split between EDK (client libraries) and VDX (server deployment):

| Component | Location | Description |
|-----------|----------|-------------|
| **Signature Client** | EDK | Core signing commands with DI integration |
| **DSS Provider** | EDK | Local in-process signing using EU DSS library |
| **REST Client** | EDK | HTTP client implementing SignatureProvider |
| **REST API Models** | EDK | OpenAPI-generated DTOs for REST communication |
| **REST Server** | VDX | Full REST server with persistence (PostgreSQL, MySQL, SQLite) |

This separation enables:
- **Mobile apps**: Use REST client to delegate signing to a server
- **Desktop apps**: Use DSS provider for local in-process signing
- **Hybrid**: Create digest locally, sign remotely, complete locally

## Modules

| Module | Description | Platform |
|--------|-------------|----------|
| `lib-eidas-signature-client-public` | Public API interfaces | Multiplatform |
| `lib-eidas-signature-client-impl` | Implementation with IDK integration | Multiplatform |
| `lib-eidas-signature-client-dss` | Local DSS provider for full eIDAS compliance | JVM only |
| `lib-eidas-signature-rest-api` | OpenAPI models for REST endpoints | Multiplatform |
| `lib-eidas-signature-rest-client` | REST client implementing SignatureProvider | JVM |

:::info REST Server in VDX
The eIDAS REST Server with database persistence is part of **VDX**. See the [VDX eIDAS Signature REST API](/vdx/rest-apis/identity-crypto/eidas-signature) for deployment documentation.
:::

## Quick Start

### Sign a PDF Document

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.eidas.signature.*
import kotlin.time.Duration.Companion.hours

// Inject the signing command
val signDocumentCommand: SignDocumentCommand

// Prepare the document
val pdfBytes = File("contract.pdf").readBytes()
val input = SignInput.pdf(pdfBytes)

// Configure signature parameters
val params = PAdESParameters(
    signatureLevel = SignatureLevel.PAdES_BASELINE_LT,
    visualSignatureParameters = VisualSignatureParameters(
        fieldParameters = SignatureFieldParameters(
            page = 1,
            originX = 50f,
            originY = 700f,
            width = 200f,
            height = 50f
        ),
        textParameters = SignatureTextParameters(
            text = "Signed by: John Doe\nDate: 2025-01-02"
        )
    ),
    reason = "Contract approval",
    location = "Amsterdam, Netherlands"
)

// Sign the document
val result = signDocumentCommand.execute(
    SignDocumentArgs(
        input = input,
        keyInfo = keyManagerService.getKeyInfo("signing-key"),
        signatureLevel = SignatureLevel.PAdES_BASELINE_LT,
        parameters = params,
        timestampParameters = TimestampParameters(
            tsaUrl = "http://timestamp.example.com/rfc3161"
        )
    ),
    sessionContext
)

when (result) {
    is Ok -> {
        val signed = result.value
        File("contract-signed.pdf").writeBytes(signed.signedData)
        println("Signed at: ${signed.signingTime}")
        println("Certificate: ${signed.certificateInfo?.subjectDN}")
    }
    is Err -> println("Error: ${result.error.message}")
}
```

### Validate a Signature

```kotlin
val validationResult = validateSignatureCommand.execute(
    ValidateSignatureArgs(
        signedDocument = signedPdfBytes,
        checkCertificateRevocation = true
    ),
    sessionContext
)

when (validationResult) {
    is Ok -> {
        val validation = validationResult.value
        println("Valid: ${validation.isValid}")

        validation.signatures.forEach { sig ->
            println("Signature: ${sig.signatureId}")
            println("  Status: ${sig.indication}")
            println("  Signer: ${sig.certificateInfo?.subjectDN}")
            println("  Time: ${sig.signingTime}")
        }
    }
    is Err -> println("Validation error: ${result.error.message}")
}
```

## Two-Step Signing for Document Sovereignty

The two-step signing workflow is designed for scenarios where **documents must not leave your infrastructure**. This is critical for:

- **Regulatory compliance** - Documents containing sensitive data (healthcare, financial, legal) that cannot be transmitted to external signing services
- **Data sovereignty** - Organizations that must keep documents within specific geographic or network boundaries
- **Air-gapped environments** - Secure facilities where documents cannot reach the internet
- **HSM/smartcard integration** - Using remote or hardware-based keys while keeping documents local

### How It Works

1. **Step 1 (Local)**: Create a cryptographic digest (hash) of the document. Only this small hash value leaves your system.
2. **Step 2 (Remote)**: Send the hash to your signing service (HSM, cloud KMS, smartcard) which returns a signature value.
3. **Step 3 (Local)**: Combine the signature with the original document to produce the signed output.

**The document never leaves your infrastructure.** Only a hash (typically 32-64 bytes) is transmitted externally.

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│              Your Secure Environment                         │
│                                                              │
│  ┌──────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐    ┌──────────────┐   │
│  │   Document   │───▶│ Create Hash  │───▶│   Combine    │   │
│  │  (stays here)│    │   (Step 1)   │    │   (Step 3)   │   │
│  └──────────────┘    └──────┬───────┘    └──────▲───────┘   │
│                             │                    │           │
└─────────────────────────────┼────────────────────┼───────────┘
                              │ Hash only          │ Signature
                              ▼                    │
                    ┌─────────────────────┐        │
                    │   Signing Service   │────────┘
                    │  (HSM, Cloud KMS)   │
                    └─────────────────────┘
```

### Implementation

```kotlin
// Step 1: Create digest locally - document stays on-premise
val digestResult = createDigestCommand.execute(
    CreateDigestArgs(
        input = SignInput.pdf(pdfBytes),
        keyInfo = certificateChain,  // Public cert only
        parameters = PAdESParameters(signatureLevel = SignatureLevel.PAdES_BASELINE_LT)
    ),
    sessionContext
)

val digest = digestResult.getOrThrow()
// Only the hash is sent externally - document remains local
println("Hash to sign: ${digest.digestToSign.toBase64()}")  // ~32-64 bytes

// Step 2: Send ONLY the hash to signing service (HSM, cloud KMS, smartcard)
// The signing service never sees the document content
val signatureValue = signingService.signHash(digest.digestToSign)

// Step 3: Complete signature locally - combine signature with document
val signedResult = completeSignatureCommand.execute(
    CompleteSignatureArgs(
        signingSessionId = digest.signingSessionId,
        signatureValue = signatureValue,
        signatureDocumentBytes = digest.signatureDocumentBytes
    ),
    sessionContext
)

// Final signed document - created entirely within your infrastructure
val signedDoc = signedResult.getOrThrow()
File("document-signed.pdf").writeBytes(signedDoc.signedData)
```

### Use Cases

| Scenario | Benefit |
|----------|---------|
| **Healthcare records** | Patient data never leaves hospital network |
| **Financial documents** | Contracts stay within bank infrastructure |
| **Government classified** | Documents remain in secure facility |
| **GDPR compliance** | Personal data doesn't cross jurisdictions |
| **Legal discovery** | Maintain chain of custody for evidence |

## Configuration

```yaml
eidas:
  signature:
    default-level: PAdES_BASELINE_B
    default-digest-algorithm: SHA256

    timestamp:
      enabled: true
      url: http://timestamp.example.com/rfc3161
      policy-oid: 1.2.3.4.5
      digest-algorithm: SHA256
      timeout-ms: 30000

    validation:
      check-revocation: true
      revocation-freshness: 86400
      allow-expired-certificates: false
      lotl-url: https://ec.europa.eu/tools-databases/lotl/eu-lotl.xml

    cache:
      enabled: true
      ttl-seconds: 3600
      max-size: 1000
```

## Next Steps

- [Client API](./client) - Detailed client API documentation with format-specific parameters
- [REST Server](./server) - Deploy signature services as REST APIs

---

# Pronto Integration

# Pronto Integration

[Pronto V2](https://www.simac.com/en/simac-id-solutions/pronto-v2) is Simac's physical access control and facility management platform. It manages door access, visitor registration, NFC card provisioning, locker management, and room booking through a unified system. The EDK provides a type-safe, command-based integration with Pronto's REST API, enabling wallet-verified identities to automatically receive physical access rights.

This integration bridges the digital identity world (verifiable credentials, wallets, OID4VP) with the physical access world (NFC cards, door readers, access zones). When a student presents their educational credential via a wallet, the system can automatically provision their NFC card in Pronto, assign them to the correct access zone group for their building, and set time-bounded access windows that match their class schedule, all without manual badge office intervention.

## What Pronto Manages

Pronto's domain model centers around people, their identification credentials, and which physical zones they can access:

**Persons** are the primary identity entity, employees, students, visitors. Each person has a unique ID, name, contact details, and optional time bounds (valid from/until). A person can belong to multiple groups and hold multiple identifications.

**Identifications** are physical credentials, Mifare NFC cards, barcodes, PIN codes, mobile credentials, or smartphone badges. Each identification has a serial number and can be blocked or time-limited. A person typically has one primary NFC card, but can have multiple identifications for different access methods.

**PersonsGroups** define collections of access zones. A group named "Building A, Daytime" might grant access to all doors in Building A between 7:00 and 19:00. Groups can be hierarchical (a parent group contains child groups) and time-bounded. Membership in a group is what actually grants physical access.

**PersonsGroupRelation** is the time-bounded link between a person and a group. This is the key entity for booking-based access: when a student books a room, the system creates a relation with `fromTime` set to the booking start (minus a lead time) and `untilTime` set to the booking end. The student's NFC card grants access to that zone only during that window.

**Readers** are the physical access control devices, card readers mounted at doors, turnstiles, or gates. Each reader has an address and can be remotely commanded (e.g., unlock a door).

**Registrations** are the audit trail, every card scan at every reader is logged with the serial number, reader ID, scan type (In, Blocked, Antipassback, etc.), and timestamp.

## Integration Architecture

The EDK integration communicates with Pronto's REST API v1 over HTTP with OAuth bearer token authentication:

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-pronto-integration.svg" alt="Pronto Integration Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '560px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

All communication uses Pronto's REST API. The integration handles OAuth token management (automatic fetch, 5-minute caching, transparent refresh), JSON serialization with Pronto's PascalCase field naming, and adaptive rate limiting from Pronto's `X-RateLimit-*` response headers.

## Connecting Credentials to Physical Access

The integration maps verified credential claims to Pronto entities through two configurable claim keys:

**`identificationClaimKey`** (default: `"nfckaart"`), the credential claim that contains the person's NFC card serial number. When a wallet credential includes an `nfckaart` claim, the integration can look up the corresponding Pronto Person by their identification.

**`zoneGroupClaimKey`** (default: `"zoneGroupId"`), the credential claim that specifies which PersonsGroup the holder should be granted access to. This links the credential to a physical access zone.

A typical flow:

1. Student presents a verifiable credential from their wallet
2. The credential contains `nfckaart: "04:A2:B3:C4:D5"` and `zoneGroupId: "building-a-lab"`
3. The system looks up the Pronto Person with that NFC serial number
4. It adds a time-bounded `PersonsGroupRelation` linking the student to the "building-a-lab" group
5. The student's NFC card now opens doors in Building A's lab area during the specified time window

## Time-Bounded Access

The integration is designed around bookings and reservations, temporary access grants with explicit start and end times. This is fundamentally different from permanent badge access; it supports scenarios where access should be granted only for specific time windows.

Three commands manage time-bounded group membership:

**`AddPersonToGroupCommand`** creates a new time-bounded relation between a person and a group. If the person doesn't exist in Pronto yet, the command creates them automatically. The `schedulingLeadTimeSeconds` config (default 60 seconds) determines how early before the booking start the access is provisioned, so a student arriving a minute early can still get through the door.

**`ExtendPersonInGroupCommand`** extends an existing relation's `untilTime`. Useful when a booking is extended or a class runs overtime, the access window grows without creating a new relation.

**`RemovePersonFromGroupCommand`** removes a person from a group. Used when a booking is cancelled or access needs to be revoked immediately.

**`RegisterReservationCommand`** is a higher-level command that combines person creation/update with group assignment and time bounds in a single operation. It's the preferred command for booking system integrations.

## Commands

The integration provides 30+ commands covering all Pronto API operations. Every command follows the EDK's standard `ServiceCommand<Args, Result>` pattern, so they participate in authorization, audit, telemetry, and remote transport like any other command.

### Person Management

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `ListPersonsCommand` | `pronto.person.list` | List all persons (paginated) |
| `CreatePersonCommand` | `pronto.person.create` | Create a new person |
| `GetPersonCommand` | `pronto.person.get` | Get a person by ID |
| `UpdatePersonCommand` | `pronto.person.update` | Update person details |
| `DeletePersonCommand` | `pronto.person.delete` | Delete a person |

### Identification Management

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `ListIdentificationsCommand` | `pronto.identification.list` | List all identifications |
| `CreateIdentificationCommand` | `pronto.identification.create` | Register a new NFC card/barcode |
| `GetIdentificationCommand` | `pronto.identification.get` | Get identification by ID |
| `UpdateIdentificationCommand` | `pronto.identification.update` | Update identification (e.g., block a card) |

Identification types: `Mifare`, `Barcode`, `Pincode`, `Mobile`, `Smartphone`.

### Access Zone Groups

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `ListPersonsGroupsCommand` | `pronto.personsgroup.list` | List access zone groups |
| `CreatePersonsGroupCommand` | `pronto.personsgroup.create` | Create a new access zone group |
| `GetPersonsGroupCommand` | `pronto.personsgroup.get` | Get group details |
| `UpdatePersonsGroupCommand` | `pronto.personsgroup.update` | Update group |
| `DeletePersonsGroupCommand` | `pronto.personsgroup.delete` | Delete group |

### Time-Bounded Access

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `AddPersonToGroupCommand` | `pronto.person-group.add` | Grant time-bounded access to a zone group |
| `RemovePersonFromGroupCommand` | `pronto.person-group.remove` | Revoke access from a zone group |
| `ExtendPersonInGroupCommand` | `pronto.person-group.extend` | Extend access window |
| `RegisterReservationCommand` | `pronto.reservation.register` | Create/update person with time-bounded access |

### Physical Control

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `ListReadersCommand` | `pronto.reader.list` | List access control readers |
| `OpenReaderCommand` | `pronto.reader.open` | Remotely unlock a door |
| `OpenOrCloseZoneDomLocksCommand` | `pronto.zone.dom-locks` | Open or close all locks in a zone |

### Audit & Registration

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `ListRegistrationsCommand` | `pronto.registration.list` | Query access logs (filterable by date range) |

### Administration

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `ListRolesCommand` | `pronto.role.list` | List Pronto roles |
| `CreateRoleCommand` | `pronto.role.create` | Create role |
| `AssignRolePermissionCommand` | `pronto.role.assign-permission` | Assign permission to role |
| `ListWebUsersCommand` | `pronto.webuser.list` | List Pronto web interface users |
| `CreateWebUserCommand` | `pronto.webuser.create` | Create web user |

## Configuration

The integration is configured per tenant through the EDK's configuration system, under the `integrations.pronto.*` prefix:

```yaml
integrations:
  pronto:
    enabled: true
    base-url: https://pronto.example.com
    base-path: /api/v1
    oauth:
      client-id: my-api-user
      client-secret: ${secret:vault:pronto/api-secret}
    zone-group-claim-key: zoneGroupId
    identification-claim-key: nfckaart
    scheduling-lead-time-seconds: 60
    http:
      enable-logging: false
      enable-http-cache: true
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `enabled` | `true` | Enable/disable the Pronto integration |
| `base-url` | - | Pronto server URL (required) |
| `base-path` | `/api/v1` | API path prefix |
| `oauth.client-id` | - | API username for token authentication |
| `oauth.client-secret` | - | API password (use `${secret:...}` interpolation) |
| `zone-group-claim-key` | `zoneGroupId` | Credential claim name for the target PersonsGroup |
| `identification-claim-key` | `nfckaart` | Credential claim name for the NFC card serial number |
| `scheduling-lead-time-seconds` | `60` | How many seconds before a booking start time to provision access |

Because configuration is tenant-scoped, different tenants can connect to different Pronto instances, a multi-campus deployment might have each campus running its own Pronto server, with the EDK routing commands to the correct instance based on the tenant context.

## Multi-Tenant Support

The `TenantProntoClientConfig` reads configuration from the tenant-scoped `ConfigService`. This means:

- Different tenants can have different Pronto servers, credentials, and claim mappings
- A single EDK deployment can manage physical access across multiple Pronto installations
- Tenant configuration can be stored in Azure App Configuration, database settings, or environment variables, the integration doesn't care where the values come from

---

# The Semantic Catalog (L1)

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# The Semantic Catalog (L1)

Before any credential is designed, the catalog lets an organization describe **its world**: the kinds of party it deals with, the attributes those parties carry, and the relationships between them. Everything downstream, profiles, sets, VC channels, issuer designs, and verifier DCQL queries, derives from this one governed layer, so it is worth modeling deliberately rather than per credential.

**The catalog is owned by a Party.** Every catalog is bound to its owner through `ownerPartyRef`. In most organizations that owner is the tenant or the organization itself, though it can just as well be a local subsidiary that keeps its own catalog. Whoever owns it, a catalog is the organization's single source of truth for its world: one governed place where the meaning, classification, and structure of every attribute is defined once and reused everywhere.

The catalog is created as a **shell** (name, `ownerPartyRef`, and `overlays`), then **entities** and **relationships** are appended via sub-collection calls, and finally the catalog is **published**. This staged construction lets each entity and relationship be reviewed before the catalog is made available to the layers above it.

:::note VDX guided authoring
The REST calls on this page are the same operations VDX performs when you author a catalog through its guided UI. The concepts and the resulting model are identical whether you use the UI or the API directly.
:::

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-layered-model.svg" alt="Four-layer semantic model: L1 catalog declares entities (PREDEFINED and SPECIALIZATION) and first-class relationships; L2 profile binds catalog entities to use-case roles and selects relationships; L3 set is a role-scoped traversal subselection of one profile; L4 channels are the set-bound artifacts that issuer designs and verifier DCQL both derive from." style={{maxWidth: '800px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Concepts

### Entities: PREDEFINED and SPECIALIZATION

Each entity in the catalog is a **kind of party**. The platform ships a rich set of built-in party types, including `natural_person`, `organization`, `address` (a physical address), and `group`, alongside platform roles such as `identity`, `credential_template`, `resource`, and `user`. The `partyType` token is extensible too, so a catalog can declare any further type an organization needs. Each `PREDEFINED` entity names the party type it represents in its `partyType`.

There are two entity kinds:

- **`kind: "PREDEFINED"`**, a built-in party type modelled up front, identified by a `partyType` token. The walkthrough uses three of them: `natural_person` (Person), `address` (Address), and `organization` (Organization). Because `address` is a party type in its own right, any party links to an address through a named relationship rather than carrying address fields inline.
- **`kind: "SPECIALIZATION"`**, a use-case subtype that extends an existing entity with `specializes: { entity: "<EntityName>" }` and adds attributes on top of what it specializes. The walkthrough defines Employee (specializes Person) and Employer (specializes Organization). Specializations are the pattern for roles like Employee, Student, or Customer that a use case introduces without making them platform-level party types.

Every entity has a `name`, an `attributes` array, and an entity-level `overlays.i18n` block (`{ "<lang>": { "label", "information" } }`).

### Attribute anatomy

Each attribute in an entity's `attributes` array has this shape:

| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `path` | The attribute's location in the entity, an **array** of segments (e.g. `["given_name"]`). Each segment names one attribute, so a segment never contains a `.`. This is the semantic path; where a value lands in an issued credential is a separate wire `claimPath`, decided later at L4. |
| `valueType` | One of the 7 OCA capture-base types: `Text`, `Numeric`, `Boolean`, `Binary`, `DateTime`, `Reference`, `Array`. Drives form widget, validation, and wire encoding. |
| `overlays` | The overlay bag. Everything beyond the capture base, including all governance, lives here. |

Every piece of meaning beyond the capture base is an overlay in the `overlays` bag:

| Overlay key | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `conformance` | Whether a value is required. `MANDATORY` means the attribute must be present when the entity is captured or issued; `OPTIONAL` means it may be omitted. |
| `sdPolicy` | The default selective-disclosure stance once the attribute becomes a credential claim: `ALWAYS` (independently disclosable), `NEVER` (only ever disclosed bundled with the credential), or `OPTIONAL` (the holder chooses at presentation). |
| `format` | A value-format constraint such as a regular expression or an ISO 8601 date pattern, used for validation and to convey date/time precision. |
| `widgetHint` | The preferred capture widget for a form rendering, such as `TEXT_INPUT` or `PICKLIST`. |
| `standard` | The reference standard the values follow, such as `"ISO 3166-1"` for country codes. Informational provenance for the value domain. |
| `entryCodes` | The allowed value domain for a coded attribute, `{ "codes": ["NL", "DE", ...] }`. Declaring it makes the attribute a closed code list; a profile or set may later narrow it to a subset, and the human-readable label for each code lives under `i18n.<lang>.entries`. A coded attribute must declare its `entryCodes` here; nothing downstream invents codes. |
| `unit` | The unit of measure for a numeric value, such as a currency or SI unit. |
| `sensitive` | Marks the attribute as sensitive so renderers mask it in UIs and logs. |
| `i18n` | Per-language label, information text, and code display strings: `{ "<lang>": { "label", "information", "entries": { "<code>": "<display>" } } }`. The `entries` map labels the codes declared in `entryCodes`, so its keys must be a subset of those codes. |
| `classification` | Governance: `{ label?, impact?: { confidentiality, integrity, availability }, pii?, specialCategory?: { type } }`. ISO 27001 label, NIST FIPS 199 impact triad, and the personal-data / GDPR Article 9 special-category markers. |
| `processing` | Governance: `{ purposes: [ { purpose, legalBasis?, retention? } ], operations: [] }`. The DPV processing purposes, each with its GDPR Article 6 legal basis and its own retention rule. |
| `residency` | Governance: `{ allowed, denied, localizationRequired?, transfer?: { mechanism } }`. Where the value may reside and the Chapter V transfer mechanism for permitted cross-border movement. |
| `assurance` | Governance: `{ loa?, attestationType?, authenticSourceRef? }`. The eIDAS level of assurance and electronic-attestation type. |

The four governance overlays (`classification`, `processing`, `residency`, `assurance`) are grounded in W3C DPV, GDPR, NIST FIPS 199, ISO 27001, and eIDAS2. They are authored once on the catalog attribute and flow through every layer into the wire form, never retyped per credential. Personal-data classification is `overlays.classification.pii` (with `specialCategory` for GDPR Article 9 data).

### Relationships are first-class

Relationships between entities are **first-class catalog objects**. A relationship has:

| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `name` | The relationship name, used as a path segment in traversal (e.g. `residentialAddress`). |
| `relationType` | A semantic type token (e.g. `has-address`, `employed-by`). |
| `source` | The source end: `{ entity: { entity: "<Name>" }, role?, cardinality: { min, max? } }`. |
| `target` | The target end: `{ entity: { entity: "<Name>" }, role?, cardinality: { min, max? } }`. |
| `overlays.i18n` | Localized labels. |

Cardinality is **per-end** (UML look-across style): the cardinality on each end describes how many of that end exist from the perspective of the opposite end. For example, `residentialAddress` has source Person with `{ min: 0 }` (a home address is optional for a person) and target Address with `{ min: 1, max: 1 }` (when the relationship exists, it points to exactly one address).

### Schema bindings

A catalog may also record how its entities and attributes relate to external schemas via two sub-collections:

- **Schema bindings** (`/catalogs/{id}/schemabindings`): named pointers to external or internal schemas (`JSON_SCHEMA`, `SD_JWT_VCT`, etc.) with a `purpose` and an `origin`.
- **Schema relationships** (`/catalogs/{id}/schemarelationships`): per-attribute mappings between a canonical attribute `semanticPath` and an external schema attribute, with a `relation` type (`DERIVED_FROM_EXTERNAL`, `EQUIVALENT_TO_EXTERNAL`, etc.) and a `direction`. These anchor provenance in the model, for example, this canonical `birth_date` is `DERIVED_FROM_EXTERNAL` the PID `birthdate` claim, rather than leaving it in a spreadsheet.

### Lifecycle

A catalog's `status` moves through `DRAFT | PUBLISHED`. A `DRAFT` is editable; a `PUBLISHED` snapshot is frozen and can be pinned by version from a profile. The catalog also carries a monotonic `version` counter starting at `1`.

---

## REST: Build the Walkthrough Catalog

All calls use the operator's OIDC bearer token. The tenant is resolved from the token's `tenant_id` claim.

```http
Authorization: Bearer <operator access token>
Content-Type: application/json
```

Every write in the enterprise tier is gated behind the `semantic-attribute-binding` license feature. With the unbounded default license the gate passes. See [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world#the-license-gate).

The walkthrough catalog has **five entities** and **two relationships**:

| Entity | Kind | partyType | Attributes |
|---|---|---|---|
| Person | PREDEFINED | `natural_person` | `given_name`, `family_name`, `email` |
| Address | PREDEFINED | `address` | `street`, `postal_code`, `city`, `country` |
| Organization | PREDEFINED | `organization` | `legal_name`, `registration_number` |
| Employee | SPECIALIZATION of Person |, | `employee_id`, `job_title`, `employment_status` |
| Employer | SPECIALIZATION of Organization |, | `department` |

| Relationship | Type | Source | Target |
|---|---|---|---|
| `residentialAddress` | `has-address` | Person (cardinality `min: 0`) | Address, role `home` (cardinality `min: 1, max: 1`) |
| `employment` | `employed-by` | Employee (cardinality `min: 0`) | Employer, role `employer` (cardinality `min: 1, max: 1`) |

### Step 1: Create the catalog shell

<Tabs groupId="catalog-shell">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs
```

```json
{
  "name": "Acme Employee Catalog (layered)",
  "description": "Canonical Acme employee semantic catalog authored via the layered /api/attributes/v1/catalogs surface.",
  "ownerPartyRef": "acme",
  "overlays": {
    "meta": {
      "en": {
        "name": "Acme Employee Catalog",
        "description": "Canonical employee + address + organization attributes governed by Acme HR"
      },
      "nl": {
        "name": "Acme Medewerkerscatalogus",
        "description": "Canonieke medewerker-, adres- en organisatieattributen, beheerd door Acme HR"
      },
      "es": {
        "name": "Catálogo de empleados de Acme",
        "description": "Atributos canónicos de empleado, dirección y organización gobernados por RR. HH. de Acme"
      },
      "fr": {
        "name": "Catalogue des employés d'Acme",
        "description": "Attributs canoniques d'employé, d'adresse et d'organisation régis par les RH d'Acme"
      }
    },
    "governance": {
      "jurisdictions": [
        {
          "region": "EU",
          "laws": ["eu-gdpr"],
          "frameworks": ["GDPR", "EIDAS2", "NIS2"],
          "authority": "EDPB",
          "residency": { "allowed": ["EU", "EEA"], "localizationRequired": false },
          "defaultTransfer": { "mechanism": "ADEQUACY_DECISION" }
        }
      ],
      "primaryJurisdiction": "EU",
      "controller": { "partyId": "acme", "role": "CONTROLLER", "establishedIn": "NL" },
      "classificationScheme": ["PUBLIC", "INTERNAL", "CONFIDENTIAL", "RESTRICTED"]
    }
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`201 Created` returns the bare `SemanticCatalog` with `status: "DRAFT"` and `version: 1`. Capture `.id` and `.version`.

```jsonc
{
  "id": "5b8c...catalogId",
  "name": "Acme Employee Catalog (layered)",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "DRAFT",
  "ownerPartyRef": "acme"
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

The `overlays.meta` block carries localized catalog-level name and description (separate from the per-attribute `overlays.i18n` labels added below). The `overlays.governance` block grounds the catalog in DPV/GDPR/eIDAS2/NIS2: jurisdictions, residency rules, data controller identity, and a classification scheme.

### Step 2: Add entities

All five entities are appended to the catalog shell via `POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/entities`. Each call returns the updated catalog; check that the `entities` count increased.

#### Person (PREDEFINED, `natural_person`)

<Tabs groupId="entity-person">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/entities
```

```json
{
  "name": "Person",
  "kind": "PREDEFINED",
  "partyType": "natural_person",
  "attributes": [
    {
      "path": ["given_name"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "MANDATORY",
        "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Given name" },
          "nl": { "label": "Voornaam" },
          "es": { "label": "Nombre" },
          "fr": { "label": "Prénom" }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "path": ["family_name"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "MANDATORY",
        "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Family name" },
          "nl": { "label": "Achternaam" },
          "es": { "label": "Apellido" },
          "fr": { "label": "Nom de famille" }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "path": ["email"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL",
        "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "format": "^[^@]+@[^@]+$",
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Email" },
          "nl": { "label": "E-mail" },
          "es": { "label": "Correo electrónico" },
          "fr": { "label": "E-mail" }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "overlays": {
    "i18n": {
      "en": { "label": "Person", "information": "A natural person" },
      "nl": { "label": "Persoon" },
      "es": { "label": "Persona", "information": "Una persona física" },
      "fr": { "label": "Personne", "information": "Une personne physique" }
    }
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK` returns the updated `SemanticCatalog` with the entity appended to `entities` (count now 1). The same shape is returned by every entity and relationship add (attribute overlays elided):

```jsonc
{
  "id": "5b8c...catalogId",
  "name": "Acme Employee Catalog (layered)",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "DRAFT",
  "ownerPartyRef": "acme",
  "entities": [
    {
      "name": "Person",
      "kind": "PREDEFINED",
      "partyType": "natural_person",
      "attributes": [
        { "path": ["given_name"],  "valueType": "Text", "overlays": { /* conformance, sdPolicy, i18n, classification */ } },
        { "path": ["family_name"], "valueType": "Text", "overlays": { /* ... */ } },
        { "path": ["email"],       "valueType": "Text", "overlays": { /* ... */ } }
      ],
      "overlays": { "i18n": { "en": { "label": "Person", "information": "A natural person" } } }
    }
  ],
  "relationships": []
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

Each attribute `path` is an array of string segments. The `overlays.i18n` block is a language-keyed map; each entry carries `label`, `information`, and (for coded attributes) `entries` mapping code values to display strings. Personal-data classification lives in `overlays.classification.pii`, not as a flat field on the attribute.

#### Address (PREDEFINED, `address`)

Address is a **predefined party** in its own right (`partyType: "address"`). Keeping address as its own entity means any party type can link to an address through a named relationship, and the address attributes are governed and classified independently.

<Tabs groupId="entity-address">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/entities
```

```json
{
  "name": "Address",
  "kind": "PREDEFINED",
  "partyType": "address",
  "attributes": [
    {
      "path": ["street"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL",
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Street" },
          "nl": { "label": "Straat" },
          "es": { "label": "Calle" },
          "fr": { "label": "Rue" }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "path": ["postal_code"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL",
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Postal code" },
          "nl": { "label": "Postcode" },
          "es": { "label": "Código postal" },
          "fr": { "label": "Code postal" }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "path": ["city"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL",
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "City" },
          "nl": { "label": "Plaats" },
          "es": { "label": "Ciudad" },
          "fr": { "label": "Ville" }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "path": ["country"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL",
        "widgetHint": "PICKLIST",
        "standard": "ISO 3166-1",
        "entryCodes": { "codes": ["NL", "DE", "FR", "BE"] },
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": {
            "label": "Country",
            "entries": { "NL": "Netherlands", "DE": "Germany", "FR": "France", "BE": "Belgium" }
          },
          "nl": {
            "label": "Land",
            "entries": { "NL": "Nederland", "DE": "Duitsland", "FR": "Frankrijk", "BE": "België" }
          },
          "es": {
            "label": "País",
            "entries": { "NL": "Países Bajos", "DE": "Alemania", "FR": "Francia", "BE": "Bélgica" }
          },
          "fr": {
            "label": "Pays",
            "entries": { "NL": "Pays-Bas", "DE": "Allemagne", "FR": "France", "BE": "Belgique" }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "overlays": {
    "i18n": {
      "en": { "label": "Address", "information": "A physical postal address" },
      "nl": { "label": "Adres" },
      "es": { "label": "Dirección", "information": "Una dirección postal física" },
      "fr": { "label": "Adresse", "information": "Une adresse postale physique" }
    }
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

The updated catalog is returned. The `country` attribute carries `entryCodes` (the code list itself) in `overlays.entryCodes` and the human-readable display strings under `overlays.i18n.{lang}.entries`.

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

#### Organization (PREDEFINED, `organization`)

Organization is a predefined party (`partyType: "organization"`) carrying `legal_name` and `registration_number`. Both attributes are non-personal (`classification.pii: false`), which flows through to DCQL and credential rendering.

<Tabs groupId="entity-organization">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/entities
```

```json
{
  "name": "Organization",
  "kind": "PREDEFINED",
  "partyType": "organization",
  "attributes": [
    {
      "path": ["legal_name"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "MANDATORY",
        "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "classification": { "pii": false },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Legal name" },
          "nl": { "label": "Statutaire naam" },
          "es": { "label": "Razón social" },
          "fr": { "label": "Raison sociale" }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "path": ["registration_number"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL",
        "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "classification": { "pii": false },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Registration number" },
          "nl": { "label": "KvK-nummer" },
          "es": { "label": "Número de registro" },
          "fr": { "label": "Numéro d'enregistrement" }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "overlays": {
    "i18n": {
      "en": { "label": "Organization", "information": "A legal organization" },
      "nl": { "label": "Organisatie" },
      "es": { "label": "Organización", "information": "Una organización jurídica" },
      "fr": { "label": "Organisation", "information": "Une organisation juridique" }
    }
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

The updated catalog is returned with Organization appended to `entities`.

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

#### Employee (SPECIALIZATION of Person)

Employee specializes Person and adds three employment-specific attributes. The `specializes` field names the predefined entity being extended. Employee inherits `given_name`, `family_name`, and `email` from Person and contributes `employee_id`, `job_title`, and `employment_status` of its own.

<Tabs groupId="entity-employee">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/entities
```

```json
{
  "name": "Employee",
  "kind": "SPECIALIZATION",
  "specializes": { "entity": "Person" },
  "attributes": [
    {
      "path": ["employee_id"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "MANDATORY",
        "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Employee identifier" },
          "nl": { "label": "Medewerkernummer" },
          "es": { "label": "Identificador de empleado" },
          "fr": { "label": "Identifiant de l'employé" }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "path": ["job_title"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL",
        "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Job title" },
          "nl": { "label": "Functietitel" },
          "es": { "label": "Puesto" },
          "fr": { "label": "Intitulé du poste" }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "path": ["employment_status"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL",
        "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "widgetHint": "PICKLIST",
        "entryCodes": { "codes": ["active", "suspended", "terminated"] },
        "classification": { "pii": true },
        "i18n": {
          "en": {
            "label": "Employment status",
            "entries": { "active": "Active", "suspended": "Suspended", "terminated": "Terminated" }
          },
          "nl": {
            "label": "Dienstverbandstatus",
            "entries": { "active": "Actief", "suspended": "Geschorst", "terminated": "Beëindigd" }
          },
          "es": {
            "label": "Situación laboral",
            "entries": { "active": "Activo", "suspended": "Suspendido", "terminated": "Terminado" }
          },
          "fr": {
            "label": "Statut d'emploi",
            "entries": { "active": "Actif", "suspended": "Suspendu", "terminated": "Terminé" }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "overlays": {
    "i18n": {
      "en": { "label": "Employee", "information": "A person employed by the organization" },
      "nl": { "label": "Medewerker" },
      "es": { "label": "Empleado", "information": "Una persona empleada por la organización" },
      "fr": { "label": "Employé", "information": "Une personne employée par l'organisation" }
    }
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

The updated catalog is returned. Employee contributes `employee_id`, `job_title`, and `employment_status`; it inherits `given_name`, `family_name`, and `email` from Person through the specialization.

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

#### Employer (SPECIALIZATION of Organization)

Employer specializes Organization and adds `department`. The pattern is symmetric: just as Employee narrows a Person, Employer narrows an Organization for the employment use case.

<Tabs groupId="entity-employer">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/entities
```

```json
{
  "name": "Employer",
  "kind": "SPECIALIZATION",
  "specializes": { "entity": "Organization" },
  "attributes": [
    {
      "path": ["department"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL",
        "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "classification": { "pii": false },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Department" },
          "nl": { "label": "Afdeling" },
          "es": { "label": "Departamento" },
          "fr": { "label": "Service" }
        }
      }
    }
  ],
  "overlays": {
    "i18n": {
      "en": { "label": "Employer", "information": "An organization in its role as employer" },
      "nl": { "label": "Werkgever" },
      "es": { "label": "Empleador", "information": "Una organización en su rol de empleador" },
      "fr": { "label": "Employeur", "information": "Une organisation dans son rôle d'employeur" }
    }
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

The updated catalog is returned with all five entities in `entities`.

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Step 3: Add relationships

Relationships are appended via `POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/relationships`. Each call returns the updated catalog; check that the `relationships` count increased.

Cardinality follows the UML look-across convention: the cardinality on each end describes how many of that end exist from the perspective of the opposite end.

#### `residentialAddress` (Person to Address)

<Tabs groupId="rel-residential">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/relationships
```

```json
{
  "name": "residentialAddress",
  "relationType": "has-address",
  "source": {
    "entity": { "entity": "Person" },
    "cardinality": { "min": 0 }
  },
  "target": {
    "entity": { "entity": "Address" },
    "role": "home",
    "cardinality": { "min": 1, "max": 1 }
  },
  "overlays": {
    "i18n": {
      "en": { "label": "Residential address" },
      "nl": { "label": "Woonadres" },
      "es": { "label": "Dirección residencial" },
      "fr": { "label": "Adresse de résidence" }
    }
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK` returns the updated catalog with the relationship appended to `relationships` (entities elided):

```jsonc
{
  "id": "5b8c...catalogId",
  "name": "Acme Employee Catalog (layered)",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "DRAFT",
  "ownerPartyRef": "acme",
  "entities": [ /* Person, Address, Organization, Employee, Employer */ ],
  "relationships": [
    {
      "name": "residentialAddress",
      "relationType": "has-address",
      "source": { "entity": { "entity": "Person" }, "cardinality": { "min": 0 } },
      "target": { "entity": { "entity": "Address" }, "role": "home", "cardinality": { "min": 1, "max": 1 } },
      "overlays": { "i18n": { "en": { "label": "Residential address" }, "nl": { "label": "Woonadres" }, "es": { "label": "Dirección residencial" }, "fr": { "label": "Adresse de résidence" } } }
    }
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

The source end `cardinality: { min: 0 }` means a person may have zero residential addresses (it is optional). The target end `cardinality: { min: 1, max: 1 }` means when the relationship exists, it points to exactly one address. The target `role: "home"` names what this Address represents in this relationship, it becomes part of the traversal semantics used by the set and VC channels.

#### `employment` (Employee to Employer)

<Tabs groupId="rel-employment">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/relationships
```

```json
{
  "name": "employment",
  "relationType": "employed-by",
  "source": {
    "entity": { "entity": "Employee" },
    "cardinality": { "min": 0 }
  },
  "target": {
    "entity": { "entity": "Employer" },
    "role": "employer",
    "cardinality": { "min": 1, "max": 1 }
  },
  "overlays": {
    "i18n": {
      "en": { "label": "Employment" },
      "nl": { "label": "Dienstverband" },
      "es": { "label": "Empleo" },
      "fr": { "label": "Emploi" }
    }
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK` returns the updated catalog with both relationships in `relationships` (entities elided):

```jsonc
{
  "id": "5b8c...catalogId",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "DRAFT",
  "entities": [ /* the five entities */ ],
  "relationships": [
    {
      "name": "residentialAddress",
      "relationType": "has-address",
      "source": { "entity": { "entity": "Person" }, "cardinality": { "min": 0 } },
      "target": { "entity": { "entity": "Address" }, "role": "home", "cardinality": { "min": 1, "max": 1 } }
    },
    {
      "name": "employment",
      "relationType": "employed-by",
      "source": { "entity": { "entity": "Employee" }, "cardinality": { "min": 0 } },
      "target": { "entity": { "entity": "Employer" }, "role": "employer", "cardinality": { "min": 1, "max": 1 } }
    }
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Step 4: Publish and resolve

Once all five entities and both relationships are appended, publish the catalog with a status transition. Publishing locks the version: downstream layers pin a specific `catalogVersion` and their view of the catalog does not change if you later create a new draft.

<Tabs groupId="catalog-publish">
  <TabItem value="publish" label="Publish">

```http
PUT /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/status
```

```json
{ "status": "PUBLISHED" }
```

`200 OK` returns the updated catalog with `status: "PUBLISHED"`. Capture the published `version`, this is the `catalogVersion` the profile will pin.

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="resolve" label="Resolve">

```http
GET /api/attributes/v1/catalogs/{catalogId}/resolved
```

`200 OK` returns the fully resolved catalog with all entities and their attributes, plus all relationships (here, 5 entities and 2 relationships). Use this to verify the catalog is complete before building the profile (attributes elided):

```jsonc
{
  "id": "5b8c...catalogId",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "PUBLISHED",
  "entities": [
    { "name": "Person",       "kind": "PREDEFINED",     "partyType": "natural_person", "attributes": [ /* given_name, family_name, email */ ] },
    { "name": "Address",      "kind": "PREDEFINED",     "partyType": "address",        "attributes": [ /* street, postal_code, city, country */ ] },
    { "name": "Organization", "kind": "PREDEFINED",     "partyType": "organization",   "attributes": [ /* legal_name, registration_number */ ] },
    { "name": "Employee",     "kind": "SPECIALIZATION", "specializes": { "entity": "Person" },       "attributes": [ /* employee_id, job_title, employment_status */ ] },
    { "name": "Employer",     "kind": "SPECIALIZATION", "specializes": { "entity": "Organization" }, "attributes": [ /* department */ ] }
  ],
  "relationships": [
    { "name": "residentialAddress", "relationType": "has-address", "source": { "entity": { "entity": "Person" } },   "target": { "entity": { "entity": "Address" },  "role": "home" } },
    { "name": "employment",         "relationType": "employed-by", "source": { "entity": { "entity": "Employee" } }, "target": { "entity": { "entity": "Employer" }, "role": "employer" } }
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Listing catalogs (the paged envelope)

Every list endpoint in the `/api/attributes/v1` family is paginated and filterable uniformly.

<Tabs groupId="catalog-list">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
GET /api/attributes/v1/catalogs?limit=10&offset=0
```

Filter and sort:

```http
GET /api/attributes/v1/catalogs?nameContains=Acme&sort=name&sortDirection=ASC&limit=50
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK`. The body is always the `{ data, pagination }` envelope, read the page from `.data` (never a bare top-level array) and the counts from `.pagination`.

```jsonc
{
  "data": [
    {
      "id": "5b8c...catalogId",
      "name": "Acme Employee Catalog (layered)",
      "version": 1,
      "status": "PUBLISHED"
    }
  ],
  "pagination": {
    "limit": 10,
    "offset": 0,
    "page": 0,
    "size": 1,
    "total": 1,
    "totalPages": 1,
    "hasMore": false
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

Accepted query parameters: `limit`, `offset`, `page`, `size`, `sort`, `sortDirection`, `nameContains`, `status`. See [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world#pagination) for the full pagination reference.

---

## What you have now

One published catalog that is the organization's single source of truth for its world: five governed party entities (three predefined, two specializations) and two first-class relationships, each attribute carrying OCA-grounded governance overlays that flow through every layer above without being retyped.

The catalog `id` and published `version` are the values the attribute profile will pin in its `catalogRefs` array.

## Next steps

- [Attribute Profile (L2)](./attribute-profile): bind catalog entities to use-case roles, select relationships, and apply narrow-only overrides
- [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world): the concepts behind entity kinds, governance overlays, override precedence, and the license gate

---

# The Attribute Profile (L2)

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# The Attribute Profile (L2)

The [Semantic Catalog (L1)](./catalog) defines the organization's world: entities, attributes, and relationships. The L2 Attribute Profile is the use-case layer above it. Its job is to say: "for **this** use case, these are the actors, these are the relationships between them, and these are the constraints that apply here, tightened beyond the catalog defaults if the use case demands it."

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-governance-flowthrough.svg" alt="Governance flow from L1 catalog through L2 profile to L3 set and L4 channel: jurisdiction, classification, and sdPolicy values set at the catalog entity flow through role bindings and role-scoped traversal selections, narrowing at each layer but never widening, reaching the wire form with full provenance." style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## What a Profile Does

A profile is a **use-case binding** that composes one or more published catalogs into a named collection of roles and relationships.

**Roles bind catalog entities to use-case actors.** A role gives a catalog entity a use-case name (`employee`, `employer`) and optionally narrows it to one or more specialization subtypes. The `employee` role binds to the `Person` entity and specializes to the `Employee` subtype, so the role carries both the base Person attributes and the Employee-specific ones.

**Relationships are selected, not redeclared.** The profile selects which catalog relationships the use case includes, by name. Relationship semantics, cardinality, and localization are already defined on the catalog and are not repeated in the profile.

**Overrides are narrow-only.** A profile may tighten individual attribute constraints per role, but it cannot loosen anything already declared on the catalog. Making `email` `MANDATORY` for the `employee` role is a valid override; making a `MANDATORY` catalog attribute `OPTIONAL` is not. This ensures that governance constraints established at L1 can only be strengthened, never weakened, as they flow downstream.

**Catalogs are pinned by version.** The `catalogRefs` array pins exactly one version per source catalog. Resolution is deterministic: downstream layers that pin this profile version see a stable view of the catalog regardless of subsequent catalog revisions.

The profile does not select individual attributes. Attribute selection happens at the [Attribute Set (L3)](./attribute-set) layer, which takes a published profile as its input. A profile is the governance boundary; a set is the selection surface.

These layers are authored over REST in this walkthrough. VDX presents a guided UI for the same layers; the concepts and the resulting model are identical.

## Create, Publish, and Resolve the Profile

The "Acme Employee" profile composes the catalog published in [Catalog (L1)](./catalog). It defines two roles:

- `employee`, bound to the `Person` entity, narrowed to the `Employee` specialization. Inherits all Person attributes plus the Employee-specific ones.
- `employer`, bound to the `Organization` entity, narrowed to the `Employer` specialization.

It selects both catalog relationships (`residentialAddress` and `employment`) and applies one override: `email` is tightened from `OPTIONAL` (its catalog default on `Person`) to `MANDATORY` for the `employee` role in this use case.

### Create

<Tabs groupId="profile-create">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/profiles
```

```json
{
  "name": "Acme Employee Profile (layered)",
  "description": "Use-case profile over the layered Acme catalog: employee (Person/Employee) + employer (Organization/Employer) roles, residentialAddress + employment relationships.",
  "catalogRefs": [
    { "catalogId": "5b8c...catalogId", "catalogVersion": 1 }
  ],
  "roles": [
    {
      "id": "employee",
      "name": "Employee",
      "entity": { "catalogId": "5b8c...catalogId", "entity": "Person" },
      "specializes": ["Employee"]
    },
    {
      "id": "employer",
      "name": "Employer",
      "entity": { "catalogId": "5b8c...catalogId", "entity": "Organization" },
      "specializes": ["Employer"]
    }
  ],
  "relationships": [
    { "catalogId": "5b8c...catalogId", "relationship": "residentialAddress" },
    { "catalogId": "5b8c...catalogId", "relationship": "employment" }
  ],
  "overrides": [
    { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["email"], "conformance": "MANDATORY" }
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`201 Created` returns the bare `AttributeProfile`. Capture `.id` and `.version`; they are the `profileId` and `profileVersion` the [Attribute Set (L3)](./attribute-set) will pin.

```jsonc
{
  "id": "a1f0...profileId",
  "name": "Acme Employee Profile (layered)",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "DRAFT"
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

#### Field reference

| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `catalogRefs` | `[{ catalogId, catalogVersion }]`. Pins one version per source catalog. |
| `roles[].id` | The use-case role identifier used throughout L3 traversal paths (e.g. `"employee"`). |
| `roles[].name` | A human-readable name for the role. |
| `roles[].entity` | `{ catalogId, entity: "<EntityName>" }`. The catalog entity this role is bound to. |
| `roles[].specializes` | Array of specialization entity names to narrow the role. The role carries the base entity's attributes plus the specialization's additions. |
| `relationships[]` | `{ catalogId, relationship: "<relationshipName>" }`. Selects a catalog relationship by name. The relationship's cardinality and localization are read from the catalog. |
| `overrides[]` | `{ roleRef, path: [...], conformance?, sdPolicy?, ... }`. Narrow-only per (role, attribute path). The allow-list fields are `conformance`, `sdPolicy`, `entryCodesSubset`, `sensitive`. |

The `overrides` entry `{ "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["email"], "conformance": "MANDATORY" }` upgrades `email` from `OPTIONAL` (its value on the `Person` entity in the catalog) to `MANDATORY` for the `employee` role in this use case. Any attribute not listed in `overrides` reads through to the catalog value.

### Publish

Publish the profile to freeze it for downstream consumption.

<Tabs groupId="profile-publish">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
PUT /api/attributes/v1/profiles/{profileId}/status
```

```json
{ "status": "PUBLISHED" }
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK` returns the updated `AttributeProfile` with `status: "PUBLISHED"`. Capture the published `version`; this is the `profileVersion` the attribute set will pin via `profileRef`.

```jsonc
{
  "id": "a1f0...profileId",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "PUBLISHED"
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

After publishing, the profile is immutable. Any subsequent changes require a new draft.

### Resolve

<Tabs groupId="profile-resolve">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
GET /api/attributes/v1/profiles/{profileId}/resolved
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK` returns the resolved profile with all `roles` expanded against the pinned catalog snapshot. Each role carries its full attribute set including attributes inherited through the specialization chain. The `employee` role's resolved attributes include `given_name`, `family_name`, and `email` from `Person`, plus `employee_id`, `job_title`, and `employment_status` from the `Employee` specialization.

```jsonc
{
  "id": "a1f0...profileId",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "PUBLISHED",
  "roles": [
    {
      "id": "employee",
      "name": "Employee",
      "entity": { "catalogId": "5b8c...catalogId", "entity": "Person" },
      "specializes": ["Employee"]
    },
    {
      "id": "employer",
      "name": "Employer",
      "entity": { "catalogId": "5b8c...catalogId", "entity": "Organization" },
      "specializes": ["Employer"]
    }
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Override and Version-Pinning Precedence

The profile is the second layer in the resolution order. When a downstream layer resolves an attribute's effective value:

1. **Catalog (L1)** establishes the canonical value for `valueType`, `overlays.i18n`, `sdPolicy`, and all governance overlays.
2. **Profile override (L2)** is the effective value for fields in the override allow-list (`conformance`, `sdPolicy`, `entryCodesSubset`, `sensitive`). Anything outside the allow-list reads through to the catalog unchanged.
3. **Set override (L3)** may tighten further per selected traversal entry.
4. **VC channel (L4)** is selection and claim mapping only; it does not override governance.

No layer widens what a layer above has declared. The version pin in `catalogRefs` means this profile always resolves the catalog at version 1, regardless of how the catalog evolves after publishing.

See [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world#override-and-version-pinning-precedence) for the full precedence table.

## The License Gate

Creating and publishing a profile is a license-gated enterprise write, governed by the `semantic-attribute-binding` feature. Reading (get, list, resolve) is never gated. See [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world#the-license-gate) for the full gate behaviour.

Every write on this page uses the operator's OIDC bearer token:

```http
Authorization: Bearer <operator access token>
Content-Type: application/json
```

The tenant is resolved from the token's `tenant_id` claim.

## Next Steps

- [Attribute Set (L2)](./attribute-set): pin this published profile, select traversal paths (including cross-relationship paths), and apply set-level narrow overrides
- [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world): the full layer model, governance-overlay detail, and version-pinning precedence
- [Catalog (L1)](./catalog): the entity, attribute, and relationship definitions this profile composes

---

# The Attribute Set (L3)

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# The Attribute Set (L3)

An attribute set is a **role-scoped traversal subselection** of exactly one published profile. Where the catalog (L1) defines every attribute the organization manages and the profile (L2) assembles those into use-case roles, the set (L3) answers a sharper question: *which attributes from which roles does a specific output (a form, a portal page, a PDF, an API payload, or a credential) need, and exactly where does each one live in the entity graph?*

The set is the consumable contract that L4 channels bind to. It is versioned and reuses the same `DRAFT | PUBLISHED` lifecycle as every other layer.

> VDX presents a guided authoring UI for the attribute set layer. The concepts and the resulting model are identical whether you work over the REST API documented here or through the UI.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-layered-model.svg" alt="Four-layer semantic model: L1 catalog declares entities and relationships; L2 profile binds them to use-case roles; L3 set is a role-scoped traversal subselection of one profile; L4 channels are the set-bound artifacts that issuer designs and verifier DCQL both derive from." style={{maxWidth: '800px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Core Concepts

### profileRef, pinning one profile version

A set references exactly one published profile via `profileRef: { profileId, profileVersion }`. Pinning the version keeps the set's view of the world stable: if the profile is revised and republished the set continues to resolve against the version it was authored against.

### selected, role-scoped traversal paths

`selected` is an array of `{ roleRef, path }` entries. Each entry selects one attribute reachable from the named role. `path` is always an **array** of string segments, and it may **cross a relationship boundary**.

This is the pivotal capability of the set layer. Consider the employee role, which the profile binds to the Person entity (narrowed by the Employee specialization). Person has a `residentialAddress` relationship to the Address entity, and Address carries a `country` attribute (an ISO 3166-1 picklist). To select that country value the path simply steps across the relationship:

```json
{ "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["residentialAddress", "country"] }
```

The first segment, `residentialAddress`, is the relationship name declared in the catalog. The second segment, `country`, is the attribute on the Address entity at the other end. The set traverses from the employee role, across the relationship, and arrives at the attribute on the related entity.

A direct attribute on the role's entity uses a single-segment path:

```json
{ "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["given_name"] }
```

There is no special syntax to distinguish direct from traversal paths; the platform resolves both against the profile's entity graph.

### overrides, narrow-only tightening

`overrides` is an array of `{ roleRef, path, ... }` entries that tighten constraints on a selected (role, path) pair. Overrides are **narrow-only**: they cannot widen anything the catalog or profile already declared.

The fields accepted in a set override are:

| Field | Effect |
|---|---|
| `conformance` | Tighten from `OPTIONAL` to `MANDATORY`. |
| `entryCodesSubset` | Restrict a picklist to a subset of the codes declared in `overlays.entryCodes` at the catalog level. |
| `cardinality` | Narrow the occurrence count within the set's scope. |
| `sensitive` | Mark the attribute as needing extra handling (masked in UIs). |

The walkthrough set uses one override: `employment_status` is narrowed to `entryCodesSubset: ["active", "suspended"]`, removing the `terminated` code. The catalog declares all three codes; the set never admits a terminated employment status, whatever output consumes it.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-governance-flowthrough.svg" alt="Governance flow from L1 catalog through L2 profile to L3 set and L4 channel: jurisdiction, classification, and sdPolicy values set at the catalog entity flow through role bindings and role-scoped traversal selections, narrowing at each layer but never widening, reaching the wire form with full provenance." style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

### The through-line from set traversal to channel output

The traversal paths in `selected` are not discarded after the set is published; they are what each channel consumes. A form channel binds a path to an input field, a portal page to a display row, a PDF channel to a placement, an API channel to a payload key, and a VC channel to a `claimMappings` entry. Whatever the channel, the path crosses the relationship boundary once (here, in the set) and the channel decides where the value lands in its output. Nothing about the resolution is repeated downstream; the set is the single place where cross-entity selection is declared.

As one example, the Employee SD-JWT channel resolves the traversal entries like this:

| Set traversal path | Wire claim path |
|---|---|
| `["residentialAddress", "country"]` | SD-JWT: `["address", "country"]` |
| `["residentialAddress", "postal_code"]` | mdoc: `["postal_code"]` (placed under the channel's `namespace`) |

The set knows *how to reach* the value across the entity graph; each channel decides *where to place* it in its own output. See [Channels (L4)](./credential-definitions) for the full per-channel shapes.

---

## REST: Create, Publish, and Resolve an Attribute Set

Every call requires the operator's OIDC bearer token. The tenant is resolved from the token's `tenant_id` claim. These are [license-gated](./modeling-your-world#the-license-gate) enterprise writes.

```http
Authorization: Bearer <operator access token>
Content-Type: application/json
```

### Create the set

<Tabs groupId="set-create">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/sets
```

```json
{
  "name": "Acme Employee Badge Set (layered)",
  "description": "L3 set selecting employee identity + residential country traversal + employer legal name.",
  "profileRef": { "profileId": "a1f0...profileId", "profileVersion": 1 },
  "selected": [
    { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["given_name"] },
    { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["family_name"] },
    { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["employee_id"] },
    { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["job_title"] },
    { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["employment_status"] },
    { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["email"] },
    { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["residentialAddress", "postal_code"] },
    { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["residentialAddress", "country"] },
    { "roleRef": "employer", "path": ["legal_name"] }
  ],
  "overrides": [
    {
      "roleRef": "employee",
      "path": ["employment_status"],
      "entryCodesSubset": ["active", "suspended"]
    }
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`201 Created` returns the bare `AttributeSet`. Capture `.id` and `.version`.

```jsonc
{
  "id": "7c4d...setId",
  "name": "Acme Employee Badge Set (layered)",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "DRAFT"
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

The set selects nine paths in total:

- **Six direct employee attributes**: `given_name`, `family_name`, `employee_id`, `job_title`, `employment_status`, `email`. These are attributes declared on the Person or Employee entity and reached without crossing a relationship.
- **Two relationship-traversal paths**: `["residentialAddress", "postal_code"]` and `["residentialAddress", "country"]`. Both cross the `residentialAddress` relationship from the employee role's Person entity to the Address entity.
- **One employer attribute**: `legal_name`, a direct attribute on the Employer entity reached via the `employer` role.

The two relationship-traversal entries are worth examining explicitly:

```json
{ "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["residentialAddress", "postal_code"] }
```

This crosses the `residentialAddress` relationship (declared in the catalog as `has-address`, from Person to Address) and arrives at `postal_code` on the Address entity.

```json
{ "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["residentialAddress", "country"] }
```

This crosses the same relationship and arrives at `country`, the ISO 3166-1 picklist attribute on Address. This is the path that ultimately maps to `["address", "country"]` in the SD-JWT credential wire form.

The `overrides` entry narrows `employment_status` down to two codes. The catalog declared `["active", "suspended", "terminated"]`; the override removes `terminated` from the set's effective code list. The `entryCodesSubset` must be a subset of the catalog's `entryCodes.codes`; the API rejects any code not present at the catalog level.

### Publish the set

Once the set is reviewed, publish it with a status transition. Publishing locks the version so that downstream channels pin a stable view.

<Tabs groupId="set-publish">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Publish">

```http
PUT /api/attributes/v1/sets/{setId}/status
```

```json
{ "status": "PUBLISHED" }
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

The response is the updated `AttributeSet` with `status: "PUBLISHED"`. Capture the published `version`, this is the `setVersion` channels will pin via `setRef`.

```jsonc
{
  "id": "7c4d...setId",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "PUBLISHED"
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Resolve the set

`GET /api/attributes/v1/sets/{setId}/resolved` returns the fully resolved set: all selected attributes expanded against the profile snapshot (which is itself resolved against the pinned catalog version), with overrides applied.

<Tabs groupId="set-resolve">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
GET /api/attributes/v1/sets/{setId}/resolved
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK`. The `attributes` array contains all resolved entries including traversal-resolved attributes from related entities. The `employment_status` entry reflects the narrowed `entryCodesSubset`; the relationship-traversal entries carry their full resolved attribute shape (including the `country` picklist with its ISO 3166-1 codes and all four localized `entries` maps).

```jsonc
{
  "id": "7c4d...setId",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "PUBLISHED",
  "attributes": [
    {
      "roleRef": "employee",
      "path": ["given_name"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": { "conformance": "MANDATORY", "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS",
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Given name" }, "nl": { "label": "Voornaam" },
          "es": { "label": "Nombre" },     "fr": { "label": "Prénom" }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "roleRef": "employee",
      "path": ["employment_status"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL", "sdPolicy": "ALWAYS", "widgetHint": "PICKLIST",
        "entryCodes": { "codes": ["active", "suspended"] },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Employment status",
            "entries": { "active": "Active", "suspended": "Suspended" } },
          "nl": { "label": "Dienstverbandstatus",
            "entries": { "active": "Actief", "suspended": "Geschorst" } },
          "es": { "label": "Situación laboral",
            "entries": { "active": "Activo", "suspended": "Suspendido" } },
          "fr": { "label": "Statut d'emploi",
            "entries": { "active": "Actif", "suspended": "Suspendu" } }
        }
      }
    },
    {
      "roleRef": "employee",
      "path": ["residentialAddress", "country"],
      "valueType": "Text",
      "overlays": {
        "conformance": "OPTIONAL", "widgetHint": "PICKLIST", "standard": "ISO 3166-1",
        "entryCodes": { "codes": ["NL", "DE", "FR", "BE"] },
        "i18n": {
          "en": { "label": "Country",
            "entries": { "NL": "Netherlands", "DE": "Germany", "FR": "France", "BE": "Belgium" } },
          "nl": { "label": "Land",
            "entries": { "NL": "Nederland", "DE": "Duitsland", "FR": "Frankrijk", "BE": "België" } },
          "es": { "label": "País",
            "entries": { "NL": "Países Bajos", "DE": "Alemania", "FR": "Francia", "BE": "Bélgica" } },
          "fr": { "label": "Pays",
            "entries": { "NL": "Pays-Bas", "DE": "Allemagne", "FR": "France", "BE": "Belgique" } }
        }
      }
    }
    // ... remaining 6 entries
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

Notice that the resolved `employment_status` entry carries only the two active codes (`active`, `suspended`) and their localized display strings, the `terminated` code is absent because the set-level `entryCodesSubset` override removed it. The resolved `["residentialAddress", "country"]` entry carries the full ISO 3166-1 picklist shape, including all four locale blocks, resolved from the Address entity in the catalog.

---

## Version Pinning and Narrowing Precedence

Once published, the set's version is frozen. Any channel that references this set via `setRef: { setId, setVersion: 1 }` always resolves the v1 shape regardless of whether the set is later revised and republished at v2.

The override precedence from catalog to set follows the same narrow-only rule as every other layer:

1. **Catalog (L1)**: `valueType`, `overlays.entryCodes`, governance overlays, canonical.
2. **Profile override (L2)**: may tighten `conformance`, `sdPolicy`, `entryCodesSubset`, `sensitive`. The walkthrough profile tightens `email` to `MANDATORY` for the employee role.
3. **Set override (L3)**: may tighten further. The walkthrough set tightens `employment_status` to a two-code subset.
4. **Channel (L4)**: selection and output mapping only, no governance override.

No layer widens what the layer above declares. An attempt to specify an `entryCodesSubset` that adds a code not present in the catalog's `entryCodes.codes` is rejected at write time.

---

## What the Published Set Delivers

With the set published you have a stable, versioned, cross-entity selection that:

- Names exactly which attributes are in scope for the use case, by role and traversal path.
- Carries the full resolved attribute shape (value type, governance overlays, localized labels) derived from the catalog through the profile.
- Applies the final narrow-only tightening (the `employment_status` subset in this walkthrough).
- Is ready to be consumed by one or more channels: a form, a portal page, a PDF document, an API payload, or a verifiable credential, each of which maps these traversal paths to its own output.

The two relationship-traversal paths, `["residentialAddress", "postal_code"]` and `["residentialAddress", "country"]`, make the cross-entity selection concrete. A downstream SD-JWT channel maps `["residentialAddress", "country"]` to the wire claim path `["address", "country"]`; an mdoc channel maps `["residentialAddress", "postal_code"]` to the element `["postal_code"]` and places it under its `namespace`; a form or PDF channel would bind the same paths to a field or a placement. The set is where those traversals are declared once; each channel decides where they land in its output.

## Next Steps

- [Channels (L4)](./credential-definitions): bind this set to two credential formats (SD-JWT and mdoc), declare claim mappings including the `residentialAddress` traversal paths, and create the OID4VCI issuance channel
- [Attribute Profile (L2)](./attribute-profile): review the profile this set is derived from
- [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world): the catalog entities, relationships, and governance that underpin every layer
- [Provenance & Operations](./provenance-and-operations): usage-lineage rows written when a VC channel or DCQL query consumes a set traversal path

---

# Channels (L4)

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Channels (L4)

L4 is the **channel-rendering layer**. It is not only about verifiable credentials: one resolved [attribute set](./attribute-set) can be rendered to many outputs, each authored at `/api/attributes/v1/channels/{channel}`:

- a **form** that captures the attributes,
- a **portal page** that displays them,
- a generated **PDF document**,
- an **API payload** for a downstream system,
- and a **verifiable credential**.

Every channel renders the same governed set, so a form, a PDF, and a credential built from one set stay consistent by construction. Because this is an issuer and verifier walkthrough, the steps here author the **credential** channel (the set-bound VC channel) and the **OID4VCI issuance** channel; the other channels follow the same pattern against the same set.

Everything built at L1 through L3 converges at L4: the [attribute set](./attribute-set) pins a published profile, which pins a published catalog, and a VC channel pins that set. From one set you can derive multiple credential formats, and an issuance channel composes those formats into an issuable offer configuration.

These layers are authored over REST on this page. VDX presents a guided UI for the same layers; the concepts and the resulting model are identical.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-semantic-two-definitions.svg" alt="Two VC channels (Employee SD-JWT and Business Card mdoc) derived from the same attribute set and the same branding: both bind the set traversal entries to their respective wire formats, with claim paths mapping set roleRef+path pairs to SD-JWT claims or mdoc namespace-element pairs." style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## The Set-Bound VC Channel

A VC channel binds exactly one [attribute set](./attribute-set) to one credential format. It is the pivot of the issuance and verification flow: it names the credential's claims, its credential-type identity (`format` + `vct` or `doctype`), and the selective-disclosure posture of each claim.

The channel is **role-neutral by construction**. It does not belong to the issuer or the verifier:

- The **issuer** renders a credential design from the channel and issues it.
- The **verifier** derives a DCQL credential query from the same channel and requests it.

Because both roles derive from the **same** channel, the issued credential and the requested credential are guaranteed to agree on attribute identity, selective-disclosure posture, and credential-type identity, by construction. A verifier can also work from a channel for a credential type it does not issue at all: the verifier is a standalone role that exists independently of any issuer.

The key fields on a VC channel are:

| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `setRef` | `{ setId, setVersion }`. Pins the set version the channel consumes. |
| `credentialFormat` | `dc+sd-jwt` or `mso_mdoc`. |
| `vct` | The SD-JWT VC type URI (for `dc+sd-jwt`). |
| `doctype` | The mdoc doctype string (for `mso_mdoc`). |
| `brandingRef` | `{ brandingId, version }`. References this credential type's L4 branding overlay (its localized display name, description, logo, and colors). |
| `claimMappings` | Array of `{ set: { roleRef, path: [...] }, claimPath?: [...], disclosure }`. `claimPath` is optional and defaults to the set path; provide it only when the wire path differs. |

Each `claimMappings` entry is the **through-line** from the semantic model to the wire form. `set.roleRef` and `set.path` identify the traversal entry in the set; `claimPath` is the corresponding claim path in the credential wire format; `disclosure` is `"ALWAYS"` or `"SELECTIVE"`.

When given, an SD-JWT `claimPath` is the nested JSON location: `["address", "country"]` produces a nested `address.country` claim. For mdoc it is just the element (`["postal_code"]`); the channel's `namespace` field places it, so the namespace is never a path segment. `claimPath` is omitted whenever it equals the set path, and no `claimPath` segment ever contains a dot.

VC channel creates return a **`ChannelEnvelope`**: `{ channelType: "VERIFIABLE_CREDENTIAL", channel: { id, version, ... } }`. The `channelType` discriminator tells you which channel kind it is, and the channel `id` is at `.channel.id`, not at the top level of the response.

## The OID4VCI Issuance Channel

The OID4VCI issuance channel composes one or more VC channels into the **credential configurations** the issuer advertises. It does not reference the set directly; each VC channel already declares its set binding. Each configuration is independent and sets its own signing algorithm, key-binding method, and offer/grant defaults (shown below).

| Field | Meaning |
|---|---|
| `name` | A label for the issuance bundle. |
| `credentialConfigurations` | One entry per composed credential, each independent: `{ credentialConfigurationId, channelRef: { channelId, channelVersion }, signing: { algorithm, keyBinding }, offer: { grants, txCodeRequired, validitySeconds } }`. `signing.algorithm` is e.g. `ES256` or `EdDSA`; `signing.keyBinding` is a DID method (`did:jwk`) or `x5c`. |

An OID4VCI channel create returns a `ChannelEnvelope` with `channelType: "OID4VCI"`. This is the artifact the OID4VCI offer is built against in [Issuing](./issuing).

## Branding: the L4 Presentation Overlay

Branding is a separate L4 artifact that carries visual identity for the credential surface. It is entirely separate from the per-attribute `overlays.i18n` labels in the [catalog](./catalog): attribute labels describe what an attribute means; branding describes how the whole credential looks when rendered on screen.

A branding artifact is the credential's **presentation overlay**. Per language its `locales` carry the credential's display `name` and `description` plus the `logoUri`, `backgroundColor`, and `textColor` for the wallet card, under an optional `layout`. The localized display is authored here, once, and a design never re-states it.

Branding is authored **per credential type** and referenced by each VC channel of that type via `brandingRef`. A credential issued in several formats (the same credential as both SD-JWT and mdoc) shares one branding; two different credential types (Employee, Business Card) each get their own. So this walkthrough creates two branding records.

Because branding is authored before the VC channels that reference it, the publish step comes first.

## Every call on this page

Every write on this page uses the operator's OIDC bearer token and is one of the license-gated enterprise writes. The tenant is resolved from the token's `tenant_id` claim.

```http
Authorization: Bearer <operator access token>
Content-Type: application/json
```

With the unbounded default license the gate passes. See [the license gate](./modeling-your-world#the-license-gate).

## Step 1: Create and Publish Branding (one per credential type)

Each locale's `name` is the credential's display name and `description` its card description; the visual fields (`logoUri`, `backgroundColor`, `textColor`) are the shared theme.

<Tabs groupId="branding">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request (Employee branding)">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/branding
```

```json
{
  "name": "Employee Credential branding",
  "description": "Presentation overlay for the Acme Employee credential, in every format.",
  "layout": "card-default",
  "locales": [
    { "language": "en", "name": "Employee Credential",    "description": "Acme Corp employee identity credential",          "logoUri": "https://acme.example/logo.png", "backgroundColor": "#1A237E", "textColor": "#FFFFFF" },
    { "language": "nl", "name": "Medewerkerscredential",  "description": "Acme Corp medewerkers identiteitscredential",      "logoUri": "https://acme.example/logo.png", "backgroundColor": "#1A237E", "textColor": "#FFFFFF" },
    { "language": "es", "name": "Credencial de empleado", "description": "Credencial de identidad de empleado de Acme Corp", "logoUri": "https://acme.example/logo.png", "backgroundColor": "#1A237E", "textColor": "#FFFFFF" },
    { "language": "fr", "name": "Attestation d'employé",  "description": "Attestation d'identité d'employé d'Acme Corp",     "logoUri": "https://acme.example/logo.png", "backgroundColor": "#1A237E", "textColor": "#FFFFFF" }
  ]
}
```

Create a second branding for the Business Card the same way, with its own display names (`Business Card` / `Visitekaartje` / `Tarjeta de visita` / `Carte de visite`) and descriptions.

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response (create + publish)">

`201 Created` returns the bare `CredentialBranding` (`status: "DRAFT"`, `version: 1`). Capture `.id` and `.version` of each branding.

```jsonc
{
  "id": "b1f2...employeeBrandingId",
  "name": "Employee Credential branding",
  "version": 1,
  "status": "DRAFT"
}
```

Publish each one:

```http
PUT /api/attributes/v1/branding/{brandingId}/status
```

```json
{ "status": "PUBLISHED" }
```

`200 OK` returns the branding with `status: "PUBLISHED"`. Each VC channel references its own branding via `brandingRef` (Employee branding for the SD-JWT channel, Business Card branding for the mdoc channel).

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Step 2: Create the Employee SD-JWT VC Channel

The Employee SD-JWT channel binds the published set to the `dc+sd-jwt` format. It declares 8 claim mappings covering identity, employment status, email, a relationship-traversal address path, and employer name.

Each claim mapping selects a `set` attribute (`roleRef` plus its path) and places it on the wire. `claimPath` is **optional**: omit it and the wire path defaults to the set path, which is why the identity claims below carry no `claimPath` at all. Give a `claimPath` only when the wire path must differ, to **rename** a claim (the employer's `legal_name` surfacing as `employer`) or **re-nest** it (the traversal `["residentialAddress", "country"]` landing under `["address", "country"]`). Every path is an **array of clean segments**; no segment ever contains a dot.

Format-specific structure never goes in the path either. An mdoc element must sit under a namespace, but that namespace is an explicit **field on the mdoc channel** (`namespace`), not a path segment; the renderer combines it with the element at issuance.

So the through-line to watch: the set traversal path `["residentialAddress", "country"]` maps to the wire claim path `["address", "country"]`. The set reaches the value across the relationship boundary; the VC channel decides where it lands on the credential.

<Tabs groupId="def-sdjwt">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/channels/credentials
```

```json
{
  "name": "Acme Employee - SD-JWT",
  "setRef": { "setId": "7c4d...setId", "setVersion": 1 },
  "credentialFormat": "dc+sd-jwt",
  "vct": "https://issuer.acme.example/employee",
  "brandingRef": { "brandingId": "b1f2...employeeBrandingId", "version": 1 },
  "claimMappings": [
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["given_name"] },        "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["family_name"] },       "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["employee_id"] },       "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["job_title"] },         "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["employment_status"] }, "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["email"] },             "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["residentialAddress", "country"] }, "claimPath": ["address", "country"], "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employer", "path": ["legal_name"] },        "claimPath": ["employer"], "disclosure": "ALWAYS" }
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response (ChannelEnvelope)">

`201 Created` returns a `ChannelEnvelope`. Read `channelType` (always `"VERIFIABLE_CREDENTIAL"` for this endpoint) and capture `channel.id` and `channel.version`.

```jsonc
{
  "channelType": "VERIFIABLE_CREDENTIAL",
  "channel": {
    "id": "9f10...sdjwtChannelId",
    "version": 1,
    "name": "Acme Employee - SD-JWT",
    "credentialFormat": "dc+sd-jwt",
    "vct": "https://issuer.acme.example/employee"
  }
}
```

The id is at `.channel.id`, not at the top level of the envelope.

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Step 3: Create the Business Card mdoc VC Channel

The Business Card mdoc channel binds the **same** set and the **same** branding to the `mso_mdoc` format. Because both channels share the same `setRef`, `given_name` means exactly the same thing in both credentials.

mdoc places every element under a namespace. That namespace is declared once as the channel's `namespace` field (an opaque mdoc identifier, here `org.acme.businesscard.1`), never inside a path. The direct elements below omit `claimPath` (it defaults to the set path); only the relationship traversal needs one, to reduce `["residentialAddress", "postal_code"]` to the element `["postal_code"]`. The renderer combines the channel `namespace` with each element at issuance.

The second through-line: the set traversal path `["residentialAddress", "postal_code"]` crosses the `residentialAddress` relationship from Person to Address and maps to the mdoc claim path `["postal_code"]`, which the channel namespaces under `org.acme.businesscard.1`.

<Tabs groupId="def-mdoc">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/channels/credentials
```

```json
{
  "name": "Acme Business Card - mdoc",
  "setRef": { "setId": "7c4d...setId", "setVersion": 1 },
  "credentialFormat": "mso_mdoc",
  "doctype": "org.acme.businesscard.1",
  "namespace": "org.acme.businesscard.1",
  "brandingRef": { "brandingId": "b3c4...businessCardBrandingId", "version": 1 },
  "claimMappings": [
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["given_name"] },  "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["family_name"] }, "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["job_title"] },   "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["email"] },       "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "set": { "roleRef": "employee", "path": ["residentialAddress", "postal_code"] }, "claimPath": ["postal_code"], "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" }
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response (ChannelEnvelope)">

`201 Created` returns a `ChannelEnvelope`. Capture `channel.id` and `channel.version`.

```jsonc
{
  "channelType": "VERIFIABLE_CREDENTIAL",
  "channel": {
    "id": "a3b4...mdocChannelId",
    "version": 1,
    "name": "Acme Business Card - mdoc",
    "credentialFormat": "mso_mdoc",
    "doctype": "org.acme.businesscard.1"
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## Step 4: Create the OID4VCI Issuance Channel

The OID4VCI issuance channel composes the VC channels into **credential configurations** the issuer advertises in `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` and that offers reference. It carries no `setRef`; each VC channel already declares its set binding.

Each credential configuration is **independent**. It picks its VC channel, its `credentialConfigurationId`, its signing `algorithm` (for example `ES256`, or `EdDSA` for Ed25519) and key-binding method (a DID such as `did:jwk`, or an X.509 chain via `x5c`), and its own `offer` defaults (grant types, `tx_code`, validity). So one issuance channel can mix pre-authorized and authorization-code credentials, ES256 and Ed25519 keys, and DID-bound and x5c-bound credentials. Here it exposes `EmployeeCredential` (SD-JWT, ES256, DID, authorization code) and `BusinessCardMdoc` (mdoc, Ed25519, x5c, pre-authorized), the two ids the offers use in [Issuing](./issuing).

<Tabs groupId="oid4vci-def">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/attributes/v1/channels/oid4vci
```

```json
{
  "name": "Acme Employee + Business Card issuance",
  "credentialConfigurations": [
    {
      "credentialConfigurationId": "EmployeeCredential",
      "channelRef": { "channelId": "9f10...sdjwtChannelId", "channelVersion": 1 },
      "signing": { "algorithm": "ES256", "keyBinding": "did:jwk" },
      "offer": { "grants": ["authorization_code"], "txCodeRequired": false, "validitySeconds": 600 }
    },
    {
      "credentialConfigurationId": "BusinessCardMdoc",
      "channelRef": { "channelId": "a3b4...mdocChannelId", "channelVersion": 1 },
      "signing": { "algorithm": "EdDSA", "keyBinding": "x5c" },
      "offer": { "grants": ["pre-authorized_code"], "txCodeRequired": true, "validitySeconds": 300 }
    }
  ]
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response (ChannelEnvelope)">

`201 Created` returns a `ChannelEnvelope` with `channelType: "OID4VCI"`. Capture `channel.id`.

```jsonc
{
  "channelType": "OID4VCI",
  "channel": {
    "id": "c5d6...oid4vciChannelId",
    "name": "Acme Employee + Business Card issuance",
    "credentialConfigurations": [
      { "credentialConfigurationId": "EmployeeCredential", "signing": { "algorithm": "ES256", "keyBinding": "did:jwk" } },
      { "credentialConfigurationId": "BusinessCardMdoc",  "signing": { "algorithm": "EdDSA", "keyBinding": "x5c" } }
    ]
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

The claim structure, selective-disclosure policy, and credential-type identity come from the referenced VC channels. The issuance channel adds, **per credential configuration**, the signing algorithm, the key-binding method, and the offer defaults, which is what the issuer advertises and what each credential offer references in [Issuing](./issuing).

## Listing Channels (the Paged Envelope)

The `/api/attributes/v1/channels` endpoint lists all channels across channels. You can narrow by `channel` (`VERIFIABLE_CREDENTIAL` or `OID4VCI`) and by `setId`.

<Tabs groupId="list-definitions">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
GET /api/attributes/v1/channels?limit=10&offset=0
```

Filter to VC channels only:

```http
GET /api/attributes/v1/channels?channel=VERIFIABLE_CREDENTIAL&limit=10
```

Filter by the set they consume:

```http
GET /api/attributes/v1/channels?setId=7c4d...setId&limit=10
```

The `/api/attributes/v1/branding` endpoint accepts `nameContains` and `status` filters:

```http
GET /api/attributes/v1/branding?status=PUBLISHED&limit=10
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response (paged envelope)">

`200 OK`. The body is always the `{ data, pagination }` envelope. Read the page from `.data` (never a bare top-level array) and the counts from `.pagination`.

For channels, `.data` is an array of `ChannelEnvelope` items; read each concrete channel at `.data[].channel`.

```jsonc
{
  "data": [
    {
      "channelType": "VERIFIABLE_CREDENTIAL",
      "channel": {
        "id": "9f10...sdjwtChannelId",
        "version": 1,
        "name": "Acme Employee - SD-JWT",
        "credentialFormat": "dc+sd-jwt",
        "vct": "https://issuer.acme.example/employee"
      }
    },
    {
      "channelType": "VERIFIABLE_CREDENTIAL",
      "channel": {
        "id": "a3b4...mdocChannelId",
        "version": 1,
        "name": "Acme Business Card - mdoc",
        "credentialFormat": "mso_mdoc",
        "doctype": "org.acme.businesscard.1"
      }
    }
  ],
  "pagination": {
    "limit": 10,
    "offset": 0,
    "page": 0,
    "size": 2,
    "total": 2,
    "totalPages": 1,
    "hasMore": false
  }
}
```

See [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world#pagination) for the full pagination parameter reference.

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

## What You Have Now

One attribute set now has two VC channels bound to it, each in a different credential format, sharing the same branding. The same canonical attributes underpin both credentials: `given_name` means exactly the same thing on the Employee SD-JWT and on the Business Card mdoc because both channels trace back to the same Person entity in the same [catalog](./catalog), selected by the same [set](./attribute-set).

An OID4VCI issuance channel composes both into an issuable configuration. The issuer and verifier both derive from these same two VC channels, so their credential shapes agree by construction without any out-of-band coordination.

## Next Steps

- [Issuing](./issuing): render the two issuer designs from the VC channels and create the credential offer
- [Verifying](./verifying): author a multi-credential DCQL from the same two channels
- [Attribute Set (L3)](./attribute-set): the role-scoped traversal subselection that L4 channels consume
- [Modeling Your World](./modeling-your-world): the layer rules and governance model behind these calls

---

# Issuing

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Issuing

With the two VC channels in place ([Channels](./credential-definitions)), the issuer now renders a credential design from each one and offers them to a wallet. The central idea on this page: in the enterprise model, **the design is derived from the VC channel, not authored beside it**. You supply only what the channel does not carry: an optional alias, the hosting mode, and a reference back to the channel. There is no `claims[]` array, no `bindings[]` array, and no `displays` in the request; the converter reads the channel's `claimMappings`, traverses the set selection and the profile roles, and takes the localized display (name, description, logo, colors) from the channel's branding.

| Method | Path | Description |
|---|---|---|
| POST | `/api/v1/designs/credentials/fromchannel` | Render a credential design from a set-bound VC channel |
| POST | `/oid4vci/backend/credential/offers` | Create a credential offer for one or more configurations |

All calls use the operator's OIDC bearer token. The design-from-channel render is a **license-gated** enterprise write (it derives, persists, and records lineage); offer creation is a standard issuer backend call.

## Rendering a Design From a VC Channel

The converter derives the claim list, selective-disclosure policy, ordering, credential-type identity, and the localized display directly from the VC channel you created in [Channels](./credential-definitions) (the display comes from the channel's `brandingRef`). The request body carries only what the channel does not already encode: an optional `alias`, the `hostingMode`, and a `channelRef` pointing at the VC channel by id and version.

The converter reads the channel's `claimMappings` (each entry linking a set traversal path to a wire claim path with a disclosure policy), resolves those paths through the set, the profile roles, and the catalog entities, and emits:

- the design claim list, with selective-disclosure policy and ordering flowing from the `claimMappings` and catalog governance metadata, and
- the credential-type identity (`format`, `vct` for SD-JWT, or `doctype` for mdoc) taken directly from the VC channel.

It also writes one ISSUE-role usage-lineage row for each consumed traversal path. See [Provenance and Operations](./provenance-and-operations#usage-lineage).

### Render the Employee SD-JWT design

<Tabs groupId="design-emp">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/v1/designs/credentials/fromchannel
```

```json
{
  "channelRef": {
    "channelId": "11aa...employeeSdjwtChannelId",
    "channelVersion": 1
  },
  "alias": "Employee Credential",
  "hostingMode": "LOCAL"
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`201 Created`. Returns the derived design and its provenance. Capture the design id.

```jsonc
{
  "designId": "d100...employeeDesignId",
  "credentialConfigurationId": "EmployeeCredential",
  "format": "dc+sd-jwt",
  "vct": "https://issuer.acme.example/employee",
  "claims": [
    // DERIVED from the VC channel's claimMappings -- not supplied in the request.
    // Each entry's path, disclosure policy, and ordering come from the claimMappings
    // and the catalog governance metadata traversed through the set + profile.
    { "path": ["given_name"],         "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "path": ["family_name"],        "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "path": ["employee_id"],        "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "path": ["job_title"],          "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "path": ["employment_status"],  "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "path": ["email"],              "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "path": ["address", "country"], "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "path": ["employer"],           "disclosure": "ALWAYS" }
  ],
  "provenance": {
    "role": "ISSUE",
    "channelId": "11aa...employeeSdjwtChannelId",
    "channelVersion": 1
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

#### Request fields

| Field | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `channelRef` | yes | Object with `channelId` and `channelVersion` pointing at the set-bound VC channel. |
| `alias` | no | A short internal label for the design. |
| `hostingMode` | yes | `LOCAL` for a self-hosted design in this walkthrough. |

:::note No claims and no display in the request
The absence of a `claims[]` array and a `displays` array is intentional. The claim list, selective-disclosure policy, ordering, and credential-type identity are derived from the VC channel and the catalog; the localized wallet display (name, description, logo, colors) comes from the channel's `brandingRef`. This is what keeps the issuer and verifier in agreement, and the display consistent across formats: all of it is authored on the model, not on the design.
:::

The eight derived claims reflect the Employee SD-JWT VC channel's `claimMappings`. Note that `address.country` is a two-segment path derived from the set traversal `["residentialAddress","country"]` (crossing the catalog's `residentialAddress` relationship from Employee to Address), and `employer` is derived from `["legal_name"]` on the employer role.

### Render the Business Card mdoc design

<Tabs groupId="design-bc">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/v1/designs/credentials/fromchannel
```

```json
{
  "channelRef": {
    "channelId": "22bb...businessCardMdocChannelId",
    "channelVersion": 1
  },
  "alias": "Business Card",
  "hostingMode": "LOCAL"
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`201 Created`. The mdoc design derives the `mso_mdoc` format, the `doctype`, and the `namespace` from the VC channel, and lists the bare elements that the namespace places at issuance. Capture the design id.

```jsonc
{
  "designId": "d200...businessCardDesignId",
  "credentialConfigurationId": "BusinessCardMdoc",
  "format": "mso_mdoc",
  "doctype": "org.acme.businesscard.1",
  "namespace": "org.acme.businesscard.1",
  "claims": [
    // Each path is the bare element; the design's namespace places them at issuance.
    { "path": ["given_name"],  "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "path": ["family_name"], "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "path": ["job_title"],   "disclosure": "ALWAYS" },
    { "path": ["email"],       "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" },
    { "path": ["postal_code"], "disclosure": "SELECTIVE" }
  ],
  "provenance": {
    "role": "ISSUE",
    "channelId": "22bb...businessCardMdocChannelId",
    "channelVersion": 1
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

The five mdoc claims come from the Business Card VC channel's `claimMappings`. `postal_code` is derived from the set traversal `["residentialAddress","postal_code"]`, crossing the same `residentialAddress` relationship used by the SD-JWT design. Selective disclosure in mdoc is handled by the namespace and element structure at issuance, so the converter emits the mdoc-appropriate policy rather than SD-JWT disclosures.

Both designs trace back to the same Acme Employee set and profile, and each binds a distinct `credentialConfigurationId` (`EmployeeCredential`, `BusinessCardMdoc`) that the issuer advertises in `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` via the OID4VCI issuance channel created in the previous step.

## Creating the Offers

A credential offer invites a wallet to obtain a credential. Create **one offer per credential configuration**: a wallet obtains a single credential per offer, so the Employee credential and the Business Card are offered separately. **Each offer uses the grant its credential configuration declared**: the Employee credential via authorization code (the wallet authenticates as the employee first), the Business Card via a pre-authorized code (the offer carries the code, no interactive login).

The `credential_configuration_ids` used below (`EmployeeCredential`, `BusinessCardMdoc`) are the ids the OID4VCI issuance channel assigned to each composed credential in [Channels (L4)](./credential-definitions#the-oid4vci-issuance-channel); the issuer advertises them in `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer`, and each design above carries its id as `credentialConfigurationId`.

### Offer the Employee credential

<Tabs groupId="offer-employee">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /oid4vci/backend/credential/offers
```

```json
{
  "credential_configuration_ids": ["EmployeeCredential"],
  "issuer_id": "http://acme.localhost:8088",
  "grants": { "authorization_code": {} },
  "ttl_seconds": 600
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`201 Created`.

```json
{
  "correlation_id": "0d5cfd20-342a-4ff0-af78-17be9cacd775",
  "offer_uri": "openid-credential-offer://?credential_offer_uri=http%3A%2F%2Facme.localhost%3A8088%2Fcredentials%2Foffers%2F..."
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Offer the Business Card credential

The Business Card offer targets the other configuration. Its OID4VCI channel declared a **pre-authorized** grant, so this offer carries a pre-authorized code rather than requiring an interactive login:

```json
{
  "credential_configuration_ids": ["BusinessCardMdoc"],
  "issuer_id": "http://acme.localhost:8088",
  "grants": { "pre_authorized_code": { "tx_code_required": true } },
  "ttl_seconds": 600
}
```

Each offer returns its own `correlation_id` and `offer_uri`.

#### Request fields

| Field | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `credential_configuration_ids[]` | yes | The configuration this offer is for. Create one offer per credential; an offer carries a single credential. |
| `issuer_id` | yes | The OID4VCI issuer identifier. |
| `grants` | yes | The grant for this offer, matching the credential configuration: `{ "authorization_code": {} }` (the wallet authenticates first) or `{ "pre_authorized_code": { "tx_code_required": true } }` (the offer carries a pre-authorized code). |
| `ttl_seconds` | no | Offer lifetime in seconds. |

The `offer_uri` is the OID4VCI offer deeplink. It can be rendered as a QR code, a link, an NFC tag, or a deeplink; the rendering is a presentation choice and does not change the offer.

:::tip Static offers
For a "one URL, many holders" scenario, the offer create accepts a `uriLifecycle` of `SINGLE_USE` (default) or `REUSABLE_FRESH_PER_FETCH`. See the [OpenID4VCI REST API](/edk/guides/oid4vci/rest-api#create-credential-offer-compact) for the compact offer endpoint and its options.
:::

## How Issuance Proceeds

The wallet drives the rest of the flow over the OpenID4VCI protocol. The protocol legs themselves are unchanged from the standard issuer and are documented in the [OpenID4VCI guide](/edk/guides/oid4vci/overview). In summary, the wallet:

1. Fetches `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` and `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`.
2. Runs the authorization-code and PKCE login as the employee.
3. Exchanges the code at `/token` for an access token.
4. Generates an ephemeral holder key and requests a `c_nonce` from `/oid4vci/nonce`.
5. Builds a JWT proof of possession over the issuer id and `c_nonce` with the holder key.
6. Requests the credential at `/oid4vci/credential` (carrying the proof) and receives the signed credential.

Those six legs are the **authorization-code** flow, which the Employee credential uses. The Business Card credential is configured **pre-authorized**: the wallet skips the login (steps 2 and 3), takes the pre-authorized code from the offer, exchanges it at `/token` (entering the `tx_code` if required), then continues from the nonce and proof steps.

The holder obtains each credential from its own offer. The issued SD-JWT carries the selected attributes as selective-disclosure entries, its `iss` and `kid` identify the issuer key, and its holder binding (`cnf.jwk`) is the wallet's ephemeral public key. The mdoc is signed with an X.509 `x5chain` (a CA-signed leaf), and the issuer binds the wallet's device public key into the mdoc MSO. Both credentials are then presented together in [Verifying](./verifying).

The claim shape each credential carries is exactly the shape the design derived from the VC channel, which is the same shape the verifier will request in [Verifying](./verifying) because the verifier's DCQL query derives from the same VC channels.

:::note See also
The designs rendered here derive from the **set-bound VC channels** created in [Channels](./credential-definitions). The OID4VCI issuance channel created in that same step composes both VC channels and is what the issuer uses to advertise the `EmployeeCredential` and `BusinessCardMdoc` configuration ids.
:::

## Next Steps

- [Verifying](./verifying): author a multi-credential DCQL from the same channels, request a presentation, and read the verified data
- [Provenance and Operations](./provenance-and-operations): the ISSUE-role lineage rows this render wrote, and governance flow-through
- [OpenID4VCI](/edk/guides/oid4vci/overview): the full issuer protocol and the attribute pipeline

---

# Verifying

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Verifying

The verifier is a standalone role: it exists and works without any issuer, and it shares only the role-neutral VC channels and the public trust path. What makes the layered model powerful here is that the verifier derives its DCQL query from the **same** set-bound VC channels the issuer used. Because both sides bind to the same channels, the issued credential and the requested credential agree on attribute identity by construction; there is no independently hand-typed claim path to drift.

A single DCQL query spans multiple credentials, one credential query per VC channel. This walkthrough authors one DCQL that references **both** channels: the Employee SD-JWT and the Business Card mdoc.

| Method | Path | Description |
|---|---|---|
| POST | `/api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/preview` | Derive a DCQL from channels without persisting (ungated) |
| POST | `/api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/authored` | Derive, persist, and record REQUEST-role lineage (license-gated) |
| POST | `/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests` | Create an OpenID4VP auth request referencing an authored query |
| GET | `/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/{correlationId}` | Poll presentation status and read verified data |

The authoring and backend calls use the operator's OIDC bearer token; the verifier validates that cross-service token (issued by the tenant's AS) and resolves the tenant from its `tenant_id` claim. The wallet-facing endpoints (`/oid4vp/request-uri/...`, `/oid4vp/auth/...`) are anonymous.

## DCQL Spans Multiple Credentials

DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) lets one query ask for several credentials and the specific claims to disclose from each. In the layered model, each credential query in the DCQL is derived from one VC channel: channel to credential query is one-to-one, and the DCQL collects them. Referencing two channels yields a two-credential DCQL. For the conceptual converter details, see [DCQL Authoring](/edk/guides/oid4vp/dcql-authoring).

## Preview the Derived DCQL

`preview` derives and returns the query but persists nothing and records no lineage, so it is **not** license-gated. Use it to see the derived shape before committing.

<Tabs groupId="dcql-preview">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/preview
```

```json
{
  "channelRefs": [
    { "channelId": "11aa...employeeChannelId", "channelVersion": 1 },
    { "channelId": "22bb...businessCardChannelId", "channelVersion": 1 }
  ],
  "intentToRetain": false
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK`. Returns `dcqlQuery` with one credential query per channel (here, two).

```jsonc
{
  "dcqlQuery": {
    "credentials": [
      {
        "id": "EmployeeCredential",
        "format": "dc+sd-jwt",
        "meta": { "vct_values": ["https://issuer.acme.example/employee"] },
        "claims": [
          { "path": ["given_name"] },
          { "path": ["family_name"] },
          { "path": ["employee_id"] },
          { "path": ["job_title"] },
          { "path": ["employment_status"] },
          { "path": ["email"] },
          { "path": ["address", "country"] },
          { "path": ["employer"] }
        ]
      },
      {
        "id": "BusinessCardMdoc",
        "format": "mso_mdoc",
        "meta": { "doctype_value": "org.acme.businesscard.1" },
        "claims": [
          { "path": ["org.acme.businesscard.1", "given_name"] },
          { "path": ["org.acme.businesscard.1", "family_name"] },
          { "path": ["org.acme.businesscard.1", "job_title"] },
          { "path": ["org.acme.businesscard.1", "email"] },
          { "path": ["org.acme.businesscard.1", "postal_code"] }
        ]
      }
    ]
  },
  "warnings": []
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

The SD-JWT credential query carries eight claims. The through-line from the set to the wire shape is visible: the set traversal `["residentialAddress","country"]` maps to the VC channel's `claimPath ["address","country"]`, which is the path the DCQL emits. The mdoc query is **generated**, not authored: OpenID4VP addresses every mdoc claim as `[namespace, element]`, so the converter pairs each element with the channel's `namespace` (here `org.acme.businesscard.1`). You never type a namespaced path anywhere; the verifier derives it from the channel.

## Author and Persist the DCQL

`authored` derives the same query, persists it to the versioned DCQL store under `queryId`, and records REQUEST-role usage-lineage rows for every consumed attribute path. It is **license-gated**.

<Tabs groupId="dcql-author">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/authored
```

```json
{
  "queryId": "acme-employee-businesscard-1779392600",
  "name": "Acme Employee + Business Card",
  "channelRefs": [
    { "channelId": "11aa...employeeChannelId", "channelVersion": 1 },
    { "channelId": "22bb...businessCardChannelId", "channelVersion": 1 }
  ],
  "intentToRetain": false
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK`. Capture `queryId` and `version`.

```jsonc
{
  "queryId": "acme-employee-businesscard-1779392600",
  "version": 1,
  "dcqlQuery": { "credentials": [ /* the same 2 credential queries as preview */ ] }
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

#### Request fields

| Field | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `queryId` | yes (authored) | The id the persisted, versioned query is stored under. |
| `name` | no | Human-readable name. |
| `channelRefs[]` | yes | Array of `{ channelId, channelVersion }` objects. One credential query is derived per channel; two here. |
| `intentToRetain` | no | Stamped on every derived claim query when `true`. |

:::note Preview vs authored
`preview` is the read-shaped, ungated derivation; `authored` is the gated write that persists a versioned query and records lineage. The two derive the identical DCQL; the difference is persistence and lineage.
:::

## Create the OpenID4VP Auth Request

Reference the authored `query_id` rather than inlining a query, so the presentation request and the authored, version-pinned query stay in lockstep.

<Tabs groupId="auth-request">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
POST /oid4vp/backend/auth/requests
```

```json
{
  "query_id": "acme-employee-businesscard-1779392600",
  "client_id": "https://verifier.acme.example",
  "response_uri": "http://acme.localhost:8082/oid4vp/auth/response"
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

`200 OK`.

```json
{
  "correlation_id": "BQp4oCijJdJ9oq7X7TWa9Q",
  "request_uri": "openid4vp://?client_id=decentralized_identifier%3Adid%3Ajwk%3A...&request_uri=http%3A%2F%2Facme.localhost%3A8082%2Foid4vp%2Frequest-uri%2FBQp4oCijJdJ9oq7X7TWa9Q&state=BQp4oCijJdJ9oq7X7TWa9Q"
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

#### Request fields

| Field | Required | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| `query_id` | yes | The authored DCQL query to use (version-pinned by the store). |
| `client_id` | yes | The verifier's client identifier (its audience). |
| `response_uri` | yes | Where the wallet posts the presentation (`direct_post`). |

The response carries a `correlation_id` to use when polling, and a `request_uri` that is an `openid4vp://` deeplink. Its inner `request_uri` points to the signed request object (a JAR). The wallet dereferences it, verifies the signature, and reads the `nonce`, `client_id` (audience), and `response_uri` that bind the presentation.

## The Wallet Presents

The wallet selects the disclosures the DCQL asks for, builds a key-binding JWT with the holder key (proving possession of the credential's `cnf.jwk`), and submits via `direct_post` to the verifier's `response_uri`. The KB-JWT's audience is the verifier's `client_id`, its `nonce` is the verifier's nonce, and its key matches the credential's holder binding exactly. This is standard OpenID4VP; see the [OpenID4VP guide](/edk/guides/oid4vp/overview).

## Poll Status and Read Verified Data

<Tabs groupId="status-poll">
  <TabItem value="request" label="Request">

```http
GET /oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/BQp4oCijJdJ9oq7X7TWa9Q
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="response" label="Response">

The status lifecycle runs `created` then `request_retrieved` then `authorization_response_verified`. On success the response carries `verified_data` with the verified claims:

```jsonc
{
  "correlation_id": "BQp4oCijJdJ9oq7X7TWa9Q",
  "status": "authorization_response_verified",
  "verified_data": {
    "credential_claims": [
      {
        "id": "EmployeeCredential",
        "type": "dc+sd-jwt",
        "claims": {
          "given_name": "Anneke",
          "family_name": "De Vries",
          "email": "employee@acme.example",
          "job_title": "Senior Engineer"
        },
        "presentation": "eyJ0eXAiOiJkYytzZC1qd3QiLCJraWQiOiJkaWQ6andr...<SD-JWT + disclosures + KB-JWT>"
      },
      {
        "id": "BusinessCardMdoc",
        "type": "mso_mdoc",
        "claims": {
          "org.acme.businesscard.1.given_name": "Anneke",
          "org.acme.businesscard.1.postal_code": "1011 AB"
        }
      }
    ]
  }
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

The SD-JWT claims surface as plain keys (`given_name`, `family_name`, `email`, `job_title`). The mdoc's disclosed data elements surface under the namespace-qualified key `<namespace>.<elementIdentifier>` (here `org.acme.businesscard.1.<element>`), mirroring the two-segment mdoc DCQL `claims[].path` array.

Before recording `authorization_response_verified`, the verifier validates the full chain for each credential: for the SD-JWT, the issuer signature, disclosure integrity (each presented disclosure hashes to a selective-disclosure entry), holder binding (KB-JWT signed by the credential's holder key), audience (KB-JWT audience equals the verifier `client_id`), and nonce and replay (KB-JWT nonce equals the issued nonce); for the mdoc, the `DeviceResponse` CBOR decode, `DeviceAuth` (COSE_Sign1) verification over the reconstructed OpenID4VP `SessionTranscript`, and the `x5chain` trust path. Then the DCQL match.

:::note Agree by construction
The DCQL derives from the same two VC channels the issuer rendered its designs from (see [Channels](./credential-definitions)). The set-bound VC channel is the single artifact both roles share, so the issued credential shape and the requested credential shape agree without any manual coordination.
:::

## Next Steps

- [Provenance & Operations](./provenance-and-operations): the REQUEST-role lineage this authored query wrote, governance flow-through, versioning in practice, and the current API limits
- [DCQL Authoring](/edk/guides/oid4vp/dcql-authoring): the semantic-to-DCQL converter behind these endpoints
- [OpenID4VP](/edk/guides/oid4vp/overview): the verifier protocol, the versioned DCQL store, and verifier bindings

---

# Owner Activation

# Owner Activation

Registering a tenant creates an owner bootstrap and mints a one-time owner invitation token, but the owner account is not yet usable. The owner activates it by redeeming that token and setting a credential. This is the last step that turns a registered tenant into a tenant whose owner can sign in.

## The Invitation Token

The owner invitation token is minted server-side as part of tenant registration. It is delivered out of band:

- **Admin invite by email**: the EDK hands the token to the `enterprise-email-service` server-side, which sends the owner an activation email containing the redemption link.
- **Admin direct creation without email**: the operator hands the token to the owner through an out-of-band channel.

The token is never returned in any API response. Browser-visible responses redact it, and it is never stored in browser storage. The redemption endpoint and the credential are both write-only.

## Redeeming the Invitation

The owner completes activation with `POST /owner/redeem` (`redeemOwnerInvitation`), submitting the one-time token plus the new credential they want to set. This endpoint is public and unauthenticated (`security: []`), because the owner has no account yet. The token itself is the proof of authorisation: it is one-time, scoped to a single owner bootstrap, and consumed on first successful redemption. On success the response identifies the activated owner and the tenant they own. The request and response schemas are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

After redemption the owner account is active. The owner signs in through the tenant's authorization server and proceeds to configure the tenant's identity provider. See [Tenant Federation](./federation).

## Failure Modes

- An unknown, already-redeemed, or expired token returns a `404`.
- A malformed request (missing token or credential, or a credential that fails the deployment's credential policy) returns the `{error}` validation envelope with `400`.

Because the token is one-time, a second redemption attempt with the same token fails. If an owner never received or lost the invitation, the operator reissues it through the admin invite flow rather than re-exposing the original token.

---

# Configuration System Overview

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# EDK Configuration System Overview

The Enterprise Development Kit (EDK) extends the IDK core configuration system with cloud providers, database persistence, and offline caching capabilities for enterprise deployments.

## Key Concept: Just Add the Dependency

EDK configuration providers use **auto-registration**. When you add a provider module to your classpath, it automatically integrates with the `ConfigService`. Your application code just calls:

```kotlin
val apiUrl = configService.getProperty("api.base.url", String::class)
```

The system figures out where to get the value - environment variables, Azure App Configuration, database, or property files.

## Architecture

<img src="/img/diagrams/config-architecture.svg" alt="Configuration System Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Auto-Registration

Providers register themselves automatically when:
1. Their module is on the classpath
2. Required configuration is provided (e.g., connection strings)
3. They're not explicitly disabled

### How It Works

When your application starts, the `PropertySourceBootstrap` service:

1. **Discovers** all `PropertySourceContribution` implementations via dependency injection
2. **Checks** if each provider is enabled (configuration flag + required config)
3. **Registers** enabled providers with the appropriate `ConfigService`
4. **Initializes** providers that need async setup (cloud providers)

### Enabling a Provider

Simply add the dependency and provide connection details:

<Tabs>
    <TabItem value="azure" label="Azure App Config">

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-conf-azure-app-config:$version")
}
```

```bash title="Environment Variables"
# Azure auto-enables when connection details are provided
export AZURE_APPCONFIG_CONNECTION_STRING="Endpoint=https://myapp.azconfig.io;..."

# Or use endpoint with managed identity
export AZURE_APPCONFIG_ENDPOINT="https://myapp.azconfig.io"
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="rest" label="REST Config">

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-conf-config-rest-client:$version")
}
```

```bash title="Environment Variables"
export REST_CONFIG_BASE_URL="https://config.example.com"
export REST_CONFIG_TENANT_ID="my-tenant"
export REST_CONFIG_AUTH_API_KEY="my-api-key"
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="db" label="Database (VDX)">

```kotlin title="build.gradle.kts"
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.vdx:vdx-conf-settings-persistence-postgresql:$version")
}
```

Database providers auto-register when database connection is configured.

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Disabling a Provider

Disable any provider via configuration:

```bash
# Disable Azure provider
export CONFIG_PROVIDERS_AZURE_APP_CONFIG_ENABLED=false

# Disable REST provider
export CONFIG_PROVIDERS_REST_CONFIG_ENABLED=false

# Disable PostgreSQL database provider
export CONFIG_PROVIDERS_POSTGRESQL_DB_ENABLED=false
```

Or in properties:

```properties
config.providers.azure-app-config.enabled=false
config.providers.rest-config.enabled=false
config.providers.postgresql-db.enabled=false
```

## Provider IDs

Each provider has a unique ID for configuration:

| Provider | Provider ID | Module |
|----------|-------------|--------|
| Azure App Configuration | `azure-app-config` | `lib-conf-azure-app-config` |
| REST Config Client | `rest-config` | `lib-conf-config-rest-client` |
| PostgreSQL Database | `postgresql-db` | `vdx-conf-settings-persistence-postgresql` |
| MySQL Database | `mysql-db` | `vdx-conf-settings-persistence-mysql` |
| SQLite Database | `sqlite-db` | `vdx-conf-settings-persistence-sqlite` |

## Module Summary

### Cloud Configuration Providers

| Module | Description | Platform | Priority |
|--------|-------------|----------|----------|
| `config-rest-client` | REST API client for remote configuration servers | Multiplatform | High |
| `azure-app-config` | Azure App Configuration integration | JVM | High |

### Database Providers (VDX)

| Module | Description | Platform | Priority |
|--------|-------------|----------|----------|
| `vdx-conf-settings-persistence-postgresql` | PostgreSQL settings storage | JVM | Medium |
| `vdx-conf-settings-persistence-mysql` | MySQL settings storage | JVM | Medium |
| `vdx-conf-settings-persistence-sqlite` | SQLite settings storage | JVM | Medium |

### Caching

| Module | Description | Platform |
|--------|-------------|----------|
| `config-offline-cache` | Offline-capable configuration caching | Multiplatform |

## Priority Order

When the same key exists in multiple providers:

| Priority | Provider Type | Example |
|----------|--------------|---------|
| 1 (Highest) | Environment Variables | `API_URL=...` |
| 2 | System Properties | `-Dapi.url=...` |
| 3 | Cloud Providers | Azure, REST |
| 4 | Database Providers | PostgreSQL, MySQL |
| 5 | Property Files | `application.properties` |
| 6 (Lowest) | Programmatic Defaults | `MapPropertySource` |

This allows you to:
- Define defaults in property files or database
- Override with cloud configuration for centralized management
- Override everything with environment variables in production

## Configuration Reference

### Azure App Configuration

```properties
# Connection (use one)
azure.appconfig.connection-string=Endpoint=https://...;Id=...;Secret=...
azure.appconfig.endpoint=https://myapp.azconfig.io

# Key filtering
azure.appconfig.key-filter=myapp/*
azure.appconfig.key-prefix=myapp/
azure.appconfig.trim-key-prefix=true

# Label/environment
azure.appconfig.label-filter=production

# Change detection
azure.appconfig.sentinel-key=app:version
azure.appconfig.refresh-interval=30s

# Scoping
azure.appconfig.tenant-id=my-tenant
```

### REST Config Client

```properties
# Connection
rest.config.base-url=https://config.example.com
rest.config.tenant-id=my-tenant
rest.config.profile=production

# Paths
rest.config.settings-path=/api/v1/config/settings
rest.config.refresh-path=/api/v1/config/refresh

# Authentication (choose one method)
rest.config.auth.method=API_KEY
rest.config.auth.api-key=my-api-key
rest.config.auth.api-key-header=X-API-Key

# Or Bearer token
rest.config.auth.method=BEARER_TOKEN
rest.config.auth.bearer-token=my-jwt-token

# Timeouts
rest.config.connect-timeout-ms=5000
rest.config.read-timeout-ms=30000

# Caching
rest.config.offline-cache-enabled=true
```

## Quick Start Example

```kotlin
// Your application just uses ConfigService - providers are auto-registered
class MyService(
    private val configService: ConfigService
) {
    fun doSomething() {
        // This value might come from Azure, REST, database, or env vars
        // Your code doesn't need to know!
        val apiUrl = configService.getProperty("api.base.url", String::class)
            ?: throw IllegalStateException("api.base.url not configured")

        val timeout = configService.getProperty("http.timeout.ms", Int::class, 30000)
        val retryEnabled = configService.getProperty("retry.enabled", Boolean::class, true)

        // Use the configuration...
    }
}
```

## Caching Behavior

### Cloud Providers

Cloud providers use `OfflineConfigCache` for network resilience:

```
refresh() called
    │
    ├─ Network request to Azure/REST
    │    │
    │    ├─ Success
    │    │    ├─ Update in-memory store
    │    │    ├─ Persist to offline cache (disk)
    │    │    └─ Return success
    │    │
    │    └─ Failure (network error)
    │         ├─ Load from offline cache
    │         └─ Return cached data (or error if cache empty)
```

### Database Providers

Database providers use `SettingsCache` for performance:

- **Read**: Check cache → query database → cache result
- **Write**: Update database → invalidate cache
- **TTL**: Cached entries expire automatically

## Related Documentation

- [Cloud Providers](./cloud-providers) - Detailed REST and Azure configuration
- [Offline Cache](./offline-cache) - Offline caching system details
- [IDK Configuration](/idk/v0.13/guides/config/configuration) - Core configuration concepts
- [IDK Providers](/idk/v0.13/guides/config/providers) - Provider overview and custom providers

---

# Cloud Configuration Providers

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Cloud Configuration Providers

Cloud configuration providers fetch configuration from remote sources, enabling centralized configuration management, dynamic updates, and multi-environment support.

## Available Providers

| Provider | Module | Platform | Use Case |
|----------|--------|----------|----------|
| REST Client | `config-rest-client` | Multiplatform | Generic REST config servers |
| Azure App Configuration | `azure-app-config` | JVM | Azure cloud deployments |

## CloudConfigProvider Interface

All cloud providers implement the `CloudConfigProvider` interface:

```kotlin
interface CloudConfigProvider : PropertySource<Map<String, Any>> {
    val providerId: String
    val isAvailable: Boolean
    val configLevel: ConfigLevel
    val lastRefreshedAt: Instant?

    suspend fun refresh(): IdkResult<RefreshResult, IdkError>
    fun watchForChanges(): Flow<ConfigChangeEvent>
    suspend fun startWatching()
    suspend fun stopWatching()
    suspend fun healthCheck(): IdkResult<CloudProviderHealth, IdkError>
}
```

### Data Classes

```kotlin
data class RefreshResult(
    val configCount: Int,         // Number of configuration keys loaded
    val changedKeys: Set<String>, // Keys that changed since last refresh
    val refreshedAt: Instant      // Timestamp of refresh
)

data class ConfigChangeEvent(
    val changedKeys: Set<String>,
    val source: String,
    val timestamp: Instant
)

data class CloudProviderHealth(
    val isHealthy: Boolean,
    val latencyMs: Long,
    val configKeyCount: Int,
    val lastSuccessfulRefresh: Instant?,
    val errorMessage: String?
)
```

## REST Configuration Client

The `config-rest-client` module provides a multiplatform REST API client for fetching configuration from remote servers.

### Installation

```kotlin
// build.gradle.kts
dependencies {
    implementation(project(":lib-conf-config-rest-client"))
    implementation(project(":lib-conf-config-offline-cache"))  // Optional
}
```

### Configuration

```kotlin
data class RestConfigProviderConfig(
    val baseUrl: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val settingsPath: String = "/api/v1/config/settings",
    val refreshPath: String = "/api/v1/config/refresh",
    val auth: RestAuthConfig? = null,
    val connectTimeoutMs: Long = 5000,
    val readTimeoutMs: Long = 30000,
    val refreshIntervalMs: Long = 60000,  // 1 minute
    val offlineCacheEnabled: Boolean = true,
    val baseConfig: CloudConfigProviderConfig = CloudConfigProviderConfig()
)
```

### Authentication Options

<Tabs>
    <TabItem value="bearer" label="Bearer Token">

```kotlin
val config = RestConfigProviderConfig(
    baseUrl = "https://config.mycompany.com",
    tenantId = "my-tenant",
    auth = RestAuthConfig.BearerToken("my-jwt-token")
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="basic" label="Basic Auth">

```kotlin
val config = RestConfigProviderConfig(
    baseUrl = "https://config.mycompany.com",
    tenantId = "my-tenant",
    auth = RestAuthConfig.BasicAuth(
        username = "config-user",
        password = "secret"
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="apikey" label="API Key">

```kotlin
val config = RestConfigProviderConfig(
    baseUrl = "https://config.mycompany.com",
    tenantId = "my-tenant",
    auth = RestAuthConfig.ApiKey(
        headerName = "X-API-Key",
        apiKey = "my-api-key"
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="oauth2" label="OAuth 2.0">

```kotlin
val config = RestConfigProviderConfig(
    baseUrl = "https://config.mycompany.com",
    tenantId = "my-tenant",
    auth = RestAuthConfig.OAuth2(
        tokenUrl = "https://auth.mycompany.com/oauth2/token",
        clientId = "config-client",
        clientSecret = "client-secret",
        scopes = listOf("config:read")
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Basic Usage

```kotlin
val provider = RestConfigProviderImpl(
    config = config,
    httpClient = HttpClient(CIO),
    offlineCache = KmpSettingsStorage()
)

// Initial load
val refreshResult = provider.refresh()
if (refreshResult.isOk) {
    println("Loaded ${refreshResult.value.configCount} configuration keys")
}

// Access properties
val dbHost = provider.getProperty("database.host", String::class)
val timeout = provider.getProperty("http.timeout", Int::class, 5000)
```

### API Compatibility

The REST client expects these endpoints:

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| GET | `/api/v1/config/settings` | List settings |
| GET | `/api/v1/config/settings/{key}` | Get setting by key |
| POST | `/api/v1/config/refresh` | Trigger cache refresh |

**Query Parameters:**

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|-----------|------|-------------|
| `scope` | String | APP, TENANT, or PRINCIPAL |
| `profile` | String | Configuration profile |
| `keyPrefix` | String | Filter by key prefix |

## Azure App Configuration

The `azure-app-config` module provides integration with Azure App Configuration service.

### Installation

```kotlin
// build.gradle.kts
dependencies {
    implementation(project(":lib-conf-azure-app-config"))

    // Azure SDK
    implementation(platform("com.azure:azure-sdk-bom:1.2.18"))
    implementation("com.azure:azure-data-appconfiguration")
    implementation("com.azure:azure-identity")
}
```

### Configuration

```kotlin
data class AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    val connectionString: String? = null,
    val endpoint: String? = null,
    val credentialOptions: AzureCredentialOptions? = null,
    val keyFilter: String = "*",
    val labelFilter: String? = null,
    val refreshInterval: Duration = 30.seconds,
    val sentinelKey: String? = null,
    val keyPrefix: String? = null,
    val trimKeyPrefix: Boolean = true,
    val offlineCacheEnabled: Boolean = true,
    val tenantId: String? = null,
    val baseConfig: CloudConfigProviderConfig = CloudConfigProviderConfig()
)
```

### Authentication Methods

<Tabs>
    <TabItem value="default" label="Default Credential (Recommended)">

```kotlin
// Recommended for production - uses DefaultAzureCredential
val config = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
    credentialOptions = AzureCredentialOptions(
        authMethod = AzureAuthMethod.DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL
    ),
    labelFilter = "production"
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="connection" label="Connection String">

```kotlin
// Simple but less secure
val config = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    connectionString = "Endpoint=https://myapp.azconfig.io;Id=...;Secret=..."
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="managed" label="Managed Identity">

```kotlin
// System-assigned managed identity
val config = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
    credentialOptions = AzureCredentialOptions(
        authMethod = AzureAuthMethod.MANAGED_IDENTITY
    )
)

// User-assigned managed identity
val config = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
    credentialOptions = AzureCredentialOptions(
        authMethod = AzureAuthMethod.USER_ASSIGNED_MANAGED_IDENTITY,
        managedIdentityClientId = "12345678-1234-1234-1234-123456789012"
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="serviceprincipal" label="Service Principal">

```kotlin
val config = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
    credentialOptions = AzureCredentialOptions(
        authMethod = AzureAuthMethod.CLIENT_SECRET,
        tenantId = "your-tenant-id",
        clientId = "your-client-id",
        clientSecret = "your-client-secret"
    )
)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Label-Based Environment Separation

Azure App Configuration uses labels to separate environments:

```kotlin
// Production environment
val prodConfig = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
    labelFilter = "production"
)

// Staging environment
val stagingConfig = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
    labelFilter = "staging"
)

// No label (default values)
val defaultConfig = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
    labelFilter = null  // or "\\0" for no label
)
```

### Key Conventions

Keys are parsed to determine their scope:

| Key Format | Scope | Example |
|------------|-------|---------|
| `{key}` | APP | `database.host` |
| `tenant.{tenantId}.{key}` | TENANT | `tenant.acme.feature.enabled` |
| `principal.{tenantId}.{principalId}.{key}` | PRINCIPAL | `principal.acme.alice.theme` |

## Change Watching

Both providers support watching for configuration changes.

### Polling-Based Watching

```kotlin
// Start watching (uses configured refresh interval)
provider.startWatching()

// Collect change events
provider.watchForChanges().collect { event ->
    println("Config changed: ${event.changedKeys}")
    println("Source: ${event.source}")
    println("Time: ${event.timestamp}")

    // React to specific changes
    if ("feature.maintenance-mode" in event.changedKeys) {
        enableMaintenanceMode()
    }
}

// Stop watching
provider.stopWatching()
```

### Sentinel Key (Azure)

Azure supports sentinel keys for efficient change detection:

```kotlin
val config = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
    sentinelKey = "settings:sentinel",  // Only poll this key
    refreshInterval = 30.seconds
)

// When you update configuration in Azure:
// 1. Update your config values
// 2. Update the sentinel key value
// 3. Client detects sentinel change and refreshes all config
```

## Health Checks

Monitor provider health for observability:

```kotlin
val health = provider.healthCheck()
if (health.isOk) {
    val status = health.value
    println("Healthy: ${status.isHealthy}")
    println("Latency: ${status.latencyMs}ms")
    println("Keys: ${status.configKeyCount}")
    println("Last refresh: ${status.lastSuccessfulRefresh}")
} else {
    println("Health check failed: ${health.error.message}")
}

// Integration with health endpoint
@Inject
class HealthController(
    private val configProvider: CloudConfigProvider
) {
    suspend fun checkHealth(): HealthResponse {
        val configHealth = configProvider.healthCheck()
        return HealthResponse(
            config = if (configHealth.isOk) "UP" else "DOWN",
            configLatency = configHealth.getOrNull()?.latencyMs
        )
    }
}
```

## Offline Fallback

Cloud providers can use offline cache for network failure resilience.

### Configuration

```kotlin
val provider = RestConfigProviderImpl(
    config = RestConfigProviderConfig(
        baseUrl = "https://config.mycompany.com",
        tenantId = "my-tenant",
        offlineCacheEnabled = true
    ),
    offlineCache = KmpSettingsStorage()
)
```

### Fallback Behavior

<img src="/img/diagrams/offline-cache-flow.svg" alt="Offline Cache Fallback Flow" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Best Practices

### 1. Use DefaultAzureCredential in Azure

```kotlin
// Recommended - flexible credential chain
val config = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
    credentialOptions = AzureCredentialOptions(
        authMethod = AzureAuthMethod.DEFAULT_CREDENTIAL
    )
)
```

### 2. Always Enable Offline Cache

```kotlin
// Resilient to network failures
val provider = RestConfigProviderImpl(
    config = config.copy(offlineCacheEnabled = true),
    offlineCache = KmpSettingsStorage()
)
```

### 3. Use Labels for Environments

```kotlin
val config = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    labelFilter = when (environment) {
        "prod" -> "production"
        "staging" -> "staging"
        else -> "development"
    }
)
```

### 4. Handle Refresh Failures Gracefully

```kotlin
suspend fun refreshWithRetry(maxRetries: Int = 3): RefreshResult? {
    repeat(maxRetries) { attempt ->
        val result = provider.refresh()
        if (result.isOk) {
            return result.value
        }
        log.warn("Refresh attempt ${attempt + 1} failed: ${result.error.message}")
        delay(1000L * (attempt + 1))  // Exponential backoff
    }
    log.error("All refresh attempts failed, using cached config")
    return null
}
```

### 5. Use Sentinel Keys for Efficient Polling

```kotlin
// Only polls sentinel key, not all configuration
val config = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
    sentinelKey = "app:version",
    refreshInterval = 30.seconds
)
```

---

# Offline Configuration Cache

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Offline Configuration Cache

The `config-offline-cache` module provides persistent local caching for configuration, ensuring applications remain functional during network outages.

## Overview

The offline cache stores configuration data locally using [kmp-settings](https://github.com/russhwolf/multiplatform-settings), enabling:

- **Network Resilience** - Applications continue working when cloud config is unavailable
- **Faster Startup** - Cached config loads instantly without network requests
- **Multiplatform Support** - Works on JVM, Android, iOS, and other Kotlin targets
- **Scope Isolation** - Separate caches per tenant and config level

## Installation

```kotlin
// build.gradle.kts
dependencies {
    implementation(project(":lib-conf-config-offline-cache"))

    // kmp-settings for persistence
    implementation("com.russhwolf:multiplatform-settings:1.1.1")
    implementation("com.russhwolf:multiplatform-settings-coroutines:1.1.1")
}
```

## OfflineConfigCache Interface

```kotlin
interface OfflineConfigCache {
    /**
     * Persist configuration to local storage.
     */
    suspend fun persist(
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        tenantId: String?,
        config: Map<String, Any>
    )

    /**
     * Load configuration from local storage.
     */
    suspend fun load(
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        tenantId: String?
    ): Map<String, Any>?

    /**
     * Check if cached data is stale.
     */
    suspend fun isStale(
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        tenantId: String?,
        maxStaleness: Duration
    ): Boolean

    /**
     * Clear cached configuration.
     */
    suspend fun clear(
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        tenantId: String?
    )

    /**
     * Get the timestamp of the last cache update.
     */
    suspend fun getLastUpdated(
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        tenantId: String?
    ): Instant?
}
```

## Basic Usage

### Creating the Cache

<Tabs>
    <TabItem value="jvm" label="JVM">

```kotlin
import com.russhwolf.settings.PreferencesSettings
import java.util.prefs.Preferences

val settings = PreferencesSettings(
    Preferences.userRoot().node("com.myapp.config")
)
val offlineCache = KmpSettingsStorage(settings)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="android" label="Android">

```kotlin
import com.russhwolf.settings.SharedPreferencesSettings
import android.content.Context

val settings = SharedPreferencesSettings(
    context.getSharedPreferences("config_cache", Context.MODE_PRIVATE)
)
val offlineCache = KmpSettingsStorage(settings)
```

    </TabItem>
    <TabItem value="ios" label="iOS">

```kotlin
import com.russhwolf.settings.NSUserDefaultsSettings
import platform.Foundation.NSUserDefaults

val settings = NSUserDefaultsSettings(NSUserDefaults.standardUserDefaults)
val offlineCache = KmpSettingsStorage(settings)
```

    </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Persisting Configuration

```kotlin
// After successful cloud refresh, persist to cache
val cloudConfig = mapOf(
    "database.host" to "prod-db.example.com",
    "database.port" to 5432,
    "feature.newUi" to true,
    "api.timeout" to 30000
)

offlineCache.persist(
    scope = ConfigLevel.APP,
    tenantId = "my-tenant",
    config = cloudConfig
)
```

### Loading Cached Configuration

```kotlin
// Load from cache when cloud is unavailable
val cachedConfig = offlineCache.load(
    scope = ConfigLevel.APP,
    tenantId = "my-tenant"
)

if (cachedConfig != null) {
    val dbHost = cachedConfig["database.host"] as? String
    val dbPort = cachedConfig["database.port"] as? Int
}
```

### Checking Staleness

```kotlin
import kotlin.time.Duration.Companion.hours

val isStale = offlineCache.isStale(
    scope = ConfigLevel.APP,
    tenantId = "my-tenant",
    maxStaleness = 24.hours
)

if (isStale) {
    log.warn("Configuration cache is stale, attempting refresh")
    try {
        cloudProvider.refresh()
    } catch (e: Exception) {
        log.warn("Refresh failed, continuing with stale cache")
    }
}
```

## Integration with Cloud Providers

The offline cache integrates seamlessly with cloud configuration providers.

### REST Config Provider

```kotlin
val restProvider = RestConfigProviderImpl(
    config = RestConfigProviderConfig(
        baseUrl = "https://config.mycompany.com",
        tenantId = "my-tenant",
        offlineCacheEnabled = true
    ),
    httpClient = HttpClient(CIO),
    offlineCache = KmpSettingsStorage(settings)
)

// On refresh:
// 1. Fetches from REST API
// 2. If successful, updates cache
// 3. If failed, loads from cache
val result = restProvider.refresh()
```

### Azure App Configuration

```kotlin
val azureProvider = AzureAppConfigProvider(
    azureConfig = AzureAppConfigProviderConfig(
        endpoint = "https://myapp.azconfig.io",
        offlineCacheEnabled = true
    ),
    offlineCache = KmpSettingsStorage(settings)
)
```

## Fallback Strategy

The recommended fallback strategy for cloud providers:

```kotlin
class ResilientConfigProvider(
    private val cloudProvider: CloudConfigProvider,
    private val offlineCache: OfflineConfigCache,
    private val maxStaleness: Duration = 24.hours
) {
    suspend fun refresh(): IdkResult<RefreshResult, IdkError> {
        // Try cloud first
        val cloudResult = cloudProvider.refresh()

        if (cloudResult.isOk) {
            // Cloud succeeded - update cache
            offlineCache.persist(
                scope = cloudProvider.configLevel,
                tenantId = currentTenantId,
                config = cloudProvider.source
            )
            return cloudResult
        }

        // Cloud failed - try cache
        val cached = offlineCache.load(
            scope = cloudProvider.configLevel,
            tenantId = currentTenantId
        )

        if (cached != null) {
            val isStale = offlineCache.isStale(
                scope = cloudProvider.configLevel,
                tenantId = currentTenantId,
                maxStaleness = maxStaleness
            )

            if (isStale) {
                log.warn("Using stale cached configuration (last updated: ${
                    offlineCache.getLastUpdated(cloudProvider.configLevel, currentTenantId)
                })")
            }

            return Ok(RefreshResult(
                configCount = cached.size,
                changedKeys = emptySet(),
                refreshedAt = offlineCache.getLastUpdated(
                    cloudProvider.configLevel,
                    currentTenantId
                ) ?: Clock.System.now()
            ))
        }

        // Both cloud and cache failed
        return cloudResult
    }
}
```

## Cache Key Structure

The cache uses a structured key format for isolation:

```
{scope}:{tenantId}:{key}
```

Examples:
- `APP:my-tenant:database.host`
- `TENANT:my-tenant:feature.enabled`
- `PRINCIPAL:my-tenant:user.theme`

### Metadata Keys

Special keys store cache metadata:

```
_meta:{scope}:{tenantId}:lastUpdated
_meta:{scope}:{tenantId}:configKeys
```

## Scope-Based Storage

Configuration is stored separately per scope and tenant:

```kotlin
// App-level config (shared across all users)
offlineCache.persist(
    scope = ConfigLevel.APP,
    tenantId = "tenant1",
    config = appConfig
)

// Tenant-level config
offlineCache.persist(
    scope = ConfigLevel.TENANT,
    tenantId = "tenant1",
    config = tenantConfig
)

// Principal-level config
offlineCache.persist(
    scope = ConfigLevel.PRINCIPAL,
    tenantId = "tenant1",  // Still needs tenantId for isolation
    config = principalConfig
)
```

## Cache Management

### Clearing Cache

```kotlin
// Clear specific scope
offlineCache.clear(
    scope = ConfigLevel.APP,
    tenantId = "tenant1"
)

// Clear all for tenant
offlineCache.clear(
    scope = ConfigLevel.APP,
    tenantId = "tenant1"
)
offlineCache.clear(
    scope = ConfigLevel.TENANT,
    tenantId = "tenant1"
)
offlineCache.clear(
    scope = ConfigLevel.PRINCIPAL,
    tenantId = "tenant1"
)
```

### Cache Statistics

```kotlin
// Get last update time
val lastUpdated = offlineCache.getLastUpdated(
    scope = ConfigLevel.APP,
    tenantId = "tenant1"
)

// Check staleness
val staleness = if (lastUpdated != null) {
    Clock.System.now() - lastUpdated
} else {
    Duration.INFINITE
}

log.info("Cache age: ${staleness.inWholeMinutes} minutes")
```

## Serialization

The cache serializes values to JSON for storage:

```kotlin
// Supported types
val config = mapOf(
    "stringValue" to "hello",
    "intValue" to 42,
    "doubleValue" to 3.14,
    "boolValue" to true,
    "listValue" to listOf("a", "b", "c"),
    "mapValue" to mapOf("nested" to "value")
)

offlineCache.persist(scope, tenantId, config)

// Deserialization preserves types
val loaded = offlineCache.load(scope, tenantId)
val str = loaded["stringValue"] as String
val num = loaded["intValue"] as Int
val flag = loaded["boolValue"] as Boolean
```

## Error Handling

```kotlin
try {
    offlineCache.persist(scope, tenantId, config)
} catch (e: SerializationException) {
    log.error("Failed to serialize config for caching", e)
    // Continue without caching
} catch (e: IOException) {
    log.error("Failed to write to cache storage", e)
    // Continue without caching
}

// Load with fallback
val config = try {
    offlineCache.load(scope, tenantId)
} catch (e: Exception) {
    log.warn("Failed to load from cache", e)
    null
}
```

## Best Practices

### 1. Always Enable Offline Cache in Production

```kotlin
val provider = RestConfigProviderImpl(
    config = RestConfigProviderConfig(
        // ... other config
        offlineCacheEnabled = true  // Essential for resilience
    ),
    offlineCache = offlineCacheImpl
)
```

### 2. Set Appropriate Staleness Thresholds

```kotlin
// Short staleness for frequently changing config
val featureFlagsMaxStaleness = 1.hours

// Longer staleness for stable config
val connectionConfigMaxStaleness = 24.hours

if (offlineCache.isStale(scope, tenantId, featureFlagsMaxStaleness)) {
    prioritizeRefresh()
}
```

### 3. Handle Missing Cache Gracefully

```kotlin
val config = offlineCache.load(scope, tenantId)
    ?: run {
        log.info("No cached config available, using defaults")
        defaultConfiguration
    }
```

### 4. Clear Cache on Logout

```kotlin
fun logout(tenantId: String) {
    // Clear user-specific cached config
    offlineCache.clear(ConfigLevel.PRINCIPAL, tenantId)

    // Optionally clear tenant config too
    if (clearTenantDataOnLogout) {
        offlineCache.clear(ConfigLevel.TENANT, tenantId)
    }
}
```

### 5. Log Cache Status at Startup

```kotlin
fun logCacheStatus(tenantId: String) {
    val lastUpdated = offlineCache.getLastUpdated(ConfigLevel.APP, tenantId)

    if (lastUpdated != null) {
        val age = Clock.System.now() - lastUpdated
        log.info("Configuration cache available (age: ${age.inWholeMinutes} minutes)")
    } else {
        log.info("No configuration cache available")
    }
}
```

## Platform-Specific Notes

### Android

Use `SharedPreferences` with app-private mode:

```kotlin
val settings = SharedPreferencesSettings(
    context.getSharedPreferences(
        "config_cache",
        Context.MODE_PRIVATE  // Not accessible to other apps
    )
)
```

### iOS

NSUserDefaults is suitable for small config. For large configs, consider file-based storage:

```kotlin
val settings = NSUserDefaultsSettings(
    NSUserDefaults(suiteName = "com.myapp.config")
)
```

### JVM Server

Use file-based preferences for server deployments:

```kotlin
val prefsPath = Paths.get(System.getProperty("user.home"), ".myapp", "config")
val settings = PreferencesSettings(
    Preferences.userRoot().node(prefsPath.toString())
)
```

---

# Audit Logging

# Audit Logging

The EDK's audit system records a structured trail of every significant action in the application, who did what, on which resource, when, whether it succeeded, and why it was denied. Unlike general-purpose application logging, audit logs are designed for compliance, security review, and forensic analysis.

Audit logging operates independently from the [event system](../events/overview). Events are for real-time pub/sub within the application (triggering workflows, updating caches, forwarding to external systems). Audit logs are append-only records optimized for after-the-fact investigation, "show me everything user X did in the last 30 days" or "which commands were denied by the policy engine yesterday."

## Key Design Principles

**Never fail the command.** Audit logging is critical but not blocking. If the audit store is unavailable, the command still executes. Sink failures are caught and logged to the application logger, never propagated to the caller. A failing audit system should degrade gracefully, not take down production.

**Redact before persisting.** Sensitive data (passwords, tokens, API keys, JWTs) is automatically stripped from audit metadata before it reaches any sink. The `AuditRedactionPolicy` catches common patterns, `password`, `token`, `secret`, `credential`, `api_key`, `jwt`, `authorization`, `bearer`, `private_key`, and replaces their values with `[REDACTED]`. Error messages are similarly sanitized to remove embedded credentials.

**Enrich from session context.** Audit events are enriched with tenant ID, actor ID, and correlation ID from the current session context. Code that records audit events doesn't need to manually pass this information, the enrichment layer fills it in automatically from the request's session.

**Append-only storage.** The `ImmutableAuditStore` interface enforces append-only semantics, events can be written and queried, but never updated or deleted. In the PostgreSQL implementation, database triggers guard against modification, providing an additional layer of protection against tampering.

## What Gets Recorded

Every audit event captures:

| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `commandId` | Which command was executed (e.g., `kms.keys.generate`, `party.manager.create`) |
| `result` | Outcome: `STARTED`, `SUCCEEDED`, `FAILED`, `POLICY_DENIED`, `AUTH_FAILURE` |
| `actorId` | Who performed the action (enriched from session principal) |
| `tenantId` | Which tenant context (enriched from session) |
| `resourceId` | What was acted on |
| `durationMs` | How long the command took |
| `correlationId` | Links related audit events across a request lifecycle |
| `traceId` / `spanId` | W3C Trace Context for distributed tracing correlation |
| `metadata` | Additional key-value pairs (redacted before persistence) |
| `errorCode` / `errorMessage` | Failure details (sanitized to remove credentials) |
| `transportType` / `transportScope` | Whether the command was local, HTTP, or gRPC |

The `result` field distinguishes between different failure modes: `FAILED` means the command threw an error, `POLICY_DENIED` means the authorization layer blocked it, and `AUTH_FAILURE` means the caller couldn't be authenticated. This distinction matters for security analysis, a spike in `POLICY_DENIED` events is a different signal than a spike in `FAILED` events.

## Output Formats

Audit events can be formatted in three standards, depending on what your SIEM or log aggregation system expects:

**JSON**: structured JSON objects. The default format, suitable for Elasticsearch, Splunk, Datadog, and most modern log platforms. Every field is a named key, metadata is a nested object.

**CEF** (ArcSight Common Event Format), the standard format for ArcSight, QRadar, and legacy SIEM systems. Events are formatted as pipe-delimited strings with severity mapping: `STARTED`=1, `SUCCEEDED`=3, `FAILED`=7, `POLICY_DENIED`=8, `AUTH_FAILURE`=9. Custom field labels carry tenant, trace, and correlation IDs.

**OCSF** (Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework), the emerging standard for security telemetry. Events are mapped to the API Activity class (class_uid=6003) with proper OCSF severity levels and status codes. Includes full product/vendor metadata for automated classification.

All three formatters implement the `AuditFormatter` interface, so you can register multiple formatters simultaneously, for example, JSON to your log aggregator and CEF to your SIEM.

## Tamper Evidence

For regulated environments that require proof that audit logs haven't been altered, the audit system supports two complementary mechanisms:

**Hash chaining** links each audit event to the previous one using a cryptographic hash chain. Every event is hashed, and its hash is combined with the previous event's hash. If any event in the chain is modified, the chain breaks and verification fails. The chain starts from a genesis hash and can be verified for any range of events.

**Signed checkpoints** periodically capture a signed digest of the chain. At configurable intervals (default every 1,000 events), a checkpoint is created containing the chain digest, sequence range, timestamp, and a KMS signature. Checkpoints can be verified independently, you can prove that all events between checkpoint A and checkpoint B are unmodified without recomputing the entire chain.

```kotlin
data class TamperEvidenceConfig(
    val hashChainEnabled: Boolean = false,
    val checkpointSigningEnabled: Boolean = false,
    val hashAlgorithm: String = "SHA-256",
    val checkpointIntervalEvents: Int = 1000,
    val signingKeyRef: String = ""
)
```

The `AuditChainVerifier` can verify any range of the chain and any individual checkpoint:

```kotlin
interface AuditChainVerifier {
    suspend fun verifyChain(tenantId: String, fromSequence: Long, toSequence: Long?): IdkResult<Long, IdkError>
    suspend fun verifyCheckpoint(tenantId: String, checkpointId: String): IdkResult<Unit, IdkError>
}
```

## Processing Pipeline

When an audit event is recorded, it passes through a three-stage pipeline:

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-audit-pipeline.svg" alt="Audit Processing Pipeline" style={{maxWidth: '480px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

Each stage is isolated, enrichment failures don't prevent redaction, and redaction failures don't prevent persistence. The entire pipeline is wrapped in a catch-all exception handler so that audit infrastructure failures never propagate to the caller.

## Querying Audit Logs

The `AuditQueryService` provides structured queries over persisted audit events:

```kotlin
interface AuditQueryService {
    suspend fun query(filter: AuditQueryFilter): IdkResult<List<AuditEvent>, IdkError>
    suspend fun getByCorrelationId(tenantId: String, correlationId: String): IdkResult<List<AuditEvent>, IdkError>
    suspend fun getByTraceId(tenantId: String, traceId: String): IdkResult<List<AuditEvent>, IdkError>
}
```

Queries support filtering by tenant, command, module, actor, trace ID, result type, and time range, with pagination via limit/offset. The `getByCorrelationId` query is particularly useful for reconstructing the full lifecycle of a request across multiple commands.

## Modules

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-audit-public` | `AuditEvent`, `AuditLogService`, `AuditEventSink`, formatters, redaction policy, store and query interfaces |
| `lib-audit-impl` | `DefaultAuditLogService`, session enricher, JSON/CEF/OCSF formatters, composite sink, tamper evidence |

---

# Events System

# Events System

The EDK provides an event system extension that builds on the IDK core events infrastructure, adding enterprise-specific event types, subsystems, and rich filtering capabilities.

## Overview

The EDK events module (`lib-events-event-api`) defines:

- **Event Types** - EDK-specific event categories for authorization, persistence, and integration operations
- **Subsystems** - Logical groupings for filtering and routing events
- **Transmitter Interfaces** - Contracts for sending events to external systems

## Modules

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-events-event-api` | EDK event types, subsystems, and transmitter interfaces |
| `lib-events-event-persistence-api` | Event persistence interfaces and models |
| `lib-events-event-persistence-postgresql` | PostgreSQL event storage |
| `lib-events-event-persistence-mysql` | MySQL event storage |
| `lib-events-event-persistence-sqlite` | SQLite event storage |
| `lib-events-event-spring` | Spring Boot auto-configuration for events |

## Event Categories

### Authorization Events

Events related to policy evaluation and authorization decisions:

| Event | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `AuthorizationRequested` | Policy evaluation initiated |
| `AuthorizationGranted` | Access permitted by policy |
| `AuthorizationDenied` | Access denied by policy |
| `CircuitBreakerOpened` | PDP circuit breaker tripped |
| `CircuitBreakerClosed` | PDP circuit breaker recovered |

### Persistence Events

Events related to database operations:

| Event | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `EntityCreated` | New entity persisted |
| `EntityUpdated` | Existing entity modified |
| `EntityDeleted` | Entity soft-deleted |
| `ConnectionPoolExhausted` | Database pool limit reached |
| `TenantDatabaseRouted` | Request routed to tenant database |

### Integration Events

Events related to external service integration:

| Event | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `ExternalServiceCalled` | Outbound API request made |
| `ExternalServiceFailed` | Outbound API request failed |
| `WebhookDispatched` | Webhook notification sent |

## Subsystems

Events are categorized into subsystems for filtering:

| Subsystem | Description |
|-----------|-------------|
| `AUTHZ` | Authorization and policy events |
| `PERSISTENCE` | Database and storage events |
| `INTEGRATION` | External service events |
| `AUDIT` | Audit trail events |

## Usage

### Subscribing to Events

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.events.api.EventSubscriber
import com.sphereon.events.api.AuthorizationEvent

class AuthorizationAuditSubscriber : EventSubscriber<AuthorizationEvent> {
    override suspend fun onEvent(event: AuthorizationEvent) {
        when (event) {
            is AuthorizationEvent.Denied -> {
                logger.warn("Access denied: ${event.principal} -> ${event.resource}")
            }
            is AuthorizationEvent.Granted -> {
                logger.debug("Access granted: ${event.principal} -> ${event.resource}")
            }
        }
    }
}
```

### Transmitting Events

The transmitter interface allows sending events to external systems:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.events.api.EventTransmitter
import com.sphereon.events.api.Event

class WebhookEventTransmitter(
    private val httpClient: HttpClient,
    private val webhookUrl: String
) : EventTransmitter {
    override suspend fun transmit(event: Event) {
        httpClient.post(webhookUrl) {
            contentType(ContentType.Application.Json)
            setBody(event.toJson())
        }
    }
}
```

## Integration with IDK Events

The EDK events module extends the IDK core events system:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.core.events.EventHub
import com.sphereon.edk.events.EdkEventTypes

// Register EDK event types with the IDK event hub
val eventHub: EventHub = sessionComponent.eventHub

eventHub.subscribe(EdkEventTypes.AUTHORIZATION) { event ->
    // Handle authorization events
}

eventHub.subscribe(EdkEventTypes.PERSISTENCE) { event ->
    // Handle persistence events
}
```

## Configuration

Configure event handling in your application:

```yaml
sphereon:
  events:
    enabled: true
    subsystems:
      authz:
        enabled: true
        log-level: DEBUG
      persistence:
        enabled: true
        log-level: INFO
      integration:
        enabled: false
    transmitters:
      webhook:
        enabled: true
        url: https://events.example.com/webhook
        batch-size: 100
        flush-interval-ms: 5000
```

## Event Persistence

The EDK provides database-backed event storage for audit trails, compliance, and event replay.

### Configuration

```kotlin
dependencies {
    // Choose your database backend
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-events-event-persistence-postgresql:0.13.0")
    // or
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-events-event-persistence-mysql:0.13.0")
    // or
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-events-event-persistence-sqlite:0.13.0")
}
```

### Using Event Persistence

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.events.persistence.api.EventRepository
import com.sphereon.events.persistence.api.EventQuery

class AuditService(
    private val eventRepository: EventRepository
) {
    // Store an event
    suspend fun recordEvent(event: Event) {
        eventRepository.save(event)
    }

    // Query events with filters
    suspend fun getAuthorizationEvents(
        tenantId: String,
        startTime: Instant,
        endTime: Instant
    ): List<Event> {
        return eventRepository.query(
            EventQuery(
                subsystem = "AUTHZ",
                tenantId = tenantId,
                timeRange = startTime..endTime
            )
        )
    }

    // Paginated queries for large result sets
    suspend fun getRecentEvents(page: Int, pageSize: Int): Page<Event> {
        return eventRepository.queryPaged(
            EventQuery(
                orderBy = EventQuery.OrderBy.TIMESTAMP_DESC
            ),
            page = page,
            pageSize = pageSize
        )
    }
}
```

### Spring Boot Integration

With the Spring module, event persistence is auto-configured:

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-events-event-spring:0.13.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-events-event-persistence-postgresql:0.13.0")
}
```

```yaml
# application.yml
sphereon:
  events:
    persistence:
      enabled: true
      table-name: sphereon_events
      retention-days: 90  # Auto-cleanup after 90 days
```

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.events.persistence.api.EventRepository
import org.springframework.stereotype.Service

@Service
class AuditService(
    private val eventRepository: EventRepository  // Auto-injected
) {
    suspend fun getAuditTrail(entityId: String): List<Event> {
        return eventRepository.queryByEntityId(entityId)
    }
}
```

### Retention Policies

Configure automatic cleanup of old events:

```yaml
sphereon:
  events:
    persistence:
      retention:
        enabled: true
        days: 90
        cleanup-schedule: "0 0 2 * * *"  # Daily at 2 AM
```

## Best Practices

**Use subsystem filtering.** Subscribe only to the event subsystems you need to minimize processing overhead.

**Handle events asynchronously.** Event handlers should not block the main execution flow. Use coroutines for any I/O operations.

**Implement idempotent handlers.** Events may be delivered more than once in distributed scenarios.

**Log authorization denials.** Always log denied authorization attempts for security auditing.

**Persist critical events.** Use event persistence for audit trails and compliance requirements. Configure appropriate retention policies based on regulatory needs.

---

# Shared Signals (SSF)

# Shared Signals Framework (SSF)

The Shared Signals Framework implements the [OpenID Shared Signals and Events](https://openid.net/specs/openid-sse-framework-1_0.html) specification for exchanging security events between services and organizations. When a user's account is compromised, a session is revoked, or credentials change, SSF propagates that signal to all relying parties so they can react immediately, revoking sessions, requiring re-authentication, or triggering step-up verification.

SSF operates on top of the EDK's [event system](./overview). Internal events with security significance are mapped to standardized SSF event types and transmitted as signed Security Event Tokens (SETs) to external receivers. In the other direction, incoming SETs from external transmitters are validated, mapped to internal event types, and published on the `EventHub` for local consumers.

## Why Shared Signals?

In a federated identity ecosystem, a security event at one party affects all parties that trust that identity. If a user's credentials are compromised at the identity provider, every relying party with an active session for that user needs to know, not minutes later via polling, but immediately.

Without SSF, each relying party independently discovers compromises through its own detection (if it has any), or waits for the user to report the issue. SSF creates a real-time notification channel between identity providers, relying parties, and security services. When the IdP detects a compromise, it sends a SET to all registered receivers, and each receiver can take immediate action.

The EDK's SSF implementation is bidirectional: your application can both transmit signals (when it detects security events) and receive signals (from upstream identity providers or partner organizations).

## Supported Event Types

SSF defines event types from two specifications:

### CAEP (Continuous Access Evaluation Protocol)

CAEP events signal changes to active sessions and tokens. They enable real-time access revocation without waiting for token expiration.

| Event | URN | Meaning |
|-------|-----|---------|
| **Session Revoked** | `https://schemas.openid.net/.../session-revoked` | A user's session has been terminated. Relying parties should invalidate their local sessions for this user. |
| **Token Claims Changed** | `https://schemas.openid.net/.../token-claims-change` | Claims in an active token have changed (e.g., role removed, group membership updated). Relying parties should re-evaluate access decisions. |
| **Credential Changed** | `https://schemas.openid.net/.../credential-change` | A user's credentials were updated (password change, MFA enrollment). May indicate a security event if not user-initiated. |

### RISC (Risk Incident Sharing and Coordination)

RISC events signal security incidents that may affect user accounts across providers.

| Event | URN | Meaning |
|-------|-----|---------|
| **Account Disabled** | `https://schemas.openid.net/.../account-disabled` | An account has been disabled, typically due to detected compromise or policy violation. |
| **Account Purged** | `https://schemas.openid.net/.../account-purged` | An account has been permanently deleted (GDPR erasure, offboarding). All data for this user should be removed. |
| **Credential Compromise** | `https://schemas.openid.net/.../credential-compromise` | A user's credentials are believed to be compromised. All sessions should be terminated and re-authentication required. |

## Security Event Tokens (SET)

SSF events are transmitted as JWTs with type `secevent+jwt`. Each SET is signed by the transmitter and validated by the receiver. The EDK's `SetTokenValidator` enforces a strict validation pipeline:

1. **Payload size**: reject oversized tokens (default max 64KB)
2. **JWT type**: must be `secevent+jwt`
3. **Algorithm**: must be in the allowed set (default RS256, ES256)
4. **Signature**: verified against the transmitter's JWKS
5. **Issuer**: must be in the configured trusted issuer set
6. **Audience**: must match the receiver's configured audience
7. **Freshness**: timestamp must be within configured clock skew (default 5 minutes)
8. **Replay detection**: JTI (JWT ID) checked against the replay cache to prevent reprocessing

The `JtiReplayDetector` uses an LRU cache with configurable TTL and maximum size. Entries are tenant-scoped, so JTI uniqueness is enforced per-tenant rather than globally.

## Bidirectional Bridge

The `SsfEventHubBridge` connects the internal event system to external SSF streams in both directions.

### Outbound (Internal → External)

When a security-relevant event is published on the `EventHub`, the bridge:

1. Subscribes to events in subsystem `SHARED_SIGNALS` with category `SECURITY`
2. Maps internal event types to SSF URNs (e.g., `CAEP_SESSION_REVOKED` → `https://schemas.openid.net/.../session-revoked`)
3. Creates a `SharedSignalEvent` with issuer, audience, timestamp, unique JTI, and event payload
4. Passes the event to the configured `SsfTransmitter` for delivery

Your application publishes internal events normally. The bridge handles the mapping and transmission, application code doesn't need to know about SSF.

### Inbound (External → Internal)

When a SET is received from an external transmitter:

1. The `SetTokenValidator` validates the JWT (signature, issuer, audience, replay, freshness)
2. The `SsfEventHubBridge` maps SSF URNs back to internal event types
3. An internal `Event` is created with the SSF payload (issuer, JTI, timestamp, and all event-specific claims)
4. The event is published on the `EventHub`

Downstream consumers (session managers, cache invalidators, audit loggers) subscribe to these events through the normal event system. They don't need to know the event originated from an external SSF stream.

## Delivery Modes

SSF supports two delivery modes:

**Push**: external transmitters POST signed SETs to your application's push endpoint. The EDK validates the SET and publishes it to the `EventHub`. This is the preferred mode for real-time security signals.

**Poll**: the EDK periodically fetches SETs from a transmitter's poll endpoint. The poll interval is configurable (default 60 seconds). This mode is useful when the transmitter doesn't support push or when network topology prevents inbound connections.

## Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  ssf:
    enabled: true

    # Trust configuration
    trusted-issuers:
      - "https://idp.example.com"
      - "https://partner.example.com"
    audience: "https://api.myapp.com"
    allowed-algorithms:
      - RS256
      - ES256

    # Signing (for outbound SETs)
    signing-key-ref: "ssf-signing-key"

    # Delivery
    push-endpoint: "/ssf/events"
    poll-endpoint: null
    poll-interval-seconds: 60

    # Replay detection
    jti-cache-ttl-seconds: 86400        # 24 hours
    jti-cache-max-size: 100000

    # Safety
    clock-skew-seconds: 300             # 5 minutes
    max-payload-size-bytes: 65536       # 64KB

    # Event type filtering (empty = accept all)
    accepted-event-types: []
```

The `trusted-issuers` list is critical, only SETs from these issuers will be accepted. The `signing-key-ref` points to a KMS key used to sign outbound SETs.

## Integration Example

Handling an inbound credential compromise signal to invalidate all sessions for the affected user:

```kotlin
// Subscribe to RISC credential compromise events
eventHub.subscribe(edkEventFilter {
    type(SsfEventTypes.RISC_CREDENTIAL_COMPROMISE)
}).collect { event ->
    val subjectId = event.payload["sub"] as? String ?: return@collect
    val issuer = event.payload["ssf_iss"] as? String

    logger.warn("Credential compromise for $subjectId from issuer $issuer")

    // Revoke all sessions for this user
    sessionService.revokeAllSessions(subjectId)

    // Invalidate cached authorization decisions
    authZenCache.invalidateBySubject(subjectId)

    // Record in audit log
    auditLogService.record(AuditEvent(
        commandId = "ssf.credential-compromise",
        command = "credential-compromise",
        subjectId = subjectId,
        result = AuditEventResult.STARTED,
        timestamp = Clock.System.now().toEpochMilliseconds()
    ))
}
```

## Modules

| Module | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `lib-ssf-public` | `SharedSignalEvent`, `SsfEventTypes`, `SetTokenValidator`, `SsfTransmitter`, `SsfReceiver`, `JtiReplayDetector`, configuration |
| `lib-ssf-impl` | Kache-backed replay detector, `SsfEventHubBridge`, SET validation pipeline |

---

# Command Contracts

# Command Contracts

Every service operation in the EDK, issuing a credential, verifying a presentation, generating a key, signing a JWT, is expressed as a command. Commands are how the platform moves work between modules, tenants, transports, and runtimes. That much is foundational to the IDK.

What the EDK adds on top is a contract for each of those commands. A contract is an app-scoped object that describes, in one place, everything that is statically true about the operation: who is allowed to run it, what regulatory obligations touch it, what data it accepts and returns, what configuration it reads, and how sensitive its inputs and outputs are.

A command without a contract is still executable. A command with a contract becomes something the rest of the platform can reason about. Authorization can decide before invocation instead of inside it. Compliance reporting can be generated from the running system rather than a spreadsheet. UIs and MCP agents can render inputs safely without copying the schema. Operators can audit which features a new build actually activates.

## Why this is not buried in code

The information a contract captures has traditionally been scattered across five or six different places:

- Regulatory obligations live in compliance documents maintained by a different team.
- Minimum authentication levels live in Keycloak configurations or route-level annotations.
- Input validation lives in the command's implementation, mixed with business logic.
- UI labels and help text live in a frontend translation file that nobody keeps in sync.
- Configuration keys are documented in a README, if at all.

This scatter is the reason compliance audits take weeks, security reviews miss requirements, and "what config does this service actually consume?" is a question no one can answer confidently. It is also the reason most platforms accumulate implicit knowledge that exists only in the heads of the engineers who wrote the code.

Contracts collapse this scatter into one declarative object per operation, owned by the module that owns the command. The command implementation no longer carries metadata the runtime would like to know. It just does its work. Everything else, policy, compliance, rate limiting, schema, config, becomes introspectable, queryable, and tooling-friendly.

## What a contract describes

Each contract attaches five categories of metadata to a single command.

### Regulatory relationship

The most distinctive part of the EDK contract is the compliance profile. It is an explicit, typed list of the regulatory clauses that apply to the operation, the frameworks they come from (GDPR, eIDAS 2, the EU Digital Identity Wallet regulation, NIS2, DORA, NIST SP 800-63, ISO 27001, FIPS 140), and whether each clause applies, may apply, or is implemented by the code.

The distinction matters. Issuing a credential that carries a date of birth is a clear Article 25 ("data protection by design") and Article 32 ("security of processing") activity under the GDPR. Issuing a credential that carries a biometric template additionally triggers Article 9 ("special categories") and Article 35 ("data protection impact assessment"). A policy engine, an audit report, or a deployment gate can read those references and treat the two commands differently without the application code needing to know anything about regulations. When auditors ask which operations in production process special-category data, the answer is a registry query, not a code search.

Alongside the references, a contract may declare that its execution constitutes a data-processing activity for Article 30 record-keeping, or that the operation requires a DPIA. These are not magic strings. They are typed enum values that the registry can filter on and that IDE autocomplete helps developers get right.

Concretely, the compliance profile of an OID4VCI issuance command looks something like this:

```kotlin
override val complianceProfile = complianceProfile {
    frameworks(RegulatoryFramework.EIDAS2, RegulatoryFramework.EUDIW)
    reference(Eidas.ART_25_SIGNATURES)
    reference(Gdpr.ART_6)                              // lawful basis required
    reference(Gdpr.ART_25_DATA_PROTECTION_BY_DESIGN)
    reference(Gdpr.ART_30_RECORDS_OF_PROCESSING)
    reference(Gdpr.ART_32_SECURITY_OF_PROCESSING)
    potentiallyApplies(Gdpr.ART_35_DPIA,
        note = "DPIA required for large-scale issuance")
    dataProcessingActivity()
}
```

A verifier handling a presentation that contains biometric data flips two of those from "applies" to "applies with higher bar" and adds Article 9:

```kotlin
reference(Gdpr.ART_9)        // special categories (biometrics, health)
reference(Gdpr.ART_35_DPIA)  // no longer just "potentially applies"
requiresDpia()
```

Nothing in the command's implementation changes. What changes is what the platform can tell you about the running system. An internal audit can enumerate every operation that processes special-category data without anyone reading source code. A risk assessment can filter the registry for commands that trigger Article 35 and check whether the corresponding DPIAs on file actually cover what is deployed. A GDPR Article 30 record-of-processing can be generated from the `dataProcessingActivity()` flag rather than maintained by hand. When a new regulation lands, a new eIDAS implementing act or a new NIS2 control, finding the affected operations is a query, not a workshop.

### Risk and assurance requirements

A contract declares the authentication assurance level required to execute the command, following NIST SP 800-63B (AAL1 / AAL2 / AAL3) and mapped 1:1 to the eIDAS levels of assurance (Low / Substantial / High). It can also require a maximum authentication age (a command that signs a qualified signature may refuse a session older than five minutes), a specific authentication method reference (multi-factor, hardware-bound), or dual control for destructive ceremonies.

Requiring AAL2 for a credential issuance and AAL3 for a key deletion is not something the business logic should decide every time. It is a property of the operation itself, and the contract is where it lives. When the transport layer or the policy engine sees a command come in, it can reject or step-up the session before the implementation runs, using nothing but the contract.

### Inputs, outputs, and schema overlays

Every contract declares typed tokens for its input and output. This alone gives the runtime what it needs for serialization, for REST/gRPC binding, and for generating OpenAPI and gRPC descriptors without reflection. The more interesting piece is the schema overlay.

A schema overlay describes each input field at a semantic level: what to label it in UIs ("Credential Configuration"), what help text to show, whether the field is confidential (redact in logs, don't echo to clients), whether it is an identifier that policy rules can target ("this is the `client_id`"), and which policy constraints apply to it. Overlay entries carry stable i18n keys derived from the command ID so translators can translate them without touching code, and MCP agents or admin UIs can render the same form consistently across locales.

The overlay is separate from the input type itself. The same `String` can be a public issuer identifier in one command and a confidential access token in another. The overlay tells the platform which one, without forcing the argument type into a custom wrapper.

### Resource targets and policy identifiers

Authorization engines, AuthZEN, Cedar, OPA, evaluate rules against structured requests: subject, action, resource, context. A contract's resource target describes the resource side of that tuple: what type of thing the command operates on ("oid4vci.credential", "kms.key"), which arguments identify the instance, and which arguments are constraints that policy can read. Once this is declared, the policy layer can build correct requests for every command automatically. It never needs a hand-written mapping between the input and the fields that matter for authorization.

This is what makes deep policy evaluation possible. Without a contract, a policy engine receives an opaque command invocation. It knows the command ran, it may know who called it, but it cannot reason about what the command is actually doing. Rules degrade to coarse "this role can call this endpoint" checks, because the engine has no structured view of the inputs. With a contract, the engine sees the command's exact shape: the resource type, the identifiers that pin down which instance is being touched, the typed constraints drawn from the arguments, the confidential fields to treat carefully in decision logs, the assurance level that was declared, the compliance clauses that apply. A Cedar policy can now say "this tenant may issue credentials only for configurations whose `credential_configuration_id` starts with `employee_`, and only at AAL2 or higher, and only during business hours", and the engine has every field it needs to evaluate that rule, because the contract surfaced them as typed resource attributes rather than hidden inside the argument object.

The same declarations fuel rate limiting keyed by tenant and resource, usage metering for billing, and pattern-based feature gating ("all `oid4vci.*` operations are gated behind the issuance license").

### License protection

Contracts can also declare `licenseProtection`, the static license metadata for a command. The descriptor carries a canonical entitlement key in `product.module.service.command` form, the deployment shapes where enforcement applies, the protection mode, optional quota keys, and an optional domain policy reference. This is the bridge between the command registry, the license runtime, OpenAPI documentation, and operational inventory.

For HTTP-exposed commands, the canonical source is the OpenAPI operation. The operation carries `x-license-protection` beside its `operationId`:

```yaml
x-license-protection:
  entitlementKey: vdx.semantic.binding.create-party-type-binding
  deploymentShapePredicates: [packaging=container, environment=production]
  protectionMode: licensed
```

The build reads that metadata, validates the descriptor shape, and attaches it to the command's contract. If an annotation and OpenAPI both describe the same operation, the OpenAPI descriptor is authoritative. Duplicate operation IDs with conflicting license descriptors are rejected because they make enforcement ambiguous.

Missing license descriptors are treated as an inventory gap, not as a malformed descriptor. That distinction helps during migration. Existing commands can keep running while coverage reports identify unclassified operations. A malformed descriptor is different. If a command claims license protection but the entitlement key, product, module, service, command, protection mode, or deployment predicates are inconsistent, validation reports it as a contract error.

#### The entitlement key

The entitlement key is the stable address of a licensed operation. It always has exactly four dot-separated segments, `product.module.service.command`, and it is the join key between the command contract, the signed grant, the OpenAPI operation, and the operational inventory. A descriptor's `product`, `module`, `service`, and `command` fields must agree with the four segments of its entitlement key. Validation rejects any descriptor where they drift apart, so a single canonical string identifies the operation everywhere it is referenced.

The four-segment shape is what lets a license grant address operations at any granularity. A grant can name an exact command, or it can use a wildcard pattern such as `kms.**` or `vdx.semantic.binding.*` to cover a whole module or service. The same pattern vocabulary the authorization layer uses for command IDs applies here, so a coarse feature grant and a fine command rule live in the same namespace.

#### Command overrides

A coarse feature grant is convenient but blunt. It turns a whole capability on or off. Command overrides are the definitive, per-command layer above it. A grant carries two override sets, allow and deny, each a set of command patterns:

- An allow override grants a command even when its feature is not present. It is how a license enables a single operation from a capability the customer otherwise does not hold.
- A deny override withholds a command even when its feature is present. It is how a license excludes one operation from a capability the customer otherwise holds.

A deny always wins. When a command matches both an allow and a deny pattern, whether from the platform baseline or a per-tenant subscription, the deny is definitive and the command is refused with `COMMAND_DENIED`. This deny-overrides rule makes overrides safe to compose. A tenant can be granted extra operations on top of the platform baseline, but no addition can re-enable something the platform or the signed ceiling has denied. The full evaluation order, deny first, then the signed ceiling, then allow overrides, then feature gates, is described in [Entitlement Resolution](../concepts/entitlement-resolution).

### Configuration inventory

Production services read dozens of configuration keys. In practice, nobody has an authoritative list of which keys a given build actually touches, which are required, which have defaults, and which are read as secrets versus plain values.

A contract's config options inventory fixes that. Each key is declared with a role. The command either defines it (authoritative source, controls the default), consumes it (reads but doesn't own), or references it (mentions, for example for redirection). Keys are typed, and secret-bearing keys are marked. The registry can answer: "which command defines `sphereon.oid4vci.issuer.nonce.ttl`?" "which commands read it?" "what is the default?" That is a very different operational posture from grepping a codebase for string literals.

## How the platform uses contracts

Contracts are app-scoped, which means they are available before any session is created and before any request arrives. The EDK exposes them through a single registry with pattern-based lookup. From that point on:

- Authorization builds its AuthZEN/Cedar/OPA requests from the resource target and identifiers, without the command ever knowing a policy engine exists.
- Step-up authentication reads the assurance requirements to decide whether to challenge for AAL3 before invocation.
- Schema delivery serves overlay-enriched input schemas to UI clients and MCP agents, with i18n resolved per locale.
- Transport binding generates REST routes, gRPC method descriptors, and OpenAPI documents from the type tokens and resource identifiers.
- Compliance reporting walks the registry to enumerate which running commands touch personal data, which trigger DPIAs, which define retention periods, which process special-category data.
- Operational introspection lets operators ask which commands read a given config key, which capabilities a deployment has enabled, or which commands are ready for async execution.

None of this is framework magic. It is a straightforward consequence of deciding that a command's static description is data, and data should be queryable.

## Where contracts live

The contract framework lives in the EDK. The concrete contract for each domain lives next to the public command interface it describes, so the issuer contracts sit with the issuer command interfaces, the KMS contracts with the KMS command interfaces, and so on. The module that owns the command owns its contract.

Nothing in the open-source IDK depends on the contract framework. Commands declare themselves in IDK modules without knowing contracts exist. The EDK layers the metadata over them. The IDK stays an open foundation, and the contract infrastructure, along with the compliance, policy, and operational tooling that depends on it, is an enterprise capability.

Pure EDK and VDX command surfaces may keep the contract in the public module when there is no separate contract module. The VDX semantic-binding surface does this. Its service command contracts live next to the public command interfaces and expose license descriptors that match the per-operation `x-license-protection` entries in the canonical OpenAPI specification. The HTTP adapter commands are not licensed separately. The protected unit is the service command that performs the business operation.

A service that wants contract-driven behavior pulls in the relevant contract modules. DI discovers them automatically, and the registry is populated at application startup. A service that does not need them, a stripped-down testing harness for instance, can omit them with no runtime changes anywhere else.

## When to write one

Any new service command in the EDK should have a contract. The minimum bar is the command's action type, operation type, resource target, assurance requirements, and compliance profile. The schema overlay and config inventory are worth filling in for anything exposed over a transport or consumed by a UI. For internal orchestration helpers that are never externally addressable, they can be deferred.

The contract is authored once, next to the command, by the module that owns both. It is reviewed as part of the same PR. It is the one artifact a reviewer needs to confirm that a new operation has thought about regulation, risk, input handling, and configuration, before the implementation is merged, not six months later during an audit.

---

# HTTP & Transport

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# HTTP & Transport

The EDK has two communication systems that serve different roles but share the same command-oriented architecture:

| System | Purpose | Protocol | Audience |
|--------|---------|----------|----------|
| **Universal HTTP Adapter** | Expose public REST APIs to external clients | HTTP REST | Browsers, mobile apps, third-party integrations |
| **Command Transport** | Execute commands locally or via remote microservices | HTTP RPC, gRPC | Internal service-to-service communication |

Both systems are built on the EDK's command pattern. Every operation, generating a key, resolving a DID, validating a credential, is a `ServiceCommand` with a typed input and output. The difference is how that command reaches the implementation that executes it.

## Monolith vs Microservices

The EDK is designed so that the same application code can be deployed as a monolith or as distributed microservices without code changes. The decision is purely a matter of configuration and which modules are on the classpath.

### Monolith Deployment

All command implementations run in the same process. Every command resolves to `LOCAL` execution:

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-monolith-deployment.svg" alt="Monolith Deployment" style={{maxWidth: '520px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

Include all `-impl` modules in your classpath and every command executes locally. No network overhead, no serialization cost, no separate services to manage.

### Microservice Deployment

Individual domains run as separate services. Commands that target a remote domain are transparently forwarded over HTTP RPC or gRPC:

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-microservice-deployment.svg" alt="Microservice Deployment" style={{maxWidth: '620px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The calling code is identical in both cases. A developer invoking `kms.keys.generate` writes the same code regardless of whether KMS runs in-process or on a remote node. The transport layer handles serialization, routing, and error mapping transparently.

## How It Works

### 1. Command Invocation

You can invoke commands directly, but you don't have to. Service-layer classes like `KmsService` or `DidService` use commands internally, so whether you call a service method or a command, the transport routing applies equally:

```kotlin
// Option 1: Invoke the command directly
val result = generateKeyCommand.execute(
    GenerateKeyInput(algorithm = "EC", curve = "P-256")
)

// Option 2: Use the service layer — internally delegates to the same command
val key = kmsService.generateKey(algorithm = "EC", curve = "P-256")
```

Both paths end up at the same `ServiceCommand`. If KMS is configured to run on a remote node, the command is forwarded transparently, regardless of whether you called the command or the service.

This means local vs remote execution is entirely invisible to the caller. You never need to know or care whether a particular domain is in-process or on another machine.

### 2. Routing Decision

The `ExecutionTargetResolver` determines where the command runs, based on hierarchical configuration:

| Target | Behavior |
|--------|----------|
| `LOCAL` | Execute in-process via the session-scoped command registry |
| `SERVER` | Forward to a remote service over HTTP RPC or gRPC |
| `AUTO` | Try the configured remote transport; fall back to `LOCAL` if unavailable |

### 3. Transport Selection

When a command is routed to `SERVER`, the configured transport type determines the protocol:

| Transport | Path Convention | Use Case |
|-----------|----------------|----------|
| `HTTP` | `POST /rpc/{module}/{service}/{action}` | Cross-platform, firewall-friendly |
| `GRPC` | `{module}.{Service}Service/{Action}` | High-throughput, streaming support |

Both transports carry the same payload, the command's serialized input, and return the same typed result. Switching between them is a one-line config change.

### 4. Transparent Execution

From the developer's perspective, there is no difference:

```kotlin
// This code works identically whether KMS is local or remote
val key = generateKeyCommand.execute(input)
```

If KMS is local, the command executes directly. If KMS is remote, the transport layer:
1. Serializes the input (JSON, CBOR, or Protobuf)
2. Sends it to the configured endpoint
3. Deserializes the response
4. Returns the same `IdkResult<T, IdkError>` type

Errors from remote services are mapped to the same `IdkError` types used locally (e.g., `NOT_FOUND_ERROR`, `UNAUTHORIZED_ERROR`), so error handling code doesn't need to distinguish between local and remote failures.

## Configuration

A single configuration block controls all routing decisions:

```yaml
sphereon:
  transport:
    routing:
      defaults:
        target: LOCAL               # Default: everything runs locally
        transport: HTTP             # Protocol when routing to SERVER
        timeoutMs: 30000

      modules:
        kms:                        # Route all KMS commands to a remote service
          target: SERVER
          endpoint: "kms.internal:9090"
          transport: GRPC
        did:
          target: SERVER
          endpoint: "https://did-service.internal"
          transport: HTTP
```

This configuration means:
- All commands default to `LOCAL` execution
- `kms.*` commands are forwarded to `kms.internal:9090` via gRPC
- `did.*` commands are forwarded to `https://did-service.internal` via HTTP RPC
- Everything else (party, credentials, etc.) runs in-process

See [Command Transport](./command-transport) for the full configuration reference and transport details.

## Classpath-Driven Assembly

The transport behavior depends on which modules are on your classpath:

| Module | Provides |
|--------|----------|
| `lib-transport-routing-api` | Core routing logic, local transport, configuration |
| `lib-transport-client-api` | HTTP RPC client (Ktor-based) |
| `lib-transport-client-grpc` | gRPC client (Netty-based, JVM only) |
| `lib-transport-codec-binary` | CBOR and Protobuf serialization codecs |
| Domain `-impl` modules | Local command implementations |

If a domain's `-impl` module is on the classpath, its commands can run locally. If the transport client modules are on the classpath and a domain is configured with `target: SERVER`, those commands are forwarded remotely.

A typical monolith includes all `-impl` modules. A typical gateway service includes transport clients and only the `-impl` modules for domains it handles locally.

---

# Universal HTTP Adapter

# Universal HTTP Adapter

The Universal HTTP Adapter is a framework-agnostic abstraction for building HTTP APIs. Define your routes and handlers once, then run them on any supported HTTP framework—Ktor, Spring Boot, AWS Lambda, or others.

## Why Universal Adapters?

Traditional approaches couple your business logic to a specific HTTP framework:

```kotlin
// Ktor-specific
get("/keys/{id}") {
    val id = call.parameters["id"]
    call.respond(keyService.getKey(id))
}

// Spring-specific
@GetMapping("/keys/{id}")
fun getKey(@PathVariable id: String) = keyService.getKey(id)
```

This creates problems:
- **Vendor lock-in** - Switching frameworks requires rewriting all endpoints
- **Testing complexity** - Tests depend on framework-specific mocks
- **Code duplication** - Same logic reimplemented for different deployments

The Universal HTTP Adapter solves this by decoupling your API logic from the HTTP framework:

```kotlin
// Framework-agnostic
val routes = httpRoutes {
    get("/keys/{id}") {
        handle { request ->
            val id = request.pathParameters["id"]!!
            val key = keyService.getKey(id)
            GenericHttpResponse(200, body = json.encodeToString(key))
        }
    }
}

// Deploy to any framework
// - Ktor: installUniversalHttpAdapters()
// - Spring: UniversalHttpAdapterController
// - Lambda: Direct dispatch
```

## Architecture Overview

<img src="/img/diagrams/universal-http-adapter-architecture.svg" alt="Universal HTTP Adapter Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '650px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Core Abstractions

### GenericHttpRequest

Framework-agnostic representation of an HTTP request:

```kotlin
data class GenericHttpRequest(
    val method: String,                         // GET, POST, PUT, etc.
    val path: String,                           // Full request path
    val pathParameters: Map<String, String>,    // Extracted from patterns
    val queryParameters: Map<String, String?>,  // Query string
    val headers: Map<String, String>,           // HTTP headers
    val bodySupplier: (() -> String?)?,         // Lazy body reading
    val bodyContent: GenericHttpBody            // Typed body
)
```

**Key Features:**
- **Lazy body reading** - Body is only read when accessed, avoiding I/O for GET requests
- **Lazy collections** - Headers and query params use `LazyMap` to avoid allocation if not accessed
- **Path parameter extraction** - Automatically populated from route patterns

**Helper Methods:**

```kotlin
// Check if request matches a route
request.matches("GET", "/keys/{id}")  // true/false

// Create new request with extracted path parameters
val enriched = request.withExtractedParams("/keys/{id}")
// enriched.pathParameters["id"] is now populated
```

### GenericHttpResponse

Framework-agnostic representation of an HTTP response:

```kotlin
data class GenericHttpResponse(
    val statusCode: Int,
    val headers: Map<String, String> = emptyMap(),
    val body: String? = null,
    val bodyContent: GenericHttpBody = GenericHttpBody.Empty
)
```

**Factory Methods:**

```kotlin
// Success responses
GenericHttpResponse(200, body = """{"id": "123"}""")
GenericHttpResponse(201, headers = mapOf("Location" to "/keys/123"))
GenericHttpResponse(204)  // No content

// Error responses
GenericHttpResponse(400, body = """{"error": "Invalid input"}""")
GenericHttpResponse(404, body = """{"error": "Not found"}""")
GenericHttpResponse(500, body = """{"error": "Internal error"}""")
```

### GenericHttpBody

Typed body content supporting text and binary:

```kotlin
sealed class GenericHttpBody {
    data object Empty : GenericHttpBody()

    data class Text(
        val value: String,
        val charset: String = "utf-8"
    ) : GenericHttpBody()

    data class Bytes(
        val value: ByteArray
    ) : GenericHttpBody()

    class LazyText(
        private val supplier: () -> String?,
        val charset: String = "utf-8"
    ) : GenericHttpBody()

    class LazyBytes(
        private val supplier: () -> ByteArray?
    ) : GenericHttpBody()
}
```

## HttpAdapter Interface

The core interface that all adapters implement:

```kotlin
interface HttpAdapter {
    val id: String

    fun describe(): HttpAdapterDescription

    suspend fun handleRequest(request: GenericHttpRequest): GenericHttpResponse
}
```

| Property/Method | Description |
|-----------------|-------------|
| `id` | Stable identifier for configuration and replacement |
| `describe()` | Returns metadata about routes for catalog registration |
| `handleRequest()` | Processes requests and returns responses |

## Building Adapters

### RoutedHttpAdapter (Recommended)

The simplest way to build an adapter using the route DSL:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.core.api.http.RoutedHttpAdapter
import com.sphereon.core.api.http.describe.*
import amazon.lastmile.inject.anvil.ContributesBinding
import amazon.lastmile.inject.anvil.SingleIn
import com.sphereon.di.scope.SessionScope
import jakarta.inject.Inject
import jakarta.inject.Named

@Inject
@Named(KeysHttpAdapter.ID)
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@ContributesBinding(SessionScope::class, boundType = HttpAdapter::class, multibinding = true)
class KeysHttpAdapter(
    private val keyService: KeyService
) : RoutedHttpAdapter() {

    companion object {
        const val ID = "keys-adapter"
    }

    override val id = ID

    override val mount = HttpAdapterMount(
        serverPrefix = "/api/v1",
        adapterBasePath = "/keys"
    )

    override val routes = httpRoutes {
        get("") {
            operationId("listKeys")
            produces(MediaType.ApplicationJson)
            handle { request ->
                val keys = keyService.listKeys()
                GenericHttpResponse(200, body = json.encodeToString(keys))
            }
        }

        get("/{keyId}") {
            operationId("getKey")
            produces(MediaType.ApplicationJson)
            handle { request ->
                val keyId = request.pathParameters["keyId"]!!
                val key = keyService.getKey(keyId)
                    ?: return@handle GenericHttpResponse(404)
                GenericHttpResponse(200, body = json.encodeToString(key))
            }
        }

        post("") {
            operationId("createKey")
            consumes(MediaType.ApplicationJson)
            produces(MediaType.ApplicationJson)
            handle { request ->
                val input = json.decodeFromString<CreateKeyInput>(request.body!!)
                val key = keyService.createKey(input)
                GenericHttpResponse(
                    statusCode = 201,
                    headers = mapOf("Location" to "/api/v1/keys/${key.id}"),
                    body = json.encodeToString(key)
                )
            }
        }

        delete("/{keyId}") {
            operationId("deleteKey")
            handle { request ->
                val keyId = request.pathParameters["keyId"]!!
                keyService.deleteKey(keyId)
                GenericHttpResponse(204)
            }
        }
    }
}
```

### Route DSL Reference

```kotlin
httpRoutes {
    // HTTP methods
    get("/path") { /* ... */ }
    post("/path") { /* ... */ }
    put("/path") { /* ... */ }
    delete("/path") { /* ... */ }
    patch("/path") { /* ... */ }

    // Path parameters
    get("/users/{userId}/keys/{keyId}") {
        handle { request ->
            val userId = request.pathParameters["userId"]!!
            val keyId = request.pathParameters["keyId"]!!
            // ...
        }
    }

    // Metadata for OpenAPI
    get("/keys") {
        operationId("listKeys")           // Unique operation identifier
        summary("List all keys")          // Short description
        tags("Keys", "Management")        // Grouping tags
        consumes(MediaType.ApplicationJson)  // Request content types
        produces(MediaType.ApplicationJson)  // Response content types

        handle { request -> /* ... */ }
    }
}
```

### CommandBackedHttpAdapter (Advanced)

For complex scenarios with full command lifecycle integration:

```kotlin
abstract class CommandBackedHttpAdapter(
    override val id: String,
    execution: SessionExecution,
    protected val mount: HttpAdapterMount,
    isEnabled: Boolean = true,
    initExtensions: Array<ICommandInitExtension<...>> = emptyArray(),
    executionExtensions: Array<ICommandExecutionExtension<...>> = emptyArray()
) : HttpAdapter {

    protected abstract val endpointCommands: List<HttpEndpointCommand>

    // Each endpoint becomes a standalone command with:
    // - Init/execution extensions
    // - Per-endpoint enablement
    // - Full command lifecycle
}
```

Use `CommandBackedHttpAdapter` when you need:
- Per-endpoint feature flags
- Command-level authorization checks
- Audit logging via extensions
- Complex multi-step operations

## Adapter Mounting

### HttpAdapterMount

Controls where an adapter is mounted in the URL hierarchy:

```kotlin
data class HttpAdapterMount(
    val serverPrefix: String,              // e.g., "/api/v1"
    val adapterBasePath: String,           // e.g., "/keys"
    val tenantPathMode: TenantPathMode = TenantPathMode.OFF,
    val tenantSegmentPattern: String = "/t/{tenantId}",
    val tenantResolutionPriority: TenantResolutionPriority = TenantResolutionPriority.HEADER_THEN_PATH
)
```

**URL Structure:**

```
Full URL:     /api/v1/keys/{keyId}
              ├──────┤├────┤├─────┤
              server   base  endpoint
              prefix   path  pattern
```

### Tenant-in-Path Support

Enable tenant identification in the URL path:

| Mode | Example URL | Description |
|------|-------------|-------------|
| `OFF` | `/api/keys` | Tenant from headers/JWT only |
| `BEFORE_SERVER_PREFIX` | `/t/acme/api/keys` | Tenant before server prefix |
| `AFTER_SERVER_PREFIX` | `/api/t/acme/keys` | Tenant after server prefix |
| `BOTH` | Either of above | Both placements supported |

**Configuration:**

```kotlin
val mount = HttpAdapterMount(
    serverPrefix = "/api",
    adapterBasePath = "/keys",
    tenantPathMode = TenantPathMode.AFTER_SERVER_PREFIX,
    tenantSegmentPattern = "/t/{tenantId}",
    tenantResolutionPriority = TenantResolutionPriority.PATH_THEN_HEADER
)
```

**Resolution Priority:**

| Priority | Behavior |
|----------|----------|
| `HEADER_THEN_PATH` | Check X-Tenant-ID header first, fall back to path |
| `PATH_THEN_HEADER` | Check path first, fall back to header |

## Dispatching System

### HttpAdapterCatalog

Indexes all registered adapters at application startup:

```kotlin
interface HttpAdapterCatalog {
    val descriptions: List<HttpAdapterDescription>

    fun describeAll(): List<HttpAdapterDescription>
    fun descriptionById(id: String): HttpAdapterDescription?
    fun requireNoCollisions()  // Throws if duplicates detected
}
```

**Collision Detection:**

The catalog detects and reports:
- Duplicate adapter IDs
- Overlapping endpoints (same method + path on different adapters)
- Duplicate endpoints within a single adapter

### HttpAdapterDispatcher

Routes incoming requests to the correct adapter:

```kotlin
interface HttpAdapterDispatcher {
    suspend fun dispatch(request: GenericHttpRequest): GenericHttpResponse
}
```

**Dispatch Algorithm:**

1. **Find candidates** - All adapters whose mount + endpoints match the request
2. **Score candidates** by specificity:
   - Server prefix segment count (more segments = higher score)
   - Base path segment count
   - Literal segments in endpoint (static parts beat parameters)
   - Total segment count
3. **Select highest scorer**
4. **Normalize request** - Strip server prefix, extract tenant
5. **Delegate** to adapter's `handleRequest()`

## Spring Boot Integration

### UniversalHttpAdapterController

Base interface for Spring controllers:

```kotlin
interface UniversalHttpAdapterController {
    val httpAdapter: HttpAdapter

    @UniversalHttpMapping
    suspend fun handleRequest(request: HttpServletRequest): ResponseEntity<String>
}
```

### Creating a Spring Controller

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.spring.http.UniversalHttpAdapterController
import com.sphereon.spring.http.UniversalHttpMapping
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RequestMapping
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.RestController

@RestController
@RequestMapping("/api/v1/keys/**")
class KeysController(
    private val keysAdapter: KeysHttpAdapter
) : UniversalHttpAdapterController {

    override val httpAdapter: HttpAdapter = keysAdapter

    // handleRequest() is inherited from UniversalHttpAdapterController
}
```

### Catch-All Dispatcher

For a single controller that handles all adapters:

```kotlin
@RestController
@RequestMapping("/**")
class UniversalApiController(
    private val dispatcher: HttpAdapterDispatcher
) {
    @UniversalHttpMapping
    suspend fun handleRequest(request: HttpServletRequest): ResponseEntity<String> {
        val genericRequest = request.toGenericHttpRequest()
        val genericResponse = dispatcher.dispatch(genericRequest)
        return genericResponse.toSpringResponse()
    }
}
```

### Extension Functions

Convert between Spring and generic types:

```kotlin
// Spring → Generic
fun HttpServletRequest.toGenericHttpRequest(): GenericHttpRequest

// Generic → Spring
fun GenericHttpResponse.toSpringResponse(): ResponseEntity<String>
```

## Configuration

### UniversalHttpConfig

Configure defaults and per-adapter overrides:

```kotlin
data class UniversalHttpConfig(
    val defaults: UniversalHttpDefaults = UniversalHttpDefaults(),
    val overrides: Map<String, UniversalHttpAdapterOverride> = emptyMap()
)

data class UniversalHttpDefaults(
    val serverPrefix: String = "",
    val tenantPathMode: TenantPathMode = TenantPathMode.OFF,
    val tenantSegmentPattern: String = "/t/{tenantId}",
    val tenantResolutionPriority: TenantResolutionPriority = TenantResolutionPriority.HEADER_THEN_PATH,
    val defaultConsumes: Set<MediaType> = setOf(MediaType.ApplicationJson),
    val defaultProduces: Set<MediaType> = setOf(MediaType.ApplicationJson)
)

data class UniversalHttpAdapterOverride(
    val serverPrefix: String? = null,
    val adapterBasePath: String? = null,
    val tenantPathMode: TenantPathMode? = null,
    val enabled: Boolean = true
)
```

### Properties Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  http:
    defaults:
      server-prefix: /api/v1
      tenant-path-mode: AFTER_SERVER_PREFIX
      tenant-segment-pattern: /t/{tenantId}

    overrides:
      keys-adapter:
        server-prefix: /api/v2   # Override for specific adapter
        enabled: true

      legacy-adapter:
        enabled: false           # Disable adapter
```

## Complete Example

### 1. Define the Adapter

```kotlin
@Inject
@Named(PartyHttpAdapter.ID)
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@ContributesBinding(SessionScope::class, boundType = HttpAdapter::class, multibinding = true)
class PartyHttpAdapter(
    private val partyService: PartyService,
    private val json: Json
) : RoutedHttpAdapter() {

    companion object {
        const val ID = "party-adapter"
    }

    override val id = ID

    override val mount = HttpAdapterMount(
        serverPrefix = "/api/v1",
        adapterBasePath = "/parties",
        tenantPathMode = TenantPathMode.OFF
    )

    override val routes = httpRoutes {
        get("") {
            operationId("listParties")
            produces(MediaType.ApplicationJson)
            handle { request ->
                val tenantId = request.headers["X-Tenant-ID"]
                    ?: return@handle GenericHttpResponse(400, body = "Missing tenant")

                val parties = partyService.listParties(tenantId)
                GenericHttpResponse(200, body = json.encodeToString(parties))
            }
        }

        get("/{partyId}") {
            operationId("getParty")
            produces(MediaType.ApplicationJson)
            handle { request ->
                val tenantId = request.headers["X-Tenant-ID"]!!
                val partyId = request.pathParameters["partyId"]!!

                val party = partyService.getParty(tenantId, partyId)
                    ?: return@handle GenericHttpResponse(404)

                GenericHttpResponse(200, body = json.encodeToString(party))
            }
        }

        post("") {
            operationId("createParty")
            consumes(MediaType.ApplicationJson)
            produces(MediaType.ApplicationJson)
            handle { request ->
                val tenantId = request.headers["X-Tenant-ID"]!!
                val input = json.decodeFromString<CreatePartyInput>(request.body!!)

                val party = partyService.createParty(tenantId, input)
                GenericHttpResponse(
                    statusCode = 201,
                    headers = mapOf(
                        "Location" to "/api/v1/parties/${party.partyId}",
                        "Content-Type" to "application/json"
                    ),
                    body = json.encodeToString(party)
                )
            }
        }
    }
}
```

### 2. Create Spring Controller

```kotlin
@RestController
@RequestMapping("/api/v1/parties/**")
class PartyController(
    private val partyAdapter: PartyHttpAdapter
) : UniversalHttpAdapterController {
    override val httpAdapter: HttpAdapter = partyAdapter
}
```

### 3. Test the API

```bash
# List parties
curl -H "X-Tenant-ID: acme" http://localhost:8080/api/v1/parties

# Get party
curl -H "X-Tenant-ID: acme" http://localhost:8080/api/v1/parties/p123

# Create party
curl -X POST -H "X-Tenant-ID: acme" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"displayName": "Alice"}' \
  http://localhost:8080/api/v1/parties
```

## Best Practices

**Use RoutedHttpAdapter for most cases** - It's simpler and routes are the single source of truth.

**Keep handlers focused** - Extract business logic to services; handlers should just parse/serialize.

**Use lazy body reading** - Don't access `request.body` in GET/DELETE handlers unnecessarily.

**Define meaningful operation IDs** - They're used for OpenAPI generation and logging.

**Handle errors consistently** - Return appropriate status codes and structured error bodies.

**Test adapters in isolation** - Create `GenericHttpRequest` directly without framework dependencies.

---

# Command Transport

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# Command Transport

The command transport system enables transparent local and remote execution of EDK commands. Every `ServiceCommand` can be invoked in-process or forwarded to a remote service, the calling code is identical in both cases.

## Transport Architecture

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-command-transport.svg" alt="Command Transport Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '560px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Execution Targets

The `ExecutionTarget` enum determines where a command runs:

```kotlin
enum class ExecutionTarget {
    LOCAL,   // In-process via SessionScopedCommandRegistry
    SERVER,  // Remote endpoint via HTTP RPC or gRPC
    AUTO     // SERVER if transport available, fallback to LOCAL
}
```

| Target | When to use |
|--------|-------------|
| `LOCAL` | The command's `-impl` module is on the classpath and you want in-process execution. No serialization overhead. |
| `SERVER` | The domain runs as a separate microservice. Commands are serialized and forwarded. |
| `AUTO` | Useful during migration, tries remote first, falls back to local if the transport module isn't available. |

## Configuration

### Hierarchical Resolution

Configuration follows a specificity hierarchy. More specific settings override less specific ones:

```
defaults → module → service → command
```

```yaml
sphereon:
  transport:
    routing:
      defaults:
        target: LOCAL
        transport: HTTP
        timeoutMs: 30000

      modules:
        kms:
          target: SERVER
          endpoint: "kms.internal:9090"
          transport: GRPC
          services:
            keys:
              timeoutMs: 5000         # Override timeout for key operations
              commands:
                kms.keys.sign:
                  timeoutMs: 60000    # Signing can take longer
```

**Resolution for `kms.keys.sign`:**
1. Start with defaults: `LOCAL`, `HTTP`, 30s
2. Apply `modules.kms`: → `SERVER`, `GRPC`, endpoint `kms.internal:9090`
3. Apply `modules.kms.services.keys`: → timeout 5s
4. Apply command override: → timeout 60s
5. **Result:** `SERVER`, `GRPC`, `kms.internal:9090`, 60s timeout

### Configuration Properties

```kotlin
data class ServiceCommandsConfig(
    val defaults: TransportDefaults = TransportDefaults(),
    val modules: Map<String, ModuleConfig> = emptyMap()
)

data class TransportDefaults(
    val target: ExecutionTarget = ExecutionTarget.LOCAL,
    val transport: TransportType = TransportType.HTTP,
    val timeoutMs: Long = 30_000
)

data class ModuleConfig(
    val target: ExecutionTarget? = null,
    val transport: TransportType? = null,
    val endpoint: String? = null,
    val timeoutMs: Long? = null,
    val services: Map<String, ServiceConfig> = emptyMap()
)

data class ServiceConfig(
    val target: ExecutionTarget? = null,
    val transport: TransportType? = null,
    val endpoint: String? = null,
    val timeoutMs: Long? = null,
    val commands: Map<String, CommandConfig> = emptyMap()
)

data class CommandConfig(
    val target: ExecutionTarget? = null,
    val transport: TransportType? = null,
    val endpoint: String? = null,
    val timeoutMs: Long? = null
)
```

Null fields at any level mean "inherit from parent." Only set what you want to override.

### Configuration Integration

The transport configuration is read through the EDK's `ConfigService`, so it participates in the standard property resolution chain, environment variables, YAML files, cloud config, and database-backed settings all work:

```bash
# Environment variable overrides
export SPHEREON_TRANSPORT_ROUTING_DEFAULTS_TARGET=LOCAL
export SPHEREON_TRANSPORT_ROUTING_MODULES_KMS_TARGET=SERVER
export SPHEREON_TRANSPORT_ROUTING_MODULES_KMS_ENDPOINT=kms.internal:9090
```

Since `ConfigService` supports tenant-scoped resolution, different tenants can have different routing configurations, for example, routing one tenant's KMS operations to a dedicated HSM service.

## Convention-Based Routing

When a command is routed to `SERVER`, the transport layer derives the HTTP and gRPC paths from the command ID without any explicit binding configuration:

| Command ID | HTTP RPC Path | gRPC Service | gRPC Method |
|-----------|---------------|-------------|-------------|
| `kms.keys.generate` | `POST /rpc/kms/keys/generate` | `kms.KeysService` | `Generate` |
| `kms.keys.sign` | `POST /rpc/kms/keys/sign` | `kms.KeysService` | `Sign` |
| `did.resolution.resolve` | `POST /rpc/did/resolution/resolve` | `did.ResolutionService` | `Resolve` |
| `party.manager.create` | `POST /rpc/party/manager/create` | `party.ManagerService` | `Create` |

The convention is:
- **Command ID format:** `{module}.{service}.{action}`
- **HTTP:** `POST /rpc/{module}/{service}/{action}`
- **gRPC:** `{module}.{Service}Service/{Action}`

New commands work automatically, no binding metadata or registration needed.

## HTTP RPC Transport

The HTTP transport sends commands as POST requests to a remote service:

```
POST {endpoint}/rpc/{module}/{service}/{action}
Content-Type: application/json
X-Command-Id: kms.keys.generate
Authorization: Bearer {token}
traceparent: 00-{traceId}-{spanId}-01

{"algorithm": "EC", "curve": "P-256"}
```

**Features:**
- **Codec negotiation**: JSON by default; CBOR and Protobuf available when `lib-transport-codec-binary` is on the classpath
- **Auth propagation**: Session context (bearer tokens, tenant ID) is forwarded via headers
- **W3C Trace Context**: `traceparent` headers enable distributed tracing across services
- **Ktor-based**: Uses Ktor's CIO engine (JVM) or Darwin engine (iOS/macOS)

### HTTP Client Implementation

The `KtorHttpCommandClient` handles serialization, codec negotiation, and error mapping:

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@ContributesBinding(SessionScope::class, binding = binding<HttpCommandClient>())
class KtorHttpCommandClient(
    private val codecRegistry: StreamingCodecRegistry,
    private val mediaTypeNegotiator: MediaTypeNegotiator,
    private val httpClientFactory: HttpClientFactory,
    private val logService: LogService
) : HttpCommandClient
```

The client is injected automatically when `lib-transport-client-api` is on the classpath.

## gRPC Transport

The gRPC transport uses Protocol Buffers over HTTP/2 for high-throughput, low-latency communication:

### Protocol Definition

```protobuf
service CommandService {
  rpc Invoke(CommandRequest) returns (CommandResponse);
  rpc InvokeServerStream(CommandRequest) returns (stream CommandResponse);
  rpc InvokeBidiStream(stream CommandRequest) returns (stream CommandResponse);
}

message CommandRequest {
  string command_id = 1;
  string content_type = 2;
  map<string, string> headers = 3;
  map<string, string> metadata = 4;
  bytes body = 5;
}

message CommandResponse {
  int32 status_code = 1;
  string content_type = 2;
  map<string, string> headers = 3;
  bytes body = 4;
}
```

The generic `CommandRequest`/`CommandResponse` envelope carries any command's serialized input and output, there is no per-command `.proto` definition needed.

### Streaming Patterns

| Pattern | Use Case | Example |
|---------|----------|---------|
| **Unary** | Standard request/response | Key generation, DID resolution |
| **Server streaming** | Server sends multiple results | Bulk credential validation, event feeds |
| **Bidirectional streaming** | Both sides send streams | Real-time audit log forwarding |

Streaming methods return Kotlin `Flow<IdkResult<T, IdkError>>` for backpressure-aware consumption:

```kotlin
val results: Flow<IdkResult<ValidationResult, IdkError>> =
    transport.invokeServerStream(
        commandId = "credentials.batch.validate",
        input = BatchValidateInput(credentials),
        sessionContext = sessionContext,
        outputTypeToken = typeToken<ValidationResult>()
    )

results.collect { result ->
    result.onSuccess { println("Validated: ${it.credentialId}") }
    result.onFailure { println("Error: ${it.message}") }
}
```

### gRPC Client Features

- **Channel pooling**: Connections are pooled by `(host, port, useTls, caCertPath)` with 5-minute idle timeout
- **TLS support**: Plaintext, system trust store, or custom CA certificate
- **Auth propagation**: Session context forwarded as gRPC metadata headers
- **Platform**: JVM only (Netty-based). Non-JVM platforms use the HTTP transport.

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
class GrpcCommandClientImpl(
    private val codecRegistry: StreamingCodecRegistry,
    private val mediaTypeNegotiator: MediaTypeNegotiator,
    private val clientInterceptors: Set<ClientInterceptor>,
    private val serviceIdentity: ServiceIdentity
) : GrpcCommandClient
```

## Serialization Codecs

The transport layer supports multiple serialization formats. Codecs are registered via Metro multibinding and selected through content-type negotiation:

| Codec | Content-Type | Module | Notes |
|-------|-------------|--------|-------|
| JSON | `application/json` | Core (always available) | Default, human-readable |
| CBOR | `application/cbor` | `lib-transport-codec-binary` | Compact binary, good for large payloads |
| Protobuf | `application/protobuf` | `lib-transport-codec-binary` | Smallest wire size, requires schema |

Codec selection is configured per-endpoint or via content-type negotiation:

```yaml
sphereon:
  transport:
    routing:
      modules:
        kms:
          target: SERVER
          endpoint: "kms.internal:9090"
          transport: GRPC
          # gRPC uses CBOR by default for payload encoding
```

## Local Transport

When a command resolves to `LOCAL`, the `LocalServiceCommandTransport` bypasses all serialization and network overhead:

```kotlin
class LocalServiceCommandTransport(
    private val sessionRegistry: SessionScopedCommandRegistry
) : ServiceCommandTransport {

    private suspend fun <T : Any> invokeInternal(
        commandId: String,
        input: Any
    ): IdkResult<T, IdkError> {
        val command = sessionRegistry.getLocal(commandId)
            ?: return Err(IdkError.NOT_FOUND_ERROR(
                message = "No LOCAL implementation found for command: $commandId"
            ))
        return (command as ServiceCommand<Any, Any>).execute(input) as IdkResult<T, IdkError>
    }
}
```

The `getLocal()` call ensures that even if a `RoutingCommandDelegator` sits in the registry, it resolves the underlying local implementation, preventing infinite recursion when config says `LOCAL`.

## Code Generation

The `@GenerateRoutedCommands` annotation triggers KSP code generation that creates remote-capable wrappers for commands. For each annotated command interface, a `{CommandName}Routed` class is generated:

```kotlin
// Generated by TransportAdapterProcessor
@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
class GenerateKeyCommandRouted(
    private val transportFactory: ServiceCommandTransportFactory,
    private val runtimeSessionContext: SessionContext
) : GenerateKeyCommand, RoutableImplementation {

    override val executionTarget = ExecutionTarget.SERVER

    override suspend fun execute(args: GenerateKeyInput): IdkResult<GeneratedKey, IdkError> {
        val transport = transportFactory.getRuntimeBoundTransport(commandId, runtimeSessionContext)
        return transport.invoke(commandId, args, outputTypeToken)
    }
}
```

This generated class is contributed to the DI graph alongside the local implementation. The `RoutingCommandDelegator` receives both via multibinding and selects the right one based on the execution target resolved from configuration.

You don't write this code, the KSP processor generates it from the command interface. Adding `lib-transport-routing-api` and annotating your command module is sufficient.

## Error Handling

Remote errors are mapped to the same `IdkError` types used by local implementations:

| HTTP Status / gRPC Code | IdkError |
|--------------------------|----------|
| 400 | `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR` |
| 401 | `UNAUTHORIZED_ERROR` |
| 403 | `FORBIDDEN_ERROR` |
| 404 | `NOT_FOUND_ERROR` |
| 409 | `INVALID_STATE` |
| 5xx | `UNKNOWN_ERROR` |

This means error handling code works identically for local and remote commands:

```kotlin
when (val result = generateKeyCommand.execute(input)) {
    is Ok -> handleSuccess(result.value)
    is Err -> when (result.error.type) {
        IdkErrorType.NOT_FOUND_ERROR -> handleNotFound()
        IdkErrorType.UNAUTHORIZED_ERROR -> handleUnauthorized()
        else -> handleGenericError(result.error)
    }
}
```

## Policy-Aware Transport

The `PolicyAwareHttpCommandClient` decorator adds pre-flight authorization checks before forwarding commands to remote services:

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
class PolicyAwareHttpCommandClient(
    private val delegate: HttpCommandClient,
    private val policyClient: PolicyClient,
    private val config: PolicyAwareConfig = PolicyAwareConfig()
) : HttpCommandClient
```

Before each remote invocation, it evaluates the command against the configured policy engine (e.g., Cedarling/AuthZEN). If the policy denies the request, a `FORBIDDEN_ERROR` is returned immediately, avoiding the network round-trip.

The `failOnPolicyError` flag controls behavior when the policy service itself is unavailable:
- `false` (default), fail open, allow the request
- `true`, fail closed, deny the request

## Deployment Examples

### All-in-One Monolith

```yaml
# No transport config needed — everything defaults to LOCAL
sphereon:
  transport:
    routing:
      defaults:
        target: LOCAL
```

Classpath: all `-impl` modules included.

### Gateway + KMS Microservice

**Gateway service:**
```yaml
sphereon:
  transport:
    routing:
      defaults:
        target: LOCAL
      modules:
        kms:
          target: SERVER
          endpoint: "kms.internal:9090"
          transport: GRPC
```

Classpath: all `-impl` modules *except* KMS. Includes `lib-transport-client-grpc`.

**KMS service:**
```yaml
sphereon:
  transport:
    routing:
      defaults:
        target: LOCAL
```

Classpath: only KMS `-impl` modules. Exposes gRPC `CommandService` endpoint.

### Gradual Migration

Use `AUTO` target to migrate domains incrementally:

```yaml
sphereon:
  transport:
    routing:
      defaults:
        target: LOCAL
      modules:
        kms:
          target: AUTO                  # Try remote, fall back to local
          endpoint: "kms.internal:9090"
          transport: GRPC
```

With `AUTO`, if the gRPC transport module is on the classpath and the endpoint is reachable, commands go remote. Otherwise they execute locally. This lets you deploy the microservice first, then remove the local `-impl` module from the gateway once you've confirmed the remote service is stable.

## Module Reference

| Module | Artifact | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| Routing API | `lib-transport-routing-api` | Core routing, config resolution, local transport, code generation annotations |
| HTTP Client | `lib-transport-client-api` | Ktor-based HTTP RPC client |
| gRPC Client | `lib-transport-client-grpc` | Netty-based gRPC client (JVM only) |
| Binary Codecs | `lib-transport-codec-binary` | CBOR and Protobuf serialization |
| Adapter Processor | `lib-transport-adapter-processor` | KSP processor for `@GenerateRoutedCommands` |

---

# Telemetry & Observability

# Telemetry & Observability

The EDK's telemetry system gives you visibility into what your application is doing at runtime, which commands are executing, how long they take, where time is spent across service boundaries, and how errors propagate through the system. It covers the three pillars of observability: distributed tracing, metrics, and log correlation.

The system is built as a platform-agnostic abstraction with an OpenTelemetry backend. Application code uses the EDK's `TracerProvider` and `MetricsCollector` interfaces, it never imports OpenTelemetry directly. This means telemetry works identically across Kotlin Multiplatform targets (JVM, JS, Node.js), and the backend can be swapped without changing application code.

## Why Telemetry Matters for the EDK

In a command-oriented architecture where operations can execute locally or be forwarded to remote microservices via [command transport](./command-transport), understanding what happens across service boundaries is essential. A single user action might trigger a chain of commands: authenticate → resolve identity → check policy → generate key → sign credential. Without tracing, debugging a slow response or intermittent failure in that chain means reading logs from multiple services and manually correlating timestamps.

With the telemetry system:
- A **trace** follows the entire chain from the initial HTTP request through every command and remote call, with a single trace ID that links everything together
- **Spans** within the trace show where time is spent, 200ms in policy evaluation, 50ms in KMS, 10ms in the database
- **Metrics** track command success/failure rates, latency distributions, and concurrent execution counts
- **Log correlation** injects the trace ID and span ID into application logs, so you can filter your log aggregator (Elasticsearch, Loki, Datadog) by trace ID and see every log line from every service that participated in that request

## Architecture

The telemetry system uses a two-layer architecture:

**Public API** (`lib-telemetry-public`) defines the interfaces that all application code uses: `TracerProvider`, `Tracer`, `Span`, `SpanBuilder`, `MetricsCollector`, and `TraceContext`. This module has no OpenTelemetry dependencies and supports Kotlin Multiplatform.

**OTel Implementation** (`lib-telemetry-otel`) adapts the OpenTelemetry SDK to the public API. It provides `OtelTracerProvider`, `OtelMetricsCollector`, and `OtelContextPropagator`, JVM-only implementations backed by the OTel SDK. When this module is on the classpath, Metro DI automatically replaces the no-op defaults with the OTel implementations.

When `lib-telemetry-otel` is **not** on the classpath, all telemetry calls go to zero-overhead no-op implementations. There's no runtime cost, method calls return immediately, no objects are allocated, no data is collected. This means libraries can instrument their code unconditionally; the cost is zero unless someone explicitly opts in by adding the OTel module.

## Distributed Tracing

### Trace Context

Every trace starts with a `TraceContext` that carries a W3C-compliant trace ID and span ID:

```kotlin
data class TraceContext(
    val traceId: String,        // 32-char hex (128 bits)
    val spanId: String,         // 16-char hex (64 bits)
    val parentSpanId: String?,
    val traceFlags: Int = 0     // Sampled bit
)
```

The `TraceContext` can be serialized to/from the standard `traceparent` header (`00-{traceId}-{spanId}-{flags}`), which is how traces propagate across HTTP and gRPC boundaries. When a service receives a request with a `traceparent` header, it extracts the parent context and creates child spans under it, linking the entire request chain into a single trace.

### Creating Spans

Spans represent units of work. Each span has a name, a parent (if it's not the root), attributes (key-value metadata), events (timestamped log entries), and a status (OK or ERROR):

```kotlin
val tracer = tracerProvider.getTracer("com.example.myservice")

val span = tracer.spanBuilder("process-credential")
    .setAttribute("credential.type", "VerifiableCredential")
    .setAttribute("tenant.id", tenantId)
    .startSpan()

try {
    span.makeCurrent().use {
        // All child operations inherit this span as parent
        val result = credentialService.process(input)
        span.setStatus(SpanStatus.OK, null)
    }
} catch (e: Exception) {
    span.recordException(e)
    span.setStatus(SpanStatus.ERROR, e.message)
    throw e
} finally {
    span.end()
}
```

The `makeCurrent()` call pushes the span onto the current context (thread-local on JVM, coroutine context element in suspend functions). Any child spans created within that scope automatically become children of this span. This is how a trace tree forms, you don't need to manually pass parent references.

### Coroutine Integration

In Kotlin coroutine-based code (which is most EDK code), spans propagate via a `SpanContextElement` in the coroutine context:

```kotlin
val span = tracer.spanBuilder("background-job").startSpan()

launch(SpanContextElement(span)) {
    // This coroutine and all its children carry the span
    val metadata = LogCorrelation.currentTraceMetadata()
    // metadata = { "traceId": "abc...", "spanId": "def..." }
}
```

This means suspend functions don't need to accept trace context as a parameter, it flows automatically through the coroutine hierarchy.

## Cross-Service Propagation

When the [command transport](./command-transport) forwards a command to a remote service, the trace context must travel with it. The `OtelContextPropagator` handles this:

**Outbound**: before sending an HTTP RPC or gRPC request, the transport injects the current span's context into the request headers as a `traceparent` header.

**Inbound**: when receiving a request, the transport extracts the `traceparent` header and creates a child span under the received parent context.

This happens automatically in the transport layer. Application code doesn't need to manage trace propagation, it creates spans for its own work, and the transport ensures those spans are linked across service boundaries.

The result is an end-to-end trace that shows the full path of a request:

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-distributed-trace.svg" alt="Distributed Trace Waterfall" style={{maxWidth: '580px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

Each service contributes its spans to the same trace, and tools like Jaeger, Zipkin, or Grafana Tempo render the full tree.

## Metrics

The `MetricsCollector` provides three instrument types:

**Counters** track how many times something happens. Command executions, authorization denials, cache hits/misses, HTTP requests by status code:

```kotlin
metricsCollector.incrementCounter(
    "command.executed",
    mapOf("command" to "kms.keys.generate", "result" to "success")
)
```

**Histograms** track the distribution of values, typically latencies. Command execution time, PDP evaluation time, database query time. Histograms give you percentiles (p50, p95, p99) rather than just averages:

```kotlin
metricsCollector.recordHistogram(
    "command.duration_ms",
    durationMs.toDouble(),
    mapOf("command" to "kms.keys.generate")
)
```

**Gauges** track current values that go up and down, active connections, queue depth, cache size:

```kotlin
metricsCollector.setGauge(
    "connections.active",
    connectionPool.activeCount.toDouble(),
    mapOf("database" to "primary")
)
```

All instruments support tags (key-value pairs) for dimensional filtering. The OTel implementation creates instruments lazily on first use and caches them for thread-safe reuse.

### Exporting Metrics

The OTel SDK supports multiple metrics exporters:

| Exporter | Protocol | Use case |
|----------|----------|----------|
| OTLP | gRPC or HTTP | OpenTelemetry Collector, Grafana Cloud, Datadog |
| Prometheus | Pull-based scrape | Prometheus server, Grafana |
| Logging | stdout | Development, debugging |

The exporter is configured via environment variables (see [Configuration](#configuration)), your application code doesn't know or care where metrics go.

## Log Correlation

Traces and logs serve different purposes, but they're most useful when connected. The `LogCorrelation` utility extracts trace metadata that you can inject into your structured logs:

```kotlin
val metadata = LogCorrelation.currentTraceMetadata()
// Returns: { "traceId": "abc123...", "spanId": "def456...", "parentSpanId": "..." }
// Returns null if no active trace
```

In practice, this means you can configure your logging framework to include trace IDs in every log line. When a user reports a problem, you find their trace ID in the API response headers, search your log aggregator for that trace ID, and see every log line from every service that handled their request, without needing to know which services were involved.

The `mergeTraceMetadata` helper merges trace fields into existing metadata maps, which is useful when building audit events or structured log entries that already carry other context.

## Command Integration

The telemetry system integrates with the EDK's command lifecycle through the same extension mechanism used by [authorization](../authorization/command-extension) and [audit](../audit/overview). A telemetry extension can:

- **Before execution**: create a span named after the command, set attributes for the command ID, tenant, and principal
- **After execution**: set the span status (OK/ERROR), record the duration, increment success/failure counters
- **On error**: record the exception on the span for error analysis

This gives you automatic tracing and metrics for every command without instrumenting individual command implementations.

## Configuration

The telemetry system is configured through `TelemetryConfig` and standard OpenTelemetry environment variables.

### TelemetryConfig

```kotlin
data class TelemetryConfig(
    val enabled: Boolean = true,
    val serviceName: String = "sphereon-vdx",
    val serviceVersion: String = "0.14.0",
    val tracingEnabled: Boolean = true,
    val metricsEnabled: Boolean = true,
    val samplingRate: Double = 1.0    // 0.0 to 1.0
)
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `enabled` | `true` | Master switch. When false, returns `OpenTelemetry.noop()`, zero overhead. |
| `serviceName` | `sphereon-vdx` | Identifies your service in trace visualizers and metric dashboards |
| `serviceVersion` | `0.14.0` | Version tag for distinguishing deployments |
| `tracingEnabled` | `true` | Enable/disable trace collection independently of metrics |
| `metricsEnabled` | `true` | Enable/disable metric collection independently of tracing |
| `samplingRate` | `1.0` | Probability that a trace is sampled. `1.0` = all traces, `0.1` = 10% of traces. Lower rates reduce overhead in high-throughput services. |

### OpenTelemetry Environment Variables

The OTel SDK reads standard environment variables for exporter configuration:

```bash
# Service identity
OTEL_SERVICE_NAME=my-service
OTEL_SERVICE_VERSION=1.0.0

# Trace export
OTEL_TRACES_EXPORTER=otlp              # otlp, logging, zipkin, none
OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://otel-collector:4318

# Metrics export
OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER=otlp             # otlp, logging, prometheus, none

# Sampling
OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER=parentbased_traceidratio
OTEL_TRACES_SAMPLER_ARG=0.1            # 10% sampling
```

For development, `OTEL_TRACES_EXPORTER=logging` writes traces to stdout, useful for verifying instrumentation without deploying a collector.

### Production Setup

A typical production setup routes telemetry to an OpenTelemetry Collector, which then forwards to your observability platform:

```yaml
# docker-compose
services:
  otel-collector:
    image: otel/opentelemetry-collector:latest
    ports:
      - "4318:4318"   # OTLP HTTP
      - "4317:4317"   # OTLP gRPC
    volumes:
      - ./otel-config.yaml:/etc/otel/config.yaml

  app:
    environment:
      - OTEL_SERVICE_NAME=my-service
      - OTEL_TRACES_EXPORTER=otlp
      - OTEL_METRICS_EXPORTER=otlp
      - OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT=http://otel-collector:4318
```

The collector can export to Jaeger, Zipkin, Grafana Tempo, Datadog, New Relic, or any OTLP-compatible backend.

## Modules

| Module | Platform | Description |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| `lib-telemetry-public` | Kotlin Multiplatform | Platform-agnostic interfaces (`TracerProvider`, `MetricsCollector`, `TraceContext`, `LogCorrelation`), no-op defaults |
| `lib-telemetry-otel` | JVM only | OpenTelemetry SDK adapter (OTel API 1.44.1, SDK auto-configuration, OTLP + logging exporters) |

---

# JWT Validation

# JWT Validation

The EDK provides framework integrations for JWT validation with support for multiple Identity Providers (IdPs) and per-tenant routing. The core validation logic lives in the IDK, with EDK providing Ktor and Spring Boot integrations.

## Overview

The JWT validation framework provides:

- **Multi-IdP support** - Keycloak, Azure AD, Auth0, Okta, generic OIDC
- **Per-tenant routing** - Different IdPs per tenant
- **Automatic discovery** - OIDC discovery for JWKS URIs
- **Scope checking** - Built-in scope validation helpers
- **Framework integration** - Ktor plugin and Spring Boot auto-configuration

## Architecture

<img src="/img/diagrams/jwt-validation-architecture.svg" alt="JWT Validation Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## IdP Configuration

### Supported IdP Types

| Type | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `OIDC` | Generic OpenID Connect |
| `KEYCLOAK` | Keycloak with realm support |
| `AZURE_AD` | Azure Active Directory / Entra ID |
| `AUTH0` | Auth0 |
| `OKTA` | Okta |
| `CUSTOM` | Custom with explicit JWKS URI |

### Configuration Examples

```kotlin
// Keycloak
val keycloak = IdpConfig.keycloak(
    id = "keycloak-prod",
    baseUrl = "https://auth.example.com",
    realm = "master",
    audience = "my-api"
)

// Azure AD / Entra ID
val azureAd = IdpConfig.azureAd(
    id = "azure-prod",
    tenantId = "your-azure-tenant-id",
    audience = "api://my-api"
)

// Auth0
val auth0 = IdpConfig.auth0(
    id = "auth0-prod",
    domain = "your-tenant.auth0.com",
    audience = "https://api.example.com"
)

// Generic OIDC (uses discovery)
val oidc = IdpConfig.oidc(
    id = "custom-idp",
    issuer = "https://idp.example.com",
    audience = "my-api"
)

// Custom with explicit JWKS URI
val custom = IdpConfig.custom(
    id = "legacy-idp",
    issuer = "https://legacy.example.com",
    jwksUri = "https://legacy.example.com/.well-known/jwks.json",
    audience = "my-api"
)
```

### IdpConfig Properties

```kotlin
data class IdpConfig(
    val id: String,
    val type: IdpType = IdpType.OIDC,
    val issuer: String,
    val audience: String? = null,
    val jwksUri: String? = null,               // Explicit JWKS URI
    val discoveryUri: String? = null,          // OIDC discovery URL
    val tenantClaim: String = "tenant_id",     // Claim for tenant ID
    val tenantClaimAlternatives: List<String> = listOf("azp", "client_id"),
    val allowedAlgorithms: List<String> = listOf("RS256", "ES256"),
    val clockSkewSeconds: Long = 60,
    val jwksCacheTtlSeconds: Long = 3600,
    val requiredClaims: List<String> = emptyList()
)
```

## ValidatedAccessToken

The result of successful validation:

```kotlin
data class ValidatedAccessToken(
    val subject: String,               // The 'sub' claim
    val issuer: String,                // Verified 'iss' claim
    val audiences: List<String>,       // The 'aud' claim(s)
    val expiresAt: Long,               // Expiration timestamp
    val issuedAt: Long,                // Issued-at timestamp
    val notBefore: Long?,              // Not-before timestamp
    val scopes: Set<String>,           // OAuth scopes
    val tenantId: String?,             // Extracted tenant ID
    val clientId: String?,             // Client ID (azp/client_id)
    val jwtId: String?,                // JWT ID (jti)
    val rawToken: String,              // Original token string
    val claims: Map<String, JsonElement>,  // All claims
    val idpId: String                  // Which IdP validated this
) {
    fun hasScope(scope: String): Boolean = scopes.contains(scope)
    fun hasAllScopes(required: Set<String>): Boolean = scopes.containsAll(required)
    fun hasAnyScope(allowed: Set<String>): Boolean = scopes.any { allowed.contains(it) }
}
```

## Ktor Integration

### Plugin Installation

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.oauth2.jwt.validation.ktor.*
import io.ktor.server.application.*

fun Application.module() {
    // Install JWT authentication
    install(JwtAuthentication) {
        validationService = myJwtValidationService

        anonymousConfig = AnonymousAccessConfig(
            allowed = false,
            allowedPaths = listOf("/health", "/api/public/*")
        )

        onAuthenticationFailed = { call, message ->
            call.respond(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized, mapOf("error" to message))
        }
    }
}
```

### Accessing Validated Token

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.oauth2.jwt.validation.ktor.ValidatedTokenKey

routing {
    get("/protected") {
        val token = call.attributes.getOrNull(ValidatedTokenKey)

        if (token != null) {
            call.respond("Hello ${token.subject}, tenant: ${token.tenantId}")
        } else {
            call.respond(HttpStatusCode.Unauthorized)
        }
    }

    get("/admin") {
        val token = call.attributes[ValidatedTokenKey]

        if (token.hasScope("admin")) {
            call.respond("Admin access granted")
        } else {
            call.respond(HttpStatusCode.Forbidden, "Requires admin scope")
        }
    }
}
```

### Tenant and Principal Resolution

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.oauth2.jwt.validation.ktor.*

fun Application.module() {
    install(JwtAuthentication) { ... }

    // Use JWT-based resolvers for user context
    install(KotlinInjectPlugin) {
        appComponent = myAppComponent
        tenantResolver = ValidatingTenantResolver(defaultTenantId = "default")
        principalResolver = ValidatingPrincipalResolver()
    }
}
```

## Spring Boot Integration

### Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  auth:
    jwt:
      enabled: true

      default-idp:
        issuer: https://auth.example.com/realms/master
        audience: my-api
        tenant-claim: tenant_id

      tenant-idps:
        tenant-a:
          issuer: https://login.microsoftonline.com/tenant-a-id/v2.0
          type: AZURE_AD
          tenant-claim: tid
        tenant-b:
          issuer: https://tenant-b.auth0.com/
          type: AUTH0
          audience: api://tenant-b

      anonymous:
        allowed: false
        allowed-paths:
          - /health
          - /actuator/**
          - /.well-known/**
```

### Properties Reference

```kotlin
@ConfigurationProperties(prefix = "sphereon.auth.jwt")
class JwtValidationProperties {
    var enabled: Boolean = true
    var defaultIdp: IdpProperties = IdpProperties()
    var tenantIdps: Map<String, IdpProperties> = emptyMap()
    var anonymous: AnonymousProperties = AnonymousProperties()

    class IdpProperties {
        var type: IdpType = IdpType.OIDC
        var issuer: String = ""
        var audience: String? = null
        var jwksUri: String? = null
        var tenantClaim: String = "tenant_id"
        var tenantClaimAlternatives: List<String> = listOf("azp", "client_id")
        var allowedAlgorithms: List<String> = listOf("RS256", "ES256")
        var jwksCacheTtlSeconds: Long = 3600
        var clockSkewSeconds: Long = 60
        var requireExp: Boolean = true
        var requireIat: Boolean = false
    }

    class AnonymousProperties {
        var allowed: Boolean = false
        var allowedPaths: List<String> = listOf("/health", "/actuator/**")
    }
}
```

### Controller Usage

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.oauth2.jwt.validation.spring.ValidatingAuthenticationResolver
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest

@RestController
@RequestMapping("/api")
class MyController(
    private val authResolver: ValidatingAuthenticationResolver
) {

    @GetMapping("/profile")
    fun getProfile(request: HttpServletRequest): Map<String, Any> {
        val token = authResolver.requireValidatedToken(request)

        return mapOf(
            "subject" to token.subject,
            "tenant" to (token.tenantId ?: "unknown"),
            "scopes" to token.scopes,
            "expires_at" to token.expiresAt
        )
    }

    @PostMapping("/admin/action")
    fun adminAction(request: HttpServletRequest): ResponseEntity<Any> {
        if (!authResolver.hasScope(request, "admin")) {
            return ResponseEntity.status(403)
                .body(mapOf("error" to "Requires admin scope"))
        }

        return ResponseEntity.ok(mapOf("result" to "success"))
    }

    @GetMapping("/resources")
    fun getResources(request: HttpServletRequest): ResponseEntity<Any> {
        val requiredScopes = setOf("read:resources", "list:resources")

        if (!authResolver.hasAnyScope(request, *requiredScopes.toTypedArray())) {
            return ResponseEntity.status(403)
                .body(mapOf("error" to "Insufficient scopes"))
        }

        val tenantId = authResolver.resolveTenantId(request)
        return ResponseEntity.ok(getResourcesForTenant(tenantId))
    }
}
```

### Token Forwarding

Forward tokens to downstream services:

```kotlin
@Service
class DownstreamClient(
    private val authResolver: ValidatingAuthenticationResolver,
    private val restTemplate: RestTemplate
) {

    fun callDownstream(request: HttpServletRequest): String {
        val rawToken = authResolver.getRawToken(request)
            ?: throw UnauthorizedException("No token")

        val headers = HttpHeaders().apply {
            setBearerAuth(rawToken)
        }

        val entity = HttpEntity<Void>(headers)
        return restTemplate.exchange(
            "http://downstream/api/resource",
            HttpMethod.GET,
            entity,
            String::class.java
        ).body ?: ""
    }
}
```

## Multi-Tenant JWT Decoder

The Spring integration includes a multi-tenant decoder that routes to the correct IdP based on token issuer:

```kotlin
class MultiTenantJwtDecoder(
    private val defaultIdpConfig: IdpConfig,
    private val tenantIdpConfigs: Map<String, IdpConfig>
) : JwtDecoder {

    override fun decode(token: String): Jwt {
        // Extract issuer from unverified token
        val issuer = extractIssuerFromToken(token)
            ?: throw JwtException("Cannot extract issuer")

        // Get or create decoder for this issuer
        val decoder = getOrCreateDecoder(issuer)

        // Decode and validate
        return decoder.decode(token)
    }

    // Register new IdP at runtime
    fun registerIdp(config: IdpConfig)

    // Remove IdP
    fun removeIdp(issuer: String)

    // Clear decoder cache (for key rotation)
    fun clearCache()
}
```

## Error Handling

### Error Types

```kotlin
enum class JwtValidationErrorType {
    MISSING_TOKEN,
    INVALID_TOKEN_FORMAT,
    SIGNATURE_INVALID,
    TOKEN_EXPIRED,
    TOKEN_NOT_YET_VALID,
    UNTRUSTED_ISSUER,
    INVALID_AUDIENCE,
    MISSING_REQUIRED_CLAIM,
    JWKS_UNAVAILABLE,
    KEY_NOT_FOUND,
    ALGORITHM_NOT_ALLOWED,
    IDP_CONFIGURATION_ERROR,
    DISCOVERY_FAILED,
    VALIDATION_ERROR
}
```

### Error Response

```kotlin
data class JwtValidationError(
    val type: JwtValidationErrorType,
    val message: String,
    val issuer: String? = null,
    val audience: String? = null,
    val claim: String? = null,
    val cause: String? = null
)
```

## Integration with AuthZEN

Forward validated tokens to the PDP for fine-grained authorization:

```kotlin
@Service
class AuthorizedService(
    private val authResolver: ValidatingAuthenticationResolver,
    private val policyEngine: PolicyEngine
) {

    suspend fun performAction(request: HttpServletRequest, resourceId: String) {
        val token = authResolver.requireValidatedToken(request)

        // Build policy request with token info
        val policyRequest = PolicyRequest(
            principal = PolicyPrincipal(
                type = "User",
                id = token.subject,
                attributes = mapOf(
                    "jwt" to JsonPrimitive(token.rawToken),
                    "scopes" to JsonArray(token.scopes.map { JsonPrimitive(it) })
                )
            ),
            action = PolicyAction(name = "resource.read"),
            resource = PolicyResource(type = "Resource", id = resourceId),
            context = PolicyContext(
                tenantId = token.tenantId,
                accessToken = token.rawToken
            )
        )

        val decision = policyEngine.evaluate(policyRequest).getOrThrow()

        if (decision.isDenied) {
            throw ForbiddenException("Access denied")
        }

        // Proceed with action
    }
}
```

## Security Best Practices

**Always validate audience** - Configure expected `audience` to prevent token confusion attacks.

**Use short clock skew** - Keep `clockSkewSeconds` minimal (30-60s) for accurate expiration.

**Cache JWKS appropriately** - Balance between security (shorter TTL) and performance (longer TTL).

**Restrict algorithms** - Only allow expected algorithms (RS256, ES256) to prevent algorithm confusion.

**Validate required claims** - Use `requiredClaims` for critical claims like `tenant_id`.

**Use TLS everywhere** - Protect tokens in transit between services.

---

# Identity Verification (IDV)

# Identity Verification (IDV)

The IDV system provides composable verification workflows where multiple identity proofing methods are orchestrated as a directed graph. Nodes in the graph represent verification steps, OIDC login, wallet credential presentation, document scanning, biometric checks, OTP challenges, and the graph structure defines how they combine.

IDV is a standalone subsystem, it operates independently of wallets, OID4VP, and auth bridges. Any system that needs to verify an identity can use IDV. The reconciliation orchestrator and auth bridge are consumers of IDV, not the other way around.

### Ownership Split

IDV spans three layers:

| Layer | Owns | Key contents |
|-------|------|-------------|
| **IDK** | Portable contracts + OIDC/Wallet drivers | `IdvNode` graph model, `IdvMethodDriver` SPI, command interfaces, store interfaces, `OidcMethodDriver`, `WalletMethodDriver` |
| **EDK** | Execution engine + enterprise drivers | Graph compiler, node dispatcher, join/failure policy evaluator, execution state machine, materialization engine, OTP/biometric/document/REST drivers, PostgreSQL persistence |
| **VDX** | Product-facing integration | Admin CRUD APIs, tenant management, onboarding compositions, UI adapters |

IDV materializes into the existing identity graph (`Party` → `Identity` → `CorrelationIdentifier` → `IdentityMatch`), it does not introduce a parallel identity model.

## Graph Composition

Rather than encoding verification logic as procedural code, IDV represents workflows as composable node graphs. This means a tenant's onboarding flow, "first log in with your institution, then scan your ID card, then do a liveness check", is a data structure, not a hardcoded sequence. Graphs can be stored in configuration, versioned per tenant, and evaluated by the engine without writing new code.

Verification workflows are defined as trees of `IdvNode` instances. Four composite node types control execution flow:

**`SequenceNode`** executes children in order. If any step fails, the entire sequence fails. Use this when steps must happen in a specific order, for example, an institutional OIDC login must complete before a document scan because the document verification needs the user's name from the OIDC claims.

**`ParallelNode`** executes children concurrently. This is useful when verification steps are independent, a document scan and a biometric check can run at the same time. The join policy controls how many children need to succeed, and the failure policy controls whether to cancel remaining children when one fails.

| Join Policy | Behavior |
|------------|----------|
| `All` | All children must succeed, strictest, appropriate for high-assurance |
| `Any` | At least one child must succeed, flexible, good for offering alternatives |
| `BestEffort` | Complete as many as possible without ever failing the node, useful for enrichment |

| Failure Policy | Behavior |
|---------------|----------|
| `FailFast` | Cancel remaining children on first failure, saves time and cost |
| `WaitForAll` | Wait for all children before reporting, collects all errors for better diagnostics |
| `ContinueOnFailure` | Keep running regardless, appropriate when combined with `BestEffort` join |

**`ChoiceNode`** presents alternatives. The user or the system selects one child to execute. This handles cases like "verify with passport OR ID card" where the user picks their preferred method.

| Selection Policy | Behavior |
|--------|----------|
| `UserSelect` | Present options to the user, they pick |
| `HighestAssurance` | Automatically pick the method with highest LoA |
| `LowestCost` | Automatically pick the cheapest method |
| `FirstAvailable` | Pick the first available method |

**`ThresholdNode`** requires at least N children to succeed. This is the most flexible composition, "2-of-3: OIDC, document, biometric" means the user can fail one method and still pass. This is useful for inclusive flows where not all users have access to every verification method.

Leaf nodes are `MethodNode` instances, each referencing a verification method driver by ID.

### Example Workflows

A customer onboarding flow that requires email verification, then a document scan, then a biometric liveness check:

```kotlin
val customerOnboarding = sequenceNode {
    methodNode("email-verify", methodId = "otp-email")
    choiceNode(selectionPolicy = UserSelect) {
        methodNode("passport-scan", methodId = "document-passport")
        methodNode("id-card-scan", methodId = "document-id-card")
    }
    methodNode("liveness-check", methodId = "biometric-iproov")
}
```

A lighter employee onboarding that accepts either institutional OIDC login or a wallet presentation:

```kotlin
val employeeOnboarding = choiceNode(selectionPolicy = UserSelect) {
    methodNode("institutional-login", methodId = "oidc-corporate-ad")
    methodNode("wallet-presentation", methodId = "wallet-eudiw-pid")
}
```

A high-assurance flow where at least 2 of 3 methods must succeed:

```kotlin
val highAssurance = thresholdNode(minimumSuccesses = 2) {
    methodNode("oidc-login", methodId = "oidc-eidas-node")
    methodNode("document-scan", methodId = "document-passport-nfc")
    methodNode("biometric", methodId = "biometric-face")
}
```

## Method Drivers

The graph defines the structure of the workflow, but the actual verification logic lives in method drivers. A driver is a pluggable implementation that knows how to talk to a specific external system, an OIDC provider, a document scanning service, a biometric API, or a wallet. The IDV engine dispatches work to drivers and collects results without knowing the details of any particular verification method.

This separation means adding a new verification provider (say, a new biometric vendor) requires implementing one driver interface, not changing the engine or the graph model.

Each verification method is implemented as an `IdvMethodDriver`:

```kotlin
interface IdvMethodDriver {
    val methodType: IdvMethodType
    suspend fun dispatch(work: DispatchWork): IdkResult<DispatchOutcome, IdvError>
    suspend fun submit(work: SubmitWork): IdkResult<SubmitOutcome, IdvError>
    suspend fun callback(work: CallbackWork): IdkResult<CallbackOutcome, IdvError>
    suspend fun poll(work: PollWork): IdkResult<PollOutcome, IdvError>
    suspend fun cancel(work: CancelWork): IdkResult<CancelOutcome, IdvError>
}
```

### Supported Methods

| Type | Driver | Description |
|------|--------|-------------|
| `OIDC` | `OidcMethodDriver` | Federated OpenID Connect authentication with PKCE, userInfo, and attribute mapping |
| `WALLET` | `WalletMethodDriver` | OID4VP wallet credential presentation with DCQL queries and trusted issuer validation |
| `DOCUMENT` | Pluggable | Document verification, OCR, liveness, NFC read. Providers: Onfido, Jumio, ReadID |
| `BIOMETRIC` | Pluggable | Biometric verification, face matching, fingerprint. Providers: iProov, Onfido, Jumio |
| `OTP` | Pluggable | One-time passcode via email, SMS, or authenticator app |
| `CLAIM_MATCH` | Built-in | Verify attributes against the identity matching store without external calls |
| `REST_API` | Built-in | Delegate to a custom REST endpoint for verification logic |

### Driver Lifecycle

Each driver method maps to a phase of the verification step:

1. **`dispatch`**: Start the verification. Returns either a `PendingDispatch` (redirect URL, QR code, form) or an `ImmediateResult` if no user interaction is needed.
2. **`submit`**: Handle user input (form submission, OTP entry).
3. **`callback`**: Process async callback from an external provider (OIDC redirect, wallet response, webhook).
4. **`poll`**: Check status of an in-progress verification.
5. **`cancel`**: Clean up resources for a cancelled verification.

### OIDC Method

The `OidcMethodDriver` dispatches an authorization request with PKCE and processes the callback:

```kotlin
data class OidcMethodDefinition(
    override val id: String,
    val discoveryUrl: String,
    val clientIdRef: ConfigRef,
    val clientSecretRef: SecretRef?,
    val scopes: Set<String> = setOf("openid", "profile", "email"),
    val attributeMappings: List<AttributeMapping>,
    val subjectBinding: SubjectBinding?,
    // ...
)
```

On callback, it exchanges the authorization code for tokens, validates the JWT, extracts claims via the configured attribute mappings, and returns identifiers and assurance metadata.

### Wallet Method

The `WalletMethodDriver` creates an OID4VP authorization request using DCQL queries:

```kotlin
data class WalletMethodDefinition(
    override val id: String,
    val dcqlQuery: DcqlQuery,
    val trustedIssuers: List<TrustedIssuer>,
    val credentialTypes: Set<String>,
    val acceptedLoAs: Set<String>,
    // ...
)
```

It dispatches a QR code or deep link, waits for the wallet to present credentials, verifies them against trusted issuers, and extracts disclosed attributes.

## Execution Model

When a use case is triggered, the engine creates an `IdvExecution`, a persistent, resumable representation of the running workflow. The execution tracks per-node state, accumulated attributes from completed nodes, pending user actions, and errors. Because the execution is persisted, the workflow survives server restarts and can be resumed asynchronously, the user can close their browser, return hours later, and continue where they left off.

The execution uses optimistic concurrency (version field) to prevent conflicting updates when multiple callbacks arrive simultaneously.

### IdvExecution

```kotlin
data class IdvExecution(
    val executionId: IdvExecutionId,
    val useCaseId: IdvUseCaseId,
    val tenantId: String,
    val subject: IdvSubjectRef,
    val status: IdvExecutionStatus,
    val nodeStates: Map<IdvNodeId, IdvNodeState>,
    val currentPendingActions: List<NodePendingAction>,
    val accumulatedAttributes: AttributeBag,
    val results: List<IdvNodeResult>,
    val errors: List<IdvError>,
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val expiresAt: Instant,
)
```

### Status Lifecycle

```
CREATED → RUNNING → AWAITING_ACTION → COMPLETED
                 ↘ FAILED / EXPIRED / CANCELLED
```

`AWAITING_ACTION` means the execution is waiting for user interaction, a redirect return, form submission, or wallet scan. The `currentPendingActions` list describes what's needed:

| Action | Meaning |
|--------|---------|
| `RedirectAction` | User must be redirected to an external URL (OIDC provider, document scanner) |
| `UserInputAction` | User must fill in a form (OTP code, personal details) |
| `PollAction` | Backend is polling an external service; client should retry after interval |
| `WaitForCallbackAction` | Waiting for an async webhook or wallet response |

### Attribute Flow

Attributes flow through the graph via `AttributeBinding`:

```kotlin
data class AttributeBinding(
    val input: AttributeInputRef,  // ContextAttribute, PriorNodeAttribute, UserInputAttribute
    val target: AttributePath
)
```

A later node can bind its input to an earlier node's output, for example, the biometric node can receive the photo extracted by the document node.

### Node Results

Each completed node produces an `IdvNodeResult` containing:
- **Identifiers**: Resolved identifiers (subject ID, email, DID)
- **Attributes**: Extracted and mapped attributes
- **Assurance**: LoA achieved by this method
- **AMR**: Authentication method references (e.g., `mfa`, `face`, `hwk`)
- **Evidence**: Audit record with provider, method type, timestamp, and metadata

Results are aggregated across the graph into an `IdvExecutionResult` with the highest assurance level, combined AMR, and all resolved identifiers.

## Assurance & Compliance

Identity verification is not just about confirming someone's identity, it's about doing so at a specific level of trust. A self-declared email address is a different level of confidence than a government-issued PID verified through an eIDAS node with biometric liveness. The IDV system tracks this through assurance levels and compliance profiles.

Every method definition declares the maximum assurance it can produce, and every use case declares the minimum assurance it requires. The engine enforces the threshold: if the combined assurance from completed nodes doesn't meet the use case's minimum, the execution fails with an `AssuranceError` even if all methods succeeded technically.

### Assurance Levels

| Framework | Levels | Typical use |
|-----------|--------|-------------|
| eIDAS | `LOW`, `SUBSTANTIAL`, `HIGH` | EU regulatory compliance, cross-border identity |
| NIST 800-63A (AAL) | `AAL1`, `AAL2`, `AAL3` | US federal systems, enterprise authentication |

### Evidence Strength

Each method also declares the strength of the evidence it produces, following NIST 800-63A terminology:

| Level | Meaning | Example |
|-------|---------|---------|
| `FAIR` | Basic electronic verification | Email OTP, self-declared attributes |
| `STRONG` | Multi-factor or document-backed | Passport NFC read, institutional OIDC with MFA |
| `SUPERIOR` | In-person or hardware-backed | eIDAS high with certified hardware token |

### Compliance Profiles

For regulated environments, each method definition can declare a compliance profile. This controls which methods are available in which jurisdictions and ensures the system collects required consent before processing biometric data or transferring data across borders.

Profiles specify:
- **Regulatory frameworks**: `EIDAS`, `NIST_800_63A`, `UK_DIATF`, `DE_AML`, so the engine knows which rules apply
- **Proofing scenario**: `FACE_TO_FACE`, `REMOTE_ASSISTED`, `UNATTENDED_REMOTE`, which affects the maximum achievable assurance
- **Consent requirements**: `BIOMETRIC_PROCESSING`, `DATA_SHARING`, `CROSS_BORDER_TRANSFER`, the engine blocks execution until required consent is collected
- **Territory restrictions**: per-country rules that prohibit certain methods or require additional legal basis for specific identifiers (e.g., BSN in the Netherlands)

The execution result is evaluated against the use case's minimum assurance and compliance requirements. If a method produces evidence that doesn't meet the regulatory framework's requirements for the target assurance level, the engine treats it as insufficient.

## Materialization

Verification alone doesn't change any persistent state. The results of a successful IDV execution, resolved identifiers, verified attributes, evidence records, need to be written into the identity graph. Materialization rules declare what should happen after the execution completes, as typed instructions rather than procedural code.

This declarative approach matters because materialization rules can be inspected before they run (for policy review), replayed if a write fails (for resilience), and projected differently per deployment (a test environment might skip party creation while production creates real records).

Each use case definition includes a list of `IdvMaterializationRule` instances:

| Rule | What it creates |
|------|--------|
| `CreateIdentifiersMaterialization` | `CorrelationIdentifier` records for resolved identifiers (email, subject ID, DID) |
| `CreateIdentityMatchMaterialization` | HMAC-hashed `IdentityMatch` records linking external identifiers to the internal identity |
| `CreateRelationshipMaterialization` | Links between verified entities (e.g., student → institution) |
| `CreateRegistrationMaterialization` | Service-specific registration records |
| `AttachEvidenceMaterialization` | Persists evidence artifacts (provider responses, timestamps, method metadata) for audit trails |
| `MarkVerifiedMaterialization` | Sets the verified flag and assurance level on the identity |

Materializations are what connect IDV results to the [identity matching](./matching-reconciliation) layer, the `CreateIdentityMatchMaterialization` rule is how a verified identity gets its HMAC-hashed binding, enabling fast-path recognition on subsequent visits.

## Commands

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `ResolveIdvUseCase` | `idv.usecase.resolve` | Select a use case definition by trigger context |
| `CompileIdvGraph` | `idv.graph.compile` | Prepare a graph for execution |
| `StartIdvExecution` | `idv.execution.start` | Initialize a verification session |
| `DispatchIdvNode` | `idv.node.dispatch` | Invoke a method driver for a graph node |
| `SubmitIdvNode` | `idv.node.submit` | Handle user form submission |
| `HandleIdvNodeCallback` | `idv.node.callback` | Process async callback (OIDC redirect, wallet response) |
| `PollIdvNode` | `idv.node.poll` | Check status of an in-progress node |
| `GetIdvExecution` | `idv.execution.get` | Fetch current execution state |
| `CancelIdvExecution` | `idv.execution.cancel` | Cancel with reason |
| `ApplyIdvMaterialization` | `idv.materialization.apply` | Create post-IDV artifacts |

## Configuration

IDV has two configuration layers that are managed separately:

**Method definitions** describe individual verification systems, an OIDC provider, an OTP email channel, a document scanning service, a biometric API. Methods are configured once and reused across multiple use cases. They can be scoped to `APP` level (available to all tenants) or `TENANT` level (tenant-specific overrides or additions).

**Use case definitions** compose methods into verification scenarios, "customer onboarding requires email OTP then document scan" or "employee registration accepts either institutional OIDC or wallet PID." Each use case references methods by ID, defines the graph structure, and declares assurance and compliance requirements.

This separation means an organization can configure its OIDC providers, OTP channels, and document scanning integrations once, then compose them into different use cases for different tenants or scenarios.

### JSON Configuration

Definitions are loaded via `IdvDefinitionConfigBinder`. The `_type` discriminator enables polymorphic deserialization of different method types:

```json
{
  "methods": [
    {
      "_type": "OidcMethodDefinition",
      "id": "corporate-ad",
      "type": "oidc",
      "discoveryUrl": "https://login.microsoftonline.com/tenant/v2.0/.well-known/openid-configuration",
      "clientIdRef": { "key": "idv.oidc.corporate.client-id" },
      "clientSecretRef": { "key": "idv.oidc.corporate.client-secret" },
      "scopes": ["openid", "profile", "email"],
      "attributeMappings": [
        { "sourceAttribute": "sub", "targetAttribute": "subject.id", "identifierType": "SUBJECT_ID" },
        { "sourceAttribute": "email", "targetAttribute": "contact.email", "identifierType": "EMAIL" }
      ]
    },
    {
      "_type": "WalletMethodDefinition",
      "id": "wallet-pid",
      "type": "wallet",
      "credentialTypes": ["eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1"],
      "acceptedLoAs": ["substantial", "high"]
    },
    {
      "_type": "OtpMethodDefinition",
      "id": "email-otp",
      "type": "otp",
      "channel": "email",
      "codeLength": 6,
      "codeTtlSeconds": 300,
      "maxAttempts": 3
    },
    {
      "_type": "DocumentMethodDefinition",
      "id": "passport-nfc",
      "type": "document",
      "provider": "readid",
      "documentTypes": ["passport"],
      "nfcEnabled": true
    }
  ],
  "useCases": [
    {
      "id": "customer-onboarding",
      "tenantId": "default",
      "graph": {
        "_type": "SequenceNode",
        "children": [
          { "_type": "MethodNode", "nodeId": "step-email", "methodId": "email-otp" },
          { "_type": "ChoiceNode", "selectionPolicy": "UserSelect", "children": [
            { "_type": "MethodNode", "nodeId": "step-passport", "methodId": "passport-nfc" },
            { "_type": "MethodNode", "nodeId": "step-wallet", "methodId": "wallet-pid" }
          ]}
        ]
      },
      "policy": {
        "minimumAssurance": "substantial",
        "sessionTtlSeconds": 3600
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "employee-registration",
      "tenantId": "default",
      "graph": {
        "_type": "MethodNode",
        "nodeId": "step-oidc",
        "methodId": "corporate-ad"
      },
      "policy": {
        "minimumAssurance": "low",
        "sessionTtlSeconds": 600
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

Secret references (`clientIdRef`, `clientSecretRef`) are resolved through the EDK's [configuration system](/edk/guides/config/overview), so they can come from environment variables, cloud config providers, or vault, sensitive credentials are never stored in the JSON definition itself.

---

# Identity Matching & Reconciliation

# Identity Matching & Reconciliation

Identity matching links external identifiers (holder keys, subject IDs, email addresses, claim tuples) to internal identity IDs using privacy-preserving HMAC hashing. Identity reconciliation is the policy engine that decides what to do when a user shows up, accept an existing link, run identity verification, require step-up, or reject.

## Identity Matching

### How Linking Works

External identifiers are never stored in plaintext. Instead, three domain-separated keys are used:

| Key | Alias | Algorithm | Purpose |
|-----|-------|-----------|---------|
| **Key A** | `reconciliation:holder` | HMAC-SHA256 | Hash holder key identifiers (wallet public keys) |
| **Key B** | `reconciliation:institution` | HMAC-SHA256 | Hash institution/external identifiers (subject IDs, emails) |
| **Key C** | `reconciliation:encryption` | AES-256-GCM | Encrypt reversible payloads (canonical claims, institution IDs, auxiliary data) |

All keys are managed by the IDK KMS. In production, they should be backed by an HSM or cloud KMS provider. Key aliases are configured via:

```yaml
identity:
  reconciliation:
    crypto:
      hmac-key-alias: reconciliation-hmac-key
      hmac-key-provider-id: software
      encryption-key-alias: reconciliation-encryption-key
      encryption-key-provider-id: software
```

The flow for every identifier: the plaintext value is HMAC-hashed with the appropriate domain-separated key, producing a multibase-encoded multihash that gets stored in the `IdentityMatch` record. Lookups reverse this, hash the incoming identifier with the same key and compare against stored hashes.

Lookups are hash-based: the system hashes the incoming identifier with the same key and compares against stored hashes. The plaintext identifier is never persisted.

### IdentityMatch

An `IdentityMatch` is the core link between an external world and your internal identity model. When a user authenticates through their wallet, the wallet's public key fingerprint gets HMAC-hashed and stored as an `IdentityMatch`. The next time that wallet shows up, the system hashes the key again, finds the match, and knows immediately which internal identity this is, without calling any external service.

Matches are intentionally minimal, they store the hash, the type, and a reference to the internal identity. They don't store the user's name, email, or any other attributes. That's the job of the `IdentityLinkBinding` (below), which holds encrypted canonical attributes alongside the match.

```kotlin
data class IdentityMatch(
    val id: String,
    val identifierHash: String,       // HMAC hash of external identifier
    val identifierType: IdentifierType,
    val internalIdentityId: String,   // Reference to internal identity
    val tenantId: String,
    val metadata: Map<String, String>,
    val hashKeyVersion: String?,      // For key rotation
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant?,
    val lastUsedAt: Instant?,
)
```

### Identifier Types

A single identity can have multiple matches, one for the wallet's public key, another for their institutional subject ID, another for their email hash. The `IdentifierType` distinguishes them:

| Type | What gets hashed | When it's used |
|------|-----------------|----------------|
| `KEY` | Wallet public key fingerprint (JWK thumbprint) | Fast-path recognition of returning wallets |
| `DID` | Decentralized Identifier | Persistent identifier for rotatable DID methods |
| `EMAIL` | Email address | Matching by email across providers |
| `SUBJECT_ID` | External subject ID (OIDC `sub` claim) | Linking to institutional identity providers |
| `CLAIM_TUPLE` | Composite hash of multiple claims (name + DOB + email) | Matching without a cryptographic key, when wallet doesn't provide holder binding |

The type is a value class, so you can define custom types beyond the built-in set.

### IdentityLinkBinding

While `IdentityMatch` is the index, the fast lookup from external hash to internal identity, the `IdentityLinkBinding` is the full dossier. It stores the encrypted canonical attributes (name, email, institutional ID) collected during verification, the assurance metadata from the verification that created it, and versioning information for staleness detection.

The binding is what makes the "fast path" work: when a known wallet returns, the system doesn't just know who they are, it can decrypt their cached canonical attributes from the binding and project them into OIDC claims immediately, without contacting any external provider. This is why the binding stores encrypted attributes rather than relying on re-fetching them.

```kotlin
data class IdentityLinkBinding(
    val id: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val matchId: String,                          // FK to IdentityMatch

    // HMAC hashes for lookup (dual-read for key rotation)
    val holderIdentifierHash: String,
    val holderHashKeyVersion: String,
    val institutionIdentifierHash: String?,
    val institutionHashKeyVersion: String?,

    // Encrypted reversible data
    val encryptedInstitutionId: EncryptedPayload?,        // AES-256-GCM
    val persistedAttributesEnvelope: PersistedAttributesEnvelope, // Encrypted canonical claims

    // Provenance
    val providerId: String,                       // Which reconciliation provider created this
    val institutionId: String?,

    // Assurance metadata
    val assuranceSummary: AssuranceSummary?,       // LoA + ACR/AMR from verification

    // Version tracking for staleness detection
    val canonicalSchemaVersion: String?,
    val materialProfileVersion: String?,
    val selectorRuleVersion: String?,
    val materialFingerprints: Set<String>?,

    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant?,
    val lastUsedAt: Instant?,
)
```

### AssuranceSummary

Stored on each binding to track the level of assurance from the verification that established it:

```kotlin
data class AssuranceSummary(
    val walletAssuranceLevel: String?,     // e.g., "high", "substantial", "low"
    val oidcAcr: String?,                  // Authentication Context Class Reference
    val oidcAmr: List<String>?,            // Authentication Methods References
    val executionId: String?,              // IDV execution that produced this
    val evidenceReferenceHash: String?,    // Hash referencing verification evidence
)
```

This is what powers step-up decisions: if a binding's `walletAssuranceLevel` is `"low"` but the current operation requires `"substantial"`, the reconciliation engine triggers a step-up.

### Key Rotation

HMAC keys and encryption keys need to be rotated periodically, compliance requirements, key compromise response, or just good hygiene. The challenge is that rotating an HMAC key changes every hash, which would break all existing lookups.

The `ReconciliationCryptoService` solves this with dual-read support. During a rotation window, the service computes hashes with both the current and previous key. Lookups try the current key first; if no match is found, they retry with the previous key. When a match is found via the old key, it gets re-hashed with the new key on next write. This means no bulk data migration is needed, bindings migrate lazily as they're accessed.

```kotlin
interface ReconciliationCryptoService {
    suspend fun hashHolderKey(holderKey: String): HashedIdentifier
    suspend fun hashExternalIdentifier(identifier: String): HashedIdentifier
    suspend fun encrypt(plaintext: String): EncryptedPayload
    suspend fun decrypt(payload: EncryptedPayload): String

    // Dual-read: hash with previous key version for rotation
    suspend fun hashHolderKeyWithPrevious(holderKey: String): HashedIdentifier?
    suspend fun hashExternalIdentifierWithPrevious(identifier: String): HashedIdentifier?
}
```

During rotation, lookups try the current key first, then fall back to the previous key. No data migration is required, bindings are re-hashed lazily on next access.

### Commands

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `LookupIdentityMatchCommand` | `identity.matching.lookup` | Look up a match by identifier hash and type |
| `CreateIdentityMatchCommand` | `identity.matching.create` | Create a new match record |
| `DeleteIdentityMatchCommand` | `identity.matching.delete` | Delete a match |
| `ListIdentityMatchesCommand` | `identity.matching.list` | List all matches for an internal identity |

## Identity Reconciliation

When a user presents credentials, the system needs to answer: "What do we do with this person?" If they have an existing binding with sufficient assurance, accept them. If they're new, verify their identity. If their binding has expired, ask them to re-verify. If policy says this credential type isn't acceptable, reject them.

These decisions are the domain of the reconciliation engine. Rather than encoding this logic in application code, the engine uses declarative selector rules that match on properties of the incoming request and produce a typed plan. This means the decision logic is configuration, tenants can have different rules, and rules can be updated without code changes.

### Reconciliation Plans

The engine produces one of five plans, each representing a distinct course of action. The plans are a sealed interface, so the compiler enforces that all cases are handled.

```kotlin
sealed interface ReconciliationPlan {

    data class SkipReconciliation(...)
    // Skip reconciliation entirely. Use when wallet credentials
    // are sufficient without identity linking.

    data class UseExistingBinding(...)
    // Accept the existing identity link binding as-is.
    // Used when the holder is known and assurance is sufficient.

    data class RunIdv(
        val providerId: String,
        val materialProfileId: String,
        val minimumAssurance: String?,       // LoA threshold, e.g., "substantial"
        val bindingPolicy: BindingPolicy,    // REUSE_OR_CREATE, CREATE_NEW, REUSE_ONLY
        ...
    )
    // Run a full identity verification workflow via an OIDC provider.
    // Creates or updates an identity link binding on success.

    data class StepUp(
        val providerId: String,
        val materialProfileId: String,
        ...
    )
    // Upgrade an existing binding to a higher assurance level
    // without full re-verification.

    data class FailClosed(
        val reason: String,
        ...
    )
    // Explicitly reject the reconciliation attempt.
}
```

### Selector Rules

Selector rules are the reconciliation engine's decision table. Each rule specifies a set of conditions (which tenant, what kind of credential, whether the holder is known) and a plan to execute when those conditions match. Rules are evaluated in priority order, the first match wins.

The power of this approach is composability. You can have a high-priority rule that fast-tracks known holders, a medium-priority rule that sends unknown holders through institutional OIDC verification, a rule for expired bindings that triggers email verification as a step-up, and a low-priority catch-all that rejects everything else. Each rule is independent and testable.

Rules are evaluated against the incoming context. The first matching rule (by priority) determines the plan:

```kotlin
data class ReconciliationSelectorRule(
    val id: String,
    val enabled: Boolean = true,
    val priority: Int = 0,                          // Higher = tried first

    // Match conditions (null = match all)
    val tenants: Set<String>?,
    val entryPointTypes: Set<String>?,              // WALLET_OID4VP, FEDERATED_OIDC, etc.
    val triggerTypes: Set<String>?,                 // ONBOARDING, STEP_UP, REVALIDATION
    val credentialTypes: Set<String>?,              // eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1, etc.
    val issuers: Set<String>?,                      // Regex patterns against issuer
    val knownHolderStates: Set<KnownHolderState>?,  // MATCHED_HOLDER_KEY, NOT_FOUND, etc.
    val attributePredicates: List<AttributePredicate>?,

    // Output
    val plan: ReconciliationPlanTemplate,
)
```

### KnownHolderState

Before rule evaluation, the system checks whether the holder already has a binding:

| State | Meaning |
|-------|---------|
| `MATCHED_HOLDER_KEY` | Existing binding found via cryptographic holder key hash |
| `MATCHED_CLAIM_TUPLE` | Existing binding found via claim tuple hash |
| `NOT_FOUND` | No existing binding |
| `EXPIRED_BINDING` | Binding exists but has expired |

This is the key input for step-up decisions: a rule can match on `MATCHED_HOLDER_KEY` with a condition that the stored assurance is below a threshold, producing a `StepUp` plan.

### Rule Evaluation

```kotlin
object ReconciliationSelector {
    fun evaluate(
        rules: List<ReconciliationSelectorRule>,
        input: ReconciliationSelectorInput,
        ruleVersion: String
    ): ReconciliationPlan?
}
```

The selector:
1. Filters enabled rules
2. Matches each rule against the input (tenant, credential types, issuers, holder state, attribute predicates)
3. Sorts by priority (descending), then by ID (ascending)
4. Returns the first match's plan, or `null` if no rules match

### Example Rules

The following example shows a typical rule set for a multi-method deployment. The first rule fast-tracks returning users. The second sends new holders through a full IDV use case that might involve OIDC, document scanning, biometric checks, or email verification, the rule doesn't prescribe which methods; it references an IDV use case that defines the verification graph. The third handles expired bindings with a lighter step-up. The fourth is a catch-all.

```json
[
  {
    "id": "known-holder-accept",
    "priority": 100,
    "knownHolderStates": ["MATCHED_HOLDER_KEY"],
    "plan": { "decision": "USE_EXISTING_BINDING" }
  },
  {
    "id": "new-holder-idv",
    "priority": 50,
    "knownHolderStates": ["NOT_FOUND"],
    "entryPointTypes": ["WALLET_OID4VP"],
    "plan": {
      "decision": "RUN_IDV",
      "providerId": "onboarding-idv",
      "materialProfileId": "standard-onboarding",
      "minimumAssurance": "substantial",
      "bindingPolicy": "REUSE_OR_CREATE"
    }
  },
  {
    "id": "expired-step-up",
    "priority": 75,
    "knownHolderStates": ["EXPIRED_BINDING"],
    "plan": {
      "decision": "STEP_UP",
      "providerId": "email-reverification",
      "materialProfileId": "standard-onboarding"
    }
  },
  {
    "id": "fallback-deny",
    "priority": 0,
    "plan": {
      "decision": "FAIL_CLOSED",
      "failReason": "No matching reconciliation rule"
    }
  }
]
```

The `providerId` in the `RunIdv` plan doesn't have to be an OIDC provider, it references whatever IDV use case the deployment has configured. That use case might be a single OIDC login, an email OTP followed by a document scan, a biometric liveness check, or any graph of verification methods. The reconciliation engine is IDV-method-agnostic; it only decides *whether* to run IDV and with what assurance threshold.

### Reconciliation Providers

When reconciliation triggers IDV via the `RunIdv` or `StepUp` plan, the actual verification can take many forms. In the simplest case, it's a redirect to an OIDC provider (institutional login). In more complex deployments, it's a multi-step IDV workflow involving document scanning, biometric liveness, email verification, or combinations of these. The `ReconciliationProvider` configuration describes the OIDC-based path; for richer verification flows, the provider references an [IDV use case](./idv) that defines the full verification graph.

The provider also defines attribute mappings, how claims from the verification source are normalized into canonical form for storage in the encrypted binding:

```kotlin
data class ReconciliationProvider(
    val id: String,
    val name: String?,
    val oidcClientId: String,
    val identifierAttributeName: String = "sub",
    val enabled: Boolean = true,
    val attributeMappings: List<ReconciliationAttributeMapping>,
    val userInfoAttributeMappings: List<ReconciliationAttributeMapping>,
    val assuranceAcr: String?,       // ACR value for this provider
    val assuranceAmr: List<String>?, // AMR values for this provider
)
```

Attribute mappings control how provider claims are normalized into canonical form:

```kotlin
data class ReconciliationAttributeMapping(
    val source: String,          // Claim from provider, e.g., "eduid"
    val target: String,          // Canonical name, e.g., "institutional_id"
    val identifierType: String?, // e.g., "SUBJECT_ID", "EMAIL"
    val required: Boolean = false,
)
```

### Material Profiles

A material profile defines the recipe for constructing an identity link binding, specifically, which identifiers to HMAC-hash for future lookup and which attributes to encrypt for storage. This is separate from the provider configuration because the same verification result can be materialized differently depending on the deployment's requirements.

For example, one deployment might hash both the wallet key and the institutional subject ID (two lookup paths), while another might also add a claim-tuple hash based on name + date of birth (a third lookup path for matching users who switch wallets).

```kotlin
sealed interface ReconciliationMaterial {
    data class HolderKeyMaterial(val hmacDomain: String = "holder")
    data class ProviderSubjectMaterial(val providerId: String, val hmacDomain: String = "institution")
    data class AttributeTupleMaterial(
        val attributePaths: List<String>,
        val normalizationProfile: String,
        val saltRef: String,
        val hmacDomain: String,
        val minRequiredAttributes: Int,
    )
    data class CredentialAttributeTupleMaterial(
        val credentialQueryId: String?,
        val attributePaths: List<String>,
        val normalizationProfile: String,
        val saltRef: String,
        val hmacDomain: String,
        val minRequiredAttributes: Int,
    )
}
```

`HolderKeyMaterial` hashes the wallet's public key. `ProviderSubjectMaterial` hashes the OIDC provider's subject ID. `AttributeTupleMaterial` creates a composite hash from multiple attributes (e.g., email + date of birth + name) for matching without a cryptographic key.

### Reconciliation Session

The reconciliation flow is managed through a session with its own lifecycle:

```kotlin
data class ReconciliationSession(
    val id: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val status: ReconciliationSessionStatus,  // CREATED → REDIRECTED → CALLBACK_RECEIVED → COMPLETED
    val identifierHash: String,
    val identifierType: IdentifierType,
    val providerId: String,
    val authorizationUrl: String?,            // OIDC authorization URL
    val state: String?,                       // OIDC state
    val nonce: String?,                       // OIDC nonce
    val codeVerifier: String?,                // PKCE
    val redirectUri: String?,
    val tokenEndpoint: String?,
    val encryptedIdentity: EncryptedPayload?, // Resolved identity (AES-256-GCM)
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val expiresAt: Instant,                   // 10-minute TTL
)
```

### Commands

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `CreateReconciliationSessionCommand` | `identity.reconciliation.create` | Start a reconciliation flow, get OIDC authorization URL |
| `CompleteReconciliationCommand` | `identity.reconciliation.complete` | Exchange auth code, create/update identity match |
| `GetReconciliationSessionCommand` | `identity.reconciliation.get` | Fetch session state |
| `CancelReconciliationSessionCommand` | `identity.reconciliation.cancel` | Cancel a reconciliation session |

## Persistence

The IDK provides in-memory store implementations for development and testing. For production, the auth bridge service uses PostgreSQL via SQLDelight with the following schema:

| Table | Contents | Protection |
|-------|----------|------------|
| `identity_match` | HMAC-hashed identifier → internal identity mappings | Identifier never stored in plaintext (HMAC via Key A/B) |
| `identity_link_binding` | Encrypted profile linking wallet holder to institutional identity | Institution ID encrypted (AES-256-GCM via Key C), canonical claims encrypted in envelope |
| `reconciliation_session` | OIDC reconciliation flow state | Resolved identity encrypted (AES-256-GCM), 10-minute TTL |
| `reconciliation_provider` | Provider configuration (client ID, attribute mappings, assurance) | Long-lived config data |
| `auxiliary_data` | Identity-linked supplemental data (enrollment, grades, etc.) | All fields encrypted at rest (AES-256-GCM via Key C) |

The PostgreSQL stores use `@ContributesBinding` to replace the IDK's in-memory defaults at `AppScope`.

## Auxiliary Data

The auxiliary data store allows authorized systems to attach encrypted supplemental data to reconciled identities, enrollment records, grades, programme information, or any category-keyed data that should be linked to the identity without being part of the canonical claims.

```kotlin
data class AuxiliaryDataRecord(
    val id: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val internalIdentityId: String,
    val category: String,                 // e.g., "enrollment", "grades"
    val encryptedPayload: EncryptedPayload, // AES-256-GCM via Key C
    val schemaVersion: String = "1",
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant,
    val expiresAt: Instant? = null,       // Optional TTL
)
```

Data is encrypted on write and decrypted on read, callers never see raw ciphertext. The `AuxiliaryDataService` orchestrates encryption/decryption via `ReconciliationCryptoService`.

## External Reconciliation API

The auth bridge exposes a REST API at `/api/external/v1/reconciliation` for authorized third-party systems (student information systems, grade registries, credential validators) to access reconciled identity data.

### Authentication

All requests require an OAuth2 `client_credentials` bearer token with scope `reconciliation:read`. The client ID is matched to a projection configuration that controls which claims and auxiliary categories the client can see.

### Per-Client Projection

Each client sees only the data it is authorized for:

```yaml
external-api:
  clients:
    krs-module:
      client-id: krs-system
      scopes: reconciliation:read
      projection:
        claims: given_name,family_name,email
        auxiliary:
          names: enrollment,grades
          enrollment: enrollment_status,programme_code,cohort
          grades: gpa,credits
      can-write: true
```

### Endpoints

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/lookup` | Resolve identity by HMAC-hashed identifier and type |
| `GET` | `/{id}` | Full projected identity (canonical claims + auxiliary + assurance) |
| `GET` | `/{id}/claims` | Projected canonical claims only |
| `GET` | `/{id}/auxiliary` | All projected auxiliary categories |
| `GET` | `/{id}/auxiliary/{category}` | Single projected auxiliary category |
| `PUT` | `/{id}/auxiliary/{category}` | Store/update auxiliary data (requires `canWrite`) |
| `DELETE` | `/{id}/auxiliary/{category}` | Delete auxiliary category (requires `canWrite`) |
| `DELETE` | `/{id}` | GDPR erasure, deletes all matches, bindings, and auxiliary data. Irreversible. |

Data is decrypted on-the-fly per request and never cached in plaintext.

## Token Enrichment

The `TokenEnrichmentService` reads canonical claims from the `PersistedAttributesEnvelope` and auxiliary data, merging them into a claim set that the STS (Security Token Service) uses during token minting. This means ID tokens and access tokens issued by the authorization server can carry reconciled identity claims without the relying party needing to call the external API.

---

# Identity Resolution

# Identity Resolution

Identity resolution maps an external identifier to an internal identity ID. It answers the question: "given this external identifier (subject ID, email, DID), which internal identity does it belong to?"

The system uses a pluggable resolver chain, multiple `IdentityResolver` implementations are registered via multibinding and tried in priority order until one succeeds. This allows combining different resolution strategies (identity matching store, LDAP, OIDC introspection, directory service) without hard-coding the resolution logic.

## IdentityResolver Interface

```kotlin
interface IdentityResolver {
    val resolverId: String     // e.g., "identity-matching", "ldap"
    val priority: Int          // Higher = tried first

    suspend fun supports(tenantId: String, resolverConfig: ResolverConfig?): Boolean

    suspend fun resolve(
        identifier: String,
        tenantId: String,
        resolverConfig: ResolverConfig?
    ): IdkResult<IdentityResolutionResult, IdkError>
}
```

Each resolver:
- Self-determines whether it can handle the request via `supports()`
- Returns `resolved=true` with the internal identity ID on success
- Returns `resolved=false` to indicate it can't resolve, the chain moves to the next resolver
- Returns `Err` for hard failures that should stop the chain

## Resolution Result

```kotlin
data class IdentityResolutionResult(
    val resolved: Boolean = false,
    val internalIdentityId: String?,
    val resolverId: String?,
    val identifierType: IdentifierType?,
    val metadata: Map<String, String> = emptyMap(),
)
```

## Built-In Resolver: Identity Matching

The `MatchingIdentityResolverImpl` uses the [identity matching](./matching-reconciliation) store to resolve identifiers:

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@ContributesIntoSet(SessionScope::class, binding = binding<IdentityResolver>())
class MatchingIdentityResolverImpl(
    private val resolveMatchingCommand: ResolveMatchingIdentityCommand
) : IdentityResolver {

    override val resolverId = "identity-matching"
    override val priority = 100

    override suspend fun supports(tenantId: String, resolverConfig: ResolverConfig?): Boolean {
        return resolverConfig?.enabled == true
            && resolverConfig.properties.containsKey("kms-key-id")
    }

    override suspend fun resolve(
        identifier: String,
        tenantId: String,
        resolverConfig: ResolverConfig?
    ): IdkResult<IdentityResolutionResult, IdkError> {
        val kmsKeyId = resolverConfig!!.properties["kms-key-id"]!!
        val identifierType = resolverConfig.properties["identifier-type"]
            ?.let { IdentifierType(it) } ?: IdentifierType.SUBJECT_ID

        return resolveMatchingCommand.execute(
            ResolveMatchingIdentityArgs(
                identifier = identifier,
                tenantId = tenantId,
                kmsKeyId = kmsKeyId,
                identifierType = identifierType
            )
        )
    }
}
```

It HMAC-hashes the identifier using a KMS-managed key, then looks up the hash in the `IdentityMatchStore`. This means the resolver never sees or stores the plaintext identifier, privacy is maintained end-to-end.

## Adding Custom Resolvers

Register additional resolvers via Metro multibinding:

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(SessionScope::class)
@ContributesIntoSet(SessionScope::class, binding = binding<IdentityResolver>())
class LdapIdentityResolver(
    private val ldapClient: LdapClient
) : IdentityResolver {

    override val resolverId = "ldap"
    override val priority = 50  // Lower than matching — tried second

    override suspend fun supports(tenantId: String, resolverConfig: ResolverConfig?): Boolean {
        return resolverConfig?.enabled == true
    }

    override suspend fun resolve(
        identifier: String,
        tenantId: String,
        resolverConfig: ResolverConfig?
    ): IdkResult<IdentityResolutionResult, IdkError> {
        val result = ldapClient.searchByEmail(identifier, tenantId)
            ?: return Ok(IdentityResolutionResult.NOT_FOUND) // Soft failure — try next

        return Ok(IdentityResolutionResult.found(
            internalIdentityId = result.uid,
            resolverId = resolverId,
            identifierType = IdentifierType.EMAIL
        ))
    }
}
```

With the matching resolver at priority 100 and LDAP at 50, the chain first checks the HMAC-hashed identity store. If no match is found, it falls back to LDAP. If LDAP also returns `NOT_FOUND`, the overall result is unresolved.

## Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  identity:
    resolution:
      enabled: true
      resolvers:
        identity-matching:
          enabled: true
          priority: 100
          properties:
            kms-key-id: "arn:aws:kms:eu-west-1:123:key/abc"
            identifier-type: SUBJECT_ID
        ldap:
          enabled: true
          priority: 50
          properties:
            base-dn: "ou=users,dc=example,dc=com"
```

```kotlin
data class IdentityResolutionConfig(
    val enabled: Boolean = false,
    val resolvers: Map<String, ResolverConfig> = emptyMap(),
)

data class ResolverConfig(
    val enabled: Boolean = true,
    val priority: Int = 0,
    val properties: Map<String, String> = emptyMap(),
)
```

Per-resolver properties are opaque `Map<String, String>`, each resolver reads what it needs. This keeps the resolution framework independent of specific resolver implementations.

## Commands

| Command | ID | Description |
|---------|-----|-------------|
| `ResolveIdentityCommand` | `identity.resolution.resolve` | Run the full resolver chain |
| `ResolveMatchingIdentityCommand` | `identity.resolution.resolve-matching` | HMAC hash + matching store lookup (used by the built-in resolver) |

## Identity Resolution vs Identifier Resolution

These are separate systems:

| | Identity Resolution | Identifier Resolution |
|---|---|---|
| **Question** | "Which internal identity does this external identifier belong to?" | "What key material does this cryptographic identifier resolve to?" |
| **Input** | External identifier (email, subject ID) | Cryptographic identifier (DID, X.509 fingerprint, JWK thumbprint) |
| **Output** | Internal identity ID | Key material, DID document, certificate chain |
| **Module** | `lib-identity-resolution` | `lib-crypto-identifier-resolution` |
| **Use case** | User authentication, session binding | Signature verification, encryption, trust establishment |

Identity resolution answers "who is this person?" while identifier resolution answers "what keys does this identifier control?"

---

# Auth Bridge

# Auth Bridge

The OID4VP Authentication Bridge connects wallet-based credential presentation to OAuth2/OIDC authorization servers. It sits between an authorization server (internal or external, Keycloak, Auth0, Azure AD) and the user's wallet, handling the full flow from QR code generation through credential verification, identity matching, optional IDV, and user resolution.

The result is standard OIDC claims that the authorization server can use to issue tokens, the authorization server doesn't need to know anything about wallets or verifiable credentials.

## Flow Overview

### Fast Path (Known Holder)

When the user's wallet key already has a binding in the identity matching store, the bridge skips IDV entirely and serves cached attributes:

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-auth-bridge-fast-path.svg" alt="Auth Bridge Fast Path" style={{maxWidth: '560px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

### IDV Path (Unknown Holder)

When no binding exists or the binding has expired, the reconciliation selector evaluates its rules and produces a plan, RunIdv, StepUp, or FailClosed. For RunIdv and StepUp, the user is redirected to an identity verification flow (OIDC login, document scan, email OTP, or any configured IDV method). On completion, the wallet attributes are merged with the verification results, a new identity match and encrypted binding are created, and the result flows back to the authorization server as OIDC claims.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-auth-bridge-flow.svg" alt="Auth Bridge IDV Flow" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Session Lifecycle

```kotlin
data class Oid4vpAuthSession(
    val sessionId: String,
    val correlationId: String,                     // Universal OID4VP correlation ID
    val oauthSessionId: String?,                   // Linked OAuth2 session
    val queryId: String,                           // Credential query ID
    val status: Oid4vpAuthSessionStatus,
    val verifiedData: VerifiedData?,               // Verified credentials (when VERIFIED)
    val resolvedUserId: String?,                   // Resolved user (when COMPLETED)
    val reconciliationSessionId: String?,           // IDV session link
    val holderIdentifierHash: String?,             // Cryptographic holder binding
    val knownHolderState: KnownHolderState?,
    val idvRequirementReason: IdvRequirementReason?,
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val expiresAt: Instant,
)
```

### Status Transitions

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-auth-session-status.svg" alt="Auth Session Status Transitions" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

| Status | Meaning |
|--------|---------|
| `PENDING` | QR code generated, waiting for wallet scan |
| `INTERACTION_STARTED` | Wallet retrieved the authorization request |
| `VERIFIED` | Credentials verified by Universal OID4VP |
| `IDV_REQUIRED` | Identity verification needed before completion |
| `COMPLETED` | Authentication complete, claims available |
| `EXPIRED` | Session TTL exceeded (default 5 minutes) |
| `ERROR` | Flow failed |

### IDV Requirement Reasons

When the session transitions to `IDV_REQUIRED`, the reason indicates why:

| Reason | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `FIRST_TIME_LINK` | New holder, no binding exists |
| `EXPIRED_BINDING` | Binding found but expired |
| `CANDIDATE_MATCH_CONFIRMATION` | Multiple candidate matches need disambiguation |
| `FORCED_RECONCILIATION` | `forceReconciliation` flag was set on session creation |

## HTTP Endpoints

The bridge exposes a set of HTTP endpoints via `CommandBackedHttpAdapter`:

### Session Management

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/auth/oid4vp/sessions` | Create a new auth session, returns QR code and status URI |
| `GET` | `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{sessionId}/status` | Poll session status |
| `POST` | `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{sessionId}/complete` | Complete authentication, get OIDC claims |

### IDV Integration

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `POST` | `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{sessionId}/idv/initiate` | Start IDV flow, get OIDC redirect URL |
| `GET` | `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{sessionId}/idv/status` | Check IDV status |
| `GET` | `/auth/oid4vp/idv/callback` | OIDC callback handler (receives auth code from institutional provider) |

### Session Creation

```bash
POST /auth/oid4vp/sessions
Content-Type: application/json

{
    "queryId": "pid-query",
    "oauthSessionId": "keycloak-session-123",
    "forceReconciliation": false
}
```

Response:
```json
{
    "sessionId": "abc-123",
    "qrCodeDataUri": "data:image/png;base64,...",
    "requestUri": "openid4vp://authorize?request_uri=...",
    "statusUri": "/auth/oid4vp/sessions/abc-123/status",
    "qrPageUri": "/auth/oid4vp/sessions/abc-123/qr"
}
```

### Authentication Result

```kotlin
data class Oid4vpAuthResult(
    val userId: String,
    val claims: Map<String, JsonElement>,
    val jwtClaims: String?,                           // Pre-built JWT payload
    val isNewUser: Boolean,
    val authenticatedAt: Instant,
    val acr: String = "urn:sphereon:oid4vp:vp",      // Auth Context Class Reference
    val amr: List<String> = listOf("vp"),             // Auth Method References
    val claimSource: ClaimSource,                     // WALLET_ONLY or CANONICAL_BINDING
)
```

| Claim Source | Meaning |
|-------------|---------|
| `WALLET_ONLY` | Claims projected directly from wallet credentials |
| `CANONICAL_BINDING` | Claims from a reconciled identity link binding (higher trust, includes institutional verification) |

When the claim source is `CANONICAL_BINDING`, the `acr` and `amr` values reflect the institutional verification, for example, `acr` might be `urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport` and `amr` might include `["pwd", "mfa"]`.

## Reconciliation Integration

The bridge delegates identity matching and reconciliation to the `ReconciliationOrchestratorApi`:

```kotlin
interface ReconciliationOrchestratorApi {
    // Check if the holder key has a known binding
    suspend fun resolveKnownHolder(
        holderKeyHash: String,
        tenantId: String,
        rawHolderKey: String? = null,
        walletAttributes: Map<String, JsonElement>? = null,
    ): IdkResult<ResolvedKnownHolder?, IdkError>

    // Start an IDV/reconciliation flow
    suspend fun initiateReconciliation(
        oid4vpSessionId: String,
        redirectUri: String,
    ): IdkResult<ReconciliationInitiateResult, IdkError>

    // Handle the OIDC callback from the institutional provider
    suspend fun handleCallback(
        code: String,
        state: String,
        walletAttributes: Map<String, JsonElement> = emptyMap(),
    ): IdkResult<ReconciliationCallbackResult, IdkError>
}
```

### Known Holder Resolution

```kotlin
data class ResolvedKnownHolder(
    val userId: String,
    val bindingId: String,
    val matchId: String,
    val canonicalAttributes: Map<String, JsonElement>,
    val assurance: AssuranceSummary?,
    val state: KnownHolderState = KnownHolderState.MATCHED_HOLDER_KEY,
)
```

When a known holder is found, the bridge skips IDV entirely, it uses the cached canonical attributes and assurance metadata from the binding. This is the fast path that avoids any external calls.

### Holder Key Extraction

The bridge extracts a persistent identifier from the VP token. The extraction strategy depends on the holder binding type:

| Holder binding | Persistent identifier | Key fingerprint role |
|---------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| **Rotatable DID** (`did:web`, `did:ion`, `did:tdw`) | The DID itself, survives key rotation via DID document updates | Fast-path cache only |
| **Key-bound DID** (`did:key`, `did:jwk`) | The key fingerprint, the DID IS the key, so rotation produces a new DID | Primary identifier |
| **`cnf.jwk`** (no DID) | The key fingerprint, no persistent identifier exists | Primary identifier |
| **X.509 certificate** | Subject DN (optionally scoped by Issuer DN), survives certificate renewal | Fast-path cache only |

**Extraction sources** (first available):

1. VP proof signature, key + optional DID from verification method reference
2. `cnf.jwk` confirmation claim
3. DID document resolution, match against proof signature's `kid`
4. X.509 SubjectPublicKeyInfo from certificate-bound credentials

**Canonicalization and hashing:**

1. Canonicalize the key material (RFC 7638 JWK thumbprint for JWK, DER-encoded SubjectPublicKeyInfo for X.509)
2. HMAC hash via `ReconciliationCryptoService.hashHolderKey()` using the tenant-scoped pepper
3. Look up the hash in the identity matching store

For **rotatable DID methods**, if a key fingerprint lookup misses but a DID is present, the system resolves the DID document and checks whether the presenting key is a current key, if so, it's the same identity with a rotated key (no full reconciliation needed, just add the new key fingerprint to the fast-path cache).

If the wallet doesn't include a holder key (e.g., bearer credentials without key binding), the bridge falls back to claim-based matching using `AttributeTupleMaterial`.

## Configuration

```yaml
oid4vp:
  auth-bridge:
    # Verifier identity
    client-id: "did:web:verifier.example.com"
    response-uri: "https://api.example.com/auth/oid4vp/response"

    # Credential queries
    default-query-id: "pid-query"

    # Session settings
    session-ttl-seconds: 300
    auto-create-user: true
    require-reconciliation: false     # Set to true to enforce holder binding
    user-identifier-claim-path: "sub"

    # Universal OID4VP service
    universal-api:
      base-url: "https://oid4vp.example.com"
      connection-timeout-ms: 30000
      request-timeout-ms: 120000

    # User microservice
    user-api:
      base-url: "https://users.example.com/api/v1"
      connection-timeout-ms: 30000
      request-timeout-ms: 60000
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `client-id` | - | Verifier identity (DID or URI) for OID4VP requests |
| `response-uri` | - | `direct_post` callback URI for wallet responses |
| `default-query-id` | - | Default credential query ID if not specified per-session |
| `default-dcql-query` | - | Inline DCQL query JSON (fallback) |
| `session-ttl-seconds` | `300` | Session expiration (5 minutes) |
| `auto-create-user` | `true` | Create user in user service if not found |
| `require-reconciliation` | `false` | Enforce cryptographic holder binding + IDV for all sessions |
| `user-identifier-claim-path` | `"sub"` | JSON path to extract user ID from verified credentials |

## Step-Up Contract

When the session transitions to `IDV_REQUIRED`, the status endpoint exposes structured metadata so the frontend can render appropriate UI:

| `idvRequirementReason` | `reconciliationPlanType` | User-facing meaning |
|------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| `FIRST_TIME_LINK` | `RUN_IDV` | New holder, no binding exists, full verification required |
| `EXPIRED_BINDING` | `STEP_UP` | Previous binding expired, re-verification needed |
| `CANDIDATE_MATCH_CONFIRMATION` | `STEP_UP` | Claim-tuple match found but needs confirmation via institutional login |
| `FORCED_RECONCILIATION` | `RUN_IDV` | `forceReconciliation=true` was set on session creation |

The `StepUp` plan uses the same OIDC redirect mechanism as `RunIdv`, the difference is in the callback behavior: `StepUp` updates the existing binding rather than creating a new one. The API exposes the distinction so policy and UX can treat them differently, even though the redirect flow is the same.

## Service Architecture

In a typical deployment, the auth bridge runs as a dedicated service alongside the authorization server:

| Service | Port | Role |
|---------|------|------|
| **service-auth-bridge** | 8090 | OID4VP verification, reconciliation, IDV flow, claims mapping, external API |
| **service-sts** | 8080 | OAuth2 authorization server, federation login, wallet login via auth-bridge HTTP calls |

The auth bridge uses PostgreSQL via SQLDelight for all reconciliation persistence (identity matches, link bindings, reconciliation sessions, auxiliary data). See [Matching & Reconciliation](./matching-reconciliation) for the database schema and external API details.

Token enrichment bridges the two services: when the STS mints tokens, the `TokenEnrichmentService` reads canonical claims and auxiliary data from the auth bridge's database, merging them into the token's claim set.

## Integration with Authorization Servers

The auth bridge is designed to be called by an authorization server during its authentication flow. The typical integration pattern:

1. **Keycloak**: Custom authenticator SPI that calls the bridge endpoints
2. **Auth0**: Custom Action that redirects through the bridge
3. **Custom AS**: Direct HTTP calls from the authorization endpoint handler

The bridge returns `Oid4vpAuthResult` with pre-built OIDC claims that the AS can embed in its ID tokens and access tokens. The `acr` and `amr` values are standards-compliant, so downstream relying parties can evaluate authentication strength without knowing the bridge exists.

---

# Cedarling Integration

# Cedarling Integration

Cedarling is a sidecar that exposes the Cedar policy engine via the OpenID AuthZEN protocol. The EDK provides a dedicated client for Cedarling integration.

## Overview

Cedar is a policy language developed by AWS that provides:

- **Readable policies** - Human-friendly syntax for authorization rules
- **Fast evaluation** - Millisecond-level decision times
- **Formal verification** - Policies can be mathematically proven correct

Cedarling wraps Cedar in an AuthZEN-compliant REST API, enabling integration with the EDK's authorization framework.

## Architecture

<img src="/img/diagrams/cedarling-architecture.svg" alt="Cedarling Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Configuration

### CedarlingConfig

```kotlin
data class CedarlingConfig(
    val baseUrl: String,                                    // Cedarling base URL
    val evaluationPath: String = "/cedarling/evaluation",   // Evaluation endpoint
    val healthPath: String = "/health",                     // Health check endpoint
    val discoveryPath: String = "/.well-known/authzen-configuration",
    val evaluationTimeoutMs: Long = 5000,
    val healthCheckTimeoutMs: Long = 2000
)
```

### Factory Methods

```kotlin
// Local development
val localConfig = CedarlingConfig.LOCAL
// Equivalent to: CedarlingConfig(baseUrl = "http://localhost:5000")

// From environment variables
val envConfig = CedarlingConfig.fromEnvironment(
    baseUrl = System.getenv("CEDARLING_URL") ?: "http://localhost:5000",
    evaluationTimeoutMs = 3000
)
```

### Spring Boot Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  authzen:
    enabled: true
    pdp:
      type: cedarling
      base-url: http://cedarling-sidecar:5000
      evaluation-path: /cedarling/evaluation
      health-path: /health
      timeout-ms: 5000
      health-check-timeout-ms: 2000
```

## CedarlingPdp

The Cedarling PDP client implementation:

```kotlin
class CedarlingPdp(
    private val config: CedarlingConfig,
    private val httpClient: HttpClient = createDefaultClient()
) : AuthZenPdp {

    override val id: String = "cedarling"

    override suspend fun isHealthy(): Boolean {
        return try {
            withTimeout(config.healthCheckTimeoutMs) {
                val response = httpClient.get("${config.baseUrl}${config.healthPath}")
                response.status.isSuccess()
            }
        } catch (e: Exception) {
            false
        }
    }

    override suspend fun evaluate(
        request: AuthZenEvaluationRequest
    ): IdkResult<AuthZenEvaluationResponse, IdkError> {
        return try {
            withTimeout(config.evaluationTimeoutMs) {
                val response = httpClient.post("${config.baseUrl}${config.evaluationPath}") {
                    contentType(ContentType.Application.Json)
                    setBody(request)
                }

                if (response.status.isSuccess()) {
                    Ok(response.body<AuthZenEvaluationResponse>())
                } else {
                    Err(IdkError(
                        code = "CEDARLING_PDP_ERROR",
                        message = "PDP returned ${response.status}"
                    ))
                }
            }
        } catch (e: TimeoutCancellationException) {
            Err(IdkError(code = "CEDARLING_TIMEOUT", message = "Request timed out"))
        } catch (e: Exception) {
            Err(IdkError(code = "CEDARLING_ERROR", message = e.message ?: "Unknown error"))
        }
    }
}
```

## Usage Examples

### Basic Evaluation

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.authz.authzen.cedarling.CedarlingPdp
import com.sphereon.authz.authzen.cedarling.CedarlingConfig
import com.sphereon.authz.authzen.model.*

val config = CedarlingConfig(baseUrl = "http://localhost:5000")
val pdp = CedarlingPdp(config)

// Check access
val request = AuthZenEvaluationRequest(
    subject = AuthZenSubject.user("alice"),
    action = AuthZenAction(name = "read"),
    resource = AuthZenResource(type = "document", id = "doc-123"),
    context = AuthZenContext(tenantId = "acme", sessionId = "session-abc")
)

val result = pdp.evaluate(request)

when (result) {
    is Ok -> {
        if (result.value.decision) {
            println("Access granted")
        } else {
            println("Access denied")
        }
    }
    is Err -> println("Error: ${result.error.message}")
}
```

### With Resilience

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.authz.authzen.impl.ResilientAuthZenPdp

val resilientPdp = ResilientAuthZenPdp(
    delegate = CedarlingPdp(config),
    config = AuthZenConfig(
        enabled = true,
        fallbackPolicy = FallbackPolicy.DENY,
        cacheEnabled = true,
        cacheTtlSeconds = 300,
        resilience = ResilienceConfig(
            circuitBreakerEnabled = true,
            failureThreshold = 5,
            resetTimeMs = 30000
        )
    )
)

// Evaluate with automatic caching and circuit breaking
val result = resilientPdp.evaluate(request)

// Monitor health
println("Circuit state: ${resilientPdp.getCircuitBreakerState()}")
println("Cache stats: ${resilientPdp.getCacheStats()}")
```

### As PolicyEngine

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.authz.policy.AuthZenPolicyEngine

// Wrap in generic PolicyEngine interface
val policyEngine: PolicyEngine = AuthZenPolicyEngine(resilientPdp)

// Use PolicyRequest instead of AuthZenEvaluationRequest
val policyRequest = PolicyRequest(
    principal = PolicyPrincipal(type = "User", id = "alice"),
    action = PolicyAction(name = "document.read"),
    resource = PolicyResource(type = "Document", id = "doc-123"),
    context = PolicyContext(tenantId = "acme")
)

val decision = policyEngine.evaluate(policyRequest).getOrThrow()

if (decision.isPermitted) {
    // Proceed with operation
}
```

## Cedar Policy Examples

### Basic RBAC

```cedar
// Allow admins to perform any action
permit (
    principal in Role::"admin",
    action,
    resource
);

// Allow users to read their own documents
permit (
    principal,
    action == Action::"read",
    resource
) when {
    resource.owner == principal
};
```

### Tenant Isolation

```cedar
// Only allow access within same tenant
permit (
    principal,
    action,
    resource
) when {
    principal.tenant_id == resource.tenant_id
};
```

### Command-Based Authorization

```cedar
// Allow specific command patterns
permit (
    principal in Role::"document-editor",
    action,
    resource
) when {
    action.domain == "document" &&
    action.operation in ["create", "read", "update"]
};

// Deny delete for non-owners
forbid (
    principal,
    action,
    resource
) when {
    action.operation == "delete" &&
    resource.owner != principal
};
```

## Deployment

### Docker Compose

```yaml
services:
  cedarling:
    image: janssenproject/cedarling:latest
    ports:
      - "5000:5000"
    volumes:
      - ./policies:/policies
    environment:
      - CEDAR_POLICY_DIR=/policies

  app:
    build: .
    environment:
      - CEDARLING_URL=http://cedarling:5000
    depends_on:
      - cedarling
```

### Kubernetes

```yaml
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: my-app
spec:
  template:
    spec:
      containers:
        - name: app
          image: my-app:latest
          env:
            - name: CEDARLING_URL
              value: http://localhost:5000

        - name: cedarling
          image: janssenproject/cedarling:latest
          ports:
            - containerPort: 5000
          volumeMounts:
            - name: policies
              mountPath: /policies

      volumes:
        - name: policies
          configMap:
            name: cedar-policies
```

## Error Handling

The Cedarling client uses specific error codes:

| Error Code | Description |
|------------|-------------|
| `CEDARLING_PDP_ERROR` | HTTP error from Cedarling |
| `CEDARLING_TIMEOUT` | Request exceeded timeout |
| `CEDARLING_ERROR` | General communication error |
| `CEDARLING_DISCOVERY_ERROR` | Failed to fetch configuration |

```kotlin
val result = pdp.evaluate(request)

when (result) {
    is Ok -> handleSuccess(result.value)
    is Err -> {
        when (result.error.code) {
            "CEDARLING_TIMEOUT" -> {
                // PDP slow, use cached result or fallback
            }
            "CEDARLING_PDP_ERROR" -> {
                // PDP returned error, check policies
            }
            else -> {
                // Network or other error
            }
        }
    }
}
```

## Health Monitoring

```kotlin
// Check if Cedarling is healthy
val healthy = pdp.isHealthy()

// In Spring Boot, expose as actuator endpoint
@Component
class CedarlingHealthIndicator(
    private val pdp: CedarlingPdp
) : HealthIndicator {

    override fun health(): Health = runBlocking {
        if (pdp.isHealthy()) {
            Health.up().build()
        } else {
            Health.down().withDetail("error", "Cedarling unavailable").build()
        }
    }
}
```

---

# OPA Integration

# OPA Integration

[Open Policy Agent (OPA)](https://www.openpolicyagent.org/) is a general-purpose policy engine that uses the Rego language for policy authoring. It's widely adopted in cloud-native environments, particularly for Kubernetes admission control, API gateway authorization, and microservice policy enforcement. The EDK integrates with OPA via its REST API, sending authorization requests to OPA's data API and interpreting the response.

## How It Works

When a command triggers authorization, the EDK builds an OPA input document from the `PolicyRequest` and sends it as a POST to OPA's policy path. The input follows a normalized structure so that Rego policies always see the same shape regardless of which command triggered the evaluation.

The request sent to OPA:

```json
{
  "input": {
    "principal": {
      "type": "user",
      "id": "usr_abc123",
      "attributes": { "roles": ["admin"], "department": "engineering" }
    },
    "action": {
      "name": "generate",
      "module": "kms",
      "service": "keys",
      "command": "kms.keys.generate"
    },
    "resource": {
      "type": "Key",
      "id": "key-456"
    },
    "context": {
      "tenantId": "acme-corp",
      "sessionId": "sess_789"
    }
  }
}
```

OPA evaluates the Rego policy at the configured path and returns a response. The EDK looks for `result.allow`, if it's `true`, the decision is PERMIT. If `false` or missing, the decision is DENY. This fail-closed interpretation means a misconfigured policy that doesn't set `allow` will deny rather than accidentally grant access.

## Rego Policy Examples

A basic RBAC policy:

```rego
package sphereon.authz

default allow = false

# Admins can do anything
allow {
    input.principal.attributes.roles[_] == "admin"
}

# Users can read keys in their own tenant
allow {
    input.action.module == "kms"
    input.action.name == "get"
    input.principal.attributes.tenantId == input.context.tenantId
}

# Deny cross-tenant access explicitly
deny {
    input.principal.attributes.tenantId != input.context.tenantId
}
```

A more granular policy with reasons:

```rego
package sphereon.authz

default allow = false

allow {
    has_permission
    not deny
}

has_permission {
    input.principal.attributes.roles[_] == "key-manager"
    input.action.module == "kms"
}

deny {
    input.action.name == "delete"
    not input.principal.attributes.roles[_] == "admin"
}

reasons[msg] {
    not has_permission
    msg := sprintf("principal %s lacks required role for %s", [input.principal.id, input.action.command])
}
```

## Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  authzen:
    enabled: true
    pdp:
      type: opa
      base-url: http://opa:8181
      policy-path: /v1/data/sphereon/authz
      timeout-ms: 5000
      health-path: /health
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|----------|---------|-------------|
| `base-url` | - | OPA server URL |
| `policy-path` | `/v1/data/sphereon/authz` | Rego package path in OPA's data API |
| `timeout-ms` | `5000` | Request timeout |
| `health-path` | `/health` | Health check endpoint |

## Deployment

OPA is typically deployed as a sidecar or a shared service. As a sidecar, it runs alongside your application and serves policy decisions with minimal network latency. As a shared service, multiple applications query the same OPA instance.

Policies can be loaded from local files, fetched from a bundle server, or pushed via OPA's management API. For the EDK, the policy must be available at the configured `policy-path` when the first authorization request arrives.

```yaml
# docker-compose example
services:
  opa:
    image: openpolicyagent/opa:latest
    command: run --server --addr 0.0.0.0:8181 /policies
    volumes:
      - ./policies:/policies
    ports:
      - "8181:8181"
```

---

# Command Authorization Extension

# Command Authorization Extension

The `PolicyCommandExtension` automatically intercepts command execution to enforce authorization policies. This provides transparent authorization without modifying individual command implementations.

## Overview

The command extension integrates with the IDK's command execution pipeline:

<img src="/img/diagrams/command-extension-flow.svg" alt="Command Extension Flow" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Command IDs

Commands are identified by hierarchical IDs following the pattern `domain.resource.operation`:

```kotlin
data class CommandId(
    val domain: String,      // e.g., "identity", "party", "kms"
    val resource: String,    // e.g., "identities", "parties", "keys"
    val operation: String    // e.g., "create", "read", "update", "delete"
) {
    val fullId: String get() = "$domain.$resource.$operation"
}

// Examples
CommandId.parse("identity.identities.create")
// domain=identity, resource=identities, operation=create

CommandId.parse("party.contacts.delete")
// domain=party, resource=contacts, operation=delete
```

## Pattern Matching

Include and exclude patterns use glob-style matching:

| Pattern | Matches |
|---------|---------|
| `identity.**` | All identity commands |
| `*.*.create` | All create operations |
| `party.contacts.*` | All contact operations |
| `kms.keys.sign` | Exact match |

```kotlin
val config = AuthZenConfig(
    // Skip authorization for health and discovery
    excludePatterns = listOf(
        "health.**",
        "discovery.**",
        "actuator.**"
    ),
    // Only authorize these patterns
    includePatterns = listOf("**")  // All commands
)
```

## PolicyCommandExtension

The extension implements `ICommandExecutionExtension` to intercept commands:

```kotlin
class PolicyCommandExtension<Arg : Any, SuccessResult : Any, ErrorResult : IdkErrorType>(
    private val policyEngineProvider: PolicyEngineProvider,
    private val config: AuthZenConfig,
    private val sessionContextProvider: () -> SessionContext
) : ICommandExecutionExtension<Arg, SuccessResult, ErrorResult> {

    override fun beforeExecute(
        service: Command<Arg, SuccessResult, ErrorResult>,
        args: Arg,
        plugin: ISurePlugin?
    ) {
        // Skip if disabled
        if (!config.enabled) return

        // Check include/exclude patterns
        if (!shouldAuthorize(service.id)) return

        // Evaluate authorization
        runBlockingCompat {
            val result = evaluateAuthorization(service, args)
            result.fold(
                success = { decision ->
                    if (decision.isDenied) {
                        throw AuthorizationDeniedException(
                            commandId = service.id,
                            reason = decision.reasons.firstOrNull() ?: "Access denied"
                        )
                    }
                },
                failure = { error ->
                    handleError(service.id, error)
                }
            )
        }
    }

    private suspend fun evaluateAuthorization(
        command: Command<*, *, *>,
        args: Any
    ): IdkResult<PolicyDecision, IdkError> {
        val context = sessionContextProvider()

        // Extract subjects from session (user, workload, roles)
        val subjects = extractSubjects(context)

        // Map command to action
        val action = mapAction(command.id)

        // Map arguments to resource
        val resource = mapResource(command.id, args)

        // Build request and evaluate
        val request = PolicyRequest(
            principal = subjects.first(),
            action = action,
            resource = resource,
            context = PolicyContext(
                tenantId = context.tenant.tenantId,
                sessionId = context.sessionId,
                timestamp = Clock.System.now().toEpochMilliseconds()
            )
        )

        return policyEngineProvider.getEngine().evaluate(request)
    }
}
```

## Subject Extraction

The extension extracts subjects from JWT tokens in the session context:

```kotlin
class JwtSubjectExtractor(
    private val roleClaimNames: List<String> = listOf("roles", "groups", "realm_access.roles")
) : AuthZenSubjectExtractor {

    override suspend fun extractSubjects(
        sessionContext: SessionContext
    ): IdkResult<List<AuthZenSubject>, IdkError> {
        val subjects = mutableListOf<AuthZenSubject>()

        // User subject from principal
        val principal = sessionContext.principal
        if (principal != null) {
            subjects.add(AuthZenSubject(
                type = "user",
                id = principal.toString(),
                properties = buildMap {
                    put("tenant_id", JsonPrimitive(sessionContext.tenant.tenantId))
                    sessionContext.accessToken?.let { token ->
                        token.email?.let { put("email", JsonPrimitive(it)) }
                        token.name?.let { put("name", JsonPrimitive(it)) }
                    }
                }
            ))
        }

        // Workload subject from JWT issuer
        sessionContext.accessToken?.issuer?.let { issuer ->
            subjects.add(AuthZenSubject(
                type = "workload",
                id = issuer,
                properties = emptyMap()
            ))
        }

        // Role subjects from JWT claims
        val roles = extractRoles(sessionContext.accessToken)
        roles.forEach { role ->
            subjects.add(AuthZenSubject(
                type = "role",
                id = role,
                properties = emptyMap()
            ))
        }

        return Ok(subjects)
    }
}
```

## Action Mapping

Commands are mapped to policy actions with operation categories:

```kotlin
class DefaultActionMapper : AuthZenActionMapper {

    override fun mapAction(commandId: String): AuthZenAction {
        val parsed = CommandId.parse(commandId)
            ?: return AuthZenAction(name = commandId)

        return AuthZenAction(
            name = parsed.fullId,
            properties = buildMap {
                put("domain", JsonPrimitive(parsed.domain))
                put("resource", JsonPrimitive(parsed.resource))
                put("operation", JsonPrimitive(parsed.operation))
                put("operation_category", JsonPrimitive(
                    getOperationCategory(parsed.operation)
                ))
            }
        )
    }

    private fun getOperationCategory(operation: String): String {
        return when (operation) {
            "get", "list", "find", "search", "exists" -> "read"
            "create", "add", "register" -> "create"
            "update", "patch", "modify" -> "update"
            "delete", "remove", "unregister" -> "delete"
            "enable", "disable", "configure" -> "admin"
            "execute", "run", "invoke" -> "execute"
            "sign", "verify", "encrypt", "decrypt" -> "crypto"
            else -> "other"
        }
    }
}
```

## Resource Mapping

Custom mappers extract resource information from command arguments:

```kotlin
interface AuthZenResourceMapper<Arg> {
    fun mapResource(commandId: String, args: Arg): AuthZenResource?
    fun supports(commandId: String): Boolean = true
}

// Example: Identity resource mapper
class IdentityResourceMapper : AuthZenResourceMapper<IdentityArgs> {

    override fun mapResource(commandId: String, args: IdentityArgs): AuthZenResource {
        return AuthZenResource(
            type = "Identity",
            id = args.identityId,
            properties = buildMap {
                args.partyId?.let { put("party_id", JsonPrimitive(it)) }
                args.tenantId?.let { put("tenant_id", JsonPrimitive(it)) }
            }
        )
    }

    override fun supports(commandId: String): Boolean {
        return commandId.startsWith("identity.identities.")
    }
}

// Register mappers
val registry = DefaultResourceMapperRegistry().apply {
    register(IdentityArgs::class, IdentityResourceMapper())
    register(PartyArgs::class, PartyResourceMapper())
}
```

## Error Handling

Authorization failures throw specific exceptions:

```kotlin
class AuthorizationDeniedException(
    val commandId: String,
    val reason: String
) : RuntimeException("Authorization denied for $commandId: $reason")

class AuthorizationException(
    val commandId: String,
    val reason: String
) : RuntimeException("Authorization error for $commandId: $reason")
```

Handle in your service layer:

```kotlin
try {
    val result = command.execute(args, context)
    // Success
} catch (e: AuthorizationDeniedException) {
    // User not authorized - return 403
    throw ForbiddenException(e.reason)
} catch (e: AuthorizationException) {
    // Authorization system error - use fallback or fail
    when (config.fallbackPolicy) {
        FallbackPolicy.ALLOW -> {
            // Proceed anyway (development only)
            command.execute(args, context)
        }
        FallbackPolicy.DENY -> throw ForbiddenException("Authorization unavailable")
        FallbackPolicy.FAIL -> throw e
    }
}
```

## Configuration

### Per-Command Exclusions

```kotlin
val config = AuthZenConfig(
    enabled = true,
    excludePatterns = listOf(
        // System endpoints
        "health.**",
        "actuator.**",
        "discovery.**",

        // Public endpoints
        "public.**",

        // Skip specific commands
        "identity.tokens.refresh",
        "oauth2.*.authorize"
    ),
    includePatterns = listOf("**")
)
```

### Domain-Specific Authorization

```kotlin
val config = AuthZenConfig(
    enabled = true,
    excludePatterns = listOf("health.**"),
    // Only authorize specific domains
    includePatterns = listOf(
        "party.**",      // All party operations
        "identity.**",   // All identity operations
        "kms.keys.*"     // Key operations only
    )
)
```

## Spring Boot Integration

The command extension is automatically configured with Spring Boot auto-configuration:

```yaml
sphereon:
  authzen:
    enabled: true
    pdp:
      type: cedarling
      base-url: http://cedarling:5000
    exclude-patterns:
      - "health.**"
      - "actuator.**"
    include-patterns:
      - "**"
```

The extension is registered as a Spring bean and injected into the command execution pipeline.

## Testing

### Unit Testing

```kotlin
@Test
fun `should deny unauthorized access`() {
    // Setup mock policy engine
    val mockEngine = mockk<PolicyEngine>()
    coEvery { mockEngine.evaluate(any()) } returns Ok(
        PolicyDecision(decision = Decision.DENY, reasons = listOf("Not authorized"))
    )

    val extension = PolicyCommandExtension(
        policyEngineProvider = { mockEngine },
        config = AuthZenConfig(enabled = true),
        sessionContextProvider = { testSessionContext }
    )

    // Should throw
    assertThrows<AuthorizationDeniedException> {
        extension.beforeExecute(testCommand, testArgs, null)
    }
}

@Test
fun `should skip excluded commands`() {
    val config = AuthZenConfig(
        enabled = true,
        excludePatterns = listOf("health.**")
    )

    val extension = PolicyCommandExtension(
        policyEngineProvider = { mockEngine },
        config = config,
        sessionContextProvider = { testSessionContext }
    )

    // Health command should not evaluate policy
    extension.beforeExecute(healthCheckCommand, args, null)

    coVerify(exactly = 0) { mockEngine.evaluate(any()) }
}
```

### Integration Testing

```kotlin
@SpringBootTest
class AuthorizationIntegrationTest {

    @Autowired
    lateinit var partyService: PartyService

    @Test
    fun `admin can create party`() {
        // Login as admin
        withAdminContext {
            val party = partyService.createParty(input)
            assertNotNull(party)
        }
    }

    @Test
    fun `regular user cannot delete party`() {
        withUserContext {
            assertThrows<AuthorizationDeniedException> {
                partyService.deleteParty(partyId)
            }
        }
    }
}
```

---

# Party REST API

import ApiCapability from '@site/src/components/ApiCapability';

# Party REST API

The party model is managed over a REST surface mounted at `/api/party/v1`. Each party type has its own resource that creates, reads, lists, updates, and soft-deletes that one type and returns the typed object directly, a `Person`, an `Organization`, and so on, with no nested detail record to reassemble. A polymorphic `/parties` resource reads across all types, and further resources manage relationships, group membership, application login surfaces, and identity bindings.

Every endpoint is a thin HTTP adapter over an in-process **service command**. The HTTP layer decodes the request, calls the service command, and encodes the result; the business logic lives only in the service command. Each operation therefore has two command ids: a service id (`party.<resource>.<action>`) and a distinct REST id (`party-rest.<resource>.<action>`). The blocks below show each operation four ways, an abstract, the REST call, the in-process service command, and the gRPC envelope, so you can call it over whichever transport you use.

Every request runs within the caller's tenant, resolved from the OIDC bearer token; the tenant is never read from a client-supplied field. List endpoints accept both `limit`/`offset` and `page`/`size`, clamp the page size, and return a `pagination` block alongside the `data` array. Errors share a stable machine-readable body.

## Quick Reference

| Resource | Operations |
|----------|------------|
| `/persons` | create, get, list, update, delete |
| `/organizations` | create, get, list, update, delete |
| `/organizationunits` | create, get, list, update, delete, list children, list members |
| `/services` | create, get, list, update, delete, get/set login config |
| `/groups` | create, get, list, update, delete, list/replace/add/remove members |
| `/parties` | polymorphic get, polymorphic list, list a party's relationships |
| `/relationships` | create, get, list, update, delete |
| `/identities/{identityId}/applications/{applicationId}` | get, set, delete binding |

The blocks on this page cover a representative operation from each resource family. For the full set, see the [Party Management reference](/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager).

## Persons

The person resource is the canonical example; every other typed resource follows the same five-operation shape.

### Create

Returns `201 Created` with the full `Person` (server-assigned id, tenant from the session, and timestamps). A `400` is returned for a malformed body.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createPerson"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/party/v1/persons"
  commandId="party.person.create"
  argsType="CreatePersonArgs"
  resultType="Person"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Supply the `displayName` and the optional name parts, birth date, origin, home `organizationUnitId`, and ownership. The result is the stored `Person` as one coherent object.

</ApiCapability>

### Get

Returns `200 OK` with the `Person`. The optional `include` set opts into associations such as `specializations`; by default nothing extra is hydrated. A `404` is returned when no person with that id exists in the tenant.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="getPerson"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/party/v1/persons/{id}"
  commandId="party.person.get"
  argsType="GetPersonArgs"
  resultType="Person"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Reads one person by the `id` taken from the path. Pass `include=specializations` to hydrate the party's roles and validated attributes.

</ApiCapability>

### List

Returns `200 OK` with a page of `Person` objects. Narrow the page with the name and display-name filters, the home-unit and origin filters, and a free-text `q`; window it with `limit`/`offset` or `page`/`size`.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listPersons"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/party/v1/persons"
  commandId="party.person.list"
  argsType="ListPersonsArgs"
  resultType="Page<Person>"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Lists the calling tenant's persons, paged and filtered. The tenant comes from the session; the result is a `Page<Person>` with a pagination block.

</ApiCapability>

### Update

Returns `200 OK` with the updated `Person`. A `null` or omitted field leaves the stored value unchanged. A `404` is returned when the person does not exist.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="updatePerson"
  method="PUT"
  path="/api/party/v1/persons/{id}"
  commandId="party.person.update"
  argsType="UpdatePersonArgs"
  resultType="Person"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

The `id` comes from the path. Supply only the fields to change; any `null` field keeps the current stored value.

</ApiCapability>

### Delete

Soft-deletes the person and returns `204 No Content`. A `404` is returned when the person does not exist.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="deletePerson"
  method="DELETE"
  path="/api/party/v1/persons/{id}"
  commandId="party.person.delete"
  argsType="DeletePersonArgs"
  resultType="DeletePersonResult"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Soft-deletes the person named by the path `id`. The command result reports whether a matching person existed and was deleted.

</ApiCapability>

## Organizations

Organizations follow the same five-operation shape as persons, returning the merged `Organization` object. The create block is shown; get, list, update, and delete mirror the person operations with the `party.organization.*` command ids.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createOrganization"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/party/v1/organizations"
  commandId="party.organization.create"
  argsType="CreateOrganizationArgs"
  resultType="Organization"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Supply the `legalName` and the optional organization type, industry, contact details, and policy URIs. The result is the stored `Organization`.

</ApiCapability>

### Registrations

An organization carries its formal registrations, the registered numbers that prove the entity is who it claims to be, such as a VAT number, a Legal Entity Identifier, a DUNS number, or a Chamber of Commerce entry. They are managed through the organization's `registrations` sub-resource: list the registrations an organization holds, or add a new one as the entity is verified in a jurisdiction. These endpoints work directly against the organization store rather than through a separate service command, so they expose the Overview and API reference views only.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listOrganizationRegistrations"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/party/v1/organizations/{id}/registrations"
  command={false}
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Lists the registrations held by the organization named by the path `id`. Each entry carries the registration type (the scheme), its value, and the issuing authority.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="addOrganizationRegistration"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/party/v1/organizations/{id}/registrations"
  command={false}
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Adds a registration to the organization named by the path `id`. Supply the registration type, the value, and the issuing authority.

</ApiCapability>

## Organization Units

An organization unit is created like any other party and additionally carries a parent unit, branding, and a terms URI. Beyond the standard five operations, a unit exposes `GET /organizationunits/{id}/children` to walk the nesting tree and `GET /organizationunits/{id}/members` to list the parties contained in it; both are in the [full reference](/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager).

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createOrganizationUnit"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/party/v1/organizationunits"
  commandId="party.organizationunit.create"
  argsType="CreateOrganizationUnitArgs"
  resultType="OrganizationUnit"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Supply the unit `name`, an optional `parentOuId` to nest it, and optional branding and terms. Omitting `parentOuId` places the unit directly under the tenant root.

</ApiCapability>

## Services and Login Configuration {#application-login-and-bindings}

A service is a software-backed party. A service that people sign in to additionally carries a login configuration set through `PUT /services/{id}/login-config`, which makes the service a login surface (see [Identities and Identifiers](./identities-and-identifiers#applications-are-services)).

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createService"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/party/v1/services"
  commandId="party.service.create"
  argsType="CreateServiceArgs"
  resultType="Service"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Supply the `displayName` and the optional service type, endpoint URI, and OAuth client id. The result is the stored `Service`.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="setApplicationLoginConfig"
  method="PUT"
  path="/api/party/v1/services/{id}/login-config"
  commandId="party.login-config.set"
  argsType="SetApplicationLoginConfigArgs"
  resultType="ApplicationLoginConfigResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

The `id` is the service party id. Supply the accepted authentication methods, the identifier types valid as logins here, the identity providers that may back login, and whether self-registration is allowed.

</ApiCapability>

### Identity Application Bindings

An identity may authenticate at a service only through an explicit binding that grants the `authenticable` capability. Setting a binding ties an identity to an application with its allowed methods and an optional application role; deleting it removes the ability to log in there.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="setIdentityApplicationBinding"
  method="PUT"
  path="/api/party/v1/identities/{identityId}/applications/{applicationId}"
  commandId="party.application-binding.set"
  argsType="SetIdentityApplicationBindingArgs"
  resultType="IdentityApplicationBindingResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

The `identityId` and `applicationId` come from the path. Supply the capabilities (such as `authenticable`), the allowed authentication methods, an optional application role, and the validity window.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="deleteIdentityApplicationBinding"
  method="DELETE"
  path="/api/party/v1/identities/{identityId}/applications/{applicationId}"
  commandId="party.application-binding.delete"
  argsType="DeleteIdentityApplicationBindingArgs"
  resultType="DeleteIdentityApplicationBindingResult"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Removes the binding between the identity and the application named in the path. The result reports whether a binding existed and was removed.

</ApiCapability>

## Groups and Membership

A group is created like any other party and gathers members. Membership is managed under `/groups/{id}/members`: list the members, replace the whole set, or add and remove one member at a time. A member may be any party, including another group.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createGroup"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/party/v1/groups"
  commandId="party.group.create"
  argsType="CreateGroupArgs"
  resultType="Group"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Supply the group `name`. A group never bears specializations or attributes; it carries only its members.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="addGroupMember"
  method="PUT"
  path="/api/party/v1/groups/{id}/members/{memberId}"
  commandId="party.group-member.add"
  argsType="AddGroupMemberArgs"
  resultType="GroupMembershipResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

The `id` is the group and `memberId` is the party to add. The call is idempotent: adding a member that is already present is a no-op.

</ApiCapability>

## Addresses {#addresses}

Any party can carry electronic addresses (email, phone, messaging handles) and physical addresses, attached as records under `/parties/{id}/addresses`. They are hydrated on demand rather than returned on every party read, so an ordinary read stays small and you ask for addresses only when you need them. The electronic-address create and list operations are shown; the physical-address operations and the per-address get, update, and delete follow the same shape under `/parties/{id}/addresses/physical` and are in the [full reference](/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager).

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="addElectronicAddress"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/party/v1/parties/{id}/addresses/electronic"
  commandId="party.electronic-address.create"
  argsType="CreateElectronicAddressArgs"
  resultType="ElectronicAddress"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

The `id` is the owning party. Supply the address type, the value, and optional flags such as whether it is primary or already verified. The result is the stored `ElectronicAddress`.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listElectronicAddresses"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/party/v1/parties/{id}/addresses/electronic"
  commandId="party.electronic-address.list"
  argsType="ListElectronicAddressesArgs"
  resultType="List<ElectronicAddress>"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Lists the electronic addresses attached to the party named by the path `id`.

</ApiCapability>

## Parties (Polymorphic) {#parties}

When you do not know a party's type in advance, the `/parties` resource reads across all types and returns the discriminated `PartyEntity`, the correct typed subclass for each row. `GET /parties` lists with filters on `partyType`, `partySubtype`, `organizationUnitId`, and `origin`; `GET /parties/{id}` reads one.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="getParty"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/party/v1/parties/{id}"
  commandId="party.parties.get"
  argsType="GetPartyArgs"
  resultType="PartyEntity"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Reads one party by `id` regardless of type and returns it as the correct `PartyEntity` subclass. Use `include` to hydrate associations such as addresses.

</ApiCapability>

## Relationships {#relationships}

Relationships are typed, directional edges between any two parties (see [Relationships](./relationships)). Create them under `/relationships`, and list the relationships of a given party through `/parties/{id}/relationships`.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createRelationship"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/party/v1/relationships"
  commandId="party.relationship.create"
  argsType="CreateRelationshipArgs"
  resultType="PartyRelationshipResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Supply the two party ids, the relationship `type` from the registered catalog (for example `employed_by` or `same_entity`), and an optional validity window. The result is the stored relationship.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="party-manager-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listPartyRelationships"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/party/v1/parties/{id}/relationships"
  commandId="party.relationship.list-by-party"
  argsType="ListRelationshipsByPartyArgs"
  resultType="List<PartyRelationshipResult>"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/parties/party-manager">

Lists every relationship in which the party named by the path `id` participates, in either direction, so you can walk the graph from one party to its counter-parties.

</ApiCapability>

## Tenancy and Authorization

Every endpoint operates in the single tenant resolved from the bearer token before the request reaches the adapter; the optional `X-Tenant-ID` header is a trusted-infrastructure override and is never used for ordinary access control. Reads are implicitly scoped to the caller's tenant, and writes land in the caller's tenant regardless of any tenant-shaped field in the payload.

Because each endpoint delegates to a named service command, [authorization](/edk/guides/authorization/overview) policies key on the command id (`party.<resource>.<action>`). A typical policy grants reads to any authenticated principal and restricts writes to administrators, and can layer in the RBAC, ABAC, and ReBAC rules that the party model itself supplies the facts for.

---

# Universal Registrar (DIF)

# Universal Registrar (DIF)

The Universal Registrar is the EDK's implementation of the [DIF Universal Registrar](https://github.com/decentralized-identity/universal-registrar) HTTP API. It is the standardized way to register, update, and deactivate DIDs over REST, and the surface most cross-vendor integrations expect to find when they speak DID lifecycle to a registrar component.

The whole point of the spec is **uniform interop**. Every endpoint takes a method-agnostic envelope and returns a state object that callers can interpret without knowing which DID method ran underneath. That uniformity is also the spec's most important limitation: it deals in entire DID Documents, not in the individual verification methods or services inside them, and it does not concern itself with listing, filtering, or any kind of inventory operation. If those are the things you need, use the [rich DID manager REST API](./rich-rest-api) instead; if you need spec-shaped, vendor-portable lifecycle operations, this is the right surface.

## What this API is and is not

The Universal Registrar is intentionally narrow. It does five things:

1. Create a new DID for a chosen method.
2. Apply a document-level update to an existing DID.
3. Deactivate an existing DID.
4. Tell callers which DID methods this registrar supports.
5. Tell callers what those methods can do (create only, update, deactivate, key generation).

Notably absent: there is no `GET /1.0/identifiers` in the registrar (that lives on the Universal Resolver), there is no list endpoint, there is no concept of an admin-side query, and there is no first-class hook for editing individual verification methods or services. Those gaps exist because the DIF spec deliberately leaves all of them out, so any tool that drives the Universal Registrar can do so without coordinating on extensions.

## Mounting

The registrar is provided by the `lib-did-rest-registrar-server` module and ships as an `HttpAdapter` (`UniversalRegistrarHttpAdapter`) bound under base path `/1.0`. The adapter wires five injected endpoint commands that each delegate to the IDK DID manager. The Spring Boot integration registers the adapter automatically when the module is on the classpath.

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-did-rest-registrar-server:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:idk-spring-support:0.25.0")

    // The DID methods you want to register through this registrar.
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-key:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-jwk:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-web:0.25.0")

    // Persistence for managed DIDs. Pick one per tenant; PostgreSQL is the
    // EDK enterprise choice.
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-did-persistence-postgresql:0.25.0")
}
```

```yaml
sphereon:
  did:
    registrar:
      enabled: true
      base-path: /did/registrar
```

The `base-path` setting prefixes the adapter so a `POST /1.0/create` from a client becomes, on the wire, `POST /did/registrar/1.0/create`. Leave it blank to mount at the bare DIF paths.

## The five endpoints

All paths are relative to the adapter mount (`/1.0` plus any configured base path).

| Method | Path | Endpoint command | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| `POST` | `/1.0/create` | `CreateDidEndpointCommand` | Create a new DID |
| `POST` | `/1.0/update` | `UpdateDidEndpointCommand` | Apply a document-level update |
| `POST` | `/1.0/deactivate` | `DeactivateDidEndpointCommand` | Deactivate a DID |
| `GET` | `/1.0/methods` | `GetRegistrarMethodsEndpointCommand` | List supported methods |
| `GET` | `/1.0/properties` | `GetRegistrarPropertiesEndpointCommand` | Capability matrix per method |

Each command is a thin adapter over the matching DID manager service command, so behaviour stays identical to programmatic IDK usage.

## Create a DID

`POST /1.0/create` takes the spec request envelope (`method`, `options`, `secret`, `didDocument`) and returns the spec response envelope. The fields the DID manager looks at depend on the method.

```http
POST /1.0/create HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "method": "web",
  "options": {
    "domain": "example.com",
    "path": ["users", "alice"]
  },
  "secret": {
    "verificationMethod": [{
      "type": "JsonWebKey2020",
      "purpose": ["authentication", "assertionMethod"]
    }]
  }
}
```

The response carries a `didState` whose `state` is `finished` when the registrar produced a usable DID synchronously, `action` when the caller needs to publish something (the canonical example is the registrar handing you back a `did.json` you have to host yourself for `did:web`), or `failed` with a reason for spec-conformant failure reporting.

```json
{
  "jobId": null,
  "didState": {
    "state": "finished",
    "did": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
    "didDocument": {
      "@context": ["https://www.w3.org/ns/did/v1"],
      "id": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
      "verificationMethod": [{
        "id": "did:web:example.com:users:alice#key-1",
        "type": "JsonWebKey2020",
        "controller": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
        "publicKeyJwk": {
          "kty": "EC",
          "crv": "P-256",
          "x": "...",
          "y": "..."
        }
      }],
      "authentication": ["did:web:example.com:users:alice#key-1"],
      "assertionMethod": ["did:web:example.com:users:alice#key-1"]
    }
  },
  "didDocumentMetadata": {},
  "didRegistrationMetadata": {}
}
```

A few practical notes that the spec leaves implicit:

- The `secret.verificationMethod[].purpose` array drives which top-level relationship arrays (`authentication`, `assertionMethod`, ...) the new key ends up in. Empty `purpose` means "key is present in the document but bound to no relationship", which is almost never what you want.
- For methods where the registrar generates a key (the default when `secret.verificationMethod[].privateKeyJwk` is absent), the new key material lands in the KMS configured for the tenant. The endpoint returns only public material; private keys never leave the KMS.
- `options` is method-specific. For `did:web` it is `domain` and `path`. For `did:webvh` it includes the witness configuration. For `did:key` and `did:jwk` the body of `options` is usually empty because the DID is fully derived from the key.

## Update a DID

`POST /1.0/update` takes the existing DID, an optional `secret`, an array of `didDocumentOperation` verbs, and an array of `didDocument` patches to apply. The verbs and patches are positional: the i-th verb describes what to do with the i-th patch.

```http
POST /1.0/update HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "did": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
  "options": {},
  "didDocumentOperation": ["addToDidDocument"],
  "didDocument": [{
    "service": [{
      "id": "#hub",
      "type": "LinkedDomains",
      "serviceEndpoint": "https://hub.example.com"
    }]
  }]
}
```

The supported operations follow the DIF spec set: `setDidDocument` to replace, `addToDidDocument` to merge in, `removeFromDidDocument` to subtract. The registrar applies them in order, validates the resulting document against the method provider, persists, and republishes if the method requires it (writing a new `did.json` for `did:web`, appending a log entry for `did:webvh`).

Because update is document-level, a single call can change multiple parts of the document at once. That is convenient for batch reconfiguration; it is also the reason the rich API offers sub-resource endpoints for the more delicate cases (rotating a single verification method without disturbing anything else, for example).

## Deactivate a DID

`POST /1.0/deactivate` marks the DID as deactivated through the method-specific mechanism. For `did:web` that means publishing a new `did.json` with `"deactivated": true`. For `did:webvh` it appends a deactivation entry to the log. For `did:key` and `did:jwk` deactivation is not meaningful because the DID is self-derived and immutable; the registrar reports that through `/1.0/properties`.

```http
POST /1.0/deactivate HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "did": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
  "options": {
    "reason": "Key rotation"
  }
}
```

Deactivation through this endpoint also flips the `deactivated` flag on the locally tracked DID, so resolution returns the deactivated document and downstream consumers (issuer, verifier, trust evaluator) stop treating it as live.

## Discover what the registrar supports

`GET /1.0/methods` returns the list of DID methods this instance can create, update, or deactivate. The values depend on which `lib-did-methods-*` modules are on the classpath.

```http
GET /1.0/methods HTTP/1.1
```

```json
{
  "methods": ["key", "jwk", "web", "webvh"]
}
```

`GET /1.0/properties` is the spec's capability advertisement. It returns a per-method matrix describing whether create, update, and deactivate are supported. That matters because not every DID method is updatable: `did:key` and `did:jwk` are immutable by design, while `did:web` and `did:webvh` support the full lifecycle.

```http
GET /1.0/properties HTTP/1.1
```

```json
{
  "methods": ["key", "jwk", "web", "webvh"],
  "methodCapabilities": {
    "key":   { "create": true, "update": false, "deactivate": false },
    "jwk":   { "create": true, "update": false, "deactivate": false },
    "web":   { "create": true, "update": true,  "deactivate": true  },
    "webvh": { "create": true, "update": true,  "deactivate": true  }
  }
}
```

Callers should consult `/1.0/properties` before attempting an update or deactivate, especially when they want to be polite to immutable methods rather than catching the spec-conformant failure response.

## Async jobs and `jobId`

The DIF spec models long-running operations through `jobId`: the registrar can return `jobId: "<some-id>"` with a non-finished `didState`, and the client polls back to the same endpoint with the same `jobId` to advance the state. The EDK's current implementation performs all method operations synchronously and returns `jobId: null` on completion. Clients should treat a non-null `jobId` as the asynchronous path defined by the spec, which is forward-compatible if a later method provider (for example a registrar that talks to an external on-chain method) introduces it.

## Authentication and authorization

The DIF spec is silent on authentication, so you secure the registrar like any other write surface in the tenant.

```yaml
sphereon:
  did:
    registrar:
      require-authentication: true
  security:
    jwt:
      issuer: https://auth.example.com
      audience: did-registrar
```

For finer-grained control (which subjects may create which methods, which may deactivate, and so on), reach for the authorization stack and put a policy in front of the registrar's command IDs. See [Authorization Overview](../../authorization/overview) for how to attach Cedar or OPA policies to specific commands.

## When the Universal Registrar is the wrong choice

The Universal Registrar is the right choice when you need DIF interop or when document-level operations match what you actually want to do. It is a poor fit when:

- you need to enumerate DIDs ("list all DIDs of method `web` created in the last seven days"), since there is no list endpoint;
- you need to rotate a single verification method without rewriting the entire document, since there is no per-VM endpoint;
- you need to inspect the KMS key mappings for a DID, which are not part of the DIF model;
- you need to attach internal-only metadata such as aliases or canonical identifiers, which are intentionally outside the spec.

For those, the [rich DID manager REST API](./rich-rest-api) is the right tool. The two coexist over the same DID state, so picking the one that fits a particular consumer does not preclude using the other for a different one.

## Related material

- [Decentralized Identifiers overview](./overview)
- [Rich DID manager REST API](./rich-rest-api)
- [IDK DID Overview](/idk/guides/did/overview) for the DID manager DSL, providers, and method-specific options.

---

# Rich DID manager REST API

# Rich DID manager REST API

The rich DID manager REST API is the EDK-specific HTTP surface for everything the [Universal Registrar](./universal-registrar) does not cover. It is the API you want behind a tenant admin UI, in front of automation that needs to enumerate or selectively mutate DIDs, and anywhere a single document-level PUT is too coarse a tool for the change you want to make.

The API ships in the `services-did-manager-rest` module of the IDK and is mounted at base path `/api/dids/v1`. One composite adapter (`DidManagerHttpAdapter`) routes requests to ten sub-adapters that each own a slice of the DID model, all delegating to the same underlying DID manager service commands the IDK uses internally. That means there is no second source of truth: a DID created through this API and one created through the Universal Registrar live in the same store, surface in the same list, and resolve the same way.

## What this API gives you that the Universal Registrar does not

The headline difference is granularity. The Universal Registrar speaks in entire DID Documents; the rich API speaks in DID Documents **and** in each editable part of one. The headline difference behind that is **inventory and queryability**: the Universal Registrar has no list endpoint, no filter, no projection mechanism, no way to enumerate KMS key mappings; the rich API has all of those as first-class concerns.

The concrete differences:

- Listing DIDs with filtering, pagination, sort, and optional field expansion.
- CRUD on individual verification methods, services, controllers, verification relationships, also-known-as aliases, and equivalent identifiers.
- Explicit inspection and management of the KMS key mappings that back each verification method.
- Direct access to the resolved document cache: read the cached view, force re-resolution, or invalidate.
- Per-method capability advertisement, including a compact summary view for UIs.
- Importing externally-managed DIDs so the tenant can track them alongside DIDs it controls.

## Surface map

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-did-rich-surface.svg" alt="Rich DID Manager REST API surface map showing lifecycle, document parts, key and cache, and capabilities" style={{maxWidth: '760px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The composite adapter dispatches by path prefix to ten sub-adapters. They are described per group below; all paths are relative to `/api/dids/v1`.

## DID lifecycle

The lifecycle adapter holds the verbs that create, find, alter, and remove a DID. Note that PATCH is partial (JSON Merge Patch over the declarative fields) and PUT is a full replace of the **declarative** sub-collections (`controllers`, `alsoKnownAs`, `equivalentIds`, services, ...), explicitly excluding verification methods and key mappings. Verification methods and key mappings are mutated through their dedicated sub-resources precisely because a wholesale replace would risk leaving orphan KMS keys or dropping live keys without the corresponding KMS lifecycle event.

| Method | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `POST` | `/dids` | Create a new DID |
| `GET` | `/dids` | List DIDs (filter, page, sort, expand) |
| `POST` | `/dids/external` | Import an externally-managed DID |
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}` | Get a DID, with optional projections |
| `PATCH` | `/dids/{did}` | Partial update of declarative fields |
| `PUT` | `/dids/{did}` | Replace declarative collections |
| `DELETE` | `/dids/{did}` | Soft-delete the DID locally |
| `POST` | `/dids/{did}/actions/deactivate` | Deactivate the DID on its method's network |
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/resolve` | Resolve through the resolver registry |

`DELETE` is intentionally a **local** soft delete: it sets the row's `deletedAt` timestamp so the DID disappears from the default list view but remains queryable through `includeDeleted=true`. It does not deactivate the DID on its network, and it does not destroy KMS keys. Deactivation on the network is the explicit `actions/deactivate` call. The two are distinct on purpose, because "stop tracking this here" and "publicly retire this identifier" are different decisions that usually warrant different reviews.

### Create

```http
POST /api/dids/v1/dids HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "method": "key",
  "keyInfo": {
    "providerId": "default-kms",
    "alias": "alice-signing-key",
    "keyType": { "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256" }
  },
  "didAlias": "alice",
  "controllers": ["did:web:example.com:control"],
  "alsoKnownAs": ["https://alice.example.com"]
}
```

The request body uses `keyInfo` to point at the KMS provider and key alias that should back the DID. The DID manager looks the key up, derives the DID per the method's rules, persists the resulting `ManagedDid`, and returns the wire-shape `Did`. `didAlias` is a human-readable handle stored alongside the DID for later lookup; `controllers`, `alsoKnownAs`, and the rest of the declarative fields can be set at creation time or added later through `PATCH`.

Response:

```json
{
  "did": "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faWxcsSqt4mq6D8GwSkLrHee",
  "method": "key",
  "alias": "alice",
  "role": "MANAGED",
  "alsoKnownAs": ["https://alice.example.com"],
  "equivalentIds": [],
  "canonicalId": null,
  "createdAt": "2026-05-18T20:14:11Z",
  "updatedAt": "2026-05-18T20:14:11Z"
}
```

### List

The list endpoint exposes the full `DidFilter` shape as query parameters. Defaults are tuned for "fast useful answer": newest first, 100 per page, lightweight projection (no inline document, no inline keys), and excluding both deactivated and soft-deleted entries.

```http
GET /api/dids/v1/dids?method=web&role=MANAGED&page=0&size=25&sort=updatedAt&sortDirection=DESC&expand=keys HTTP/1.1
```

The supported parameters:

| Parameter | Type | Default | Meaning |
|---|---|---|---|
| `method` | string | none | Restrict to a single DID method |
| `alias` | string | none | Exact-match alias filter |
| `role` | `MANAGED` \| `EXTERNAL` | none | Locally controlled vs imported-for-tracking |
| `search` | string | none | Case-insensitive substring match over DID and alias |
| `includeDeactivated` | boolean | `false` | Include DIDs whose method-level deactivation flag is set |
| `includeDeleted` | boolean | `false` | Include locally soft-deleted DIDs |
| `page` | int | `0` | Zero-based page index |
| `size` | int | `100` | Page size; omit to return everything matching |
| `sort` | enum | `CREATED_AT` | One of `CREATED_AT`, `UPDATED_AT`, `DID`, `METHOD`, `ALIAS` |
| `sortDirection` | enum | `DESC` | `ASC` or `DESC` |
| `expand` | string | none | Comma-separated; `document`, `keys`, or `all` |

The response is `{ items, page }` where `items` are wire-shape `Did` records and `page` carries `{ page, size, totalElements, totalPages }`.

```json
{
  "items": [
    {
      "did": "did:web:example.com:users:alice",
      "method": "web",
      "alias": "alice",
      "role": "MANAGED",
      "alsoKnownAs": [],
      "equivalentIds": [],
      "canonicalId": null,
      "createdAt": "2026-05-18T19:55:02Z",
      "updatedAt": "2026-05-18T20:02:41Z",
      "keys": [
        { "verificationMethodId": "#key-1", "providerId": "default-kms", "alias": "alice-signing-key" }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "page": { "page": 0, "size": 25, "totalElements": 1, "totalPages": 1 }
}
```

`expand` is what keeps the list fast by default. The lightweight projection skips two expensive fields: the resolved DID Document and the KMS key mappings. Both fields are populated only when the caller asks for them, so a typical list call does not trigger a resolver round-trip per row. Set `expand=document` for inline documents, `expand=keys` for inline key mappings, or `expand=all` for both.

### Tracking external DIDs

`POST /dids/external` imports a DID that some other party controls so the tenant can list, query, and use it like a first-class identifier without owning its private keys. This is the typical pattern for known counterparties (an Issuer's DID you accept credentials from, or a Verifier you sometimes interact with): you store the alias and reference, the system resolves the document on demand through the resolver, and the rest of the tenant treats it as a normal `Did` record with `role: EXTERNAL`.

External DIDs cannot be updated or deactivated through this API. Their lifecycle endpoints exist but reject method-mutating operations, because the tenant does not hold the keys to authorise them.

### Get, with projections

```http
GET /api/dids/v1/dids/did:web:example.com:users:alice?expand=document,keys HTTP/1.1
```

The same `expand` model applies: a bare `GET` returns the summary view, while explicit projections inline the resolved document and the KMS key mappings. This is the right way to render a DID detail screen without writing two requests.

### Update (PATCH) and Replace (PUT)

`PATCH /dids/{did}` uses JSON Merge Patch semantics over the declarative fields (`alias`, `controllers`, `alsoKnownAs`, `equivalentIds`, `canonicalId`, ...). It is the right verb for "change one field on this DID record".

`PUT /dids/{did}` replaces the entire declarative side of the record at once: every listed collection is rewritten with what you send, with omitted fields being treated as empty rather than left untouched. Verification methods and key mappings are deliberately excluded from the replace body; mutating them goes through the dedicated sub-resources below.

### Deactivate (on the network)

```http
POST /api/dids/v1/dids/did:web:example.com:users:alice/actions/deactivate HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/json

{ "options": { "reason": "Key compromised" } }
```

The endpoint runs the method-specific deactivation: for `did:web` it republishes the `did.json` with `"deactivated": true`; for `did:webvh` it appends a deactivation entry to the log; for `did:key` and `did:jwk` it returns the spec-conformant capability error because those methods are immutable. The local row's deactivated flag is set in the same transaction, so resolution and downstream consumers immediately see the deactivation.

### Resolve (locally tracked)

`GET /dids/{did}/resolve` runs the same resolver registry the [Universal Resolver](./overview#did-resolution) exposes, but scoped to a DID that is already tracked locally. The response carries the resolution result, the resolved document, and the resolver metadata. It is convenient when a UI wants to show "what does the world see for this DID right now" alongside the locally-stored aliases and key mappings.

## Document sub-resources

Each editable part of the DID Document has its own sub-resource. The verbs are deliberately uniform across them: `GET` to list, `POST` to add, `GET /{id}` to fetch one, `PATCH /{id}` where partial update makes sense, `DELETE /{id}` to remove.

### Verification methods

| Method | Path |
|---|---|
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/verification-methods` |
| `POST` | `/dids/{did}/verification-methods` |
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/verification-methods/{methodId}` |
| `PATCH` | `/dids/{did}/verification-methods/{methodId}` |
| `DELETE` | `/dids/{did}/verification-methods/{methodId}` |

Verification methods are the most consequential thing in a DID Document: every signature you produce as that DID is bound to one of them. Adding a verification method through this endpoint also creates the matching KMS key mapping in the same transaction, so there is no window where a verification method exists without its key reference. Removing a verification method removes the mapping; whether it removes the underlying KMS key depends on the key's lifecycle policy (a key that backs other verification methods or other DIDs is not deleted just because one reference is removed).

This is the principal reason to prefer per-VM endpoints over the document-level PUT: PUT cannot express "rotate verification method `#key-1` to a new KMS key while keeping `#key-2` untouched" without rewriting the whole document and risking accidental drift.

### Services

| Method | Path |
|---|---|
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/services` |
| `POST` | `/dids/{did}/services` |
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/services/{serviceId}` |
| `PATCH` | `/dids/{did}/services/{serviceId}` |
| `DELETE` | `/dids/{did}/services/{serviceId}` |

Services are the document's pointers at endpoints (an issuer endpoint, a credential repository, a hub URL). Per-service endpoints are useful because services tend to change independently of keys, and because a tenant admin UI usually wants to render and edit them in isolation.

### Controllers

| Method | Path |
|---|---|
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/controllers` |
| `POST` | `/dids/{did}/controllers` |
| `DELETE` | `/dids/{did}/controllers/{controllerId}` |

The `controller` array on a DID Document declares which other DIDs are authorised to act on its behalf. Multi-controller setups (delegation between an organisational DID and a key-rotation DID, for instance) are common in enterprise deployments, and managing the list element by element keeps changes auditable.

### Also-known-as and equivalent IDs

| Method | Path |
|---|---|
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/also-known-as` |
| `POST` | `/dids/{did}/also-known-as` |
| `DELETE` | `/dids/{did}/also-known-as/{akaId}` |
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/equivalent-ids` |
| `POST` | `/dids/{did}/equivalent-ids` |
| `DELETE` | `/dids/{did}/equivalent-ids/{equivalentId}` |

`alsoKnownAs` are non-DID identifiers (URLs, account references) that name the same subject; `equivalentIds` are other DIDs that the controller asserts to be the same identity. They serve different verifiability stories (`alsoKnownAs` is a hint, `equivalentIds` is a controller-signed assertion) and each gets its own sub-resource so the audit trail stays clean.

### Verification relationships

| Method | Path |
|---|---|
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/verification-relationships` |
| `POST` | `/dids/{did}/verification-relationships` |
| `DELETE` | `/dids/{did}/verification-relationships/{relationshipId}` |

Relationships (`authentication`, `assertionMethod`, `keyAgreement`, `capabilityInvocation`, `capabilityDelegation`) define which verification methods can do what. Editing them as a separate sub-resource lets you assign or revoke a purpose for an existing key without touching the key itself.

## Key mappings and document cache

### Key mappings

| Method | Path |
|---|---|
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/key-mappings` |
| `POST` | `/dids/{did}/key-mappings` |
| `DELETE` | `/dids/{did}/key-mappings/{mappingId}` |

A key mapping ties a verification method (in the DID Document) to a KMS provider and key alias (where the private material lives). The mapping endpoints expose that link directly: useful when you need to migrate a DID from one KMS provider to another, when you are auditing which keys back which DIDs, or when you are reconciling a freshly imported tenant's DIDs with a freshly imported KMS.

Adding a key mapping does not create a verification method on its own; the typical flow is "add verification method through the verification-method endpoint, which atomically creates the mapping". The bare key-mapping endpoints exist mostly for repair, migration, and inspection.

### Document cache

| Method | Path |
|---|---|
| `GET` | `/dids/{did}/document` |
| `POST` | `/dids/{did}/document/refresh` |
| `DELETE` | `/dids/{did}/document/cache` |

The DID manager keeps a cached view of the resolved document so reads do not trigger a resolver round-trip every time. The cache endpoints expose that:

- `GET /document` returns whatever is in the cache (or a stale-with-warning response if the cache has expired).
- `POST /document/refresh` forces a fresh resolve and replaces the cached entry. This is the right operation to run after a `did:web` publish, to make the new document visible immediately without waiting for the natural TTL to expire.
- `DELETE /document/cache` invalidates the cache entry without forcing an immediate re-resolve; the next read will trigger one.

## Capabilities

The capability endpoints answer "what can the DID manager do with method X" in machine-readable form, which is what makes building a method-aware UI tractable.

| Method | Path | Returns |
|---|---|---|
| `GET` | `/methods` | The full list of methods this tenant supports |
| `GET` | `/methods/{method}/capabilities` | The detailed capability descriptor for one method |
| `GET` | `/methods/{method}/capabilities/summary` | A compact yes/no summary suitable for UI rendering |

The full descriptor describes everything from supported key types and curves to whether keys can be rotated, whether services can be added after creation, and whether the method has a deactivation operation. The summary version trims it to the booleans most UIs actually render.

## Wiring it into a tenant

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:services-did-manager-rest:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:idk-spring-support:0.25.0")

    // Method providers; each provider is independently optional.
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-key:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-jwk:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-web:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-webvh-provider:0.25.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.idk:lib-did-methods-webvh-resolver:0.25.0")

    // Persistence. Pick one per tenant.
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-did-persistence-postgresql:0.25.0")
}
```

```yaml
sphereon:
  did:
    manager:
      enabled: true
      base-path: /admin/did
```

The optional `base-path` setting prefixes the adapter so `/api/dids/v1/dids` lands on `/admin/did/api/dids/v1/dids` on the wire. The adapter is contributed into the `SessionScope` DI graph, so it runs inside the per-session command and audit envelope that the rest of the EDK uses.

## Authentication and authorization

The rich API is the surface that exposes the most operator-significant verbs (deactivation, key mapping inspection, controller mutation), so it warrants careful authorization. Three layers usually combine:

1. **Transport-level authentication**. Place the adapter behind your tenant's authenticated ingress; the EDK ships with JWT and OAuth2 integrations that work out of the box.
2. **Command-level authorization**. Every endpoint is an `HttpEndpointCommand` with a stable command ID, so [Authorization](../../authorization/overview) policies can permit or deny by command. This is the right granularity for "operator role can list and read but only platform-admin role can deactivate".
3. **Audit**. The same command envelope that enforces authorization emits audit events through the [Audit](../../audit/overview) pipeline, so every mutation is traceable to a subject, a request, and a tenant.

## When to reach for the Universal Registrar instead

If a particular consumer is a DIF-aware tool that already knows how to drive `/1.0/create`, `/1.0/update`, `/1.0/deactivate`, point it at the [Universal Registrar](./universal-registrar) and keep the rich API for everything else. Both APIs share the same state, so a DID created through one is visible and editable through the other immediately.

The rule of thumb: external interop and document-level operations through the Universal Registrar; everything internal, granular, queryable, or operator-facing through the rich API.

## Related material

- [Decentralized Identifiers overview](./overview)
- [Universal Registrar (DIF)](./universal-registrar)
- [IDK DID Overview](/idk/guides/did/overview)
- [Roles and Topology: DID services](../../../deployment/container-deployment/did)

---

# Attribute Pipeline

# Attribute Pipeline

The EDK issuance pipeline is the stateful runtime around OID4VCI. It stores the in-flight attribute bag, connector fields, approval state, deferral state, and audit-friendly lifecycle status. Automatic integration is connector-native: `PipelineConfiguration.invocationBindings` declares which connector invocations run at each OID4VCI stage.

Manual REST contribution is still supported for backend/admin use cases. In those request bodies, `contributorId` is provenance on contributed records. It is not the automatic runtime binding contract.

## Guiding Principle: Provide Attributes as Late as You Can

Every attribute in an issuance session is sensitive data the EDK has to encrypt, store, and eventually delete. If the wallet might claim a credential minutes or hours after the offer was created, seed connector fields such as `employee_id` instead of the full payload and use connector invocations to fetch current values when `/credential` is called.

In practice:

- Seed short connector fields at offer/session start when possible.
- Pull authoritative values through connector invocations at `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST`.
- Use async/deferred connector execution for slow systems.
- Retain issued evidence only through explicit `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE` vault-retention bindings.

## Integration Patterns

### Pattern 1: Push Known Data

Use this when your backend already has every claim value and the wallet flow is short. Push attributes or connector fields through `POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/credential/offers` or the session contribution endpoints. The EDK stores attributes in the encrypted session bag and keeps connector fields available for connector invocations.

This is not the preferred default for long-lived or mutable data.

### Pattern 2: Fetch Live Data at Credential Request

Use this for most production integrations. At offer/session start, seed a connector field such as `employee_id`. Bind an `ENRICHMENT_SOURCE` connector invocation at `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST`. When the wallet calls `/credential`, the connector fetches the live data and returns `producedFields`; the pipeline persists those fields into the session bag and the claims assembler reads them.

### Pattern 3: Async or Deferred Upstream

Use this when the upstream system cannot answer inside the wallet request window. Bind the connector invocation with an async/deferred execution policy. The EDK can wait for a configured sync window; if the integration is still pending, the wallet receives a deferred credential response and later `/credential_deferred` polling completes after the integration contributes its fields.

## OID4VCI Connector Stages

| Stage | Protocol moment | Common use |
|-------|-----------------|------------|
| `OID4VCI_START` | Offer/session start | Audit, initialization, non-PII routing state |
| `OID4VCI_AUTHORIZATION` | Authorization-code flow and AS context | Capture userinfo context or presentation-derived values |
| `OID4VCI_PRE_AUTHORIZED` | Pre-authorized-code offer setup | Validate backend-triggered issuance context |
| `OID4VCI_TOKEN` | Token exchange | Resolve subject identifiers and risk state |
| `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST` | Wallet calls `/credential` | Fetch current claims, dispatch async work |
| `OID4VCI_PRE_ISSUE` | Request/proof validated, before signing | Final enrichment, policy state, status-list prep |
| `OID4VCI_DEFERRED` | Wallet polls `/credential_deferred` | Re-run pending/deferred work |
| `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE` | Credential response produced | Vault retention, evidence export, notifications |
| `OID4VCI_NOTIFICATION_RECEIPT` | Wallet sends notification | Receipt audit, downstream acknowledgement |

The runtime uses the same connector invocation model at every stage. Later stages can consume fields produced earlier in the session.

## Connector Fields vs Attributes

**Attributes** are fields that may end up in the credential, such as `given_name`, `birth_date`, or `employment.department`.

**Connector fields** are operational inputs and outputs for connector invocations, such as `employee_id`, `email`, `identity_id`, risk scores, callback handles, or AS/userinfo claims captured during the OID4VCI lifecycle. They are encrypted at rest like attributes, but they do not become credential claims unless a connector invocation or claim mapping deliberately writes them into the attribute bag.

This distinction is what makes late fetching useful: the session can carry one connector field for a long time and only materialize the full claim payload when the wallet is ready.

## REST Groups Are a Wire-Format Convenience

The V1 contribution endpoints accept compact `groups`. A group factors out shared provenance, phase, timestamp, and retention once for a batch of attributes and connector fields. The HTTP adapter decodes groups into `AttributeRecord` values plus a connector-field map before the pipeline command runs.

This manual contribution shape does not define automatic connector execution. Automatic execution is configured through `ConnectorInvocationBinding` records in `PipelineConfiguration.invocationBindings`.

## Session Lifecycle

| Status | Meaning |
|--------|---------|
| `CREATED` | Session exists; protocol work has not completed. |
| `PHASE_EXECUTING` | A phase is running. |
| `PHASE_COMPLETED` | A phase completed and the session is between gates. |
| `AWAITING_DEFERRED` | Required data is not ready; the wallet can continue with deferred issuance. |
| `AWAITING_APPROVAL` | All data is present, but an operator decision is required. |
| `READY` | All gates are satisfied; the next credential/deferred request can issue. |
| `COMPLETED` | Credential issuance completed. |
| `FAILED` | Terminal failure. |
| `EXPIRED` | Session expired before completion. |

`AWAITING_DEFERRED` usually means an async connector invocation or callback has not completed yet. `AWAITING_APPROVAL` is controlled by the credential binding approval policy.

## Multiple Connector Invocations

A single credential may need several integrations. Bind each connector invocation to the phase where the data is most useful. For example:

- `OID4VCI_TOKEN`: resolve an email or subject id to an internal identity id.
- `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST`: fetch HR and compliance fields using that identity id.
- `OID4VCI_PRE_ISSUE`: prepare status-list or policy evidence.
- `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE`: retain proof/evidence in a vault.

Use connector `subsetMapping.inputFields` selectors and `subsetMapping.producedFields` selectors to make dependencies explicit. The field names should point at connector fields, protocol claims, or canonical fields rather than a separate pipeline connector-field model.

## Retention

By default, the session bag is retained only until session expiry and cleanup. To keep data for re-issuance or audit evidence, bind an explicit `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE` connector invocation with `VAULT_RETENTION` role and a materialization policy. This keeps retention deliberate, auditable, and tied to connector governance.

## Putting It Together

For most production integrations:

1. Create the offer/session with connector fields, not full PII.
2. Bind connector invocations for live enrichment at `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST`.
3. Use deferred execution for slow integrations.
4. Use `OID4VCI_PRE_ISSUE` for final state before signing.
5. Use `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE` only when you intentionally retain or export issued evidence.

Next: [Connector Invocations](./connector-invocations) shows the binding shape and examples.

---

# Connector Invocations

# Connector Invocations

OID4VCI issuance integrations are modeled as connector invocations. A connector invocation is a durable binding from an issuance phase to a connector target. It can fetch fields, push selected data out, write evidence to a vault, emit notifications, or start a route-backed integration run.

## Pick Your Integration Shape

| Your situation | Approach |
|----------------|----------|
| Your backend already has the data when it creates the offer | Seed attributes or connector fields through the offer/session REST body |
| You want live data when the wallet requests the credential | Bind an `ENRICHMENT_SOURCE` connector invocation at `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST` |
| You need to resolve identity before claim enrichment | Bind an enrichment invocation at `OID4VCI_AUTHORIZATION` or `OID4VCI_TOKEN` |
| You need final enrichment or policy state before signing | Bind an invocation at `OID4VCI_PRE_ISSUE` |
| You need retained evidence or re-issuance support | Bind a `VAULT_RETENTION` invocation at `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE` |
| Your upstream is slow or asynchronous | Use an async/deferred execution policy and callback or deferred completion |
| You need audit or notifications | Bind `NOTIFICATION` or route orchestration invocations at the relevant phase |

Manual REST contributions still exist. Their `contributorId` field is provenance for pushed records; it is not the automatic integration binding model.

## OID4VCI Phases

Connector invocation bindings can target these stages:

| Stage | Protocol moment |
|-------|-----------------|
| `OID4VCI_START` | Offer/session start before grant-specific work |
| `OID4VCI_AUTHORIZATION` | Authorization-code flow and AS/userinfo context |
| `OID4VCI_PRE_AUTHORIZED` | Pre-authorized-code offer setup |
| `OID4VCI_TOKEN` | Token exchange and access-token context |
| `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST` | Wallet calls `/credential` |
| `OID4VCI_PRE_ISSUE` | After request/proof validation, before the credential is built/signed |
| `OID4VCI_DEFERRED` | Wallet polls `/credential_deferred` |
| `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE` | After a credential response is produced |
| `OID4VCI_NOTIFICATION_RECEIPT` | Wallet sends issuance notification receipt |

You do not need every phase. Bind only the phases that matter for the credential flow.

## Registering an Invocation Binding

VDX-hosted deployments persist connector bindings through the connector API. This is the durable/registrable layer for connector routes, grants, throttling, run lineage, and invocation bindings; the EDK consumes the resolved connector model at issuance time.

```http
POST /api/connector/v1/invocation/bindings
Authorization: Bearer <operator access token>
Content-Type: application/json
```

```json
{
  "binding": {
    "invocationBindingId": "issuer-config-1:credential-request:hr-profile",
    "ownerSurface": "OID4VCI",
    "ownerReference": "issuer-config-1",
    "stage": "OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST",
    "role": "ENRICHMENT_SOURCE",
    "target": {
      "routeId": "hr-profile-route"
    },
    "exchangeMode": "PLATFORM_INITIATED_PULL",
    "subsetMapping": {
      "inputFields": [
        { "canonicalFieldPath": "employee.id" }
      ],
      "producedFields": [
        { "canonicalFieldPath": "employee.givenName" },
        { "canonicalFieldPath": "employee.familyName" },
        { "canonicalFieldPath": "employment.department" }
      ]
    },
    "logicalContext": {
      "tenantId": "tenant-1"
    },
    "executionPolicy": {
      "timing": "INLINE_REQUIRED",
      "failureEffect": "FAIL_PROTOCOL"
    }
  }
}
```

The binding id is stable and appears in audit/run lineage. The target can point at a route, connector instance, or operation binding depending on the deployment.

## Composing a Pipeline

The issuer resolves a `PipelineConfiguration` for an issuer and requested credential configurations. The important field is `invocationBindings`:

```kotlin
val employeeCredentialPipeline = PipelineConfiguration(
    pipelineId = "employee-credential-v2",
    invocationBindings = listOf(
        ConnectorInvocationBinding(
            invocationBindingId = ConnectorInvocationBindingId("issuer-config-1:token:risk"),
            ownerSurface = ConnectorOwnerSurface.OID4VCI,
            ownerReference = "issuer-config-1",
            stage = ConnectorInvocationStage.OID4VCI_TOKEN,
            role = ConnectorInvocationRole.ENRICHMENT_SOURCE,
            target = ConnectorInvocationTarget(routeId = ConnectorRouteId("risk-score-route")),
            exchangeMode = ConnectorExchangeMode.PLATFORM_INITIATED_PULL,
            subsetMapping = ConnectorSubsetMapping(
                inputFields = listOf(ConnectorFieldSelector(protocolClaimPath = "subject")),
                producedFields = listOf(ConnectorFieldSelector(canonicalFieldPath = "risk.score")),
            ),
            logicalContext = ConnectorLogicalContext(tenantId = "tenant-1"),
        ),
        ConnectorInvocationBinding(
            invocationBindingId = ConnectorInvocationBindingId("issuer-config-1:credential-request:hr-profile"),
            ownerSurface = ConnectorOwnerSurface.OID4VCI,
            ownerReference = "issuer-config-1",
            stage = ConnectorInvocationStage.OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST,
            role = ConnectorInvocationRole.ENRICHMENT_SOURCE,
            target = ConnectorInvocationTarget(routeId = ConnectorRouteId("hr-profile-route")),
            exchangeMode = ConnectorExchangeMode.PLATFORM_INITIATED_PULL,
            subsetMapping = ConnectorSubsetMapping(
                inputFields = listOf(ConnectorFieldSelector(canonicalFieldPath = "employee.id")),
                producedFields = listOf(
                    ConnectorFieldSelector(canonicalFieldPath = "employee.givenName"),
                    ConnectorFieldSelector(canonicalFieldPath = "employee.familyName"),
                    ConnectorFieldSelector(canonicalFieldPath = "employment.department"),
                ),
            ),
            logicalContext = ConnectorLogicalContext(tenantId = "tenant-1"),
        ),
        ConnectorInvocationBinding(
            invocationBindingId = ConnectorInvocationBindingId("issuer-config-1:post-issuance:proof-vault"),
            ownerSurface = ConnectorOwnerSurface.OID4VCI,
            ownerReference = "issuer-config-1",
            stage = ConnectorInvocationStage.OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE,
            role = ConnectorInvocationRole.VAULT_RETENTION,
            target = ConnectorInvocationTarget(routeId = ConnectorRouteId("proof-vault-route")),
            exchangeMode = ConnectorExchangeMode.PLATFORM_INITIATED_PUSH,
            logicalContext = ConnectorLogicalContext(tenantId = "tenant-1"),
        ),
    ),
    claimsBindings = listOf(
        CredentialClaimsBinding(
            id = "EmployeeCredential",
            semanticAttributeSetRef = employeeSetRef,
            deferralPolicy = DeferralPolicy(enabled = false),
        ),
    ),
    expectedInitialConnectorFields = setOf("employee.id"),
)
```

The pieces:

- `invocationBindings` is the ordered connector-native contract for OID4VCI runtime integration.
- `subsetMapping.inputFields` declares which connector fields, protocol claims, or canonical fields a connector needs.
- `subsetMapping.producedFields` declares the canonical fields later phases can consume.
- `executionPolicy` controls inline, optional, async/deferred, and durable execution.
- `claimsBindings` maps each `credential_configuration_id` to a semantic attribute set and deferral/approval policy.
- `expectedInitialConnectorFields` is the caller contract for session/offer creation.

## Pattern 1: Push Known Data

If the backend already has every field when it starts issuance, push attributes or connector fields through the offer or session REST body. This is a manual contribution path. It is useful for short-lived issuance where the data is known and stable.

Use this sparingly for PII-heavy payloads. If the wallet might claim the credential much later, seed connector fields and fetch the live values through connector invocations instead.

## Pattern 2: Fetch Live Data at Credential Request

For most production integrations, seed a connector field such as `employee.id` at offer/session start and bind an `ENRICHMENT_SOURCE` connector invocation at `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST`.

When the wallet calls `/credential`, the EDK passes accumulated attributes and connector fields to the connector route. Returned `producedFields` are written back into the session bag with connector provenance, then the credential claim assembler reads them.

## Pattern 3: Async or Deferred Upstream

When an upstream cannot answer within the wallet request window, set the invocation execution policy to an async or durable timing:

```kotlin
ConnectorInvocationExecutionPolicy(
    timing = ConnectorExecutionTiming.DEFERRED_ASYNC,
    failureEffect = ConnectorFailureEffect.FAIL_PROTOCOL,
    syncWaitWindowMillis = 5000,
)
```

The EDK may wait briefly for completion. If the integration is still pending, the wallet receives a deferred credential response and polls. Callback ingress can contribute the later fields into the same session before deferred issuance completes.

## Post-Issuance Retention

By default, the session retains the bag only until session expiry and cleanup. For re-issuance or audit evidence, bind `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE` with a `VAULT_RETENTION` role and a materialization policy. That keeps retention explicit and tied to connector governance and run lineage.

## Operational Notes

- Use `ownerSurface = OID4VCI` for issuer pipeline bindings.
- Use `ownerReference` consistently, usually the issuer configuration id or pipeline owner id.
- Keep connector route execution and VDX registry state in VDX-owned modules.
- Keep the EDK model neutral: connector/public and pipeline public contracts must not import VDX packages.
- Manual contribution groups use `contributorId` only as record provenance.

---

# REST API

import ApiCapability from '@site/src/components/ApiCapability';

# REST API

The wallet-facing OID4VCI protocol endpoints (`/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer`, `/oid4vci/credential`, `/oid4vci/deferredCredential`, `/oid4vci/nonce`, `/oid4vci/notification`, and credential-offer read endpoints) are the IDK simple issuer surface. Wallets call those endpoints.

The EDK adds backend/admin endpoints under `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/...` for the connector-backed issuance pipeline. These endpoints create and inspect pipeline sessions, push manual attributes or connector fields, approve or fail in-flight issuance, and accept async callback contributions. Automatic OID4VCI integration is still configured through `PipelineConfiguration.invocationBindings`; REST contribution is only for backend input, admin intervention, and callback ingress.

## Quick Reference

| Method | Path | Operation |
|--------|------|-----------|
| POST | `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/credential/offers` | Create a credential offer and optional pre-seeded groups |
| GET | `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/credential/offers/{correlation_id}` | Read offer status |
| POST | `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions` | Initialize a pipeline session |
| GET | `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/attributes` | Read the accumulated attributes and connector field names |
| POST | `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/attributes` | Contribute compact groups |
| GET | `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/completeness` | Evaluate readiness for issuance |
| POST | `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/approve` | Approve or reject an awaiting-review session |
| POST | `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/fail` | Record a contributor failure |
| POST | `/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/callbacks/{callbackToken}` | Async callback contribution |

All endpoints except callback ingress use the EDK bearer-token policy path. Callback ingress is authenticated by the scoped capability token in the URL.

## Lifecycle Integration

The pipeline can run connector invocations at every OID4VCI lifecycle phase:

`OID4VCI_START`, `OID4VCI_AUTHORIZATION`, `OID4VCI_PRE_AUTHORIZED`, `OID4VCI_TOKEN`, `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_REQUEST`, `OID4VCI_PRE_ISSUE`, `OID4VCI_DEFERRED`, `OID4VCI_POST_ISSUANCE`, and `OID4VCI_NOTIFICATION_RECEIPT`.

The IDK issuer exposes neutral lifecycle hook arguments. The EDK connector bridge implements that hook and calls the EDK pipeline commands. VDX is the durable registry/admin layer for connector registrations, routes, grants, throttling, and run lineage.

## Initialize a Session

`POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions` creates an `IssuancePipelineSession`. The body carries a `pipeline_configuration`, optional `correlation_id`, optional `initial_attributes`, optional `initial_connector_fields`, an encryption mode, and TTL.

```json
{
  "pipeline_configuration": {
    "pipelineId": "employee-credential-v2",
    "invocationBindings": [],
    "claimsBindings": [],
    "expectedInitialConnectorFields": ["employee.id"]
  },
  "correlation_id": "offer-123",
  "initial_connector_fields": {
    "employee.id": "E1042"
  },
  "ttl_seconds": 600
}
```

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="oid4vci-issuer-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="initPipelineSession"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions"
  commandId="issuance.pipeline.init-session"
  argsType="InitPipelineSessionArgs"
  resultType="InitPipelineSessionResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/oid4vci-issuer">

Initial connector fields satisfy connector invocation inputs before any phase produces them.

</ApiCapability>

## Contribute Groups

`POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/attributes` runs `issuance.pipeline.contribute-attributes`. The request body is compact and connector-native:

```json
{
  "groups": [
    {
      "contributorId": "hr-backend",
      "phase": "oid4vci_credential_request",
      "connectorFields": {
        "employee.id": "E1042"
      },
      "semanticAttributeSets": [
        {
          "bundleId": "eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1",
          "values": {
            "given_name": "Alice",
            "family_name": "Smith"
          }
        }
      ],
      "attributes": [
        { "path": "employment.department", "value": "Engineering" }
      ]
    }
  ]
}
```

`contributorId` is provenance for manually supplied input. `connectorFields` are operational inputs for connector invocations. `semanticAttributeSets` and `attributes` become `AttributeRecord` entries in the session bag and can become credential claims through the claims binding.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="oid4vci-issuer-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="contributeAttributes"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/attributes"
  commandId="issuance.pipeline.contribute-attributes"
  argsType="ContributeAttributesArgs"
  resultType="ContributeAttributesResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/oid4vci-issuer">

The adapter decodes compact groups to attributes plus connector fields, then runs the named phase.

</ApiCapability>

## Read Attributes

`GET /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/attributes` returns the decrypted attribute bag, status, completed phases, deferral entries, and connector field names available in the session.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="oid4vci-issuer-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="getSessionAttributes"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/attributes"
  commandId="issuance.pipeline.get-session-attributes"
  argsType="GetSessionAttributesArgs"
  resultType="GetSessionAttributesResult"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/oid4vci-issuer">

Restrict this endpoint carefully; the response contains decrypted session data.

</ApiCapability>

## Completeness and Approval

`GET /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/completeness` evaluates whether every credential binding has the required claims. If a binding is deferrable, the protocol can return a deferred credential response while async connector work continues.

`POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/approve` records a review decision. `APPROVED` lets an awaiting-review session continue; `REJECTED` fails it.

## Contributor Failure

`POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/fail` records that a named contributor failed:

```json
{
  "contributor_id": "hr-backend",
  "reason": "upstream timeout"
}
```

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="oid4vci-issuer-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="recordPipelineContributorFailure"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/fail"
  commandId="issuance.pipeline.record-contributor-failure"
  argsType="RecordPipelineContributorFailureArgs"
  resultType="RecordPipelineContributorFailureResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/oid4vci-issuer">

The pipeline stops waiting on that contributor. If the contributor was required, the session fails.

</ApiCapability>

## Create Credential Offer

`POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/credential/offers` accepts the IDK simple issuer offer fields plus EDK `preSeededGroups`. The pre-seeded attributes are flattened for the IDK offer command; connector fields are passed to the lifecycle hook as initial connector fields for the EDK pipeline.

```json
{
  "issuerId": "pid-issuer",
  "credentialConfigurationIds": ["PidCredential"],
  "preAuthorizedCodeGrant": true,
  "offerTtlSeconds": 600,
  "preSeededGroups": [
    {
      "contributorId": "registration-office",
      "phase": "oid4vci_start",
      "connectorFields": {
        "document.number": "1234567890"
      }
    }
  ]
}
```

## Async Callback

`POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/callbacks/{callbackToken}` accepts the same compact `groups` body as a normal contribution. The endpoint validates the capability token, cross-checks its `correlationId` and `contributorId`, pins execution to the deferred phase, and then runs the pipeline contribution.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="oid4vci-issuer-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="contributeViaCallback"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions/{correlationId}/callbacks/{callbackToken}"
  commandId="issuance.pipeline.contribute-via-callback"
  argsType="ContributeAttributesArgs"
  resultType="ContributeAttributesResult"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/oid4vci-issuer">

Callback ingress is a connector contribution under capability-token auth.

</ApiCapability>

## Authorization

Policy command ids are:

- `issuance.pipeline.init-session`
- `issuance.pipeline.contribute-attributes`
- `issuance.pipeline.get-session-attributes`
- `issuance.pipeline.evaluate-completeness`
- `issuance.pipeline.approve-session`
- `issuance.pipeline.record-contributor-failure`
- `issuance.pipeline.contribute-via-callback`
- `oid4vci.issuer.createoffer`

Use tenant/backend roles for create and contribution operations. Use narrower support/audit roles for readback because decrypted attributes are visible.

---

# Persistence

# Persistence

Every in-flight OID4VCI issuance has a corresponding `IssuancePipelineSession` row. The session carries both operational data (status, timestamps, current phase, completed phases, deferral entries) and sensitive data (the resolved attribute bag, connector fields, and approval evidence). The EDK separates these two: operational fields stay queryable in cleartext so an admin UI can list "every session in `AWAITING_APPROVAL`" without decrypting anything; sensitive fields are encrypted at rest with one of three modes the operator chooses per session.

This page describes the session store contract, the encryption modes and when to use each, and the store implementations the EDK ships. The session lifecycle and what attributes flow through the session are covered in [Attribute Pipeline](./attribute-pipeline); this page is the persistence layer underneath that.

## The Session Store Contract

```kotlin
interface IssuancePipelineSessionStore {
    suspend fun create(session: IssuancePipelineSession): IdkResult<IssuancePipelineSession, IdkError>
    suspend fun get(sessionId: String): IdkResult<IssuancePipelineSession?, IdkError>
    suspend fun getByCorrelationIdHmac(correlationIdHmac: ByteArray): IdkResult<IssuancePipelineSession?, IdkError>
    suspend fun update(session: IssuancePipelineSession): IdkResult<IssuancePipelineSession, IdkError>
    suspend fun delete(sessionId: String): IdkResult<Boolean, IdkError>
}
```

There are two lookup paths because the two callers have different keys. The IDK protocol handlers and the EDK pipeline commands know the internal `sessionId` and use `get`. External ingress (the REST endpoints under `/oid4vci/sessions/{correlationId}/...`, the async-source callback) only knows the `correlationId`, and uses `getByCorrelationIdHmac`.

The store never sees the raw `correlationId`. Callers compute an HMAC over the correlation id using a tenant-scoped key and pass the digest; the store indexes by digest. The reason is privacy: a database dump should not let anyone derive correlation ids by correlating with external systems that might leak them. The HMAC computation is shared infrastructure and you do not implement it per call.

`create` and `update` are responsible for encrypting the sensitive payload before writing per the session's `encryptionMode`. `get` and `getByCorrelationIdHmac` decrypt before returning. The store is the at-rest encryption boundary; nothing above it sees ciphertext.

## What Is Sensitive vs Operational

The fields on `IssuancePipelineSession` split into two groups by where they need to live:

**Sensitive (encrypted at rest):**
- `bag` (the attribute records: every resolved claim value)
- `connectorFields` (email addresses, employee ids, protocol claims, callback handles, business keys, anything that correlates to a real person or drives a connector invocation)
- `approval` (the approver identity, the decision, the reason)

**Operational (cleartext):**
- `sessionId`, `tenantId`, `issuerPartyId`, `correlationId` (as HMAC)
- `pipelineConfiguration` (a registered pipeline id; configuration carries no per-session secrets)
- `status` (`CREATED`, `PHASE_EXECUTING`, `AWAITING_DEFERRED`, ...)
- `completedPhases`, `currentPhase`
- `protocolContext` (small per-flow tokens like `issuer_state`)
- `deferralEntries` (per-binding deferral metadata: contributor id, failure reason, timestamps)
- `encryptionMode`
- `createdAt`, `updatedAt`, `expiresAt`

The operational fields are what queries filter on. The cleartext `status` column lets an operator query "show me every session in `AWAITING_APPROVAL` older than an hour" without decrypting one payload. The cleartext `expiresAt` lets a sweeper find expired sessions to delete without touching the encrypted blob. The HMAC'd `correlationId` lets callback ingress find the session without ever knowing the raw value.

## Encryption Modes

`SessionEncryptionMode` is a sealed type with three variants. The session carries its own mode, so different sessions in the same store can have different protection levels.

**`PlaintextMode`** stores the sensitive payload as plaintext. There is no encryption. **Use only for local development and tests, or for genuinely non-PII flows where confidentiality of the bag has no value.** Do not run it in production.

**`PlatformEncryptedMode`** (the default) AEAD-encrypts the sensitive payload under a per-session data encryption key (DEK), and the DEK is wrapped by the tenant key encryption key (KEK). Decryption requires the tenant KEK, which lives in the EDK KMS. The platform alone can read the payload. This is the right default for most deployments: it gives you encryption at rest, key separation per tenant, and a single recovery path through the KMS.

**`ClientBoundMode`** behaves like `PlatformEncryptedMode`, plus the effective key is HKDF-bound to the session's `correlationId`. Decryption requires re-presenting the raw `correlationId` to the cipher. The platform alone cannot read the payload; a separately-stored `correlationId` is needed too. Use this for flows where the operator wants stronger separation between the at-rest data and the encryption material, for example when the `correlationId` is held by the wallet or the calling backend and is not stored in the issuer's database.

`ClientBoundMode` has a `fallbackToPlatform: Boolean` switch. When `false` (the default), a session whose `correlationId` cannot be re-presented is unreadable; when `true`, the session degrades to `PlatformEncryptedMode` semantics. Use `true` when you want defence-in-depth without breaking re-issuance flows where the `correlationId` may be lost.

The mode is chosen at session init through the REST API's `encryptionMode` field on `POST /api/oid4vci/v1/backend/sessions` (see the [REST API](./rest-api#initialize-a-session) docs). The EDK default if you omit the field is `PlatformEncryptedMode`.

## Choosing a Mode

A rough decision:

- Local development, integration tests against fixtures: `PlaintextMode`. You will see the bag in the database and that is fine.
- Production, default: `PlatformEncryptedMode`. Encryption at rest with tenant key separation. Operators can recover sessions because the KMS holds the keys.
- Production, the `correlationId` is held outside the issuer's database (a wallet pre-shared secret, a high-assurance backend that never persists it next to the session): `ClientBoundMode` with `fallbackToPlatform = false`. The issuer alone cannot read sessions; an attacker who exfiltrates only the issuer database gets nothing useful. Re-issuance flows need to re-present the `correlationId`.
- Production where you want the strict separation but cannot guarantee the `correlationId` survives: `ClientBoundMode` with `fallbackToPlatform = true`. Acceptably-strong default with a working recovery path.

You cannot change a session's encryption mode after creation. If you need to upgrade the protection level of an in-flight session, delete it and re-init.

## Store Implementations

The EDK ships one store binding and the IDK ships another:

**`KvIssuancePipelineSessionStore`** (default in `lib-credential-issuance-pipeline-impl`) is backed by the IDK `KeyValueStore` abstraction. The KV store implementation you wire (in-memory, SQLite, Redis) determines the actual persistence. Suitable for development, single-process deployments, and small-scale production where a real database would be over-engineering.

**Postgres-backed store** (VDX-supplied) is a Postgres implementation that exposes `IssuancePipelineSession` rows in a relational layout: top-level columns for the operational fields, a single `BYTEA` column for the encrypted sensitive blob, indexed by `session_id` and `correlationId_hmac`. Use this when you want SQL-level queries against the operational fields, when you need transactional semantics with adjacent data (the issuer-core session, audit rows), or when you want backup/restore through your existing database tooling.

In an EDK-only deployment without VDX modules, you get the KV-backed store automatically. To use the Postgres store in an EDK deployment that has the VDX module on the classpath, the Metro binding for `IssuancePipelineSessionStore` resolves to the Postgres implementation through `replaces`, and no code changes are needed in your service.

## TTL and Cleanup

Every session has an `expiresAt`. The default TTL is set by the EDK config (`issuance.pipeline.session.ttl-seconds`, configurable per tenant); the REST `Init` call can override it per session via the `ttlSeconds` field. Expired sessions move to status `EXPIRED` on the next access; they remain in the store until a sweeper removes them.

The sweeper is a separate concern. The EDK does not run one inside the request path. Wire a scheduled job that calls `IssuancePipelineSessionStore.delete` for every session past `expiresAt` plus a grace window. Tune the grace window to your audit requirements: once a session is deleted, the encrypted payload is gone, and so is the audit trail of its contents (the standard EDK [audit](/edk/guides/audit/overview) log still has the command-level history).

### Wallet-initiated protocol ownership

A wallet-initiated credential request can exist without a credential-offer session. Its access-token `jti` supplies the protocol-session key, but the owning issuer instance still has to remain stable across retries, deferred polling, notifications, and multiple issuer replicas. The issuer therefore uses the tenant-scoped `oid4vci.credential-request-identities` KV store.

The first request performs an optimistic append with no predecessor. The stored value contains the canonical protocol-session ID and issuer-instance ID. A same-instance retry reads the existing head and is idempotent; a different-instance retry conflicts. Enterprise issuer configuration selects the database KV backend, whose version stream and predecessor link enforce this first-writer rule atomically across replicas. This is protocol ownership metadata only; it does not duplicate the credential attributes held by the encrypted issuance pipeline session.

## What Goes Where, Concretely

When the operator looks at the database after one issuance flow has run, they see:

- One `issuance_pipeline_session` row with `status = COMPLETED`, `correlation_id_hmac = <bytes>`, `created_at`/`updated_at`/`expires_at` populated, `completed_phases` listing every phase that ran, and an encrypted `sensitive_payload` blob.
- The decrypted payload, if they could read it, would carry every `AttributeRecord` (path, value, producer, phase, timestamp, priority), the connector-field map, and the `ApprovalState` if approval was used.
- The issuer-core `issuance_session` row (separate table, owned by the IDK issuer module) with the protocol-level state and a matching `correlation_id`.
- Audit events for every command (`issuance.pipeline.init-session`, `issuance.pipeline.contribute-attributes`, `oid4vci.protocol.handle-credential`, ...) in the standard EDK audit log.

The pipeline session and the issuer-core session live in separate tables. The join key is the `correlationId` (raw on the issuer-core side, HMAC'd on the pipeline side). They do not share a single transaction; the EDK does not need them to, because the pipeline session is the source of truth for attribute state and the issuer-core session is the source of truth for protocol state.

## Multi-Tenant Routing

The session store runs under the standard EDK [database routing](/edk/guides/database/routing) layer in deployments that need per-tenant databases or schemas. The store does not have its own routing; it uses whatever the platform routes for the calling tenant. The tenant id is on the session row, so even when one database is shared across tenants, queries are tenant-scoped at the SQL level.

## Recovery and Re-Hydration

If a session is in `AWAITING_DEFERRED` or `AWAITING_APPROVAL` and the issuer service restarts, nothing special happens: the persistent state in the store is the truth, and the next protocol event (a wallet poll, an approval submission, a callback arrival) drives the session forward by reading from the store, running a phase, and persisting again. There is no in-memory state that needs to be reconstructed.

`ClientBoundMode` sessions need the `correlationId` to be re-presented to decrypt the payload. The protocol handlers and the REST endpoints all take the `correlationId` in the request, so the recovery path is automatic: when an inbound request arrives carrying the `correlationId`, the store loads the session, the cipher unwraps the payload using the supplied `correlationId`, the engine runs, and the updated session is re-encrypted and persisted. The `correlationId` is never persisted in plaintext on the session row even in `ClientBoundMode`; only the HMAC is.

---

# OID4VP Integration Guide

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';

# OID4VP Integration Guide

This guide walks you through integrating the Universal OID4VP API into your application to verify credentials from digital wallets.

## Prerequisites

Before starting, ensure you have:

1. **API Access** - OAuth 2.0 client credentials for the Universal OID4VP API
2. **Query ID** - A pre-configured `query_id` from your administrator
3. **HTTPS Endpoint** - Your backend must be accessible via HTTPS for callbacks

## Integration Steps

### Step 1: Get Your Query ID

Contact your administrator to obtain the `query_id` for your use case. Common examples:

| Query ID | Description |
|----------|-------------|
| `age_verification` | Verify user is over 18 |
| `identity_check` | Full identity verification |
| `license_verification` | Professional license check |

The administrator configures which credentials and claims each query requests.

### Step 2: Create Authorization Request

When a user needs to verify their credentials:

<Tabs>
  <TabItem value="typescript" label="TypeScript">

```typescript
interface CreateRequestOptions {
  queryId: string;
  correlationId?: string;
  callbackUrl?: string;
}

async function createVerificationRequest(options: CreateRequestOptions) {
  const response = await fetch(`${API_BASE}/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests`, {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {
      'Authorization': `Bearer ${await getAccessToken()}`,
      'Content-Type': 'application/json'
    },
    body: JSON.stringify({
      query_id: options.queryId,
      correlation_id: options.correlationId || crypto.randomUUID(),
      qr_code: {
        size: 300,
        color_dark: '#1a1a1a'
      },
      callback: options.callbackUrl ? {
        url: options.callbackUrl,
        statuses: ['authorization_response_verified', 'error'],
        include_verified_data: true
      } : undefined
    })
  });

  if (!response.ok) {
    throw new Error(`Failed to create request: ${response.statusText}`);
  }

  return response.json();
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="kotlin" label="Kotlin">

```kotlin
import io.ktor.client.*
import io.ktor.client.request.*
import io.ktor.client.statement.*
import kotlinx.serialization.json.*

suspend fun createVerificationRequest(
    client: HttpClient,
    queryId: String,
    correlationId: String? = null,
    callbackUrl: String? = null
): CreateAuthorizationRequestOutput {
    val response = client.post("$apiBase/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests") {
        bearerAuth(getAccessToken())
        contentType(ContentType.Application.Json)
        setBody(buildJsonObject {
            put("query_id", queryId)
            correlationId?.let { put("correlation_id", it) }
            putJsonObject("qr_code") {
                put("size", 300)
            }
            callbackUrl?.let {
                putJsonObject("callback") {
                    put("url", it)
                    putJsonArray("statuses") {
                        add("authorization_response_verified")
                        add("error")
                    }
                    put("include_verified_data", true)
                }
            }
        })
    }

    return response.body()
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="python" label="Python">

```python
import requests
import uuid

def create_verification_request(
    query_id: str,
    correlation_id: str = None,
    callback_url: str = None
) -> dict:
    """Create an OID4VP authorization request."""

    payload = {
        "query_id": query_id,
        "correlation_id": correlation_id or str(uuid.uuid4()),
        "qr_code": {
            "size": 300,
            "color_dark": "#1a1a1a"
        }
    }

    if callback_url:
        payload["callback"] = {
            "url": callback_url,
            "statuses": ["authorization_response_verified", "error"],
            "include_verified_data": True
        }

    response = requests.post(
        f"{API_BASE}/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests",
        headers={
            "Authorization": f"Bearer {get_access_token()}",
            "Content-Type": "application/json"
        },
        json=payload
    )
    response.raise_for_status()
    return response.json()
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Step 3: Display QR Code to User

Present the QR code to the user for wallet scanning:

```html
<!-- Frontend: Display QR code -->
<div id="verification-container">
  <h3>Scan with your wallet</h3>
  <img id="qr-code" alt="Scan to verify" />
  <p id="status">Waiting for wallet...</p>

  <!-- Same-device flow: deep link button -->
  <a id="open-wallet" class="button" style="display: none;">
    Open Wallet
  </a>
</div>

<script>
  async function startVerification() {
    const session = await createVerificationRequest({
      queryId: 'age_verification',
      correlationId: orderId
    });

    // Display QR code
    document.getElementById('qr-code').src = session.qr_code_data_uri;

    // Show deep link for same-device flow
    const openWalletLink = document.getElementById('open-wallet');
    openWalletLink.href = session.request_uri;
    openWalletLink.style.display = 'inline-block';

    // Start polling for status
    pollForCompletion(session.correlation_id);
  }
</script>
```

### Step 4: Poll for Completion

Poll the status endpoint until verification completes:

<Tabs>
  <TabItem value="typescript" label="TypeScript">

```typescript
interface VerificationResult {
  success: boolean;
  claims?: Record<string, any>;
  error?: string;
}

async function pollForCompletion(
  correlationId: string,
  maxAttempts = 60,
  intervalMs = 2000
): Promise<VerificationResult> {
  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < maxAttempts; attempt++) {
    const response = await fetch(
      `${API_BASE}/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/${correlationId}`,
      {
        headers: {
          'Authorization': `Bearer ${await getAccessToken()}`
        }
      }
    );

    const status = await response.json();

    switch (status.status) {
      case 'authorization_response_verified':
        return {
          success: true,
          claims: status.verified_data?.credentials?.[0]?.claims
        };

      case 'error':
        return {
          success: false,
          error: status.error?.description || 'Verification failed'
        };

      case 'authorization_request_retrieved':
        // User scanned QR, update UI
        updateStatus('User is selecting credentials...');
        break;
    }

    await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, intervalMs));
  }

  return { success: false, error: 'Verification timed out' };
}
```

  </TabItem>
  <TabItem value="kotlin" label="Kotlin">

```kotlin
import kotlinx.coroutines.delay

sealed class VerificationResult {
    data class Success(val claims: Map<String, Any>) : VerificationResult()
    data class Error(val message: String) : VerificationResult()
    object Timeout : VerificationResult()
}

suspend fun pollForCompletion(
    client: HttpClient,
    correlationId: String,
    maxAttempts: Int = 60,
    intervalMs: Long = 2000
): VerificationResult {
    repeat(maxAttempts) {
        val response = client.get(
            "$apiBase/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/$correlationId"
        ) {
            bearerAuth(getAccessToken())
        }

        val status: AuthorizationStatus = response.body()

        when (status.status) {
            "authorization_response_verified" -> {
                return VerificationResult.Success(
                    status.verifiedData?.credentials?.firstOrNull()?.claims ?: emptyMap()
                )
            }
            "error" -> {
                return VerificationResult.Error(
                    status.error?.description ?: "Verification failed"
                )
            }
        }

        delay(intervalMs)
    }

    return VerificationResult.Timeout
}
```

  </TabItem>
</Tabs>

### Step 5: Handle Webhook Callbacks (Optional)

For server-to-server notification, implement a webhook handler:

```kotlin
import io.ktor.server.application.*
import io.ktor.server.request.*
import io.ktor.server.response.*
import io.ktor.server.routing.*
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable

@Serializable
data class Oid4vpCallback(
    val correlationId: String,
    val status: String,
    val queryId: String?,
    val verifiedData: VerifiedData? = null,
    val error: CallbackError? = null
)

@Serializable
data class VerifiedData(val credentials: List<VerifiedCredential>)

@Serializable
data class VerifiedCredential(
    val id: String,
    val format: String,
    val type: String?,
    val claims: Map<String, JsonElement>
)

@Serializable
data class CallbackError(
    val code: String,
    val description: String?
)

fun Application.configureWebhooks() {
    routing {
        post("/webhooks/oid4vp") {
            val callback = call.receive<Oid4vpCallback>()

            when (callback.status) {
                "authorization_response_verified" -> {
                    val claims = callback.verifiedData
                        ?.credentials
                        ?.firstOrNull()
                        ?.claims

                    // Process verified claims
                    processVerifiedClaims(callback.correlationId, claims)
                }
                "error" -> {
                    handleVerificationError(
                        callback.correlationId,
                        callback.error?.description
                    )
                }
            }

            call.respond(HttpStatusCode.OK)
        }
    }
}

private suspend fun processVerifiedClaims(
    correlationId: String,
    claims: Map<String, JsonElement>?
) {
    // Update your database with verified data
    val ageOver18 = claims?.get("age_over_18")
        ?.jsonPrimitive
        ?.booleanOrNull

    if (ageOver18 == true) {
        orderService.approveOrder(correlationId)
    } else {
        orderService.rejectOrder(correlationId, "Age verification failed")
    }
}
```

### Step 6: Clean Up Sessions

After verification completes or times out, clean up the session:

```typescript
async function cleanupSession(correlationId: string): Promise<void> {
  await fetch(
    `${API_BASE}/oid4vp/backend/auth/requests/${correlationId}`,
    {
      method: 'DELETE',
      headers: {
        'Authorization': `Bearer ${await getAccessToken()}`
      }
    }
  );
}
```

## Complete Flow Example

Here's a complete React component demonstrating the full flow:

```tsx
import React, { useState, useEffect } from 'react';

interface VerificationProps {
  queryId: string;
  orderId: string;
  onSuccess: (claims: Record<string, any>) => void;
  onError: (error: string) => void;
}

export function CredentialVerification({
  queryId,
  orderId,
  onSuccess,
  onError
}: VerificationProps) {
  const [qrCode, setQrCode] = useState<string | null>(null);
  const [deepLink, setDeepLink] = useState<string | null>(null);
  const [status, setStatus] = useState<string>('initializing');
  const [correlationId, setCorrelationId] = useState<string | null>(null);

  // Create session on mount
  useEffect(() => {
    async function initSession() {
      try {
        const session = await createVerificationRequest({
          queryId,
          correlationId: orderId
        });

        setQrCode(session.qr_code_data_uri);
        setDeepLink(session.request_uri);
        setCorrelationId(session.correlation_id);
        setStatus('waiting');
      } catch (error) {
        onError('Failed to start verification');
      }
    }

    initSession();
  }, [queryId, orderId]);

  // Poll for completion
  useEffect(() => {
    if (!correlationId || status !== 'waiting') return;

    const poll = async () => {
      try {
        const result = await pollForCompletion(correlationId);

        if (result.success) {
          setStatus('success');
          onSuccess(result.claims!);
        } else {
          setStatus('error');
          onError(result.error!);
        }
      } catch (error) {
        setStatus('error');
        onError('Polling failed');
      }
    };

    poll();
  }, [correlationId, status]);

  // Cleanup on unmount
  useEffect(() => {
    return () => {
      if (correlationId) {
        cleanupSession(correlationId).catch(console.error);
      }
    };
  }, [correlationId]);

  return (
    <div className="verification-container">
      {status === 'initializing' && <p>Starting verification...</p>}

      {status === 'waiting' && (
        <>
          <h3>Verify Your Credentials</h3>
          {qrCode && (
            <img
              src={qrCode}
              alt="Scan with your wallet"
              className="qr-code"
            />
          )}
          <p>Scan with your wallet app</p>

          {deepLink && (
            <a href={deepLink} className="button">
              Open Wallet
            </a>
          )}
        </>
      )}

      {status === 'success' && (
        <div className="success">Verification successful</div>
      )}

      {status === 'error' && (
        <div className="error">Verification failed</div>
      )}
    </div>
  );
}
```

## Best Practices

### Security

1. **Always use HTTPS** for your callback URLs
2. **Validate webhook signatures** if your implementation supports them
3. **Use short session TTLs** (10 minutes is recommended)
4. **Clean up sessions** after completion to prevent replay attacks

### User Experience

1. **Show status updates** as the wallet interacts with the request
2. **Provide a deep link** for same-device flows
3. **Handle timeouts gracefully** with clear messaging
4. **Allow retry** if verification fails

### Performance

1. **Use webhooks** instead of polling when possible
2. **Cache access tokens** to avoid repeated OAuth flows

## Troubleshooting

### Common Issues

| Issue | Cause | Solution |
|-------|-------|----------|
| QR code not scanning | Wrong URL scheme | Ensure wallet supports `openid4vp://` |
| Wallet shows error | Invalid query configuration | Contact administrator |
| Timeout | User abandoned flow | Implement retry mechanism |
| No verified data | Wrong status check | Poll until `authorization_response_verified` |

### Debug Mode

Enable verbose logging to diagnose issues:

```kotlin
// In your application configuration
sphereon.oid4vp.debug = true
```

## Next Steps

- **[OID4VP Verifier REST API](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/oid4vp-verifier)** - Full OpenAPI documentation
- **[OID4VP Overview](./overview)** - Architecture and concepts

---

# DCQL Store

# DCQL Store

The IDK ships a `DcqlQueryConfigurationStore` interface and a default key-value-backed implementation that is fine for tests and single-tenant developer setups but loses history on every write. The EDK replaces it with `VersionedDcqlQueryConfigurationStore`: same contract for ordinary reads and writes, plus an immutable per-query version trail backed by a relational database. Every write produces a new immutable row in a shared `config_version` table and advances a current-version pointer in a typed `dcql_query` header table. Reads through the IDK interface continue to return the body the current-version pointer references, so existing IDK-facing code keeps working without changes. The version-history operations are exposed as a small additional REST surface alongside the existing IDK DCQL admin endpoints.

## Storage Model

The store keeps two related rows for every DCQL query:

The `dcql_query` table holds the **mutable header** keyed by `(tenant_id, identifier)`. It stores the logical query identity (`name`, `description`, `enabled`), the current-version pointer (`current_version`), a soft-delete timestamp (`deleted_at`, omitted from normal reads), and `created_at` / `updated_at` audit columns. Updates to header metadata happen in place; only the DCQL body is versioned.

The shared `config_version` table holds the **immutable history**. Each row carries the full serialized DCQL body for one version of one query, plus `created_at` and `created_by` audit columns. The `config_version` table is also used by other versioned configuration types in the EDK (credential designs, for example), so the same versioning infrastructure is reused; the `domain` column on each row distinguishes them (`"oid4vp-dcql"` for DCQL).

```kotlin
data class DcqlQueryHeaderRow(
    val tenantId: String,
    val identifier: String,
    val name: String,
    val description: String? = null,
    val enabled: Boolean = true,
    val currentVersion: Int,
    val createdAt: Long,
    val updatedAt: Long,
)

data class DcqlQueryVersionRecord(
    val identifier: String,
    val version: Int,
    val dcqlQuery: DcqlQuery,
    val createdAt: Long,
    val createdBy: String? = null,
)

data class DcqlQueryVersionSummary(
    val version: Int,
    val createdAt: Long,
    val createdBy: String? = null,
)
```

Tenant isolation is enforced at the query layer: every repository method filters by `tenantId`, which is resolved from the session context, not from a wire-supplied argument. The store has no concept of a verifier; that's a layer above, handled by the [verifier-DCQL binding](./verifier-bindings) system.

## What Counts as a New Version

Every write through the IDK `DcqlQueryConfigurationStore.put`/`putPersistent` path appends a new immutable `config_version` row and advances the header's `currentVersion`. Translated to the HTTP surface:

- `POST /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql` writes version 1 along with the header.
- `PUT /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/{queryId}` appends a new version.
- `PATCH /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/{queryId}` also appends a new version, even when only `name`, `description`, or `enabled` is touched. The version row carries the DCQL body; for a header-only PATCH the new row's body is identical to the previous one. This is a deliberate trade-off: the version history is monotonic and every admin action shows up as a row, at the cost of "no-op" body rows.
- `POST /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/{queryId}/versions/{version}/restore` appends a new version whose body equals the chosen historical version and advances the pointer. History rows are never mutated.

Deletes are soft: the header's `deleted_at` is set and the row stops appearing in normal reads. The version history is preserved internally even though the version-history endpoints return `404` for soft-deleted queries.

## REST API

The full HTTP surface for managing DCQL queries and walking version history is documented on its own page, with request and response shapes per endpoint, error mapping, tenancy rules, and policy considerations: see [DCQL REST API](./dcql-rest-api). In brief, the basic CRUD endpoints come from the IDK `DcqlQueryAdminHttpAdapter` (`lib-oid4vp-dcql-store-rest`) and the version-history endpoints come from the EDK `DcqlQueryVersionHttpAdapter` (`lib-oid4vp-dcql-store-versioned-rest`); both mount under `/api/v1/oid4vp/dcql` and share the `oid4vp-dcql` OpenAPI tag.

## Choosing a Backend

Two persistence backends are shipped. PostgreSQL is the recommended default for new deployments; MySQL is provided for organisations that have standardised on MySQL.

| Module | Backend |
|--------|---------|
| `lib-oid4vp-dcql-store-versioned-persistence-postgresql` | PostgreSQL via SQLDelight |
| `lib-oid4vp-dcql-store-versioned-persistence-mysql` | MySQL via SQLDelight |

Both backends share the same SQLDelight-generated repository surface (`DcqlQueryHeaderRepository`), so the rest of the EDK does not care which one is wired in. Include exactly one of the persistence modules; the version-history rows go into the shared `config_version` table that the EDK provides as part of its versioned-config infrastructure, so no additional setup is needed.

The repositories run inside the same multi-tenant database routing layer the rest of the EDK uses, so per-tenant database selection and shared-schema-with-tenant-column deployments both work without DCQL-specific configuration.

## Resolution at Authorization-Request Creation Time

When the universal OID4VP backend (`POST /oid4vp/backend/auth/requests`) creates an authorization request for a given `query_id`, it does not embed the DCQL body inline. It resolves the body through the registered `DcqlQueryResolver`, which by default in the EDK is the version-aware resolver (`EdkDcqlQueryResolver`) and, when the VDX binding module is on the classpath, the verifier-aware resolver (`VdxDcqlQueryResolver`). The resolver picks the body from the versioned store, snapshots both the `queryId` and the `version` into the authorization session, and uses that pair to render the DCQL body in the authorization request the wallet eventually fetches. The version is part of the snapshot, so a DCQL update committed after the session was created does not affect the wallet's view of the request.

## Audit

Every write through the versioned store and every version-history endpoint goes through the EDK `PolicyCommandExtension`, so [authorization](/edk/guides/authorization/overview) policies can scope DCQL admin and history operations independently. The standard EDK [audit](/edk/guides/audit/overview) pipeline records every command execution; the `createdBy` column on the version row carries the actor for the data-side audit. Together, the audit event timestamp and the version row's audit columns let an investigator answer both "who did this" and "what did the DCQL body look like at any past moment".

---

# DCQL REST API

import ApiCapability from '@site/src/components/ApiCapability';

# DCQL REST API

The DCQL query configurations that the [Universal OID4VP API](./integration) references by `query_id` are managed through a REST surface mounted under `/api/dcql/v1`. The basic CRUD operations come from the IDK `DcqlQueryAdminHttpAdapter` and work against any DCQL store (the in-memory IDK default or the EDK versioned store). When the EDK versioned store is wired in, a second adapter, the `DcqlQueryVersionHttpAdapter`, mounts the version-history endpoints alongside the admin endpoints under the same base path.

Both adapters are wired automatically once the relevant module is on the classpath of the host service. The IDK admin endpoints come from `lib-oid4vp-dcql-store-rest`. The EDK version endpoints come from `lib-oid4vp-dcql-store-versioned-rest`. They share the OpenAPI tag `oid4vp-dcql` and the operation-id prefix `oid4vpDcql`, so tools like Swagger UI present them as one logical group.

This page assumes you have read the [DCQL Store](./dcql-store) page for the storage model (header + immutable `config_version` rows) and the semantics of "current version".

## Quick Reference

### Admin Endpoints (IDK)

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| GET | `/api/dcql/v1/queries` | List every DCQL query configuration in the tenant |
| POST | `/api/dcql/v1/queries` | Create a new DCQL query configuration |
| GET | `/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}` | Read one DCQL query configuration |
| PUT | `/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}` | Replace a DCQL query configuration in full |
| PATCH | `/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}` | Partially update a DCQL query configuration |
| DELETE | `/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}` | Delete a DCQL query configuration |

### Version Endpoints (EDK, present when the versioned store is wired)

| Method | Path | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| GET | `/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}/versions` | List the version history of a DCQL query |
| GET | `/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}/versions/{version}` | Read the body of one historical version |
| POST | `/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}/versions/{version}/restore` | Append a copy of a historical version as the new current version |

All endpoints require an OIDC bearer token. The tenant is resolved by the EDK Layer 1 tenant pipeline from the validated JWT, the `Host` header, or the configured default; it is never read from a client-supplied header. Responses are `application/json` with `Cache-Control: no-store`.

## Authoring a DCQL Query

Before walking the endpoint shapes it helps to know what goes inside a query. A `DcqlQueryConfiguration` carries the operator-facing metadata plus an embedded `DcqlQuery` body. The body is the OpenID4VP-spec DCQL JSON (credentials and credential_sets) that the wallet eventually sees. The wrapper adds the `queryId` (the stable identifier `query_id` callers reference), `name`, `description`, and `enabled`.

If you do not want to compose the DCQL body by hand, the EDK ships the [semantic-to-DCQL authoring](./dcql-authoring) helper that takes a list of semantic-attribute selections and produces the body for you. The authoring helper output is what you would POST as the `dcqlQuery` field below.

## Create

Returns `201 Created` with the full `DcqlQueryConfiguration` (server-assigned `createdAt`, `updatedAt`, and on the EDK versioned store, `currentVersion = 1`).

Errors:
- `409 Conflict` with `ALREADY_EXISTS_ERROR` if a query with that `queryId` already exists in the tenant.
- `400 Bad Request` with `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR` for a malformed body.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="dcql-edk-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createDcqlQuery"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.create"
  argsType="CreateDcqlQueryArgs"
  resultType="DcqlQueryConfiguration"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk">

Supply the `queryId`, `name`, the `dcqlQuery` body, and `enabled`. The result is the stored `DcqlQueryConfiguration` with server-assigned timestamps (and `currentVersion` on the versioned store).

</ApiCapability>

## Read

Returns `200 OK` with the current `DcqlQueryConfiguration`. `createdAt` and `updatedAt` are epoch milliseconds. `currentVersion` is present when the versioned store is in use and null for the IDK in-memory backings.

`404 Not Found` with `NOT_FOUND_ERROR` if no query with that `queryId` exists.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="dcql-edk-openapi.yml"
  operationId="getDcqlQuery"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.get"
  argsType="GetDcqlQueryArgs"
  resultType="DcqlQueryConfiguration"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk">

Reads the current configuration for the `queryId` taken from the path.

</ApiCapability>

## List

Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of every `DcqlQueryConfiguration` in the current tenant. There is no filtering or pagination at this endpoint; if your tenant has many queries, the list is the full set.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="dcql-edk-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listDcqlQueries"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.list"
  argsType="ListDcqlQueriesArgs"
  resultType="List<DcqlQueryConfiguration>"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk">

Lists every configuration in the caller's tenant. The command takes no arguments; the tenant comes from the session.

</ApiCapability>

## Update (PUT vs PATCH)

Both `PUT` and `PATCH` accept the same body shape and merge it into the stored configuration. The semantic difference is *intent*, not server behaviour: convention says a `PUT` supplies every field, a `PATCH` supplies a subset and leaves others unchanged. The actual merge rule is the same in both methods: **a `null` (or omitted) field leaves the stored value unchanged**.

Returns `200 OK` with the updated `DcqlQueryConfiguration`. In the EDK versioned store, the call also appends a new version row and advances `currentVersion`, even for header-only changes that do not touch `dcqlQuery`. Each version row carries the DCQL body at the time of the write; the header fields (`name`, `description`, `enabled`) are not part of the versioned payload.

This is intentional: every write produces a complete `(queryId, version)` snapshot of the body, so the version history is monotonic and a header-only edit is a no-op in body terms but still produces an audit row. If you are concerned about version-table growth, batch your edits.

Errors:
- `404 Not Found` if the query does not exist.
- `400 Bad Request` for malformed body.

Both methods carry the same `UpdateDcqlQueryArgs` and resolve to the same `oid4vp.dcql.update` command; a `null` field leaves the stored value unchanged.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="dcql-edk-openapi.yml"
  operationId="replaceDcqlQuery"
  method="PUT"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.update"
  argsType="UpdateDcqlQueryArgs"
  resultType="DcqlQueryConfiguration"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk">

Replace intent: supply every field. The `queryId` comes from the path; any `null` field still leaves the stored value unchanged.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="dcql-edk-openapi.yml"
  operationId="patchDcqlQuery"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.update"
  argsType="UpdateDcqlQueryArgs"
  resultType="DcqlQueryConfiguration"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk">

Patch intent: supply only the fields to change. Same command and merge rule as the replace above.

</ApiCapability>

## Delete

Returns `204 No Content` on success.

`404 Not Found` if the query does not exist.

On the EDK versioned store the delete is a soft-delete: the header row's `deleted_at` is set and the header stops appearing in normal reads, but the `config_version` history rows are preserved. The history can still be retrieved through the version endpoints if needed for an audit; the query is otherwise inaccessible.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="dcql-edk-openapi.yml"
  operationId="deleteDcqlQuery"
  method="DELETE"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.delete"
  argsType="DeleteDcqlQueryArgs"
  resultType="Boolean"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk">

Deletes the query named by the path `queryId`. The command returns `true` when an entry was removed and `false` when none existed (the REST surface maps both to `204`/`404`).

</ApiCapability>

## Version History

The endpoints in this section are only present when `lib-oid4vp-dcql-store-versioned-rest` is on the classpath. On the IDK default in-memory store they return 404.

### List Versions

Returns `200 OK` with a JSON array of `DcqlQueryVersionSummary`, newest first. `createdBy` is the session principal id at write time; it is null when the write was unauthenticated (typically only in test harnesses).

The summary intentionally omits the DCQL body; fetch each version individually if you need it, so an audit UI can render the list without loading possibly-large bodies.

`404 Not Found` if the query does not exist (including soft-deleted queries, even though their version rows are preserved internally).

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="dcql-edk-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listDcqlQueryVersions"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}/versions"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.list-versions"
  argsType="ListDcqlQueryVersionsArgs"
  resultType="List<DcqlQueryVersionSummary>"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk">

Lists the version history (newest first) for the `queryId` from the path. Each `DcqlQueryVersionSummary` carries the `version`, `createdAt`, and `createdBy`, but not the body.

</ApiCapability>

### Get One Version

Returns `200 OK` with the full `DcqlQueryVersionRecord`. `dcqlQuery` is the body as it was at that point in time, deserialised from the `config_version` row. The header metadata (`name`, `description`, `enabled`) is *not* part of the version record; only the body is versioned. If you need to diff a historical body against the current one, fetch this and `GET /api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}` separately.

Errors:
- `404 Not Found` with `NOT_FOUND_ERROR` if the query does not exist, or if `{version}` does not exist for that query.
- `400 Bad Request` with `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR` if `{version}` is not a positive integer.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="dcql-edk-openapi.yml"
  operationId="getDcqlQueryVersion"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}/versions/{version}"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.get-version"
  argsType="GetDcqlQueryVersionArgs"
  resultType="DcqlQueryVersionRecord"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk">

Reads one historical version: the `queryId` and `version` come from the path. The `DcqlQueryVersionRecord` carries the `dcqlQuery` body as it was at that version; the header metadata is not versioned.

</ApiCapability>

### Restore a Version

The request body is optional. An empty body or `{}` is equivalent to `{ "note": null }`. The `note` is carried with the audit event for the restore command; it is not stored on the resulting version row, so do not rely on it as the long-term audit trail (use the standard EDK audit log for that).

Returns `200 OK` with the resulting `DcqlQueryConfiguration` (now reflecting the restored content; `currentVersion` is the *new* version number, not `3`).

Behaviour: the server reads the body of version `3`, appends it as a new version row with the next sequential version number, advances `currentVersion`, and returns the new state. The historical rows (including the original version `3`) are unchanged. Subsequent `GET /api/dcql/v1/queries/age_verification` returns the restored body; subsequent `GET /api/dcql/v1/queries/age_verification/versions` lists the new version at the top with `version` greater than every previous version.

Errors:
- `404 Not Found` if the query or the specified version does not exist.
- `400 Bad Request` if `{version}` is not a positive integer or the request body is malformed.

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="dcql-edk-openapi.yml"
  operationId="restoreDcqlQueryVersion"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}/versions/{version}/restore"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.restore-version"
  argsType="RestoreDcqlQueryVersionArgs"
  resultType="DcqlQueryConfiguration"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk">

The `queryId` and `version` come from the path; the optional `note` is carried on the restore audit event. The server appends the historical body as a new current version and returns the resulting `DcqlQueryConfiguration` (its `currentVersion` is the new number).

</ApiCapability>

## Tenancy and Authorization

Every endpoint operates in a single tenant resolved by the EDK Layer 1 tenant pipeline before the request reaches the adapter. A wire-side `X-Tenant-Id` header may be set for observability but is **never** consulted for tenant resolution or access control. The implications are the same as for the [credential design REST API](../credential-design/rest-api#tenancy): calls without a tenant-resolvable JWT fail before the DCQL adapter sees them, every read is implicitly scoped to the caller's tenant, and writes land in the caller's tenant regardless of any tenant-shaped field in the payload.

All endpoints pass through the EDK `PolicyCommandExtension`, so [authorization](/edk/guides/authorization/overview) policies can be applied per command. Typical policies grant reads (`list`, `get`, `list-versions`, `get-version`) to any authenticated principal and restrict writes (`create`, `replace`, `patch`, `delete`, `restore-version`) to administrators. The action names match the underlying command IDs (`oid4vp.dcql.http.*` for the adapters in this surface), which is what the policy engine keys on.

## Error Envelope

Failures use the standard EDK `IdkError` envelope:

```json
{
  "code": "NOT_FOUND_ERROR",
  "message": "DCQL query configuration not found: age_verification"
}
```

Mapping from the codes you will see on this surface to HTTP statuses:

| Error code | HTTP status | When |
|------------|-------------|------|
| `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR` | 400 | Malformed body, non-integer version, bad `{queryId}` |
| `NOT_FOUND_ERROR` | 404 | Missing query, missing version |
| `ALREADY_EXISTS_ERROR` | 409 | Create with an existing `queryId` |
| `UNKNOWN_ERROR` or other | 500 | Unexpected server failure |

Authorization failures from the `PolicyCommandExtension` are 403 with the policy decision in the message; authentication failures are handled by the surrounding bearer-token middleware and never reach the adapter.

## Resolution Snapshots Are Independent of the Admin API

A wallet that fetches an authorization request does *not* go through this REST surface. The Universal OID4VP backend calls the in-process `DcqlQueryResolver`, which reads the body directly from the versioned store and snapshots `(queryId, version)` into the authorization session at the moment the session is created. Subsequent edits through the admin API do not retroactively change the body the wallet sees, because the wallet's view is pinned by the session snapshot. See [DCQL Store](./dcql-store#resolution-at-authorization-request-creation-time) for the resolution-time detail.

If you want different verifiers in the same tenant to use the same `query_id` at different versions, layer the [verifier bindings](./verifier-bindings) module on top: that adds a per-verifier `pinnedVersion` and its own REST surface for managing per-verifier pins and scheduled future activations.

---

# DCQL Authoring

# DCQL Authoring

A DCQL query asks a wallet for a set of credentials and the specific claims to disclose. Writing one by hand requires knowing the credential-type binding registry, the claim path conventions used by every credential format the tenant accepts, and the `credential_sets` semantics for combining required and alternative credentials. The EDK lets the author work at a higher level: select attributes from semantic attribute sets that the tenant has already published, set a small number of flags, and let `SemanticToDcqlConverter` produce the DCQL JSON mechanically.

The same converter sits behind two different authoring entry points. A lightweight "give me a query that asks for these three attributes" call (used by tooling, scripts, and the admin UI's quick-create) builds a request directly. The enterprise authoring path layers a richer UI on top with set browsing, attribute search, and preview, then still produces the same request and hands it to the same converter. The DCQL it emits is identical in both cases.

## The Conversion Contract

```kotlin
interface SemanticToDcqlConverter {
    suspend fun convert(
        request: SemanticToDcqlConversionRequest,
    ): IdkResult<DcqlConversionResult, IdkError>
}
```

The request lists which attribute sets the author wants to include, optionally restricts the attributes within each set to a chosen subset, and sets two DCQL-level flags. The result carries the assembled `DcqlQuery` plus the provenance information that the authoring layer needs to snapshot per version (which sets contributed, which attribute paths were resolved, which claim paths the converter emitted, and any warnings).

```kotlin
data class AttributeSelection(
    val attributeSetId: Uuid,
    val selectedPaths: List<String> = emptyList(),
)

data class SemanticToDcqlConversionRequest(
    val selections: List<AttributeSelection>,
    val intentToRetain: Boolean = false,
    val useCredentialSets: Boolean = false,
)

data class DcqlConversionResult(
    val dcqlQuery: DcqlQuery,
    val attributeSetIds: List<Uuid>,
    val selectedAttributePaths: List<String>,
    val generatedClaimPaths: Map<String, List<List<String>>>,
    val warnings: List<String> = emptyList(),
)
```

An empty `selectedPaths` means "include every attribute in this set". A non-empty list filters to the attributes whose path matches one of the strings; unresolved paths produce a warning in the result rather than a hard failure, so the caller can show the author what was missing and let them decide whether to commit anyway.

## How the Converter Works

The converter walks the request in four phases.

**Resolve sets.** Every `attributeSetId` is looked up in the `SemanticAttributeSet` registry. A missing set is a fatal error; missing attribute paths within a present set are non-fatal warnings.

**Resolve candidate credentials.** Each set has an associated `CredentialTypeBinding` registry entry listing the credential-type candidates that carry its attributes (for example, an "identity" attribute set might bind to both `org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL` and the SD-JWT `identity_credential` VCT). The converter pulls the candidate list per set.

**Emit claim queries.** For each candidate credential, the converter emits a `DcqlClaimQuery` per resolved attribute path. The claim path is translated from the attribute's semantic path to the credential format's actual claim path through the binding. `intent_to_retain` from the request is stamped on every emitted claim query when set.

**Wrap as needed.** When `useCredentialSets` is true, the converter wraps every candidate credential id in a single `DcqlCredentialSetQuery` with `required = true` and a single options list naming all candidates. This is the right shape when the author wants "any one of these credentials is acceptable", as opposed to the default behaviour where each candidate is an independent credential the wallet may or may not have.

The result preserves the input order of `selections` in `attributeSetIds`, and groups the emitted claim paths by credential-query id in `generatedClaimPaths`. The authoring layer uses these to display a structured preview of the DCQL the wallet will see before the author commits.

## Wiring Authoring into the Versioned Store

The converter is stateless and does not write to the DCQL store. The authoring flow is:

1. The author selects attribute sets and paths in the UI (or in code).
2. The UI calls `SemanticToDcqlConverter.convert(...)` and renders the result.
3. The author reviews `dcqlQuery`, `generatedClaimPaths`, and any `warnings`.
4. The UI calls the [DCQL admin REST API](./dcql-store#rest-api) to persist the result: `POST /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql` for a new query, `PUT` or `PATCH /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql/{queryId}` to update an existing one. The body is a `DcqlQueryConfiguration` carrying the converter's `dcqlQuery` as the body.
5. The store appends a new immutable version and advances the current-version pointer.

The provenance fields on `DcqlConversionResult` (which attribute sets contributed, which paths were resolved) are typically persisted alongside the DCQL query by the authoring layer in a separate table, so that the author can later open the same query, see what it was generated from, and re-author it without rebuilding the selection from scratch. The version history in the DCQL store proper only holds the resulting `DcqlQuery` body; the authoring provenance lives in the authoring module's own store.

## Example

A tenant publishes an "Identity basics" attribute set with paths `given_name`, `family_name`, `birth_date`. The bindings registry says this set is carried by two credential candidates: SD-JWT VCT `https://issuer.example.com/identity` and mDoc doctype `org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL`. The author wants a query asking for first and last name only, accepting either credential.

```kotlin
val result = converter.convert(
    SemanticToDcqlConversionRequest(
        selections = listOf(
            AttributeSelection(
                attributeSetId = identityBasicsSetId,
                selectedPaths = listOf("given_name", "family_name"),
            ),
        ),
        intentToRetain = false,
        useCredentialSets = true,
    ),
)
```

The converter resolves the set, finds the two candidates, emits a `DcqlCredentialQuery` for each (with claim queries for `given_name` and `family_name` translated to the SD-JWT and mDoc claim paths respectively), and wraps both candidate ids in a `DcqlCredentialSetQuery` with `required = true`. The author commits the result through `POST /api/v1/oid4vp/dcql` and the versioned store writes version 1.

## Errors and Warnings

Errors come back as `IdkError` and are fatal:

- Missing or deleted attribute set: `NOT_FOUND_ERROR`.
- No credential-type bindings registered for the set: `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR` (the converter cannot emit a `DcqlCredentialQuery` without at least one candidate).

Warnings are returned in the successful result and are not fatal:

- An entry in `selectedPaths` did not match any attribute in the set, the warning names the path and the set.
- A candidate credential's binding does not cover one of the selected attributes; the converter skips that attribute for that candidate (it may still be emitted for other candidates) and warns.

The authoring UI is expected to display warnings and let the author decide whether to commit. The DCQL store does not re-validate against the binding registry on write, so a query committed with warnings remains as-authored.

---

# Verifier DCQL Bindings

import ApiCapability from '@site/src/components/ApiCapability';

# Verifier DCQL Bindings

A tenant typically defines its DCQL queries once at the tenant level. The same `age_verification` query lives in the [versioned DCQL store](./dcql-store) and gets edited over time. But a tenant also typically hosts multiple verifiers (a checkout flow, a customer-portal flow, a third-party-relying-party integration), each of which may want to use the shared query at a *specific* version. The VDX `VerifierDcqlBinding` is the thin layer that captures that pin: which verifier uses which shared DCQL query, at which version, with which local alias and enabled flag.

This is a VDX-level concern, not a base EDK one. The IDK and the bare EDK ship a tenant-level versioned DCQL resolver; this module adds the per-verifier binding store, the verifier-aware resolver that replaces the tenant-level one, the REST surface for managing bindings, and the scheduled-activation projection over the EDK scheduler.

## The Binding Model

```kotlin
data class VerifierDcqlBinding(
    val id: String,
    val tenantId: String,
    val verifierId: String,
    val dcqlQueryId: String,
    val pinnedVersion: Int,
    val enabled: Boolean = true,
    val alias: String? = null,
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant,
)
```

A binding is identified by `(tenantId, verifierId, dcqlQueryId)` and points at a specific `pinnedVersion` of the shared query. The binding never copies the DCQL body or its history; that lives in the versioned DCQL store. Two verifiers binding the same `dcqlQueryId` at different versions consume two pointers into the same history, not two copies of the body.

`enabled` lets an operator disable a binding without deleting it; a disabled binding is rejected at authorization-request creation time with an `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR`. `alias` is a verifier-local short name for the query, useful when the same shared query is used in a UI that needs to label it per verifier (for example, "Age check (checkout)" vs "Age check (customer portal)" backed by the same `age_verification` query).

Bindings are soft-deleted (a `deletedAt` timestamp); live reads exclude soft-deleted rows.

## How Resolution Uses the Binding

When the universal OID4VP backend creates an authorization request for a `query_id`, it calls `DcqlQueryResolver.resolveForCreate(queryId, verifierId)`. When the VDX binding module is on the classpath, the resolver is `VdxDcqlQueryResolver`, which behaves as follows:

If `verifierId` is null, fall back to current-version resolution on the versioned store. This matches the EDK base behaviour and is what the Universal API uses when no per-verifier context is in scope.

If `verifierId` is not null, look up the live binding for `(tenantId, verifierId, queryId)`. Reject with `NOT_FOUND_ERROR` if no binding exists. Reject with `ILLEGAL_ARGUMENT_ERROR` if the binding is disabled. Otherwise read the body for `binding.pinnedVersion` from the versioned store and snapshot `(queryId, pinnedVersion)` into the authorization session. The wallet's view of the request is therefore frozen at the pinned version regardless of what subsequent DCQL edits do.

The pinned version is also returned in `ResolvedDcqlQuery.version`, so the audit log and the authorization-session record both capture it.

## REST API

The binding surface is exposed by two HTTP adapters, both mounted under the DCQL admin base path `/api/dcql/v1`. The verifier-scoped adapter (`/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings`) is what a verifier admin uses to manage that verifier's bindings and their scheduled activations. The reverse-lookup adapter (`/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}/verifiers`) is what a tenant admin uses to find every verifier bound to a shared query.

Every endpoint requires an OIDC bearer token; the tenant is resolved from the validated JWT, never from a client-supplied header. Each REST endpoint delegates to a `ServiceCommand` (the `oid4vp.dcql.*` ids below), so the same operation is reachable in-process through the command invoker and over the internal transport.

### Verifier-Scoped Bindings

Base path: `/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings`.

#### Bind a query to a verifier

Pins a shared DCQL query to the verifier. Returns `201 Created` with the resulting `VerifierDcqlBinding`. A `400` is returned for a malformed body and a `404` if the verifier or query does not exist.

<ApiCapability
  product="vdx"
  spec="dcql-vdx-openapi.yml"
  operationId="bindVerifierDcql"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.bind-verifier"
  argsType="BindVerifierDcqlArgs"
  resultType="VerifierDcqlBinding"
  referenceUrl="/vdx/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-vdx">

Supply the `queryId` to bind; the `verifierId` comes from the path. `version` is optional — when omitted the binding pins the DCQL query's current version at the moment of the call. The result is the stored `VerifierDcqlBinding`.

</ApiCapability>

#### Read and list bindings

<ApiCapability
  product="vdx"
  spec="dcql-vdx-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listVerifierDcqlBindings"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.list-bindings"
  argsType="ListVerifierDcqlBindingsArgs"
  resultType="List<VerifierDcqlBinding>"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/vdx/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-vdx">

Lists every binding held by the verifier named in the path.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="vdx"
  spec="dcql-vdx-openapi.yml"
  operationId="getVerifierDcqlBinding"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings/{queryId}"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.get-binding"
  argsType="VerifierDcqlBindingKey"
  resultType="VerifierDcqlBinding"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/vdx/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-vdx">

Reads the single binding for the `(verifierId, queryId)` pair taken from the path. `404` if no such binding exists.

</ApiCapability>

#### Update a binding

Immediately advances or rolls back the pinned version, toggles `enabled`, or sets the `alias`. A `null` (or omitted) field leaves the stored value unchanged. For a change that should land at a future time, schedule an activation instead. Returns `200 OK` with the updated binding.

<ApiCapability
  product="vdx"
  spec="dcql-vdx-openapi.yml"
  operationId="updateVerifierDcqlBinding"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings/{queryId}"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.update-binding"
  argsType="UpdateVerifierDcqlBindingArgs"
  resultType="VerifierDcqlBinding"
  referenceUrl="/vdx/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-vdx">

Supply only the fields to change; the `verifierId` and `queryId` come from the path. A `pinnedVersion` update takes effect immediately.

</ApiCapability>

#### Unbind

<ApiCapability
  product="vdx"
  spec="dcql-vdx-openapi.yml"
  operationId="unbindVerifierDcql"
  method="DELETE"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings/{queryId}"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.unbind-verifier"
  argsType="VerifierDcqlBindingKey"
  resultType="VerifierDcqlBinding"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/vdx/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-vdx">

Removes the binding for `(verifierId, queryId)`. Returns `200 OK` with the `VerifierDcqlBinding` that was removed, so the caller gets the resource it acted on rather than a bare flag; a missing binding is `404`.

</ApiCapability>

### Scheduled Activations

A scheduled activation moves the binding's pinned version on a future date. It is projected over the EDK scheduler's `scheduled_command` table, not a dedicated activations table. When the scheduler fires at `effectiveAt`, it runs an internal command that calls the binding update path; from the binding's perspective this is identical to an operator calling the update endpoint with `pinnedVersion` set to the target. The activation appears in the binding's history through the audit trail.

<ApiCapability
  product="vdx"
  spec="dcql-vdx-openapi.yml"
  operationId="activateVerifierDcqlBinding"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings/{queryId}/activations"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.schedule-activation"
  argsType="ScheduleVerifierDcqlActivationArgs"
  resultType="VerifierDcqlScheduledActivation"
  referenceUrl="/vdx/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-vdx">

Supply the `effectiveAt` timestamp and an optional `pinnedVersion` (defaults to the query's current version when omitted). The `verifierId` and `queryId` come from the path. Returns `201 Created` with the resulting `VerifierDcqlScheduledActivation` in `PENDING` status.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="vdx"
  spec="dcql-vdx-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listVerifierDcqlBindingActivations"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings/{queryId}/activations"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.list-activations"
  argsType="VerifierDcqlBindingKey"
  resultType="List<VerifierDcqlScheduledActivation>"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/vdx/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-vdx">

Lists the scheduled activations for the binding named by the path.

</ApiCapability>

<ApiCapability
  product="vdx"
  spec="dcql-vdx-openapi.yml"
  operationId="deactivateVerifierDcqlBinding"
  method="DELETE"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings/{queryId}/activations/{activationId}"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.cancel-activation"
  argsType="CancelVerifierDcqlActivationArgs"
  resultType="VerifierDcqlScheduledActivation"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/vdx/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-vdx">

Cancels a pending activation by `activationId`, deleting the corresponding scheduled-command row. Returns `200 OK` with the cancelled `VerifierDcqlScheduledActivation` (its `status` is now `CANCELLED`). Activations that have already executed cannot be cancelled (they appear with `APPLIED` status and are not part of any cancellable set).

</ApiCapability>

The activation's `status` is projected from the underlying scheduled-command lifecycle:

| Status | Meaning |
|--------|---------|
| `PENDING` | Scheduled, not yet executed |
| `APPLIED` | Executed successfully; the binding's `pinnedVersion` was updated |
| `CANCELLED` | The activation was cancelled before its `effectiveAt` |
| `FAILED` | Execution threw; the binding's `pinnedVersion` is unchanged and the error is in the audit log |

### Reverse Lookup

When you need to find every verifier in a tenant that is currently bound to a shared DCQL query (for example, before publishing a new version, to know who is going to be affected):

<ApiCapability
  product="vdx"
  spec="dcql-vdx-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listDcqlBoundVerifiers"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}/verifiers"
  commandId="oid4vp.dcql.list-verifiers"
  argsType="ListVerifiersForDcqlArgs"
  resultType="List<VerifierDcqlBinding>"
  rpc={false}
  referenceUrl="/vdx/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-vdx">

Lists every binding that references the `queryId` from the path — one `VerifierDcqlBinding` per bound verifier, each carrying the version it pins. Returns an empty array in single-verifier deployments.

</ApiCapability>

## Why Two Bind Paths

The binding system shows up in two places for a reason. The verifier-scoped surface (`/api/dcql/v1/verifiers/{verifierId}/bindings`) is what a verifier admin uses: they manage *their* verifier's bindings. The reverse-lookup surface (`/api/dcql/v1/queries/{queryId}/verifiers`) is what a tenant admin uses when they own the shared DCQL queries and want to understand or plan an organisation-wide change. The same data is exposed from both angles; the access policy on each surface is configured independently through the EDK [authorization](/edk/guides/authorization/overview) layer.

## Persistence

Two backends are shipped, paralleling the DCQL store itself:

| Module | Backend |
|--------|---------|
| `lib-data-store-oid4vp-dcql-binding-persistence-postgres` | PostgreSQL via SQLDelight |
| `lib-data-store-oid4vp-dcql-binding-persistence-mysql` | MySQL via SQLDelight |

Both implement the `VerifierDcqlBindingRepository` interface from the public module. The schema is small (one `verifier_dcql_binding` table keyed by `(tenant_id, verifier_id, dcql_query_id)` with the mutable fields plus `deleted_at`); no shared infrastructure table is needed.

The scheduled-activations projection has no table of its own; it queries the EDK scheduler's `scheduled_command` rows whose target command id and arguments encode "advance binding X to version Y" and groups them by `(verifierId, dcqlQueryId)`.

## Wiring

Include the binding module alongside the versioned DCQL store. The `VdxDcqlQueryResolver` is bound with `replaces = [EdkDcqlQueryResolver::class]`, so the verifier-aware resolver automatically takes the place of the tenant-only resolver in any assembly that has both on the classpath. Code that calls `DcqlQueryResolver.resolveForCreate(...)` keeps the same signature.

---

# REST API

import Tabs from '@theme/Tabs';
import TabItem from '@theme/TabItem';
import ApiCapability from '@site/src/components/ApiCapability';

# REST API

The EDK exposes the credential design registry over HTTP under the base path
`/api/credential-design/v1`. One adapter covers credential designs, issuer designs, verifier
designs, render variants, imports, refreshes, resolution, source snapshots, and binary assets.

The full request and response schema for every operation is in the
[Credential Design API reference](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design). The
endpoints that list or find designs return a plain JSON array rather than a paginated page.

## Credential designs

A credential design holds the bindings a credential is matched by, its localized displays, the claim
presentation (labels, ordering, selective disclosure policy), and the render variants it points at.
Bindings are the protocol identifiers a credential is keyed on, set as an object rather than a
key/value pair:

```json
{
  "bindings": [
    { "vct": "https://issuer.example.com/identity", "credentialConfigurationId": "IdentityCredential" }
  ]
}
```

Each claim is addressed by a `path`, a list of polymorphic segments discriminated by `type`
(`property`, `index`, or `any`). The path to `given_name` is `[{ "type": "property", "name":
"given_name" }]`. `sdPolicy` is `ALWAYS`, `ALLOWED`, or `NEVER`; `valueKind` and `widgetHint` drive
form rendering. The full field set is in the API reference.

### Create a credential design

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createCredentialDesign"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials"
  commandId="credential-design.designs.create"
  argsType="CreateCredentialDesignArgs"
  resultType="CredentialDesignRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Creates a credential design in the caller's tenant from its bindings, displays, and claims. Returns
the stored `CredentialDesignRecord` with the server-assigned `id`, `tenantId`, and timestamps. Fails
with `409` when a binding already maps to a design.

</ApiCapability>

### List credential designs

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listCredentialDesigns"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials"
  commandId="credential-design.designs.list"
  argsType="ListDesignsArgs"
  resultType="List<CredentialDesignRecord>"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Returns every credential design in the tenant matching the optional query filters: `entityType`,
`hostingMode`, `bindingKey` + `bindingValue`, `aliasContains`, and `sourceType`. Unknown enum values
are ignored. The response is a plain array.

</ApiCapability>

### Find credential designs by binding

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="findCredentialDesignsByBindingKey"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials/bindings/{bindingKey}/{bindingValue}"
  commandId="credential-design.designs.find-by-binding-key"
  argsType="FindByBindingKeyArgs"
  resultType="List<CredentialDesignRecord>"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Finds the credential designs whose binding has a given value for one dimension, for example all
designs bound to a `VCT`. The companion `POST /designs/credentials/find/binding` matches against a
full binding object instead.

</ApiCapability>

### Import a credential design

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="importCredentialDesign"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials/import"
  commandId="credential-design.external.credential-import"
  argsType="ImportExternalDesignArgs"
  resultType="CredentialDesignRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Imports a design from an external source. The server fetches `sourceUrl` through an SSRF-protected
fetcher, stores a source snapshot, runs the mapper for the declared `sourceType` (one of
the `DesignSourceType` values, for example `OID4VCI_CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION`, `SD_JWT_VCT_METADATA`,
or `OCA_BUNDLE`), and persists the canonical design with `hostingMode` set to `CACHED_EXTERNAL`.

</ApiCapability>

### Resolve a credential design

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="resolveCredentialDesign"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials/resolve"
  commandId="credential-design.resolution.credential-resolve"
  argsType="ResolveCredentialDesignArgs"
  resultType="ResolvedCredentialDesign"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Resolves a design into its merged form: the design combined with its issuer and verifier designs,
the matching render variants, derived render hints, the ordered list of applied source layers, the
fields locked by authoritative layers, and an ETag for caching. Select the design by `designId`, a
full `binding`, or a `bindingKey` + `bindingValue` pair. Pass external material inline through
`externalMetadata` (for example an `ocaBundle`) to fold it into the result without importing first.

</ApiCapability>

### Get a credential design

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="getCredentialDesign"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials/{designId}"
  commandId="credential-design.designs.get"
  argsType="GetCredentialDesignArgs"
  resultType="CredentialDesignRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Returns one credential design exactly as stored. To get the merged result with everything that
contributes to it, use the resolve endpoint instead.

</ApiCapability>

### Update a credential design

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="updateCredentialDesign"
  method="PUT"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials/{designId}"
  commandId="credential-design.designs.update"
  argsType="UpdateCredentialDesignArgs"
  resultType="CredentialDesignRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Updates a credential design. Every field on the body is optional; omitted fields are left unchanged.

</ApiCapability>

### Delete a credential design

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="deleteCredentialDesign"
  method="DELETE"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials/{designId}"
  commandId="credential-design.designs.delete"
  argsType="DeleteDesignArgs"
  resultType="Boolean"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Deletes a credential design, returning `true` when a design was removed.

</ApiCapability>

### Refresh an imported design

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="refreshCredentialDesign"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials/{designId}/refresh"
  commandId="credential-design.external.credential-refresh"
  argsType="RefreshDesignArgs"
  resultType="CredentialDesignRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Re-fetches an imported design from its source and re-applies the mapper, using the snapshot's ETag
for a conditional request. Returns the updated design.

</ApiCapability>

## Issuer and verifier designs

Issuer and verifier designs describe how the issuing or verifying party presents itself, matched by
issuer or verifier identity bindings (`issuerDid`, `issuerUri`, `verifierClientId`). Their endpoints
mirror the credential design set exactly under `/designs/issuers` and `/designs/verifiers`: create,
list, find by binding, find by binding key, import, resolve, get, update, delete, and refresh. The
request and response bodies are the same shape with the issuer or verifier record type, and the
command ids follow the `credential-design.issuers.*` and `credential-design.verifiers.*` namespaces.
A credential design links the issuer design it is issued under through `issuerDesignId`.

### Create an issuer design

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createIssuerDesign"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/issuers"
  commandId="credential-design.issuers.create"
  argsType="CreateIssuerDesignArgs"
  resultType="IssuerDesignRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Creates an issuer design. The verifier equivalent is `POST /designs/verifiers`
(`credential-design.verifiers.create`), with the same body shape.

</ApiCapability>

### Resolve an issuer design

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="resolveIssuerDesign"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/issuers/resolve"
  commandId="credential-design.resolution.issuer-resolve"
  argsType="ResolveIssuerDesignArgs"
  resultType="ResolvedIssuerDesign"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Resolves an issuer design selected by id or binding into its merged form with render variants,
applied layers, and locked fields. The verifier equivalent is `POST /designs/verifiers/resolve`
(`credential-design.resolution.verifier-resolve`).

</ApiCapability>

## Render variants

A render variant is a reusable rendering technique that designs point at: a simple card (colors plus
a logo and background image), an SVG template, a W3C VC `renderMethod` reference, a PDF template, or
an external reference. The `kind` field selects which, and the relevant fields are populated for that
kind.

### Create a render variant

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="createRenderVariant"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/render/variants"
  commandId="credential-design.render-variants.create"
  argsType="CreateRenderVariantArgs"
  resultType="RenderVariantRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Creates a render variant. A design references it by id in `renderVariantIds`, and resolution returns
the full variant records.

</ApiCapability>

### List render variants

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="listRenderVariants"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/render/variants"
  commandId="credential-design.render-variants.list"
  argsType="ListRenderVariantsArgs"
  resultType="List<RenderVariantRecord>"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Lists the render variants in the tenant. Get, update, and delete a single variant by id at
`/designs/render/variants/{variantId}` (`credential-design.render-variants.get` / `.update` /
`.delete`).

</ApiCapability>

## Source snapshots

When a design is imported, the raw fetched payload is stored as a source snapshot, retained so the
design can be refreshed and audited. A snapshot carries the source type and URL, the ETag and
integrity digest used for conditional refresh, and a reference to the stored bytes.

### Get a source snapshot

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="getSourceSnapshot"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/snapshots/{snapshotId}"
  commandId="credential-design.snapshots.get"
  argsType="GetSourceSnapshotArgs"
  resultType="SourceSnapshotRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Returns the metadata and stored payload reference for one snapshot.

</ApiCapability>

### Refresh a source snapshot

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="refreshSourceSnapshot"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/snapshots/{snapshotId}/refresh"
  commandId="credential-design.external.snapshot-refresh"
  argsType="RefreshSourceSnapshotArgs"
  resultType="SourceSnapshotRecord"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Re-fetches the snapshot's source, using its stored ETag for a conditional request, and returns the
updated snapshot.

</ApiCapability>

## Design assets

Branding assets (logo, background image, SVG template, PDF template) are stored and served as raw
bytes, addressed by design id, locale, and asset type. `{locale}` is a BCP-47 tag (`en`, `nl`,
`en-GB`); `{assetType}` is one of `LOGO`, `BACKGROUND_IMAGE`, `SVG_TEMPLATE`, or `PDF_TEMPLATE`.
Upload sends the bytes with the asset's MIME type in the request `Content-Type` header and returns an
`AssetReference`; download returns the bytes with the stored `Content-Type`.

### Upload a design asset

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="uploadDesignAsset"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials/{designId}/assets/{locale}/{assetType}"
  commandId="credential-design.assets.upload"
  argsType="UploadDesignAssetArgs"
  resultType="AssetReference"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Uploads a branding asset as `application/octet-stream`. The design id, locale, and asset type come
from the path; the content type comes from the request header. Returns a reference to the stored
asset.

</ApiCapability>

### Download a design asset

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="credential-design-openapi.yml"
  operationId="getDesignAsset"
  method="GET"
  path="/api/credential-design/v1/designs/credentials/{designId}/assets/{locale}/{assetType}"
  commandId="credential-design.assets.get"
  argsType="GetDesignAssetArgs"
  resultType="ResolvedDesignAsset"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design">

Downloads a stored asset as raw bytes, with the `Content-Type` it was stored as (for example
`image/png`, `image/svg+xml`, or `application/pdf`).

</ApiCapability>

The wire shape of every request and response, including all model fields and their types, is in the
[Credential Design API reference](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design).

---

# Versioning

# Versioning

The EDK credential design store has explicit version-snapshot operations on top of the IDK CRUD interface. They are useful when you need a permanent record of what a design looked like at a particular moment ("this is the version approved for production on 2026-05-01"), or when you want to be able to recover an earlier state after a regrettable edit. They are not a change log: ordinary `createCredentialDesign`, `updateCredentialDesign`, and import/refresh operations **do not produce versions automatically**. You decide when a snapshot is meaningful and call `createDesignVersion` for it.

Read this page if you are building tooling that needs to operate on the version history (an admin UI with a "save as version" button, a CI step that snapshots after a promotion, an audit report). If you only consume designs at runtime, you can ignore this layer: `getCredentialDesign` and `resolveCredentialDesign` always return the current live state and never look at the version history.

## What a Version Is

A version is an immutable JSON snapshot of one `CredentialDesignRecord` at the moment `createDesignVersion` is called. Snapshots are stored in a generic `config_version` table that the EDK uses for all versioned configuration types (design, DCQL, others); the per-design active-version pointer is stored separately in `design_current_version`. The metadata you get back is:

```kotlin
data class DesignVersion(
    val designId: Uuid,
    val tenantId: String,
    val version: Int,        // monotonically increasing per (tenantId, designId), starting at 1
    val isLatest: Boolean,   // true for the version the current-version pointer references
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val createdBy: String?,  // session principal at snapshot time
)
```

`CreateDesignVersionInput` carries an optional `description`. It is recorded with the audit event for the snapshot operation; it is not stored on the version row itself, so do not rely on it as the audit trail.

## What `createDesignVersion` Actually Does

It reads the current row from the credential repository and serialises it to the `config_version` table. That is the entire operation. From the implementation:

```kotlin
override suspend fun createDesignVersion(
    tenantId: String, designId: Uuid, input: CreateDesignVersionInput,
): IdkResult<DesignVersion, IdkError> {
    val design = credentialRepo.findById(tenantId, designId)
        ?: return Err(IdkError.NOT_FOUND_ERROR(...))
    val contentJson = json.encodeToString(CredentialDesignRecord.serializer(), design)
    val row = configVersionRepo.appendVersion(
        tenantId = tenantId, domain = DOMAIN,
        ownerKey = designId.toString(),
        contentJson = contentJson, createdBy = execution.principalId,
    )
    currentVersionRepo.setCurrentVersion(tenantId, designId, row.version)
    return Ok(DesignVersion(... isLatest = true ...))
}
```

The newly written version automatically becomes the current version. The live design row is untouched: snapshotting does not modify what `getCredentialDesign` returns.

Implication: if you edit a design (via `updateCredentialDesign`, `importExternalDesign`, or `refreshCredentialDesign`) after taking a snapshot, the snapshot still reflects the pre-edit state. If you want a new snapshot of the post-edit state, you must call `createDesignVersion` again.

## How the Current-Version Pointer Is Used

The current-version pointer is a label. It marks one version as "the latest" for display in `listDesignVersions`. It is **not** consulted by `getCredentialDesign`, `findCredentialDesignByBinding`, `resolveCredentialDesign`, or any other read path. The live design content always comes from the live row in the credential repository; the pointer never reroutes reads.

This matters if you are designing a workflow around versions. "Roll back to version 3" cannot be done by repointing alone; see [Rollback](#rollback) below.

## Reading the History

`listDesignVersions` returns the version metadata for one design, with `isLatest` set on whichever row the pointer references:

```kotlin
val versions: List<DesignVersion> = service
    .listDesignVersions(tenantId, designId)
    .getOrElse { return }
for (v in versions) {
    val marker = if (v.isLatest) " (current pointer)" else ""
    println("v${v.version} by ${v.createdBy ?: "system"} at ${v.createdAt}$marker")
}
```

`getDesignVersionContent` returns the full snapshot for one version, deserialised into a `CredentialDesignRecord`:

```kotlin
val snapshot: CredentialDesignRecord = service
    .getDesignVersionContent(tenantId, designId, version = 3)
    .getOrElse { return }
```

The snapshot is the same record type as a live read, so anything that consumes a current design (rendering, the resolution engine, OID4VCI metadata generation) can also consume a historical snapshot.

## What `setLatestDesignVersion` Does

It updates only the current-version pointer. The live design row is untouched, and (as above) ordinary reads do not consult the pointer. Use it to label a different version as "current" for the purposes of `listDesignVersions` display and any tooling you build that filters on `isLatest`. Do not use it expecting the live design to change.

```kotlin
service.setLatestDesignVersion(tenantId, designId, version = 4)
// `listDesignVersions` now flags v4 as isLatest = true.
// `getCredentialDesign` still returns whatever the live row says.
```

If your operator UI needs "click here to make this version live", that UI must do two things, in this order: read the content with `getDesignVersionContent`, then apply it with `updateCredentialDesign` (covered below).

## Rollback

To actually restore an earlier state into the live design, read the snapshot and write it back through the regular update path:

```kotlin
suspend fun rollback(
    service: VersionedCredentialDesignService,
    tenantId: String,
    designId: Uuid,
    version: Int,
): IdkResult<CredentialDesignRecord, IdkError> {
    val snapshot = service
        .getDesignVersionContent(tenantId, designId, version)
        .getOrElse { return Err(it) }

    val updateInput = UpdateCredentialDesignInput(
        alias = snapshot.alias,
        bindings = snapshot.bindings,
        credentialTemplateId = snapshot.credentialTemplateId,
        issuerDesignId = snapshot.issuerDesignId,
        displays = snapshot.displays,
        claims = snapshot.claims,
        renderVariantIds = snapshot.renderVariantIds,
        hostingMode = snapshot.hostingMode,
    )
    return service.updateCredentialDesign(tenantId, designId, updateInput)
}
```

After this, you almost certainly want to call `createDesignVersion(designId, ...)` so the rollback action itself is recorded as a fresh version. That gives you a clean trail: "v3 was the live design. v4 was an edit. v5 is a rollback to v3's content." If you skip the snapshot, the rollback is invisible in the version history (only the live row's `updatedAt` changes).

Render variants and assets are referenced by id from `renderVariantIds`. The snapshot preserves those ids, but the variants themselves are separate records that are *not* part of the credential design's version history. If you have also deleted or changed a render variant since the snapshot was taken, a rollback restores the id list but the referenced variants may no longer exist or may have different content. Treat render variants as long-lived shared resources rather than per-version data.

## When to Take a Snapshot

There is no general right answer; pattern by what your operations team needs to be able to prove or recover. Common triggers:

- After importing a design from an external source (`importExternalDesign`, `refreshCredentialDesign`). The snapshot captures the imported state so a later upstream change can be compared.
- Before a risky edit (a binding change, a claim removal, a render variant swap) where you want a guaranteed restore point.
- At a compliance checkpoint ("approved by the compliance review on 2026-05-01"). The `description` field on `CreateDesignVersionInput` is the right place for that text.
- After a promotion from staging to production (in CI, immediately after `updateCredentialDesign` lands the staged content).

There is no garbage collection of old versions. The history grows monotonically per design.

## Audit Trail

`DesignVersion.createdBy` is the session principal at snapshot time; `createdAt` is the snapshot timestamp. The standard EDK [audit](/edk/guides/audit/overview) pipeline also records the `credential-design.versions.*` command executions with the actor, tenant, correlation id, and trace id, so for a compliance investigation you can correlate the version row with the originating audit event. Edits between snapshots leave `updatedAt` on the live row and a normal audit event for the `updateCredentialDesign` command, but no version row of their own.

---

# Persistence & Offline Cache

# Persistence and Offline Cache

The EDK has two unrelated storage stories for credential designs and they solve different problems. The **server-side persistence** modules back the design service with PostgreSQL or MySQL, so a multi-tenant service can store designs durably and read them with normal database semantics. The **client-side cache** wrapper sits in front of a remote design service and keeps a local copy of what has been read, so a wallet or verifier UI can keep rendering credentials when the network is unreachable. Most services need one or the other, not both.

## Server-Side Persistence

Pick one of the persistence modules and add it to your service alongside `lib-data-store-credential-design-impl`. The repository implementations are bound through Metro DI and the rest of the EDK does not need to know which dialect is in use.

| Module | Backend |
|--------|---------|
| `lib-data-store-credential-design-persistence-postgresql` | PostgreSQL via SQLDelight |
| `lib-data-store-credential-design-persistence-mysql` | MySQL via SQLDelight |

Inside the chosen module you get implementations of every repository the design service depends on:

- `CredentialDesignRepository`, `IssuerDesignRepository`, `VerifierDesignRepository` for the three entity types
- `RenderVariantRepository` for render variants
- `DerivedRenderHintsRepository` for hints produced by the OCA mapper and other deriving sources
- `SourceSnapshotRepository` for the raw payloads cached when a design is imported from an external source
- `DesignCurrentVersionRepository` for the per-design current-version pointer described in [Versioning](./versioning)

Both backends share the same SQLDelight schema with dialect-specific tweaks for JSON column types (PostgreSQL uses `JSONB`, MySQL uses `JSON`). The repository APIs are identical, so a service can move between dialects without code changes; only the dependency on the matching `-persistence-{dialect}` module changes.

The schema for one design row is a small set of indexed top-level columns (`id`, `tenant_id`, `alias`, `hosting_mode`, `created_at`, `updated_at`) plus a JSON column for the polymorphic parts (bindings, displays, claims, render variant ids). Lookups by binding key go through generated indexes; lookups inside claim arrays are not indexed and are done at the JSON level.

### Tenant Isolation

Every repository method takes `tenantId` and filters by it at the SQL level. The IDK service interface takes `tenantId` as a method argument, so it stays explicit through to the database. In a multi-tenant deployment, the EDK [database routing](/edk/guides/database/routing) layer can route per-tenant requests to per-tenant databases or schemas; the credential design store does not have its own routing and relies on the shared platform mechanism.

### Imports and Source Snapshots

When you call `importExternalDesign`, the service fetches the source URL through the SSRF-protected `DesignExternalFetcher`, stores the raw response as a `SourceSnapshotRecord`, runs the matching format mapper, and writes the resulting `CredentialDesignRecord`. The snapshot row keeps the body and any `ETag`/`Last-Modified` headers; `refreshCredentialDesign` uses them for conditional re-fetches, so unchanged sources do not redownload.

The snapshot is the audit answer for "what did the upstream metadata actually look like when this design was last imported?" Snapshot rows are kept until the design is deleted; there is no time-based cleanup.

### Wiring Checklist

```
1. Add the EDK base module:           lib-data-store-credential-design-impl
2. Add one persistence module:        lib-data-store-credential-design-persistence-postgresql
                                      or lib-data-store-credential-design-persistence-mysql
3. Configure your DataSource          (standard EDK pattern, see /edk/guides/persistence/...)
4. (Optional) REST adapter:           lib-data-store-credential-design-rest-vdx
                                      (registers CredentialDesignHttpAdapter at /api/v1/designs)
```

The Metro `replaces` mechanism swaps the IDK in-memory `DefaultCredentialDesignService` binding for the EDK `DefaultVersionedCredentialDesignService` binding automatically, with no explicit unbinding or wiring code.

## Offline Cache

The cache wrapper solves a narrow problem: **a client process needs to keep returning credential designs when the call to the design service fails.** Typical case is a mobile wallet or a verifier UI rendering a credential while the network is down. It is not a performance cache; it does not save round-trips on the happy path.

### Behaviour

`CachingCredentialDesignService` wraps two collaborators: a remote `CredentialDesignService` (usually the routed-command client that talks to the design service over HTTP RPC) and a local `BlobService` (filesystem, SQLite-backed, in-memory). It implements the same `CredentialDesignService` interface, so consumers do not see the difference.

For reads of an individual entity (`getCredentialDesign`, `getIssuerDesign`, `getVerifierDesign`, `getRenderVariant`, asset get, snapshot get), the order is:

1. Call the remote.
2. **If remote succeeds**: write the result to the local blob store as a side effect, return the remote result. The cache is updated; the remote answer wins.
3. **If remote fails**: look up the local blob store. If a cached entry exists, return it. If not, return the remote failure.

For listing (`listCredentialDesigns`, `findCredentialDesignByBinding`, `findCredentialDesignByBindingKey`, `listRenderVariants`), there is **no caching and no fallback**. The remote is the only source. The list operations are pass-through. This is intentional: caching a list is meaningless when the list itself can change between calls and the cache cannot know.

For writes (`create*`, `update*`, `import*`, `refresh*`, asset upload), the order is: call the remote; on success, update the cache; return the remote result. The cache is consistent with the last successful write the client made through this wrapper, not with arbitrary changes that other clients may have applied to the remote.

For deletes, the same pattern: delete on the remote, then invalidate the cached entry on success.

### What the Cache Cannot Do

- It cannot serve a `findCredentialDesignByBindingKey` lookup when the remote is down, because that operation is not cached. A wallet that wants to render a credential by its `VCT` should first do the lookup while the network is up and remember the design id, then use `getCredentialDesign(id)` when offline. Calling `resolveCredentialDesign` while offline likewise fails (it is not a cached read path).
- It cannot detect remote-side changes. A design that another client updated will not be reflected in the cache until this client makes a read against the remote successfully. There is no background invalidation.
- It does not have a TTL. A cached entry stays until the next successful write through this wrapper or an explicit invalidation through the underlying blob store.

### Wiring

```kotlin
val remote: CredentialDesignService = /* routed-command client to the design service */
val localBlobs: BlobService = /* FileSystemBlobService, SqliteBlobService, ... */

val designService: CredentialDesignService = CachingCredentialDesignService(
    remote = remote,
    localBlobService = localBlobs,
)
```

Inject the wrapper as your `CredentialDesignService` and consumers (renderers, OID4VCI clients, anything that holds the IDK interface) read through it transparently.

### Sync Helper

`CredentialDesignSyncService.syncAll(tenantId, filter)` is a companion that pulls every design matching the filter from the remote and routes each one through the caching wrapper's `getCredentialDesign(id)`. The effect is that every design in the filtered set is in the local blob store afterwards. Call this at app startup or before going offline to pre-warm the cache.

```kotlin
val syncService = CredentialDesignSyncService(
    remote = remote,
    cachingService = designService as CachingCredentialDesignService,
)
val synced = syncService.syncAll(tenantId).getOrElse { return }
// `synced` is the list of designs that were fetched. After this call, getCredentialDesign(id)
// for any of these ids will succeed even if the network later goes down.
```

The sync calls the remote for each design id; it does not currently do server-side delta detection. If you are syncing thousands of designs you will pay for one round-trip each.

### Blob Storage Options

`BlobService` is the IDK abstraction. Pick the implementation that matches your platform:

| BlobService | Use case |
|------------|----------|
| `InMemoryBlobService` | Tests, short-lived process caches |
| `FileSystemBlobService` | Desktop apps, server-side temporary caches |
| `SqliteBlobService` | Mobile wallets where the cache must survive restarts |

The cache wrapper treats the blob store as opaque: it serialises each record to JSON, writes it under a path derived from `(tenantId, entityType, id)`, and reads it back the same way. Any custom `BlobService` implementation works.

## When You Need Both

A multi-tenant EDK service that hosts the design registry uses the server-side persistence. A wallet that talks to that service uses the offline cache in front of a routed-command client. The two ends of the same architecture: the cache is on the consuming side, the persistence is on the serving side, and the wire format between them is the routed `CredentialDesignService` interface.

A single process almost never needs both. If your service has direct database access through the persistence modules, do not put the cache in front of it; the cache is meant for callers that are at least one network hop away from the database.

---

# Bundle Service

# Bundle Service

The `OcaBundleService` is the entry point for working with OCA bundles in the EDK. It coordinates three things: parsing raw OCA JSON into a structured `ParsedOcaBundle`, processing the parsed form to flatten every overlay into a single typed `OcaProcessedBundle`, and verifying the bundle's SAID integrity. The interface is intentionally small; the heavy lifting happens in the dedicated parser and processor classes.

```kotlin
interface OcaBundleService {
    fun parseBundle(bundleJson: JsonObject): ParsedOcaBundle
    fun processBundle(bundle: ParsedOcaBundle): OcaProcessedBundle
    fun parseAndProcess(bundleJson: JsonObject): OcaProcessedBundle
    fun verifySaid(bundle: ParsedOcaBundle): Boolean
}
```

The default implementation, `DefaultOcaBundleService`, lives in `lib-data-oca-impl` and is wired through Metro at session scope. Code that needs to consume OCA bundles injects the interface and gets the default; tests can substitute their own implementation as needed.

Bundles also drive OID4VCI attribute provisioning — see [Compact attribute provisioning](../oid4vci/rest-api.mdx#push-attributes).

## Parsing

Parsing turns the raw bundle JSON into a `ParsedOcaBundle`:

```kotlin
data class ParsedOcaBundle(
    val bundleSaid: String,
    val captureBaseSaid: String,
    val ocaVersion: String,
    val attributes: Map<String, String>,
    val overlays: List<ParsedOcaOverlay>,
    val rawJson: JsonObject,
)

data class ParsedOcaOverlay(
    val type: String,
    val language: String?,
    val said: String,
    val captureBaseSaid: String,
    val payload: JsonObject,
)
```

The parser reads the bundle SAID (`d` or `digest`), the capture base, and every overlay. It accepts both the v1 array layout and the v2 object layout for `overlays`, and it accepts both `d` and `digest` as the SAID field name on individual elements. Unknown fields are preserved in the original `rawJson` so writers and round-trippers do not lose information.

```kotlin
val parsed = ocaService.parseBundle(bundleJson)

println("Bundle SAID: ${parsed.bundleSaid}")
println("Capture Base SAID: ${parsed.captureBaseSaid}")
println("OCA Version: ${parsed.ocaVersion}")
parsed.attributes.forEach { (name, type) ->
    println("  $name: $type")
}
parsed.overlays.forEach { overlay ->
    println("Overlay: ${overlay.type}, language: ${overlay.language ?: "(global)"}")
}
```

A `ParsedOcaBundle` is the right type to keep around if you need the original overlay structure (for example, to display the bundle's overlay layout in an admin UI, or to feed it into the native persistence service unchanged). For consumers that just want the flattened metadata, the next step is processing.

## Processing

Processing walks the parsed overlays and produces a single typed result:

```kotlin
data class OcaProcessedBundle(
    val captureBaseSaid: String,
    val bundleSaid: String,
    val ocaVersion: String,
    val attributes: Map<String, String>,
    val characterEncodings: Map<String, String>,
    val formatPatterns: Map<String, String>,
    val standards: Map<String, String>,
    val mandatoryAttributes: Set<String>,
    val cardinalities: Map<String, String>,
    val entryCodes: Map<String, List<String>>,
    val units: Map<String, String>,
    val sensitiveAttributes: Set<String>,
    val metaDisplays: Map<String, OcaMetaDisplay>,
    val labels: Map<String, Map<String, String>>,
    val descriptions: Map<String, Map<String, String>>,
    val entryValues: Map<String, Map<String, Map<String, String>>>,
    val groups: Map<String, String>,
)
```

Most fields are keyed by attribute name. The ones that depend on locale (`labels`, `descriptions`, `entryValues`, `metaDisplays`) carry the locale as the inner key.

```kotlin
val processed = ocaService.processBundle(parsed)

processed.metaDisplays.forEach { (locale, display) ->
    println("[$locale] ${display.name}: ${display.description ?: ""}")
}

processed.labels.forEach { (attribute, perLocale) ->
    perLocale.forEach { (locale, label) ->
        println("  $attribute [$locale]: $label")
    }
}

println("Mandatory: ${processed.mandatoryAttributes}")
println("Sensitive: ${processed.sensitiveAttributes}")

processed.entryValues.forEach { (attribute, perLocale) ->
    perLocale.forEach { (locale, codeToDisplay) ->
        codeToDisplay.forEach { (code, display) ->
            println("  $attribute [$locale]: $code -> $display")
        }
    }
}
```

The `OcaOverlayProcessor` that backs `processBundle` is defensive about overlay shapes. When the conformance overlay uses the OCA v2 object form (`{"given_name": "M", "family_name": "O"}`) the result is the set of mandatory attribute names; when it uses the legacy array form (a plain list of mandatory attribute names) the result is the same set. The same kind of dual-shape handling applies to `entry_code`, `cardinality`, and `attribute_unit`. Wrongly shaped values do not throw; they are skipped, so a single malformed overlay does not break the entire processing run.

## Combined Parse-and-Process

`parseAndProcess` is the convenience method for the common case where you do not need the intermediate `ParsedOcaBundle`:

```kotlin
val processed = ocaService.parseAndProcess(bundleJson)
```

Use this when you are reading a bundle for display, validation, or conversion to credential design. Use the explicit two-step form when you need the parsed bundle for SAID verification, native persistence, or any flow that wants the original overlay structure.

## Cardinality Parsing

OCA cardinality strings are stored as strings in `OcaProcessedBundle.cardinalities` so the processor stays neutral. The static helper `OcaOverlayProcessor.parseCardinality` turns them into a structured `(min, max)` pair when consumers need numeric bounds:

| Input | Result |
|-------|--------|
| `"3"` | `(3, 3)` |
| `"1-5"` | `(1, 5)` |
| `"0-*"` | `(0, null)` |
| invalid | `null` |

The credential design mapper uses this helper to convert OCA cardinality into the design system's `ClaimCardinality` type; consumers can do the same when they need typed bounds.

## Field-Name Constants

The OCA v2 specification uses a small set of canonical JSON field names (`d`, `type`, `capture_base`, `overlays`, `attributes`, `attribute_labels`, `attribute_information`, `attribute_formats`, `attribute_conformance`, `attribute_entry_codes`, `attribute_entries`, `attribute_cardinality`, `attribute_unit`, `language`, `name`, `description`). The constants for those names are exposed as `OcaFieldNames`. Code that reads or writes OCA JSON should reference the constants rather than string literals so the wire format stays in sync with a single source of truth.

The OCA spec version constant (`OcaSpec.VERSION_2 = "2.0.0"`) is the default version written by builders and the fallback assumed by readers when no `type` version segment is present.

## Tips for Bundle Authors

When constructing OCA bundles programmatically (for example, in a credential issuance pipeline that emits an OCA companion bundle alongside every credential), the order is: build the capture base, compute its SAID, build each overlay with the capture base SAID pinned in `captureBaseSaid`, compute each overlay's SAID, then build the bundle wrapper with the capture base embedded and the overlay list filled in, and compute the bundle SAID last. The `OcaSaidVerifier.applySaid` helper takes care of the placeholder-then-recompute step at each level.

---

# SAID Verification

# SAID Verification

Every OCA object carries a Self-Addressing Identifier (SAID) under its `d` field. The SAID is a content-derived hash that lets any consumer verify that the object has not been altered since it was issued, without needing a separate signature or trust anchor. The EDK's `OcaSaidVerifier` provides three progressively strict verification levels: format, structural, and cryptographic.

A SAID begins with a one-character algorithm prefix (`E` for SHA-256, `F` for SHA-512, `G` for BLAKE3-256, `H` for BLAKE2b-256, `I` for BLAKE2s-256) followed by the Base64url-encoded hash. The total length depends on the algorithm. The hash itself is computed over the object's canonical JSON with the SAID field temporarily replaced by a placeholder of the same length, so two different objects whose only difference is the SAID value can be told apart by recomputing.

## Format Verification

The cheapest check looks only at the SAID string itself:

```kotlin
val ok = OcaSaidVerifier.isValidSaidFormat(said)
```

It verifies that the SAID starts with a known algorithm prefix, has the correct length for that algorithm, and contains only Base64url characters (A-Z, a-z, 0-9, `-`, `_`). It does not look at any content and cannot detect tampering. Use this when you only need to reject obviously malformed identifiers before doing more expensive work.

## Structural Verification

The next level checks that the bundle and its overlays are wired together correctly:

```kotlin
val ok = OcaSaidVerifier.verifyBundle(parsed)
```

Or, with detailed failure reasons:

```kotlin
val result = OcaSaidVerifier.verifyBundleDetailed(parsed)
if (!result.valid) {
    println("Bundle invalid: ${result.reason}")
}
```

Structural verification confirms that the bundle SAID and capture base SAID are present and formatted correctly, every overlay has a SAID, and every overlay's `captureBaseSaid` reference matches the bundle's capture base. This catches the common "we glued two unrelated bundles together" failure mode and the "this overlay was authored for a different capture base" failure mode without recomputing any hashes.

`OcaBundleService.verifySaid` is the same as `OcaSaidVerifier.verifyBundle`: it returns a boolean for the structural check. It is the default sanity check the EDK runs before importing an OCA bundle.

## Cryptographic Verification

The strictest level recomputes each SAID and compares it against the value embedded in the object:

```kotlin
val hasher: SaidHasher = SaidHasherImpl()  // SHA-256 implementation from lib-data-oca-impl
val result = OcaSaidVerifier.verifyBundleCryptographic(parsed, hasher)
if (!result.valid) {
    println("Cryptographic verification failed: ${result.reason}")
}
```

This catches any tampering with the content of any overlay, the capture base, or the bundle itself. The algorithm follows the OCA specification:

1. Replace the SAID field with `#` placeholder characters matching the Base64url output length of the hash algorithm (44 characters for SHA-256).
2. Compute the hash over the canonical (sorted-keys) JSON serialization.
3. Prepend the version byte `0x00`.
4. Encode as Base64 URL-safe without padding.
5. Replace the first character with the algorithm prefix (`E` for SHA-256).

`OcaSaidVerifier.verifyBundleCryptographic` runs the structural check first and then verifies each overlay's SAID, the capture base SAID, and the bundle-level SAID in turn. The first failure short-circuits and is reported with a human-readable reason.

## The SaidHasher Contract

The OCA public module does not carry a crypto dependency. Cryptographic verification requires the caller to supply a `SaidHasher` implementation:

```kotlin
fun interface SaidHasher {
    fun hash(input: ByteArray): ByteArray
}
```

The expected algorithm is implied by the SAID prefix being verified, so a `SaidHasher` that computes SHA-256 is sufficient for verifying any SAID with prefix `E`. The default implementation `SaidHasherImpl` in `lib-data-oca-impl` provides SHA-256 on every supported Kotlin Multiplatform target. Custom algorithms are supplied by injecting an alternative `SaidHasher`.

## Computing and Applying SAIDs

When constructing OCA objects programmatically, the writer pattern is:

```kotlin
// Build the object with a placeholder in `d`
val withPlaceholder = buildJsonObject {
    put("d", JsonPrimitive("#".repeat(44)))
    put("type", JsonPrimitive("spec/capture_base/2.0.0"))
    put("attributes", JsonObject(...))
}

// Recompute the SAID and write it into `d`
val finalised = OcaSaidVerifier.applySaid(withPlaceholder, hasher)
```

`applySaid` does the compute step (`computeSaid`) and the field-overwrite step in one call. The resulting object is structurally identical to the input, except the `d` field now holds a cryptographically valid SAID. For multi-level objects (bundles containing capture bases containing overlays), apply SAIDs from the innermost level outwards: overlays first, then the capture base, then the bundle.

## Choosing a Verification Level at Import Time

The EDK's design import flow uses structural verification by default: it is fast, it catches the obvious mistakes (mismatched capture base references, missing SAIDs), and it does not require a `SaidHasher` to be present in the DI graph for every consumer.

When you need stronger guarantees (importing bundles from an untrusted source, accepting bundles in a federation where any participant can publish), upgrade to cryptographic verification by injecting a `SaidHasher` and calling `verifyBundleCryptographic` explicitly before passing the parsed bundle to the design mapper. The cost is a SHA-256 over the canonical JSON of every object, which is negligible for any realistic bundle size.

Format verification is rarely useful on its own; it is a building block for the other levels and for input sanitisation in admin UIs that surface SAIDs as user-editable strings.

---

# Credential Design Integration

# Credential Design Integration

The EDK glues OCA into the credential design system through three components. The `OcaDesignMapper` converts a parsed OCA bundle into the canonical credential design model used by the IDK (claim presentations, displays, derived render hints). The `OcaBundleDesignProvider` plugs OCA into the IDK's design resolution pipeline as a layer provider, so calls to `resolveCredentialDesign` can fold OCA-derived metadata into the result alongside OID4VCI metadata, SD-JWT VCT, and local overrides. The `OcaNativePersistenceService` stores the original OCA records alongside the canonical design so the bundle remains round-trippable even after the design has been mapped, edited, and republished.

This page explains how the three components fit together and what each one is responsible for. The underlying credential design model (claim paths, value kinds, widget hints, render variants) is documented in the [IDK credential design guide](/idk/guides/credential-design/overview) and is not reshaped by the OCA integration; OCA is one of several sources that feed it.

## The Mapper

`OcaDesignMapper.toCanonical(bundle, bindings)` is the conversion entry point. It accepts a `ParsedOcaBundle` and a list of `DesignBinding`s and returns an `OcaCanonicalResult` containing:

- A `CredentialDesignRecord` with the bindings, locale-aware displays, and a `ClaimPresentation` per attribute, ordered as they appear in the capture base
- A `DerivedRenderHintsRecord` with per-field `FieldRenderHint` entries carrying the OCA-derived value kind, widget hint, character encoding, format pattern, standard reference, parsed cardinality, and sensitivity flag
- The same displays and claims as flat lists, in case the caller wants them directly

The mapper delegates the overlay walk to `OcaOverlayProcessor` (described in [Bundle Service](./bundle-service)), then maps the processed result onto the design model types. The translation is mechanical:

| OCA Concept | Canonical Mapping |
|-------------|-------------------|
| Attribute and its type | `ClaimPresentation` with `valueKind` from `OcaTypeMapping.valueKind` |
| Attribute with no entry codes | `widgetHint` from `OcaTypeMapping.defaultWidget` |
| Attribute with entry codes | `widgetHint = ClaimWidgetHint.PICKLIST` (overrides the default) |
| `label` overlay per locale | `ClaimLabel(locale, label)` added to the claim's `labels` |
| `information` overlay per locale | `ClaimLabel.description` for the matching locale |
| `entry` overlay per locale | `ClaimLabel.entryValues` for the matching locale |
| `conformance` mandatory flag | `ClaimPresentation.mandatory = true` |
| `cardinality` string | `ClaimCardinality(min, max)` via `parseCardinality` |
| `sensitive` overlay | `FieldRenderHint.sensitive = true` |
| `unit` overlay | `ClaimPresentation.unit` |
| `meta` overlay per locale | `LocalizedCredentialDisplay(locale, name, description)` |
| `format` overlay | `FieldRenderHint.formatHint` |
| `character_encoding` overlay | `FieldRenderHint.characterEncoding` |
| `standard` overlay | `FieldRenderHint.standard` |

The `bindings` parameter lets the caller decide how the resulting design should be matched to credentials at resolution time. When no bindings are provided the mapper falls back to a single OCA-SAID binding (`DesignBinding(ocaSaid = bundleCaptureBaseSaid)`), which makes the design match credentials referenced by their capture base SAID. In practice, callers usually pass an explicit binding such as a `CREDENTIAL_CONFIGURATION_ID` or `VCT` so the OCA-derived design slots into the same binding identifiers as designs from other inputs.

The mapper does not touch render variants; those are the responsibility of separate ingestion paths (SVG templates, W3C render method references, simple cards). An OCA bundle that wants to carry a render template should attach the template through a render variant in the credential design system, not through OCA itself.

## The Layer Provider

`OcaBundleDesignProvider` implements the IDK's `DesignLayerProvider` interface and registers itself with the design resolution engine. At resolve time, the provider looks for an OCA bundle in `ResolveCredentialDesignInput.externalMetadata.ocaBundle`, parses it, runs the SAID structural check, and runs the mapper to produce a `CredentialDesignLayerResult`. The layer result carries the displays, claims, and derived render hints contributed by OCA, plus a set of `providedFields` markers the engine uses to track which fields the OCA layer touched.

The provider's `sourceType` is `DesignSourceType.OCA_BUNDLE` and its `authoritative` flag is `false` by default, which means lower-priority providers can still contribute fields the OCA bundle did not cover, and higher-priority providers (notably `LOCAL_OVERRIDE`) win on conflict. If your deployment treats OCA as the canonical source for a particular credential type, set `authoritative = true` on a custom subclass and bind that instead; the engine will then field-lock everything the OCA layer contributes.

```kotlin
val resolved = designService.resolveCredentialDesign(
    tenantId = tenantId,
    input = ResolveCredentialDesignInput(
        bindingKey = DesignBindingKey.VCT,
        bindingValue = "https://issuer.example.com/identity",
        preferredLocales = listOf("en", "nl"),
        externalMetadata = ExternalDesignMetadata(
            ocaBundle = bundleJson,
        ),
    ),
)
```

When the provider returns a non-null layer, the resolution engine merges its contributions in priority order with everything else (schema inference, JSON-LD context, OID4VCI metadata, SD-JWT VCT, W3C render method, local override). The full priority list is in the [IDK resolution and import guide](/idk/guides/credential-design/resolution).

## Native Persistence

When an OCA bundle is imported through the design service, the canonical credential design produced by the mapper is what the IDK stores. The original OCA records are not kept by the design store itself. The EDK provides a parallel native persistence path so the original bundle and overlays can be retrieved unchanged later, for republication, for export, or just for audit.

`OcaNativePersistenceService.persistBundle(tenantId, bundle, designId, sourceSnapshotId)` writes an `OcaBundleRecord` for the bundle and an `OcaOverlayRecord` for each overlay, linked back to the corresponding `CredentialDesignRecord` via `designId` and to the original fetched payload via `sourceSnapshotId`. The records carry every overlay type and language present in the bundle, plus the original payload JSON, so the bundle can be reassembled byte-for-byte.

The two repository interfaces:

```kotlin
interface OcaBundleRepository {
    suspend fun findById(tenantId: String, id: Uuid): OcaBundleRecord?
    suspend fun findByBundleSaid(tenantId: String, bundleSaid: String): OcaBundleRecord?
    suspend fun findByDesignId(tenantId: String, designId: Uuid): List<OcaBundleRecord>
    suspend fun create(record: OcaBundleRecord): OcaBundleRecord
    suspend fun delete(tenantId: String, id: Uuid): Boolean
}

interface OcaOverlayRepository {
    suspend fun findById(tenantId: String, id: Uuid): OcaOverlayRecord?
    suspend fun findByBundleId(tenantId: String, bundleId: Uuid): List<OcaOverlayRecord>
    suspend fun create(record: OcaOverlayRecord): OcaOverlayRecord
    suspend fun delete(tenantId: String, id: Uuid): Boolean
}
```

The dialect-specific implementations follow the same `Postgres*Repository` / `Mysql*Repository` pattern as the rest of the credential design persistence layer (see [Persistence and Caching](../credential-design/persistence)). The records persist as native JSON for the overlay payloads with a small number of indexed top-level columns (`bundle_said`, `capture_base_said`, `design_id`, `tenant_id`) for efficient lookups.

Two additional record types exist for richer OCA workflows:

`OcaOverlayDefinitionRecord` describes a custom overlay schema. OCA supports user-defined overlay types beyond the core spec; this record stores the definition (namespace, name, version, unique-key fields, definition JSON) so an ecosystem can publish and reference its own overlays.

`OcaAuthoringArtifactRecord` describes the source files used to author a bundle (raw bundle JSON, capture base JSON, individual overlay JSON, OCAfile or overlay-file declarations). The `kind` enum (`BUNDLE_JSON`, `CAPTURE_BASE_JSON`, `OVERLAY_JSON`, `OCAFILE`, `OVERLAYFILE`) drives interpretation. The actual content is stored in the blob store under `contentBlobPath`; the record carries the metadata and links back to the design and source snapshot.

Both additional record types have their own repositories with the same dialect-specific implementations.

## End-to-End Import Flow

The typical OCA import looks like this:

1. The client calls `importCredentialDesign` (or the OCA-specific import variant) with the source URL or raw bundle.
2. The design service fetches the bundle through the `DesignExternalFetcher`, which enforces SSRF protection and size limits.
3. The fetched content is stored as a `SourceSnapshotRecord`, producing `sourceSnapshotId`.
4. The bundle is parsed and the SAID is structurally verified.
5. The mapper produces a canonical `CredentialDesignRecord` and `DerivedRenderHintsRecord`.
6. The design service persists those records and creates a `DesignVersion` (see [Versioning](../credential-design/versioning)).
7. The `OcaNativePersistenceService` writes the native `OcaBundleRecord` and `OcaOverlayRecord`s, linked to the new `designId` and `sourceSnapshotId`.

After import, two consumers can read the design:
- The IDK design service returns the canonical `CredentialDesignRecord` from `getCredentialDesign` (or any resolution call).
- The OCA repositories return the native `OcaBundleRecord` and overlays from `findByDesignId`, which can be reassembled into the original bundle JSON for export or republication.

If the bundle is later refreshed because the external source changed, a new `SourceSnapshotRecord` is stored, the mapper runs again, a new `DesignVersion` is committed, and a new set of native OCA records is written. The historical OCA records remain queryable through the version-aware repository methods.

## Driving Attribute Provisioning from a Bundle

The EDK OID4VCI attribute-contribution endpoint accepts an OCA bundle id directly in its compact request body. Inside each contribution group, a `semanticAttributeSets` entry carries a `bundleId` (and an optional `version`) plus a `values` map of `term -> JSON value`. The decoder resolves the bundle through the `SemanticAttributeSetService`, indexes the resulting `SemanticAttributeDefinition`s by attribute term, and for each `term` derives the wire-side fields the integrator would otherwise have to spell out:

- `path` (the JSON Pointer the attribute lands at in the session bag)
- `valueKind` (how the JSON value is wrapped as an `AttributeValue`)
- `dataClassification` (e.g. PII, sensitive PII)
- `legalBasis` (GDPR Art. 6 lawful basis, jurisdiction-specific values supported)
- `retentionPolicy` (ephemeral, session, or retained with `retentionDays` and friends)
- `sensitive` (drives masking and PII-handling pathways)
- `sdPolicy` (selective-disclosure policy at credential-assembly time)

The same `semanticAttributeSets[i].bundleId` field is accepted by `POST /api/v1/oid4vci/offers` under `preSeededGroups[i].semanticAttributeSets[i].bundleId`, so an integrator can seed attributes at offer creation time using exactly the same notation.

A typical contribution becomes a small JSON payload that names the bundle and lists term-value pairs:

```json
{
  "groups": [
    {
      "contributorId": "hr-backend",
      "phase": "oid4vci_credential_request",
      "semanticAttributeSets": [
        {
          "bundleId": "eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1",
          "values": {
            "given_name":  "Alice",
            "family_name": "Smith",
            "birth_date":  "1990-04-01"
          }
        }
      ]
    }
  ]
}
```

The server-side resolver call goes through `SemanticAttributeSetService.getAttributeSetByName(bundleId, version)`. When `version` is omitted, the service returns the tenant's pinned active bundle version (falling back to the highest available version), so tenants pinned to an earlier bundle get deterministic resolution rather than silent drift. Unknown terms short-circuit the entire request with a single `400` response listing every unresolved item across all sets; the session is never partially updated.

Per-attribute overrides (retention, priority, assurance, verified, contributorDetail, sdPolicy) remain available through the `semanticAttributeSets[i].attributes[]` form, with the precedence per-item > set-level > group-level > semantic-derived > default. The wire shape and the precedence rules are documented in the [OID4VCI REST API](../oid4vci/rest-api.mdx#push-attributes).

## When to Pass OCA Inline vs. Import It

Two distinct flows use OCA bundles, and they call into different parts of the integration:

**Inline resolution.** A wallet has a credential and an OCA bundle that came with it (for example, attached to an OID4VCI offer or fetched on the side from a published location). The wallet calls `resolveCredentialDesign` with the bundle in `externalMetadata.ocaBundle`. The layer provider parses, maps, and contributes claims and displays for this single call, but nothing is persisted. The OCA bundle is treated as transient data.

**Registry import.** An issuer admin uploads or references an OCA bundle that should become a long-lived credential design in the registry. The bundle goes through the full import flow above: it is fetched, snapshotted, parsed, verified, mapped, persisted as a design, persisted natively as OCA records, and versioned. Subsequent resolution calls find the canonical design through its bindings and do not need to pass the OCA bundle again.

The inline path is what mobile wallets and one-off rendering use. The registry path is what issuer onboarding and verifier-side credential type catalogs use.

---

# eIDAS Signature Client

# eIDAS Signature Client

The eIDAS signature client provides a command-based API for signing, validating, and timestamping documents. The client integrates with the IDK's key management system for automatic key resolution.

## Commands

| Command | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| `SignDocumentCommand` | Sign a document in one step |
| `CreateDigestCommand` | Create digest for remote signing (step 1) |
| `CompleteSignatureCommand` | Complete remote signature (step 2) |
| `ValidateSignatureCommand` | Validate existing signatures |
| `TimestampCommand` | Request RFC 3161 timestamps |

## SignDocumentCommand

Signs a document using a key from the configured KMS provider.

### Arguments

```kotlin
data class SignDocumentArgs(
    val input: SignInput,
    val keyInfo: KeyInfoType<*>,
    val signatureLevel: SignatureLevel,
    val signaturePackaging: SignaturePackaging = SignaturePackaging.ENVELOPED,
    val parameters: SignatureParameters? = null,
    val timestampParameters: TimestampParameters? = null
)
```

### SignInput

Factory methods for creating input documents:

```kotlin
// PDF document
val pdfInput = SignInput.pdf(pdfBytes)

// XML document
val xmlInput = SignInput.xml(xmlBytes)

// JSON document
val jsonInput = SignInput.json(jsonBytes)

// Binary data
val binaryInput = SignInput.binary(dataBytes)

// Pre-computed digest (for special cases)
val digestInput = SignInput.digest(hashBytes)

// Custom MIME type
val customInput = SignInput(
    data = fileBytes,
    name = "document.docx",
    mimeType = "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document"
)
```

### SignOutput

```kotlin
data class SignOutput(
    val signedData: ByteArray,           // Signed document bytes
    val signatureLevel: SignatureLevel,  // Applied signature level
    val signingTime: Instant,            // When signature was created
    val signatureId: String?,            // Signature identifier
    val certificateInfo: CertificateInfo?,
    val timestampInfo: TimestampInfo?,
    val name: String?,
    val mimeType: String?
)

data class CertificateInfo(
    val subjectDN: String,       // "CN=John Doe, O=Company"
    val issuerDN: String,        // "CN=CA, O=Authority"
    val serialNumber: String?,
    val notBefore: Instant?,
    val notAfter: Instant?,
    val fingerprint: String?     // SHA-256 fingerprint
)

data class TimestampInfo(
    val timestampTime: Instant,
    val timestampAuthority: String?,
    val policyOid: String?,
    val serialNumber: String?
)
```

## Signature Parameters

### CAdES Parameters (Binary Data)

```kotlin
data class CAdESParameters(
    val signatureLevel: SignatureLevel = SignatureLevel.CAdES_BASELINE_B,
    val signaturePackaging: SignaturePackaging = SignaturePackaging.ENVELOPING,
    val digestAlgorithm: DigestAlg = DigestAlg.SHA256,
    val signWithExpiredCertificate: Boolean = false,
    val generateTBSWithoutCertificate: Boolean = false
)

// Usage
val params = CAdESParameters(
    signatureLevel = SignatureLevel.CAdES_BASELINE_LT,
    digestAlgorithm = DigestAlg.SHA384
)
```

### PAdES Parameters (PDF)

```kotlin
data class PAdESParameters(
    val signatureLevel: SignatureLevel = SignatureLevel.PAdES_BASELINE_B,
    val signaturePackaging: SignaturePackaging = SignaturePackaging.ENVELOPED,
    val digestAlgorithm: DigestAlg = DigestAlg.SHA256,
    val visualSignatureParameters: VisualSignatureParameters? = null,
    val signatureFieldId: String? = null,    // Use existing signature field
    val reason: String? = null,              // Signing reason
    val location: String? = null,            // Signing location
    val contactInfo: String? = null,         // Contact information
    val permission: PdfPermission = PdfPermission.NO_CHANGES_PERMITTED
)

enum class PdfPermission {
    NO_CHANGES_PERMITTED,      // Lock document after signing
    MINIMAL_CHANGES_PERMITTED, // Allow form filling
    CHANGES_PERMITTED          // Allow annotations
}
```

### Visual Signature (PDF)

```kotlin
data class VisualSignatureParameters(
    val fieldParameters: SignatureFieldParameters? = null,
    val imageParameters: SignatureImageParameters? = null,
    val textParameters: SignatureTextParameters? = null,
    val rotation: VisualSignatureRotation = VisualSignatureRotation.NONE,
    val zoom: Int = 100
)

data class SignatureFieldParameters(
    val page: Int = 1,           // Page number (1-based)
    val originX: Float = 0f,     // X position from left
    val originY: Float = 0f,     // Y position from bottom
    val width: Float = 200f,     // Field width
    val height: Float = 50f,     // Field height
    val fieldId: String? = null  // Optional field identifier
)

data class SignatureImageParameters(
    val image: ByteArray,        // PNG, JPEG image bytes
    val dpi: Int = 96,
    val alignmentHorizontal: VisualSignatureAlignmentHorizontal = LEFT,
    val alignmentVertical: VisualSignatureAlignmentVertical = TOP
)

data class SignatureTextParameters(
    val text: String? = null,
    val font: String = "Helvetica",
    val size: Float = 10f,
    val textColor: String = "#000000",
    val backgroundColor: String? = null,
    val signerNamePosition: SignerTextPosition = SignerTextPosition.TOP,
    val textWrapping: TextWrapping = TextWrapping.FILL_BOX
)
```

### JAdES Parameters (JSON)

```kotlin
data class JAdESParameters(
    val signatureLevel: SignatureLevel = SignatureLevel.JAdES_BASELINE_B,
    val signaturePackaging: SignaturePackaging = SignaturePackaging.ENVELOPING,
    val digestAlgorithm: DigestAlg = DigestAlg.SHA256,
    val jwsSerializationType: JwsSerializationType = JwsSerializationType.COMPACT_SERIALIZATION,
    val sigDPolicy: String? = null,
    val base64UrlEncodedPayload: Boolean = true
)

enum class JwsSerializationType {
    COMPACT_SERIALIZATION,      // Three-part dot-separated
    JSON_SERIALIZATION,         // Full JSON structure
    FLATTENED_JSON_SERIALIZATION
}
```

### XAdES Parameters (XML)

```kotlin
data class XAdESParameters(
    val signatureLevel: SignatureLevel = SignatureLevel.XAdES_BASELINE_B,
    val signaturePackaging: SignaturePackaging = SignaturePackaging.ENVELOPED,
    val digestAlgorithm: DigestAlg = DigestAlg.SHA256,
    val xPathLocationString: String? = null,
    val signedInfoCanonicalizationMethod: CanonicalizationMethod = CanonicalizationMethod.EXCLUSIVE,
    val signedPropertiesCanonicalizationMethod: CanonicalizationMethod = CanonicalizationMethod.EXCLUSIVE
)

enum class CanonicalizationMethod {
    INCLUSIVE,                  // http://www.w3.org/TR/2001/REC-xml-c14n-20010315
    INCLUSIVE_WITH_COMMENTS,
    EXCLUSIVE,                  // http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#
    EXCLUSIVE_WITH_COMMENTS
}
```

## Timestamp Parameters

```kotlin
data class TimestampParameters(
    val tsaUrl: String,                              // TSA endpoint
    val tsaPolicyOid: String? = null,                // Timestamp policy
    val digestAlgorithm: DigestAlg = DigestAlg.SHA256,
    val includeNonce: Boolean = true,
    val includeCertificates: Boolean = true,
    val username: String? = null,                    // TSA authentication
    val password: String? = null
) {
    companion object {
        fun simple(url: String) = TimestampParameters(tsaUrl = url)

        fun withAuth(url: String, username: String, password: String) =
            TimestampParameters(
                tsaUrl = url,
                username = username,
                password = password
            )
    }
}
```

## Validation

### ValidateSignatureArgs

```kotlin
data class ValidateSignatureArgs(
    val signedDocument: ByteArray,
    val originalDocument: ByteArray? = null,  // For detached signatures
    val signatureForm: SignatureForm? = null, // Auto-detect if null
    val validationTime: Instant? = null,      // Validate at specific time
    val checkCertificateRevocation: Boolean = true
)
```

### ValidationResult

```kotlin
data class ValidationResult(
    val isValid: Boolean,
    val signatures: List<SignatureValidation>,
    val documentName: String? = null,
    val signatureForm: SignatureForm? = null
)

data class SignatureValidation(
    val signatureId: String,
    val isValid: Boolean,
    val indication: ValidationIndication,
    val subIndication: ValidationSubIndication? = null,
    val signatureLevel: SignatureLevel? = null,
    val signingTime: Instant? = null,
    val certificateInfo: CertificateInfo? = null,
    val timestampInfo: TimestampInfo? = null,
    val errors: List<String> = emptyList(),
    val warnings: List<String> = emptyList()
)

enum class ValidationIndication {
    TOTAL_PASSED,     // Signature valid
    TOTAL_FAILED,     // Signature invalid
    INDETERMINATE     // Cannot determine validity
}
```

## Complete Examples

### Sign with Visual Signature

```kotlin
val visualParams = VisualSignatureParameters(
    fieldParameters = SignatureFieldParameters(
        page = 1,
        originX = 400f,
        originY = 100f,
        width = 150f,
        height = 60f
    ),
    imageParameters = SignatureImageParameters(
        image = logoBytes,
        dpi = 150
    ),
    textParameters = SignatureTextParameters(
        text = "Digitally signed by\n${signerName}\n${LocalDate.now()}",
        font = "Courier",
        size = 8f
    )
)

val result = signDocumentCommand.execute(
    SignDocumentArgs(
        input = SignInput.pdf(pdfBytes),
        keyInfo = keyInfo,
        signatureLevel = SignatureLevel.PAdES_BASELINE_LT,
        parameters = PAdESParameters(
            visualSignatureParameters = visualParams,
            reason = "Document approval",
            location = "Amsterdam"
        ),
        timestampParameters = TimestampParameters.simple(tsaUrl)
    ),
    sessionContext
)
```

### Sign JSON with JAdES

```kotlin
val jsonData = """{"contract": "Agreement #123", "amount": 50000}"""

val result = signDocumentCommand.execute(
    SignDocumentArgs(
        input = SignInput.json(jsonData.encodeToByteArray()),
        keyInfo = keyInfo,
        signatureLevel = SignatureLevel.JAdES_BASELINE_T,
        parameters = JAdESParameters(
            jwsSerializationType = JwsSerializationType.JSON_SERIALIZATION,
            base64UrlEncodedPayload = true
        ),
        timestampParameters = TimestampParameters.simple(tsaUrl)
    ),
    sessionContext
)
```

### Validate Multiple Signatures

```kotlin
val result = validateSignatureCommand.execute(
    ValidateSignatureArgs(
        signedDocument = signedPdfBytes,
        checkCertificateRevocation = true
    ),
    sessionContext
)

result.fold(
    success = { validation ->
        println("Document has ${validation.signatures.size} signature(s)")
        println("Overall valid: ${validation.isValid}")

        validation.signatures.forEachIndexed { index, sig ->
            println("\nSignature ${index + 1}:")
            println("  ID: ${sig.signatureId}")
            println("  Valid: ${sig.isValid}")
            println("  Indication: ${sig.indication}")
            sig.subIndication?.let { println("  Sub-indication: $it") }
            println("  Signer: ${sig.certificateInfo?.subjectDN}")
            println("  Signed at: ${sig.signingTime}")
            sig.timestampInfo?.let {
                println("  Timestamped at: ${it.timestampTime}")
                println("  TSA: ${it.timestampAuthority}")
            }
            if (sig.errors.isNotEmpty()) {
                println("  Errors: ${sig.errors.joinToString()}")
            }
            if (sig.warnings.isNotEmpty()) {
                println("  Warnings: ${sig.warnings.joinToString()}")
            }
        }
    },
    failure = { error ->
        println("Validation failed: ${error.message}")
    }
)
```

## Signature Providers

The EDK offers two `SignatureProvider` implementations that share the same interface:

### DSS Provider (Local)

For in-process signing using the EU DSS library (JVM only):

```kotlin
dependencies {
    // Core signing client (multiplatform)
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-eidas-signature-client-impl:0.13.0")

    // JVM provider for full eIDAS compliance
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-eidas-signature-client-dss:0.13.0")
}
```

The DSS provider supports all signature formats (CAdES, PAdES, JAdES, XAdES), all baseline levels (B, T, LT, LTA), timestamping, and validation with revocation checking.

### REST Client Provider (Remote)

For delegating signing to a remote eIDAS server:

```kotlin
dependencies {
    // Core signing client
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-eidas-signature-client-impl:0.13.0")

    // REST client provider
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-eidas-signature-rest-client:0.13.0")
}
```

The REST client implements the same `SignatureProvider` interface, allowing seamless switching between local and remote signing:

```kotlin
// Configuration for REST client
@Inject
@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
@ContributesBinding(AppScope::class)
class MyRestSignatureConfig : RestSignatureClientConfig {
    override val baseUrl: String = "https://signature-server.example.com/api/v1"
    override val defaultConfigId: String = "pdf-lt-config"
}
```

Once configured, use the same commands as with local signing:

```kotlin
// The RestSignatureProvider is automatically used when DSS is not on classpath
val result = signDocumentCommand.execute(
    SignDocumentArgs(
        input = SignInput.pdf(pdfBytes),
        keyInfo = keyInfo,
        signatureLevel = SignatureLevel.PAdES_BASELINE_LT
    ),
    sessionContext
)
```

### Hybrid Signing

For maximum flexibility, use both providers:

1. **Local digest creation** - Document never leaves your infrastructure
2. **Remote signing** - Only the hash is sent to the server
3. **Local completion** - Combine signature with document locally

```kotlin
// Step 1: Create digest locally (document stays on-premise)
val dssProvider: DssSignatureProvider = session.component.dssSignatureProvider
val digest = dssProvider.createDigest(input, keyInfo, params, sessionContext)

// Step 2: Sign hash remotely (only hash leaves your network)
val restProvider: RestSignatureProvider = session.component.restSignatureProvider
val signatureValue = restProvider.signDigest(digest.value.digestToSign)

// Step 3: Complete locally (final document created on-premise)
val signed = dssProvider.completeSignature(
    signatureValue,
    digest.value.signatureDocumentBytes,
    keyInfo,
    params,
    sessionContext
)
```

---

# eIDAS REST Server

# eIDAS REST Server

The eIDAS REST Server is part of **VDX** (Verifiable Data Exchange), providing enterprise deployment with multi-database persistence.

For server documentation, see:
- [VDX eIDAS Signature REST API](/vdx/rest-apis/identity-crypto/eidas-signature) - REST API reference

## Architecture

The eIDAS functionality is split between EDK and VDX:

| Component | Location | Description |
|-----------|----------|-------------|
| **Signature Client** | EDK | Core signing commands with DI integration |
| **DSS Provider** | EDK | Local in-process signing using EU DSS library |
| **REST Client** | EDK | HTTP client implementing SignatureProvider |
| **REST Server** | VDX | Full REST server with persistence |

This separation enables:
- **Mobile apps**: Use REST client to delegate signing to a server
- **Desktop apps**: Use DSS provider for local in-process signing
- **Hybrid**: Create digest locally, sign remotely, complete locally

## Using the REST Client

To call a VDX eIDAS server from your application, use the EDK REST client:

```kotlin
dependencies {
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-eidas-signature-client-impl:0.13.0")
    implementation("com.sphereon.edk:lib-eidas-signature-rest-client:0.13.0")
}
```

Configure the client to point to your VDX server:

```kotlin
@Inject
@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
@ContributesBinding(AppScope::class)
class MyRestSignatureConfig : RestSignatureClientConfig {
    override val baseUrl: String = "https://my-vdx-server.example.com/api/v1"
    override val defaultConfigId: String = "pdf-lt-config"
}
```

See [Client API](./client#rest-client-provider-remote) for complete usage documentation.

---

# Party Persistence

# Party Persistence

The EDK provides database persistence for parties, identities, contacts, and physical addresses. The persistence layer supports PostgreSQL, MySQL, and SQLite through a unified adapter pattern.

## Overview

The party persistence system extends the IDK's party data models with:

- **Multi-dialect support** - Same API works with PostgreSQL, MySQL, or SQLite
- **Unified adapter pattern** - Dialect-specific SQLDelight databases behind a common interface
- **Tenant isolation** - All queries filtered by tenant ID
- **Multi-tenant routing** - Route to different databases per tenant
- **Extended models** - Contacts, physical addresses, electronic identifiers, registration numbers

## Data Models

### Core Entities

The persistence layer stores these entity types:

| Entity | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| **Tenant** | Organizational isolation boundary |
| **Party** | Person, organization, or service |
| **Identity** | Role a party plays (issuer, verifier, holder) |
| **CorrelationIdentifier** | External identifier mapping (DID, X.509, email) |
| **Contact** | External party encountered during credential exchange |
| **PhysicalAddress** | Physical/postal addresses linked to identities |

### Contact

Represents an external party discovered during credential exchanges:

```kotlin
data class Contact(
    val contactId: String,
    val partyId: String,           // Links to Party
    val tenantId: String,
    val firstIdentityId: String,   // First identity encountered
    val discoveryMethod: DiscoveryMethod,
    val notes: String?,
    val firstEncounteredAt: Instant,
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant,
    val deletedAt: Instant?        // Soft delete
)
```

**Discovery Methods:**

| Method | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| `MANUAL` | Manually added by user |
| `X509_CERTIFICATE` | Discovered from X.509 certificate |
| `OPENID_FEDERATION` | Discovered via OpenID Federation |
| `CREDENTIAL_EXCHANGE` | Discovered during OID4VP/OID4VCI |
| `IMPORT` | Imported from external source |
| `AUTO` | Auto-discovered by system |

### Physical Address

Postal/physical addresses with validity periods:

```kotlin
data class PhysicalAddress(
    val addressId: String,
    val identityId: String,        // Links to Identity
    val tenantId: String,
    val addressType: AddressType,
    val label: String?,
    val isPrimary: Boolean,
    val streetAddress: String?,
    val city: String?,
    val province: String?,         // State/province/region
    val postalCode: String?,
    val countryCode: String?,      // ISO 3166-1 alpha-2
    val latitude: Double?,
    val longitude: Double?,
    val validFrom: Instant?,       // Address history support
    val validUntil: Instant?,
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant,
    val deletedAt: Instant?
)
```

**Address Types:**

| Type | Description |
|------|-------------|
| `WORK` | Work/office address |
| `HOME` | Residential address |
| `BILLING` | Billing address |
| `SHIPPING` | Shipping/delivery address |
| `MAILING` | Postal mailing address |
| `HEADQUARTERS` | Organization headquarters |
| `BRANCH` | Branch office |
| `LEGAL` | Legal/registered address |

### Identifier Extensions

Additional identifier types beyond the IDK's base correlation identifiers:

**IdentifierElectronic** - For EMAIL, PHONE, URL types:

```kotlin
data class IdentifierElectronic(
    val identifierId: String,      // Same ID as CorrelationIdentifier
    val electronicType: String,    // EMAIL, PHONE, URL
    val label: String?             // "Work Email", "Mobile", etc.
)
```

**IdentifierRegistration** - For registration numbers:

```kotlin
data class IdentifierRegistration(
    val identifierId: String,
    val registrationType: String,  // VAT, LEI, KVK, EIN, DUNS
    val issuingAuthority: String?, // Who issued the registration
    val jurisdictionCountry: String? // Country of jurisdiction
)
```

## Unified Adapter Pattern

The persistence layer uses a unified adapter pattern to support multiple database dialects:

<img src="/img/diagrams/unified-adapter-pattern.svg" alt="Unified Adapter Pattern" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

### UnifiedIdentityDatabase

The common interface for all database operations:

```kotlin
interface UnifiedIdentityDatabase {
    val dialect: DatabaseDialect
    val identityQueries: IdentityQueriesInterface

    fun getRawDatabase(): Any  // For advanced/dialect-specific operations
}
```

### IdentityQueriesInterface

The unified query interface with 40+ methods:

```kotlin
interface IdentityQueriesInterface {
    // Tenant operations
    fun findTenantById(tenantId: String): TenantRecord?
    fun listTenants(): List<TenantRecord>
    fun countTenants(): Long
    fun insertTenant(...)
    fun updateTenant(...)
    fun softDeleteTenant(...)

    // Identity operations
    fun findIdentityById(tenantId: String, identityId: String): IdentityRecord?
    fun listIdentities(tenantId: String): List<IdentityRecord>
    fun listIdentitiesByRole(tenantId: String, role: String): List<IdentityRecord>
    fun findDefaultIdentity(tenantId: String, partyId: String): IdentityRecord?
    fun insertIdentity(...)
    fun updateIdentity(...)
    fun softDeleteIdentity(...)

    // Correlation identifier operations
    fun findCorrelationIdentifierById(tenantId: String, id: String): CorrelationIdentifierRecord?
    fun findIdentityByCorrelationValue(tenantId: String, type: String, value: String): IdentityRecord?
    fun listCorrelationIdentifiersByIdentity(tenantId: String, identityId: String): List<CorrelationIdentifierRecord>
    // ... more methods

    // Physical address operations
    fun findPhysicalAddressById(tenantId: String, addressId: String): PhysicalAddressRecord?
    fun listPhysicalAddressesByIdentity(tenantId: String, identityId: String): List<PhysicalAddressRecord>
    fun insertPhysicalAddress(...)
    fun updatePhysicalAddress(...)
    fun softDeletePhysicalAddress(...)

    // Contact operations
    fun findContactById(tenantId: String, contactId: String): ContactRecord?
    fun findContactByPartyId(tenantId: String, partyId: String): ContactRecord?
    fun listContacts(tenantId: String): List<ContactRecord>
    fun insertContact(...)
    fun updateContact(...)
    fun softDeleteContact(...)

    // Filtered/paginated queries
    fun listIdentitiesFiltered(tenantId: String, filter: IdentityFilter, offset: Long, limit: Long): List<IdentityRecord>
    fun listContactsFiltered(tenantId: String, filter: ContactFilter, offset: Long, limit: Long): List<ContactRecord>
    // ... more filtered queries

    // Superadmin operations (cross-tenant)
    fun superadminListAllTenants(): List<TenantRecord>
    fun superadminFindIdentityById(identityId: String): IdentityRecord?
    // ... more superadmin methods
}
```

## Repository Interfaces

### IdentityRepository

High-level repository for identity operations:

```kotlin
interface IdentityRepository {
    // Read operations
    suspend fun findById(tenantId: String, identityId: String): Identity?
    suspend fun findAll(tenantId: String): List<Identity>
    suspend fun findDefault(tenantId: String, partyId: String): Identity?
    suspend fun findByCorrelationValue(tenantId: String, type: String, value: String): Identity?
    suspend fun count(tenantId: String): Long

    // Write operations
    suspend fun create(identity: Identity): Identity
    suspend fun update(identity: Identity): Identity
    suspend fun softDelete(tenantId: String, identityId: String, deletedBy: String?)

    // Correlation identifier operations
    suspend fun findCorrelationIdentifierById(tenantId: String, id: String): CorrelationIdentifier?
    suspend fun findCorrelationIdentifiers(tenantId: String, identityId: String): List<CorrelationIdentifier>
    suspend fun createCorrelationIdentifier(identifier: CorrelationIdentifier): CorrelationIdentifier
    suspend fun updateCorrelationIdentifier(identifier: CorrelationIdentifier): CorrelationIdentifier
    suspend fun softDeleteCorrelationIdentifier(tenantId: String, id: String, deletedBy: String?)
    suspend fun deleteCorrelationIdentifier(tenantId: String, id: String)
}
```

### ContactRepository

Repository for contact operations:

```kotlin
interface ContactRepository {
    suspend fun findById(tenantId: String, contactId: String): Contact?
    suspend fun findByPartyId(tenantId: String, partyId: String): Contact?
    suspend fun findAll(tenantId: String): List<Contact>
    suspend fun findFiltered(tenantId: String, filter: ContactFilter, offset: Long, limit: Long): List<Contact>

    suspend fun create(contact: Contact): Contact
    suspend fun update(contact: Contact): Contact
    suspend fun softDelete(tenantId: String, contactId: String, deletedBy: String?)
}
```

### PhysicalAddressRepository

Repository for address operations:

```kotlin
interface PhysicalAddressRepository {
    suspend fun findById(tenantId: String, addressId: String): PhysicalAddress?
    suspend fun findByIdentity(tenantId: String, identityId: String): List<PhysicalAddress>
    suspend fun findPrimary(tenantId: String, identityId: String): PhysicalAddress?

    suspend fun create(address: PhysicalAddress): PhysicalAddress
    suspend fun update(address: PhysicalAddress): PhysicalAddress
    suspend fun softDelete(tenantId: String, addressId: String, deletedBy: String?)
}
```

## Multi-Tenant Routing

### TenantDatabaseRegistry

Stores the mapping between tenants and their database configurations:

```kotlin
interface TenantDatabaseRegistry {
    suspend fun getTenantDatabaseConfig(tenantId: String): TenantDatabaseConfig?
    suspend fun registerTenant(tenantId: String, config: TenantDatabaseConfig)
    suspend fun unregisterTenant(tenantId: String)
    suspend fun listTenants(): List<String>
    suspend fun listTenantsByDialect(dialect: DatabaseDialect): List<String>
    suspend fun isRegistered(tenantId: String): Boolean
    suspend fun enableTenant(tenantId: String)
    suspend fun disableTenant(tenantId: String)
}
```

### TenantDatabaseRouter

Routes database operations to the correct tenant database:

```kotlin
interface TenantDatabaseRouter {
    suspend fun getDialectForTenant(tenantId: String): DatabaseDialect
    suspend fun getDatabaseForTenant(tenantId: String): UnifiedIdentityDatabase
    suspend fun hasTenantDatabase(tenantId: String): Boolean
    suspend fun invalidateCache(tenantId: String)
    suspend fun invalidateAllCaches()
    suspend fun isHealthy(tenantId: String): Boolean
}
```

### Usage Example

```kotlin
@Singleton
class PartyService @Inject constructor(
    private val router: TenantDatabaseRouter
) {
    suspend fun getIdentitiesForTenant(tenantId: String): List<Identity> {
        // Get the correct database for this tenant
        val database = router.getDatabaseForTenant(tenantId)

        // Query using unified interface
        val records = database.identityQueries.listIdentities(tenantId)

        // Map to domain objects
        return records.map { it.toIdentity() }
    }

    suspend fun findContactByDid(tenantId: String, did: String): Contact? {
        val database = router.getDatabaseForTenant(tenantId)

        // Find identity by DID correlation
        val identity = database.identityQueries
            .findIdentityByCorrelationValue(tenantId, "DID", did)
            ?: return null

        // Find contact for that party
        return database.identityQueries
            .findContactByPartyId(tenantId, identity.partyId)
            ?.toContact()
    }
}
```

## Database Provider Architecture

### DatabaseProvider

Abstracts database connections:

```kotlin
interface DatabaseProvider {
    val dialect: DatabaseDialect

    fun getDatabase(): Any  // Dialect-specific SQLDelight database
    fun close()
    fun isHealthy(): Boolean
}
```

### DatabaseProviderFactory

Creates providers with optional connection pooling:

```kotlin
interface DatabaseProviderFactory {
    val dialect: DatabaseDialect

    fun create(config: DatabaseConfig): DatabaseProvider
    fun createPooled(config: DatabaseConfig, poolName: String): DatabaseProvider
}
```

### Dialect-Specific Factories

Each database dialect provides its own factory:

**PostgreSQL:**

```kotlin
class PostgresDatabaseProviderFactory : DatabaseProviderFactory {
    override val dialect = DatabaseDialect.POSTGRESQL

    override fun createPooled(config: DatabaseConfig, poolName: String): DatabaseProvider {
        val hikariConfig = HikariConfig().apply {
            jdbcUrl = "jdbc:postgresql://${config.host}:${config.port}/${config.database}"
            username = config.username
            password = config.password
            maximumPoolSize = config.poolSize
            poolName = poolName
            // PostgreSQL-specific settings
            addDataSourceProperty("prepStmtCacheSize", "250")
            addDataSourceProperty("prepStmtCacheSqlLimit", "2048")
        }
        return PostgresDatabaseProvider(HikariDataSource(hikariConfig))
    }
}
```

**MySQL and SQLite** follow similar patterns with dialect-specific configurations.

## Configuration

### TenantDatabaseConfig

Configuration for a tenant's database:

```kotlin
data class TenantDatabaseConfig(
    val tenantId: String,
    val dialect: DatabaseDialect,
    val host: String,
    val port: Int,
    val database: String,
    val username: String,
    val password: String,
    val schema: String? = null,
    val poolSize: Int = 10,
    val enabled: Boolean = true,
    val tier: ServiceTier = ServiceTier.STANDARD,
    val isolationStrategy: IsolationStrategy = IsolationStrategy.Shared,
    val properties: Map<String, String> = emptyMap()
)
```

### Registering Tenants

```kotlin
// In-memory registry for development
val registry = InMemoryTenantDatabaseRegistry()

// Register a tenant with PostgreSQL
registry.registerTenant(
    tenantId = "tenant-acme",
    config = TenantDatabaseConfig(
        tenantId = "tenant-acme",
        dialect = DatabaseDialect.POSTGRESQL,
        host = "db.example.com",
        port = 5432,
        database = "vdx_acme",
        username = "vdx_app",
        password = secrets.getPassword("tenant-acme"),
        schema = "acme",
        poolSize = 20,
        tier = ServiceTier.PREMIUM
    )
)

// Register a tenant with SQLite (edge deployment)
registry.registerTenant(
    tenantId = "tenant-edge",
    config = TenantDatabaseConfig(
        tenantId = "tenant-edge",
        dialect = DatabaseDialect.SQLITE,
        host = "",
        port = 0,
        database = "/data/edge.db",
        username = "",
        password = "",
        poolSize = 1
    )
)
```

## Best Practices

**Use the unified adapter pattern** - Always work through `UnifiedIdentityDatabase` and `IdentityQueriesInterface` for portability across databases.

**Enable connection pooling** - Use `createPooled()` in production for efficient connection management.

**Implement tenant caching** - The `TenantDatabaseRouter` caches database connections; call `invalidateCache()` when tenant configuration changes.

**Handle soft deletes** - Most entities support soft delete via `deletedAt`. Query active records only unless specifically needing deleted data.

**Use filtered queries for pagination** - For large datasets, use the filtered/paginated query methods instead of loading all records.

**Monitor connection pools** - Track HikariCP metrics to detect connection exhaustion or slow queries.

---

# Settings Persistence

# Settings Persistence

The EDK provides database-backed settings persistence with hierarchical scope inheritance. Configuration values can be stored at application, tenant, or principal (user) levels, with automatic inheritance from parent scopes.

## Overview

The settings persistence system provides:

- **Hierarchical scopes** - APP > TENANT > PRINCIPAL inheritance
- **Type-safe storage** - Typed values with automatic serialization
- **Multi-dialect support** - PostgreSQL, MySQL, SQLite
- **Cache layer** - TTL-based caching for performance
- **Soft delete** - Audit trail with deletedAt/deletedBy

## Scope Hierarchy

Settings are organized in a three-level hierarchy. More specific scopes override less specific ones:

<img src="/img/diagrams/settings-scope-hierarchy.svg" alt="Settings Scope Hierarchy" style={{maxWidth: '550px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

**Resolution Example:**

For property `feature.enabled`:
1. Check PRINCIPAL scope for user "alice" → not found
2. Check TENANT scope for "tenant-acme" → found: `true`
3. Return `true`

If not found at any level, returns null or default.

## Data Model

### SettingEntity

Each setting is stored as an entity:

```kotlin
data class SettingEntity(
    val id: String,                 // Unique setting ID
    val tenantId: String,           // Tenant context
    val scope: ConfigLevel,         // APP, TENANT, or PRINCIPAL
    val scopeIdentifier: String?,   // null for APP, tenantId for TENANT, principalId for PRINCIPAL
    val propertyKey: String,        // Normalized key (e.g., "feature.enabled")
    val propertyValue: String,      // Serialized value
    val valueType: String,          // STRING, INT, LONG, FLOAT, DOUBLE, BOOLEAN, JSON, NULL
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val createdBy: String?,
    val updatedAt: Instant,
    val updatedBy: String?,
    val deletedAt: Instant?,        // Soft delete
    val deletedBy: String?
)
```

### Value Types

| Type | Description | Example |
|------|-------------|---------|
| `STRING` | Plain text | `"hello"` |
| `INT` | 32-bit integer | `42` |
| `LONG` | 64-bit integer | `9223372036854775807` |
| `FLOAT` | 32-bit floating point | `3.14` |
| `DOUBLE` | 64-bit floating point | `3.141592653589793` |
| `BOOLEAN` | True/false | `true` |
| `JSON` | Serialized JSON | `{"key": "value"}` |
| `NULL` | Explicit null value | — |

## Repository Interface

### SettingsRepository

The core repository interface for settings operations:

```kotlin
interface SettingsRepository {
    // Read operations
    suspend fun findSetting(
        tenantId: String,
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        scopeIdentifier: String?,
        key: String
    ): SettingEntity?

    suspend fun findAllByScope(
        tenantId: String,
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        scopeIdentifier: String?
    ): List<SettingEntity>

    suspend fun getAllKeys(
        tenantId: String,
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        scopeIdentifier: String?
    ): List<String>

    suspend fun exists(
        tenantId: String,
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        scopeIdentifier: String?,
        key: String
    ): Boolean

    // Write operations
    suspend fun upsertSetting(setting: SettingEntity)

    suspend fun deleteSetting(
        tenantId: String,
        scope: ConfigLevel,
        scopeIdentifier: String?,
        key: String,
        deletedBy: String?
    )
}
```

## Property Sources

The settings persistence integrates with the IDK's property source abstraction through three scope-specific implementations:

### DatabasePropertySource

Base interface extending IDK's `PropertySource`:

```kotlin
interface DatabasePropertySource : PropertySource<SettingsRepository> {
    fun hasProperty(name: String): Boolean
    fun <T : Any> getProperty(name: String, targetType: KClass<T>): T?
    fun <T : Any> setProperty(key: String, targetType: KClass<T>, value: T?)
    fun removeProperty(name: String)
    fun getAllPropertyNames(): List<String>
}
```

### Scope-Specific Sources

**DatabaseAppPropertySource** - Application-wide settings:

```kotlin
@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
class DatabaseAppPropertySource @Inject constructor(
    repository: SettingsRepository,
    cache: SettingsCache
) : AbstractDatabasePropertySource(
    name = "database-app",
    configLevel = ConfigLevel.APP,
    tenantId = "system",       // System-wide
    scopeIdentifier = null,    // No specific scope
    repository = repository,
    cache = cache
)
```

**DatabaseTenantPropertySource** - Tenant-level settings:

```kotlin
@SingleIn(UserScope::class)
class DatabaseTenantPropertySource @Inject constructor(
    @Named("tenantId") tenantId: String,
    repository: SettingsRepository,
    cache: SettingsCache
) : AbstractDatabasePropertySource(
    name = "database-tenant",
    configLevel = ConfigLevel.TENANT,
    tenantId = tenantId,
    scopeIdentifier = tenantId,
    repository = repository,
    cache = cache
)
```

**DatabasePrincipalPropertySource** - User-level settings:

```kotlin
@SingleIn(UserScope::class)
class DatabasePrincipalPropertySource @Inject constructor(
    @Named("tenantId") tenantId: String,
    @Named("principalId") principalId: String,
    repository: SettingsRepository,
    cache: SettingsCache
) : AbstractDatabasePropertySource(
    name = "database-principal",
    configLevel = ConfigLevel.PRINCIPAL,
    tenantId = tenantId,
    scopeIdentifier = principalId,
    principalId = principalId,
    repository = repository,
    cache = cache
)
```

## Caching

### SettingsCache

TTL-based cache for settings to reduce database load:

```kotlin
interface SettingsCache {
    fun get(scope: ConfigLevel, scopeIdentifier: String?, key: String): CachedSetting?
    fun put(scope: ConfigLevel, scopeIdentifier: String?, key: String, setting: CachedSetting)
    fun invalidate(scope: ConfigLevel, scopeIdentifier: String?, key: String)
    fun invalidateScope(scope: ConfigLevel, scopeIdentifier: String?)
    fun invalidateAll()
}
```

### CachedSetting

Wrapper for cached values with TTL:

```kotlin
data class CachedSetting(
    val value: Any?,
    val valueType: String,
    val cachedAt: Instant,
    val exists: Boolean = true  // Enables negative caching
)
```

### KacheSettingsCache

Default implementation using the Kache library:

```kotlin
@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
class KacheSettingsCache @Inject constructor() : SettingsCache {
    private val cache = Kache<SettingsCacheKey, CachedSetting>(
        maxSize = 10_000,
        strategy = LruStrategy()
    )

    private val ttl = 5.minutes  // Default TTL

    override fun get(scope: ConfigLevel, scopeIdentifier: String?, key: String): CachedSetting? {
        val cacheKey = SettingsCacheKey(scope, scopeIdentifier, key)
        val cached = cache.get(cacheKey) ?: return null

        // Check TTL
        if (Clock.System.now() - cached.cachedAt > ttl) {
            cache.remove(cacheKey)
            return null
        }

        return cached
    }
}
```

## Usage Examples

### Reading Settings

```kotlin
@Singleton
class FeatureService @Inject constructor(
    private val appSettings: DatabaseAppPropertySource,
    private val tenantSettings: DatabaseTenantPropertySource,
    private val userSettings: DatabasePrincipalPropertySource
) {
    fun isFeatureEnabled(feature: String): Boolean {
        // Check user preference first
        userSettings.getProperty("feature.$feature.enabled", Boolean::class)?.let { return it }

        // Fall back to tenant setting
        tenantSettings.getProperty("feature.$feature.enabled", Boolean::class)?.let { return it }

        // Fall back to app default
        return appSettings.getProperty("feature.$feature.enabled", Boolean::class) ?: false
    }
}
```

### Writing Settings

```kotlin
@Singleton
class PreferencesService @Inject constructor(
    private val userSettings: DatabasePrincipalPropertySource
) {
    fun setUserPreference(key: String, value: String) {
        userSettings.setProperty(key, String::class, value)
    }

    fun setUserTheme(theme: Theme) {
        // Store complex object as JSON
        userSettings.setProperty("ui.theme", Theme::class, theme)
    }
}
```

### Managing Tenant Configuration

```kotlin
@Singleton
class TenantConfigService @Inject constructor(
    private val repository: SettingsRepository
) {
    suspend fun configureTenant(tenantId: String, config: TenantConfig) {
        // Store tenant-level settings
        repository.upsertSetting(SettingEntity(
            id = UUID.randomUUID().toString(),
            tenantId = tenantId,
            scope = ConfigLevel.TENANT,
            scopeIdentifier = tenantId,
            propertyKey = "branding.logo-url",
            propertyValue = config.logoUrl,
            valueType = "STRING",
            createdAt = Clock.System.now(),
            updatedAt = Clock.System.now()
        ))

        repository.upsertSetting(SettingEntity(
            id = UUID.randomUUID().toString(),
            tenantId = tenantId,
            scope = ConfigLevel.TENANT,
            scopeIdentifier = tenantId,
            propertyKey = "limits.max-credentials",
            propertyValue = config.maxCredentials.toString(),
            valueType = "INT",
            createdAt = Clock.System.now(),
            updatedAt = Clock.System.now()
        ))
    }

    suspend fun getTenantConfig(tenantId: String): TenantConfig {
        val settings = repository.findAllByScope(tenantId, ConfigLevel.TENANT, tenantId)
        return TenantConfig(
            logoUrl = settings.find { it.propertyKey == "branding.logo-url" }?.propertyValue,
            maxCredentials = settings.find { it.propertyKey == "limits.max-credentials" }
                ?.propertyValue?.toIntOrNull() ?: 100
        )
    }
}
```

## Database Schema

### PostgreSQL

```sql
CREATE TABLE config_setting (
    id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
    scope TEXT NOT NULL,              -- 'APP', 'TENANT', 'PRINCIPAL'
    scope_identifier TEXT,
    property_key TEXT NOT NULL,
    property_value TEXT,
    value_type TEXT NOT NULL,
    created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL,
    created_by TEXT,
    updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL,
    updated_by TEXT,
    deleted_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE,
    deleted_by TEXT,
    UNIQUE (tenant_id, scope, scope_identifier, property_key)
);

CREATE INDEX idx_config_setting_scope ON config_setting(tenant_id, scope, scope_identifier);
CREATE INDEX idx_config_setting_key ON config_setting(property_key);
```

### MySQL

Uses `DATETIME(6)` for timestamps instead of `TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE`.

### SQLite

Uses `TEXT` for timestamps in ISO8601 format.

## Configuration

### Properties

Configure the settings persistence via application properties:

```yaml
sphereon:
  persistence:
    settings:
      dialect: postgresql           # postgresql, mysql, sqlite
      cache:
        enabled: true
        ttl-seconds: 300            # 5 minutes
        max-size: 10000
```

### Database Connection

The settings repository uses the same database routing as other persistence modules:

```kotlin
@Singleton
class SettingsRepositoryProvider @Inject constructor(
    private val router: TenantDatabaseRouter
) {
    suspend fun getRepository(tenantId: String): SettingsRepository {
        val database = router.getDatabaseForTenant(tenantId)
        return when (database.dialect) {
            DatabaseDialect.POSTGRESQL -> PostgresSettingsRepository(database)
            DatabaseDialect.MYSQL -> MysqlSettingsRepository(database)
            DatabaseDialect.SQLITE -> SqliteSettingsRepository(database)
        }
    }
}
```

## Best Practices

**Use appropriate scopes** - Store settings at the most appropriate level. User preferences at PRINCIPAL, organization settings at TENANT, system defaults at APP.

**Cache invalidation** - Call `invalidate()` or `invalidateScope()` when settings change to ensure consistency across instances.

**Key naming conventions** - Use dotted notation for hierarchical keys: `feature.oauth.enabled`, `branding.colors.primary`.

**Type consistency** - Always use the same type for a key. Changing types can cause deserialization errors.

**Audit trail** - Populate `createdBy`, `updatedBy`, and `deletedBy` for compliance and debugging.

**Default values** - Always provide sensible defaults in your application code; don't rely on database values existing.

---

# KV Store Persistence

# KV Store Persistence

The EDK extends the IDK's KvStore abstraction with database-backed implementations. Store key-value data in PostgreSQL, MySQL, or SQLite with full multi-tenant and multi-scope isolation.

## Overview

The database KV store provides:

- **Multi-dialect support** - PostgreSQL, MySQL, SQLite backends
- **Multi-scope isolation** - APP, TENANT, PRINCIPAL, SESSION partitioning
- **TTL support** - Automatic expiration of entries
- **Namespace isolation** - Type-safe namespaces with codecs
- **IDK compatibility** - Implements the same `KvStore` interface

## Architecture

The database KV store implements the IDK's `KvStoreListing` interface:

<img src="/img/diagrams/kv-store-architecture.svg" alt="KV Store Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Data Model

### KvEntryEntity

Each key-value entry is stored as:

```kotlin
data class KvEntryEntity(
    val id: String,              // Unique entry ID
    val storeId: String,         // KV store identifier
    val tenantId: String,        // Tenant isolation
    val principalId: String?,    // User isolation (null for APP/TENANT)
    val sessionId: String?,      // Session isolation (null except SESSION scope)
    val namespace: String,       // Namespace isolation
    val key: String,             // Key within namespace
    val value: ByteArray,        // Serialized value
    val expiresAt: Instant?,     // Expiration time (null = never)
    val createdAt: Instant,
    val updatedAt: Instant
)
```

### Partition Key Structure

The partition key provides multi-level isolation:

| Scope | Partition Key Components |
|-------|-------------------------|
| **APP** | `(storeId, tenantId, null, null, namespace, key)` |
| **TENANT** | `(storeId, tenantId, null, null, namespace, key)` |
| **PRINCIPAL** | `(storeId, tenantId, principalId, null, namespace, key)` |
| **SESSION** | `(storeId, tenantId, principalId, sessionId, namespace, key)` |

## Repository Interface

### KvRepository

The core repository interface:

```kotlin
interface KvRepository {
    // Read operations
    suspend fun findEntry(
        storeId: String,
        tenantId: String,
        principalId: String?,
        sessionId: String?,
        namespace: String,
        key: String
    ): KvEntryEntity?  // Returns null if expired or not found

    suspend fun existsEntry(
        storeId: String,
        tenantId: String,
        principalId: String?,
        sessionId: String?,
        namespace: String,
        key: String
    ): Boolean  // Excludes expired entries

    suspend fun listKeys(
        storeId: String,
        tenantId: String,
        principalId: String?,
        sessionId: String?,
        namespace: String
    ): List<String>  // Non-expired keys only

    suspend fun findAllEntries(
        storeId: String,
        tenantId: String,
        principalId: String?,
        sessionId: String?,
        namespace: String
    ): List<KvEntryEntity>  // Non-expired entries only

    // Write operations
    suspend fun upsertEntry(entity: KvEntryEntity)

    suspend fun deleteEntry(
        storeId: String,
        tenantId: String,
        principalId: String?,
        sessionId: String?,
        namespace: String,
        key: String
    ): Boolean  // Returns true if entry was deleted

    suspend fun touchEntry(
        storeId: String,
        tenantId: String,
        principalId: String?,
        sessionId: String?,
        namespace: String,
        key: String,
        newExpiresAt: Instant?
    ): Boolean  // Update TTL without changing value

    // Maintenance
    suspend fun cleanupExpired(namespace: String?): Int  // Returns count deleted
}
```

## DatabaseKvStore

The main KV store implementation:

```kotlin
class DatabaseKvStore(
    private val config: KvStoreConfig,
    private val repositoryProvider: () -> KvRepository,
    private val partitionKey: PartitionKey  // Contains scope identifiers
) : KvStoreListing {

    override suspend fun <V : Any> put(
        namespace: KvNamespace<V>,
        key: String,
        value: V,
        ttl: Duration
    ): IdkResult<KvPutResult, IdkError> {
        return try {
            val encoded = namespace.codec.encode(value)
            val expiresAt = if (ttl.isInfinite()) null
                           else Clock.System.now() + ttl

            val entity = KvEntryEntity(
                id = UUID.randomUUID().toString(),
                storeId = config.id,
                tenantId = partitionKey.tenantId,
                principalId = partitionKey.principalId,
                sessionId = partitionKey.sessionId,
                namespace = namespace.name,
                key = key,
                value = encoded,
                expiresAt = expiresAt,
                createdAt = Clock.System.now(),
                updatedAt = Clock.System.now()
            )

            repository.upsertEntry(entity)

            Ok(KvPutResult(
                metadata = KvEntryMetadata(
                    createdAtEpochMillis = entity.createdAt.toEpochMilliseconds(),
                    expiresAtEpochMillis = entity.expiresAt?.toEpochMilliseconds()
                )
            ))
        } catch (e: Exception) {
            Err(IdkError(
                code = "KV_PUT_FAILED",
                message = IdkError.Message(
                    i18nKey = "com.sphereon.kv.error.put-failed",
                    defaultMessage = "Failed to store value: ${e.message}"
                )
            ))
        }
    }

    override suspend fun <V : Any> get(
        namespace: KvNamespace<V>,
        key: String
    ): IdkResult<V?, IdkError> {
        return try {
            val entity = repository.findEntry(
                storeId = config.id,
                tenantId = partitionKey.tenantId,
                principalId = partitionKey.principalId,
                sessionId = partitionKey.sessionId,
                namespace = namespace.name,
                key = key
            )

            if (entity == null) {
                Ok(null)
            } else {
                val decoded = namespace.codec.decode(entity.value)
                Ok(decoded)
            }
        } catch (e: Exception) {
            Err(IdkError(code = "KV_GET_FAILED", ...))
        }
    }

    // ... other KvStore methods
}
```

## Usage Examples

### Basic Operations

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.data.store.kv.*
import kotlinx.serialization.Serializable
import kotlin.time.Duration.Companion.hours

@Serializable
data class CacheEntry(
    val data: String,
    val cachedAt: Long
)

// Define a namespace with JSON codec
val cacheNamespace = KvNamespace(
    name = "api.cache",
    codec = KotlinxSerializationJsonKvCodec(
        json = Json { ignoreUnknownKeys = true },
        serializer = CacheEntry.serializer()
    )
)

// Store a value with TTL
val result = kvStore.put(
    namespace = cacheNamespace,
    key = "user-profile-123",
    value = CacheEntry(
        data = """{"name": "Alice"}""",
        cachedAt = System.currentTimeMillis()
    ),
    ttl = 1.hours
)

when (result) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        println("Stored, expires at: ${result.value.metadata.expiresAtEpochMillis}")
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Failed: ${result.error.message}")
    }
}

// Retrieve the value
val getResult = kvStore.get(cacheNamespace, "user-profile-123")

when (getResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        val entry = getResult.value
        if (entry != null) {
            println("Cached data: ${entry.data}")
        } else {
            println("Not found or expired")
        }
    }
    is IdkResult.Failure -> {
        println("Error: ${getResult.error}")
    }
}
```

### Multi-Tenant Usage

```kotlin
@Singleton
class TenantCacheService @Inject constructor(
    private val kvStoreService: KvStoreService
) {
    private val cacheNamespace = KvNamespace(
        name = "tenant.cache",
        codec = StringKvCodec()
    )

    suspend fun getCachedValue(tenantId: String, key: String): String? {
        // Get tenant-scoped KV store
        val store = kvStoreService.getStoreForTenant(tenantId)

        return store.get(cacheNamespace, key)
            .getOrNull()
    }

    suspend fun setCachedValue(tenantId: String, key: String, value: String, ttl: Duration) {
        val store = kvStoreService.getStoreForTenant(tenantId)

        store.put(cacheNamespace, key, value, ttl)
            .getOrThrow()
    }
}
```

### Session-Scoped Storage

```kotlin
@Singleton
class SessionDataService @Inject constructor(
    private val kvStoreService: KvStoreService
) {
    private val sessionNamespace = KvNamespace(
        name = "session.data",
        codec = KotlinxSerializationJsonKvCodec(
            json = Json,
            serializer = SessionData.serializer()
        )
    )

    suspend fun getSessionData(sessionId: String): SessionData? {
        // Get session-scoped KV store
        val store = kvStoreService.getStoreForSession(sessionId)

        return store.get(sessionNamespace, "current")
            .getOrNull()
    }

    suspend fun setSessionData(sessionId: String, data: SessionData) {
        val store = kvStoreService.getStoreForSession(sessionId)

        // Session data expires with session (30 minutes)
        store.put(sessionNamespace, "current", data, 30.minutes)
            .getOrThrow()
    }
}
```

### Listing and Cleanup

```kotlin
// List all keys in namespace
val keysResult = kvStore.listKeys(cacheNamespace)

when (keysResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        keysResult.value.forEach { key ->
            println("Key: $key")
        }
    }
}

// Get all entries with metadata
val entriesResult = kvStore.getAllEntries(cacheNamespace)

when (entriesResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        entriesResult.value.forEach { (key, entry) ->
            println("$key: ${entry.value}, expires: ${entry.metadata.expiresAtEpochMillis}")
        }
    }
}

// Clean up expired entries
val cleanupResult = kvStore.cleanupExpired(cacheNamespace)

when (cleanupResult) {
    is IdkResult.Success -> {
        println("Cleaned up ${cleanupResult.value} expired entries")
    }
}
```

## Database Schema

### PostgreSQL

```sql
CREATE TABLE kv_entry (
    id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
    store_id TEXT NOT NULL,
    tenant_id TEXT NOT NULL,
    principal_id TEXT,
    session_id TEXT,
    namespace TEXT NOT NULL,
    key TEXT NOT NULL,
    value BYTEA NOT NULL,
    expires_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE,
    created_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL,
    updated_at TIMESTAMP WITH TIME ZONE NOT NULL,
    UNIQUE (store_id, tenant_id, principal_id, session_id, namespace, key)
);

CREATE INDEX idx_kv_entry_lookup ON kv_entry(store_id, tenant_id, principal_id, session_id, namespace);
CREATE INDEX idx_kv_entry_expires ON kv_entry(expires_at) WHERE expires_at IS NOT NULL;
```

### MySQL

Uses `DATETIME(6)` for timestamps and `BLOB` for value storage.

### SQLite

Uses `TEXT` for timestamps and `BLOB` for value storage.

## Configuration

### Backend Identifiers

```kotlin
object DatabaseKvStoreBackends {
    const val DATABASE = "database"      // Generic database backend
    const val POSTGRESQL = "postgresql"  // PostgreSQL-specific
    const val MYSQL = "mysql"            // MySQL-specific
    const val SQLITE = "sqlite"          // SQLite-specific
}
```

### Store Configuration

```kotlin
val config = KvStoreConfig(
    id = "cache-store",
    scopeBinding = KvStoreScopeBinding.TENANT,  // Partition by tenant
    backendId = DatabaseKvStoreBackends.POSTGRESQL,
    enabled = true,
    order = 0
)
```

### Properties Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  kv:
    stores:
      cache:
        backend: postgresql
        scope-binding: TENANT
        enabled: true

      session:
        backend: postgresql
        scope-binding: SESSION
        enabled: true
```

## Scope Bindings

| Binding | Partition By | Use Case |
|---------|-------------|----------|
| `APP` | Application only | Global cache, feature flags |
| `TENANT` | Tenant ID | Tenant-specific data |
| `PRINCIPAL_TENANT` | Tenant + Principal | User data within tenant |
| `SESSION` | Tenant + Principal + Session | Session-specific state |

## Best Practices

**Choose appropriate scope binding** - Use the most restrictive scope that meets your needs for proper data isolation.

**Set meaningful TTLs** - Always set TTL for temporary data. Use `Duration.INFINITE` only for permanent data.

**Run periodic cleanup** - Schedule `cleanupExpired()` to remove expired entries if your database doesn't support automatic TTL enforcement.

**Use typed namespaces** - Define namespaces with proper codecs for type safety and consistent serialization.

**Handle errors with IdkResult** - All operations return `IdkResult`; handle both success and failure cases.

**Monitor storage growth** - Track namespace sizes and implement cleanup policies for high-volume stores.

---

# Database Routing

# Database Routing

The EDK provides a flexible database routing system that directs database operations to the correct database, schema, or host based on the current scope (application, tenant, or user). This enables true multi-tenant isolation at the database level.

## Overview

The database routing system consists of several components:

- **DatabaseRouter** - Routes operations to the appropriate database based on scope
- **DatabaseScope** - Defines the isolation level (APP, TENANT, USER)
- **IsolationStrategy** - Determines how databases are isolated (shared, schema, database, host)
- **ConnectionPoolManager** - Manages connection pools with HikariCP
- **DatabaseRegistry** - Stores and retrieves database configurations

## Database Scopes

The EDK supports three levels of database scoping:

```kotlin
enum class DatabaseScope {
    APP,     // Application-wide data shared across all tenants
    TENANT,  // Tenant-specific data (most common)
    USER     // User-specific data (e.g., wallet backends)
}
```

| Scope | Use Case | Entity ID |
|-------|----------|-----------|
| `APP` | System config, feature flags, global lookups | `null` or `"default"` |
| `TENANT` | Organization data, party management, credentials | Tenant UUID |
| `USER` | Personal wallet data, user preferences | User/Principal UUID |

## Isolation Strategies

The isolation strategy determines how data is physically separated at the infrastructure level:

### Shared

All entities use the same database and schema. Isolation is achieved via discriminator columns (`tenant_id`, `user_id`).

```kotlin
IsolationStrategy.Shared
```

**Best for:** Standard tenants with moderate data volumes where row-level isolation is sufficient.

**Pool behavior:** Single shared connection pool for the database.

### Schema Per Entity

Each entity gets its own schema within a shared database. PostgreSQL supports this well.

```kotlin
IsolationStrategy.SchemaPerEntity(
    schemaNamePattern = "tenant_{id}"  // Results in: tenant_abc123
)
```

**Best for:** Premium tenants needing stronger isolation, or user-scoped databases in wallet scenarios.

**Pool behavior:** Shared pool at database level; schema is set per connection.

### Database Per Entity

Each entity gets a dedicated database instance.

```kotlin
IsolationStrategy.DatabasePerEntity(
    databaseNamePattern = "vdx_{scope}_{id}"  // Results in: vdx_tenant_abc123
)
```

**Best for:** Large data volumes or stricter isolation requirements.

**Pool behavior:** Separate connection pool per database.

### Host Per Entity

Each entity gets a dedicated database server/host. Used for enterprise tenants with regulatory requirements.

```kotlin
IsolationStrategy.HostPerEntity(
    requireDedicatedPool = true
)
```

**Best for:** Enterprise tenants with compliance requirements (data residency, dedicated resources).

**Pool behavior:** Dedicated pool per host.

## Strategy Comparison

| Strategy | Isolation | Resource Usage | Complexity | Use Case |
|----------|-----------|----------------|------------|----------|
| Shared | Row-level | Low | Low | Most tenants |
| SchemaPerEntity | Schema-level | Medium | Medium | Premium tenants |
| DatabasePerEntity | Database-level | High | High | Large tenants |
| HostPerEntity | Server-level | Highest | Highest | Enterprise/Regulated |

## Using the DatabaseRouter

### Basic Usage

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.DatabaseRouter
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.DatabaseScope
import jakarta.inject.Inject
import jakarta.inject.Singleton

@Singleton
class TenantDataService @Inject constructor(
    private val router: DatabaseRouter
) {
    suspend fun getParties(tenantId: String): List<Party> {
        // Get driver for tenant's database
        val driver = router.getDriver(DatabaseScope.TENANT, tenantId)

        // Use the driver with your database queries
        val database = PartyDatabase(driver)
        return database.partyQueries.findAll().executeAsList()
    }
}
```

### Convenience Methods

The `DatabaseRouter` provides convenience methods for common scopes:

```kotlin
// Tenant-scoped database (most common)
val tenantDriver = router.getDriverForTenant(tenantUuid)

// User-scoped database (wallet data)
val userDriver = router.getDriverForUser(userUuid)

// App-scoped database (global data)
val appDriver = router.getDriverForApp("default")
```

### Getting Database Metadata

```kotlin
// Get the dialect for a scoped entity
val dialect = router.getDialect(DatabaseScope.TENANT, tenantId)

// Get the isolation strategy
val strategy = router.getIsolationStrategy(DatabaseScope.TENANT, tenantId)

// Get the effective schema name (for SchemaPerEntity)
val schema = router.getSchema(DatabaseScope.TENANT, tenantId)
```

### Health Checks

```kotlin
// Check if a database is healthy
val isHealthy = router.isHealthy(DatabaseScope.TENANT, tenantId)
```

### Resource Cleanup

When a tenant is disabled or deleted:

```kotlin
// Release cached drivers and connection pools
router.releaseResources(DatabaseScope.TENANT, tenantId)
```

## Database Configuration

### ScopedDatabaseConfig

Each database is configured with `ScopedDatabaseConfig`:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.ScopedDatabaseConfig
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.DatabaseDialect
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.IsolationStrategy

// Tenant-scoped configuration
val tenantConfig = ScopedDatabaseConfig.forTenant(
    tenantId = "tenant-abc123",
    dialect = DatabaseDialect.POSTGRESQL,
    host = "db.example.com",
    port = 5432,
    database = "vdx",
    username = "vdx_app",
    password = secrets.getDatabasePassword(),
    isolationStrategy = IsolationStrategy.SchemaPerEntity(
        schemaNamePattern = "tenant_{id}"
    ),
    tier = ServiceTier.PREMIUM
)

// App-scoped configuration
val appConfig = ScopedDatabaseConfig.forApp(
    dialect = DatabaseDialect.POSTGRESQL,
    host = "db.example.com",
    port = 5432,
    database = "vdx_system",
    username = "vdx_system",
    password = secrets.getSystemPassword()
)

// User-scoped configuration
val userConfig = ScopedDatabaseConfig.forUser(
    userId = "user-xyz789",
    dialect = DatabaseDialect.SQLITE,
    host = "",
    port = 0,
    database = "/data/wallets/user_xyz789.db",
    username = "",
    password = ""
)
```

### Configuration Properties

Configure databases via properties files:

```properties
# Default tenant database configuration
db.routing.tenant.default.dialect=POSTGRESQL
db.routing.tenant.default.host=localhost
db.routing.tenant.default.port=5432
db.routing.tenant.default.database=vdx
db.routing.tenant.default.username=vdx_app
db.routing.tenant.default.password=${DB_PASSWORD}
db.routing.tenant.default.isolation=SHARED

# Premium tenant with schema isolation
db.routing.tenant.premium.isolation=SCHEMA_PER_ENTITY
db.routing.tenant.premium.schema-pattern=tenant_{id}

# Enterprise tenant with dedicated host
db.routing.tenant.enterprise-acme.dialect=POSTGRESQL
db.routing.tenant.enterprise-acme.host=acme.db.example.com
db.routing.tenant.enterprise-acme.isolation=HOST_PER_ENTITY
```

## Connection Pooling

### ConnectionPoolConfig

Configure connection pools for optimal performance:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.ConnectionPoolConfig

// Default configuration
val defaultPool = ConnectionPoolConfig.DEFAULT

// High-throughput configuration
val highThroughput = ConnectionPoolConfig.HIGH_THROUGHPUT

// Low-resource configuration
val lowResource = ConnectionPoolConfig.LOW_RESOURCE

// Custom configuration
val customPool = ConnectionPoolConfig(
    maximumPoolSize = 20,
    minimumIdle = 5,
    connectionTimeout = 15_000,    // 15 seconds
    idleTimeout = 300_000,         // 5 minutes
    maxLifetime = 1_200_000,       // 20 minutes
    keepaliveTime = 60_000,        // 1 minute
    validationTimeout = 5_000,     // 5 seconds
    dedicatedPool = false
)
```

### Pool Configuration Presets

| Preset | Max Pool | Min Idle | Timeout | Use Case |
|--------|----------|----------|---------|----------|
| `DEFAULT` | 10 | 2 | 30s | General purpose |
| `HIGH_THROUGHPUT` | 25 | 10 | 10s | High-traffic services |
| `LOW_RESOURCE` | 5 | 1 | 60s | Edge/embedded deployments |

### Pool Sharing

Pool sharing is determined by the isolation strategy:

| Strategy | Pool Sharing |
|----------|-------------|
| Shared | Single pool for entire database |
| SchemaPerEntity | Pool shared at database level |
| DatabasePerEntity | Pool per database instance |
| HostPerEntity | Dedicated pool per host |

Force a dedicated pool for specific entities:

```kotlin
val config = ScopedDatabaseConfig.forTenant(
    tenantId = "high-priority-tenant",
    // ... other config
    poolConfig = ConnectionPoolConfig(
        dedicatedPool = true,
        maximumPoolSize = 20
    )
)
```

## Database Registry

The EDK provides two registry implementations for storing database configurations:

### Configuration-Based Registry

Reads configurations from property files. Best for static deployments.

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.config.ConfigDatabaseRegistryImpl

// Automatically configured via DI
@Singleton
class MyService @Inject constructor(
    private val registry: DatabaseRegistry
) {
    suspend fun getTenantConfig(tenantId: String): ScopedDatabaseConfig? {
        return registry.getConfig(DatabaseScope.TENANT, tenantId)
    }
}
```

### Database-Backed Registry

Stores configurations in a bootstrap database. Enables runtime configuration changes.

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.database.DatabaseRegistryImpl
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.database.BootstrapDatabaseProvider

// Bootstrap database stores routing configurations
val bootstrapProvider = BootstrapDatabaseProvider(
    jdbcUrl = "jdbc:postgresql://localhost:5432/vdx_bootstrap",
    username = "vdx_admin",
    password = secrets.getBootstrapPassword()
)

// Registry reads/writes to bootstrap database
val registry = DatabaseRegistryImpl(bootstrapProvider)

// Add a new tenant at runtime
registry.register(newTenantConfig)
```

## Integration with Spring Boot

When using `@EnableSphereonRestApi`, the `DatabaseRouter` is automatically available:

```kotlin
@RestController
class PartyController @Inject constructor(
    private val router: DatabaseRouter,
    private val userContext: UserContext  // Contains tenantId
) {
    @GetMapping("/parties")
    suspend fun getParties(): List<Party> {
        val driver = router.getDriverForTenant(userContext.tenantId)
        // ... execute queries
    }
}
```

## Supported Databases

| Database | Dialect | Features |
|----------|---------|----------|
| PostgreSQL | `POSTGRESQL` | Full support, schemas, JSONB |
| MySQL | `MYSQL` | Full support, JSON columns |
| SQLite | `SQLITE` | Single-file, edge deployments |
| H2 | `H2` | Testing and development |

## Best Practices

**Choose the right isolation strategy** based on tenant requirements. Start with `Shared` and upgrade to stronger isolation as needed.

**Size connection pools appropriately.** Too few connections causes contention; too many wastes resources. Monitor pool metrics and adjust.

**Use the database-backed registry** for dynamic tenant onboarding where configurations change at runtime.

**Implement health checks** in your monitoring to detect database connectivity issues early.

**Clean up resources** when tenants are deactivated to release connections and memory.

---

# Spring Boot Integration

# Spring Boot Integration

The EDK provides first-class Spring Boot integration that bridges the IDK's kotlin-inject dependency injection system with Spring's IoC container. This enables you to build production-ready identity services with multi-tenant support.

## Two Integration Modes

The Spring Boot integration offers two modes depending on your application type:

| Mode | Annotation | Use Case |
|------|------------|----------|
| **REST API** | `@EnableSphereonRestApi` | Multi-tenant REST APIs with request-scoped contexts |
| **Application** | `@EnableSphereonApplication` | Desktop/server apps with login/logout lifecycle |

## REST API Mode

For multi-tenant REST APIs where each HTTP request may have a different tenant and user:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.spring.annotation.EnableSphereonRestApi
import org.springframework.boot.autoconfigure.SpringBootApplication
import org.springframework.boot.runApplication

@SpringBootApplication
@EnableSphereonRestApi
class IdentityServiceApplication

fun main(args: Array<String>) {
    runApplication<IdentityServiceApplication>(*args)
}
```

### Key Features

- **Request-scoped contexts** - Each HTTP request gets its own tenant/user context
- **Thread-safe** - No global state; contexts resolved per-request via IDs
- **Automatic HTTP filter** - Extracts tenant and principal from headers
- **kotlin-inject bridge** - IDK services available as Spring beans

### Request Flow

<img src="/img/diagrams/spring-boot-request-flow.svg" alt="Spring Boot Request Flow" style={{maxWidth: '580px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

### Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    id: identity-service
    profile: ${spring.profiles.active:development}

  kotlin-inject:
    scan-packages:
      - com.sphereon
      - com.yourcompany
    auto-register: true

  rest-api:
    auto-filter: true
    filter-order: -100

    auth:
      methods:
        - header
        - oauth2
        - oidc
      auth-header: Authorization
      tenant-header: X-Tenant-ID
      principal-header: X-User-ID
```

### Using IDK Services

IDK services are automatically registered as Spring beans:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.data.store.db.routing.DatabaseRouter
import org.springframework.web.bind.annotation.*

@RestController
@RequestMapping("/api/v1/parties")
class PartyController(
    private val router: DatabaseRouter,  // From IDK
    private val partyService: PartyService  // Your service
) {
    @GetMapping
    suspend fun listParties(
        @RequestHeader("X-Tenant-ID") tenantId: String
    ): List<PartyDto> {
        val driver = router.getDriver(DatabaseScope.TENANT, tenantId)
        return partyService.findAll(driver)
    }

    @PostMapping
    suspend fun createParty(
        @RequestHeader("X-Tenant-ID") tenantId: String,
        @RequestBody input: CreatePartyInput
    ): PartyDto {
        val driver = router.getDriver(DatabaseScope.TENANT, tenantId)
        return partyService.create(driver, input)
    }
}
```

## Application Mode

For desktop or server applications with a single active user (login/logout lifecycle):

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.spring.annotation.EnableSphereonApplication
import org.springframework.boot.autoconfigure.SpringBootApplication
import org.springframework.boot.runApplication

@SpringBootApplication
@EnableSphereonApplication
class WalletDesktopApplication

fun main(args: Array<String>) {
    runApplication<WalletDesktopApplication>(*args)
}
```

### Key Features

- **Application-wide context holder** - Single active user context
- **Login/logout lifecycle** - Spring events for state changes
- **User switch support** - Switch between users in multi-profile apps
- **Services scoped to active user** - Automatic scoping

### User Lifecycle Events

Subscribe to user state changes:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.spring.event.*
import org.springframework.context.event.EventListener
import org.springframework.stereotype.Component

@Component
class UserLifecycleListener {

    @EventListener
    fun onLogin(event: UserLoggedInEvent) {
        logger.info("User logged in: ${event.context.principal}")
        // Initialize user-specific resources
    }

    @EventListener
    fun onLogout(event: UserLoggedOutEvent) {
        logger.info("User logged out: ${event.context.principal}")
        // Clean up user resources
    }

    @EventListener
    fun onSwitch(event: UserSwitchedEvent) {
        logger.info("User switched from ${event.previousContext} to ${event.newContext}")
    }
}
```

### Managing User Sessions

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.spring.service.SpringUserContextService
import org.springframework.stereotype.Service

@Service
class AuthService(
    private val userContextService: SpringUserContextService
) {
    fun login(username: String, tenantId: String) {
        // Create and activate user context
        userContextService.login(
            tenantId = tenantId,
            principalId = username
        )
    }

    fun logout() {
        userContextService.logout()
    }

    fun switchUser(newUsername: String, newTenantId: String) {
        userContextService.switchUser(
            tenantId = newTenantId,
            principalId = newUsername
        )
    }
}
```

### Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    id: desktop-wallet

  application:
    auto-login: false        # Don't auto-login with anonymous
    remember-user: true      # Remember last user across restarts
```

## Configuration Properties

### SphereonProperties

The root configuration class:

```kotlin
@ConfigurationProperties(prefix = "sphereon")
data class SphereonProperties(
    var app: AppProperties,
    var kotlinInject: KotlinInjectProperties,
    var restApi: RestApiProperties,
    var application: ApplicationProperties
)
```

### App Properties

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    id: my-app                      # Application ID
    profile: production             # IDK profile (defaults to Spring profile)
```

### kotlin-inject Properties

```yaml
sphereon:
  kotlin-inject:
    scan-packages:                  # Packages to scan for @SingleIn services
      - com.sphereon
      - com.mycompany
    auto-register: true             # Register as Spring beans
```

### REST API Properties

```yaml
sphereon:
  rest-api:
    auto-filter: true               # Register UserContextFilter
    filter-order: -100              # Filter priority

    auth:
      methods:                      # Allowed auth methods
        - header
        - oauth2
        - oidc
      auth-header: Authorization    # Bearer token header
      tenant-header: X-Tenant-ID    # Tenant ID header
      principal-header: X-User-ID   # Principal/User ID header
```

### Application Properties

```yaml
sphereon:
  application:
    auto-login: false               # Auto-login on startup
    remember-user: true             # Persist last user
```

## Custom Resolvers

### Custom Tenant Resolver

Extract tenant from JWT claims instead of headers:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.di.context.TenantInput
import com.sphereon.di.context.TenantInputString
import com.sphereon.spring.resolver.TenantResolver
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest
import org.springframework.stereotype.Component

@Component
class JwtTenantResolver : TenantResolver {

    override fun resolve(request: HttpServletRequest): TenantInput {
        val authHeader = request.getHeader("Authorization")
            ?: return TenantInputString("default")

        val jwt = parseJwt(authHeader.removePrefix("Bearer "))
        val tenantId = jwt.getClaim("tenant_id") as String?
            ?: return TenantInputString("default")

        return TenantInputString(tenantId)
    }

    private fun parseJwt(token: String): Claims {
        // Parse and validate JWT
    }
}
```

### Custom Principal Resolver

Extract principal from OIDC subject:

```kotlin
import com.sphereon.di.context.PrincipalInput
import com.sphereon.di.context.PrincipalInputString
import com.sphereon.spring.resolver.PrincipalResolver
import jakarta.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest
import org.springframework.security.core.context.SecurityContextHolder
import org.springframework.security.oauth2.server.resource.authentication.JwtAuthenticationToken
import org.springframework.stereotype.Component

@Component
class OidcPrincipalResolver : PrincipalResolver {

    override fun resolve(request: HttpServletRequest): PrincipalInput {
        val authentication = SecurityContextHolder.getContext().authentication
            ?: return PrincipalInputString("anonymous")

        if (authentication is JwtAuthenticationToken) {
            val subject = authentication.token.subject
            return PrincipalInputString(subject)
        }

        return PrincipalInputString(authentication.name)
    }
}
```

## Environment Integration

The IDK's configuration system integrates with Spring's Environment:

### SpringEnvironmentConfiguration

Backs the IDK's `ConfigService` with Spring's property sources:

```kotlin
// Automatically configured
// IDK services can read Spring properties via ConfigService

@Singleton
class MyService @Inject constructor(
    private val configService: ConfigService
) {
    fun getDbUrl(): String {
        // Reads from Spring's Environment
        return configService.getProperty("spring.datasource.url")
            ?: throw IllegalStateException("Database URL not configured")
    }
}
```

### Profile Alignment

The IDK profile aligns with Spring profiles by default:

```yaml
# Spring profile
spring:
  profiles:
    active: production

# IDK profile (defaults to Spring's if not set)
sphereon:
  app:
    profile: ${spring.profiles.active}
```

## kotlin-inject Bridge

The integration bridges kotlin-inject's `@SingleIn` with Spring:

### Service Scanning

Services annotated with `@SingleIn` are discovered and registered as Spring beans:

```kotlin
import amazon.lastmile.inject.anvil.SingleIn
import com.sphereon.di.scope.AppScope
import jakarta.inject.Inject

@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
class MyIdkService @Inject constructor(
    private val database: DatabaseRouter
) {
    // This class is available as a Spring bean
}
```

### Named Qualifiers

The `@Named` qualifier from kotlin-inject works with Spring's autowiring:

```kotlin
@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
@Named("primary")
class PrimaryDataSource @Inject constructor() : DataSource

@SingleIn(AppScope::class)
@Named("replica")
class ReplicaDataSource @Inject constructor() : DataSource

// Spring can inject by name
@Service
class DataService(
    @Named("primary") private val primary: DataSource,
    @Named("replica") private val replica: DataSource
)
```

## Best Practices

**Use REST API mode for microservices.** Request-scoped contexts ensure thread safety in concurrent environments.

**Implement custom resolvers for production.** Extract tenant/principal from JWTs rather than headers for security.

**Align IDK and Spring profiles.** Keep configuration consistent across both systems.

**Monitor user lifecycle events.** Use events to initialize and clean up user-specific resources.

**Configure proper filter ordering.** Ensure `UserContextFilter` runs before your business logic filters.

---

# Per-Tenant Configuration

# Per-Tenant Configuration

The EDK has one layered configuration model that every service uses. There are three scopes:

- **App scope.** Deployment-wide config from YAML, environment variables, and cloud config providers.
- **Tenant scope.** Per-tenant config stored in the database and read at runtime.
- **Principal scope.** Per-user overrides. The narrowest scope, rarely used outside specialised flows.

The runtime combines the three, and the rule is **narrower wins**: a property defined at both the app and tenant level resolves to the tenant value inside a request bound to that tenant, and to the app value otherwise. This page covers the tenant scope; the app scope is covered in the [Roles and Topology configuration page](../../deployment/container-deployment/configuration).

## What Per-Tenant Config Holds

A per-tenant property is a dotted key (`oauth2.servers.default.issuer`, `oid4vci.issuer.signing_key_alias`, `webhook.dispatch.timeout_ms`) bound to one tenant. Two flavours:

- **Non-secret.** The value is stored directly. Examples: a tenant-specific cache TTL, a feature toggle, a per-tenant URL base.
- **Secret-bearing.** Only a reference into the configured secret backend is stored; the secret value itself lives in the backend, never in the database. Examples: an IdP client secret, an SMTP password, a webhook signing key.

Whether a property is secret-bearing is determined by the config domain that owns it, not by the caller; secret writes are routed to the secret backend automatically.

## Writing Tenant Config

Tenant administrators do not write raw config rows. Each configuration domain exposes a typed admin API that knows its own schema, its secret-bearing fields, and its validation rules: the OID4VCI issuer config (credential designs, attribute suppliers), the OID4VP verifier config (DCQL, trust), the AS config (servers, clients, federation providers), the DID method config, the integration registry, the webhook config, and the tenant admin itself for tenant-scoped infrastructure overrides. Behind each, the endpoint writes the non-secret value directly and routes the secret half through the secret backend, leaving only the reference in tenant config.

There is no raw key/value or JSONB tenant-config endpoint, by design. A raw endpoint removes type safety, makes secret classification unenforceable, and lets an administrator write values the runtime is unprepared for. Every config domain has a typed surface instead.

## Reading Tenant Config

The runtime reads through the scope chain: principal scope (usually empty), then tenant scope, then app scope. The narrowest scope that has the property wins. For a request bound to tenant `acme`, a read checks the principal scope, then `acme`'s tenant config, then falls through to the app scope. Typed config blocks bind at the appropriate scope the same way. Tenant reads are cached so a per-tenant lookup stays off the hot path.

## Secret References

A secret reference is a typed URI naming a backend and a key path:

```text
secret:vault:edk/tenant-acme/idp-client-secret
secret:aws:edk/acme/webhook-hmac
secret:azure:edk-vault/acme/oauth-client-secret
secret:k8s:acme-secrets/idp-secret
```

The same `${secret:...}` syntax works in YAML and environment variables. At read time the runtime resolves the reference through the configured backend, caches the value for a short TTL, and returns it. The reference itself is non-secret: storing references in tenant config is safe even if the database is exfiltrated, because the actual secret lives only in the backend.

When a typed admin command stores a secret-bearing property, it writes the secret value to the backend under a path derived from the tenant and property, stores the resulting reference, and records an audit event with the reference (never the plaintext) and the writer principal. The backend selection is deployment-wide; see [Application Tenant and Bootstrap](./application-tenant) for choosing it.

## Propagation Across Replicas

A tenant admin updating config on one replica must not be silently overridden by another replica serving a stale cached value. After a config write commits, the change propagates over the shared event channel to every replica, which invalidates the affected entry (or the whole tenant scope for a broad change). The next read repopulates from the database. A cache TTL covers a missed notification, so a change is visible everywhere at most one TTL window later. A deployment standardised on a different event bus (Kafka, NATS, a service mesh's eventing) can substitute its own propagation mechanism; the EDK default uses Postgres `LISTEN`/`NOTIFY`.

## The Scope Chain in Practice

A few examples that show how scopes compose:

- **Per-tenant signing key alias.** Override the default issuer signing alias for one tenant with `oid4vci.issuer.signing_key_alias = "acme-custom-alias"`. Only `acme`'s issuance reads it; other tenants keep their own or the default.
- **Per-tenant webhook timeout.** The default is 5s. Set `webhook.dispatch.timeout_ms = "30000"` for a tenant with a slow consumer; other tenants stay at 5s.
- **Per-tenant SMTP.** A tenant can ship its owner invitation emails through its own SMTP server by setting the SMTP host and a credentials reference in its tenant config; the email service consults the tenant scope when picking a transport.
- **Per-tenant external IdP client secret.** Stored as a secret reference and resolved at the federation handshake, not at config-read time.
- **Per-tenant audit signing.** Enable audit checkpoint signing for one tenant with `audit.events.signing.enabled = "true"` without enabling it deployment-wide.

## Auditing Config Changes

Every typed admin command emits a structured audit event when it writes config or a secret. The event carries the tenant id, the acting principal, the operation, the property keys touched, and (for secret writes) the new reference, never the plaintext. The audit stream is the operator's "who changed what when" record and can replicate to an external SIEM; see [Operations](../../deployment/container-deployment/operations).

---

# Deployment Architecture

# Deployment Architecture

An EDK enterprise deployment runs the published enterprise service images with the Compose stack, Helm chart, gateway examples, Postman collection, and provisioning scripts from the [Enterprise Development Kit Deployment repository](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/Enterprise-Development-Kit-Deployment).

This page is the canonical description of the public shape: the host scheme, the gateway contract a fronting layer must satisfy, and the routing table that maps host and path to a backend service. The install guides for Docker, Kubernetes, and cloud load balancers all implement what is described here, using the published `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-*` images and the deployment repository.

## Single Port, Many Tenants

The stack runs a central platform container plus the tenant runtime services. Each environment exposes one external port, `443`. Tenants are addressed by subdomain, and the gateway fans out by host and path. The only traffic that does not pass through this port is internal service-to-service traffic, including gRPC to the platform and tenant-KMS services.

This keeps the public surface small. There is one port to open and one place where TLS terminates. Adding a tenant adds a subdomain, not a port or a load balancer.

## Host Scheme

Two host classes share the single port, where `<base-domain>` is the customer-controlled deployment base domain (for example `example.com`).

- The operator host `platform.<base-domain>` carries the platform setup and admin APIs, the operator login (the platform's own authorization server), and the admin user interface at `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console`.
- Tenant hosts `<tenant>.<base-domain>`, matched by the wildcard `*.<base-domain>`, carry the per-tenant protocol surface and the per-tenant management APIs. The tenant is identified by the host, so `acme.<base-domain>` resolves tenant `acme`.

The platform and tenants are not separate DNS zones in the EDK application model. They are sibling subdomains under the same base domain. Use either a wildcard certificate for `*.<base-domain>` plus the operator host, or individual certificates for every deployed host. A wildcard certificate is the normal operating model because new tenants are created as `<tenant>.<base-domain>`. If you use individual certificates, automation must issue and renew a certificate before each tenant host goes live.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-base-domain-model.svg" alt="EDK base domain and tenant subdomain model" style={{maxWidth: '960px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

`platform` is a reserved tenant slug, so no tenant can claim the operator host. The default reserved-slug set does not include it, so a deployment adds it through configuration:

```yaml
tenant:
  resolution:
    reserved-slugs: ["platform"]
```

Reserved slugs only extend the set, they never shrink it.

## The Gateway Contract

Any fronting layer is conformant when it meets all six rules. This holds for Cilium Gateway, Traefik, AWS ALB, GKE Gateway, Azure Application Gateway, or a customer's own proxy.

1. Terminate TLS on one external port, `443`, with certificates valid for the operator host and all tenant hosts. In most deployments this is a wildcard certificate for `*.<base-domain>` plus `platform.<base-domain>`. Let's Encrypt is fine when issued with DNS-01 validation; HTTP-01 cannot validate a wildcard SAN.
2. Route by host and path to the backend service per the routing table below.
3. Preserve the inbound `Host` header end to end. The gateway must not rewrite Host to the upstream service name. This is the most important rule.
4. Set `X-Forwarded-Proto: https`, and overwrite any client-supplied `X-Forwarded-*` values rather than passing them through.
5. Do not require the tenant in the path. Tenant resolution is host-based.
6. Leave gRPC `9090` strictly east-west, never on the public port.

### Why Host Preservation Is Mandatory

Tenant resolution reads the raw `Host` header. The stack deliberately does not install the Ktor `XForwardedHeaders` plugin, and it rejects `X-Forwarded-Host` and `X-Tenant-ID` as client-controlled values. A gateway that rewrites Host to the backend name, which is a common default on some controllers including Azure AGIC, makes every request resolve to the wrong tenant or to none. Configure the gateway to forward the original public host. The [Cloud load balancers](./cloud-load-balancers) guide covers the one caveat per platform.

## Routing Table

Tenant identity comes from the host, so the gateway never peels a tenant out of the path. It matches the path prefix and forwards to the backend service on its REST port, `8080`.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-gateway-routing.svg" alt="EDK single-port gateway routing" style={{maxWidth: '980px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

### Operator Host `platform.<base-domain>`

| Path prefix | Service |
| --- | --- |
| `/api/platform/setup/v1` | platform |
| `/api/platform/admin/v1` | platform |
| `/authorize`, `/token`, `/login`, `/oauth2`, `/userinfo` | platform (operator AS) |
| `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`, `/.well-known/openid-configuration` | platform |
| `/admin-console` | admin-console |

### Tenant Host `*.<base-domain>`

| Path prefix | Service |
| --- | --- |
| `/oid4vci`, `/credential`, `/credential_deferred`, `/nonce`, `/notification`, `/public/statuslists` | issuer |
| `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` | issuer |
| `/api/oid4vci/v1`, `/api/credential-design/v1`, `/api/statuslist/v1` | issuer |
| `/oid4vp`, `/request_uri`, `/direct_post` | verifier |
| `/api/dcql/v1` | verifier |
| `/authorize`, `/token`, `/userinfo`, `/oauth2` | tenant-as |
| `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`, `/.well-known/openid-configuration`, `/.well-known/jwks.json` | tenant-as |
| `/1.0/identifiers`, `/.well-known/did.json` | did |
| `/api/did/v1` | did |
| `/api/kms/v1` | tenant-kms |

A few points about the table:

- `/authorize` and `/token` exist on both the platform AS and the tenant AS. They never collide because they live on different host classes: the operator host versus a tenant host.
- Management APIs follow the `/api/<spec-name>/v1` convention, so every service owns a distinct prefix and they all fan out on the single tenant host with no rewrite. See the [REST API reference](/edk/api) for the wire shapes. Administrative routes are not anonymous public traffic; expose them only through the documented gateway policy with bearer-token authorization.
- Tenant KMS administration is exposed only as the protected `/api/kms/v1` gateway route on the tenant host. Do not expose the KMS container hostname, container port, health route, or gRPC receiver directly. Runtime service-to-service signing traffic still stays east-west.

## Scheme and Advertised URLs

Each service advertises absolute URLs in issuer metadata, AS discovery documents, and OID4VP request URIs. Those URLs come from, in order of precedence:

1. The per-tenant public-endpoint binding (`tenant_public_endpoint`), bound for `OID4VCI_ISSUER`, `OID4VP_VERIFIER`, and `OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER` with `host=<tenant>.<base-domain>`. Provisioning binds all three per tenant. For the default hosted issuer, the OID4VCI `credential_issuer` identifier is the tenant origin, for example `https://acme.example.com`.
2. A configured issuer URL (`EXTERNAL_BASE_URL`), used by the operator AS.
3. `X-Forwarded-Proto` and `X-Forwarded-Host` when trusted, then a localhost fallback.

Because the bindings and the configured issuer URL cover every public AS, issuer, and verifier URL in this deployment, the `X-Forwarded` fallback is a backstop. The gateway still sets `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` so the fallback resolves `https` rather than the localhost default.

## What Stays Internal

The platform container is the central control service. It owns first-run setup, license activation, operator login, platform administration, platform configuration, and the small runtime bootstrap projection used by browser apps and satellites. The browser-safe endpoint is `GET /api/platform/bootstrap/v1/runtime-config/{applicationId}`. It returns an envelope with `metadata` for revision/cache diagnostics and `data.services` for allowlisted service objects: each object owns its browser-facing `baseUrl`, optional token `audience`, and named `endpoints`. Platform service objects point at the platform origin; tenant service objects such as tenant-KMS and DID point at the tenant origin when a tenant selector/public base is known. It does not return secrets, database settings, internal service DNS names, container ports, or business artifact bodies. The admin console is a separate UI container reached at `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console`; it loads that runtime projection first and then calls the platform APIs directly with the operator token or, in BFF mode, through same-origin `/admin-console/api/*` requests while the BFF keeps OAuth tokens server-side and uses configured internal service URLs for server-side platform and tenant API calls.

gRPC `9090` stays east-west only, never on the public port. The platform, tenant-KMS, wallet-unit, and wallet-interaction containers run inbound gRPC receivers. DID, tenant-AS, issuer, verifier, tenant-KMS, wallet-unit, and wallet-interaction use internal gRPC to the platform service for bootstrap discovery, platform configuration, and platform-managed data. DID, tenant-AS, issuer, and verifier use internal gRPC to tenant-KMS for key generation, signing, verification, and public-key access. Issuer and verifier call wallet-interaction, and wallet-interaction calls wallet-unit, over internal gRPC for headless wallet protocol operations. These internal routes need no public hostname. They do need platform-issued workload JWTs with the receiver audience; trusted tenant/principal headers are honored only after JWT validation and service-id binding. The [Roles and Topology](./container-deployment/topology) page covers the internal service relationships in detail.

## Next Steps

- [Install on Docker](./install-docker): the Traefik gateway overlay and a local wildcard certificate.
- [Install on Kubernetes (Cilium)](./install-kubernetes-cilium): the Cilium Gateway API and wildcard TLS.
- [Cloud load balancers](./cloud-load-balancers): ALB, GKE Gateway, and Azure AGIC conformance.
- [Provisioning and onboarding](./provisioning-and-onboarding): bring up a platform with three fully deployed tenants.

---

# Install on Docker

# Install on Docker

This guide brings up the EDK enterprise stack on Docker Compose behind the single-port Traefik gateway, using the published `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-*` images and the Docker Compose files from the [Enterprise Development Kit Deployment repository](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/Enterprise-Development-Kit-Deployment). Customer deployments use the repository's `compose/` and `scripts/` directories.

The result matches the [deployment architecture](./architecture): one external port on `443`, the operator host and tenant hosts on TLS certificates valid for those hosts, and the gateway routing by host and path. The same steps work for local evaluation and for a Docker-based environment, because the gateway implements the same contract as the Kubernetes and cloud paths. This Compose path is for evaluation; for a cluster use the [Kubernetes install](./install-kubernetes-cilium).

## Pull the Published Images

The service images are published as `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-platform`, `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-kms`, `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-did`, `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-as`, `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-wallet-unit`, `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-wallet-interaction`, `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-issuer`, and `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-verifier`; the admin UI uses `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/admin-console` when enabled. The deployment repository Compose files reference these tags, so Docker pulls them on first bring-up. See [Images and Helm chart](./enterprise-deployment/images-and-chart) for the registry coordinates and the pull secret.

## The Traefik Gateway Overlay

The deployment repository ships a base Compose file for the enterprise services and admin console, plus a gateway overlay that adds Traefik in front of them, under `compose/`.

Traefik is the Docker equivalent of the Kubernetes Cilium Gateway. Its static configuration terminates TLS on `443`, redirects `80` to `443`, and loads a hot-reloaded dynamic routing table. The dynamic configuration matches the operator host and the tenant wildcard host and forwards by path to each service, with `passHostHeader: true` so the inbound Host reaches the backend unchanged. Traefik sets `X-Forwarded-Proto` on the TLS entrypoint and overwrites untrusted client `X-Forwarded-*` values, which is exactly what the services rely on for `https` scheme detection. That satisfies the [gateway contract](./architecture#the-gateway-contract).

## Local Wildcard DNS

The base domain for local runs is `saas.localtest.me`. The `localtest.me` domain and all of its subdomains resolve to `127.0.0.1` with no host-file edits and no local DNS server. So `https://platform.saas.localtest.me` and `https://<tenant>.saas.localtest.me` both reach the gateway on your machine.

The stack starts with no customer tenants. First-run setup creates the platform operator; tenant registration later chooses each tenant slug and binds `<tenant>.saas.localtest.me`. The automated E2E suite uses `acme`, `globex`, and `initech`, but normal Compose startup does not create them.

## Local Wildcard TLS Certificate

The gateway terminates TLS, so it needs a certificate valid for `*.saas.localtest.me` and `platform.saas.localtest.me`. Generate it with the script in the deployment repository:

```bash
scripts/gen-local-wildcard-cert.sh
```

On Windows, run the PowerShell variant:

```powershell
scripts\gen-local-wildcard-cert.ps1
```

The script writes to `compose/gateway/certs/`:

- `wildcard.crt` and `wildcard.key`: the server certificate for `*.saas.localtest.me` and the platform host, mounted into Traefik.
- `local-ca.crt`: the local certificate authority. Trust this in your operating system, browser, and wallet.
- `local-truststore.p12`: a TLS truststore holding the CA, mounted into the service containers so they trust the gateway when they fetch per-tenant JWKS over TLS in development. The default password is `changeit`.

If `mkcert` is installed, the script uses it and its CA is auto-trusted once you run `mkcert -install`. Otherwise it falls back to a self-signed OpenSSL CA that you trust manually. You can re-run the script at any time; it overwrites the certificate material.

## Trust the Local CA

Browsers and wallets reject a certificate signed by an untrusted CA, so the local CA must be trusted before TLS connections succeed.

- With `mkcert`, run `mkcert -install` once. The browser then trusts the generated certificate.
- Without `mkcert`, import `compose/gateway/certs/local-ca.crt` into your operating system or browser trust store.

A real phone wallet on a separate device needs the same trust and public DNS; for that, see [Local multi-domain development](./local-multi-domain-development).

## Configure the stack

Copy `compose/.env.example` to `compose/.env` and provide the required values
before starting:

```bash
cd compose
cp .env.example .env
```

At minimum, set the pinned `EDK_TAG`, separate platform and tenant database
passwords, `EDK_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD`, `EDK_INTERNAL_CLIENT_SECRET`, and the two
issuer pipeline keys. Generate every credential independently and keep `.env`
out of version control. The keystore password protects the software PKCS#12
stores. The internal client secret is shared by satellite confidential clients
when obtaining short-lived platform-issued east-west tokens.

## Run the Stack

Start the stack with the base Compose file and the gateway overlay from the deployment repository:

```bash
docker compose \
  -f compose/docker-compose.yml \
  -f compose/docker-compose.gateway.yml \
  up -d
```

Compose pulls the eight published `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-*` images, brings up the services, and starts Traefik on the single port. Generate the local wildcard certificate first if it is missing, as described above.

With the gateway overlay, all customer traffic goes through `443` and the host-based routing described in the [architecture](./architecture#routing-table) takes effect. The service container ports are implementation details of the Compose network and are not customer endpoints.

Provide the deployment license during first-run setup, covered in [Provisioning and onboarding](./provisioning-and-onboarding) and [Platform onboarding](./enterprise-deployment/platform-onboarding).

For a real domain, replace the local certificate with a publicly trusted wildcard certificate for `*.<base-domain>` plus `platform.<base-domain>`, or configure individual certificates for every tenant host and the operator host. Because tenants are hosted as `<tenant>.<base-domain>`, wildcard TLS is the simplest production model. Let's Encrypt is supported; use DNS-01 validation for wildcard issuance.

## Open the Platform

Once the stack is ready, open the operator host:

```
https://platform.saas.localtest.me
```

Complete first-run setup there: activate the license and create the first platform operator account. After that first run, sign in with that operator account at:

```
https://platform.saas.localtest.me/admin-console
```

The two onboarding paths, interactive and scripted, are covered in [Provisioning and onboarding](./provisioning-and-onboarding). The platform first-run flow itself is detailed in [Platform onboarding](./enterprise-deployment/platform-onboarding).

## Next Steps

- [Provisioning and onboarding](./provisioning-and-onboarding): onboard the platform and create its first tenant.
- [Local multi-domain development](./local-multi-domain-development): expose the local stack to a real phone wallet.
- [Install on Kubernetes (Cilium)](./install-kubernetes-cilium): the same contract on a cluster.

---

# Install on Kubernetes (Cilium)

# Install on Kubernetes (Cilium)

This guide deploys the EDK enterprise stack on Kubernetes using the Cilium Gateway API as the single-port front door, with the published `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-*` images and the `edk-enterprise` Helm chart from `https://nexus.sphereon.com/repository/edk-helm`. The [Enterprise Development Kit Deployment repository](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/Enterprise-Development-Kit-Deployment) provides example values files and scripts.

One `Gateway` with a wildcard HTTPS listener terminates TLS for the operator host and all tenant hosts, and `HTTPRoute`s fan out by host and path. The result satisfies the [gateway contract](./architecture#the-gateway-contract): Cilium Gateway preserves the inbound Host header by default, so tenant resolution works without extra tuning.

## Prerequisites

Before installing, create the target namespace and all credentials described in
[Images and Helm chart](./enterprise-deployment/images-and-chart):

- registry pull credentials;
- separate platform and tenant database credential Secrets;
- a runtime Secret containing independently generated `internal-client-secret`
  and `keystore-password` values;
- a wildcard TLS Secret, unless cert-manager will create it;
- a pinned enterprise image tag from your OEM, MSP, or EDK distribution channel.

The chart does not deploy PostgreSQL or generate these credentials. The runtime
Secret name must be configured through
`serviceIdentity.internalClientExistingSecret` and `keystore.existingSecret`.

## The edk-enterprise Helm Gateway Values

The `edk-enterprise` Helm chart renders the `Gateway` and the per-service `HTTPRoute`s from a `gateway.*` values block. The deployment repository ships an example values file at `helm/edk-enterprise/examples/gateway-cilium-values.yaml`:

```yaml
gateway:
  enabled: true
  className: cilium
  operatorHost: platform
  baseDomain: example.com
  tls:
    mode: secret
    secretName: edk-wildcard-tls
  httpRedirect: true

ingress:
  legacy:
    enabled: false
```

The fields map directly to the host scheme and contract:

- `enabled: true` turns on the Gateway and HTTPRoutes.
- `className: cilium` selects the Cilium GatewayClass.
- `operatorHost: platform` and `baseDomain: example.com` produce the operator host `platform.example.com` and the tenant wildcard `*.example.com`.
- `tls.mode` and the cert fields configure wildcard TLS, covered below.
- `httpRedirect: true` adds an HTTP listener on `80` that redirects to HTTPS.

The rendered `Gateway` has a single HTTPS listener on port `443` with hostname `*.example.com`, `tls.mode: Terminate`, and a certificate reference. That one wildcard listener serves both the operator host and every tenant host.

## Wildcard TLS

The listener needs TLS material valid for the operator host and every tenant host. A wildcard certificate for `*.example.com` covers first-level subdomains, including `platform.example.com` and tenant hosts such as `acme.example.com`. You may still list `platform.example.com` explicitly as a SAN when your CA, gateway, or audit policy expects it. Individual certificates per tenant host also work, but tenant onboarding must provision the certificate before that tenant host is made public.

### TLS Secret

Set `tls.mode: secret` and reference a pre-created Kubernetes TLS secret holding the wildcard certificate and key:

```yaml
gateway:
  tls:
    mode: secret
    secretName: edk-wildcard-tls
```

Create the secret from a certificate you already hold, for example one issued by your corporate CA or an external ACME flow.

### cert-manager with DNS-01

To issue and renew the wildcard automatically, use cert-manager with a DNS-01 solver. A wildcard SAN cannot be validated with HTTP-01, so DNS-01 is required. Set `tls.mode: certManager` and the cluster issuer; the chart then annotates the Gateway with `cert-manager.io/cluster-issuer` so cert-manager provisions the wildcard certificate into the referenced secret:

```yaml
gateway:
  tls:
    mode: certManager
    clusterIssuer: letsencrypt-dns01
    secretName: edk-wildcard-tls
```

Configure the cluster issuer with a DNS provider that can answer the `_acme-challenge` records for your base domain.

## Disabling the Legacy Ingress

`ingress.legacy.enabled: false` turns off the classic per-service Ingress objects so the Gateway is the only public entry point. Leave the legacy ingress disabled on Cilium; it exists for cloud load balancer paths that route through classic Ingress, covered in [Cloud load balancers](./cloud-load-balancers).

## Install the Chart

Install or upgrade the chart with a database overlay, the Cilium gateway overlay,
and your environment-specific domain and image settings. The example below uses
the in-cluster Postgres overlay; use the managed Postgres overlay when applicable:

```bash
helm repo add edk-helm https://nexus.sphereon.com/repository/edk-helm --username <username> --password <token>

helm upgrade --install edk-enterprise edk-helm/edk-enterprise \
  --namespace edk \
  -f helm/edk-enterprise/examples/shared-postgres-values.yaml \
  -f helm/edk-enterprise/examples/gateway-cilium-values.yaml \
  --set global.imageTag=<enterprise-version> \
  --set 'global.imagePullSecrets[0]=edk-registry-credentials' \
  --set global.platformBaseDomain=example.com \
  --set gateway.baseDomain=example.com \
  --set platform.externalBaseUrl=https://platform.example.com \
  --set platform.bootstrap.issuer=https://platform.example.com \
  --set serviceIdentity.internalClientExistingSecret=edk-runtime-secrets \
  --set keystore.existingSecret=edk-runtime-secrets
```

Render with the same values before installing. Missing runtime Secret references
are Helm errors. A configured name whose Secret object or keys do not exist is a
Kubernetes startup error; inspect pod events for `secret ... not found` or
`couldn't find key ...` without printing Secret data.

After the release is ready, point your wildcard DNS record `*.example.com` and the operator host at the Gateway's external address. The operator host then resolves at `https://platform.example.com` and each tenant at `https://<tenant>.example.com`.

## Relationship to the East-West Network Policy

The Gateway handles north-south public traffic. Internal service-to-service traffic, including KMS command routing over gRPC `9090`, stays east-west and is governed by a separate `CiliumNetworkPolicy`. The gRPC port is never placed on the public Gateway. Keep the east-west policy in place so the tenant runtime services can reach tenant KMS and the platform configuration service while the public surface stays limited to the single HTTPS listener. The [Roles and Topology](./container-deployment/topology) page describes which services talk to which.

## Next Steps

- [Cloud load balancers](./cloud-load-balancers): ALB, GKE Gateway, and Azure AGIC.
- [Provisioning and onboarding](./provisioning-and-onboarding): onboard a platform with three fully deployed tenants.
- [Deployment architecture](./architecture): the contract and routing table this install implements.

---

# Cloud Load Balancers

# Cloud Load Balancers

The [gateway contract](./architecture#the-gateway-contract) is provider-neutral. AWS, Google Cloud, and Azure each have a managed load balancer that can front the EDK enterprise stack on a single port, terminate wildcard TLS, and route by host and path. This page covers how each one conforms and the single gotcha to watch for on each platform. The `edk-enterprise` chart ships an example values file per platform under `helm/edk-enterprise/examples/`.

Two general shapes appear across the three platforms:

- Gateway API path: set `gateway.enabled: true` with the platform's GatewayClass, and `ingress.legacy.enabled: false`. The Gateway and HTTPRoutes fan out by host and path exactly as the [Cilium install](./install-kubernetes-cilium) does.
- Classic Ingress path: set `gateway.enabled: false` and `ingress.legacy.enabled: true`, then configure per-service public ingress hosts and the platform's load balancer annotations.

## AWS Application Load Balancer

Example values: `helm/edk-enterprise/examples/gateway-aws-alb-values.yaml`.

On AWS you can either use the AWS Gateway API controller (set `gateway.enabled: true` with the ALB Gateway class) or the classic Ingress path with the AWS Load Balancer Controller. The example file uses the classic path, which is the common choice: one internet-facing ALB terminates TLS on `443` and routes by host and path. The ALB controller groups Ingress objects that share a `group.name` annotation into a single load balancer, so all public hosts land on one ALB and one port.

ALB preserves the inbound Host header and sets `X-Forwarded-Proto` by default, so it satisfies the contract without extra tuning.

The gotcha is the certificate. Use one ACM wildcard certificate for `*.example.com`, which covers the operator host `platform.example.com` and every tenant host such as `acme.example.com`, and reference it by ARN:

```yaml
ingress:
  legacy:
    enabled: true
  public:
    annotations:
      alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/scheme: internet-facing
      alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/listen-ports: '[{"HTTPS":443}]'
      alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/certificate-arn: arn:aws:acm:us-east-1:123456789012:certificate/REPLACE-WITH-WILDCARD-CERT
      alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/ssl-redirect: "443"
      alb.ingress.kubernetes.io/group.name: edk-enterprise
```

## GKE Gateway

Example values: `helm/edk-enterprise/examples/gateway-gke-values.yaml`.

On GKE, use the Gateway API. One wildcard HTTPS listener terminates TLS for the operator host and all tenant hosts, and HTTPRoutes fan out by host and path. The classic per-service Ingress objects are disabled so the Gateway is the only public entry point.

GKE Gateway preserves the inbound Host header and sets `X-Forwarded-Proto` by default, so it satisfies the contract without extra tuning.

The gotcha is the managed certificate and DNS. Wildcard TLS for `*.example.com` has two options. The simple one is `tls.mode: secret`, which references a pre-created Kubernetes TLS secret. The Google-managed option provisions a Certificate Manager managed certificate for `*.example.com`, and a wildcard SAN requires DNS authorization rather than load-balancer authorization. Bind the managed certificate to the Gateway with a `networking.gke.io/certmap` annotation instead of a secret reference.

```yaml
gateway:
  enabled: true
  className: gke-l7-global-external-managed
  operatorHost: platform
  baseDomain: example.com
  tls:
    mode: secret
    secretName: edk-wildcard-tls
  httpRedirect: true

ingress:
  legacy:
    enabled: false
```

## Azure Application Gateway (AGIC)

Example values: `helm/edk-enterprise/examples/gateway-azure-agic-values.yaml`.

On Azure, the example uses the Application Gateway Ingress Controller (AGIC) classic Ingress path. One Application Gateway terminates TLS on `443` and routes by host and path.

The gotcha on Azure is host preservation, and it is the one that breaks tenant routing if missed. AGIC by default rewrites the Host header to the backend pool address before forwarding upstream. Tenant resolution reads the raw inbound Host header, so a rewritten Host makes every request resolve to the wrong tenant or to none. You must keep the original public Host on the way to the backend. Do one of the following:

- Set `appgw.ingress.kubernetes.io/backend-hostname` to the public host per service so the forwarded Host matches the inbound host. For tenant hosts this is the wildcard tenant host.
- Or disable host override on the Application Gateway HTTP setting or backend pool so the inbound Host passes through unchanged.

Verify with a request to a tenant host that the backend sees the original Host and not the pod or service name.

```yaml
ingress:
  legacy:
    enabled: true
  public:
    annotations:
      kubernetes.io/ingress.class: azure/application-gateway
      appgw.ingress.kubernetes.io/ssl-redirect: "true"
      appgw.ingress.kubernetes.io/appgw-ssl-certificate: edk-wildcard
services:
  platform:
    publicIngress:
      className: azure-application-gateway
      host: platform.example.com
      annotations:
        appgw.ingress.kubernetes.io/backend-hostname: platform.example.com
```

Wildcard TLS for `*.example.com` is supplied either from Azure Key Vault, with `appgw-ssl-certificate` referencing a pre-uploaded certificate as shown, or from a Kubernetes TLS secret referenced in the Ingress `tls` block.

## Next Steps

- [Deployment architecture](./architecture): the full contract and routing table.
- [Install on Kubernetes (Cilium)](./install-kubernetes-cilium): the Gateway API path on a self-managed cluster.
- [Provisioning and onboarding](./provisioning-and-onboarding): bring up a platform with three tenants.

---

# Local Multi-Domain Development

# Local Multi-Domain Development

The single-port multi-tenant model needs a base domain with a wildcard so the operator host and the tenant hosts resolve. Locally this works with no DNS setup at all. To test with a real phone wallet on a separate device, expose the stack on a public wildcard domain. This page covers both.

:::note Deployment repository boundary

The loopback default in the first section uses the [Enterprise Development Kit Deployment repository](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/Enterprise-Development-Kit-Deployment): the Compose stack and the single-port Traefik gateway under `compose/`, with the local wildcard certificate from `scripts/gen-local-wildcard-cert`. For phone-wallet testing, bring your own tunnel or public DNS/TLS setup while keeping the same gateway contract.

:::

## Default: saas.localtest.me, No DNS

The default base domain for local runs is `saas.localtest.me`. The `localtest.me` domain and all of its subdomains resolve to `127.0.0.1` without any host-file edits or a local DNS server. So both the operator host and the tenant hosts work immediately:

- `https://platform.saas.localtest.me` is the operator host.
- `https://acme.saas.localtest.me`, `https://globex.saas.localtest.me`, and `https://initech.saas.localtest.me` are the three default tenants.

This is enough for browser-based development on the same machine that runs the stack. Follow [Install on Docker](./install-docker) to bring it up behind the Traefik gateway, generate the local wildcard certificate, and trust the local CA. Because `localtest.me` resolves to loopback, this path does not reach a phone or another device.

## Public Overlay for a Real Phone Wallet

A real wallet on a phone needs two things the loopback default cannot give it: public DNS that resolves from the phone, and a certificate the phone trusts. The wildcard requirement does not change: the public domain still needs `platform.<base-domain>` and `*.<base-domain>` to reach the operator host and the tenant hosts on one port. Two tunnels provide this.

Configure your tunnel to terminate or pass through TLS for `platform.<base-domain>` and `*.<base-domain>`, forward traffic to the local gateway on `443`, and preserve the original Host header. Set the deployment base domain in the deployment repository environment to the public base domain before bringing the stack up, then run the normal Compose files.

### ngrok Wildcard

An ngrok wildcard endpoint gives a public `*.{subdomain}.ngrok.dev` style domain that tunnels to the local gateway on `443`. Point the deployment base domain at the ngrok wildcard so the operator host and tenant hosts resolve publicly, and ngrok terminates TLS with a publicly trusted certificate, so the phone wallet trusts it with no local CA import. A reserved wildcard domain keeps the host stable across runs, which matters because issued credentials and advertised issuer URLs embed the host.

### Cloudflare Tunnel

A Cloudflare Tunnel maps a wildcard hostname on a domain you control to the local gateway. Cloudflare serves a publicly trusted certificate for the wildcard, so the phone wallet trusts the connection without importing the local CA. Configure the tunnel to forward to the gateway on `443` and preserve the Host header so tenant resolution still reads the right tenant.

Either overlay keeps the single-port model intact: the tunnel is the public front, and behind it the gateway routes by host and path exactly as in [Install on Docker](./install-docker).

## Tier 3: Your Own Domain plus Let's Encrypt

The tunnel overlays put someone else's front in the path. If you control a domain and can point its public DNS at this machine, Traefik can obtain and renew a publicly trusted Let's Encrypt certificate directly, with no tunnel. The single-port model is unchanged: the operator host is `platform.<base-domain>`, tenants are `*.<base-domain>`, the tenant is identified by the inbound `Host`, and the gateway preserves that Host end to end.

Configure Traefik, your gateway, or your DNS provider to obtain certificates for the operator host and tenant hosts. For arbitrary tenants, use DNS-01 and issue a wildcard certificate for `*.<base-domain>` plus `platform.<base-domain>`. If you use per-host certificates, issue certificates for every tenant host before exposing that tenant.

The operator host `platform.<base-domain>` and the wildcard `*.<base-domain>` must both resolve publicly to this machine's external IP.

### Certificate Modes

Two certificate models work:

- Per-host certificates for the operator host and each named tenant host. This is useful for a fixed demo tenant set, but every new tenant needs certificate issuance before it can go live.
- A wildcard certificate for `*.<base-domain>` plus the operator host `platform.<base-domain>`. This is the recommended model for arbitrary tenant subdomains. Use DNS-01 validation with your DNS provider when using ACME, because HTTP-01 cannot validate a wildcard SAN.

### Pointing DNS at This Machine

Public DNS for `platform.<base-domain>` and `*.<base-domain>` must resolve to this machine's external IPv4 (an `A` record) and, if used, external IPv6 (an `AAAA` record). Keep any CDN or proxy mode off (orange-cloud off on Cloudflare) so the gateway sees the raw `Host` and terminates TLS itself. Tenant resolution reads the unrewritten Host, and TLS-ALPN requires the gateway to own the TLS handshake.

If you run dynamic DNS, update the records before starting the public test and confirm they resolve from outside your network.

### Port Forwarding

Forward inbound TCP `443` from the external IP to this machine. The two challenge modes differ in what `443` is for:

- `tls-alpn` rides `443` for both issuance and serving, so `443` is all it needs.
- `dns` validates over DNS, so `443` is needed only to serve traffic, not to issue the certificate.

Forward `:80` only if you want the `web` to `websecure` HTTP-to-HTTPS redirect reachable from outside. Neither challenge needs `:80` for issuance, because this option does not use the HTTP-01 challenge.

The box reaching its own public hostnames through NAT needs router hairpin (loopback) support, which many home routers lack. If hairpin is unavailable, add a local hosts or `dnsmasq` entry mapping `platform.<base-domain>` and the tenant hosts to `127.0.0.1` or the box's LAN IP. The Let's Encrypt certificate stays valid either way, because certificate validity does not depend on how the name resolves locally. In-compose service-to-service calls already work through the Traefik network aliases, and because the certificate is publicly trusted, the services validate the gateway TLS with the image trust roots. This mode mounts no private CA truststore, unlike the self-signed overlay.

### Staging First

When you use ACME automation, run against the ACME staging endpoint first to validate DNS and reachability without burning production rate limits. Switch to the production endpoint only after the gateway serves the staging certificate correctly.

### Public Exposure Warning

This option binds the machine to the public internet on `443` and exposes the operator console and every tenant endpoint publicly. Use a disposable test domain, keep the machine patched, restrict the router forward to `443` only, and tear the stack down when you are done.

## CA Trust

How you handle CA trust depends on the front:

- With the loopback default and a self-signed local CA, import `local-ca.crt` into the device's trust store, or run `mkcert -install` when `mkcert` issued the certificate. See [Install on Docker](./install-docker#trust-the-local-ca).
- With an ngrok wildcard or a Cloudflare Tunnel, the public front terminates TLS with a publicly trusted certificate, so no local CA import is needed on the phone.
- With your own domain plus Let's Encrypt, Traefik serves a publicly trusted certificate directly, so no local CA import is needed on the phone.

When the public overlay terminates TLS itself, the local wildcard certificate is no longer on the public path. It still serves any direct browser access on the loopback host during the same run.

## Local Equals Production

The host scheme, the gateway contract, and the routing table are the same locally and in production. The only differences are the base domain and where TLS terminates. A flow that works at `https://acme.saas.localtest.me` works the same way at `https://acme.example.com`, because both resolve the tenant from the Host header and route by the same paths. See the [deployment architecture](./architecture) for the contract that holds across every environment.

## Next Steps

- [Install on Docker](./install-docker): the local gateway and certificate setup.
- [Provisioning and onboarding](./provisioning-and-onboarding): onboard a platform with three fully deployed tenants.
- [Deployment architecture](./architecture): the host scheme and routing table.

---

# Provisioning and Onboarding

# Provisioning and Onboarding

This page takes a freshly installed EDK deployment to a working platform with its first tenant. There are two paths to the same end state. The interactive path uses the onboarding web interface and the admin UI; the scripted path uses the provision script from the deployment repository. Pick whichever fits how you operate. Both produce an identical result: an active license, a closed setup gate, an operator account that can sign in at `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console`, and a tenant with an issuer, a verifier, and an authorization server bound to public endpoints.

The deployment being onboarded must use the matched enterprise image and chart versions delivered through your OEM, MSP, or EDK distribution channel. The default distribution coordinates use the private Nexus Docker repository `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker` and Helm repository `https://nexus.sphereon.com/repository/edk-helm`; a distributor may provide mirrors.

Before starting, complete one of the install guides so the stack is running:

- [Install on Docker](./install-docker) for a local or Docker-based environment.
- [Install on Kubernetes (Cilium)](./install-kubernetes-cilium) for a cluster.

Before onboarding, confirm every required workload is running. Kubernetes pods
must not be in `CreateContainerConfigError`; the runtime Secret must contain both
`internal-client-secret` and `keystore-password`. In Compose, `.env` must contain
the corresponding `EDK_INTERNAL_CLIENT_SECRET` and `EDK_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD`
values. Tenant registration provisions keys and endpoints through these
already-running east-west services.

On the local base domain a tenant is reachable at `<tenant>.saas.localtest.me`, with the operator at `platform.saas.localtest.me`.

## Local Equals Production

The steps below are the same locally and in production. Only the base domain and the TLS termination point differ. A platform onboarded at `https://platform.saas.localtest.me` follows the exact same setup, tenant creation, and public-endpoint binding as one onboarded at `https://platform.example.com`. Treat the local run as a faithful rehearsal of the production onboarding.

## Path 1: Interactive

The interactive path is the recommended one when a person is installing or evaluating the platform.

1. Open the operator host in a browser: `https://platform.<base-domain>` (locally `https://platform.saas.localtest.me`).
2. Complete first-run setup in the onboarding web interface: establish the license (generate a license request or import an issued token) and create the first platform operator account. Both must complete before the deployment is usable; the setup gate then closes. The full first-run contract and the onboarding paths are covered in [Platform onboarding](./enterprise-deployment/platform-onboarding).
3. Sign in as the platform operator through the platform authorization server. After the license is active and the operator account exists, the normal entry point is `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console`. See [Operator sign-in](./enterprise-deployment/operator-sign-in).
4. Create the tenant in the admin UI. Registering a tenant gives it routing, isolation, and an owner.
5. For the tenant, configure its services and bind a public endpoint for the issuer, the verifier, and the authorization server, so the tenant advertises and serves them at its own host. The binding step is covered in [Instance deployment](./instance-deployment), and the per-service configuration in [Roles and Topology](./container-deployment/overview).

After the tenant's endpoints are bound, the platform is onboarded. The tenant resolves from its host and serves its protocol surface on the single port. Repeat the tenant steps for each additional tenant.

## Path 2: Scripted

The scripted path suits a deployment that is CI-driven or managed by your own installer. It uses the provision script from the [Enterprise Development Kit Deployment repository](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/Enterprise-Development-Kit-Deployment) (`scripts/provision.ps1` on Windows, `scripts/provision.sh` elsewhere), which calls the published REST APIs directly against the running deployment.

1. Fill in the Postman customer environment file (`postman/EDK-Enterprise-Deployment.customer.postman_environment.json`) with the base domain, platform gateway URL, tenant slug, operator credentials, operator sign-in parameters, and the protected license bundle path. The script derives `https://platform.<base-domain>` and `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>` routes from those values and never calls workload containers directly.
2. Run the provision script:

   ```bash
   scripts/provision.sh
   ```

   On Windows, run `scripts\provision.ps1`. The script checks the platform gateway setup route, runs platform setup only if the setup gate is still open, signs the operator in through the authorization-code flow with PKCE, registers the tenant, waits for tenant onboarding to complete, and verifies the tenant gateway bindings. Setup is idempotent: when the gate is already closed, the script skips it and continues, so it is safe to re-run.

3. Override values per run with the flags: `--env-file` selects a different environment file, `--tenant-name` and `--tenant-slug` set the tenant, and `--skip-setup` skips platform setup when the platform is already initialized. On Windows the equivalents are `-EnvFile`, `-TenantName`, `-TenantSlug`, and `-SkipSetup`.
4. When the run finishes, the script prints the operator console URL, the tenant id, and the public tenant gateway URLs for issuer metadata, AS metadata, and `did.json` so you can confirm the tenant is live.

The Postman collection and the customer environment ship in the deployment repository under `postman/` and are also available from the walkthrough [downloads page](./enterprise-deployment/downloads). The collection walks the same onboarding flow request by request, plus the later keys, credential design, status list, issuance, and verification steps. The request and response examples for every call are shown across the [Enterprise deployment walkthrough](./enterprise-deployment/overview); for the wire shapes, follow the [REST API reference](/edk/api) links on each page rather than hand-copying request bodies.

## Verifying the End State

Whichever path you took, the deployment is onboarded when all of the following hold:

- The license is active and the setup gate is closed; the anonymous setup API returns `404`.
- The platform operator can sign in at `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console` and call the Platform Admin API at `/api/platform/admin/v1`.
- The tenant resolves from its host and has a bound issuer, verifier, and authorization server public endpoint.

From here, exercise credential issuance and verification per tenant. The [Enterprise deployment walkthrough](./enterprise-deployment/overview) covers keys and `did:web`, credential designs, status lists, issuance over OID4VCI, DCQL queries, and verification over OID4VP.

## Next Steps

- [Platform onboarding](./enterprise-deployment/platform-onboarding): the first-run setup contract in depth.
- [Instance deployment](./instance-deployment): binding a tenant's public endpoints.
- [Enterprise deployment walkthrough](./enterprise-deployment/overview): the full end-to-end API run.

---

# Roles and Topology Overview

---
id: overview
title: Roles and Topology Overview
sidebar_label: Overview
description: The EDK enterprise containers delivered to customers, how the platform service and tenant runtime services relate, and how a typical deployment is laid out
---

# Roles and Topology

The EDK is consumable in two ways. Library customers depend on EDK modules from the authenticated Maven repository supplied through their distribution channel and assemble whatever process shape suits them; see [Installation](../../guides/getting-started#installation) for the repository and dependency setup. Container customers run pre-built enterprise service images and configure them through REST and YAML. This section is for the second group.

:::important
Enterprise container images and the `edk-enterprise` Helm chart are delivered through an OEM, MSP, or EDK distribution channel. A customer deployment pulls the delivered images and installs the chart from the [Enterprise Development Kit Deployment repository](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/Enterprise-Development-Kit-Deployment). Use the matched image tag and Helm chart version supplied with that delivery.
:::

The shipped images are enterprise runtime assemblies. Customers consume them as published artifacts; they do not build them from source.

The enterprise distribution contains eight service images:

- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-platform`: the internal platform service for first-run setup, platform administration, platform configuration, license/config distribution, and the platform-only authorization server.
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-kms`: the cryptographic authority for tenant runtime services. Every other tenant service delegates key generation, signing, encryption, and public-key lookup to it. Customers reach its protected management API only through the tenant gateway route.
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-did`: a public DID resolver plus an internal admin and registrar surface for `did:web`, `did:webvh`, `did:jwk`, and `did:key`.
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-as`: an OAuth 2.0 / OpenID authorization server scoped to the flows that EDK needs first-hand: the OID4VCI pre-authorized code grant, the OID4VCI authorization code grant via wallet federation, and client-credentials issuance for tenant service clients.
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-wallet-unit`: the server-side wallet-unit lifecycle and policy gate for wallet-held key operations.
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-wallet-interaction`: the headless wallet interaction runtime used by issuer and verifier flows for OID4VCI, OID4VP, and wallet-mediated presentation handling.
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-issuer`: the OpenID4VCI credential issuer: protocol endpoints (`/credential`, `/credential_deferred`, `/nonce`, `/notification`), the attribute pipeline, the credential-design store, deferred and approved issuance, and the async-callback ingress.
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-verifier`: the OpenID4VP verifier: `request_uri`, `direct_post`, DCQL query store with versioning, per-tenant trust frames, and presentation callbacks.
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/admin-console`: the operator admin UI, served at `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console` through the gateway.

These are exactly the container roles. There is no combined "everything" image, and there is no per-tenant fan-out at the EDK level. Each image is one process. Each runtime image is one logical entity (one issuer, one verifier, one tenant AS, one wallet-interaction service, and so on) that becomes multi-tenant by resolving the active tenant from each request.

## Distribution

The default distribution serves the service and admin-console images through the authenticated Docker registry at `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker`. Your OEM, MSP, or EDK distributor may supply mirror coordinates and credentials. Customers use standard Docker authentication and pin the delivered version tag. The `edk-enterprise` Helm chart and baseline `application.yaml` profiles are delivered alongside the images.

Each published image carries a version tag and records its source revision in the OCI labels and `/version` output. Pin the exact tag supplied for the delivery rather than tracking `:latest`.

Each native service image carries one service application and its static default configuration. It runs as a non-root user (uid 10001) and serves REST on port 8080. The admin console is a Next.js server on port 3000. All runtime behaviour is driven through the standard EDK configuration layering: environment variables, mounted YAML overlays, platform configuration, cloud config providers, and per-tenant configuration in the tenant workload database.

Platform, tenant-KMS, wallet-unit, and wallet-interaction run inbound gRPC command receivers. Satellite services call the platform over internal gRPC for platform configuration and platform-managed state. DID, tenant-AS, issuer, and verifier call tenant-KMS for KMS operations. Issuer and verifier call wallet-interaction, which calls wallet-unit for policy-gated wallet operations. gRPC is east-west only and is never published through the public gateway. Internal calls carry platform-issued workload JWTs for the receiver audience; trusted tenant/principal headers are accepted only after JWT validation and service-id binding.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-container-topology.svg" alt="EDK roles and topology" style={{maxWidth: '980px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## How the Roles Were Drawn

The split into platform, KMS, DID, AS, Issuer, Verifier, and admin console follows where attack surfaces and access patterns actually diverge, not microservice fashion.

The platform is the central control service. It owns first-run setup, license activation, operator login, platform administration, and platform configuration. Keeping it separate from the tenant AS prevents operator administration flows from being confused with customer tenant OAuth/OIDC flows.

The KMS sees raw key material and signing requests, so it has no business being exposed as a raw container endpoint. Runtime services call it from the internal cluster network. Tenant operators use the protected `/api/kms/v1` tenant gateway route for provider and key administration; container hostnames, health routes, and gRPC stay private.

The DID service is the inverse: its primary value is public resolution. Wallets, other issuers, other verifiers, and arbitrary internet clients need to be able to fetch `did:web` documents and Universal Resolver responses. Splitting DID out of the issuer and verifier images keeps the public surface they expose down to just their protocol endpoints, and lets DID scale horizontally for resolution traffic independently of the issuer's pipeline workload.

The AS, Issuer, and Verifier each own one OAuth or OpenID protocol family. They have both wallet-facing protocol routes and protected tenant-administration routes. The deployment template puts both behind the tenant gateway host, with bearer-JWT authorization on the administrative routes.

## Tenant Resolution Across The Runtime Images

The tenant runtime images embed the same EDK tenant resolution stack. The resolved tenant is the unit of routing and the unit of authorization. Tenants are recognised from the incoming request through a layered resolver chain:

- **JWT** is the primary source for any authenticated call. The `tenant_id` claim in the bearer token is authoritative. The `X-Tenant-Id` header is informational only and is never trusted on its own.
- **Subdomain** of the configured platform base host. `acme.example.com` resolves to the `acme` tenant.
- **Custom domain** mapped to a tenant via the `TenantDomain` registry once the domain has been verified.
- **Path slug** prefix. `/{tenant-slug}/oid4vci/credential` and the various `.well-known` URL forms route into the same tenant.

For the protocol metadata endpoints, the EDK supports both the spec-canonical form and the legacy slug-before-`.well-known` form, because clients in the field use both:

- OID4VCI: `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer/{tenant-slug}` (spec) and `/{tenant-slug}/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` (legacy).
- OAuth AS metadata: `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/{tenant-slug}` (spec) and the legacy variant.
- OpenID Connect: `/{tenant-slug}/.well-known/openid-configuration` (the spec form expects slug-before).

The tenant administrator declares slugs and verified custom domains through the tenant admin REST. Runtime services consume from the registry; they never invent slugs or guess.

## How the Enterprise Images Compose

A typical deployment looks like this:

- One platform instance for setup, license activation, operator login, platform administration, platform configuration, and central platform-managed distribution.
- One tenant KMS instance, sized for the deployment's signing rate. Backed by the tenant workload database for key-reference bookkeeping; actual key material lives in the configured provider backend (software keystore, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, Digidentity CSC, an HSM).
- One DID resolver instance behind the tenant gateway, scaled horizontally if resolution traffic warrants it. Protected DID management paths are routed through the same tenant gateway policy.
- One tenant AS instance handling the wallet-facing OAuth surface and the per-tenant federation/discovery/JWKS endpoints.
- One Issuer instance handling the wallet-facing OID4VCI protocol surface plus the credential design, attribute supplier, integration, and webhook admin surfaces.
- One Verifier instance handling the wallet-facing OID4VP surface plus the DCQL versioned store, trust-frame admin, and webhook admin surfaces.
- One admin-console instance routed at `/admin-console` on the platform host.
- Two PostgreSQL database roles: a platform database owned by the platform service, and a tenant workload database shared by the tenant runtime images with one schema per tenant. Replicas of a runtime image share the same tenant workload database and route into the schema for the resolved tenant.

For a high-traffic deployment, each role scales horizontally. Cross-replica cache invalidation is handled through Postgres `LISTEN/NOTIFY` plus a TTL fallback, so tenant routing, public-endpoint binding, and per-tenant config mutations made on one replica become visible on the others without a restart and without rebooting the cluster.

## What This Section Covers

- [Topology](./topology): the gateway routes, network policies, service-to-service auth, the split platform and tenant workload databases, and how a customer typically lays out namespaces and ingress classes.
- [KMS Container](./kms): provider registration, per-tenant key aliases, the protected tenant REST surface, and the internal gRPC command route that runtime services use for signing and key operations.
- [DID Container](./did): the public resolver, the manager admin, per-tenant method allowlists, the `did:web` and `did:webvh` publishing model.
- [AS Container](./as): the tenant OAuth/OIDC surface that EDK currently supports, tenant federation, signing-key binding to KMS, the discovery URL forms.
- [Issuer Container](./issuer): protocol endpoints, the attribute pipeline, the credential-design store, integration kinds for AS binding and attribute suppliers, webhooks.
- [Verifier Container](./verifier): protocol endpoints, the DCQL versioned store, per-tenant trust-frame binding, presentation callbacks.
- [Configuration & Secrets](./configuration): the `application.yaml` profile, environment variable mapping, per-tenant config storage, secret backends.
- [Operations](./operations): health, readiness, OpenTelemetry, audit, backup and restore.

## What This Section Does Not Cover

Several capabilities that are sometimes associated with a broader production platform are deliberately out of scope for this EDK deployment section:

- Multi-instance per tenant (N issuers, N verifiers, N AS instances per tenant for different credential programs or business units).
- Building or publishing the enterprise images locally.
- Tenant self-service onboarding flows beyond the REST endpoints.
- License validation, billing, and metering.
- Durable workflow execution (sagas, long-running schedulable commands).
- Cross-tenant catalog projection.
- MFA, account self-service, and a full IAM admin UI on the AS.

Treat those as separate platform capabilities, not as features of the EDK deployment kit.

---

# Deployment Topology

# Deployment Topology

The EDK enterprise images are split because the network surface, the access pattern, and the operational lifecycle of each role are genuinely different. The platform container is the central control service. Tenant-KMS is the internal cryptographic authority. Wallet-unit and wallet-interaction provide the internal headless wallet runtime. DID, tenant-AS, issuer, and verifier are tenant runtime services. The admin console is a UI container served on the platform host.

## Public Versus Internal Surface

Each container has both a public and an internal surface, but the proportions are very different.

The platform exposes the operator authorization-server protocol surface and the `/admin-console` UI on `platform.<base-domain>`. Setup and platform-admin APIs are available only under the platform host and must be protected after first run. The platform service is also the central configuration/control service that other services call internally.

The KMS is never exposed as a raw container endpoint. Issuer, verifier, tenant-AS, and DID call into it across the cluster network. Operators reach KMS administration through the protected tenant gateway route, not by publishing KMS container ports or service DNS names to the internet.

The DID container has public resolver/document routes and protected management routes (`did:web` publishing, `did:webvh` log management, manager admin REST, method enable/disable per tenant). Public DID resolution is its primary job, so the deployment template binds the resolver and document paths to the tenant gateway and protects the management paths with bearer-token policy.

The AS, Issuer, and Verifier each have wallet-facing protocol routes and protected tenant-administrator routes. The protocol surface is what wallets and external clients hit (`/oid4vci/...`, `/oid4vp/...`, `/authorize`, `/token`, `/.well-known/...`). The admin surface lives under `/api/.../v1/...` and is meant for tenant operators and the platform admin only. Wallet-unit and wallet-interaction are internal services; customers do not publish their raw container endpoints. The gateway enforces the split: unauthenticated protocol and well-known paths are allowed where the protocol requires them, while administrative paths require a bearer JWT with the right scopes.

## Service-to-Service Auth

Once a request lands on the issuer, the verifier, or the AS, those containers may call the platform for tenant/platform configuration, the KMS for signing, the DID resolver for verifying counterparty signatures, or each other for cross-protocol operations. Those calls cross trust boundaries inside the cluster, so they are not unauthenticated.

The Helm chart renders one service-identity contract from `serviceIdentity.clientIds`, `serviceIdentity.serviceIds`, and `serviceIdentity.audiences`. The platform authorization server is the STS for workload tokens. Each runtime service presents its confidential client id to the platform AS, receives a short-lived JWT for the downstream receiver audience, and asserts its workload id as `X-Service-Id` on the internal command transport.

The receiving service's expected audience and the caller route's requested
audience must resolve to the same `serviceIdentity.audiences.<receiver>` value.
They are different from the caller registration's
`default-access-token-audience` and `allowed-access-token-audiences`: the
default is used only when the caller requests no audience, while the allowlist
contains explicit non-default targets. The client id and asserted service id
form the workload binding.

The Helm-derived caller matrix is:

| Caller | Default target | Allowed additional targets |
| --- | --- | --- |
| tenant-KMS | `audiences.platform` | none |
| wallet-unit | `audiences.platform` | none |
| tenant-AS | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.tenant-kms` |
| DID | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.tenant-kms` |
| issuer | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.tenant-kms`, `audiences.wallet-interaction` |
| verifier | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.tenant-kms`, `audiences.wallet-interaction` |
| wallet-interaction | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.wallet-unit` |

The STS accepts an omitted target only with a nonblank default and accepts
exactly one explicit target only when it is the default or an allowed
additional target. Missing defaults, multiple or duplicate targets, and
unregistered targets fail with `invalid_target`. A route with an explicit
`serviceTokenAudience` or `preferServiceTokenOverSessionBearer=true` cannot
fall back to a session bearer, delegation, or anonymous access when workload
token acquisition fails.

The default receiver audiences are:

| Receiver | Audience |
| --- | --- |
| platform | `enterprise-platform` |
| tenant-KMS | `enterprise-tenant-kms` |
| DID | `enterprise-tenant-did` |
| issuer | `enterprise-issuer` |
| verifier | `enterprise-verifier` |
| wallet-unit | `enterprise-wallet-unit` |
| wallet-interaction | `enterprise-wallet-interaction` |

Internal identity headers are never credentials by themselves. A receiver may honor `X-Tenant-Id` or `X-Principal-Id` only after the JWT validates cryptographically, the token is a workload token, the JWT client id or subject is bound to the asserted `X-Service-Id`, the token audience matches the receiver, and the receiver trust policy permits the override. Cluster mTLS or NetworkPolicy is still useful transport hardening, but it does not replace JWT validation for these trusted-header paths.

DID, tenant-AS, issuer, and verifier use two distinct JWT audiences when they route KMS work. The inbound token is addressed to the route-only service and is validated there; the KMS route then asks the platform STS for a fresh workload token addressed to the tenant-KMS receiver audience. Issuer and verifier use the same pattern for wallet operations: their wallet route uses an `enterprise-wallet-interaction` token, and wallet-interaction uses an `enterprise-wallet-unit` token for policy-gated wallet-key commands. Tenant-AS signing-key provisioning is the strictest case: the platform calls tenant-AS with a short-lived provisioning token addressed to the tenant-AS provisioning endpoint, tenant-AS validates and terminates that token, and the AS-to-KMS hop uses its own `tenant-as-service` workload token. The provisioning token is never forwarded to tenant-KMS.

## Peer Transport

The enterprise images package the generated gRPC client stubs and routed `-remote` command implementations. Platform, tenant-KMS, wallet-unit, and wallet-interaction run the inbound gRPC receivers. Runtime services route platform-config commands to the platform service, KMS commands to tenant-KMS, and wallet commands to wallet-interaction or wallet-unit over the internal network.

```yaml
grpc:
  enabled: true
  port: 9090
  authMode: service-jwt
```

The public gateway never routes gRPC. NetworkPolicy or mesh policy should allow gRPC only on the east-west paths that need it: runtime services to platform, runtime services to tenant-KMS, issuer/verifier to wallet-interaction, wallet-interaction to wallet-unit, and receiver services back to platform as needed. The platform, tenant-KMS, wallet-unit, and wallet-interaction gRPC receivers also enforce their expected JWT audience.

Runtime services bootstrap their east-west wiring from the platform before fetching richer configuration slices. The internal `platform.bootstrap.get` command and protected `/api/platform/bootstrap/v1/consumer-config/{consumerId}` REST endpoint return service objects with named endpoints, audiences, config domains, and optional Kubernetes or Docker network addresses. Browser applications use the separate public runtime-config endpoint, which never includes internal service DNS names or container ports.

Platform-owned REST APIs stay on `platform.<base-domain>`. Tenant-owned APIs such as tenant-KMS and DID stay on `<tenant>.<base-domain>` or another tenant-bound public endpoint. A frontend proxy path such as `/admin-console/api/*` is a deployment convenience only; it is not the canonical service owner or API base URL. If the admin-console BFF resolves runtime config through the internal platform service, it forwards the public host and scheme so the returned browser service URLs remain public tenant/platform gateway URLs. The BFF can still call platform-owned and tenant-owned APIs through configured internal service URLs because those calls are server-side and never exposed to the browser. For tenant-owned internal calls, it preserves the public tenant Host and forwarded scheme so service-side tenant resolution does not collapse to the internal Docker or Kubernetes service name.

## Data Plane Databases

The enterprise deployment uses two PostgreSQL database roles by default:

- **Platform database.** The platform service owns this database. It stores first-run setup state, license activation state, the application tenant, tenant registry, routing records, platform configuration, and the platform-only authorization server state.
- **Tenant workload database.** Tenant-KMS, DID, tenant-AS, issuer, verifier, wallet-unit, and wallet-interaction read and write tenant runtime data here. Isolation is schema-per-tenant: each tenant gets its own schema, for example `tenant_acme` and `tenant_globex`, and the database router sets the tenant schema on each request.

The platform service may connect to the tenant workload database for tenant onboarding and schema provisioning, but its own platform tables are not co-located with tenant runtime tables. Runtime services do not connect to the platform database.

When a customer requires stronger isolation than schema-per-tenant, the same database routing layer can route selected tenants to a dedicated database or PostgreSQL instance. Connection pooling is per-target via HikariCP. The container code is unchanged; only the routing configuration changes.

Per-tenant configuration that runtime services read through the `TenantConfigPropertySource` lives in the tenant workload database under the resolved tenant schema. Tenant admins write configuration through the admin REST; runtime services pick it up on the next resolver cache miss and through Postgres `LISTEN/NOTIFY` invalidation.

## Cross-Replica Cache Invalidation

Each runtime container caches the tenant routing table, the per-tenant config, and the public-endpoint bindings in process. With multiple replicas behind a load balancer, a mutation on replica A must be visible on replica B without a restart, or behaviour diverges between replicas.

The EDK solves this through the shared event subsystem: admin commands emit domain events on mutation, a Postgres `LISTEN/NOTIFY` bridge fans them out to subscribers in every replica, and the local caches invalidate. A TTL fallback covers the case where a notification is missed. The mechanism is the same for tenant routing, public-endpoint bindings, and `tenant_config_property` updates.

## Tenant-Aware Public Endpoint Bindings

A tenant typically owns at least one host that the wallet reaches it at: in the hosted EDK model that is `<tenant>.<base-domain>`, for example `acme.example.com`; in a custom-domain model it might be `wallet.acme.com`. The `tenant_public_endpoint` row binds a tenant + service type (OID4VCI issuer, OID4VP verifier, OAuth AS, DID resolver) to the host and optional path layout (`.well-known` path layout, `pathPrefix`) under which that service is reachable for that tenant.

The metadata that runtime services advertise (the `credential_issuer` value in OID4VCI metadata, the `issuer` in OAuth AS metadata, the `request_uri_base` in an OID4VP authorization request, the `status_uri` in a credential offer) comes from the tenant public-endpoint binding rather than from the bare request host. This matters in production: when the tenant is reached via a CDN, a reverse proxy, or a custom domain that does not match the cluster's hostname, the metadata still advertises URLs the wallet can actually reach.

The Helm chart's default behaviour is fail-closed: if no `tenant_public_endpoint` binding exists for the resolved tenant and service type, the runtime service refuses to advertise anything rather than falling back to the request host. The fallback is configurable per environment.

## Putting It Together

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-container-deployment.svg" alt="EDK roles and topology layout" style={{maxWidth: '980px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

A canonical small-to-medium deployment runs:

- One platform replica for setup, license activation, operator AS, platform admin, and platform config.
- One replica of each tenant runtime container (tenant-KMS, DID, tenant-AS, issuer, verifier) sized to the workload, on Kubernetes through the `edk-enterprise` Helm chart.
- One admin-console replica routed at `platform.<base-domain>/admin-console`.
- A platform PostgreSQL database for platform state, plus a tenant workload PostgreSQL database using one schema per tenant. Use separate managed instances when operational isolation requires it.
- A public gateway with TLS termination, routing `platform.<base-domain>` to the platform and admin-console paths, and `<tenant>.<base-domain>` to DID, tenant-KMS, tenant-AS, issuer, and verifier by path. Use a wildcard certificate for `*.<base-domain>` plus the operator host, or automate individual certificates for every tenant host and the operator host.
- NetworkPolicy or service-mesh policy that keeps service DNS names, container ports, health routes, metrics, and gRPC east-west only. Customer API access goes through the gateway hostnames.
- A monitoring stack subscribed to `/metrics` on each container and to the OpenTelemetry collector wired through the EDK telemetry module.

The chart defaults to Nexus image coordinates under `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker`, with the delivered enterprise tag supplied through `global.imageTag` and registry credentials supplied through `global.imagePullSecrets`. The KMS service itself remains private even though selected protected REST paths are reachable through the tenant gateway.

For a high-traffic deployment, the issuer, verifier, AS, and DID containers scale horizontally. The KMS scales as well, but more conservatively, most deployments find the bottleneck is the provider backend (AWS KMS rate limits, HSM throughput) rather than the container itself.

---

# KMS Container

---
id: kms
title: KMS Container
sidebar_label: KMS
description: The nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-kms image, the protected crypto authority for tenant runtime services. Provider registration, per-tenant key aliases, protected tenant REST administration, and internal gRPC command routing.
---

# KMS Container

`nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-kms` is the cryptographic authority for tenant runtime services. Every key the issuer signs credentials with, every signing key on an OID4VP request object, every key alias a tenant AS uses to sign access tokens, and every audit-checkpoint signing key lives on this container. The other runtime containers do not generate or hold key material; they reference keys by alias and route KMS commands to tenant-KMS over the internal gRPC network.

That centralisation is deliberate. It lets a deployment use a single provider backend (an HSM, AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault) across all of its issuer, verifier, AS, and DID activity, with one place to manage key lifecycles and one audit trail for crypto operations. It also keeps the issuer, verifier, and AS images free of provider SDKs they would otherwise need to ship.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-container-kms.svg" alt="KMS container internal architecture" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Why the KMS Is Protected

The KMS sees raw key material on its way in to the provider backend and sees plaintext payloads on their way in to be signed. There is no scenario in which a wallet or relying party should call it directly. Runtime signing traffic comes from the EDK's own issuer, verifier, AS, and DID containers on the east-west network.

Customer-facing administration goes through the tenant gateway route `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>/api/kms/v1` with a tenant-scoped bearer token. The KMS container hostname, service DNS name, health routes, metrics, and gRPC receiver are not customer endpoints.

If a deployment needs extra controls around KMS administration, add policy at the gateway or service mesh. Do not expose the KMS container itself.

## Providers

A provider is the actual backend that holds the key material and performs the operations. The EDK ships first-party providers for:

- **Software keystore.** Keys generated and held in process. Useful for development and for non-critical signing duties.
- **AWS KMS.** Keys live in AWS KMS; the EDK provider issues `Sign`, `Verify`, and `GetPublicKey` calls. Provider configuration carries the AWS region, credential strategy, and the key id mapping.
- **Azure Key Vault.** Keys live in Azure Key Vault under the configured vault URL. Authentication via the Azure credential chain (managed identity, service principal, environment).
- **Digidentity CSC.** Keys held in a Digidentity Cloud Signature Consortium account, suitable for eIDAS qualified signing.
- **HTTP provider facade.** A KMS provider that itself fronts another KMS through a REST-compatible EDK KMS facade. Useful when a tenant needs to route to a remote KMS instance behind that facade.

Providers register through the admin REST as typed configuration, never as raw JSONB. The provider id is a stable identifier (`software-default`, `aws-eu-west-1`, `azure-vault-prod`) that tenants reference when they bind a key alias.

A KMS instance can have any number of providers registered simultaneously. A tenant chooses which provider to use per signing duty by binding a `kms_provider` integration row on the tenant that uses the key (the issuer, verifier, or AS), pointing at the provider id on this KMS.

## Key Aliases

A key alias is a logical name a runtime service uses to refer to a key. The alias structure is `(tenant, service, purpose)`:

- `tenant`: the tenant slug the key belongs to.
- `service`: which service uses it: `issuer`, `verifier`, `as`, `did`, `audit`.
- `purpose`: what the key signs: `credential-signing`, `request-object-signing`, `access-token-signing`, `audit-checkpoint`, `did-update`.

The first time a runtime service needs a key for a given alias, it either resolves to a system-provisioned default (the deployment template generates one per tenant on first activity) or to an operator-supplied alias the tenant admin has configured through the signing-key admin REST. Either way, the service never sees the raw key, it only sees the alias and the provider routing.

Key rotation is per-alias and per-tenant. The KMS holds the key history; the runtime service queries the current public key when it needs to publish JWKS or to verify a counterparty signature.

## What the REST Surface Provides

The protected REST surface exposes several HTTP adapter families for tenant and operator administration. The same command families back service-to-service KMS operations, but runtime issuer, verifier, tenant AS, and DID traffic reaches tenant-KMS over internal gRPC rather than through the public gateway:

- `KeysHttpAdapter`: global key generation, key import, key registration, key listing, key deletion, and key metadata read. Tenant context is JWT-bound.
- `ProvidersHttpAdapter`: provider registration, provider configuration, provider listing. Platform-admin scoped.
- `CapabilitiesHttpAdapter`: provider capability listing and provider matching via `/capabilities`, `/providers/{providerId}/capabilities`, `/providers/query`, and `/providers/query/best`.
- `ResolversHttpAdapter`: public-key resolution by alias or key id. Runtime services use the corresponding command family when they publish JWKS or verify a counterparty signature.
- `SignaturesHttpAdapter`: raw signature creation and verification. These commands back issuer credential signing, AS access-token signing, OID4VP request-object signing, and audit-checkpoint signing.
- `EncryptionHttpAdapter`: content encryption/decryption, key wrap/unwrap, and key agreement.
- `CertificatesHttpAdapter`: CSR generation, certificate issuing, trusted certificate storage, and certificate-chain storage.

For keys, generation is the normal `POST /keys` and `POST /providers/{providerId}/keys` flow. Externally supplied key material is imported through `/keys/import` or `/providers/{providerId}/keys/import`. `POST /keys/register` is reserved for registering an existing provider-side key reference.

Multi-tenant isolation is enforced on every call: a tenant can only operate on its own keys, and no call can reach another tenant's key material.

## Persistence

The KMS stores only key-reference bookkeeping in the tenant workload database: the `key_reference` table maps `(tenant, alias)` to `(provider_id, kid, metadata)` inside the resolved tenant schema. The actual key material lives in the provider backend. That separation is important: even if the database is exfiltrated, no key material is in it.

The persistence module is `lib-crypto-key-persistence-postgresql`. It also has a MySQL counterpart (`lib-crypto-key-persistence-mysql`) for deployments that standardise on MySQL.

## Image and Runtime

The image is `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-kms:<enterprise-version>`, or the equivalent mirror supplied through your distribution channel. It runs as a non-root `appuser` (uid 10001) on port 8080.

The Helm chart keeps the KMS service private and routes selected REST paths through the tenant gateway. Operators use `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>/api/kms/v1` with a tenant-scoped token; service-to-service KMS commands remain on the internal gRPC network.

The minimal `application.yaml` shipped in the image is intentionally permissive for local testing:

```yaml
server:
  rest:
    port: 8080
    auth:
      enabled: false
      anonymous:
        allowed: true
```

A production deployment overrides this through the standard EDK config layering (environment variables, mounted YAML overlays, cloud config providers) to require bearer-JWT auth on every call and to disable anonymous access. Per-tenant configuration, including provider routing and key alias overrides, lives in the tenant workload database under `tenant_config_property` in the resolved tenant schema.

## Operational Notes

- **Capacity.** The KMS is rarely the bottleneck for low-to-medium throughput. When it is, the bottleneck is usually the provider backend (AWS KMS rate limits, HSM throughput) rather than the container.
- **Failure modes.** If the KMS is unreachable, signing-dependent paths fail immediately on the calling service. There is no fallback to a local key, by design. The deployment template's readiness probes consider the KMS dependency healthy before marking issuer/verifier/AS ready.
- **Provider failover.** A tenant can configure multiple `kms_provider` integration rows and switch between them at the application level. The KMS itself does not currently sequence cross-provider failover automatically.
- **Auditing.** Every signing operation emits an audit event with the tenant, alias, provider id, kid, and timestamp. The audit signing key alias is a KMS key in its own right (`(tenant, audit, audit-checkpoint)`).

---

# DID Container

---
id: did
title: DID Container
sidebar_label: DID
description: The nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-did image, a public Universal Resolver plus internal admin and registrar for did:web, did:webvh, did:jwk, and did:key. Per-tenant method allowlists, document publishing, and webvh log management.
---

# DID Container

`nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-did` is the only EDK container with a significant public surface that is not protocol-shaped. Where the issuer, verifier, and AS expose protocol endpoints (OID4VCI, OID4VP, OAuth/OIDC) on the public ingress, the DID container exposes a Universal Resolver path and, when `did:web` is enabled for a tenant, the served DID document URLs themselves. Anything else lives on the internal admin surface.

That asymmetry is intentional. DID resolution is a public good in the verifiable-credentials ecosystem: wallets, issuers, verifiers, and arbitrary third parties need to be able to resolve DIDs that the deployment hosts. Splitting the resolver into its own container keeps that public surface isolated from the issuer's and verifier's protocol surfaces, lets resolution scale horizontally independent of credential issuance volume, and keeps the admin functions (publishing, log management, method allowlists) safely internal.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-container-did.svg" alt="DID container public and internal surface" style={{maxWidth: '720px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Public Surface: The Universal Resolver

The public side serves the Universal Resolver path: `GET /1.0/identifiers/{did}` returns the resolved DID document with the standard W3C resolver result shape. This is what external clients hit.

When `did:web` is enabled for a tenant, the tenant's `did:web` document URLs are also public: tenant `acme` on base domain `example.com` can publish `did:web:acme.example.com`, and the document is served at `https://acme.example.com/.well-known/did.json` through the gateway. The DID container serves that document behind the gateway route.

Per-tenant multi-tenancy on the public surface works through subdomain resolution and verified custom domains, the same resolver stack the other EDK containers use. `acme.example.com` resolves to the `acme` tenant and serves only that tenant's documents and method registrations.

The public surface is rate-limited and cached. The `DidResolutionCache` sits in front of the four method libraries (`did:web`, `did:webvh`, `did:jwk`, `did:key`) with a configurable TTL. Cache invalidation flows through the same event subsystem that handles tenant routing and config updates.

## Internal Surface: Manager, Registrar, Webvh

Three families of admin endpoints sit behind protected gateway policy.

The **manager admin** is the larger set: more than ten HTTP adapters that handle `did:` document lifecycle (`DidManager`, `DidLifecycle`, `DidService`, `Controller`, `VerificationMethod`, `VerificationRelationship`, `KeyMapping`, `AlsoKnownAs`, `Capability`, `EquivalentId`, `DocumentCache`). Tenant administrators use this surface to manage the documents they publish and the cache behaviour for resolution.

The **Universal Registrar** (`POST /1.0/create`, `POST /1.0/update`, `POST /1.0/deactivate`) is the EDK implementation of the standard Universal Registrar shape for creating, updating, and deactivating DIDs. It is internal because creating DIDs is privileged: the registrar generates key material on the KMS, writes the DID document, and (for `did:webvh`) writes the first log entry.

The **`did:webvh` log server** serves the verifiable history log for `did:webvh` DIDs. The log itself is public (any verifier needs to walk the log to validate `did:webvh` resolution), but the **writing** of new log entries, the witness-proof generation, and the log replay are internal admin operations.

## The Four Methods

The container ships all four EDK-supported DID methods:

- **`did:key`**: fully self-contained, no infrastructure dependency. Resolution is a pure function of the DID string.
- **`did:jwk`**: similar to `did:key` but with the public key embedded as a JWK. Pure resolution.
- **`did:web`**: the DID document is served at a well-known URL on the tenant's host. Suitable when the tenant controls a stable domain and wants identifiers that anyone can resolve over plain HTTPS.
- **`did:webvh`**: a verifiable history extension to `did:web` with a tamper-evident log, witness proofs (multiple independent parties co-sign), and the SCID (Self-Certifying Identifier) bound at creation. Suitable when third parties need to verify that a DID document has not been silently rewritten by its controller.

The four method libraries (resolver, provider, plus webvh's log writer, log replayer, witness-proof tooling, and SCID hasher) are all on the classpath. Tenants opt each method in or out individually through the per-tenant method allowlist.

## Per-Tenant Method Allowlist

By default, nothing is enabled for a new tenant: the deployment never blanket-trusts a method on a tenant's behalf. The tenant administrator opts each method in through the admin REST (`POST /api/v1/did/methods`), setting the enabled flag and any method-specific configuration (the `did:web` document base path, the `did:webvh` witness policy, the trust policy for resolution).

Disabling a method blocks both resolution (the public resolver path returns a 404 for that method on that tenant) and registration (the registrar refuses to create new identifiers using that method on that tenant). Existing identifiers remain in storage but become inert until the method is re-enabled.

## Persistence

The DID container's Postgres schema covers:

- `did_resolution_cache(tenant_id, did, document_jsonb, resolved_at, ttl_seconds)`: backing for `DidResolutionCacheImpl`. Replaces the in-memory cache when running in production.
- `did_web_document(tenant_id, did_url, document_jsonb, path, …)`: per-tenant published `did:web` documents.
- `webvh_log_entry(tenant_id, did, version_id, entry_jsonb, signed_at, …)`: `did:webvh` log storage. The log server reads from this table.
- `tenant_did_method(tenant_id, method, enabled, config_jsonb)`: the per-tenant method allowlist plus method-specific configuration.

Postgres impls live in `lib-did-persistence-postgresql`. The MySQL counterpart (`lib-did-persistence-mysql`) ships for MySQL-standardised deployments.

## Image and Runtime

The image is `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-did:<enterprise-version>`, or the equivalent mirror supplied through your distribution channel. It runs as a non-root `appuser` (uid 10001) on port 8080.

The assembly is an EDK/IDK service assembly: IDK DID manager/resolver/hosting modules plus the EDK registrar and tenant-aware deployment wiring.

The Helm chart wires the DID routes through the customer gateway and keeps container ports private:

- **Public routes.** Route the resolver path (`/1.0/identifiers/...`) and, when `did:web` is in use, the document paths. These are TLS-terminated by the gateway and unauthenticated where DID resolution requires it.
- **Protected routes.** Carry `/api/did/v1/...` management paths through the tenant gateway with bearer-JWT authorization. Registrar and webvh write paths remain restricted to the deployment's internal policy when enabled.

The container reaches the KMS over the internal network for any key operation (registrar creating a new identifier, `did:webvh` log entry signing).

## Trust Policy for Resolution

`did:web` and `did:webvh` are both fetched from external hosts during resolution, so the container needs an explicit trust policy for what it will resolve from where. Two questions matter:

- **What hosts are we willing to resolve from?** A per-tenant allowlist or denylist, configurable through the manager admin. The default is no restriction.
- **For `did:webvh`, what witness signatures count as sufficient?** The witness policy declares the required number of witness signatures, the witness identities, and the validity window. The policy is per-tenant and configurable.

For `did:web` documents the container itself publishes, the trust policy is moot, the document is read from local Postgres rather than fetched.

## Operational Notes

- **Resolution traffic dwarfs registration traffic.** Plan for the public resolver to handle most of the load, with the manager admin sitting comparatively idle most of the time.
- **Cache hit rate is the main lever.** The `did_resolution_cache` TTL is configurable per method and per tenant. For `did:key` and `did:jwk`, the cache adds little because resolution is already pure; for `did:web` and `did:webvh` it matters a great deal.
- **`did:webvh` log latency.** Resolving a `did:webvh` involves walking the log. Long logs incur per-resolution cost. The Postgres `webvh_log_entry` table is indexed on `(tenant_id, did, version_id)`; an in-memory log cache sits in front of it.
- **Public route hygiene.** Because the resolver path is public and unauthenticated, the container deliberately exposes no admin information through it. Resolving an unknown DID returns a standard W3C resolver result with the appropriate error code; it does not reveal whether the DID is in storage or what tenants exist.

---

# AS Container

---
id: as
title: AS Container
sidebar_label: Authorization Server (AS)
description: The nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-as image, an OAuth 2.0 / OpenID authorization server scoped to tenant runtime flows. Pre-authorized code, wallet federation, client credentials, per-tenant federation provider binding.
---

# AS Container

`nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-as` is the OAuth 2.0 / OpenID authorization server that issuer-side flows need to delegate token issuance to. It is deliberately not a general-purpose IAM product. Its scope is the flows OID4VCI and OID4VP actually require, plus the minimum machine-to-machine surface for tenant service clients. Platform operator sign-in lives on the separate `enterprise-platform` container.

That scope is precise enough to call out:

- The **OID4VCI pre-authorized code grant**, end to end. The AS mints pre-authorized codes for the issuer, exchanges them for access tokens, and emits the `c_nonce` the wallet binds its proof to.
- The **OID4VCI authorization code grant via wallet federation**. The AS is the OAuth endpoint the wallet talks to. `/authorize` delegates the actual user-authentication step to the tenant's configured upstream IdP via the federation flow; the AS owns the protocol mechanics (state, PKCE, code issuance, token exchange, claims projection).
- **Per-tenant OAuth 2.0 `client_id`/`client_secret` issuance** for backend service clients. Available regardless of whether the tenant has an external AS configured.

User account management, MFA, account self-service, password authentication, and an in-AS user store are deferred. The `UserAuthenticationProvider` SPI stays open in the EDK so a future release can add an in-AS user store without rewriting the surface, but as shipped, the AS routes user authentication to an upstream IdP through the federation flow rather than authenticating users itself.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-container-as.svg" alt="AS container endpoints and tenant flows" style={{maxWidth: '740px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Public Protocol Surface

Thirteen HTTP adapters together cover the OAuth and OpenID protocol:

- `OAuth2AuthorizationHttpAdapter`: `/authorize`. Handles the wallet-federation handoff and the standard authorization flow.
- `OAuth2TokenHttpAdapter`: `/token`. Code exchange, pre-auth-code exchange, client-credentials exchange, refresh exchange.
- `OAuth2DiscoveryHttpAdapter`: `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` (with tenant slug per the well-known URL forms).
- `OAuth2OpenidDiscoveryPathIssuerHttpAdapter`: `/{tenant-slug}/.well-known/openid-configuration`.
- `OAuth2UserInfoHttpAdapter`: `/userinfo`.
- `OAuth2EndSessionHttpAdapter`: RP-initiated logout.
- `OAuth2FederationHttpAdapter`: the federation handshake with upstream IdPs (the EDK's bridge to OIDC providers the tenant uses for user authentication).
- `OAuth2DeviceAuthorizationHttpAdapter` / `OAuth2DeviceVerificationHttpAdapter`, the device flow.
- `OAuth2LoginHttpAdapter`: the consent/login UI shell.
- `OAuth2AttestationHttpAdapter`: wallet attestation handling.
- `OAuth2InternalHttpAdapter` and `AbstractOAuth2HttpAdapter`, internal plumbing.

Of these, the device flow, attestation, the login UI, and end-session are at a varying state of completeness across releases. The pre-auth + federation + client-credentials path is the production-ready core.

## Per-Tenant Federation Providers

The federation flow is where the AS connects to the tenant's upstream IdP for user authentication. A tenant administrator registers federation providers through the tenant-IdP admin REST (`/api/v1/oauth2/federation/providers`). Each provider entry carries the discovery URL, client credentials, scopes, and the claim mapping that translates the upstream IdP's userinfo into the claims projected into the AS-issued access token.

The federation REST surface includes:

- `TenantIdpCrudHttpEndpointCommands`: registering, listing, updating, and deleting federation providers per tenant.
- `TenantIdpStateHttpEndpointCommands`: enabling, disabling, and reading the runtime state of a provider.
- `TenantIdpConnectivityHttpEndpointCommands`: a test-connection endpoint that drives the discovery fetch and surfaces network and JWKS errors before the provider is enabled for live traffic.

The runtime federation endpoint commands (`FederationAuthorizeHttpEndpointCommandImpl`, `FederationCallbackHttpEndpointCommandImpl`, `ReconciliationAuthorizeHttpEndpointCommandImpl`, `ReconciliationCallbackHttpEndpointCommandImpl`) drive the handshake itself. The `FederationBaseUrlResolver` keeps callback URLs consistent with the tenant's public-endpoint binding.

When a tenant has multiple federation providers configured, the wallet can pick at the IdP-discovery step. When a tenant has none, the federation flow is unavailable for that tenant and only the pre-authorized code and client-credentials flows are usable.

## Per-Tenant Client Registry

Clients are tenant-scoped. The AS admin REST (`/api/v1/oauth2/clients`) covers registering, listing, updating, and deleting `client_id`/`client_secret` pairs. Dynamic registration (`/oidc/register`) is also wired through, with per-tenant policy controlling whether it is allowed.

Client secrets are not stored in plaintext. The AS hashes them on registration and verifies against the hash on `/token`. Refresh tokens, access tokens, and pre-authorized codes are stored hashed where they need to be persisted at all.

## Tenant-Aware URL Generation

Every URL the AS advertises (the `issuer` value in metadata, the `jwks_uri`, the `authorization_endpoint`, the `token_endpoint`, the `userinfo_endpoint`, the `end_session_endpoint`, the federation callback URLs) comes from the tenant's public-endpoint binding rather than the request host. The `lib-oauth2-server-rest-tenant` overlay replaces the IDK default URL resolver with one backed by `tenant_public_endpoint`.

This is what makes the AS work behind CDNs, reverse proxies, and custom domains: the metadata advertises URLs the wallet can actually reach, even when the request lands on the AS through a hostname different from the cluster's own hostname.

For the discovery URLs themselves, the AS supports the spec form (`/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/{tenant-slug}`) and the legacy slug-before form (`/{tenant-slug}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`) for OAuth metadata, and the OpenID Discovery spec form (`/{tenant-slug}/.well-known/openid-configuration`) for OIDC.

## Signing Keys

Every AS-issued artifact that needs to be signed (access tokens, id tokens, the AS's own JWKS) is signed with a per-tenant KMS key. The default alias is `(tenant, as, access-token-signing)`; the tenant admin can override the alias through the signing-key admin REST. Rotation is per-tenant and per-alias.

The `jwks_uri` in the AS metadata resolves to the union of the current and previous signing keys for the tenant, so wallets and downstream services can continue to verify recently-issued tokens during a rotation.

## Persistence

Postgres-backed stores in the EDK overlay include:

- `PostgresSigningKeyStore`: the per-tenant signing key alias binding.
- `PostgresSingleUseObjectStore`: the consolidated single-use object store that covers nonces, JTI replay caches, attestation PoPs, and back-channel logout token caches.
- `PostgresTermsAcceptanceStore`: terms-of-service acceptance per principal per tenant.
- `PostgreSqlSessionStorage`: the OAuth2 session storage from `lib-data-store-session/persistence-oauth2`.
- `PostgresAuthenticationSessionStore`, `PostgresFederationSessionStore`, `PostgresCredentialStore`, `PostgresAuthRateLimiter`, `PostgresBackChannelLogoutRetryQueue`, `PostgresIdempotencyStore`, `DatabaseOid4vpAuthSessionStore`.
- `PostgresTenantIdpRegistry`: the tenant-IdP federation provider registry.

A subset of the AS storage interfaces run on in-memory implementations in the current EDK release (the device-flow, attestation-challenge, and PAR session stores in particular). Deployments that need full multi-replica durability for those flows should consult the deployment notes for the current EDK version.

## Image and Runtime

The image is `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-as:<enterprise-version>`, or the equivalent mirror supplied through your distribution channel. It runs as a non-root `appuser` (uid 10001) on port 8080.

The entry point starts the Ktor server (`EnterpriseOAuth2AsKtorServer`), which installs the tenant resolution plugin first (so tenant context is on the call before the DI graph is consulted) and then installs the Universal HTTP adapters that mount every endpoint command into Ktor.

The minimal `application.yaml` shipped with the image enables anonymous access on port 8080 for local testing. A production deployment overrides this through environment variables, mounted YAML overlays, and cloud config providers to require admin-scoped bearer JWTs on `/api/v1/...` and to enable the per-tenant federation, KMS, and Postgres routing wiring.

## Operational Notes

- **Token signing latency.** Every `/token` response involves a KMS signing operation. KMS round-trip latency directly translates into token-endpoint p99. For high-throughput deployments, co-locate the AS replica with the KMS, and consider provider backends with low signing latency.
- **Federation resilience.** If an upstream IdP is down, the federation authorize step fails. The AS does not silently fall back to another provider. Tenants that need resilience configure multiple providers and let the wallet pick.
- **Pre-auth code TTL.** Pre-authorized codes are short-lived single-use objects. A wallet that takes too long between offer acceptance and `/token` exchange will see the code expire. The default TTL is configurable per tenant.
- **DPoP.** When tenants enable DPoP for their clients, the `htu` claim is checked against the tenant's public-endpoint binding rather than the request host. The same fail-closed default applies, if no binding is configured, DPoP-protected calls are rejected rather than accepted on the request host.

---

# Issuer Container

# Issuer Container

`nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-issuer` is the OpenID4VCI credential issuer. It owns the wallet-facing protocol endpoints, the multi-phase connector-backed pipeline that assembles credential claims, the credential-design store that defines what credentials the deployment offers, and the webhook subsystem that fires issuance status events to tenant-configured callbacks. VDX deployments add the durable connector registry, route grants, throttling, and run-lineage surfaces around the EDK pipeline.

The issuer is one of the two larger EDK images by surface area (the other being the AS), because it carries both the protocol layer and the credential-data layer above it. The protocol layer is shared with the IDK reference implementation; the credential-data layer (attribute pipeline, credential designs, semantic attribute sets, connector invocation bindings, integration kinds) is the EDK-specific extension that this container exists to deliver.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-container-issuer.svg" alt="Issuer container layout" style={{maxWidth: '760px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Public Protocol Surface

The wallet-facing endpoints are the standard OID4VCI set. The IDK protocol handlers (`/credential`, `/credential_deferred`, `/nonce`, `/notification`, `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer`) ship in this container unchanged from their IDK reference implementation. The EDK additions sit around them: the connector-backed attribute pipeline runs before `/credential` returns, the deferred ingress handles the case where a connector cannot answer in the synchronous window, and the credential offer endpoint and the various status URIs are tenant-aware through the `lib-openid-oid4vci-issuer-rest-tenant` overlay.

The metadata document is built dynamically from the credential designs registered for the tenant. As a tenant administrator adds or removes a credential design, the `credential_configurations_supported` map in the metadata picks up the change at the next cache refresh.

## The Attribute Pipeline

The pipeline is the largest EDK addition relative to a vanilla OID4VCI issuer. Each issuance is an `IssuancePipelineSession` that carries an attribute bag, connector-field context, and a status. The IDK issuer exposes lifecycle hooks for offer creation, authorization/pre-authorized setup, token exchange, credential requests, deferred polling, pre-issue evaluation, post-issuance handling, and notification receipt. EDK binds those lifecycle phases to connector invocations through `PipelineConfiguration.invocationBindings`; VDX can register and operate those connectors durably across routes, grants, throttles, and run lineage.

A typical employee-credential pipeline binds:

- `invitation-context` during offer initialization to pre-seed an `employee_id` connector field from the offer.
- `auth-session-claim` during authorization or token handling to pick up the authenticated user's email from the AS-issued access token.
- `identity-resolver` during token or credential-request handling to resolve email to an internal identity record.
- `database` during credential-request handling to read the HR record for that identity.
- `vault` after issuance to retain the assembled attributes for re-issuance without re-running external connector calls.

When the wallet calls `/credential`, the engine has the full assembled bag, applies the per-credential claim mapping declared on the design, and hands the result to the protocol handler to sign and return. Connectors that cannot answer synchronously (an upstream HR system that takes thirty seconds, an async approval workflow) defer: the wallet receives `202 Accepted` with a deferred-credential transaction, the connector or operator answers later via a callback URL, and the next `/credential_deferred` poll completes synchronously.

The pipeline session is persisted with attribute-bag encryption (three modes: `PlaintextMode` for dev, `PlatformEncryptedMode` AEAD under a tenant KEK, `ClientBoundMode` additionally bound to the session's `correlationId`).

For the full reference, see the dedicated [OpenID4VCI](../../guides/oid4vci/overview) section: [attribute pipeline](../../guides/oid4vci/attribute-pipeline), [connector invocation](../../guides/oid4vci/connector-invocations), [REST API](../../guides/oid4vci/rest-api), [persistence](../../guides/oid4vci/persistence).

## Internal Admin Surface

The admin REST under `/api/v1/...` covers everything a tenant administrator needs to configure the issuer:

- **Credential designs.** `/api/v1/credential/designs` is the CRUD over designs. A design declares the credential's claims, the claim policy (which attributes are required, which optional), the rendering bindings, the issuer signing key alias, and the format (SD-JWT VC, JWT VC, mDoc). Versioning is built in: changing a design produces a new version; previous versions remain resolvable.
- **Semantic attribute sets.** `/api/v1/data/semantic/attributes` defines reusable attribute groupings that designs reference rather than redefining attribute shapes per design.
- **Credential type bindings.** `/api/v1/credentials/typebindings` ties OID4VCI credential configuration ids to credential designs.
- **AS instance binding.** Per-tenant binding between the issuer and the AS instance the wallet uses for this tenant's issuance. Identifies the AS issuer URI, the JWKS URI, and the supported grants.
- **Connector-backed attribute pipeline.** EDK binds issuer lifecycle phases to connector invocations. In VDX deployments, connector definitions, route exposure grants, throttling, run lineage, and audit history are managed by the VDX connector services.
- **Integrations.** A first-class kind-discriminated registry for `kms_provider`, `as_binding`, `issuer_attribute_supplier`, `webhook`, `did_method`, `trust_source`, and `federation_provider` bindings.
- **Webhooks.** Per-tenant webhook configuration for issuance status events: subscription model with event-type filter, per-tenant HMAC signing key alias on KMS, durable retry queue with exponential backoff, idempotency keys, configurable timeout, circuit breaker per destination.
- **Issuance session admin.** List, inspect, cancel, and replay issuance sessions for debugging and operator intervention.
- **Tenant admin.** The shared `TenantAdminHttpAdapter` for tenant CRUD, domain registration, public-endpoint bindings, and onboarding flows.

The admin surface is tenant-scoped: an `acme`-tenant administrator can only see and modify resources belonging to `acme`. A platform-admin acting on a tenant's resources asserts the target tenant through the JWT impersonation pattern rather than through a path slug.

## Tenant-Aware Metadata and Offers

The `lib-openid-oid4vci-issuer-rest-tenant` overlay replaces the IDK default URL resolver and the IDK default offer-creation command with EDK implementations that consult `tenant_public_endpoint`. The effect:

- The `credential_issuer` value is the tenant's public base URL, for example `https://acme.example.com` in the hosted subdomain model, not the platform host and not a platform path on the base domain.
- The `credential_endpoint`, `nonce_endpoint`, `deferred_credential_endpoint`, and `notification_endpoint` URLs in the metadata point at the tenant's public OID4VCI backend base.
- `POST /oid4vci/offer` (the offer-creation endpoint) returns a `credential_offer_uri` rooted at the tenant's public endpoint, and the `status_uri` in the offer body uses the same binding.

For a bare tenant-origin issuer, metadata is exposed at `/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer` on the tenant host. Path-bearing issuer identifiers are exposed in both the spec form (`/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer/{issuer-path}`) and the legacy prefix form (`/{issuer-path}/.well-known/openid-credential-issuer`).

## Signing Keys

The issuer's credential signing key alias defaults to `(tenant, issuer, credential-signing)` on the KMS. The tenant administrator can override the alias per credential design through the signing-key binding on the design. Rotation is per-tenant and per-alias.

The webhook signing key alias (the HMAC the issuer signs outbound webhook calls with) defaults to `(tenant, issuer, webhook-signing)`. Distinct alias, distinct rotation.

## Persistence

The issuer adds the following EDK-overlay tables to the tenant workload database in each tenant schema:

- The credential design tables (design, issuer design, verifier design, render variant, source snapshot, derived render hints, design current version) under `lib-data-store-credential-design-persistence-postgresql`.
- The semantic attribute and semantic vocabulary tables under their respective `persistence-postgresql` modules.
- The integration registry tables under `lib-integration-persistence-postgresql`.
- The webhook configuration and dispatch queue tables under `lib-webhook-persistence-postgresql`.
- The connector-backed pipeline session store and, in VDX deployments, the connector registry and run-audit tables.
- The tenant IDP registry tables (shared with the AS).
- The issuance pipeline session store (KV-on-Postgres by default; promotable to dedicated session tables in future releases).

The credential offer session and the issuance pipeline session both carry sensitive intermediate state and use the encrypted session storage modes described in the OpenID4VCI [persistence](../../guides/oid4vci/persistence) page.

## Image and Runtime

The image is `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-issuer:<enterprise-version>`, or the equivalent mirror supplied through your distribution channel. It runs as a non-root `appuser` (uid 10001) on port 8080.

The entry point starts `EnterpriseOid4vciIssuerKtorServer`, which installs the tenant resolution plugin before the DI graph and then mounts the universal HTTP adapters. The Metro graph for the enterprise issuer pulls in `lib-openid-oid4vci-issuer-rest-tenant`, `services-tenant-rest`, `lib-tenant-resolution-impl`, `lib-tenant-persistence-postgresql`, the DB-routing modules, the issuer pipeline implementation, the credential design Postgres modules, the remote KMS/client transport modules, and the connector adapters the deployment uses.

A production deployment overrides the shipped `application.yaml` to require admin-scoped bearer JWTs on `/api/v1/...`, to point at the tenant workload database with schema-per-tenant routing, to register the KMS endpoint as a `kms_provider` integration on each tenant, to register the AS as the `as_binding` integration on each tenant, and to bind tenant public endpoints (subdomains, custom domains, path slugs) through the tenant admin REST.

## Operational Notes

- **Pipeline timeouts and the deferred ingress.** The `syncWaitWindow` on each connector invocation binding controls how long the engine waits inside the synchronous `/credential` window before falling through to a deferred response. Set it shorter than the wallet's expected `/credential` timeout; the EDK marks the contributor as awaiting deferred and the wallet retries via `/credential_deferred`.
- **Credential design hot-reload.** Changing a credential design through `/api/v1/credential/designs` invalidates the metadata cache for the tenant via the cross-replica invalidation channel, so the next metadata fetch picks up the new design without a restart.
- **Webhook reliability.** The outbound dispatcher uses a durable retry queue with exponential backoff and a dead-letter table. Tenant administrators can inspect delivery status through the webhook admin REST. Per-destination circuit breakers prevent a single broken consumer from saturating the dispatch pool.
- **Multi-replica behaviour.** The issuance pipeline session store is the tenant workload database KV-on-Postgres backing, so deferred sessions started on replica A are pollable from replica B without sticky sessions.

---

# Verifier Container

---
id: verifier
title: Verifier Container
sidebar_label: Verifier
description: The nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-verifier image, the OpenID4VP verifier. Protocol endpoints, DCQL versioned store, per-tenant trust frames, presentation callbacks.
---

# Verifier Container

`nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-verifier` is the OpenID4VP verifier. It accepts presentation requests from relying-party-side callers, hosts the protocol endpoints the wallet interacts with, validates incoming presentations against per-tenant trust frames, and fires callbacks to tenant-configured webhooks when a presentation completes.

Like the issuer, the verifier inherits the protocol layer from the IDK and adds the EDK layers around it: the DCQL versioned store with multi-binding per verifier, per-tenant trust-frame binding over the IDK trust engine, presentation session admin, and the same webhook infrastructure the issuer uses.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-container-verifier.svg" alt="Verifier container layout" style={{maxWidth: '740px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Public Protocol Surface

The wallet-facing endpoints are the OID4VP set plus the universal-verifier integration:

- `Oid4vpVerifierHttpAdapter`: `request_uri`, `direct_post`, `ready`. Standard OID4VP protocol mechanics.
- `UniversalOid4vpHttpAdapter`: the EDK universal-verifier surface for create-auth-request, returning the request URI for the wallet to fetch, and the response surface.
- `TenantAwareOid4vpVerifierHttpAdapter`: the tenant-aware adapter contributed by `lib-openid-oid4vp-verifier-rest-tenant`. Mounts the verifier under `/{tenant-slug}/oid4vp/...` and consults the public-endpoint binding for outbound URLs.

The IDK verifier descriptor provider publishes a `TenantPathPolicy.LeadingSlug(maxDepth = 1)`, which is what makes the `/{tenant-slug}/oid4vp/...` path form route into the verifier through catalog dispatch.

The integration with the OID4VP authorization-server bridge (`Oid4vpAuthHttpAdapter`) lets a tenant use OID4VP as the authentication step for an OAuth flow. This is the same wallet-as-authenticator pattern the EDK auth bridge implements, but exposed at the verifier rather than as a separate service.

## Internal Admin Surface

The verifier admin REST under `/api/v1/...` covers:

- **Per-tenant verifier configuration.** `/api/v1/verifier/oid4vp` is the typed CRUD for the verifier's per-tenant settings: display metadata, `response_uri` base, signing key alias for request objects, supported credential types.
- **DCQL versioned store.** Two admin surfaces. `DcqlQueryAdminHttpAdapter` (from the IDK) handles the latest-version-only CRUD for development convenience. `DcqlQueryVersionHttpAdapter` (the EDK versioned overlay) handles versioned authoring: a header is stable, each save produces a new version, previous versions stay resolvable. A single verifier can have multiple DCQL queries bound concurrently and route between them by query id.
- **Per-tenant trust-frame admin.** `/api/v1/verifier/oid4vp/integrations/trust` is the per-tenant CRUD over trust sources. Each trust source binding identifies a kind (X.509, OIDF, ETSI TSL, DID) and a source (PEM bundle, federation endpoint, TSL URL). The operational trust engine itself ships in the IDK trust modules (`lib-trust-core-impl`, `lib-trust-x509`, `lib-trust-did`, `lib-trust-etsi`, `lib-trust-oidfed`); the verifier overlay is a per-tenant binding layer over it.
- **Webhook configuration.** Same webhook subsystem the issuer uses, configured for verifier event types (presentation status, callback success, callback failure).
- **Presentation session admin.** List, inspect, and cancel presentation sessions for debugging. Adapts the existing generic session persistence at `lib-data-store-session/persistence-postgresql` rather than creating a new session table family.
- **Tenant admin.** Shared `TenantAdminHttpAdapter` for tenant CRUD, domain registration, public-endpoint bindings.

For the protocol-level reference and the DCQL authoring guide, see the OpenID4VP section: [overview](../../guides/oid4vp/overview), [integration](../../guides/oid4vp/integration), [DCQL store](../../guides/oid4vp/dcql-store), [DCQL REST API](../../guides/oid4vp/dcql-rest-api), [DCQL authoring](../../guides/oid4vp/dcql-authoring), [verifier bindings](../../guides/oid4vp/verifier-bindings).

## Tenant-Aware URL Generation

The `lib-openid-oid4vp-verifier-rest-tenant` overlay replaces the IDK default Universal OID4VP create-auth-request command with an EDK implementation that consults `tenant_public_endpoint`. The effect:

- `request_uri_base` in a returned authorization request points at the tenant's public OID4VP base.
- For signed request objects using `direct_post`, the `response_uri` is the tenant's public OID4VP response endpoint.
- `status_uri` in the returned status is rooted at the tenant's public OID4VP backend base.

The fail-closed default applies: if no `tenant_public_endpoint` binding for `OID4VP_VERIFIER` is configured for the resolved tenant, the verifier refuses to generate URLs against the request host. Tenant administrators set the binding through the tenant admin REST before enabling the verifier for live wallet traffic.

## Trust Frames

A trust frame describes what credentials a verifier is willing to accept for a given verification job. Trust sources within a frame can be:

- **X.509.** A PEM bundle of trust anchors. The IDK X.509 trust engine validates the certificate chain on incoming presentations against this set.
- **DID.** A list of trusted issuer DIDs. The IDK DID trust engine resolves the credential issuer's DID, walks the verification methods, and matches against the trusted set.
- **ETSI TSL.** A trusted list URL conforming to the ETSI Trust Service List format. The engine fetches and refreshes the TSL on the configured schedule and validates issuers against entries in the list.
- **OIDF.** An OpenID Federation entity statement chain. The engine walks the federation and validates issuers against the federation policy.

Frames compose: a verifier can use multiple trust sources in one frame, and any source's positive result is sufficient unless the per-tenant policy requires more specific behaviour.

The trust admin REST is a CRUD over the per-tenant binding. The underlying trust engine and trust-anchor refresh logic ship in the IDK; the verifier container only adds the per-tenant configuration and the integration with the verifier's presentation validation path.

## DCQL Versioning

DCQL queries are the verifier's declaration of what it wants the wallet to present. Each query has a stable header (an identifier and a label) and a sequence of versions (each carrying the query body itself). When a verifier evolves its DCQL query, it produces a new version against the same header; previous versions stay resolvable so in-flight presentations against the previous version still validate.

The header lives in `dcql_query_header`. Versions live in `dcql_query_version`. The `DcqlQueryVersionHttpAdapter` allows clients to fetch the current version, fetch by version id, list versions, and create a new version against an existing header. The Postgres impl ships in `lib-openid-oid4vp-dcql-store-versioned-persistence-postgresql`.

A verifier can also bind multiple distinct DCQL queries simultaneously, addressed by the query header id. Different presentation flows can each reference the appropriate query.

## Signing Keys

The verifier's request-object signing key alias defaults to `(tenant, verifier, request-object-signing)` on the KMS. Used when the verifier signs the authorization request object for `request_uri` flows.

The webhook signing key alias defaults to `(tenant, verifier, webhook-signing)`. Used to HMAC outbound webhook calls so consumers can verify authenticity.

Both aliases are per-tenant; the tenant admin can override either through the signing-key admin REST.

## Persistence

The verifier overlay adds the following tables to the tenant workload database in each tenant schema:

- The DCQL versioned store tables (`dcql_query_header`, `dcql_query_version`).
- The integration registry tables (shared with the issuer).
- The webhook configuration and dispatch queue tables (shared with the issuer).
- The OID4VP-as-OAuth session store (`PostgreSqlOid4vpAuthSessionRepository`), backed through `DatabaseOid4vpAuthSessionStore`.
- The presentation session admin uses the existing generic session persistence at `lib-data-store-session/persistence-postgresql`.

## Image and Runtime

The image is `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-verifier:<enterprise-version>`, or the equivalent mirror supplied through your distribution channel. It runs as a non-root `appuser` (uid 10001) on port 8080.

The entry point starts `EnterpriseOid4vpVerifierKtorServer`, which installs the tenant resolution plugin first and then mounts the universal HTTP adapters. The Metro graph for the enterprise verifier pulls in `lib-openid-oid4vp-verifier-rest-tenant`, `services-tenant-rest`, `lib-tenant-resolution-impl`, `lib-tenant-persistence-postgresql`, the DCQL versioned store with its Postgres impl, the remote KMS/client transport modules, the IDK trust engine modules (`lib-trust-core-impl`, `lib-trust-x509`), and the core events implementation that the session emitter uses to dispatch callbacks.

A production deployment overrides the shipped `application.yaml` to require admin-scoped bearer JWTs on `/api/v1/...`, points at the tenant workload database with schema-per-tenant routing, registers the KMS endpoint, registers trust sources per tenant, and binds tenant public endpoints through the tenant admin REST.

## Operational Notes

- **Trust source refresh.** ETSI TSL and OIDF federation entries refresh on a schedule. The default schedule is conservative; high-throughput deployments tune it through the per-tenant trust-source admin or via global configuration. A refresh failure does not invalidate the cached trust set, the engine continues to validate against the last successful refresh until it succeeds again.
- **Presentation session retention.** Successful presentation sessions are retained for the audit window (configurable per tenant), then archived. The `presentation-session.list` admin endpoint reads from the live table; archived sessions are accessible through the audit pipeline.
- **Multi-DCQL routing.** When a verifier is bound to multiple DCQL queries, the create-auth-request call carries the query header id. The dispatch logic looks up the current version of that header and embeds the query body in the authorization request.
- **Webhook reliability.** Same dispatcher as the issuer. The verifier emits `presentation-completed` and `presentation-failed` event types; tenants subscribe through the webhook admin REST.

---

# Configuration & Secrets

# Configuration & Secrets

The EDK enterprise containers share a configuration model with mounted YAML, environment variables, platform configuration, and per-tenant configuration stored in the tenant workload database. Secrets are kept out of those layers through secret-reference interpolation, with the actual values resolved at runtime from the configured secret backend.

## The Layered Configuration Model

Configuration in an EDK container is the result of a chain of `PropertySource` instances composed by the IDK config system and enriched by the EDK overlay:

1. **Shipped `application.yaml`.** Lives at `/app/config/application.yaml` inside the image. Carries safe defaults for local testing.
2. **Mounted YAML overlays.** A deployment mounts additional YAML files (or replaces the shipped one) at known paths under `/app/config/`. Files are merged in lexical order.
3. **Environment variables.** Standard EDK env-var mapping translates `OAUTH2__SERVERS__ACME__ISSUER_URI` into the `oauth2.servers.acme.issuer_uri` property.
4. **Cloud config providers.** Optional Azure App Configuration or REST Config providers are wired through `lib-conf-azure-appconfig` or `lib-conf-rest-config`. Both layer in as standard property sources.
5. **Platform bootstrap and config services.** Runtime services first resolve bootstrap metadata from the platform service, then resolve platform-owned configuration slices through the same platform route. In the enterprise deployment these peer calls are internal and normally use gRPC to `enterprise-platform:9090`.
6. **Per-tenant workload-database config.** The `TenantConfigPropertySource` reads `tenant_config_property` rows from the schema for the currently resolved tenant in the tenant workload database. This is the layer that tenant administrators write through platform administration and configuration APIs.

Resolution within a request is `App -> Tenant -> Principal` (the three `ConfigService` scopes). A property that exists at both the app and tenant level resolves to the tenant value within a request bound to that tenant, and to the app value otherwise.

## The Shipped application.yaml

The `application.yaml` shipped in each container is deliberately minimal and permissive, for local testing:

```yaml
server:
  rest:
    port: 8080
    auth:
      enabled: false
      anonymous:
        allowed: true
```

It ships permissive rather than locked-down so a first `docker run` reaches the health endpoint without configuring JWT issuance up front. A production deployment overrides `server.rest.auth` to `enabled: true` and configures the JWT issuer the admin REST validates bearer tokens against.

Layered onto this, a typical production overlay sets:

- The PostgreSQL JDBC URLs and credentials for the platform database and the tenant workload database (referenced through secret interpolation).
- The KMS endpoint and the service-JWT key alias the container uses to authenticate to it.
- The tenant resolution settings: the platform base host, the trusted reverse-proxy hop count, the cache TTL.
- The container-specific routing: the AS issuer URL and JWKS for the issuer container, the trust source registry refresh schedule for the verifier container, the DID method allowlist for the DID container.

## Environment Variables

Env-var mapping follows the EDK convention: double-underscore for property-path separators, single underscore inside a single path segment, uppercase. `database.url` becomes `DATABASE__URL`. `oauth2.servers.acme.issuer_uri` becomes `OAUTH2__SERVERS__ACME__ISSUER_URI`.

Two env vars are read directly by the container startup code and never via the property resolver, because they need to be available before the DI graph is composed:

- `APP_PROFILE`: the profile name passed into the Metro app graph factory. Used by config sources that key on profile.
- `PORT`: the HTTP listen port. Defaults to 8080 if not set.

The Helm chart sets the standard image and platform values under `global` and injects per-service environment overrides through `services.<role>.env`:

```yaml
global:
  imageRegistry: nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker
  imageTag: "<enterprise-version>"
  imagePullPolicy: IfNotPresent
  imagePullSecrets: []
  platformBaseDomain: example.com

services:
  issuer:
    env:
      - name: APP_PROFILE
        value: production
```

Use the exact `global.imageTag` supplied through your OEM, MSP, or EDK distribution channel. The tag is the product version for that delivery; the source revision is reported separately through image metadata and `/version`. Use `global.imagePullSecrets` for authenticated registry pulls. Do not put Docker credentials in `services.<role>.env`.

## Secret References

### Kubernetes deployment bootstrap Secrets

The Helm chart needs two deployment bootstrap values before application-level
secret providers can initialize:

```yaml
serviceIdentity:
  internalClientExistingSecret: edk-runtime-secrets
  internalClientSecretKey: internal-client-secret
keystore:
  existingSecret: edk-runtime-secrets
  passwordKey: keystore-password
```

`edk-runtime-secrets` is an example Kubernetes Secret name. Its
`internal-client-secret` value is the confidential-client credential used by
satellites to obtain platform-issued workload tokens. Its `keystore-password`
value protects the platform and tenant-KMS software PKCS#12 stores. Generate the
values independently, keep them out of Git and values files, and have the
cluster's secret-management mechanism create the Secret in the release
namespace. These values are injected with Kubernetes `secretKeyRef`; they are
not `${secret:...}` property-source references.

Helm validates the configured names. Kubernetes validates the Secret object and
key names when a container starts. Missing objects and keys therefore surface as
`CreateContainerConfigError` pod events. Restart affected Deployments after
rotating data under an existing Secret name.

### Application-level secret providers

Secrets in YAML and env vars are stored as references, never as plaintext, through the EDK secret-interpolation syntax:

```yaml
database:
  url: jdbc:postgresql://postgres:5432/edk
  username: edk_app
  password: ${secret:vault:edk/postgres/app-password}
```

`${secret:vault:...}` is resolved at startup by the configured `SecretProvider` SPI implementation. The EDK ships three production-grade implementations:

- **HashiCorp Vault.** Configured against any KV v2 secret engine. Authentication via AppRole, Kubernetes auth, or token. Module: `lib-conf-vault`.
- **AWS Secrets Manager.** Configured against the regional Secrets Manager endpoint. Authentication via the AWS credential chain (IAM role for service accounts on EKS, environment, profile). Module: `lib-conf-aws-secrets`.
- **Azure Key Vault.** Configured against a vault URL. Authentication via the Azure credential chain (managed identity, service principal, environment). Module: `lib-conf-azure-keyvault`.

When the deployment standardises on Kubernetes secrets, secrets are mounted as files and referenced through the `${file:...}` interpolation rather than `${secret:...}`. The result is the same: no plaintext secret in the YAML, no plaintext secret in the env var, no plaintext secret in the image.

A deployment may have multiple secret providers wired simultaneously, distinguished by the prefix after `secret:` (`secret:vault:`, `secret:aws:`, `secret:azure:`). Per-tenant secret backend selection is supported through the `TenantConfigSecretClassifier`.

## Per-Tenant Configuration in the Workload Database

Per-tenant configuration lives in `tenant_config_property` inside the resolved tenant's schema in the tenant workload database. Each row is `(tenant_id, key, value, secret_reference, updated_at)`. The runtime reads these rows through `TenantConfigPropertySource` when a tenant is in scope on the call.

Tenant administrators write to this table indirectly, through the typed admin REST per configuration domain. The EDK does not expose a raw JSONB config endpoint; every config domain has a typed REST surface (the AS instance admin, the issuer config admin, the verifier config admin, the DID method admin, the trust source admin, the federation provider admin, the integration registry, the webhook admin). Behind those surfaces, the values land in `tenant_config_property` as typed properties.

Secret values written through the admin REST never land in `tenant_config_property` as plaintext. The `TenantConfigSecretClassifier` recognises secret-bearing properties and persists only a secret reference; the actual value lands in the configured secret backend under a key path that includes the tenant id.

Cross-replica invalidation when a tenant administrator updates configuration goes through the shared event subsystem: the admin command emits an `application.tenant.config-updated` event, a Postgres `LISTEN/NOTIFY` bridge on the tenant workload database fans out, and each replica's `TenantConfigPropertySource` cache invalidates for the affected tenant. A TTL fallback covers missed notifications.

## Tenant Resolution Settings

The tenant resolution stack reads its settings from the top of the property resolver chain (the app-scope, not per-tenant, because tenant resolution runs before any tenant is in scope). The relevant properties:

- `tenant.resolution.platform_base_host`: the host suffix that subdomain resolution treats as the platform base. Subdomains of this resolve to tenant slugs.
- `tenant.resolution.trusted_proxy_hop_count`: how many `X-Forwarded-Host` hops the resolver trusts. Important behind reverse proxies and CDNs.
- `tenant.resolution.cache_ttl_seconds`: fallback TTL on the in-memory tenant routing cache. Cross-replica invalidation handles the typical case; the TTL covers missed notifications.
- `tenant.resolution.well_known_path_modes`: which `.well-known` URL forms each protocol supports (spec form only, spec + legacy, or custom). The defaults match the discovery URL forms described in the topology page.

The `TenantResolutionSettingsBinder` reads these properties and feeds them into the Ktor `TenantResolutionPlugin` at server startup.

## Database Routing

The enterprise deployment has two database roles. The platform service owns the platform database. Tenant-KMS, DID, tenant-AS, wallet-unit, wallet-interaction, issuer, and verifier use the tenant workload database, with schema-per-tenant isolation:

```yaml
database:
  platform:
    url: jdbc:postgresql://platform-postgres:5432/edk_platform
    username: edk_platform
    password: ${secret:vault:edk/postgres/platform/password}
  tenant:
    url: jdbc:postgresql://tenant-postgres:5432/edk_tenant
    username: edk_tenant
    password: ${secret:vault:edk/postgres/tenant/password}
    isolation: schema
    schemaPattern: tenant_{id}
```

At tenant registration time, the platform provisions the workload schema for the tenant. A request bound to the `acme` tenant routes repository calls to the tenant workload database with the search path set to that tenant's schema. Replicas of a runtime service share the same workload database and route by the resolved tenant.

When a tenant needs stronger isolation than schema-per-tenant, the `lib-data-store-db-routing-config` and `lib-data-store-db-routing-pooling` modules can route that tenant to a dedicated database or PostgreSQL instance. Connection pooling is per-target via HikariCP, and routing changes take effect on the next resolver cache miss and cross-replica invalidation without restarting the container.

## Service-to-Service Auth Configuration

Internal service calls use short-lived workload JWTs issued by the platform
authorization server. Each satellite authenticates as a registered confidential
client using the shared runtime Secret, then sends the resulting bearer to the
intended receiver audience. The service client id, asserted service id, and
receiver audience are one contract:

```yaml
serviceIdentity:
  internalClientExistingSecret: edk-runtime-secrets
  clientIds:
    tenant-as: tenant-as-service
    tenant-kms: kms-service
    issuer: issuer-service
  serviceIds:
    tenant-as: service-tenant-as
    tenant-kms: service-crypto
    issuer: service-oid4vci
  audiences:
    platform: enterprise-platform
    tenant-kms: enterprise-tenant-kms
    issuer: enterprise-issuer
```

Receivers validate the platform-issued JWT, workload-token class, client-to-service
binding, and audience before trusted tenant or principal headers can affect
request context. `grpc.authMode=service-jwt` uses this in-process contract.
`grpc.authMode=mesh-mtls` delegates peer authentication to the service mesh and
requires the matching mesh policy on both caller and receiver.

The audience controls have separate jobs. A receiver expected audience is
`serviceIdentity.audiences.<receiver>`. A caller's route-requested audience is
its effective `serviceTokenAudience`. The platform AS internal-client key
`default-access-token-audience` supplies a target only when the
`client_credentials` request omits one; `allowed-access-token-audiences`
contains the permitted explicit non-default targets. The caller's client id is
also bound to its asserted service id.

The chart derives this registration matrix from the `serviceIdentity` maps:

| Caller | Client/service binding | Default | Allowed additional audiences |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| tenant-KMS | `clientIds.tenant-kms` / `serviceIds.tenant-kms` | `audiences.platform` | none |
| wallet-unit | `clientIds.wallet-unit` / `serviceIds.wallet-unit` | `audiences.platform` | none |
| tenant-AS | `clientIds.tenant-as` / `serviceIds.tenant-as` | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.tenant-kms` |
| DID | `clientIds.did` / `serviceIds.did` | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.tenant-kms` |
| issuer | `clientIds.issuer` / `serviceIds.issuer` | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.tenant-kms`, `audiences.wallet-interaction` |
| verifier | `clientIds.verifier` / `serviceIds.verifier` | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.tenant-kms`, `audiences.wallet-interaction` |
| wallet-interaction | `clientIds.wallet-interaction` / `serviceIds.wallet-interaction` | `audiences.platform` | `audiences.wallet-unit` |

An audience-free client-credentials request requires a nonblank default. One
explicit audience is allowed only when it is the default or an allowed
additional target. Missing defaults, multiple or duplicate targets, and
unregistered targets return HTTP 400 `invalid_target`. An explicit route
`serviceTokenAudience` or `preferServiceTokenOverSessionBearer=true` is
fail-closed: a missing service token cannot fall back to the session bearer,
delegation, or anonymous access. A partial `server.service-identity` is also a
configuration error.

## Peer Transport Configuration

Peer transport is separate from peer authentication. The enterprise images include generated gRPC client stubs and routed remote command dependencies. Platform, tenant-KMS, wallet-unit, and wallet-interaction run the inbound gRPC receivers; the other runtime services use outbound routes to them:

```yaml
grpc:
  enabled: true
  port: 9090
  authMode: service-jwt
```

Keep gRPC east-west only. Runtime services route platform configuration commands to the platform service, KMS commands to tenant-KMS, and wallet commands to wallet-interaction or wallet-unit. The public gateway routes only HTTPS REST/protocol traffic. Platform, tenant-KMS, wallet-unit, and wallet-interaction receivers validate the workload JWT audience before any trusted internal tenant or principal header can affect request context.

## Configuration Hot-Reload

The boundary for hot-reload is the property source. Property sources that support change notifications (`TenantConfigPropertySource`, the Azure App Configuration provider, the REST config provider) propagate changes into the running container without a restart. The shipped `application.yaml`, mounted YAML files, and environment variables are read at startup only.

Tenant administrators changing per-tenant config through the admin REST is the most common hot-reload path. App-level config changes typically require a rolling restart of the affected container.

## Bootstrap Runtime Config

The platform exposes a narrow bootstrap projection for values needed before a service or browser app can call the richer APIs:

- satellites use the internal `platform.bootstrap.get` command, or the protected `GET /api/platform/bootstrap/v1/consumer-config/{consumerId}` REST endpoint, for platform metadata, service endpoint objects, service identity hints, audiences, config domains, license role/capabilities, telemetry hints, revision, TTL, and diagnostics. This internal projection may include Kubernetes or Docker service DNS names, ports, namespaces, and gRPC URLs;
- browser apps call `GET /api/platform/bootstrap/v1/runtime-config/{applicationId}` for an allowlisted public projection. The REST response is shaped as `{ metadata, data }`; browser service wiring lives under `data.services`, where each service owns its `baseUrl`, optional `audience`, and named `endpoints`. The current application ids are `admin-console`, `platform-onboarding`, and `license-portal`.

Browser runtime config derives the platform public base URL from the incoming request origin and forwarded headers unless an explicit platform external base URL is configured. Platform APIs remain on the platform origin, for example `https://platform.<base-domain>/api/platform/admin/v1`. Tenant APIs are not platform APIs: tenant-KMS and DID browser URLs resolve to the tenant origin, for example `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>/api/kms/v1` and `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>/api/did/v1`, or are omitted until a tenant selector/public base is known. An admin-console `/admin-console/api/*` proxy is only an explicit frontend BFF deployment mode, not the canonical service topology.

In BFF mode the admin console may fetch runtime config through the internal platform URL, but it must forward the browser-visible public origin with `X-Forwarded-Host` and `X-Forwarded-Proto`. The BFF also uses server-only internal upstreams for platform-admin, platform-config, token, setup-status, tenant-KMS, DID, issuer-owned, and verifier-owned API calls. For tenant-owned internal calls, the BFF still preserves the public tenant Host and forwarded scheme so tenant resolution and generated links remain tenant-bound. Compose and Helm set these as `ADMIN_CONSOLE_PLATFORM_BASE_URL`, `ADMIN_CONSOLE_TENANT_KMS_BASE_URL`, `ADMIN_CONSOLE_TENANT_DID_BASE_URL`, `ADMIN_CONSOLE_ISSUER_BASE_URL`, and `ADMIN_CONSOLE_VERIFIER_BASE_URL`. The runtime-config `baseUrl` values still stay public (`platform.<base-domain>` and `<tenant>.<base-domain>`); Docker or Kubernetes service DNS names belong only in server-side BFF/consumer-config/bootstrap projections.

This projection is intentionally not a replacement for platform config or the domain APIs. Service definitions and service runtime settings remain in Platform Config (`/api/platform/config/v1`). Credential designs, issuer and verifier designs, render variants, status-list policy artifacts, DCQL query bodies, and verifier presentation definitions remain in their dedicated credential-design, issuer, verifier, and DCQL APIs. Platform config may reference those resources by id/version, but bootstrap never carries their bodies.

The public bootstrap path is anonymous because it is needed before browser sign-in, but its payload is browser-safe only: no secrets, database coordinates, secret-backend paths, KMS credentials, internal-only URLs, or unrestricted config keys. Everything beyond that projection requires a bearer or an internal workload token.

Protocol metadata is the exception to request-origin derivation. OAuth/OIDC, OID4VCI, OID4VP, DID, and other `.well-known` documents must continue to advertise the canonical public endpoint binding for the resolved tenant/service rather than blindly echoing the request host.

---

# Operations

---
id: operations
title: Operations
sidebar_label: Operations
description: Running the EDK containers in production. Health and readiness, OpenTelemetry tracing and metrics, audit, backup and restore, image distribution and delivered versions, and the operator hardening checklist.
---

# Operations

The EDK containers ship with the observability and operational endpoints expected of any production Java service: health, readiness, version metadata, Prometheus metrics, structured logging, distributed tracing through OpenTelemetry, and tamper-evident audit events. This page covers how those surfaces work in practice and what an operator typically wires into them.

## Health, Readiness, and Version Metadata

Each container exposes:

- `GET /health`: liveness. Returns `200 OK` while the container is alive and able to serve. Used by Kubernetes liveness probes and container orchestrators.
- `GET /ready`: readiness. Returns `200 OK` only when the role-specific database pool is healthy, the KMS dependency is reachable where that service uses KMS, and the tenant resolver cache has loaded its initial state. The platform checks its platform database; tenant runtime services check the tenant workload database. Used by Kubernetes readiness probes and load-balancer health checks.
- `GET /version`: release metadata. Returns the container version, the Git commit SHA, the build timestamp, and the IDK version range it was built against. Useful for verifying which delivered version is actually running after a rolling deploy.

These are orchestrator and monitoring probes on the deployment network. They are not customer API endpoints and should not be routed through the public gateway.

Readiness is more stringent than liveness on purpose. A container with a healthy `/health` but a failing `/ready` is alive but not yet able to serve traffic. The deployment template uses this to keep traffic off a freshly-started replica until its dependencies are confirmed reachable.

## OpenTelemetry

The EDK telemetry module is wired into every container. Spans propagate through the command transport layer, so a single trace ID covers the API gateway, the issuer or verifier protocol handler, the attribute pipeline phases, the KMS signing call, and the webhook dispatch.

The container reads OpenTelemetry configuration from the standard env vars: `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT`, `OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_HEADERS`, `OTEL_SERVICE_NAME` (defaulted by the container to `enterprise-issuer`, `enterprise-verifier`, and so on), and the standard sampler configuration. When OTEL is not configured, the telemetry module is a no-op.

Metrics are exposed on `/metrics` in Prometheus exposition format. The metrics set includes process/runtime metrics, HTTP server metrics (request rate, latency histograms by route, error rates), command execution metrics (per command id), pipeline metrics on the issuer (phase duration, source duration, deferral rates), DCQL query metrics on the verifier, and KMS call metrics on every runtime container.

W3C Trace Context propagation is on by default. The `traceparent` and `tracestate` headers flow through the EDK transport layer, so a trace started at the API gateway or upstream caller stays continuous through the issuer/verifier/AS/KMS chain.

## Structured Logging

Logging is JSON to stdout by default. Each log entry carries the standard severity, message, and exception fields plus EDK-specific structured fields:

- `tenant_id`: the resolved tenant on the call, when applicable.
- `correlation_id`: the cross-request correlation identifier.
- `command_id`: the EDK command id, when the log entry was emitted inside command execution.
- `trace_id` and `span_id`, the OpenTelemetry trace context.
- `principal_id`: the authenticated principal, when applicable.

For sensitive operations (a credential issuance, an OID4VP presentation, a federation handshake), the log message itself is deliberately abstract; the structured fields carry the operational detail. This keeps the log stream useful for debugging without leaking credential subject claims, federation user attributes, or other PII into a downstream log aggregator.

## Audit

Audit is a separate stream from the operational log. Every command execution, authorization decision, authentication event, and admin REST mutation emits a structured audit event with the tenant, the principal, the command id, the result, and the relevant business identifiers. The audit subsystem ships with sensitive-data redaction (configurable per command), multiple output formats (JSON, CEF, OCSF), and tamper evidence via hash chaining plus signed checkpoints.

The default audit sink is a Postgres-backed event store (`PostgresDatabaseEventStore`). A read REST surface (`/api/v1/audit/events`) lets platform administrators query by tenant, principal, command, time range, and result. For long-term retention, the audit pipeline can replicate events to an external SIEM through the SSF (Shared Signals Framework) module or through a generic event transmitter.

Audit signing is per-tenant and optional. When enabled, each event is signed with a tenant-scoped audit key on the KMS (`(tenant, audit, audit-checkpoint)`), and periodic signed checkpoints make tampering with stored events detectable. The default is signing off; enable per tenant through `audit.events.signing.enabled`.

## Backup and Restore

Postgres backup and restore is the principal data-protection story. Back up both database roles: the platform database and the tenant workload database with its per-tenant schemas. The EDK does not run its own scheduled backups; the deployment uses whatever backup tooling the operator runs against Postgres in general (`pg_basebackup`, managed-service snapshots, WAL archiving).

For a clean tenant export (for compliance or for moving a tenant to a different deployment), the tenant export REST emits a self-contained JSON document with all of a tenant's CRUD-managed entities: tenant registration, public-endpoint bindings, integrations, credential designs, attribute supplier registrations, federation providers, DCQL queries, trust source bindings, signing key aliases. Re-importing the document on a target deployment recreates the tenant configuration.

Tenant export does not include credential subject data, presentation records, audit history, or KMS-held key material. Subject data and audit history follow the standard data-retention policy; key material does not move (the new deployment generates new keys for the tenant under its own KMS).

KMS key material is the special case. The provider backends (AWS KMS, Azure Key Vault, HSMs) have their own key backup and recovery stories. The EDK does not export private key material out of the provider backend. For the software keystore provider, the backup is a copy of the keystore file; for everything else, the backup is whatever the backend supports.

## Image Distribution and Delivered Versions

The default enterprise distribution publishes authenticated images under `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker`. The customer deployment consumes the delivered image tags and uses the [Enterprise Development Kit Deployment repository](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/Enterprise-Development-Kit-Deployment) for Compose, Helm, gateway examples, Postman, and provisioning scripts. An OEM, MSP, or EDK distributor supplies registry coordinates and credentials through its delivery channel; customers pull via standard Docker auth:

```bash
docker login nexus.sphereon.com
docker pull nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-issuer:<enterprise-version>
```

A typical pull-and-pin pattern in the customer's deployment:

```yaml
image: nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-issuer:<enterprise-version>
```

Use the version tag supplied through your EDK distribution channel in production deployments, not `:latest`. Verifying the image is straightforward: the metadata at `/version`, the image OCI labels, and the SBOM published alongside each image all identify the product version, the source revision, and the included module versions. Use the exact tag provided for the delivery.

## Helm Deployment

The `edk-enterprise` Helm chart is delivered alongside the images. Create the registry, database, and runtime Secrets in the target namespace before installing:

```powershell
kubectl create namespace edk
kubectl -n edk create secret docker-registry edk-registry-credentials `
  --docker-server=nexus.sphereon.com `
  --docker-username=<user> `
  --docker-password=<token> `
  --docker-email=<email>

kubectl -n edk create secret generic edk-platform-postgres `
  --from-literal=username=<platform-db-user> `
  --from-literal=password=<platform-db-password>

kubectl -n edk create secret generic edk-tenant-postgres `
  --from-literal=username=<tenant-db-user> `
  --from-literal=password=<tenant-db-password>

kubectl -n edk create secret generic edk-runtime-secrets `
  --from-literal=internal-client-secret='<long-random-confidential-client-secret>' `
  --from-literal=keystore-password='<long-random-pkcs12-password>'
```

Add the Helm repository using the coordinates and credentials supplied through your distribution channel. Then install or upgrade:

```powershell
helm repo add edk-helm https://nexus.sphereon.com/repository/edk-helm --username <user> --password <token>
helm upgrade --install edk-enterprise edk-helm/edk-enterprise `
  --namespace edk `
  --set global.imageTag=<enterprise-version> `
  --set "global.imagePullSecrets[0]=edk-registry-credentials" `
  --set database.platform.existingSecret=edk-platform-postgres `
  --set database.tenant.existingSecret=edk-tenant-postgres `
  --set serviceIdentity.internalClientExistingSecret=edk-runtime-secrets `
  --set keystore.existingSecret=edk-runtime-secrets
```

The chart defaults to `global.imageRegistry=nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker` and deploys `enterprise-platform`, `enterprise-tenant-kms`, `enterprise-did`, `enterprise-tenant-as`, `enterprise-wallet-unit`, `enterprise-wallet-interaction`, `enterprise-issuer`, `enterprise-verifier`, and the optional `admin-console`. Customer API access goes through `platform.<base-domain>` and `<tenant>.<base-domain>` only. Container ports, health routes, metrics, and gRPC stay private to the deployment. The admin console is routed at `/admin-console` on the platform host.

The chart keeps gRPC internal. Platform, tenant-KMS, wallet-unit, and wallet-interaction expose gRPC receivers on the cluster network. Satellite services use the platform route for configuration and platform-managed calls; DID, tenant-AS, issuer, and verifier use the tenant-KMS route for key operations; issuer and verifier call wallet-interaction, which calls wallet-unit. Never publish gRPC on the external gateway.

## Operator Hardening Checklist

A production-ready deployment of the EDK enterprise containers ticks the following:

- **Network isolation.** Customer traffic enters only through the gateway hosts. Protected tenant administration routes require bearer-JWT auth. Container ports, health routes, metrics, and gRPC are scoped by NetworkPolicy or mesh policy to the actual east-west call graph.
- **TLS.** Public ingresses terminate TLS at the gateway. Internal communication uses mTLS (mesh) or service JWT (in-process), per the topology choice.
- **Secrets.** No plaintext secret in values files, config templates, images, or Git. Kubernetes deployment bootstrap credentials use `secretKeyRef`; application-level secrets use `${secret:...}` references or mounted-file references resolved through the configured backend.
- **JWT validation.** Admin REST requires a bearer JWT with the right scopes. JWT issuer URL configured per environment. JWKS refresh schedule sized to expected key rotation cadence.
- **Postgres.** TLS in transit for both the platform database and the tenant workload database. Backups verified by periodic restore, including schema-per-tenant restore checks. Connection pools sized to each container's actual throughput, with the pool max below the relevant Postgres target's `max_connections` divided across replicas.
- **OpenTelemetry.** Wired to the deployment's collector. Sampling configured to the desired retention budget.
- **Metrics.** Prometheus or compatible scraper subscribed to `/metrics` on every container. Alerts on the standard SLIs: error rate, latency p99, KMS call failure rate, webhook dispatch backlog, Postgres connection pool exhaustion.
- **Logs.** Centralised aggregation. Retention sized for the deployment's compliance requirements.
- **Audit.** Sink configured (Postgres by default, replication to SIEM if applicable). Signing enabled per tenant where required.
- **Image hygiene.** Pull only the delivered enterprise tags from the authenticated registry supplied through your distribution channel. Verify image metadata, signatures or registry attestations when provided, and the SBOM against the operator's dependency policy.
- **Capacity probes.** Load test the deployment against expected traffic before going live, sized to the tenant count and credential volume of the actual workload.
- **Failover.** Platform and tenant workload database failover tested. KMS failover (where applicable) tested. The deployment template's readiness probes correctly remove a replica from rotation when its dependencies fail.
- **Runbook.** Document the deployment's tenant onboarding flow, key rotation procedure, federation provider rotation procedure, and incident response for a credential-compromise event (typically: revoke through the audit pipeline, rotate the affected tenant signing key, re-issue affected credentials).

## When Something Goes Wrong

A few standard diagnostics:

- **`/credential` returning `202` more often than expected** on the issuer container points at connector invocations timing out within the `syncWaitWindow`. Check the issuer's pipeline metrics for per-connector latency; raise the `syncWaitWindow` on the slow invocation binding, move it to a later phase, or accept the deferred flow.
- **Wallet metadata fetch returning the wrong host URL** points at a missing or stale `tenant_public_endpoint` binding. Verify the binding through the tenant admin REST; the runtime URL resolver is fail-closed by default, so an absent binding produces a refusal rather than a silent fallback.
- **Webhook deliveries failing on one consumer but the dispatcher is healthy** points at a per-destination circuit breaker opening. Check the webhook delivery status REST for the affected destination; the circuit breaker auto-closes after the cool-down window once the destination recovers.
- **Federation provider connectivity errors** are surfaced by the `TenantIdpConnectivity` test endpoint. Re-run the connectivity test after the upstream IdP recovers; the AS keeps the cached JWKS and discovery document until the test passes again.
- **Cross-replica config not propagating** points at the Postgres `LISTEN/NOTIFY` bridge being interrupted. The TTL fallback covers this within the configured cache TTL; if a permanent block exists (network policy, Postgres permission), the event subsystem's health metric surfaces it.

---

# Onboarding Walkthrough

# Onboarding Walkthrough

This is the ordered customer runbook for bringing up an EDK deployment and onboarding the first tenant. All calls go through the gateway:

- `https://platform.<base-domain>` for setup, operator sign-in, platform administration, and the admin console.
- `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>` for tenant protocol routes and protected tenant administration APIs.

Do not call workload container hostnames, container ports, health routes, or gRPC receivers directly. TLS terminates at the customer gateway with a certificate valid for `platform.<base-domain>` and `*.<base-domain>`.

## Prerequisites

The enterprise stack is running from the published Nexus artifacts:

- Docker images from `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker`.
- Helm chart from `https://nexus.sphereon.com/repository/edk-helm` when deploying on Kubernetes.
- A platform database owned by the platform service.
- A separate tenant workload database used by tenant-KMS, DID, tenant-AS, issuer, and verifier, with schema-per-tenant isolation by default.

## Step 1: Complete Platform Setup

Open the platform host:

```text
https://platform.<base-domain>
```

Complete first-run setup there. Setup installs or imports the protected license bundle and creates the first platform operator account. The setup API exists at `/api/platform/setup/v1` only while the setup gate is open; after setup it returns `404`.

Reference: [Platform onboarding](./enterprise-deployment/platform-onboarding).

## Step 2: Sign In as Platform Operator

After setup, open:

```text
https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console
```

The operator signs in through the platform authorization server using the authorization-code flow with PKCE. Platform-admin calls carry the resulting operator bearer token.

Reference: [Operator sign-in](./enterprise-deployment/operator-sign-in).

## Step 3: Create the Tenant

Create the tenant from the admin console or through:

```text
POST /api/platform/admin/v1/tenants
```

Tenant setup provisions the default tenant authorization server, the tenant-named KMS provider and default key aliases, the tenant did:web identifier, and the tenant gateway endpoint bindings. If issuer and verifier are selected, setup also creates and binds those instances.

Poll the onboarding correlation id until the workflow reports `COMPLETED`, then verify the tenant and gateway endpoint bindings through the Platform Admin API.

Reference: [First tenant](./enterprise-deployment/first-tenant).

## Step 4: Use the Tenant Gateway

After onboarding, tenant calls use:

```text
https://<tenant>.<base-domain>
```

Wallet-facing protocol paths and well-known documents are unauthenticated where the protocol requires it. Tenant administration paths, including KMS, DID, issuer, verifier, and DCQL administration APIs, require a tenant-scoped bearer token and are still reached through the tenant gateway host.

Reference: [Tenant keys and did:web](./enterprise-deployment/keys-and-did) and [Enterprise deployment walkthrough](./enterprise-deployment/overview).

## Scripted Path

For automation, use the Postman collection and provisioning scripts from the deployment repository. The customer environment uses `baseDomain`, `platformUrl`, and `tenantGatewayUrl`; it does not contain per-container service URLs.

Reference: [Downloads](./enterprise-deployment/downloads) and [Provisioning and onboarding](./provisioning-and-onboarding).

---

# Instance Deployment

# Instance Deployment

A registered tenant has routing, isolation, and an owner, but its issuer, verifier, and authorization server are not yet reachable at the tenant's own URLs. This is the final onboarding step: bind a public endpoint for each service so the tenant advertises and serves it at the right host and path.

:::note One issuer, verifier, and AS per tenant
The EDK runs at most one OID4VCI issuer, one OID4VP verifier, and one OAuth2 authorization server per tenant. Running many instances of a service per tenant, for example several issuer programs under one tenant, is outside the scope of this deployment flow.
:::

## How a Service Becomes Reachable

The three services are configuration-driven. The bootstrap provisions the tenant's default authorization server, and the per-tenant issuer and verifier configuration (credential designs, connector invocation bindings, verifier DCQL, AS clients and federation providers) lives in the tenant's configuration. What turns a configured service into one reachable at the tenant's URLs is a **public-endpoint binding**: it tells the service what host and path to advertise and serve for that tenant.

Bind a service with `PUT /tenants/{tenantId}/public-endpoints/{serviceType}` (`upsertTenantPublicEndpoint`), where `{serviceType}` is `OID4VCI_ISSUER`, `OID4VP_VERIFIER`, or `OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER`. In the hosted EDK model, set `host` to the tenant subdomain, for example `acme.example.com`; for bring-your-own-domain deployments, set `host` to the verified custom domain. Use `pathPrefix` only when the service intentionally lives below a path on that host, and set `wellKnownPath` for the spec-canonical well-known route. See the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin) for the request and response shapes.

Once the binding exists, the service advertises itself at the bound host and path: the issuer's well-known document, `credential_offer_uri`, and `status_uri` all root at the binding rather than at the request host. For the default hosted OID4VCI issuer, `credential_issuer` is the tenant origin, for example `https://acme.example.com`; it is not the platform host and it is not `https://<base-domain>/platform`. The same binding rule applies to the verifier and authorization server. Read the bindings back with `GET /tenants/{tenantId}/public-endpoints` to confirm the host, path prefix, well-known path, and `enabled` state took effect.

A binding must reference a verified domain for the same tenant, and at most one binding per `(tenant, serviceType)` is allowed. The binding rules and hardening are covered in [Domains and Public Endpoints](../guides/tenant/domains-and-endpoints).

## Per-Service Configuration

Each service's own configuration is covered in the Roles and Topology section:

- [Issuer role](./container-deployment/issuer): credential designs and connector invocation bindings.
- [Verifier role](./container-deployment/verifier): verifier DCQL and trust.
- [AS role](./container-deployment/as): AS clients and federation providers.

---

# Overview

# Enterprise Deployment Walkthrough

This walkthrough takes a fresh EDK enterprise deployment from container installation to issuing and verifying credentials. First-run onboarding can be completed with the onboarding web interface, the setup REST API, or offline license resources. The API examples shown here are sanitized captures from the published enterprise containers, so the examples reflect actual wire behavior.

The walkthrough has two parts:

- **Part 1, Deploying EDK**: installing the enterprise containers and the Helm chart, then onboarding the platform itself: license request or offline license activation, platform administrator bootstrap, setup gate closure, and operator sign-in.
- **Part 2, Using the REST APIs**: signing in as the platform operator, creating the first tenant, obtaining a tenant-AS service token for runtime services, and building out tenant credential capabilities: signing keys and a did:web identifier, credential designs for an EU Personal ID (SD-JWT) and a mobile driving licence (ISO mdoc), a token status list, issuance over OID4VCI, DCQL queries with selective disclosure, verification over OID4VP, and the authorization code flow.

## The services

An EDK enterprise deployment runs a central platform service plus the tenant runtime services. The platform role is its own service so first-run setup, license activation, platform administration, platform configuration, and the platform-only authorization server are separate from the customer tenant-bearing AS. The platform service is also the internal peer that other services call over gRPC for platform configuration.

Customer traffic enters only through the gateway: `https://platform.<base-domain>` for setup, operator sign-in, platform administration, and the admin console, and `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>` for tenant protocol routes plus protected tenant administration APIs. Tenant runtime services call tenant-KMS over internal gRPC for service-to-service key generation, signing, verification, and public-key access. Do not publish workload container hosts, container ports, health routes, or gRPC receivers as customer endpoints.

| Service | Role |
| --- | --- |
| Platform | Internal first-run setup, platform administration, platform configuration, and the platform-only authorization server. |
| Tenant KMS | Key generation and signing. Keys never leave this service; protected administration goes through the tenant gateway and service-to-service signing traffic stays internal. |
| DID | DID management and public did:web resolution. |
| Tenant AS | Customer tenant-bearing OAuth2 authorization server. |
| Wallet Unit | Internal server-side wallet lifecycle and policy-gated wallet-key operations. |
| Wallet Interaction | Internal headless wallet protocol runtime used by issuer and verifier flows. |
| Issuer | OID4VCI credential issuance, credential designs, and status list management. |
| Verifier | OID4VP verification and DCQL query management. |
| Admin console | Browser UI for platform operators, served at `/admin-console` on the platform host. |

## Following along

Each page links to the relevant [API reference](/edk/api) for full request and response schemas. To run the same calls yourself, use the Postman collection and environment from the deployment repository under `postman/`, also available on the [downloads page](./downloads). The collection starts from a small set of seed values, then discovers platform and tenant API bases from runtime config instead of asking you to maintain separate URL variables for every service.

The first-run setup API at `/api/platform/setup/v1` is available only while the durable setup gate is open. It creates the signed local license request when needed, installs or consumes the issued license, and enables the platform operator login. A mounted license token alone is not enough on a fresh instance: an operator account still has to be created through setup or supplied as part of a complete mounted bootstrap profile. After setup, open `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console` and sign in with that operator account.

The admin console, onboarding UI, and license portal load browser-safe runtime settings from `/api/platform/bootstrap/v1/runtime-config/{applicationId}` before sign-in. Service base URLs, audiences, and named endpoints live under `data.services`. Platform-owned APIs are returned on the platform origin, for example `/api/platform/admin/v1` and `/api/platform/config/v1`. Tenant-owned APIs are returned on tenant origins, for example `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>/api/kms/v1` and `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>/api/did/v1`; they are not platform endpoints. The admin console always uses its same-origin `/admin-console/api/*` BFF for browser API calls. The BFF uses configured internal service URLs for platform and tenant API calls, forwards the public host and scheme when loading runtime config, and keeps OAuth access and refresh tokens server-side in an HttpOnly session-backed flow.

The apps then call the protected APIs with the operator token or a tenant-scoped service token. Platform-admin requests require the platform operator token from [operator sign-in](./operator-sign-in). Tenant runtime services such as KMS, DID, issuer, verifier, wallet-interaction, and wallet-unit use tenant-scoped or workload service tokens where required. Issuer and verifier call wallet-interaction, and wallet-interaction calls wallet-unit, only over the internal network. Only the setup/bootstrap runtime projection, wallet-facing protocol endpoints, and the public well-known documents accept unauthenticated requests.

---

# Images and Helm chart

# Getting the Images and Helm Chart

The [Enterprise Development Kit Deployment repository](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource/Enterprise-Development-Kit-Deployment) uses published images only. The public customer deployment surface is the deployment repository: Compose, Helm, gateway examples, Postman, and provisioning scripts.

The enterprise service images are published as:

- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-platform`
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-kms`
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-did`
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-tenant-as`
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-wallet-unit`
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-wallet-interaction`
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-issuer`
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/enterprise-verifier`
- `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker/admin-console`

The eight native service images run as a non-root user, expose REST on port 8080 unless documented otherwise, and read their configuration from mounted YAML and environment variables. The `admin-console` image is a Next.js server on port 3000 and is routed at `/admin-console` on the platform host. Database credentials, JWT issuers, license material, and public hostnames are never baked into the images.

:::note
The default enterprise distribution uses the private Nexus Docker repository `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker` and Helm repository `https://nexus.sphereon.com/repository/edk-helm`. Your OEM, MSP, or EDK distributor may provide mirrored coordinates and supplies the corresponding credentials through its delivery channel.
:::

## Installing with Helm

The `edk-enterprise` chart is published from `https://nexus.sphereon.com/repository/edk-helm` and deploys the platform, tenant runtime services, and admin console with hardened defaults: non-root pods, read-only root filesystems, network policies, and a gateway route set that exposes only `platform.<base-domain>` and `<tenant>.<base-domain>` as customer endpoints. Workload container hosts, health routes, and gRPC ports stay private to the cluster.

```bash
kubectl create namespace edk

kubectl -n edk create secret docker-registry edk-registry-credentials \
  --docker-server=nexus.sphereon.com \
  --docker-username=<username> --docker-password=<token>

kubectl -n edk create secret generic edk-platform-postgres \
  --from-literal=username=<platform-db-user> --from-literal=password=<platform-db-password>

kubectl -n edk create secret generic edk-tenant-postgres \
  --from-literal=username=<tenant-db-user> --from-literal=password=<tenant-db-password>

kubectl -n edk create secret generic edk-runtime-secrets \
  --from-literal=internal-client-secret='<long-random-confidential-client-secret>' \
  --from-literal=keystore-password='<long-random-pkcs12-password>'

helm repo add edk-helm https://nexus.sphereon.com/repository/edk-helm --username <username> --password <token>

helm upgrade --install edk edk-helm/edk-enterprise \
  --namespace edk \
  --set global.imageTag=<enterprise-version> \
  --set 'global.imagePullSecrets[0]=edk-registry-credentials' \
  --set global.platformBaseDomain=<base-domain> \
  --set platform.externalBaseUrl=https://platform.<base-domain> \
  --set platform.bootstrap.issuer=https://platform.<base-domain> \
  --set platform.bootstrap.owner.email=<operator-email> \
  --set database.platform.host=<platform-postgres-host> \
  --set database.platform.name=<platform-db-name> \
  --set database.platform.existingSecret=edk-platform-postgres \
  --set database.tenant.host=<tenant-postgres-host> \
  --set database.tenant.name=<tenant-db-name> \
  --set database.tenant.existingSecret=edk-tenant-postgres \
  --set database.tenant.isolation=schema \
  --set database.tenant.schemaPattern='tenant_{id}' \
  --set serviceIdentity.internalClientExistingSecret=edk-runtime-secrets \
  --set keystore.existingSecret=edk-runtime-secrets
```

The chart does not deploy PostgreSQL or generate runtime credentials. Point it at a platform database for the platform service and a tenant workload database for tenant-KMS, DID, tenant-AS, wallet-unit, wallet-interaction, issuer, and verifier. The tenant workload database uses one schema per tenant by default. Generate the two runtime Secret values independently with at least 32 random bytes each and keep them out of values files and Git. Example values files in the deployment repository cover external managed Postgres, JWT service authentication, mesh mTLS, and OpenTelemetry export.

The chart rejects an empty runtime Secret reference while rendering. Kubernetes
checks the referenced object and keys when containers start: a missing object
produces `CreateContainerConfigError: secret ... not found`, while an empty or
incorrect object reports a missing `internal-client-secret` or
`keystore-password` key.

Once the pods report ready, continue with [platform onboarding](./platform-onboarding). After first run completes and the license is active, operators sign in at `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console`.

---

# Platform onboarding

---
title: Platform onboarding
---

# Platform Onboarding

A fresh deployment starts with first-run setup on the platform container. First-run setup has two jobs:

- establish the deployment license; and
- create at least one platform administrator.

Both must be complete before the deployment is usable. A license token by itself does not create an operator account, and an operator account by itself does not make an unlicensed deployment usable.

The anonymous setup API is exposed at `/api/platform/setup/v1` only while the durable setup gate is open. Once setup is complete, the setup adapter returns `404` and day-2 administration moves to authenticated Platform Admin calls under `/api/platform/admin/v1`.

This page assumes the platform container is part of the published enterprise image set from `nexus.sphereon.com/edk-docker`, and that Kubernetes installs use the `edk-enterprise` chart from `https://nexus.sphereon.com/repository/edk-helm`. Use the private Nexus coordinates for the enterprise stack.

The setup contract is in the [Platform Setup API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-setup). Day-2 administration uses the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

## Choose an Onboarding Path

EDK supports three first-run paths. They all end in the same state: the license is active, the setup gate is closed, and the operator signs in through the platform authorization server at `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console`.

| Path | Use when | What still has to happen locally |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Onboarding web interface | A person is installing or evaluating the platform. | Use the web interface to generate or import the license, then create the operator account. |
| Setup REST API | The deployment is scripted, CI-driven, or managed by your own installer. | Call the setup endpoints directly in the same order the web interface uses. |
| Offline license resources | Your EDK license issuer has already issued a token for this deployment, including evaluation, development, or production licenses. | Mount the license material, then either create the operator account through the setup API/web interface or mount complete operator provisioning material. |

## Onboarding Web Interface

The onboarding web interface is the recommended path for interactive first-run setup. Customers open it through the platform gateway at `https://platform.<base-domain>`; the setup API remains under the same platform host at `/api/platform/setup/v1`.

The web interface drives the same setup API described below. It collects organization details, technical and administrator contacts, license material, and administrator details. When no license has been issued yet, it generates the complete license request artifact for out-of-band delivery to the license issuer provided through your EDK distribution channel. When an offline license token has already been provided, skip request generation and paste or upload the issued token in the license install step.

After the setup gate closes, open `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console` and sign in with the operator account. The UI redirects the operator through the platform authorization server and then to platform administration.

## Setup REST API

Use the setup REST API when first-run setup is automated by scripts, Helm jobs, or an external installer. The API surface is anonymous only while setup is open.

Check setup readiness first:

```text
GET  /api/platform/setup/v1/status
GET  /api/platform/setup/v1/license-request
GET  /api/platform/setup/v1/onboarding/state
```

If the deployment does not already have an issued license token, generate a license request:

```text
POST /api/platform/setup/v1/license-request/generate
```

The generated response is the artifact sent to your EDK license issuer. It contains the canonical request JSON, the local X.509 instance certificate, and the signature over the request JSON. License delivery is `MANUAL` in setup v1.

Install the issued token:

```text
POST /api/platform/setup/v1/license/verify
POST /api/platform/setup/v1/license/install
```

Create the platform operator account before leaving first-run setup:

```text
POST /api/platform/setup/v1/bootstrap
```

The operator can be based on the technical contact, the administrator contact, or a new natural person. The setup surface closes only after the license and operator-account steps have been completed.

## Offline License Resources

Offline license resources are useful when your EDK license issuer provides a ready-to-use license token instead of asking the customer to generate a license request first. This is valid for evaluation, development, and production deployments. For example, a customer may receive a time-limited unlimited license for development against the EDK containers, while a production deployment may receive a production license token through the same offline delivery channel.

There are two distinct offline patterns:

- **License-only mount**: mount the issued token as a runtime license source with `license.path` or `license.token`. Then use the onboarding web interface or setup REST API to create the operator account and close first-run setup.
- **Full mounted bootstrap**: mount the license token under `platform.onboarding.license-token-path` together with operator provisioning material. This activates the license, seeds the operator record, and closes the setup gate during boot.

Prefer the license-only mount when the operator should be created interactively or by an installer. Use full mounted bootstrap only when the mounted profile also provisions or activates the operator through the deployment's chosen account-activation path. This avoids closing the setup gate before an operator can sign in.

### License-Only Mount

Mount the issued token and recipient key in the platform config directory, then point `license.path` at the token:

```yaml
platform:
  config:
    mount-path: /app/config
license:
  path: /app/config/license-token.txt
  recipient:
    key-id: license-recipient
    private-key-path: /app/config/license-recipient.jwk.json
  trust:
    embedded:
      enabled: true
```

With this profile, `/api/platform/setup/v1/status` can report that a license source is configured, but first-run setup is still open until the operator account is created. Continue with the web interface or call:

```text
POST /api/platform/setup/v1/bootstrap
```

### Full Mounted Bootstrap

Use full mounted bootstrap only when the mount includes both license material and operator provisioning material. Offline license material is not limited to dev or trial deployments. The restriction is on mounted break-glass credentials: `platform.onboarding.operator.initial-credential` is a dev-mode shortcut and must not be used for production account activation.

Mount an `application.yml` plus the license materials under the platform config directory, for example:

```yaml
platform:
  config:
    mount-path: /app/config
  onboarding:
    installation-base-domain: example.com
    deployment-id: deployment-1
    license-token-path: license-token.txt
    recipient-key-path: license-recipient.jwk.json
    trust-bundle-path: license-root-ca.pem
    operator:
      email: operator@example.com
      display-name: Platform Operator
license:
  recipient:
    key-id: license-recipient
    private-key-path: /app/config/license-recipient.jwk.json
  trust:
    embedded:
      enabled: true
```

The platform container reads this through the normal YAML-backed config loader. `platform.onboarding.license-token-path` is resolved against `platform.config.mount-path`, activated through the same license store used by setup install, and then the setup gate is claimed. After boot, `/api/platform/setup/v1/status` returns `404`; continue directly with [operator sign-in](./operator-sign-in).

Do not mount `platform.onboarding.license-token-path` without also providing a way to create or activate the operator account. Once that profile claims the setup gate, the anonymous setup API is no longer available. For local development only, a mounted `platform.onboarding.operator.initial-credential` can be used as a break-glass credential when the deployment mode permits it.

With the license active and the operator account available, continue with [operator sign-in](./operator-sign-in), or open `https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console` directly.

---

# Operator sign-in

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import startAuth from './_snapshots/02-operator-sign-in/01-start-authorization-request.json';
import loginPage from './_snapshots/02-operator-sign-in/02-open-login-page.json';
import submitCredentials from './_snapshots/02-operator-sign-in/03-submit-operator-credentials.json';
import resumeCallback from './_snapshots/02-operator-sign-in/04-resume-authorization-callback.json';
import exchangeToken from './_snapshots/02-operator-sign-in/05-exchange-code-for-operator-token.json';

# Operator Sign-in

Platform administration calls, from tenant registration onward, carry a bearer token for the platform operator. Setup creates or reconciles the platform tenant, its hosted authorization server, and the operator account before the setup gate closes. This page shows how the operator obtains the token after the issued license has been installed.

## The operator account

First-run setup provisions the operator account from the values posted to `/api/platform/setup/v1/bootstrap`. Full mounted-bootstrap deployments can seed the same values from `platform.onboarding.operator.*`. A license-only offline mount does not create this account; use the onboarding web interface or setup REST API to create the operator before sign-in. Offline license resources are valid for production as well as evaluation and development. The mounted initial credential is the dev-mode-only part: development deployments may use it as a break-glass credential, while production deployments use the normal account activation flow.

After the license is active and the account exists, the normal operator entry point is:

```text
https://platform.<base-domain>/admin-console
```

For example, a deployment on `example.com` uses `https://platform.example.com/admin-console`.

## The client

The operator authenticates with the OAuth2 authorization code flow with PKCE, through a public client registered in the AS configuration under `oauth2.clients.<id>`. A public client has a token-endpoint-auth-method of none: it holds no client secret, and PKCE binds the authorization code to the party that started the flow. This suits both command-line tooling and browser-based admin frontends, since neither can keep a secret.

## The flow

The same chain of requests below is what a browser performs when a person signs in interactively, and what the provisioning scripts run headlessly.

The client opens the authorization endpoint with a PKCE challenge. The AS responds with a redirect to its hosted login page:

<CapturedCall call={startAuth} />

The login page is a plain HTML form served by the AS. The hidden fields carry the authorization session, so the form post resumes the right flow:

<CapturedCall call={loginPage} />

Submitting the operator username and password validates the credentials against the platform tenant's identity store and redirects back into the authorization flow:

<CapturedCall call={submitCredentials} />

The callback completes the authorization request and redirects to the client's registered redirect URI with the authorization code:

<CapturedCall call={resumeCallback} />

The client exchanges the code at the token endpoint, presenting the PKCE verifier:

<CapturedCall call={exchangeToken} />

## The token

The access token is an RFC 9068 JWT. Two claims matter for platform administration:

- `roles` is the RFC 9068 authorization claim and includes `platform-admin` for the operator.
- `tenant_id` identifies the platform tenant the token is bound to.

Platform-admin endpoints validate the bearer token against the authorization server's JWKS and bind the session to the token's tenant. The endpoints this token is used against are documented in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

With the operator token in hand, continue with [registering the first tenant](./first-tenant).

---

# First tenant

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import registerTenant from './_snapshots/03-tenant-onboarding/01-register-tenant.json';
import onboardingStatus from './_snapshots/03-tenant-onboarding/02-get-tenant-onboarding-status.json';
import getTenant from './_snapshots/03-tenant-onboarding/03-get-tenant.json';
import listTenants from './_snapshots/03-tenant-onboarding/04-list-tenants.json';
import listEndpoints from './_snapshots/03-tenant-onboarding/05-list-tenant-gateway-endpoint-bindings.json';
import runtimeDiscovery from './_snapshots/03-tenant-onboarding/06-resolve-tenant-runtime-service-discovery.json';
import verifierParty from './_snapshots/03-tenant-onboarding/07-resolve-verifier-party-id.json';

# Creating the First Tenant

Tenants are registered through the Platform Admin API on the platform host. These calls carry the operator bearer token obtained through [operator sign-in](./operator-sign-in). Schemas are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

## Register the tenant

Registration creates the tenant with an owner account and runs tenant setup. Setup provisions the tenant authorization server, the tenant-named KMS provider and default keys, the tenant did:web identifier, issuer and verifier instances when requested, and the gateway endpoint bindings for the tenant host. Owner credentials are delivered by email in production; the example below disables delivery:

<CapturedCall call={registerTenant} />

The correlation id tracks the setup workflow. A completed workflow means the tenant runtime defaults and gateway bindings are in place:

<CapturedCall call={onboardingStatus} />

If registration returns `503 SERVICE_UNAVAILABLE` and the platform or tenant-AS
logs mention `REMOTE_PLATFORM_CONFIG_UNAVAILABLE`, `platform.config.get`, or
`Missing Authorization header`, inspect the deployment runtime Secret before
retrying. `serviceIdentity.internalClientExistingSecret` must reference a Secret
in the release namespace containing `internal-client-secret`; platform and
tenant-AS must both be restarted after that credential is created or rotated.
Also verify `keystore.existingSecret` and its `keystore-password` key. This is an
east-west service-identity failure, not an operator bearer-token or database
migration failure. See [Images and Helm chart](./images-and-chart) for the
required Secret and [container operations](../container-deployment/operations)
for deployment checks.

If the STS response is HTTP 400 `invalid_target`, diagnose in this order:
caller `serviceIdentity.clientIds` entry, effective route
`serviceTokenAudience`, the caller registration's
`default-access-token-audience` and `allowed-access-token-audiences`, then the
receiver expected audience. An omitted audience requires a nonblank default;
one explicit audience must be that default or an allowed additional target.
Missing defaults, multiple or duplicate values, and unregistered targets are
rejected. Routes declaring `serviceTokenAudience` or
`preferServiceTokenOverSessionBearer=true` fail closed and do not fall back to
the operator/session bearer, delegation, or anonymous access.

Match the response's exact description to the failed rule:

- `Invalid target: No audience was requested and this client has no default access-token audience`
- `Invalid target: Client credentials access tokens are restricted to one audience per request`
- `Invalid target: Requested audience is not registered for this client`

The tenant identifier returned here is used in every tenant-scoped call that follows:

<CapturedCall call={getTenant} />

The list endpoint confirms the tenant is visible to the platform operator:

<CapturedCall call={listTenants} />

## Gateway endpoint bindings

Tenant setup creates route metadata records for the tenant host. These are gateway bindings, not direct workload URLs. Wallets resolve issuer metadata, authorization-server metadata, verification requests, and DID documents through `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>`:

<CapturedCall call={listEndpoints} />

## Runtime service discovery

After tenant onboarding, the collection resolves the browser-safe runtime-config projection for the selected tenant. This returns the tenant-scoped API bases and endpoint paths used by later KMS, DID, issuer, verifier, credential-design, status-list, and DCQL calls. The deployment still exposes tenant services through the tenant host; it does not ask clients to call `issuer.<domain>` or `verifier.<domain>` service hosts.

<CapturedCall call={runtimeDiscovery} />

The verifier runtime APIs key DCQL bindings by the verifier party id, not by the public instance slug. The collection resolves the platform-created verifier party id before it creates DCQL bindings or OID4VP verification requests:

<CapturedCall call={verifierParty} />

Next, [configure sign-in for the tenant](./service-configuration).

---

# Service configuration

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import ApiCapability from '@site/src/components/ApiCapability';
import registerIdp from './_snapshots/04-tenant-federation/01-register-federation-idp.json';
import listIdps from './_snapshots/04-tenant-federation/02-list-federation-idps.json';

# Configuring the Authorization Server, Issuer, and Verifier

Tenant-owned service instances are configured through the Platform Config API at `https://platform.<base-domain>/api/platform/config/v1`. This surface is separate from Platform Admin: Platform Admin manages tenants, domains, signup, operator onboarding, and federation IdPs; Platform Config manages service instances and typed configuration sections for those instances.

It is also separate from platform bootstrap. Bootstrap tells a satellite or browser app how to reach the platform and tenant services, which public/runtime metadata to use, and which internal endpoints a protected workload may call. Platform Config is where application administrators manage service definitions and service settings. Business groups manage operational artifacts such as credential designs, issuer/verifier designs, render variants, and DCQL query versions through their dedicated APIs; Platform Config may reference those artifacts by id/version, but it does not become their authoring store.

In EDK, a tenant has at most one authorization server, one OID4VCI issuer, and one OID4VP verifier. The configuration paths therefore do not include an instance id; the runtime couples the configuration to the tenant.

See the [Platform Config API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config) for the live schema and examples.

## Authorization server configuration

The EDK authorization-server configuration endpoints live under:

```text
/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oauth2/as
```

The AS management resources are proper subresources, not a generic configuration-item endpoint:

- `/tokens`: access token, refresh token, authorization code, and ID token lifetimes, token format, and refresh token rotation.
- `/grants`: enabled grant types, supported response types, and supported scopes.
- `/features`: feature policy values such as OIDC, logout, introspection, revocation, PAR, PKCE, DPoP, JAR/JARM, and signed metadata.
- `/clients`: public and confidential OAuth2 client registrations consumed by the AS runtime.

Reads return effective values with source markers:

```json
{
  "accessTokenLifetimeSeconds": { "value": 1800, "source": "tenant" },
  "refreshTokenLifetimeSeconds": { "value": 2592000, "source": "default" }
}
```

`PUT` replaces one settings resource and clears omitted fields back to defaults. `PATCH` follows JSON Merge Patch semantics: absent fields stay unchanged and explicit `null` clears a tenant override. Clients are first-class resources with `clientType: public` or `clientType: confidential`; confidential client secrets are accepted on write and never returned.

### Patch token settings

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-config-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="updateAsTokenSettings"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oauth2/as/tokens"
  commandId="oauth2-as-admin.tokens.update"
  argsType="JsonObject"
  resultType="JsonObject"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config">

Patch AS token settings with JSON Merge Patch semantics. Send only the token fields to change. An explicit `null` removes the tenant override so the field falls back to the resolved default.

</ApiCapability>

### Register an OAuth2 client

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-config-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="createAsClient"
  method="POST"
  path="/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oauth2/as/clients"
  commandId="oauth2-as-admin.clients.create"
  argsType="JsonObject"
  resultType="JsonObject"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config">

Register a public or confidential OAuth2 client for the AS runtime. Public wallet and browser clients use `clientType: public` with `tokenEndpointAuthMethod: none`; backend clients use `clientType: confidential` and a configured authentication method such as `client_secret_basic`.

</ApiCapability>

## Federated identity providers

External IdPs are registered in the tenant's federation registry on the AS service. The client secret is written into the secret backend selected during onboarding; responses only ever carry an opaque reference. Schemas are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

<CapturedCall call={registerIdp} />

<CapturedCall call={listIdps} />

Register an IdP disabled, run the connectivity test endpoint to confirm the issuer is reachable and its metadata is valid, and then enable it for sign-in.

## Issuer configuration

The EDK OID4VCI issuer has singleton configuration paths:

```text
/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vci/issuer/metadata
/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vci/issuer/security
/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vci/issuer/issuance
```

These sections configure issuer runtime behavior. Credential designs, status lists, and per-credential authoring stay in their own APIs; issuer configuration references those resources rather than copying their bodies.

### Patch issuer metadata

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-config-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="updateOid4vciIssuerMetadataSettings"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vci/issuer/metadata"
  commandId="oid4vci-issuer-config.metadata.update"
  argsType="JsonObject"
  resultType="JsonObject"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config">

Set issuer metadata such as the issuer identifier, authorization-server references, wallet display name, locale, and metadata-signing key alias plus KMS provider id.

</ApiCapability>

### Patch issuer security

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-config-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="updateOid4vciIssuerSecuritySettings"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vci/issuer/security"
  commandId="oid4vci-issuer-config.security.update"
  argsType="JsonObject"
  resultType="JsonObject"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config">

Configure credential response encryption metadata and request-decryption key alias plus KMS provider id. Key material remains in KMS or the configured secrets backend; platform config stores descriptors and references only.

</ApiCapability>

### Patch issuer issuance

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-config-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="updateOid4vciIssuerIssuanceSettings"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vci/issuer/issuance"
  commandId="oid4vci-issuer-config.issuance.update"
  argsType="JsonObject"
  resultType="JsonObject"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config">

Tune issuer runtime behavior such as batch credential issuance size and accepted issuance clock skew. Credential configuration definitions themselves stay in the credential-design API.

</ApiCapability>

## Verifier configuration

The EDK OID4VP verifier has singleton configuration paths:

```text
/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vp/verifier/client
/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vp/verifier/request-object-signing
/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vp/verifier/sessions
/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vp/verifier/identity-reconciliation
```

These sections configure verifier defaults. DCQL query bodies remain in the DCQL API and are referenced by id from verifier flows instead of being duplicated here.

### Patch verifier client settings

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-config-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="updateOid4vpVerifierClientSettings"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vp/verifier/client"
  commandId="oid4vp-verifier-config.client.update"
  argsType="JsonObject"
  resultType="JsonObject"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config">

Configure the verifier's external base URL, response URI, auth-bridge client id, and auth-bridge response URI.

</ApiCapability>

### Patch request-object signing

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-config-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="updateOid4vpVerifierRequestObjectSigningSettings"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vp/verifier/request-object-signing"
  commandId="oid4vp-verifier-config.request-object-signing.update"
  argsType="JsonObject"
  resultType="JsonObject"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config">

Configure request-object signing mode, KMS key alias, provider id, issuer inclusion, audience, expiry, and DID or x509 binding details.

</ApiCapability>

### Patch session settings

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-config-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="updateOid4vpVerifierSessionSettings"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vp/verifier/sessions"
  commandId="oid4vp-verifier-config.sessions.update"
  argsType="JsonObject"
  resultType="JsonObject"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config">

Configure the authorization session lifetime used by the verifier runtime.

</ApiCapability>

### Patch identity reconciliation

<ApiCapability
  product="edk"
  spec="platform-config-openapi.yaml"
  operationId="updateOid4vpVerifierReconciliationSettings"
  method="PATCH"
  path="/api/platform/config/v1/tenants/{tenantId}/oid4vp/verifier/identity-reconciliation"
  commandId="oid4vp-verifier-config.reconciliation.update"
  argsType="JsonObject"
  resultType="JsonObject"
  referenceUrl="/edk/rest-apis/platform/platform-config">

Configure post-presentation reconciliation behavior, including whether users may be auto-created, whether reconciliation is required, and which claim path identifies the user.

</ApiCapability>

Next, [create signing keys and the tenant's did:web identifier](./keys-and-did).

---

# Keys and did:web

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import listProviders from './_snapshots/06-tenant-keys-and-did/01-list-kms-providers.json';
import listKeys from './_snapshots/06-tenant-keys-and-did/03-list-tenant-setup-kms-keys.json';
import listDids from './_snapshots/06-tenant-keys-and-did/04-list-activation-created-did-identifiers.json';
import resolveDid from './_snapshots/06-tenant-keys-and-did/05-resolve-activation-created-did.json';
import listMethods from './_snapshots/06-tenant-keys-and-did/06-list-activation-created-did-verification-methods.json';
import hostedDoc from './_snapshots/06-tenant-keys-and-did/07-fetch-hosted-activation-did-json.json';

# Tenant Keys and the did:web Identifier

Tenant setup creates the default tenant KMS provider, the signing keys used by AS, issuer, and verifier, and a did:web identifier anchored on the tenant gateway host. Customer calls go through `https://<tenant>.<base-domain>` with a tenant-scoped bearer token; they do not address workload containers or east-west gRPC ports directly.

## Verify the tenant KMS defaults

The provider id is the tenant slug. A new tenant should have exactly the tenant-named provider for tenant runtime operations:

<CapturedCall call={listProviders} />

Tenant setup also creates the default key aliases used by the runtime services. Key material stays in the KMS provider:

<CapturedCall call={listKeys} />

## Resolve the activation DID

The default did:web identifier uses the tenant gateway host. Resolvers turn `did:web:acme.example.com` into `https://acme.example.com/.well-known/did.json`:

<CapturedCall call={listDids} />

<CapturedCall call={resolveDid} />

The DID document references the setup-created authentication and assertion keys:

<CapturedCall call={listMethods} />

The public hosting surface serves the DID document at the standard well-known location, unauthenticated and cacheable. This is the URL external resolvers use:

<CapturedCall call={hostedDoc} />

Next, [bind the issuing identity to this DID](./issuer-tenant-config).

---

# Issuer settings

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import issuerDesign from './_snapshots/07-issuer-settings/01-create-issuer-design.json';
import issuerLogo from './_snapshots/07-issuer-settings/02-upload-issuer-logo-asset.json';
import issuerRenderVariant from './_snapshots/07-issuer-settings/03-create-issuer-render-variant.json';
import attachIssuerRenderVariant from './_snapshots/07-issuer-settings/04-attach-render-variant-to-issuer-design.json';

# Issuer Settings for the Tenant

The issuer design is the tenant's issuing identity: the party name and branding wallets display, bound to the did:web identifier whose assertion key signs the credentials. Schemas are in the [Credential Design API reference](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design).

<CapturedCall call={issuerDesign} />

Issuer branding is built from assets and render variants. Upload the logo asset, create the render variant, and attach it to the issuer design:

<CapturedCall call={issuerLogo} />

<CapturedCall call={issuerRenderVariant} />

<CapturedCall call={attachIssuerRenderVariant} />

Credential designs created in the next step are issued under this identity. Wallets show the issuer display name, description, and render assets during the offer and store them with the credential.

Next, [create the credential designs](./credential-designs).

---

# Credential designs

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import eupidDesign from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/01-create-eupid-sd-jwt-design.json';
import eupidLogo from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/02-upload-eupid-logo-asset.json';
import eupidRenderEn from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/03-create-eupid-render-variant-en.json';
import eupidRenderNl from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/04-create-eupid-render-variant-nl.json';
import attachEupidRenderVariants from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/05-attach-render-variants-to-eupid-design.json';
import mdlDesign from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/06-create-mdl-mdoc-design.json';
import mdlLogo from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/07-upload-mdl-logo-asset.json';
import mdlRenderEn from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/08-create-mdl-render-variant-en.json';
import attachMdlRenderVariant from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/09-attach-render-variant-to-mdl-design.json';
import listDesigns from './_snapshots/08-credential-designs/10-list-credential-designs.json';

# Credential Designs: EuPid and Mdl

A credential design defines a credential type: its format bindings, its claims with display labels, and per-claim policy such as selective disclosure. This walkthrough creates two designs through the credential-design API ([API reference](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/credential-design)):

- **EuPid**, a European personal identity credential in `dc+sd-jwt` format, bound by its verifiable credential type (vct) and credential configuration id.
- **Mdl**, a mobile driving licence in `mso_mdoc` format, bound by the ISO 18013-5 doctype `org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL`.

## EuPid (SD-JWT)

SD-JWT claims carry an `sdPolicy`. Claims marked `ALWAYS` are selectively disclosable: the holder chooses whether to reveal them at presentation time. Here family name, given name, and issuing country are disclosable while date of birth and nationality are always present:

<CapturedCall call={eupidDesign} />

The display layer is attached separately. Upload the EuPid logo asset, create localized render variants, and attach those variants to the credential design:

<CapturedCall call={eupidLogo} />

<CapturedCall call={eupidRenderEn} />

<CapturedCall call={eupidRenderNl} />

<CapturedCall call={attachEupidRenderVariants} />

## Mdl (ISO mdoc)

mdoc claims are namespace-qualified: every claim path starts with the ISO 18013-5 namespace. The portrait is transported as base64 image data and driving privileges as a structured array:

<CapturedCall call={mdlDesign} />

The Mdl uses the same asset and render-variant flow:

<CapturedCall call={mdlLogo} />

<CapturedCall call={mdlRenderEn} />

<CapturedCall call={attachMdlRenderVariant} />

## Listing designs

<CapturedCall call={listDesigns} />

The issuer service uses the bound `credentialConfigurationId` values to publish entries in `credential_configurations_supported`. For SD-JWT VC credentials, the bound `vct` also drives the hosted VCT metadata; the render variants and assets above are what wallets use to display the branded credential.

Next, [create the status list that revocation will use](./status-lists).

---

# Status lists

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import createList from './_snapshots/09-status-lists/01-create-token-status-list.json';
import fetchToken from './_snapshots/09-status-lists/04-fetch-hosted-status-list-token.json';
import revoke from './_snapshots/09-status-lists/05-revoke-a-status-entry.json';
import reactivate from './_snapshots/09-status-lists/06-reactivate-the-status-entry.json';

# Token Status List

Revocation for the EuPid uses an IETF Token Status List: a signed, compressed bit array hosted at a public URL. Each issued SD-JWT carries a `status` claim pointing at the list URI and an index in the array. Management schemas are in the [Status List Management API reference](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/statuslist-management); the public surface in the [Status List Hosting API reference](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/statuslist-hosting).

## Create the list

The correlation id is the stable business identifier: issuance references it, and the hosted URL embeds it. Indexes are allocated randomly when credentials are issued, never sequentially, so the list does not leak issuance volume or order:

<CapturedCall call={createList} />

## The hosted token

Verifiers dereference the status list URI from the credential's `status` claim. The hosting surface is public, unauthenticated, and cacheable:

<CapturedCall call={fetchToken} />

## Updating status

A status update sets the bit at an index. The read side exposes only the bit value: whether an index has been allocated to a credential is intentionally not observable, because an unallocated index is indistinguishable from a valid one:

<CapturedCall call={revoke} />

<CapturedCall call={reactivate} />

With designs and the status list in place, [issue the credentials](./issuing).

---

# Issuing credentials

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import walletKey from './_snapshots/11-issue-credentials-simple/01-generate-wallet-holder-key.json';
import createOffer from './_snapshots/11-issue-credentials-simple/02-create-eupid-offer.json';
import resolveOffer from './_snapshots/11-issue-credentials-simple/03-resolve-credential-offer.json';
import issuerMeta from './_snapshots/11-issue-credentials-simple/04-fetch-oid4vci-metadata.json';
import token from './_snapshots/11-issue-credentials-simple/05-exchange-pre-authorized-code-for-token.json';
import requestCred from './_snapshots/11-issue-credentials-simple/06-request-eupid-credential.json';
import offerStatus from './_snapshots/11-issue-credentials-simple/07-check-eupid-offer-status.json';
import mdlOffer from './_snapshots/11-issue-credentials-simple/08-create-mdl-offer.json';
import mdlCred from './_snapshots/11-issue-credentials-simple/11-request-mdl-credential.json';
import pipeInit from './_snapshots/12-issue-credentials-pipeline/01-initialize-pipeline-session.json';
import pipeContribute from './_snapshots/12-issue-credentials-pipeline/02-contribute-attributes.json';
import pipeRead from './_snapshots/12-issue-credentials-pipeline/03-read-accumulated-attributes.json';
import pipeCompleteness from './_snapshots/12-issue-credentials-pipeline/04-evaluate-completeness.json';
import pipeApprove from './_snapshots/12-issue-credentials-pipeline/05-approve-issuance.json';

# Issuing the Credentials over OID4VCI

There are two ways to get subject data into an issuance: supply it inline when creating the offer (the simple approach), or let connector invocations and manual contributions populate a pipeline session (the pipeline API). Both end in the same wallet-facing OID4VCI protocol. Backend schemas are in the [OID4VCI Issuer API reference](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/oid4vci-issuer).

## Simple approach: subject data in the offer

The backend creates a credential offer carrying the subject data and a pre-authorized code grant. The wallet scans the offer URI, exchanges the code for a token, and requests the credential.

In this walkthrough the wallet's holder key is generated through the tenant gateway so the proof of possession can be signed during the run; in production the key lives in the holder's wallet:

<CapturedCall call={walletKey} />

<CapturedCall call={createOffer} />

The wallet resolves the offer and reads the pre-authorized code:

<CapturedCall call={resolveOffer} />

Issuer metadata announces the credential configurations and endpoints. The credential configuration entries are derived from the credential designs bound in the previous steps, including the SD-JWT VC `vct`, mdoc doctype, claim policy, and display/render data:

<CapturedCall call={issuerMeta} />

The token request uses the pre-authorized code grant. The response carries the access token for the credential endpoint and the nonce that must appear in the proof of possession:

<CapturedCall call={token} />

The credential request includes an ES256 proof JWT (type `openid4vci-proof+jwt`) signed by the holder key, with the issuer as audience and the nonce from the token response. The issued SD-JWT carries the selectively disclosable claims and the `status` claim referencing the hosted status list:

<CapturedCall call={requestCred} />

The backend session reflects the completed lifecycle:

<CapturedCall call={offerStatus} />

The Mdl follows the same sequence with namespace-qualified subject data; the response carries the ISO 18013-5 mdoc bound to the holder key:

<CapturedCall call={mdlOffer} />

<CapturedCall call={mdlCred} />

## Pipeline API: attributes from connector invocations

When subject data comes from multiple systems, or issuance needs an approval gate, use the pipeline API instead of inline subject data. Automatic integrations are connector invocation bindings in `PipelineConfiguration.invocationBindings`; backend/admin systems can also manually contribute attributes into the same session keyed by correlation id. Completeness is evaluated against the credential's mandatory claims, and an approval decision releases issuance:

<CapturedCall call={pipeInit} />

<CapturedCall call={pipeContribute} />

<CapturedCall call={pipeRead} />

<CapturedCall call={pipeCompleteness} />

<CapturedCall call={pipeApprove} />

After approval, the offer and wallet protocol proceed exactly as in the simple approach, with the pipeline-collected attributes as subject data.

Next, [define what verifiers may ask for](./dcql-queries).

---

# DCQL queries

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import eupidQuery from './_snapshots/13-dcql-queries/01-create-eupid-query.json';
import mdlQuery from './_snapshots/13-dcql-queries/02-create-mdl-query.json';
import combinedQuery from './_snapshots/13-dcql-queries/03-create-combined-query.json';
import listQueries from './_snapshots/13-dcql-queries/04-list-queries.json';
import listVersions from './_snapshots/13-dcql-queries/05-list-combined-query-versions.json';
import bindCombined from './_snapshots/13-dcql-queries/06-bind-combined-query-to-verifier.json';
import listVerifierBindings from './_snapshots/13-dcql-queries/07-list-verifier-dcql-bindings.json';
import listQueryBindings from './_snapshots/13-dcql-queries/08-list-combined-query-verifier-bindings.json';

# DCQL Queries with Selective Disclosure

DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) describes what a verifier requests: which credential types, matched how, and which claims. The claim selection is what drives selective disclosure: claims a query does not name are not revealed. Queries are stored on the verifier service ([DCQL API reference](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/dcql-edk)).

## SD-JWT query

Matches the EuPid by vct and requests only three of its claims. The holder's wallet discloses family name, given name, and the age attestation; everything else in the credential stays hidden:

<CapturedCall call={eupidQuery} />

## mdoc query

Matches the Mdl by doctype. mdoc claim paths name the namespace first:

<CapturedCall call={mdlQuery} />

## Combined query

One query can request multiple credentials in a single presentation, each with its own claim selection:

<CapturedCall call={combinedQuery} />

## Listing and versioning

Stored queries are versioned; earlier versions can be inspected and restored through the version-history endpoints:

<CapturedCall call={listQueries} />

<CapturedCall call={listVersions} />

## Bind the query to the verifier

Creating a DCQL query does not automatically enable a verifier instance to use it. Bind the query to the platform-created verifier party id resolved during tenant onboarding. The public verifier instance slug is routing/display data; the binding API keys the verifier by its party id:

<CapturedCall call={bindCombined} />

The binding can be listed from the verifier side or from the query side:

<CapturedCall call={listVerifierBindings} />

<CapturedCall call={listQueryBindings} />

Next, [run a verification with the bound query](./verifier-binding).

---

# Verifier and verification

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import createRequest from './_snapshots/14-verification/01-create-verification-request.json';
import pollStatus from './_snapshots/14-verification/02-poll-verification-status.json';
import cancel from './_snapshots/14-verification/03-cancel-verification-session.json';

# Running Verifications

A verification session references a stored DCQL query by its id, so what production verifications request is governed by the stored, versioned query rather than by inline request bodies. The query must already be bound to the verifier party id as shown in the previous step. Schemas are in the [OID4VP Verifier API reference](/edk/rest-apis/verifiable-credentials/oid4vp-verifier).

## Run a verification session

The backend opens a session referencing the stored query and returns the authorization request URI a wallet opens (typically rendered as a QR code):

<CapturedCall call={createRequest} />

The session is polled by correlation id. After the wallet presents, the status reaches `authorization_response_verified` and the response carries the disclosed claims:

<CapturedCall call={pollStatus} />

<CapturedCall call={cancel} />

Next, [accounts for the authorization server](./accounts-and-identities).

---

# Accounts and identities

# Accounts and Identities for the Authorization Server

The hosted authorization server distinguishes two kinds of principals, with different rules:

- **Platform administration** uses operator accounts that live in the EDK identity store. The platform owner is provisioned during platform tenant bootstrap as a natural person with an identity and protected email identifier, and the credential is written through the hosted AS credential store. The operator signs in through the hosted AS form flow described on the [operator sign-in](./operator-sign-in) page. Platform administration does not use federated sign-in: the platform AS is an internal authorization server whose sole job is providing admin accounts for platform management, and it is intentionally kept minimal.
- **Tenant users** sign in through the identity providers registered in the tenant's federation registry. Your IdP remains the system of record for tenant users; the enterprise AS brokers authentication.

The [authorization code flow](./authorization-code-issuance) page shows how an authenticated user drives credential issuance.

---

# Authorization code flow

import CapturedCall from '@site/src/components/CapturedCall';
import authCodeOffer from './_snapshots/15-authorization-code-offer/01-create-offer-with-authorization-code-grant.json';
import asMetadata from './_snapshots/15-authorization-code-offer/02-fetch-authorization-server-metadata.json';

# Issuing with the Authorization Code Flow

The pre-authorized code flow used earlier suits backend-initiated issuance where the subject is already known. The authorization code flow inverts this: the wallet sends the user to the authorization server to authenticate first, and the issuer resolves the subject's claims from the authenticated identity.

## The offer

An offer with an `authorization_code` grant carries no subject data. The `issuer_state` ties the wallet's authorization request back to this offer:

<CapturedCall call={authCodeOffer} />

## The flow

The wallet reads the authorization server metadata, then drives a standard OAuth2 authorization code flow with PKCE:

<CapturedCall call={asMetadata} />

1. The wallet opens the authorization endpoint with `response_type=code`, its client id, a redirect URI, the `issuer_state`, and a PKCE challenge.
2. The user authenticates: against the hosted AS, or through a federated IdP registered in step 4 of this walkthrough.
3. The wallet exchanges the authorization code for an access token at the token endpoint.
4. The credential request proceeds exactly as in the pre-authorized flow: a proof of possession signed by the holder key, answered with the credential.

The issuance session on the backend moves through the same lifecycle states either way, so status polling and callbacks work identically for both grants.

---

# Downloads

# Postman Collection and Environment

The post-provisioning customer walkthrough is available as a Postman collection. It ships in the deployment repository under `postman/`. Install the license and complete platform setup in the Admin Console UI first. The collection starts after that point and covers operator sign-in, tenant onboarding, tenant runtime discovery, issuer configuration, credential design, issuance, DCQL binding, status lists, and verification.

The same files are available here for direct download:

- [EDK-Enterprise-Deployment.postman_collection.json](/downloads/edk/EDK-Enterprise-Deployment.postman_collection.json)
- [EDK-Enterprise-Deployment.customer.postman_environment.json](/downloads/edk/EDK-Enterprise-Deployment.customer.postman_environment.json)

## Using the collection

1. Import both files into Postman and select the environment.
2. Use the Admin Console UI to install the license and complete platform setup.
3. Fill in the seed environment values: `baseDomain`, `tenantSlug`, `tenantName`, and the platform operator credentials.
4. Run operator sign-in, tenant onboarding, and tenant runtime service discovery first. These folders derive `platformUrl`, `tenantGatewayUrl`, redirect URIs, service API base URLs, audiences, tenant ids, issuer ids, and the verifier party id from the platform runtime-config and platform-config APIs.
5. After discovery has run, the resource folders can be rerun independently when their own prerequisite ids already exist. For example, DCQL binding needs a created DCQL query and the discovered verifier party id; issuing needs the credential design ids, status list id, and tenant runtime service token.

| Variable | Meaning |
| --- | --- |
| `baseDomain` | Customer-controlled base domain. The gateway must terminate TLS for `platform.<baseDomain>` and `*.<baseDomain>`. |
| `tenantSlug`, `tenantName` | Tenant identity used by the onboarding folder. The tenant gateway host is `<tenantSlug>.<baseDomain>`. |
| `operatorEmail`, `operatorPassword` | Platform operator credentials used for sign-in and tenant administration. |

The collection deliberately does not ask you to maintain separate KMS, DID, issuer, verifier, AS, DCQL, credential-design, or status-list URLs. It derives those from `baseDomain`, tenant onboarding output, and `/api/platform/bootstrap/v1/runtime-config/admin-console`, then stores the discovered API bases as collection variables for later folders.

---

# eIDAS Signature REST API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/eidas-signature-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Trust Domain API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/trust-domain-openapi.yaml" />

---

# OID4VCI Issuer Integration API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/oid4vci-issuer-openapi.yaml" />

---

# OID4VP Verifier Integration API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/oid4vp-verifier-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Credential Design API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/credential-design-openapi.yml" />

---

# OID4VP DCQL Query Configuration Admin API (Enterprise)

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/edk/v0.25/dcql-edk-openapi.yml" />

---

# Credential Status List Management API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/statuslist-management-openapi.yml" />

---

# Semantic Model Authoring API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/semantic-model-authoring-openapi.yml" />

---

# Party Manager API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/party-manager-openapi.yml" />

---

# Identity Auth API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/identity-auth-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Asset API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/asset-openapi.yml" />

---

# Theme API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/theme-openapi.yml" />

---

# Platform Admin API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/platform-admin-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Platform Setup API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/platform-setup-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Platform Bootstrap API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/platform-bootstrap-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Platform Config API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/platform-config-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Application BFF OAuth Client API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/application-bff-oauth-client-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Audit API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/audit-openapi.yml" />

---

# Wallet Unit API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/wallet-unit-openapi.yml" />

---

# Wallet Entitlement API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/wallet-entitlement-openapi.yml" />

---

# OID4VCI Issuance Template API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/oid4vci-issuance-template-openapi.yml" />

---

# OID4VP Verification Template API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/oid4vp-verification-template-openapi.yml" />

---

# Platform & Tenant Onboarding

# Platform & Tenant Onboarding

VDX is the platform layer above the EDK. It shares the EDK onboarding flow, application tenant bootstrap, license activation, secret backend selection, onboarding policy, tenant creation, owner activation, and tenant identity-provider setup, and adds white-labeled portals and dashboards plus the ability to run **many** service instances per tenant.

This page gives the ordered onboarding sequence and calls out the VDX-specific deltas. For step-by-step detail on each shared stage, see the EDK platform and tenant guides (Onboarding Walkthrough, Application Tenant, License & Policy, Registration Journeys, Owner Activation, and Tenant Federation).

Two REST surfaces drive onboarding. The exact request and response shapes for every operation are documented interactively in the Scalar API references linked below.

| Surface | Base path | Reference | Purpose |
|---------|-----------|-----------|---------|
| **Platform Admin** | `/api/platform/admin/v1` | [Platform Admin API](/vdx/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin) | Application tenant bootstrap, license, secret backend, onboarding policy, tenant lifecycle, domains, public endpoints, federation, owner redemption |
| **Software / Instance Manager** | `/api/services/v1` | [Software / Instance Manager API](/vdx/rest-apis/services/software-manager) | Provision and manage issuer, verifier, and authorization-server instances per tenant |

Every authenticated call carries a bearer JWT. Tenant context is resolved from that token, never from a request parameter. The application tenant is always authenticated through the platform's own hosted identity provider, so operators can always reach the platform administration surface, including before any customer tenant exists.

---

## The Onboarding Sequence

```text
1. Bootstrap the application (platform) tenant + hosted IdP
2. Activate the license
3. Select the secret backend
4. Set the onboarding policy
5. Create a tenant (admin-direct, admin-invite, or self-service signup)
6. Owner activation
7. Tenant configures its own IdP / federation
8. Provision MANY service instances + bind public endpoints   ← VDX delta
```

Steps 1 through 7 are the shared EDK flow. Step 8 is the VDX delta: a tenant runs many service instances per type instead of one.

---

### 1. Bootstrap the platform tenant

A VDX deployment starts by bootstrapping the **application tenant**, the tenant that administers the deployment. It always has a hosted authorization server, so operators can sign in even before any customer tenant exists, and independently of any customer tenant's later external IdP configuration.

The platform tenant is initialized from `application.tenant.*` configuration on the container deployment, or by calling `POST /application/tenant/bootstrap` (`bootstrapApplicationTenant`) with the operator contact details. The call creates the application tenant and its hosted authorization server, or reconciles them if they already exist, and reports whether the platform can register its first real tenant. The configuration keys are `application.tenant.id` (the tenant identifier), `application.tenant.hosted-as.issuer` (the hosted authorization server issuer), and `application.tenant.owner.email` with `application.tenant.owner.display-name` (the operator owner identity). See the [Platform Admin API reference](/vdx/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin) for the request schema.

VDX also seeds the **platform application** inside the application tenant: a service party whose OAuth client id comes from `vdx.platform.oauth-client-id` (default `platform-admin`). The platform application is the login surface for the platform admin API; operators and tenant owners authenticate against it. Its login configuration accepts password login with email identifiers and keeps self-registration off, so platform access is granted only by binding an identity, never by signing up. Application-bound login is the default (`auth.login.require-application`), so every login resolves against a specific application and a credential only works where it is bound. The seeder also converges the bootstrap owner into a full login identity: a natural-person party with protected identifiers (the email is stored encrypted with a blind index for lookup) and an authenticable binding to the platform application. Seeding runs idempotently on every boot and is gated by `vdx.seed.platform-app.enabled` (default true); `vdx.platform.allowed-idp-ids` restricts which identity providers may authenticate against the platform application.

### 2. Activate the license

Production tenant onboarding is gated on an active license. Activate it by submitting the signed license token with `PUT /application/license` (`putApplicationLicense`), read the status projection with `GET /application/license` (`getApplicationLicense`), and check a token without installing it with `POST /application/license/verify` (`verifyApplicationLicense`).

The license is signed and encrypted: a JWS whose signing certificate chains to the Sphereon licensing root CA, wrapped in a JWE addressed to the deployment's recipient key (`license.recipient.key-id`, `license.recipient.private-key-path`). The root CA bundle (`license.trust.root-ca-bundle-path`) is the only trust anchor; missing or unverifiable material is fail-closed and blocks entitlement checks. Development deployments can opt in to a development license with `license.dev.enabled` and `license.dev.path`; it passes the same trust validation and may be valid for at most 31 days. The full `license.*` key set, the runtime recovery and grace keys, and the trust model with the `license.trust.*` policy OID checks are documented in the EDK [License, Quota, and Policy](/edk/guides/tenant/license-and-policy) guide.

Container deployments can also load license material at startup. The Kubernetes overlays mount license files at `/var/run/secrets/vdx/license`, and the runtime reads the signed license envelope, recipient key, and trust material from that directory. The expected runtime files are:

```text
/var/run/secrets/vdx/license/license.jwe
/var/run/secrets/vdx/license/recipient-private-key.pem
/var/run/secrets/vdx/license/root-ca-bundle.pem
/var/run/secrets/vdx/license/crl-bundle.pem
```

The development overlay also mounts `/var/run/secrets/vdx/license/dev-license.jwe` for local license material. The object names in the shipped overlays are `vdx-dev-license-material` and `vdx-dev-license-trust` for development, `vdx-staging-license-material` and `vdx-staging-license-trust` for staging, and `vdx-production-license-material` and `vdx-production-license-trust` for production. Operators may replace those names in their own Helm values, but the mounted filenames must stay aligned with the runtime paths.

The admin API exposes a sanitized **status projection** of the license: the effective `status` (`ACTIVE`, `GRACE`, `RECOVERY`, `MISSING`, `INVALID`, `EXPIRED`, or `BLOCKED`), one summary per licensed product (product, edition, licensed module names, quota key names), the customer and deployment identifiers, the issuer, the hex SHA-256 fingerprint of the leaf signing certificate, the expiry instant with days to expiry, the recovery and grace flags, and warnings. The raw license token, the decoded claims, and the entitlement graph are never exposed; entitlement and quota decisions read the full license internally. Self-service signup, subtenant journeys, and tenant count limits are gated on the licensed entitlements, and the license also bounds **per-service instance limits**, the ceiling on how many issuer, verifier, and authorization-server instances a tenant may run (see [Many Instances per Tenant](#many-instances-per-tenant)). Configuration can further restrict a licensed capability, but cannot enable one the license disallows. The schemas are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/vdx/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

### 3. Select the secret backend

Per-tenant secrets (identity-provider client secrets, SMTP passwords, integration secrets) are stored in a single selected backend. Tenant configuration keeps only opaque references such as `clientSecretRef`; plaintext secrets are write-only on the way in and are never echoed. The `backend` enum decides where they go:

- `azure-key-vault`: Azure Key Vault. Use it on Azure deployments.
- `hashicorp-vault`: HashiCorp Vault. Use it for a Vault-centric or cloud-neutral deployment.
- `kubernetes-secret-mount`: secrets that Kubernetes mounts into the pod. Use it when secrets are provisioned as Kubernetes Secrets.
- `config-system-dev-only`: the config system itself. Local and development only, never production.

Set or reconfigure the backend with `PUT /application/secrets/backend` (`putSecretBackend`) and read the current selection with `GET /application/secrets/backend` (`getSecretBackend`). A non-dev backend is required before invite or self-service signup journeys are enabled. See the [Platform Admin API reference](/vdx/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

### 4. Set the onboarding policy

The onboarding policy toggles which tenant-creation routes the platform accepts: root-tenant creation, admin invite, self-service signup, subtenant signup, and whether self-signup requires operator approval. Set it with `PUT /application/onboarding` (`putApplicationOnboarding`).

A toggle being on does not mean the route is usable. Read `GET /application/onboarding/availability` (`getApplicationOnboardingAvailability`) to see the evaluated result, which combines the policy with the license features and limits, email readiness, and the secret backend selection, and reports a `reason` for each route that is not enabled. The license is evaluated before policy: a toggle can turn off or constrain a licensed route, but cannot enable a route the license disallows. See the [Platform Admin API reference](/vdx/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

### 5. Create a tenant

A tenant is created with `POST /tenants` (`registerTenant`), with a default authorization server and an owner bootstrap. Owner identity is supplied as local contact details; the owner's external IdP is **not** collected at creation time. The decision that shapes this step is `ownerDelivery.mode`: `none` has the operator complete owner activation out of band (works without an email service), and `email` has the platform email the owner an invitation (needs the email service). (`manual` is not accepted over REST.) A root tenant leaves `parentTenantId` null; a subtenant sets it to the parent's id. For the public path, use `POST /tenants/signup/request` (`requestTenantSignup`). The request schemas are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/vdx/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

There are three ways to drive this step:

| Route | How the owner is reached | Email service required |
|-------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| **Admin-direct** | Operator creates the tenant and completes owner onboarding through authenticated admin flows | No |
| **Admin-invite** | Operator creates the tenant; the platform emails the owner an activation link | Yes |
| **Self-service signup** | A prospective owner signs up from a public page; the platform emails a verification link, with optional operator approval | Yes |

Admin-direct creation is the only route that works without an email service configured. Self-service signup additionally requires the `selfSignup` license feature; any subtenant route requires the `subtenants` feature with `subtenantsAllowed = true`, within `maxHierarchyDepth`.

Identity-provider settings (federation provider, OIDC issuer, OAuth client id and secret) are never collected during tenant creation. They belong to post-activation tenant IdP setup.

### 6. Owner activation

The tenant owner activates through the owner bootstrap path with `POST /owner/redeem` (`redeemOwnerInvitation`), a public, unauthenticated endpoint where the owner submits the one-time token plus the new credential they set. For admin-invite and self-service routes the platform delivers the token to the owner by email server-side; the token is delivered out of band and is never returned by any API. See the [Platform Admin API reference](/vdx/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

Owner identities converge in the application tenant. One email address resolves to exactly one login identity there, no matter how many tenants that person owns: the platform looks the email up by its blind index, reuses the identity when it exists, and binds it to the platform application. Each owned tenant carries its own user projection row referencing that shared identity, and redeeming the invitation creates the password credential keyed by the identity id, so an owner of several tenants signs in once with one credential. Deprovisioning a tenant removes only that tenant's projection row; the shared login identity, its protected identifiers, and its credential remain.

### 7. Tenant configures its own IdP

Once the owner is active, the tenant chooses how its users sign in: platform-hosted (the platform authorization server acts as the tenant's IdP, the default) or external (federate to the tenant's own OIDC IdP). To federate, register the IdP with `POST /federation/idps` (`createTenantIdp`), supplying the `issuer`, `clientId`, and `claimsMapping` (which maps `subject`, `email`, and `displayName`). The `clientSecret` is write-only in, stored in the selected secret backend, and returned only as a `clientSecretRef`. Probe it with `POST /federation/idps/{idpId}/test`, then enable it with `POST /federation/idps/{idpId}/enable`.

Tenant federation is license-gated on the `federation` feature. Configuring a tenant IdP never affects application-tenant login, which always stays on the platform's hosted authorization server. The schemas are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/vdx/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

---

## Many Instances per Tenant

:::info EDK vs VDX: instances per tenant
On the **EDK**, a tenant runs at most **one** OID4VCI issuer, **one** OID4VP verifier, and **one** OAuth2 authorization server. On **VDX**, a tenant can run **many** instances of each service type, bounded only by the license's per-service instance limits. Each instance is configured, deployed, and routed independently.
:::

A VDX tenant provisions as many issuer, verifier, and authorization-server instances as its license allows, for example a separate issuer per credential program, or distinct verifiers for distinct relying-party contexts, all under one tenant.

Instances are provisioned through the Software / Instance Manager API at `/api/services/v1`. There is a generic surface and three typed surfaces:

| Endpoint | Manages |
|----------|---------|
| `POST /api/services/v1/services/instances` | Generic cross-type instance creation |
| `POST /api/services/v1/oid4vci/issuers` | OID4VCI issuer instances |
| `POST /api/services/v1/oid4vp/verifiers` | OID4VP verifier instances |
| `POST /api/services/v1/oauth2/servers` | OAuth2 authorization-server instances |

Create a typed issuer instance with `POST /oid4vci/issuers`. The decisions here are the `managementMode` (whether the platform manages the instance lifecycle) and which authorization server it binds to. A second issuer for the same tenant is created the same way with a different display name. Each instance has its own id, lifecycle, and configuration, and supports lifecycle actions (`deploy`, `suspend`, `resume`, `decommission`) and deployment and endpoint sub-resources under `/services/instances/{instanceId}`. See the [Software / Instance Manager API reference](/vdx/rest-apis/services/software-manager) for the full request and response shapes.

### Independent routing per instance

Because a tenant runs several instances of the same type, each needs a distinct public URL. A **public-endpoint binding** makes an instance independently routable by a custom host or a path prefix. Bind one with `PUT /tenants/{tenantId}/public-endpoints/{serviceType}` (`upsertTenantPublicEndpoint`), where `serviceType` is `OID4VCI_ISSUER`, `OID4VP_VERIFIER`, or `OAUTH2_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER`. The body sets where the named `instanceId` is advertised: a verified custom `host`, or a `pathPrefix` under the platform subdomain, plus the `wellKnownPath`. By assigning a distinct `host` or `pathPrefix` per instance, issuer A and issuer B of the same tenant are reachable at separate, stable URLs. List a tenant's bindings with `GET /tenants/{tenantId}/public-endpoints`. The schemas are in the [Platform Admin API reference](/vdx/rest-apis/platform/platform-admin).

---

## Platform Container Deployment

VDX is delivered as a platform container deployment on top of the EDK service set. The platform tenant is initialized the same way on every deployment target, Kubernetes, Docker Compose, cloud, or on-premise, from `application.tenant.*` configuration or the `POST /api/platform/admin/v1/application/tenant/bootstrap` call described above. The platform tenant always has a hosted IdP and is the home of the `/api/platform/admin/v1` API.

In Kubernetes, each service pod can receive common license material through the shared Helm chart volume hooks. The chart exposes generic extra pod volumes and container volume mounts; the environment overlays use those hooks to attach the license Secret and trust ConfigMap as one read-only directory. This keeps secret contents out of Git and keeps license material provisioning in the operator's secret management flow.

See [Operations & Management](/vdx/guides/operations) for the full deployment model across Kubernetes, Docker Compose, cloud native, and on-premise.

---

## Operator Surfaces

VDX adds white-labeled per-tenant portals and dashboards over this flow. Operators drive license activation, secret-backend selection, tenant creation, and instance provisioning through the platform admin surfaces and the management dashboards:

- **Admin Console**, platform administration, tenant management, policy configuration, and onboarding status, over `/api/platform/admin/v1`.
- **Issuer Management** and **Verifier Management**, provision and operate the per-tenant issuer and verifier instances over `/api/services/v1`.

Each tenant's portals and dashboards are branded as the tenant's own product, while the underlying admin APIs and instance manager are shared. See [Operations & Management](/vdx/guides/operations) for portals, dashboards, and branding.

---

# Credentials & Trust

# Credentials & Trust

VDX manages the full credential lifecycle, from schema design through issuance, wallet storage, selective disclosure presentation, and verification against trusted issuers. Organizations control every aspect: what credentials they issue, who can verify them, which trust frameworks govern the process, and how credentials integrate with their authorization infrastructure.

<img src="/img/diagrams/vdx-credential-lifecycle.svg" alt="Credential Lifecycle" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto', margin: '20px 0'}} />

---

## Credential Design & Issuance

The **Credential Designer** is a visual tool for defining credential schemas. Administrators specify which claims to include, which are mandatory, which support selective disclosure, and what display metadata (names, descriptions, icons, colors) wallets should present to users. No code required, schemas are defined through the admin portal and published as OID4VCI credential configurations.

**Issuer Management** handles the operational side. Each issuer has its own DID, signing keys, and issuance policies. Multiple issuers can operate within a single tenant, useful when different departments issue different credential types. The platform tracks the full credential lifecycle: issuance events, usage, expiration, and revocation.

### Supported Formats

| Format | Standard | Key feature |
|--------|----------|-------------|
| **SD-JWT VC** | IETF | Selective disclosure, holder chooses which claims to reveal per presentation |
| **mDL / mdoc** | ISO 18013-5/7 | CBOR-based mobile documents, mobile driving license, national ID |
| **W3C VC** | W3C | JSON-LD and JWT with Linked Data Proofs, broadest ecosystem compatibility |

All three formats are supported for both issuance and verification. The claims mapping service translates between formats automatically, an mdoc credential can be verified against the same requirements as an SD-JWT credential.

---

## Verification

The **Verifier Management** console defines what credentials your organization accepts. Verification requirements are configured per resource or service:

- A building entrance requires a student credential from a specific university
- A financial service requires a government-issued PID with eIDAS `high` assurance
- A conference registration accepts any of three credential types from trusted issuers

Requirements can be composed: "present A AND B" or "present A OR B." The platform supports **DCQL** (Digital Credentials Query Language) for complex credential set matching where multiple credentials from different issuers are evaluated together.

Verification works in two modes:

**Online**: real-time OID4VP flow with QR code or deep link. The user presents credentials from their wallet, and the platform verifies signatures, holder binding, issuer trust, and credential status in real time.

**Offline**: signature validation against cached trust material. For environments without reliable connectivity (kiosks, border control, field verification), the platform validates cryptographic signatures locally using pre-fetched trusted issuer keys.

---

## Trust Establishment

Credentials are only as valuable as your trust in the issuer. VDX supports multiple trust frameworks, configurable per tenant:

| Framework | What it provides |
|-----------|-----------------|
| **ETSI TS 119 612/602** | EU Trusted Lists, automatic resolution and validation against EU member state trust service provider lists |
| **OpenID Federation** | Trust chain resolution for federated identity ecosystems |
| **DID-based trust** | Configurable trusted issuer DID lists per credential type and tenant |
| **X.509 PKI** | Certificate chain validation with CA bundles and fingerprint matching |

Trust configuration is tenant-scoped, each organization defines which issuers they trust for which credential types, without affecting other tenants on the same platform.

---

## Device & Kiosk Verification

VDX extends credential verification to physical devices: reception kiosks, access terminals, event check-in tablets, and NFC readers.

The **Mobile RP SDK** enables building relying party experiences on mobile devices. **NFC proximity verification** supports ISO 18013-5 flows for mDL and other mdoc credentials. Devices can operate in **online mode** (connected to VDX) or **offline mode** (validating locally against cached trust material).

**Device Management** tracks which devices are authorized, their last-known status, firmware versions, and which verification policies apply to each device or device group. Push verification initiates the flow from the device, a reception kiosk starts the verification when it detects a visitor, rather than waiting for the user to trigger it.

---

## Authorization Server

The VDX Security Token Service (STS) integrates credential-based authentication with standard OAuth2/OIDC infrastructure.

**RFC 8693 Token Exchange**: tokens from any authentication source (wallet VP, institutional OIDC, Azure AD, Keycloak) are exchanged for uniform STS tokens with standardized claims. Enterprise applications keep using standard OIDC tokens, no code changes needed.

**Identity Broker**: connects upstream OIDC providers while maintaining control over token issuance. Unlike direct federation, the broker preserves `issuer_state` for OID4VCI correlation, which is critical for credential issuance flows that span multiple authentication steps.

**Claims Mapping**: translates between credential formats and OIDC claims output, with provenance tracking that records which credentials contributed each claim. Output includes `verified_claims` structure per OIDC Identity Assurance, downstream consumers know what was verified, how, and to what assurance level.

---

# Identity & Authentication

# Identity & Authentication

VDX bridges the gap between digital wallets and enterprise identity systems. When a user presents credentials from their wallet, the platform handles verification, privacy-preserving identity matching, optional identity proofing, and user resolution, then returns standard OIDC claims to your existing authorization infrastructure.

<img src="/img/diagrams/vdx-wallet-auth-flow.svg" alt="Wallet Authentication Flow" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto', margin: '20px 0'}} />

---

## Instant Recognition, Privacy Preserved

The first time a wallet appears, VDX links it to an internal identity through privacy-preserving HMAC fingerprinting. **Raw public keys are never stored**: only `HMAC-SHA-256(tenant_pepper, canonical_key_bytes)`. Tenant-isolated peppers prevent cross-tenant correlation.

For **returning users**, recognition is instant: hash the key, check the blind index, decrypt cached attributes, issue a token. No external calls, no user interaction, no delay.

For **new users**, the reconciliation engine evaluates configurable rules and decides: run identity verification, accept the wallet claims directly, or reject. The decision depends on the credential type, the issuer, the tenant's policies, and the available claims.

---

## Composable Verification

When identity proofing is required, VDX orchestrates configurable verification pipelines that combine multiple methods:

<div style={{display: 'grid', gridTemplateColumns: 'repeat(auto-fit, minmax(160px, 1fr))', gap: '10px', margin: '16px 0'}}>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '14px', textAlign: 'center'}}>

**OIDC**

SURFconext, DigiD, FranceConnect, Azure AD

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '14px', textAlign: 'center'}}>

**Document**

Passport NFC, ID card OCR via ReadID, Onfido, Jumio

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '14px', textAlign: 'center'}}>

**Biometric**

Face liveness via iProov, Onfido, Jumio

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '14px', textAlign: 'center'}}>

**OTP**

Email, SMS, authenticator app

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '14px', textAlign: 'center'}}>

**Wallet**

EUDIW PID, mDL credential

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '14px', textAlign: 'center'}}>

**Registry**

Chamber of commerce, civil registry, REST API

</div>

</div>

Methods compose in four modes: **ALL** (every method must pass), **ANY** (user chooses one), **THRESHOLD(n)** (at least N pass), and **SEQUENCE** (ordered, with claims flowing between steps).

Each method produces identifiers, claims, assurance level (eIDAS LoA, NIST AAL), authentication methods (RFC 8176 AMR), and evidence strength, enabling downstream systems to make assurance-based access decisions.

---

## Assurance Grows Over Time

A person can be verified through multiple channels over time, wallet PID, institutional OIDC, email OTP, document scan, each contributing its own assurance level. VDX computes the **derived assurance dynamically**: the highest LoA across all bindings, with stale bindings degrading after a configurable age.

**Step-up authentication** triggers automatically when an operation requires higher assurance than the current session provides. A user browsing a catalog might need only `low` assurance, but signing a contract requires `high`, VDX challenges them to re-authenticate through a stronger method without the application needing to know about assurance levels.

---

## Enterprise IAM Integration

VDX integrates with your existing identity infrastructure rather than replacing it:

| Integration | What it does |
|------------|-------------|
| **Identity Broker** | Connects to upstream OIDC providers (Keycloak, Azure AD, SURFconext) while preserving `issuer_state` for OID4VCI correlation |
| **Token Exchange** | RFC 8693, normalizes tokens from any source into uniform STS tokens with standardized claims, ACR/AMR, and `verified_claims` |
| **Claims Mapping** | Translates between credential formats (SD-JWT, mdoc, JSON) and OIDC claims, with provenance tracking per claim |
| **Impersonation & Delegation** | Service acts AS the user or ON BEHALF OF the user, with nested `act` claims for full audit trail |

Enterprise applications keep using standard OIDC tokens. They don't need to know that behind the scenes, a wallet presentation was verified, an identity was matched, and claims were projected from encrypted canonical bindings.

---

## Per-Identity Encryption

Sensitive identity data is encrypted at rest using a two-layer key hierarchy. An **Identity Access Key** (per-identity, random 256-bit symmetric) wraps per-document **Document Encryption Keys** (AES-256-GCM).

Access is controlled through grants:

| Grant type | How it works |
|-----------|-------------|
| **Org Grant** | IAK wrapped by KMS/HSM org root key, organization can decrypt |
| **Wallet Grant** | IAK sealed with wallet's public key (HPKE), holder can decrypt |
| **Knowledge Grant** | IAK derived from passphrase (Argon2id), user can decrypt with PIN/password |
| **Sharing Grant** | DEK re-wrapped for a specific recipient, controlled data sharing |

**GDPR compliance is cryptographic:** destroying the IAK makes all data for that identity irrecoverable in O(1), crypto-shredding without data migration. Data portability is an export command. Consent is modeled as grants with purpose, validity period, and instant revocation.

---

# Security & Governance

# Security & Governance

Every data breach starts with an implicit trust assumption that shouldn't have been there, a service that wasn't authorized, an API call that wasn't logged, a permission change that nobody reviewed. VDX eliminates implicit trust from your identity infrastructure. Every command is policy-checked before execution. Every action is recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail. Every decision is traceable across services, tenants, and time.

This isn't a security layer bolted onto the platform. It's how the platform works. The same governance model applies whether you're issuing a credential, verifying a presentation, signing a document, or returning a query result. Nothing executes without authorization, nothing happens without a record.

---

## Policy-Driven Authorization

Before any command executes, issuing a credential, reading an identity, signing a document, querying a record, it passes through the policy enforcement layer. The decision is made by an external policy engine, not by application code.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-command-extension-flow.svg" alt="Command Authorization Flow" style={{maxWidth: '480px', width: '100%', height: 'auto', margin: '16px 0'}} />

Three policy engines are supported. **Cedar** (AWS) provides formally verifiable policies that can be mathematically proven correct, you can ask "is there any scenario where an unauthorized user can access this resource?" and get a definitive answer. **Open Policy Agent** uses the industry-standard Rego language, widely adopted in cloud-native environments. **Any AuthZEN-compliant PDP** works out of the box.

What makes this different from role-based access control scattered through code:

- **Policies are data, not code.** Update who can do what without redeployment. Different tenants can have entirely different policy sets.
- **Dual-principal evaluation.** Both the end user AND the calling service are authorized on every request. A compromised service can't escalate its own privileges.
- **Step-up authentication.** Policies can require higher assurance for sensitive operations, viewing a record needs `low`, but exporting it needs `high`. The platform challenges the user automatically.
- **Fail-closed by default.** If the policy engine is unreachable, everything is denied. No security degradation under failure.
- **Progressive rollout.** Log-only mode lets you see what would be denied before enforcing, validate policies against production traffic without breaking anything.

---

## Immutable Audit Trail

Every operation produces an audit record. Not just "user X did Y", the full context: who, what, when, why it was allowed (or denied), how long it took, which service handled it, and the distributed trace ID linking it to every other operation in the request chain.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-audit-pipeline.svg" alt="Audit Pipeline" style={{maxWidth: '480px', width: '100%', height: 'auto', margin: '16px 0'}} />

The audit pipeline automatically enriches events with tenant and actor context from the session, redacts sensitive data (passwords, tokens, API keys are stripped before persistence), and writes to an append-only store where records cannot be modified or deleted, not even by administrators.

**Tamper evidence** goes further: every audit event is hash-chained to the previous one. Modifying any event breaks the chain. Periodic signed checkpoints provide independent verification points. An auditor can prove that no records were altered between any two points in time.

### What Gets Recorded

| Event type | What it captures |
|-----------|-----------------|
| **Command execution** | Every business operation, credential issuance, identity verification, document signing, data queries |
| **Authorization decisions** | PERMIT and DENY with policy engine reasons, including which rules matched |
| **Authentication events** | Wallet presentations, OIDC logins, step-up challenges, session lifecycle |
| **Data access** | Who read what, from which service, at what assurance level |
| **Configuration changes** | Policy updates, tenant settings, credential schema modifications |
| **Security events** | Failed authentication attempts, suspicious patterns, credential revocations |

### SIEM Integration

Audit records export to your existing security infrastructure in three formats:

- **JSON**: for Elasticsearch, Splunk, Datadog, Loki, and modern log platforms
- **CEF** (Common Event Format), for ArcSight, QRadar, and legacy SIEM systems
- **OCSF** (Open Cybersecurity Schema Framework), the emerging standard for security telemetry

Export is asynchronous, it never blocks command execution. Failed exports retry with exponential backoff and dead-letter queuing so nothing is silently lost.

---

## End-to-End Tracing

A single user action, presenting a credential, signing a document, verifying an identity, might flow through multiple microservices. Without tracing, investigating an incident means correlating logs from different services by timestamp and hoping.

VDX uses OpenTelemetry with W3C Trace Context propagation. A single **trace ID** follows the request from the API gateway through every service that participates. Spans within the trace show where time was spent. The trace ID appears in every audit record, every log line, and every SIEM export, so investigating an incident starts with one ID and reveals the complete picture.

<img src="/img/diagrams/edk-distributed-trace.svg" alt="Distributed Trace" style={{maxWidth: '580px', width: '100%', height: 'auto', margin: '16px 0'}} />

---

## Cross-Domain Security Signals

When a credential is compromised, a session is revoked, or an account is disabled, every system that trusts that identity needs to know, immediately, not hours later.

VDX implements the **OpenID Shared Signals Framework** (SSF) for real-time security event exchange. CAEP events handle session revocation and token claim changes. RISC events handle account compromise, disablement, and purge. All signals are transmitted as signed Security Event Tokens (SETs) with replay protection.

This means VDX doesn't operate in isolation. When an upstream identity provider detects a compromise, the signal propagates to VDX, which revokes sessions, invalidates cached decisions, and notifies downstream systems, all within seconds.

---

## Data Protection

Identity data is encrypted at rest with per-identity keys. The organization can access data through its KMS-wrapped grant. The wallet holder can access it through their public key. Optional knowledge-based grants add passphrase protection.

**No plaintext identifiers in the database.** External identifiers (wallet keys, email addresses, institutional IDs) are stored as HMAC hashes. Canonical attributes are encrypted with AES-256-GCM. Even with full database access, an attacker sees only ciphertext and hashes.

**GDPR by architecture:**

- **Crypto-shredding**: destroying one key makes all data for an identity irrecoverable. No data migration, no record-by-record deletion. O(1) erasure.
- **Selective disclosure**: holders choose which claims to reveal per presentation. The verifier never sees more than what's needed.
- **Consent-as-grants**: access grants carry purpose, validity period, and revocation. Revoking consent = revoking the grant = immediate access termination.
- **Data portability**: export command bundles all data for an identity in a portable format.

---

## Attribute Sources as Parties

External systems that feed attributes into the platform, a database, an IAM, a REST API, a static dataset, are not configuration entries. Each registered attribute source is a party: an executable system is a software party, a non-executing dataset is an asset party, and the source carries an `ATTRIBUTE_SOURCE` capability on that party. The managed-versus-external distinction rides on the party itself (its origin and, for a server, its management mode), the same pattern the platform uses for an external OID4VCI issuer.

Registration creates the full identity picture in one step. The source party receives an identity it owns, and the source's endpoint URL is stored on that identity as a protected correlation identifier under the tenant's protection policy for URLs, so connection endpoints follow the same at-rest protection rules as personal identifiers. Connector secrets are never identifiers and never stored inline; they live in the selected secret backend and the source references them through its software credential's secret reference.

Because sources are parties, they are visible where parties are visible: the polymorphic party API returns them as typed `Software` and `Asset` shapes alongside persons and organizations, so a tenant's inventory of participants includes the systems its data comes from.

That visibility makes governance derivable rather than hand-maintained. Governance derivation reads each source's operator and runtime mode from its server-party record and produces complete processor-map entries: a third-party-operated source appears as a processor under its operator, the systems it depends on appear as sub-processors behind that operator, and the result feeds the processor map, transfer facts, and register reporting without a separately maintained inventory. When attribute values flow out of identifiers at issuance time, the attribute pipeline's identity source emits identifier claims protection-aware: reversible values are revealed, and blinded lookup values are never emitted as claims.

---

## Governance at Every Layer

The same governance model applies across all platform operations:

| Layer | How governance applies |
|-------|----------------------|
| **Credential issuance** | Policy check before issuing. Audit record of what was issued, to whom, by which authority. |
| **Credential verification** | Policy check on what to accept. Audit record of what was verified, from whom, with what assurance. |
| **Identity matching** | HMAC-hashed links, no plaintext. Audit record of matching decisions and IDV outcomes. |
| **Data access** | Policy check on every read/write. Encryption at rest. LoA-gated decryption grants. |
| **Configuration changes** | Policy check on who can modify settings. Audit record of every change with before/after values. |
| **Service-to-service** | mTLS and workload identity. Dual-principal authorization. No shared secrets. |

The result is a platform where every business decision, from "should we issue this credential?" to "should this service access this record?", goes through the same policy-audit-trace pipeline. No exceptions, no bypasses, no implicit trust.

---

# Operations & Management

# Operations & Management

VDX is not just a set of APIs, it's a complete operational platform. Management portals for administrators, issuers, verifiers, and end users. A workflow engine that orchestrates multi-step identity processes. A forms editor for code-free data collection. White-label branding down to the individual design token. And the deployment flexibility to run anywhere from a single Docker container to a distributed Kubernetes cluster.

---

## Portals

<img src="/img/diagrams/vdx-portals.svg" alt="VDX Portals" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto', margin: '16px 0'}} />

Portals are where organizations interact with their customers, partners, employees, and citizens. A portal is a collection of forms and workflows that guide users through identity processes, onboarding a new employee, verifying a student's enrollment, signing a contract, issuing a credential, or granting access to a resource.

Each portal integrates the full VDX capability set: credential issuance and retrieval, verification of presented credentials, wallet-based authentication, approval workflows, encrypted vault storage, and document signing. The organization defines which capabilities each portal exposes, and the portal handles the user-facing experience, forms, consent collection, status tracking, and notifications.

Portals are fully white-labeled per tenant. An educational institution's student onboarding portal looks and feels like the institution's own product. A government agency's citizen services portal carries the agency's branding and language. The underlying infrastructure is shared, but each tenant's users see only their organization's brand.

### VDX Applications

Alongside portals, VDX includes purpose-built applications for platform operations:

- **Admin Console**: platform administration, tenant management, policy configuration, device management, audit review, system health monitoring
- **Issuer Management**: credential schema design, issuance configuration, batch and individual issuance, revocation, lifecycle analytics
- **Verifier Management**: verification requirement configuration, trusted issuer lists, event monitoring, compliance reporting

These are operational tools for the teams that run the platform, separate from the portals that end users interact with.

---

## Workflows & Forms

Real-world identity processes aren't single API calls. Credential issuance might require data collection, manager approval, identity verification, and notification. Onboarding might combine document verification with organizational checks and compliance review. These multi-step, multi-actor processes are modeled as workflows.

<img src="/img/diagrams/vdx-workflow-engine.svg" alt="Workflow Engine" style={{maxWidth: '580px', width: '100%', height: 'auto', margin: '16px 0'}} />

The **Workflow Engine** orchestrates these processes. Each step in a workflow is a command, the same command abstraction that powers the rest of the platform. This means every step is automatically authorized by the policy engine, recorded in the audit trail, traced with OpenTelemetry, and can execute locally or on a remote microservice. If a step fails midway through, saga-based compensation rolls back completed steps in reverse order.

The **Forms Editor** lets administrators design input forms without writing code. Forms collect structured data for workflow steps, credential issuance requests, identity verification inputs, approval decisions, and any process that needs user input. Form definitions include:

- Validation rules (required fields, regex patterns, value ranges)
- Conditional visibility (show field B only when field A has value X)
- Multi-language labels and descriptions
- Accessibility metadata (ARIA labels, keyboard navigation)

Forms are versioned and tenant-scoped, different organizations can have different forms for the same workflow type.

---

## White-Label Branding

Every visual aspect of the platform is customizable per tenant through a Material Design 3 token-based theming system. Organizations deploy VDX as their own product, under their own brand.

<div style={{display: 'grid', gridTemplateColumns: '1fr 1fr', gap: '12px', margin: '16px 0'}}>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '16px'}}>

**Simple Branding**

Pick one seed color. The platform generates the full M3 palette, 89 color tokens across light, dark, and high-contrast variants. Upload a logo and custom fonts. 15 typography styles, 6 elevation levels, motion tokens, and responsive scales, all derived automatically.

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '16px'}}>

**Full Customization**

Override any of the 200+ design tokens, colors, typography, spacing, border radius, elevation, motion, for pixel-perfect brand alignment. Export as CSS custom properties for web. Use the Compose Multiplatform SDK for native iOS and Android.

</div>

</div>

The scope hierarchy (SYSTEM → APP → TENANT → PRINCIPAL) means platform defaults cascade through organizational overrides down to individual user preferences. A tenant only needs to define the tokens it wants to change, everything else inherits from the level above.

---

## Deployment

<img src="/img/diagrams/vdx-microservices.svg" alt="VDX Microservices" style={{maxWidth: '580px', width: '100%', height: 'auto', margin: '16px 0'}} />

VDX runs as microservices or as a monolith, same codebase, different configuration. Choose the deployment model that fits your scale and operational maturity.

<div style={{display: 'grid', gridTemplateColumns: 'repeat(auto-fit, minmax(200px, 1fr))', gap: '12px', margin: '16px 0'}}>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '16px'}}>

**Kubernetes**

Helm charts per service. Environment overlays for dev, staging, and production. Horizontal scaling per service. Health and readiness probes. License material is mounted as Secret and ConfigMap backed files, so the deployment references `license.jwe`, the recipient key, and trust bundles without storing secret contents in Git.

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '16px'}}>

**Docker Compose**

Single-command local setup. Microservices or monolith mode. PostgreSQL and Keycloak included. Environment file configuration.

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '16px'}}>

**Cloud Native**

AWS ECS/EKS, Azure AKS, or any container platform. Prebuilt service images on Eclipse Temurin 21 base images.

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '16px'}}>

**On-Premise**

Fat JAR or GraalVM native images. Air-gapped environment support. Full control over data residency. No container runtime required.

</div>

</div>

All deployment modes include PostgreSQL for persistence and integrate with Keycloak or any OIDC-compliant provider for administrative authentication.

---

## Device Management

VDX manages the physical devices that participate in your identity ecosystem, not just software clients.

**Verification devices**: tablets at reception desks, kiosks at building entrances, card readers at access points, terminals at border control. Each device is registered in the platform, assigned to a tenant, given verification policies that control what credentials it accepts, and monitored for health and activity.

**Push verification** flips the traditional flow. Instead of waiting for the user to start the process, the device initiates it. A reception kiosk starts an OID4VP flow when it detects a visitor. A turnstile triggers NFC verification. A customs terminal requests specific credentials. The platform manages the device-initiated sessions the same way it manages user-initiated ones, same verification, same policies, same audit trail.

**Workload identity** (SPIFFE/SPIRE) provides zero-trust service-to-service authentication. Every microservice in a VDX deployment has a cryptographic workload identity, eliminating shared secrets, API keys, and static credentials for internal communication. Combined with dual-principal authorization, this means even compromised internal services can't escalate privileges.

---

## Observability

Every operation in VDX is observable through three complementary systems:

<div style={{display: 'grid', gridTemplateColumns: '1fr 1fr 1fr', gap: '12px', margin: '16px 0'}}>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '16px'}}>

**Distributed Tracing**

OpenTelemetry with W3C Trace Context. One trace ID follows a request through every service. Latency breakdown per span.

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '16px'}}>

**Audit Logging**

Immutable, tamper-evident trail. Automatic data redaction. JSON, CEF, OCSF export to any SIEM.

</div>

<div style={{background: 'var(--ifm-color-emphasis-100)', borderRadius: '8px', padding: '16px'}}>

**Shared Signals**

OpenID SSF (CAEP/RISC). Real-time cross-domain security event exchange. Instant session revocation.

</div>

</div>

---

## Get Started

VDX is available as a managed service or for on-premise deployment. Contact Sphereon to discuss your requirements:

- **Website:** [sphereon.com](https://sphereon.com)
- **Email:** [info@sphereon.com](mailto:info@sphereon.com)
- **GitHub (open source):** [github.com/Sphereon-OpenSource](https://github.com/Sphereon-Opensource)

---

# OID4VP DCQL Query Configuration Admin API (Platform)

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/dcql-vdx-openapi.yml" />

---

# Semantic Binding API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/semantic-binding-openapi.yml" />

---

# Semantic Vocabulary API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/semantic-vocabulary-openapi.yml" />

---

# User Manager API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/user-manager-openapi.yml" />

---

# Software / Instance Manager API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/software-manager-openapi.yml" />

---

# Connector Registry API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/connector-openapi.yml" />

---

# Connector Integration Profile API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/connector-integration-openapi.yml" />

---

# Resource & Booking API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/resource-manager-openapi.yml" />

---

# Email API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/email-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Invitation API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/invitation-openapi.yml" />

---

# Forms API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/forms-openapi.yml" />

---

# License Portal API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/license-portal-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Identity Manager API

import SingleApiReference from '@site/src/components/SingleApiReference';

<SingleApiReference specUrl="/openapi/vdx/v0.25/identity-manager-openapi.yaml" />

---

# Dependency Injection

## Setup app with scopes
The Kiwa eLicense Holder SDK is using scopes to manage the lifecycle of the various components. More information about scopes can be found in the
[scopes section](/idk/v0.10/guides/di/scopes) of the Identity Development Kit that the Kiwa SDK uses. See the IDK documentation for more information.

### Initialize application component and scope

Typically there is only one application scope within a single app or service. Technically however multiple instances could be created.
The app scope has an app component, that is initialized with some information. The app component acts as a singleton in the app scope.

The `application` parameter below for instance is the typically the Android context or Apple app object.
The `appId` is the name of your application. It is mainly being used in configuration management. All configuration properties being used, will use the `appId` internally.
Same for the `profile`. Within a single app you can support multiple profiles. However, a single app instance will only be started with a single profile. What a profile exactly is,
is up to you as a developer. A typical use case is the type of environment the app is running in. The profile is also being used in the configuration service to distinguish, for
instance, between different configuration values between your production and test app. Lastly there is the app version. Although the component expects your app version to be
supplied there, currently it is not in use in the Kiwa SDK.

```kotlin

// Create your application component
val appComponent = KiwaSdkAppComponent.init(
    application = yourApplication, // This can be your mobile app reference instance
    appId = "your-app-id", // A string denoting your app
    profile = "prod", // A profile so you could have different properties for different environments or profiles of the app
    version = "1.0.0" // The version of your app.
)
```

Now you get access to a few objects in the app scope via the `appComponent` above. The app component however knows about quite a lot more interfaces it can injects. Its primary
function is to ensure that any objects being created with these interfaces are using Dependency Injection, so a developer does not directly provide an actual implementation. This
allows for clean, cohesive code with low coupling. One of the most important objects on the app component is the `contextManager` which we will use next.

### Initialize user context scope

Once the application component has been created it is time to create the context scope, which contains the tenant and principal values. A principal either is a
natural person (user) or system account. This scope is used to allow separation of object instances and asynchronous code. It is also being used by the configuration system,
meaning that it is possible to have different configuration values for different tenants, or even principals. If multi-tenancy is not needed in your use case, you can either always
initialize with a fake tenant and principal, or simply leverage the anonymous context scope.

```kotlin
// Initialize context with tenant and principal information
val userContextComponent = appComponent.contextManager
    .getOrCreateFromInputs(
        TenantInputString("your-tenant-id"),
        PrincipalInputString("your-principal-id@for-instance-an-email.com")
    )

// As an anonymous user, or if you don't use multi-tenancy at all:
// val contextComponent = appComponent.contextManager.getOrCreateAnonymous()
```

### Initialize Session scope

Now we have a singleton app scope, and a context scope for the tenant and principal, it is time to create a session. You can define what a session entails. It could be a long-lived
session (from user login to logout in a mobile app) or a short-lived one (a single request/response in a REST API,
for instance). The session scope is mainly used to bind all objects and asynchronous code together. This means that any outstanding work within a session will be stopped once the
session is destroyed.

```kotlin
// Initialize session
val sessionContextManager = userContextComponent.sessionContextManager
val sessionComponent = sessionContextManager.getOrCreateFromId("unique-example-session") // A unique value for the session
```

### Get Service Instances

Now that the app scope, context scope, and session scope have been initialized, you can get the main entry point into the Kiwa eLicense SDK services:

```kotlin
// Get the service factory
val kiwaServices = sessionContextManager.getService<IKiwaServices>(IKiwaServices.SERVICE_ID)

// Get the holder, auth, and verifier services
val holderService =
    kiwaHolderServices.holder // Provides access to license holder operations including issue, assign, confirm, and decode commands.
val authService =
    kiwaHolderServices.auth // Provides access to wallet certificate authentication and management operations.
```

It makes sense to have the above code somewhere early in your application. For instance during app start, or close to the authentication process.

:::note
You could be using [kotlin-inject](https://github.com/evant/kotlin-inject) in your own code as well, in which case you could inject an IKiwaHolderServices property as
constructor argument. You would automatically be provided with an instance. See also the [IDK DI documentation](/idk/v0.10/guides/di/amazon-app-platform)
:::

---

# Holder Functions

This section guides you through the essential steps required to integrate with the Kiwa eLicense SDK. You’ll learn how to set up an application with the appropriate scopes, request
a wallet certificate, and interact with the licensing system. Specifically, you'll cover:

- Creating an application with the correct scopes
- Requesting a wallet certificate
- Assigning a license to a device
- Issuing a license for a license holder
- Confirming that license issuance was successful

By the end of this section, you will have a working setup capable of securely communicating with the Kiwa APIs and managing license lifecycles.

## Prerequisites

Before using the Kiwa eLicense SDK, please ensure the following setup is complete:

### Dependencies
Ensure your project includes the necessary Kiwa eLicense SDK modules. For Android this is `com.sphereon.kiwa:kiwa-holder-sdk-impl:<version>`.
See [getting started](getting-started) and [installation](installation) for more information.

### Setup Dependency Injection
Generate your components or use predefined DI components for the scopes available in the Kiwa eLicense SDK.
See [dependency injection](di) for more information.

### Environment Variables
Set the necessary environment variables to authenticate with Kiwa APIs:
 - `KIWA_SUBSCRIPTION_KEY`: Your unique subscription key provided by Kiwa.

Example:
`
KIWA_SUBSCRIPTION_KEY=your_subscription_key_here
`

## Obtaining a wallet certificate
:::note
The below code uses service names that can be found in the [dependency injection](di) page.
:::


Before performing any license operations, you need to authenticate and obtain a wallet certificate:

```kotlin
// Request a certificate, with the optional environment parameter. If omitted, the default environment will be used from the configuration service (Acc by default if nothing is configured)
val certificateResult = authService.getWalletCertificate(GetWalletCertificateRequestOpts(environment = ApiEnvironment.ACC))
certificateResult.onSuccess { result ->
    // Certificate successfully obtained
    println("Certificate obtained: ${result.success}")
}.onFailure { error ->
    // Handle error    println("Error obtaining certificate: ${error.message.defaultMessage}")
}
```

## License Operations

### Assigning a License

The following command can be executed once an e-license has been issued to a user's email address via the Kiwa IA API. This will also provide the activation code needed to assign
the license.

To assign a license to a device/holder:

```kotlin
// Create a request with activation code and email
val assignRequest = AssignDeviceLicenseRequest(
    code = "your_activation_code_here",
    email = "user@example.com"
)

// Assign the license
val assignResult = holderService.assignLicense(assignRequest)
assignResult.onSuccess { result ->
    // License successfully assigned
    println("License assigned successfully: ${result.success}")
}.onFailure { error ->
    // Handle error
    println("Error assigning license: ${error.message.defaultMessage}")
}
```

### Issuing a license

The below command will retrieve all available licenses in Mdoc format. Internally, it will also validate the licenses for correctness, like signatures, dates, certificates, and
CBOR
document structure.

To retrieve licenses available for the authenticated holder:

```kotlin
// Issue the license
val issueResult = holderService.issueLicense()
issueResult.onSuccess { result ->
    // Process the raw license data
    val encodedCbor: ByteArray = result.raw

    // Decode the CBOR-encoded license
    val license = ElicenseIssueDocuments.decodeCbor(encodedCbor)

    // Convert to JSON for display or processing
    val licenseJson = license.toJson()
    println(licenseJson.toJsonString())

    // Convert to a simplified display format
    val simpleDisplay = license.toSimpleDisplay()
    println(CborJsonSupport.serializer.encodeToString(simpleDisplay))
}.onFailure { error ->
    println("Error issuing license: ${error.message.defaultMessage}")
}
```

### Confirming license issuance

After successfully retrieving license(s), confirm the issuance:

```kotlin
// Confirm the license issuance
val confirmResult = holderService.confirmLicense()
confirmResult.onSuccess { result ->
    println("License confirmation successful: ${result.success}")
}.onFailure { error ->
    println("Error confirming license: ${error.message.defaultMessage}")
}
```

## Complete example

Here's a complete example that demonstrates the entire process of getting an mTLS certificate and then getting the licenses:

```kotlin
// Create your components
val appComponent = KiwaAppComponent.init(
    application = yourApplication, // This can be your mobile app reference instance
    appId = "your-app-id", // A string denoting your app
    profile = "prod", // A profile so you could have different properties for different environments or profiles of the app
    version = "1.0.0" // The version of your app.
)
val contextComponent = appComponent.contextManager.initAnonymous()
val sessionContextManager = contextComponent.sessionContextManager
val sessionComponent = sessionContextManager.initSession("unique-example-session") // A unique value for the session


// Get the main Kiwa service
val kiwa = sessionContextManager.getService<IKiwaServices>(
    IKiwaServices.SERVICE_ID
)

// Get a device certificate
kiwa.auth.getWalletCertificate(GetWalletCertificateRequestOpts())
    .onSuccess { result ->
        println("Certificate obtained: ${result.success}")
    }.onFailure { error ->
        println("Error obtaining certificate: ${error.message.defaultMessage}")
        return
    }

// Step 2: Assign license
val activationCode = "your_mailed_activation_code_here"

val assignRequest = AssignDeviceLicenseRequest(
    code = activationCode,
    email = "user@example.com"
)

// kiwa.holderService.cmd.assign() <= This is the same call as below but then using the command pattern interface
kiwa.holder.assignLicense(assignRequest)
    .onSuccess { result ->
        println("License assigned successfully: ${result.success}")
    }.onFailure { error ->
        println("Error assigning license: ${error.message.defaultMessage}")
        return
    }

// Step 3: Issue license
kiwa.holder.issueLicense()
    .onSuccess { result ->
        println("License issued successfully")

        // The default way to access the license documents. They have been validated already at this point
        val documents: ElicenseIssueDocumentsCbor = issueLicensResult.documents

        // If you really want access to the raw bytes of the mDoc documents
        val encodedCbor: ByteArray = issueLicenseResult.raw
        // Decode the CBOR-encoded licenses
        val licenses = ElicenseIssueDocumentsCbor.decodeCbor(encodedCbor)
        // Convert to JSON for display or processing
        val licenseJson = licenses.toJson()
        println("License JSON: ${licenseJson.toJsonString()}")
        // Convert to a simplified display format
        val simpleDisplay = license.toSimpleDisplay()
        println("Simple display: ${CborJsonSupport.serializer.encodeToString(simpleDisplay)}")
    }.onFailure { error ->
        println("Error issuing license: ${error.message.defaultMessage}")
        return
    }

// Step 4: Confirm license issuance
kiwa.holder.confirmLicense()
    .onSuccess { result ->
        println("License confirmation successful: ${result.success}")
    }.onFailure { error ->
        println("Error confirming license: ${error.message.defaultMessage}")
    }
```

## eLicense Mdoc and verification

More information about the eLicense Mdoc format, display formats and engagement/presentation to verifiers can be found in the [Kiwa eLicense Mdoc](elicense-mdocs) and [IDK Mdoc engagemnet documentation](/idk/v0.10/guides/mdoc/engagement/intro).

---

# eLicense Mdoc display and verification

The e-licenses returned from the Kiwa APIs are Mobile Documents (Mdocs) in CBOR encoding according to the ISO 18013-5 specification. The Kiwa eLicense SDK internally thus also uses
the [Mdoc library](https://github.com/Sphereon-OpenSource/identity-development-kit/tree/develop/libraries/mdoc) for JSON conversion, presentations, and
validations ([see next chapter](#manual-holder-or-relying-party-validation)).

## Mdoc format
The [Issuing a license](#issuing-a-license) service returns an array of issued licenses. Each of these licenses is a Mdoc.
That means they contain a document according to `8.3.2.1.2.2` of the ISO 18013-5 specification, which in turn contains the cryptographic material for validations.
You can use the lower level Mdoc SDK to manually interact with the Mdocs, but the Kiwa eLicense SDK has convenience methods, ensuring you do not have to interact at that level.

The main exposed methods in the SDK are:

- Verification and validation of the e-license (see [next chapter](#manual-holder-or-relying-party-validation))
- Displaying the Mdoc CBOR data in simplified or full JSON format. The simplified version removes items not needed for display purposes (this chapter)
- Presenting licenses to 3rd party Relying Parties (mdoc readers)

In [Issuing a license](#issuing-a-license) we saw how the Kiwa API returned one or more licenses. The response contains a result called `decode` in which a property
`mobileeIDdocuments` is found. This is an array of `ELicenseDocument` objects, which in turn are the regular Mdoc CBOR objects. These can be represented as a bytearray, or decoded
into the `ELicenseDocument` objects, which the response already has done for you.

You can use the decode command/service when you have the bytearray of a single ELicense:

```kotlin
val decodeResult = holderService.cmd.decode(licenseByteArray)
decodeResult.onSuccess { documentsCbor ->
    ...
}.onFailure { error ->
    println("Failed to decode license: ${error.message.defaultMessage}")
}
```

### Simple Json display
The above document contains all kinds of sub objects, mainly wrapping the CBOR structures. As these provide low-level access, it might be useful in advanced cases, but for regular
display, the SDK provides a convenient method.

```kotlin
// Convert the Mdoc CBOR object into a simple JSON display object. Not to be confused with the .toJson() method (see below)
val licenseSimple: ElicenseDocumentSimpleDisplay = licenseDocument.toSimpleDisplay()

// Convert the JSON data object to a JSON string
val asString: String = licenseSimple.toJsonString()
```

The result should look something like:

```json
{
  "docType": "org.iso.23220.1.nl.kiwa.sampcert",
  "nameSpaces": {
    "org.iso.23220.1.nl.kiwa.sampcert": {
      "family_name": "Doe",
      "given_name": "John",
      "birth_date": "1998-06-11",
      "issue_date": "2024-10-24",
      "issue_place": "Nieuwegein",
      "starting_date": "2024-09-25",
      "expiry_date": "2024-09-26"
      // SNIP FOR READABILITY
    }
  },
  "validityInfo": {
    "signed": "2025-06-23T13:47:31.0962123Z",
    "validFrom": "2025-06-23T13:47:31.0962123Z",
    "validUntil": "2027-12-22T00:00:00Z"
  }
}

```

The `validityInfo` object contains the cryptographic dates about the validity of the license/Mdoc. Be aware that an e-license is only valid as long as the current date is between
`validFrom` and `validUntil`. Relying parties doing validations will throw errors if the current date is not within the validity window!

It makes sense that any holder app also takes this information into account when displaying information.

The `docType` value will match the key used in the nameSpaces map. For Kiwa licenses, there will only be one `nameSpaces` object for now. The easiest solution is to first look at
the docType
and then use that value as the lookup key under the `nameSpaces` key

:::note
> If you really have a need to look into more properties than the simple display provides you, without all the CBOR complexities, then there is also a generic `toJson()` object
> available you can use. That translates all the CBOR properties into JSON properties, but be aware that it still contains the same structure as an ISO 18013-5 Mdoc, meaning it
> will be harder to interact with, unless you know the 18013-5 spec well.
:::

Example of CBOR to JSON:

```json
{
  "docType": "org.iso.23220.1.nl.kiwa.sampcert",
  "issuerSigned": {
    "nameSpaces": {
      "org.iso.23220.1.nl.kiwa.sampcert": [
        {
          "digestID": 0,
          "random": "7w3AjRPhPxNiNzo5FlyoBA",
          "key": "family_name",
          "value": {
            "cddl": "tstr",
            "value": "Doe"
          },
          "cddl": "tstr"
        },
        {
          "digestID": 1,
          "random": "_rcKB4PnjOTpCB5-1FGmug",
          "key": "given_name",
          "value": {
            "cddl": "tstr",
            "value": "John"
          },
          "cddl": "tstr"
        },
        {
          "digestID": 2,
          "random": "Iw9Fg5OsE3YxJL5DEef-ZA",
          "key": "birth_date",
          "value": {
            "cddl": "tstr",
            "value": "1998-06-11"
          },
          "cddl": "tstr"
        }
        // SNIP FOR READABILITY
        // Be Aware that Mdocs can have sub elements as well here
      ]
    },
    "issuerAuth": {
      "protectedHeader": {
        "alg": -7
      },
      "unprotectedHeader": {
        "x5chain": [
          "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"
        ]
      },
      "payload": "2BhZBTumZ2RvY1R5cGV4IG9yZy5pc28uMjMyMjAuMS5ubC5raXdhLnNhbXBjZXJ0Z3ZlcnNpb25jMS4wbHZhbGlkaXR5SW5mb6Nmc2lnbmVkwHgcMjAyNS0wNi0yM1QxMzo0NzozMS4wOTYyMTIzWml2YWxpZEZyb23AeBwyMDI1LTA2LTIzVDEzOjQ3OjMxLjA5NjIxMjNaanZhbGlkVW50aWzAdDIwMjctMTItMjJUMDA6MDA6MDBabHZhbHVlRGlnZXN0c6F4IG9yZy5pc28uMjMyMjAuMS5ubC5raXdhLnNhbXBjZXJ0uBwAWCDVxzGarB2o9wRH4wRLVhTTiwlwZMtUaA0BQzBH38QzggFYIF9WqSpm047yPHFfDdsts_Q7asiyqrowz-vJeWjbfwVqAlggDwFm804y_lTPll_LDWI9Hhg3nEu01UCAs-P86dpGdpUDWCC4sRrfCVcUpS2mF1sZUvzBXAn2Z7XRt2isFcRT-M1wJARYIMRrKDsz135pSEU60XqUEX4WMHTQF0MZROqBBTednSH2BVggW9Rlr07L4wH2rIPi9QZw0gshkFmsGhDvIt5MjxArX5sGWCDhSywYAXwvnqVTxSvi62K-qkv3xFPjP3cI3K3gYmcSKgdYIKw4vZ2cOC5SdBU9sS98MlB21t7xryhqJVK7k2J6tk9tCFggkcZrkprBQ0sbrN3y4SInywawSorQcyu1weVfFAIyEbkJWCC32OUGRfibVYal1r0YUUPiZNLmrukPab4Kxa-JY_N04ApYII4-6JwgphhnzazMSgzA-X39_VGDYucsTt7WY9JDYZ_DC1gg1r0oMgucx-tW0v3LHqzqrUsQ6WUx0U5AeWIi1dcCOtYMWCD5whlv6l6Y1bR8ZS9Z2YblKQ5tBPb-9AjEKzG6eY_9Gg1YIHMGPwSolOM5JOf85gzwoVxpue9h2AKn_pUdTTvzE-d9Dlggsraz_yYQ0xuLm5xbnoAsRVWiWV2MZZ0aHiVOboMmz10PWCCUmXoRKrw67W1lQWdOEZK2Y8kLFWBgN4EYm5_ogK5BchBYIGk0s5We2nKSrYfRV2DDNQ7HF0x9FpH7c6illYJ0SYZ6EVggVX5norPWI_Yvw9DOPm64A1v2mXnyALlAnLwR_XS_BRQSWCBzxH19yp6viBEybQYt6SIy2ojVGB7XdhAP4IHfGytGfhNYIJ-P1-Aur_tIkdA7qxlZXVt1CtyXMoU5jDMpJh1tm70UFFggfDGJnDBYGhBx5rMLY8jBCgbUHAv-LBak4L4LKhHXiC8VWCD5e0u3DnAimMCIsdWmlak4LrQzGWSZM2zVHEkK-I9UXBZYIEHtYln3azFih-T-i_S__j2L22MqOaJP-J37Mj-nXfk1F1ggr_3uOoNSTITinggiQmYvpKaJEd9j2sOh3Ubm3ixAt0wYGFggs4I-1tiEH0HW6io6ueDYhQ0VlP5axHzGqsU9TJwb93EYGVggUdxGJk0cYFll2Lv3RvTd4OpMjGOK3Bq8JNVbySw3vrQYGlggvNLAto-xMMHK7uk6My57O0NqYZB5L81W6QsR_Ev1MwAYG1ggtIesqsTY6njFu2QIkv64nWqUD8TT9VHQExH-jh7eeY5tZGV2aWNlS2V5SW5mb6FpZGV2aWNlS2V5pAECIAEhWCCHkukVQVqtqcPLQCatsIj_s0GuLqUB7u_8FZsERwhjKSJYIHsplWP5I1JsXy_9MztpLEoJXdOvttfk_f1SwJ-tOsMxb2RpZ2VzdEFsZ29yaXRobWdTSEEtMjU2",
      "signature": "_2j8GQLWCB_AfoM1nJhF-L2g5f9HPh6FhcDrT5y1N11LWdYv7cQvAKVxU-j9fLC-AWZXNkYnAvti5vOih7NhWQ"
    }
  }
}
```

## Manual holder or Relying Party validation

When acting as a holder, the code to get the licenses automatically performs checks to validate the correctness of the licenses.

However, as a holder, you can check individual licenses as well. Or when acting as a verifier (also called Relying Party), you want to make sure licenses are being validated upon
receipt. The service delegates to the low level Mdoc library internally. If you need more control for whatever reason, you could use that library directly as well.

The verification performs the following steps:

1. Validate the certificate included in the Mdoc License Mobile Security Object (MSO) header according to ISO18013-5 `9.3.3`.
2. Verify the digital signature of the IssuerAuth structure (ISO1813-5 `9.1.2.4`) using the public_key,
public_key_parameters, and public_key_algorithm from the certificate validation procedure of step 1.
3. Calculate the digest value for every IssuerSignedItem returned in the DeviceResponse structure
according to `9.1.2.5` and verify that these calculated digests equal the corresponding digest values in the MSO.
4. Verify that the DocType in the MSO matches the relevant DocType in the Documents structure.
5. Validate the elements in the ValidityInfo structure, i.e., verify that:
 * the 'signed' date is within the validity period of the certificate in the MSO header,
 * the current timestamp shall be equal or later than the ‘validFrom’ element,
 * the 'validUntil' element shall be equal or later than the current timestamp.

In the below code, we will validate a single e-license/Mdoc document. Be aware that this validation also automatically happens when you get the license(s) from
the [Kiwa REST API](#issuing-a-license), so there is no need to manually perform the below verification at that point.

```kotlin
val results: VerifyResultsType = verifierService.verifyLicenseBytes(/*byte array of e-license*/)
// Or when you already have the license as mdoc/ElicenseIssueDocumentCbor decoded object:
// val results: VerifyResultsType = verifierService.verifyLicense(licenseDocument)
```

The results object consists of multiple sub objects, which contain information about the above steps being successful or not. It contains an overall boolean value called
`error`, which means that at least one of the validations contained an error and that error was deemed critical for the overall validation.
It also contains a `verifications` array of type `VerifyResultType` containing individual verification step results.

```kotlin
/**
 * Interface representing the results of a verification process.
 *
 * Provides information about the overall success or failure of the verification,
 * the individual verification results, and associated key information.
 *
 * @param KeyType The specific type of key implementing the KeyType interface.
 */
interface VerifyResultsType<out KeyType : KeyType> {
    /**
     * Indicates whether an error has occurred.
     *
     * This variable can be used to determine if an operation resulted in an error state.
     * A value of `true` means an error is present, while `false` means no error has occurred.
     */

    val error: Boolean

    /**
     * Holds an array of verification results.
     *
     * Each element of the array represents a specific verification result,
     * detailing aspects such as the name of the verification, whether it resulted
     * in an error, an optional message describing the result, and whether the
     * result is critical.
     */

    val verifications: Array<out VerifyResultType>

    /**
     * Represents information about a specific key.
     *
     * This variable holds an instance of the [KeyInfoType] interface which is parameterized with [KeyType].
     * It encapsulates various details related to a key, such as its type and other metadata.
     *
     * @property keyInfo an instance of [KeyInfoType] for the specified [KeyType], or null if no key information is present.
     */
    val keyInfo: KeyInfoType<KeyType>?
}


/**
 * Interface representing the result of a verification process.
 */
interface VerifyResultType {
    /**
     * Stores the name of a verification.
     */
    val name: String

    /**
     * Indicates whether an error has occurred.
     *
     * This boolean variable is used to represent the presence of an error condition.
     * When set to `true`, it means an error has been detected; when set to `false`,
     * it indicates that no error is currently present.
     */
    val error: Boolean

    /**
     * An optional message that provides additional information about the verification result.
     */
    val message: String?

    val detailMessage: String?

    /**
     * Indicates whether the condition is critical.
     *
     * This boolean variable is used to flag a critical state or condition within the application. When set to true,
     * it denotes that the error condition was unsuccessful and requires immediate attention or handling.
     */
    val critical: Boolean
}
```

![img.png](/kiwa/v0.6/images/img.png)

## Engaging as a holder/mdoc with a verifier (Relying Party)

Once one or more eLicenses in mdoc format are in the holders possession there is a large chance that the holder needs to prove the license(s) to a Verifier, called a Relying Party.
The Kiwa SDK leverages the Mdoc libraries for the lower level support in these cases. Although the entire lower level functionalities would be available the SDK is
tailored towards the license holder, also called the Mdoc as opposed to the Relying Party, typically called verifier or Mdoc reader.

When initiating the verification process as a license holder, it means you will have to start the so-called engagement. The engagement acts like the initialization of typically an
attended "offline" peer-to-peer connection. It is called offline because there is no necessity for an active internet connection for either the Relying Party or the license holder
when sharing the license. The engagement typically involves a QR or NFC tag. So either the Relying Party (mdoc reader) or the license holder (mdoc) will show a QR code, containing
information on how to establish a connection. Then the connection can be established using NFC (slower) or Bluetooth Low Energy. That connection setup is being handled in the
background, fully opaque to the users. All they do is show or scan a QR code, or tap 2 devices via NFC. Then the transfer/connection happens in the background

The Idententy Development Kit (IDK) on which the Kiwa eLicense Holder SDK is based, is capable of handling the different engagement scenarios. More information on the
IDK can be found in:
- [engagement intro](/idk/v0.10/guides/mdoc/engagement/intro).
- [engagement retrieval](/idk/v0.10/guides/mdoc/engagement/engagement-retrieval).

---

# Example app

We provide an example app to demonstrate how to use the Kiwa eLicense Holder SDK and the Identity Development Kit.
Although the example app is not meant to be used in production, it does give a complete example of how to integrate the Kiwa eLicense Holder SDK
into your application from retrieving the licenses, to verifying, displaying and presenting them to 3rd parties including NFC and QR engagements and BLE retrieval.

:::note
Be aware that the example app depends on the Kiwa eLicense Holder Sdk which is proprietary. Please see the install instructions for the Kiwa eLicense Holder SDK.
:::

Some screenshots of the app are shown below:

<div style={{display: 'grid', gridTemplateColumns: 'repeat(auto-fit, minmax(200px, 1fr))', gap: '16px', margin: '20px 0'}}>
    <div style={{textAlign: 'center'}}>
        <img
            src="/kiwa/v0.6/images/Screenshot_20250929_233330_testapp.jpg"
            alt="Sample App Screenshot 1"
            style={{
                width: '200px',
                height: '400px',
                objectFit: 'cover',
                borderRadius: '8px',
                cursor: 'pointer',
                border: '2px solid #ddd',
                transition: 'transform 0.2s ease, box-shadow 0.2s ease'
            }}
            onMouseOver={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1.05)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = '0 4px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.3)';
            }}
            onMouseOut={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = 'none';
            }}
            onClick={(e) => {
                const overlay = document.createElement('div');
                overlay.style.cssText = `
          position: fixed;
          top: 0;
          left: 0;
          width: 100vw;
          height: 100vh;
          background: rgba(0,0,0,0.9);
          display: flex;
          justify-content: center;
          align-items: center;
          z-index: 9999;
          cursor: pointer;
        `;
                const img = document.createElement('img');
                img.src = e.target.src;
                img.style.cssText = `
          max-width: 90vw;
          max-height: 90vh;
          object-fit: contain;
          border-radius: 8px;
        `;
                overlay.appendChild(img);
                overlay.onclick = () => document.body.removeChild(overlay);
                document.body.appendChild(overlay);
            }}
        />
        <p style={{margin: '8px 0', fontSize: '14px', color: '#666'}}>License list</p>
    </div>

    <div style={{textAlign: 'center'}}>
        <img
            src="/kiwa/v0.6/images/Screenshot_20250929_233337_testapp.jpg"
            alt="Sample App Screenshot 2"
            style={{
                width: '200px',
                height: '400px',
                objectFit: 'cover',
                borderRadius: '8px',
                cursor: 'pointer',
                border: '2px solid #ddd',
                transition: 'transform 0.2s ease, box-shadow 0.2s ease'
            }}
            onMouseOver={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1.05)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = '0 4px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.3)';
            }}
            onMouseOut={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = 'none';
            }}
            onClick={(e) => {
                const overlay = document.createElement('div');
                overlay.style.cssText = `
          position: fixed;
          top: 0;
          left: 0;
          width: 100vw;
          height: 100vh;
          background: rgba(0,0,0,0.9);
          display: flex;
          justify-content: center;
          align-items: center;
          z-index: 9999;
          cursor: pointer;
        `;
                const img = document.createElement('img');
                img.src = e.target.src;
                img.style.cssText = `
          max-width: 90vw;
          max-height: 90vh;
          object-fit: contain;
          border-radius: 8px;
        `;
                overlay.appendChild(img);
                overlay.onclick = () => document.body.removeChild(overlay);
                document.body.appendChild(overlay);
            }}
        />
        <p style={{margin: '8px 0', fontSize: '14px', color: '#666'}}>License details</p>
    </div>

    <div style={{textAlign: 'center'}}>
        <img
            src="/kiwa/v0.6/images/Screenshot_20250929_233351_testapp.jpg"
            alt="Sample App Screenshot 3"
            style={{
                width: '200px',
                height: '400px',
                objectFit: 'cover',
                borderRadius: '8px',
                cursor: 'pointer',
                border: '2px solid #ddd',
                transition: 'transform 0.2s ease, box-shadow 0.2s ease'
            }}
            onMouseOver={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1.05)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = '0 4px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.3)';
            }}
            onMouseOut={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = 'none';
            }}
            onClick={(e) => {
                const overlay = document.createElement('div');
                overlay.style.cssText = `
          position: fixed;
          top: 0;
          left: 0;
          width: 100vw;
          height: 100vh;
          background: rgba(0,0,0,0.9);
          display: flex;
          justify-content: center;
          align-items: center;
          z-index: 9999;
          cursor: pointer;
        `;
                const img = document.createElement('img');
                img.src = e.target.src;
                img.style.cssText = `
          max-width: 90vw;
          max-height: 90vh;
          object-fit: contain;
          border-radius: 8px;
        `;
                overlay.appendChild(img);
                overlay.onclick = () => document.body.removeChild(overlay);
                document.body.appendChild(overlay);
            }}
        />
        <p style={{margin: '8px 0', fontSize: '14px', color: '#666'}}>Log view</p>
    </div>

    <div style={{textAlign: 'center'}}>
        <img
            src="/kiwa/v0.6/images/Screenshot_20250929_233424_testapp.jpg"
            alt="Sample App Screenshot 4"
            style={{
                width: '200px',
                height: '400px',
                objectFit: 'cover',
                borderRadius: '8px',
                cursor: 'pointer',
                border: '2px solid #ddd',
                transition: 'transform 0.2s ease, box-shadow 0.2s ease'
            }}
            onMouseOver={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1.05)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = '0 4px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.3)';
            }}
            onMouseOut={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = 'none';
            }}
            onClick={(e) => {
                const overlay = document.createElement('div');
                overlay.style.cssText = `
          position: fixed;
          top: 0;
          left: 0;
          width: 100vw;
          height: 100vh;
          background: rgba(0,0,0,0.9);
          display: flex;
          justify-content: center;
          align-items: center;
          z-index: 9999;
          cursor: pointer;
        `;
                const img = document.createElement('img');
                img.src = e.target.src;
                img.style.cssText = `
          max-width: 90vw;
          max-height: 90vh;
          object-fit: contain;
          border-radius: 8px;
        `;
                overlay.appendChild(img);
                overlay.onclick = () => document.body.removeChild(overlay);
                document.body.appendChild(overlay);
            }}
        />
        <p style={{margin: '8px 0', fontSize: '14px', color: '#666'}}>QR engagement</p>
    </div>

    <div style={{textAlign: 'center'}}>
        <img
            src="/kiwa/v0.6/images/Screenshot_20250929_233431_testapp.jpg"
            alt="Sample App Screenshot 5"
            style={{
                width: '200px',
                height: '400px',
                objectFit: 'cover',
                borderRadius: '8px',
                cursor: 'pointer',
                border: '2px solid #ddd',
                transition: 'transform 0.2s ease, box-shadow 0.2s ease'
            }}
            onMouseOver={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1.05)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = '0 4px 12px rgba(0,0,0,0.3)';
            }}
            onMouseOut={(e) => {
                e.target.style.transform = 'scale(1)';
                e.target.style.boxShadow = 'none';
            }}
            onClick={(e) => {
                const overlay = document.createElement('div');
                overlay.style.cssText = `
          position: fixed;
          top: 0;
          left: 0;
          width: 100vw;
          height: 100vh;
          background: rgba(0,0,0,0.9);
          display: flex;
          justify-content: center;
          align-items: center;
          z-index: 9999;
          cursor: pointer;
        `;
                const img = document.createElement('img');
                img.src = e.target.src;
                img.style.cssText = `
          max-width: 90vw;
          max-height: 90vh;
          object-fit: contain;
          border-radius: 8px;
        `;
                overlay.appendChild(img);
                overlay.onclick = () => document.body.removeChild(overlay);
                document.body.appendChild(overlay);
            }}
        />
        <p style={{margin: '8px 0', fontSize: '14px', color: '#666'}}>NFC engagement</p>
    </div>
</div>




## Source code
The source code for the example app is available on [GitHub](https://github.com/Sphereon-OpenSource/kiwa-sample) and the code of the sample app itself is available with an
Open-Source Apache2 license.

### Running and installing the example app
The example app can be compiled and run using Android Studio, or any other IDE that support Gradle.
Make sure you have everything setup to perform Android development, and debugging. That is out of the scope of this document.


```console
.\gradlew clean build installDebug

```

The sample app now should be installed and your phone should start it automatically.

:::warning
Although you can use a simulator be aware that attended engagement needs BLE and NFC to work,
which is not available in the simulator. So please use a real device!
:::

---

# Changelog

# Changelog

## 0.13.0 — 2026-01-08

- Based on Kiwa SDK 0.13.0 and Identity Development Kit 0.13.0
- Version bump to 0.13.0 of the Kiwa SDK to align with IDK 0.13.0
- minSdk to 30, because of external library dependencies
- Add sample Swift app, next to the iOS and Android Compose app
- XCFramework building added
- CocoaPods support
- Removed direct dependencies on the Sphereon Identity Development Kit, as they are exposed via the Kiwa SDK

### Breaking Changes

#### IdkResult API Overhaul (from IDK 0.13.0)

The `IdkResult` type has been completely redesigned for better iOS/Swift/ObjC interoperability:

- **Changed from typealias to wrapper class**: `IdkResult` is now a proper class wrapping kotlin-result's `Result`, instead of a simple typealias
- **New `Ok` and `Err` subclasses**: Use `Ok(value)` and `Err(error)` constructors instead of kotlin-result's functions directly
- **Import changes**: Import `com.sphereon.core.api.Ok` and `com.sphereon.core.api.Err` (top-level functions)
- **New methods**: `component1()`, `component2()` for destructuring; `getOrThrow()` for exception-based handling
- **No more need to depend on `com.github.michaelbull.result`**

**Migration example:**

```kotlin
// Old (0.10)
import com.github.michaelbull.result.Ok
import com.github.michaelbull.result.Err
return Ok(value)

// New (0.13)
import com.sphereon.core.api.Ok
import com.sphereon.core.api.Err
return Ok(value)
```

---

## 0.1.1 — Internal release

### Highlights

- Based on Kiwa SDK 0.7.0 and Identity Development Kit 0.10.0
- Usage of new Engagement features:
  - Separate NFC and QR access to engagement. Creating new engagements cancels existing ones for ease of use
  - EventHub for access to all engagement and transfer events
  - UI Projector for easy UI integration
- Cleanup of ephemeral keys that made the sample app slower over time
- Fixed the back button not working on the share screen
- NFC engagement for Android hooked up to new engagement UI Projector
- Display sub properties in case an object contains an array or map
- Thumbnail images shown in the details view, open in full-screen when clicked with close button

### Android

- minSdk lowered to 27, compileSdk 35 (extension 15), Java 17 toolchain

---

# FAQ

# FAQ

**Q:** Does the Kiwa eLicense SDK require REST APIs?<br/>
**A:** Yes, The Kiwa eLicense SDK integrates with Kiwa REST APIs for license management operations. Once a license is stored in an application,
they can be presented and viewed without consulting Kiwa APIs. There are no other REST APIs involved, except for the Kiwa license and certificate management APIs.

---

**Q:** Is the Kiwa eLicense SDK open-source?<br/>
**A:** No the Kiwa eLicense SDK is not open-source. However it is built on top of the Identity Development Kit (IDK), which is open-source.
The Kiwa SDK is only available for Kiwa customers with a license agreement. Licensed customers will get source-code access to the Kiwa SDK.

---

**Q:** Where can I find the public API reference?<br/>
**A:** In the **Kotlin API** section (generated via Dokka).


---

**Q:** Where can I download the SDK?<br/>
**A:** The SDK is distributed via our Nexus (maven) repository for all platforms. Licensed customers will get an account on our Nexus repository.


---

**Q:** Which platforms are supported for the Kiwa eLicense holder SDK?<br/>
**A:** The SDK is currently available for Android/Jvm and iOS (testing). Future platforms might be added when requested.

---

**Q:** Is there support for multi-tenancy?<br/>
**A:** The holder SDK is focused on mobile apps, however any SDK and application built on top of our Identity Development Kit (IDK) can be used in a multi-tenant environment.

---

# License Agreement

# License Agreement

:::warning
**Be aware the Kiwa eLicense SDK eLicense is governed by a license agreement and is proprietary. Licensees will have source code access**
:::

---

## 1. Grant of License

**Sphereon International B.V.** (“Licensor”) grants Licensee a limited, non-exclusive, non-transferable, revocable license to install, access, and use the Software, including the Source Code provided
under this Agreement, solely for Licensee’s internal business purposes, during the Term, and only in accordance with the terms of this Agreement.

---

## 2. Source Code Access and Restrictions

### 2.1 Access Rights

Source Code is provided to Licensee as part of the licensed Software to permit internal customization, debugging, and audit.

### 2.2 No Redistribution

Licensee shall not:

- disclose, sublicense, lease, loan, rent, sell, transfer, assign, or otherwise make available the Source Code (or any modifications thereof) to any third party;
- publish, host, or distribute the Source Code in any form;
- use the Source Code to create derivative products intended for commercial distribution or competing services.

### 2.3 Permitted Copies

Licensee may make a reasonable number of copies of the Source Code solely for internal use and backup purposes. All copies must include Licensor’s copyright and proprietary
notices.

---

## 3. Modifications and Derivative Works

### 3.1 Internal Use Only

Licensee may modify the Source Code for internal business purposes only. Any modifications or derivative works remain subject to this Agreement.

### 3.2 Ownership

All intellectual property rights in modifications or derivative works are retained by **Sphereon International B.V.**, except to the extent Licensee’s confidential business information is embedded.
Licensee hereby assigns such rights to **Sphereon International B.V.**

---

## 4. Confidentiality

### 4.1 Confidential Information

Licensee acknowledges that the Source Code constitutes confidential and proprietary information of **Sphereon International B.V.**

### 4.2 Obligations

Licensee shall protect the Source Code with at least the same degree of care it uses to protect its own confidential information, and not less than a reasonable degree of care.

### 4.3 Exceptions

Disclosure is permitted only to employees and contractors of Licensee who have a need to know and are bound by confidentiality obligations no less protective than this Agreement.

---

## 5. Prohibited Acts

Licensee shall not, except as expressly permitted herein:

- reverse engineer, disassemble, or decompile the Software, except as required by applicable law for interoperability;
- disclose results of benchmark tests without **Sphereon International B.V.**’s prior written consent;
- remove or modify any proprietary notices or markings in the Software or Source Code.

---

## 6. Term and Termination

### 6.1 Term

This Agreement is effective as of the Effective Date and continues until terminated.

### 6.2 Termination for Breach

**Sphereon International B.V.** may terminate this Agreement immediately upon notice if Licensee breaches any material term (including unauthorized use, copying, or disclosure of Source Code).

### 6.3 Effect of Termination

Upon termination, Licensee must immediately cease all use of the Software and Source Code, and destroy all copies in its possession or control.

---

## 7. Ownership and Intellectual Property

**Sphereon International B.V.** retains all rights, title, and interest in and to the Software and Source Code, including all modifications and derivative works, except as expressly licensed herein. No
rights are granted by implication.

---

## 8. Limitation of Liability

To the maximum extent permitted by law, **Sphereon International B.V.** shall not be liable for any indirect, incidental, consequential, or punitive damages arising out of the use or inability to use the
Software or Source Code.

---

## 9. Governing Law and Jurisdiction

This Agreement shall be governed by and construed under the laws of **The Netherlands**. Any disputes shall be resolved exclusively in the competent courts located in **Amsterdam,
The Netherlands**.

---

# System Architecture

# System Architecture

The eduID Wallet Matching Portal follows a microservices architecture with clear separation of concerns. Four services collaborate to authenticate users, match wallet-based identities to institutional accounts, and issue standardized OIDC tokens. Each service has a well-defined responsibility boundary, its own configuration surface, and can be scaled, deployed, and updated independently.

This page describes each service in detail, explains how they communicate, and discusses the technology decisions that shaped the architecture.

---

## Architecture Diagram

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-system-architecture.svg" alt="System Architecture" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The diagram above shows the four services and their primary communication paths. The browser only ever talks to the Portal. The Portal proxies requests to the STS and Auth Bridge. The STS delegates wallet authentication to the Auth Bridge and federates upstream to SURFconext. The Auth Bridge communicates with the database and KMS for persistence and cryptographic operations.

---

## Service Descriptions

### Portal (Next.js BFF) -- Port 3000

The Portal is the only service directly exposed to end users. It implements the Backend-for-Frontend (BFF) pattern, which means the browser never communicates directly with the STS or the Auth Bridge. Every API call from the frontend passes through server-side Next.js API routes that attach the appropriate authentication tokens, enforce access control, and proxy the request to the correct backend service. This eliminates an entire class of security concerns: tokens are never exposed to browser JavaScript, CORS complexity is avoided, and the attack surface is minimized to a single entry point.

The Portal is built with Next.js 15 and React 19, taking advantage of React Server Components for server-side rendering and reduced client-side JavaScript. NextAuth.js v5 manages the OAuth2 session lifecycle with the STS, using a JWT session strategy where session data is stored in encrypted HTTP-only cookies rather than in a server-side session store. This means the Portal itself is stateless and can be horizontally scaled without session affinity.

The Portal provides several key user-facing capabilities:

- **Login page** with two clear options: "Login with institution account" (federated path) and "Login with wallet" (wallet path). The interface is designed to be self-explanatory, requiring no prior knowledge of the underlying protocols.
- **QR code display** for wallet authentication. When the user selects wallet login, the Portal creates an OID4VP session via the Auth Bridge and renders the resulting QR code. The QR code encodes a request URI that the wallet app fetches to obtain the presentation request.
- **Status polling** that monitors the OID4VP session state. The Portal polls the Auth Bridge at regular intervals to detect when the wallet has submitted a Verifiable Presentation, when reconciliation is required, or when authentication is complete.
- **IDV reconciliation UI** that guides first-time wallet users through the one-time institutional login needed to link their wallet to their eduid. This interface explains why the step is necessary, initiates the reconciliation flow, and handles the callback when the user returns from SURFconext.

All sensitive configuration -- client secrets, STS endpoints, Auth Bridge URLs -- lives in server-side environment variables and is never bundled into the client-side JavaScript payload.

### Service-STS (Security Token Service) -- Port 8080

The STS is a full-featured OAuth2 and OIDC authorization server. It is the single point of token issuance for the entire portal ecosystem. No matter how a user authenticates -- through SURFconext federation or through their wallet -- the STS is the service that mints the final access token and ID token that downstream systems consume.

The STS exposes the standard OIDC endpoints that any compliant relying party expects:

| Endpoint | Purpose |
|---|---|
| `/.well-known/openid-configuration` | Discovery document with all endpoint URLs and supported capabilities |
| `/authorize` | Authorization endpoint; initiates the OIDC code flow |
| `/token` | Token endpoint; exchanges authorization codes for tokens |
| `/introspect` | Token introspection for resource servers |
| `/revoke` | Token revocation |
| `/userinfo` | Claims endpoint returning user attributes for a valid access token |
| `/.well-known/jwks.json` | JSON Web Key Set for token signature verification |

The STS supports two authentication paths, determined by the parameters on the `/authorize` request:

**Upstream Federation (SURF/Keycloak OIDC RP):** When the Portal initiates a standard login, the STS acts as an OIDC Relying Party to the configured upstream provider (SURFconext, or a Keycloak instance in development). It generates its own PKCE challenge, state, and nonce, redirects the user to the upstream provider, and processes the callback. Once the upstream tokens are received, the STS extracts claims from the ID token and userinfo endpoint, applies canonical attribute mapping rules, and issues its own tokens with the mapped claims.

**Wallet Login (Delegates to Auth Bridge):** When the Portal initiates a wallet login with a `login_hint` parameter of the form `oid4vp:{sessionId}`, the STS recognizes this as a wallet authentication request. Instead of redirecting to an upstream provider, it calls the Auth Bridge to retrieve the resolved identity for the given session. The Auth Bridge returns the canonical claims that were either loaded from a cached identity link binding (fast path) or established through reconciliation (new holder path). The STS then issues tokens with those claims, just as it would for a federated login.

PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) is required on all authorization flows. The STS does not support the implicit flow or any flow without PKCE. This is a deliberate security decision that prevents authorization code interception attacks.

The STS also supports RFC 8693 token exchange, enabling scenarios where a service needs to exchange one token for another with different scopes or audiences. Claim mapping is entirely configuration-driven: a set of attribute rules defines how upstream claims are projected into the canonical token schema, including default values, required claims, and merge strategies for when claims come from multiple sources.

### Service-Auth-Bridge -- Port 8090

The Auth Bridge is the heart of the portal's identity matching and reconciliation capabilities. While the STS handles token minting and OIDC protocol compliance, the Auth Bridge handles the harder problem: figuring out who a wallet holder is, matching them to an institutional identity, and caching the result for future use.

The Auth Bridge's responsibilities span several domains:

**OID4VP Session Management.** The Auth Bridge creates and manages OID4VP (OpenID for Verifiable Presentations) sessions. When a user initiates wallet login, the Auth Bridge generates a session containing a request URI that the wallet will fetch. The request object -- a signed JWT -- specifies which credentials the wallet should present, using DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) to express the query. The Auth Bridge tracks the session through its lifecycle: created, interaction started (wallet fetched the request), verifying (VP received), verified (VP valid), and onwards to either completion or reconciliation.

**Verifiable Presentation Verification.** When a wallet submits a Verifiable Presentation, the Auth Bridge runs it through the Universal OID4VP Verifier provided by the IDK. This verifier validates the VP's cryptographic signatures, checks credential status (revocation), verifies the holder binding (proving the presenter controls the private key), and extracts the credential attributes and the holder's public key.

**HMAC-Based Identity Matching.** After extracting the holder's public key from a verified VP, the Auth Bridge computes an HMAC-SHA256 hash of the key's fingerprint using Key A (the holder key hashing key). This hash becomes the `identifier_hash` used for database lookups. If a matching `identity_match` record exists, the holder is known and the fast path proceeds. If not, the holder is new and reconciliation begins. A separate key, Key B, is used for hashing institutional identifiers (like eduid), ensuring that the compromise of one key cannot be used to reverse hashes created with the other.

**Encrypted Identity Link Bindings.** When a holder is matched, the Auth Bridge retrieves the associated `identity_link_binding` record, which contains the cached canonical attributes encrypted with Key C. These attributes -- eduid, name, email, assurance metadata -- are what the STS needs to issue a token. The encryption uses AES-256-GCM with a unique initialization vector per record, ensuring that identical attributes produce different ciphertext.

**Reconciliation Orchestration.** When a holder key is unknown, the Auth Bridge evaluates a set of reconciliation selector rules to determine which reconciliation plan to execute. The default plan, `RunIdv`, initiates an Identity Verification flow by redirecting the user to SURFconext for institutional authentication. The Auth Bridge acts as an OIDC Relying Party during this flow, receiving the callback, extracting the institutional claims, and creating the identity match and link binding records that enable future fast-path authentication. The reconciliation framework is extensible: new plans can be added through configuration to support alternative identity verification methods.

**External REST API.** The Auth Bridge exposes a REST API that allows third-party systems to interact with the identity matching infrastructure. This API supports session creation, status queries, and identity resolution, enabling integration scenarios beyond the Portal's own UI.

**PostgreSQL Persistence.** All data persistence is handled through SqlDelight, which generates type-safe Kotlin data access code from SQL definitions. The Auth Bridge never constructs raw SQL strings. Schema changes are managed through SqlDelight migrations, and the generated code ensures compile-time type safety for all database operations.

### PostgreSQL

PostgreSQL serves as the shared persistence layer for the Auth Bridge. It stores all identity matching data, session state, reconciliation records, and encrypted auxiliary data across seven tables. The database is designed with several non-negotiable constraints:

**All sensitive data is encrypted at rest.** Cached identity attributes are stored as AES-256-GCM encrypted envelopes. The database never contains plaintext names, email addresses, or institutional identifiers. Even if an attacker gains full read access to the database, they obtain only ciphertext that is useless without the corresponding KMS-managed encryption keys.

**All identifier lookups use HMAC-SHA256 hashes.** Rather than indexing on plaintext identifiers, the database indexes on HMAC hashes. A query like "find the identity match for this holder key" translates to a lookup on `HMAC-SHA256(holder_key_fingerprint, Key_A)`. This means the database can perform efficient equality lookups without ever storing or indexing the original identifier.

**Multi-tenancy is built in from the ground up.** Every table includes a `tenant_id` column, and every query filters by tenant. This enables a single deployment to serve multiple institutions with complete data isolation at the application level.

**SqlDelight generates all data access code.** The SQL definitions in `.sq` files are the single source of truth for the database schema. SqlDelight compiles these into type-safe Kotlin interfaces and data classes. This eliminates entire categories of bugs: typos in column names, type mismatches between Kotlin and SQL, and forgotten WHERE clauses are all caught at compile time rather than at runtime.

---

## Inter-Service Communication

All inter-service communication within the portal uses HTTP. There is no message queue, no event bus, and no shared state beyond the database. This keeps the architecture simple, debuggable, and easy to reason about.

| From | To | Path | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| Browser | Portal | HTTPS | User interaction, session cookies |
| Portal | STS | HTTP `/authorize`, `/token` | OAuth2 authorization code flow |
| Portal | Auth Bridge | HTTP `/auth/oid4vp/*` | Wallet session management (create, poll, IDV) |
| STS | Auth Bridge | HTTP `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{id}/complete` | Retrieve resolved identity for wallet auth |
| STS | SURF/Keycloak | HTTPS OIDC | Federation upstream (authorize, token, userinfo) |
| Auth Bridge | SURF/Keycloak | HTTPS OIDC | IDV reconciliation (authorize, token, userinfo) |
| Auth Bridge | PostgreSQL | JDBC | Data persistence |
| Auth Bridge | KMS | API | Cryptographic operations (HMAC, encrypt, decrypt) |
| Wallet App | Auth Bridge | HTTPS | VP submission via `request_uri` |

A few things are worth noting about this communication topology:

- The **browser never talks to the STS or Auth Bridge directly**. All communication is proxied through the Portal's server-side routes. This is the BFF pattern in action.
- The **STS and Auth Bridge communicate only for wallet authentication**. During federated login, the Auth Bridge is not involved at all. This clean separation means federated login continues to work even if the Auth Bridge is temporarily unavailable.
- The **wallet app communicates directly with the Auth Bridge** for VP submission. The QR code the user scans contains a `request_uri` pointing to the Auth Bridge. The wallet fetches the request object and submits the VP directly. This is necessary because the wallet is an external application that cannot use the Portal's session cookies.
- **KMS calls are made only by the Auth Bridge**. The STS does not directly interact with the KMS. It relies on the Auth Bridge to perform all cryptographic operations related to identity matching and return the decrypted results.

---

## Technology Decisions

### Why Kotlin Multiplatform

The IDK libraries that underpin the portal are built with Kotlin Multiplatform, enabling shared code across JVM, JavaScript, and native targets. The portal's backend services (STS and Auth Bridge) run on the JVM, but the same cryptographic and protocol code could be compiled for other platforms if needed. Within the JVM services, dependency injection is handled at compile time using kotlin-inject, which generates DI code during compilation rather than resolving dependencies at runtime through reflection. This eliminates an entire class of runtime errors (missing bindings, circular dependencies) by catching them at build time.

### Why Next.js

Next.js was chosen for the Portal because it natively supports the Backend-for-Frontend pattern through server-side API routes and React Server Components. Server Components execute on the server and never ship their code to the browser, which means sensitive logic -- token handling, API proxying, session management -- stays on the server by default. There is no risk of accidentally exposing a token in client-side JavaScript because the token-handling code physically cannot run in the browser. Additionally, Next.js 15's App Router provides a clean way to organize the Portal's routes and middleware, and its built-in support for environment variables keeps configuration management straightforward.

### Why PostgreSQL

Identity data demands ACID guarantees. When the Auth Bridge creates an identity match and a corresponding link binding during reconciliation, those two records must be created atomically. If one succeeds and the other fails, the system is in an inconsistent state: a holder key might be matched but have no cached attributes, or attributes might exist with no matching lookup hash. PostgreSQL's transaction support ensures that reconciliation operations are all-or-nothing. Its mature indexing capabilities also support the HMAC hash lookups that are central to the matching engine's performance.

### Why Separate STS from Auth Bridge

It would have been simpler to build a single service that handles both token minting and identity matching. The decision to separate them was driven by several factors:

**Different responsibilities.** The STS is an OAuth2/OIDC authorization server. Its job is to implement the OIDC specification correctly, manage client registrations, issue tokens, and handle federation. The Auth Bridge is an identity matching engine. Its job is to manage OID4VP sessions, verify credentials, perform HMAC lookups, and orchestrate reconciliation. These are fundamentally different domains with different complexity profiles.

**Different lifecycle.** Changes to reconciliation logic (new providers, different selector rules, updated credential schemas) should not require redeploying the token minting infrastructure. Conversely, updates to the OIDC configuration (new clients, claim mapping changes) should not affect the identity matching engine. Separate services mean separate deployment pipelines and separate release schedules.

**Different scaling needs.** The STS handles every authentication request -- both federated and wallet-based. The Auth Bridge handles only wallet-based requests. In a deployment where 80% of authentication is federated, the STS needs more capacity than the Auth Bridge. Separate services enable independent scaling.

**Different trust boundaries.** The STS holds the signing keys for tokens and manages client credentials. The Auth Bridge holds the KMS access credentials for HMAC and encryption keys. Neither service needs the other's secrets. Separation enforces the principle of least privilege at the service level.

---

# Authentication Flows

# Authentication Flows

Three distinct authentication paths all produce the same output: a standard OIDC access token and ID token from the Security Token Service. The choice of authentication method is invisible to downstream systems. A student information system, a learning management platform, or any other relying party receives the same token schema regardless of whether the user clicked a button and logged in through SURFconext, or scanned a QR code with their wallet.

What differs between the three paths is how the user's identity is established and how the canonical claims are sourced. The federated path retrieves claims live from SURFconext. The wallet fast path loads cached claims from an encrypted local binding. The wallet reconciliation path establishes that binding for the first time through a one-time institutional login. Once you understand these three paths, you understand the full authentication surface of the portal.

---

## Flow 1: Federated Login (eduID via SURFconext)

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-federated-login-flow.svg" alt="Federated Login Flow" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The federated login flow is the traditional authentication path that institutions already know from existing SURFconext integrations. The user authenticates at their institutional identity provider, and the resulting claims flow back through SURFconext and the STS to produce the final tokens.

### Step-by-Step Walkthrough

**Step 1: User selects "Login with institution account."** On the Portal's login page, the user clicks the button for institutional login. This is the familiar path for anyone who has used SURFconext before.

**Step 2: Portal initiates the OIDC flow with the STS.** The Portal calls `signIn('sts')` via NextAuth.js, which constructs an authorization request and redirects the user's browser to the STS `/authorize` endpoint. This request includes a PKCE code challenge (using the S256 method), a random state parameter for CSRF protection, and a nonce for ID token replay prevention.

**Step 3: STS redirects to the upstream federation provider.** The STS recognizes this as a federation login (no `login_hint` indicating wallet authentication) and redirects the user to the configured upstream OIDC provider -- SURFconext in production, or a Keycloak instance in development environments. The STS generates its own PKCE challenge, state, and nonce for this upstream request, maintaining a complete security context independent of the downstream session with the Portal.

**Step 4: User authenticates at their institution.** SURFconext presents the institutional identity provider selection screen (the "Where Are You From" or WAYF page). The user selects their institution and authenticates using whatever method their institution requires -- typically username/password, possibly with multi-factor authentication. This step is entirely outside the portal's control and happens at the institution's identity provider.

**Step 5: SURFconext calls back to the STS.** After successful authentication, SURFconext redirects the user's browser back to the STS's federation callback endpoint with an authorization code. The STS validates the state parameter to ensure the callback matches the original request.

**Step 6: STS exchanges the authorization code for tokens.** The STS sends a back-channel request to SURFconext's token endpoint, presenting the authorization code and the PKCE code verifier. SURFconext validates the code and verifier, then returns an access token, an ID token, and optionally a refresh token.

**Step 7: STS extracts and enriches claims.** The STS decodes the ID token from SURFconext to obtain the initial set of claims. It then calls SURFconext's `/userinfo` endpoint with the access token to retrieve additional claims. The combined claim set typically includes: the institution-scoped `eduid`, `eduperson_principal_name`, `given_name`, `family_name`, and `email`.

**Step 8: STS applies canonical attribute mapping.** The raw claims from SURFconext are transformed according to the STS's attribute rules configuration. This mapping normalizes claim names, applies default values where needed, and constructs the canonical claim schema that all portal tokens share. The mapping is configuration-driven, so changes to the upstream claim format can be accommodated without code changes.

**Step 9: STS issues an authorization code to the Portal.** With the canonical claims established, the STS auto-approves consent (the Portal is a trusted first-party client) and generates an authorization code. The user's browser is redirected back to the Portal's callback URL with this code.

**Step 10: Portal exchanges the STS authorization code for tokens.** NextAuth.js's callback handler receives the authorization code and exchanges it at the STS token endpoint, presenting the original PKCE code verifier. The STS validates everything and returns the final access token and ID token.

**Step 11: Session established.** NextAuth.js stores the tokens using its JWT session strategy. The session data -- including the access token, ID token, and extracted user claims -- is encrypted and stored in an HTTP-only cookie. The user is now authenticated, and subsequent requests to the Portal include this session cookie.

### Claims Produced

The STS token from a federated login contains all canonical attributes sourced from SURFconext. The most critical claims are the institution-scoped `eduid` and the `eduperson_principal_name`, which are the identifiers that downstream systems use for identity resolution. The `acr` (Authentication Context Class Reference) is set to `urn:mace:surfnet.nl:assurance:loa2`, and the `amr` (Authentication Methods References) contains `["pwd"]`, reflecting that the user authenticated with a password-based mechanism at their institution.

---

## Flow 2: Wallet Login (Known Holder -- Fast Path)

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-wallet-fast-path.svg" alt="Wallet Login Fast Path" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The wallet fast path is the optimized authentication flow for returning wallet users. When a user's wallet holder key has been previously linked to an institutional identity through reconciliation, subsequent wallet logins resolve entirely from local data. No external calls to SURFconext are required. This makes wallet authentication faster than traditional federation and reduces dependency on external services.

### Step-by-Step Walkthrough

**Step 1: User selects "Login with wallet."** On the Portal's login page, the user clicks the button for wallet login. The Portal prepares to display a QR code that the user will scan with their wallet application.

**Step 2: Portal creates an OID4VP session.** The Portal sends a POST request to the Auth Bridge at `/auth/oid4vp/sessions` to create a new OID4VP session. The request specifies which credential types are required from the wallet, expressed using DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language). This is a critical trust boundary: the DCQL query defines exactly which credentials the system accepts -- in this case, an eduID credential from a trusted issuer. Only wallets that hold a valid eduID credential can participate in the authentication flow.

**Step 3: Auth Bridge returns session details.** The Auth Bridge creates the session, generates a signed request object (a JAR -- JWT-Secured Authorization Request), and returns a response containing the `sessionId`, a `qrCodeDataUri` (a base64-encoded PNG of the QR code), and the `requestUri` that the wallet will fetch. The QR code encodes a URI that points back to the Auth Bridge where the wallet can retrieve the full request object.

**Step 4: Portal displays the QR code.** The Portal renders the QR code in the browser. The user opens their wallet application and scans the QR code with their device's camera.

**Step 5: Wallet processes the request.** The wallet application decodes the QR code to obtain the request URI, fetches the JAR-signed request object from that URI, and validates the signature. The request object specifies that an eduID credential is required -- the wallet identifies a matching eduID credential in its store and prompts the user to consent to sharing the requested attributes (such as the eduPersonPrincipalName).

**Step 6: Wallet submits a Verifiable Presentation.** The wallet constructs a Verifiable Presentation containing the eduID credential and signs it with the holder's private key, proving control of the key that is bound to the credential. The wallet sends this VP to the Auth Bridge's response endpoint.

**Step 7: Auth Bridge verifies the Verifiable Presentation.** The Auth Bridge runs the VP through the Universal OID4VP Verifier provided by the IDK. This verification checks the cryptographic signatures, validates the credential's status (checking for revocation), verifies the holder binding (proving the presenter holds the private key corresponding to the credential's holder key), and extracts the credential attributes and the holder's public key.

**Step 8: Auth Bridge computes the holder key hash.** With the holder's public key extracted, the Auth Bridge computes `HMAC-SHA256(holder_public_key_fingerprint, Key_A)` to produce the `holder_identifier_hash`. This hash is the lookup key for the identity matching database. Key A is the domain-separated cryptographic key dedicated to holder key hashing, managed in the KMS.

**Step 9: Database lookup finds a match.** The Auth Bridge queries the database: `SELECT * FROM identity_match WHERE tenant_id = ? AND identifier_hash = ? AND identifier_type = 'KEY'`. Because this holder has previously completed reconciliation, a matching record exists. The query returns the `identity_match` record, which includes the `internal_identity_id` that links to the corresponding `identity_link_binding` record.

**Step 10: Auth Bridge loads and decrypts cached attributes.** Using the `internal_identity_id`, the Auth Bridge retrieves the `identity_link_binding` record. This record contains a `persisted_attributes_envelope` -- an AES-256-GCM encrypted payload containing the canonical claims that were cached during the original reconciliation. The Auth Bridge requests decryption from the KMS using Key C, recovering the plaintext canonical attributes (the institution-scoped eduID, eduPersonPrincipalName, name, email, assurance metadata).

**Step 11: Session completes.** The OID4VP session status transitions to `COMPLETED`. The Auth Bridge stores the resolved identity data in the session record, ready for retrieval by the STS.

**Step 12: Portal detects completion.** The Portal has been polling the Auth Bridge at regular intervals, checking the session status. When it detects the `COMPLETED` status, it proceeds with the authentication flow.

**Step 13: Portal initiates STS authentication with wallet context.** The Portal calls `signIn('sts-wallet', { login_hint: 'oid4vp:{sessionId}' })`, which redirects the user's browser to the STS `/authorize` endpoint. The `login_hint` parameter tells the STS that this is a wallet authentication and provides the session ID for identity retrieval.

**Step 14: STS retrieves the resolved identity.** The STS calls the Auth Bridge at `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{sessionId}/complete` to retrieve the resolved canonical claims for the given session.

**Step 15: STS issues tokens.** With the canonical claims in hand, the STS applies its attribute mapping rules, projects the claims into the standard token schema, and issues the access token and ID token. The Portal receives these tokens through the same OIDC code flow as in the federated path.

### Key Insight

The critical characteristic of the fast path is that **zero external calls are required**. The entire identity resolution happens from the local database and KMS. SURFconext is not contacted. No external OIDC provider is involved. The only network calls are between the portal's own services and the KMS. This has two important consequences: the authentication is significantly faster (sub-second rather than the multiple-second round trips involved in federation), and the authentication is resilient to upstream outages (if SURFconext is temporarily unavailable, wallet logins still work).

---

## Flow 3: Wallet Login (Unknown Holder -- Reconciliation)

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-wallet-reconciliation-flow.svg" alt="Wallet Reconciliation Flow" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The reconciliation flow handles the case where a wallet holder is encountered for the first time. The wallet presents a valid eduID credential (verified against the trusted issuer), and the system extracts both the credential attributes (like the eduPersonPrincipalName) and the holder key. However, the system has never seen this holder key before, so it cannot resolve the holder to the institution-scoped eduID that backend systems require. The user must perform a one-time institutional login through SURFconext to obtain the institution-scoped eduID and establish the link. Once this reconciliation completes, all future wallet logins use the fast path.

### Step-by-Step Walkthrough

**Steps 1 through 8: Identical to the fast path.** The user selects wallet login, the Portal creates an OID4VP session, the QR code is displayed, the wallet scans and submits a Verifiable Presentation, the Auth Bridge verifies it, extracts the holder key, and computes the HMAC hash. These steps are exactly the same as the fast path described above.

**Step 9: No match found.** The database query for `identity_match WHERE identifier_hash = ? AND identifier_type = 'KEY'` returns no results. This holder key has never been seen before. The Auth Bridge cannot resolve the holder to any institutional identity.

**Step 10: Auth Bridge evaluates reconciliation selector rules.** The Auth Bridge consults its configuration to determine what to do with an unrecognized holder. The reconciliation selector rules are evaluated against the current context -- the credential type presented, the issuer, the assurance level, and other contextual attributes. The default rule matches and selects the `RunIdv` (Run Identity Verification) plan, which will verify the holder's institutional identity through an OIDC flow to SURFconext.

**Step 11: Session transitions to IDV_REQUIRED.** The OID4VP session status is updated to `IDV_REQUIRED`, signaling that the authentication cannot complete without additional identity verification. The session now waits for the user to initiate the IDV flow.

**Step 12: Portal detects the IDV requirement.** The Portal's status polling detects the `IDV_REQUIRED` status. Instead of completing the login, the Portal transitions to the IDV reconciliation UI.

**Step 13: Portal displays the reconciliation interface.** The user sees a screen explaining that this is their first time logging in with their wallet, and that a one-time link to their institutional account is needed. The explanation is designed to be non-technical and reassuring: "To connect your wallet to your institution account, please log in once with your institution credentials. This only needs to happen once -- after this, your wallet login will be instant."

**Step 14: User initiates IDV.** The user clicks "Link with institution account." The Portal sends a POST request to the Auth Bridge at `.../idv/initiate` to start the reconciliation flow.

**Step 15: Auth Bridge creates a reconciliation session.** The Auth Bridge generates a new OIDC authorization request targeting SURFconext. It creates its own PKCE challenge, state, and nonce, stores them in the reconciliation session for later validation, and returns an `authorizationUrl` to the Portal.

**Step 16: User authenticates at SURFconext.** The Portal redirects the user's browser to the authorization URL. The user goes through the familiar SURFconext institutional authentication flow: selecting their institution, entering their credentials, and completing any required multi-factor authentication.

**Step 17: SURFconext calls back to the Auth Bridge.** After successful authentication, SURFconext redirects the user's browser to the Auth Bridge's IDV callback endpoint with an authorization code. The Auth Bridge validates the state parameter against the stored reconciliation session.

**Step 18: Auth Bridge exchanges the code and extracts claims.** The Auth Bridge sends the authorization code to SURFconext's token endpoint along with the PKCE code verifier. SURFconext returns tokens. The Auth Bridge validates the ID token, extracts the claims, and calls the userinfo endpoint for additional attributes. The critical claim is the `eduid` -- the institutional identifier that downstream systems need.

**Step 19: Auth Bridge creates identity records.** This is the core of the reconciliation. Three records are created atomically within a single database transaction:

- An `identity_match` record mapping `HMAC(holder_key_fingerprint, Key_A)` to a new `internal_identity_id` with `identifier_type = 'KEY'`. This enables future fast-path lookups by holder key.
- An `identity_match` record mapping `HMAC(eduid, Key_B)` to the same `internal_identity_id` with `identifier_type = 'EDUID'`. This enables reverse lookups -- given an eduid, the system can find the associated identity and any linked holder keys.
- An `identity_link_binding` record associated with the `internal_identity_id`, containing the canonical claims (eduid, name, email, assurance metadata) encrypted with Key C. This is the cached attribute data that the fast path will decrypt on future logins.

The use of separate HMAC keys (Key A for holder keys, Key B for institutional identifiers) is a deliberate security measure. Even if Key A is compromised, an attacker cannot use it to reverse-engineer the institutional identifier hashes created with Key B.

**Step 20: Session transitions to COMPLETED.** With the identity records created, the OID4VP session status transitions to `COMPLETED`. The reconciliation is done.

**Step 21: Portal resumes the wallet login flow.** The Portal detects the `COMPLETED` status and resumes the authentication flow. From this point, the process is identical to the fast path: the Portal initiates STS authentication with the `login_hint` containing the session ID, the STS retrieves the resolved identity from the Auth Bridge, and tokens are issued.

### One-Time Cost, Permanent Benefit

This reconciliation flow happens **once per holder key**. After the identity records are created, every subsequent wallet login with that holder key resolves through the fast path -- no SURFconext involvement, no institutional login, sub-second authentication. The one-time reconciliation cost buys permanent fast-path access.

If a user gets a new device or a new wallet, they will have a new holder key and will need to reconcile again. But the process is the same: one institutional login, and they are linked forever (or until the records are deleted for a right-to-erasure request).

---

## Session Status State Machine

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-reconciliation-session-states.svg" alt="Session Status State Machine" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

Every OID4VP session progresses through a defined set of states. The Portal polls the session status to determine what to display to the user, and the Auth Bridge transitions the session through states as the authentication progresses.

| Status | Description |
|---|---|
| `CREATED` / `PENDING` | The session has been created and the QR code is displayed. The system is waiting for the wallet to scan the QR code and fetch the request object. |
| `INTERACTION_STARTED` | The wallet has fetched the request object from the request URI. The user is being prompted to consent to sharing their credentials. |
| `VERIFYING` | The wallet has submitted a Verifiable Presentation and it is being validated by the Universal Verifier. |
| `VERIFIED` | The VP has been successfully validated. The holder's public key has been extracted and the HMAC lookup is about to begin. |
| `IDV_REQUIRED` | The HMAC lookup found no match for this holder key. Identity verification (reconciliation) is required before authentication can complete. |
| `RECONCILING` | The IDV flow is in progress. The user has been redirected to SURFconext and is authenticating at their institution. |
| `COMPLETED` | The identity has been resolved -- either through the fast path (existing match found) or through reconciliation (new match created). The canonical claims are available for token issuance. |
| `EXPIRED` | The session has timed out. The default timeout is 5 minutes from session creation. The user must start a new wallet login. |
| `FAILED` / `ERROR` | Something went wrong during verification or reconciliation. The VP might have been invalid, a credential might have been revoked, or the reconciliation callback might have failed. Error details are logged for debugging. |

The Portal uses these states to drive the user interface. During `CREATED`/`PENDING`, the QR code is displayed with a "Waiting for wallet..." message. During `IDV_REQUIRED`, the reconciliation UI is shown. During `COMPLETED`, the login completes automatically. During `EXPIRED` or `FAILED`, an error message is shown with an option to retry.

---

## Token Output Comparison

Regardless of which authentication flow is used, the STS issues tokens with a standardized claims schema. This is the fundamental guarantee that makes wallet authentication a drop-in enhancement for institutions: downstream systems do not need to be modified.

| Claim | Federated Source | Wallet Source |
|---|---|---|
| `sub` | Generated internal ID | Generated internal ID |
| `eduid` | SURFconext userinfo | Cached from reconciliation binding |
| `eduperson_principal_name` | SURFconext userinfo | Wallet credential + OIDC (merge: OIDC_WINS) |
| `given_name` | SURFconext userinfo | Wallet credential (merge: OIDC_WINS) |
| `family_name` | SURFconext userinfo | Wallet credential (merge: OIDC_WINS) |
| `email` | SURFconext userinfo | Wallet credential (merge: OIDC_WINS) |
| `acr` | `urn:mace:surfnet.nl:assurance:loa2` | `urn:sphereon:oid4vp:vp` |
| `amr` | `["pwd"]` | `["vp"]` |

The merge strategy `OIDC_WINS` means that when both the wallet credential and the OIDC reconciliation flow provide a value for the same claim, the OIDC value (from SURFconext) takes precedence. This ensures that the authoritative institutional data always wins over self-asserted wallet credential data for claims like name and email.

There are two intentional differences between the flows:

**The `acr` claim** reflects the authentication context. Federated login through SURFconext produces `urn:mace:surfnet.nl:assurance:loa2`, indicating Level of Assurance 2 within the SURFconext federation. Wallet login produces `urn:sphereon:oid4vp:vp`, indicating that authentication was performed via a Verifiable Presentation. Downstream systems that need to distinguish authentication methods can inspect this claim.

**The `amr` claim** reflects the authentication method. Federated login produces `["pwd"]` (password-based), while wallet login produces `["vp"]` (Verifiable Presentation). Like `acr`, this allows downstream systems to make policy decisions based on how the user authenticated -- for instance, requiring federated login for administrative actions while accepting wallet login for general access.

The identity data itself -- `eduid`, `eduperson_principal_name`, `given_name`, `family_name`, `email` -- is always present and always sourced from the same authoritative origin (SURFconext claims, either live or cached). A downstream system that only inspects the identity claims will see no difference between a federated login and a wallet login. This is by design: the portal's purpose is to make wallet authentication seamless and invisible to existing institutional infrastructure.

---

# Identity Matching

# Identity Matching

Identity matching is the core mechanism that links external identifiers -- wallet holder keys, institutional subject IDs (the institution-scoped eduID, the eduPersonPrincipalName), and other credentials -- to internal identity IDs without storing any plaintext identifiers in the database. When a user presents a trusted eduID credential through an OID4VP wallet presentation, or authenticates through a federated OIDC login via SURFconext, the system converts their identifier into an HMAC-SHA256 hash using a domain-separated key, then looks up that hash in the database. If a match is found, the system resolves the user's internal identity and decrypts the cached canonical attributes associated with it.

It is important to note that matching only occurs for credentials that the system trusts. The DCQL query configuration defines which credential types and issuers are accepted. Only a valid eduID credential from a trusted issuer triggers the matching process. The wallet does not just present "a key" -- it presents a verified eduID credential that contains identity attributes, and the system uses both the credential's holder key (for matching) and its attributes (like the eduPersonPrincipalName) in the reconciliation process.

This approach means the database is cryptographically useless to an attacker. Even with full read access to every table, an adversary sees only one-way HMAC hashes and AES-256-GCM ciphertext. There are no plaintext wallet keys, no plaintext institutional identifiers, and no plaintext personal attributes stored anywhere in the matching tables. The cryptographic keys that produced these hashes and ciphertexts reside in a Hardware Security Module (HSM) or Key Management Service (KMS), entirely separate from the application database.

## Why HMAC Instead of Plaintext

The decision to use HMAC-SHA256 rather than storing identifiers in plaintext -- or even using bare SHA-256 hashes -- is driven by a careful threat model analysis.

**Plaintext storage is vulnerable to data breach.** If an attacker gains read access to the database (through SQL injection, a misconfigured backup, or a compromised admin account), they immediately obtain every user's wallet public key and institutional identifier. This enables impersonation, tracking, and correlation attacks across systems.

**Bare SHA-256 hashes are vulnerable to rainbow table attacks.** While SHA-256 is a strong hash function, it is deterministic and keyless. An attacker who knows the format of the input (for example, a JWK thumbprint or a SURFconext subject identifier) can precompute hashes for a large set of plausible inputs and match them against the database. This is especially feasible when the input space is structured, as it is with OIDC subject identifiers.

**HMAC-SHA256 eliminates rainbow table attacks** because it requires a secret key. Without the key, an attacker cannot compute the hash for any input, no matter how much they know about the input format. The key is not stored in the database or in the application configuration files -- it lives in the HSM or KMS, accessible only through authenticated API calls.

**Domain separation prevents cross-key correlation.** The system uses separate HMAC keys for different identifier types (Key A for wallet holder keys, Key B for institutional identifiers). This means that even if an attacker somehow obtained Key A, they could not use it to reverse or correlate Key B hashes. Each domain is cryptographically isolated.

## Three-Key Architecture

The matching system uses three distinct cryptographic keys, each serving a different purpose. This separation of concerns ensures that compromising one key does not compromise the entire system.

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-three-keys.svg" alt="Three Keys" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

### Key A -- Holder HMAC Key (`reconciliation:holder`, HMAC-SHA256)

Key A is used to hash wallet public key fingerprints. When a holder presents a Verifiable Presentation (VP) through the OID4VP protocol, the system extracts the holder's public key from the VP proof and computes its JWK Thumbprint according to RFC 7638. This thumbprint is a deterministic, canonical representation of the key that is independent of serialization format. The thumbprint is then passed through HMAC-SHA256 with Key A, and the resulting hash is stored as `holder_identifier_hash` in the database.

This means the system never stores the actual public key. It stores only a keyed hash of the key's thumbprint, which cannot be reversed without access to both the original key material and the HMAC secret.

### Key B -- Institution HMAC Key (`reconciliation:institution`, HMAC-SHA256)

Key B is used to hash institutional identifiers. When a user completes a reconciliation flow through SURFconext (or another OIDC provider), the system receives the `sub` claim from the OIDC token. This subject identifier is passed through HMAC-SHA256 with Key B, and the resulting hash is stored as `institution_identifier_hash`.

Using a separate key from Key A ensures that wallet hashes and institutional hashes are cryptographically independent. An attacker who somehow obtained Key A could not use it to look up or correlate institutional identifiers, and vice versa.

### Key C -- Encryption Key (`reconciliation:encryption`, AES-256-GCM)

Key C is fundamentally different from Keys A and B. While the HMAC keys produce irreversible hashes (used for lookup), Key C performs reversible encryption using AES-256-GCM. This key encrypts data that must be recoverable: the actual eduID identifier, canonical claims (name, email, affiliation), and auxiliary metadata.

Key C is used only when data must be read back in its original form. The encrypted payloads include the `persisted_attributes_envelope` (the cached canonical claims bundle) and `encrypted_institution_id` (the plaintext institutional identifier needed for token generation). On read, the system decrypts these values using Key C and projects the attributes into the OIDC response.

## Data Model Overview

The matching system uses a two-table design that separates fast lookup from detailed storage.

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-matching-data-model.svg" alt="Matching Data Model" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

### `identity_match` -- The Fast-Lookup Index

The `identity_match` table is the primary lookup structure. Given an HMAC-hashed identifier and its type, it returns the internal identity ID in a single indexed query. This table supports multiple identifier types per identity, meaning a single person can be looked up by their wallet key, their institutional subject ID, their email address, or any other registered identifier type.

The table is intentionally lightweight. It contains only the hashed identifier, the identifier type, the resolved internal identity ID, and metadata for key versioning, timestamps, and soft deletion. No encrypted payloads, no canonical attributes, no assurance metadata. This keeps the index small and the lookups fast.

### `identity_link_binding` -- The Full Dossier

The `identity_link_binding` table stores everything else: encrypted canonical attributes from the reconciliation, assurance metadata about how the identity was verified, version tracking for staleness detection, and both holder and institution hashes for bidirectional lookup. This table is linked to `identity_match` via a `match_id` foreign key.

When a known wallet holder returns, the system first queries `identity_match` to resolve their identity, then loads the associated `identity_link_binding` to decrypt the cached attributes and project them into the token. This two-step process keeps the common lookup path (identity resolution) fast while still providing access to the full attribute set when needed.

## Lookup Flow

The following pseudocode illustrates how an external identifier is resolved to an internal identity with decrypted attributes.

```text
1. Receive external identifier (e.g., wallet public key from VP proof)
2. Compute fingerprint = JWK_Thumbprint(public_key)  [RFC 7638]
3. Compute identifier_hash = HMAC-SHA256(fingerprint, Key_A)
4. Query: SELECT * FROM identity_match
     WHERE tenant_id = :tenant
       AND identifier_hash = :identifier_hash
       AND identifier_type = 'KEY'
       AND deleted_at IS NULL
5. If found -> load identity_link_binding by match_id
6. Decrypt persisted_attributes_envelope using Key C (AES-256-GCM)
7. Validate canonical_schema_version against current configuration
8. Return resolved identity with decrypted canonical attributes
```

Step 3 is where the privacy protection happens: the raw public key is never sent to the database. Only the HMAC hash is used in the query, and the database index is built on these hashes. If dual-read is active during a key rotation, step 3 may also compute a hash with the previous key version and attempt a second lookup if the first returns no results.

Step 7 is a staleness check. If the schema version stored in the binding does not match the currently configured schema version, the system knows the cached attributes may be outdated and can trigger a re-materialization on the next reconciliation opportunity.

## Identifier Types

The system supports multiple identifier types, each representing a different way a user can be identified.

| Type | Description | When Used |
|------|-------------|-----------|
| `KEY` | Wallet holder key fingerprint (JWK thumbprint per RFC 7638) | OID4VP wallet authentication. The holder's public key from the VP proof is thumbprinted and HMAC-hashed with Key A. |
| `SUBJECT_ID` | OIDC subject identifier (`sub` claim) | After reconciliation completes. The `sub` claim from SURFconext is HMAC-hashed with Key B and stored as a reverse-lookup path. |
| `EMAIL` | Email address hash | Alternative identifier matching when email is the only available correlating attribute. |
| `DID` | Decentralized Identifier | DID-based authentication flows where the user presents a DID rather than a raw public key. |
| `CLAIM_TUPLE` | Composite hash of multiple claims | Multi-attribute matching where no single claim is sufficient for unique identification. Multiple claims are concatenated in canonical order and hashed together. |

Each identifier type uses its own HMAC key (Key A for holder-side identifiers like `KEY` and `DID`, Key B for institution-side identifiers like `SUBJECT_ID`). The `EMAIL` and `CLAIM_TUPLE` types use whichever key corresponds to the context in which they are being matched.

## Multi-Match Design

A single internal identity can have multiple matches pointing to it from different identifier types. This is not an edge case -- it is the expected outcome of a successful reconciliation.

Consider a first-time wallet user who completes the reconciliation flow. Before reconciliation, the system has only a `KEY` match from the wallet presentation. After reconciliation links the wallet identity to an institutional identity, the system creates a second `SUBJECT_ID` match pointing to the same `internal_identity_id`. The result is two matches for one identity:

- **Match 1** (type `KEY`): `HMAC(wallet_thumbprint, Key_A)` maps to `internal_identity_id = abc-123`
- **Match 2** (type `SUBJECT_ID`): `HMAC(surfconext_sub, Key_B)` maps to `internal_identity_id = abc-123`

This enables bidirectional lookup. When the user returns with their wallet, the system finds them through Match 1 (the `KEY` path). When an external system queries the REST API with an institutional identifier, the system finds them through Match 2 (the `SUBJECT_ID` path). Both paths resolve to the same internal identity and the same cached attributes.

Over time, additional identifier types may be added to the same identity. For example, if the user later authenticates with a DID, a third match of type `DID` is created, still pointing to `abc-123`. The identity accumulates matches as the user interacts with the system through different channels, building a richer but still privacy-preserving identity graph.

---

# IdentityMatch Record

# IdentityMatch Record

The `identity_match` table is the fast-lookup index at the heart of the matching system. Given an HMAC-hashed external identifier and its type, it returns the internal identity ID. This single lookup is what makes returning-wallet-user authentication sub-second: one database query to resolve the identity, then decrypt the cached attributes from the associated binding.

Every time a user presents a credential -- whether a wallet public key, an OIDC subject identifier, or any other supported identifier type -- the system computes the HMAC hash of that identifier, queries `identity_match` with the hash, and either finds an existing identity or determines that this is a new, unrecognized user. The table is indexed for this exact access pattern, making the lookup operation efficient even as the number of registered identities grows.

## Record Structure

The `identity_match` table contains the following columns. Each record represents a single mapping from one hashed external identifier to one internal identity.

| Column | Type | Description |
|--------|------|-------------|
| `id` | TEXT (UUID) | Primary key. A unique identifier for this match record, generated as a UUID v4 at creation time. |
| `tenant_id` | TEXT | Multi-tenant isolation key. Every query includes a tenant filter to ensure strict data separation between tenants. |
| `identifier_hash` | TEXT | The HMAC-SHA256 hash of the external identifier. Computed using Key A (for holder identifiers) or Key B (for institutional identifiers). This is the primary lookup value. |
| `identifier_type` | TEXT | The type of identifier that was hashed. One of: `KEY`, `SUBJECT_ID`, `EMAIL`, `DID`, `CLAIM_TUPLE`. Combined with the hash, this forms the lookup key. |
| `internal_identity_id` | TEXT (UUID) | The resolved internal identity that this match points to. Multiple match records can share the same `internal_identity_id`, representing different ways to look up the same person. |
| `hash_key_version` | INTEGER | The version of the HMAC key that was used to compute `identifier_hash`. This field is critical for key rotation: it tells the system whether this hash was computed with the current key or a previous key. |
| `metadata_json` | TEXT | Optional JSON metadata about the match. This can store additional context such as the source of the match, the authentication method used, or diagnostic information. The schema of this JSON is not enforced at the database level. |
| `created_at` | TEXT (ISO 8601) | Timestamp of when this match record was first created. Set once at insertion time and never modified. |
| `updated_at` | TEXT (ISO 8601) | Timestamp of the most recent modification to this record. Updated whenever any field changes, including during key rotation migrations. |
| `last_used_at` | TEXT (ISO 8601) | Timestamp of the most recent lookup that accessed this record. Updated each time the record is used for identity resolution. This field drives inactivity-based cleanup: records not accessed within the configured threshold (default 2 years) are candidates for deletion. |
| `deleted_at` | TEXT (ISO 8601) | Soft-delete timestamp. When set, this record is considered logically deleted and is excluded from normal lookups. The record is retained during the configurable retention period (default 30 days) before permanent removal. |
| `deletion_reason` | TEXT | The reason for deletion. Possible values: `gdpr_request` (user-initiated erasure under GDPR Art. 17), `inactivity` (exceeded the 2-year inactivity threshold), `key_rotation` (old key version cleanup during migration). |

## Unique Constraint

The table enforces a unique constraint on the combination of `(tenant_id, identifier_hash, identifier_type)`. This constraint guarantees three important properties.

**One identifier maps to exactly one identity within a tenant.** A given wallet key fingerprint (hashed) can only resolve to one internal identity within the same tenant. If the system encounters a conflict -- for example, if a wallet key that was previously matched to identity A is now being matched to identity B -- the upsert operation updates the existing record rather than creating a duplicate.

**Cross-tenant isolation.** The same identifier hash appearing in two different tenants is treated as two completely independent matches. Tenant A's identity resolution is invisible to tenant B, even if the underlying user happens to be the same person. This is fundamental to the multi-tenant architecture.

**Multiple identifier types per identity.** The same `internal_identity_id` can appear in multiple rows, each with a different `identifier_type`. This is the mechanism that enables multi-match identity resolution. The unique constraint allows this because the `identifier_type` is part of the uniqueness tuple: a `KEY` match and a `SUBJECT_ID` match are distinct records even if they point to the same identity.

## Multiple Matches Per Identity

After a first-time wallet login with successful reconciliation, two match records are created pointing to the same internal identity. This is the normal and expected outcome.

```text
Match 1:
  identifier_hash = HMAC(wallet_key_thumbprint, Key_A)
  identifier_type = KEY
  internal_identity_id = abc-123

Match 2:
  identifier_hash = HMAC(surfconext_sub, Key_B)
  identifier_type = SUBJECT_ID
  internal_identity_id = abc-123
```

Both records resolve to `abc-123`. Match 1 is used when the user returns with their wallet (the common fast-path). Match 2 is used when an external system queries the REST API with the institutional identifier (the reverse-lookup path).

This design also supports future expansion. If the system later supports DID-based authentication, a third match of type `DID` can be added to the same identity without modifying the existing records. The identity accumulates lookup paths over time.

## Soft Delete and GDPR Art. 17

The `identity_match` table supports soft deletion to comply with GDPR Article 17 (Right to Erasure). When a deletion is requested, the system does not immediately remove the record from the database. Instead, it sets the `deleted_at` timestamp and the `deletion_reason` field.

During the retention period (configurable, default 30 days), the record remains in the database but is excluded from normal lookups. All queries that resolve identities include a `WHERE deleted_at IS NULL` filter, so soft-deleted records are invisible to the matching logic. The retention period exists to support audit trails, incident investigation, and the possibility of undoing an accidental deletion.

After the retention period expires, the `hardDeleteMatch` operation permanently removes the record from the database. This is an irreversible operation -- once hard-deleted, the match cannot be recovered.

Three deletion reasons are supported:

- **`gdpr_request`**: The user has exercised their right to erasure under GDPR Article 17. This triggers deletion of all matches associated with the user's `internal_identity_id`, along with all associated `identity_link_binding` records.
- **`inactivity`**: The record has not been accessed within the configured inactivity threshold (default 2 years). The `last_used_at` timestamp is compared against the threshold, and records that exceed it are marked for deletion.
- **`key_rotation`**: During a key rotation migration, records using an old key version that cannot be migrated (for example, because the identity is inactive and scheduled for cleanup) are soft-deleted rather than migrated to the new key.

## Indexes

The table uses carefully chosen indexes to support the two primary access patterns.

### Primary Lookup Index

The unique constraint on `(tenant_id, identifier_hash, identifier_type)` serves as the primary lookup index. This is the index used by the `findMatchByIdentifierHash` query, which is the hottest query in the system -- executed on every wallet authentication request. The index enables the database to resolve an identity in a single B-tree traversal, regardless of how many total matches exist.

### Identity Reverse-Lookup Index

The index `idx_match_identity(tenant_id, internal_identity_id)` supports the reverse direction: given an internal identity ID, find all matches associated with it. This access pattern is used in two critical scenarios:

- **GDPR erasure**: When a user requests deletion, the system must find and soft-delete every match record associated with their identity. Without this index, the operation would require a full table scan.
- **External API lookup**: When a third-party system queries the REST API with an identity ID, the system uses this index to find all associated matches and their linked bindings.

## Key Queries

The following queries from the SqlDelight schema define the primary operations on the `identity_match` table.

### `findMatchByIdentifierHash`

The primary lookup query. Given a tenant, an identifier hash, and an identifier type, returns the match record if it exists and has not been soft-deleted. This is the query executed on every authentication request.

```sql
SELECT * FROM identity_match
WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id
  AND identifier_hash = :identifier_hash
  AND identifier_type = :identifier_type
  AND deleted_at IS NULL;
```

### `findMatchesByIdentityId`

The reverse-lookup query. Given a tenant and an internal identity ID, returns all match records associated with that identity. Used for GDPR erasure and external API responses.

```sql
SELECT * FROM identity_match
WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id
  AND internal_identity_id = :internal_identity_id;
```

### `upsertMatch`

Insert a new match record, or update the existing record if a conflict occurs on the unique constraint `(tenant_id, identifier_hash, identifier_type)`. On conflict, the `internal_identity_id`, `hash_key_version`, `metadata_json`, and `updated_at` fields are updated. This operation is used during reconciliation to create or update matches atomically.

### `softDeleteMatch`

Set the `deleted_at` and `deletion_reason` fields on an existing match record. The record remains in the database but is excluded from normal lookups.

### `hardDeleteMatch`

Permanently remove a match record from the database. This operation is irreversible and is executed only after the retention period has expired. The system checks that `deleted_at` is older than the retention threshold before proceeding.

---

# IdentityLinkBinding Record

# IdentityLinkBinding Record

While `identity_match` is the index, `identity_link_binding` is the full dossier. It stores the encrypted canonical attributes captured during reconciliation, assurance metadata about how the identity was verified, and version tracking fields for staleness detection. This is the record that enables the wallet fast-path: when a known holder returns, the system decrypts the cached attributes from the binding and projects them directly into the OIDC token without contacting any external provider.

The binding is created during the reconciliation flow, when the system links a wallet holder identity to an institutional identity. At that moment, the canonical attributes selected by the attribute rules (name, email, affiliation, eduID, and others) are serialized to JSON, encrypted as a single AES-256-GCM blob using Key C, and stored in the `persisted_attributes_envelope` field. From that point forward, the system can serve returning wallet users entirely from its local database.

## Why Bindings Exist

The primary motivation for bindings is the fast-path optimization. Without bindings, every wallet login would require a real-time round-trip to SURFconext (or another OIDC provider) to fetch the user's institutional attributes. This introduces several problems:

- **Latency**: A round-trip to an external OIDC provider adds multiple seconds to the authentication flow. Wallet users expect near-instant authentication, especially on mobile devices where network conditions may be poor.
- **Availability dependency**: If SURFconext is down or experiencing degraded performance, wallet authentication would fail entirely. This creates a runtime dependency on an external system that the portal does not control.
- **User experience**: The reconciliation flow requires user interaction (logging in through the institutional IdP). Requiring this on every wallet login would defeat the purpose of wallet-based authentication.

With bindings, the first reconciliation caches everything needed. The user logs in through SURFconext once, the system captures and encrypts the canonical attributes, and all subsequent wallet logins are resolved entirely locally. The result is sub-second identity resolution with no external dependencies after the initial reconciliation.

## Record Structure

The `identity_link_binding` table contains the following columns. Each record represents a complete holder-to-institution mapping with all associated metadata.

| Column | Type | Encryption | Description |
|--------|------|------------|-------------|
| `id` | TEXT (UUID) | -- | Primary key. A unique identifier for this binding record. |
| `tenant_id` | TEXT | -- | Multi-tenant isolation key. All queries include a tenant filter. |
| `match_id` | TEXT (FK) | -- | Foreign key to `identity_match.id`. Links this binding to the match record that serves as the lookup index. |
| `holder_identifier_hash` | TEXT | HMAC (Key A) | HMAC-SHA256 hash of the wallet holder's key fingerprint (JWK thumbprint). Computed using Key A. |
| `holder_hash_key_version` | INTEGER | -- | Version of Key A used to compute `holder_identifier_hash`. Used for key rotation tracking. |
| `institution_identifier_hash` | TEXT | HMAC (Key B) | HMAC-SHA256 hash of the institutional identifier (e.g., SURFconext `sub` claim). Computed using Key B. |
| `institution_hash_key_version` | INTEGER | -- | Version of Key B used to compute `institution_identifier_hash`. Used for key rotation tracking. |
| `encrypted_institution_id` | TEXT | AES (Key C) | The plaintext institutional identifier (e.g., the actual eduID), encrypted with AES-256-GCM using Key C. This is the only place where the reversible institutional ID is stored. |
| `encrypted_institution_id_key_version` | INTEGER | -- | Version of Key C used to encrypt `encrypted_institution_id`. Used for key rotation tracking. |
| `persisted_attributes_envelope` | TEXT | AES (Key C) | The canonical claims bundle, serialized to JSON and encrypted as a single AES-256-GCM blob using Key C. This is the primary data payload of the binding. |
| `provider_id` | TEXT | -- | Identifies which reconciliation provider was used to create this binding. For example, `"surf"` for SURFconext-based reconciliation. Enables the system to support multiple reconciliation providers per tenant. |
| `institution_id_label` | TEXT | -- | A human-readable label for the institution, such as `"University of Amsterdam"` or `"TU Delft"`. Used for display purposes in administrative interfaces and audit logs. Not encrypted because it does not contain personally identifiable information. |
| `assurance_summary` | TEXT (JSON) | -- | Authentication assurance metadata captured during reconciliation. Contains the wallet assurance level, OIDC ACR and AMR values, and evidence references. Stored as a JSON blob. |
| `canonical_schema_version` | TEXT | -- | Version identifier for the canonical attribute schema that was in effect when this binding was created. When the attribute rules change, this version is compared against the current configuration to detect stale bindings. |
| `material_profile_version` | TEXT | -- | Version identifier for the material profile configuration used during reconciliation. Material profiles define which attributes are requested and how they are mapped. |
| `selector_rule_version` | TEXT | -- | Version identifier for the selector rule that triggered the reconciliation. Selector rules determine when and how reconciliation is initiated based on the attributes available in the VP. |
| `material_fingerprints` | TEXT | -- | A hash of the material inputs (attribute values, rule configurations) that were used to create this binding. If the same inputs would produce a different fingerprint today, the binding is stale. |
| `created_at` | TEXT | -- | Timestamp of when this binding was first created. |
| `updated_at` | TEXT | -- | Timestamp of the most recent modification. |
| `last_used_at` | TEXT | -- | Timestamp of the most recent access. Drives inactivity-based cleanup, similar to `identity_match.last_used_at`. |
| `reconcile_time` | TEXT | -- | Timestamp of the original reconciliation event that created or last refreshed this binding. Distinct from `created_at` because a binding may be refreshed (re-reconciled) without being recreated. |

## Dual-Hash Design

The binding stores both `holder_identifier_hash` (computed with Key A) and `institution_identifier_hash` (computed with Key B). This dual-hash design enables bidirectional lookup:

**Wallet key to institution binding (forward path).** When a wallet holder authenticates, the system computes the HMAC of their key fingerprint with Key A and looks up the binding by `holder_identifier_hash`. This is the primary fast-path used during wallet login. The system does not need to know anything about the user's institutional identity -- the wallet key alone is sufficient to find the binding and decrypt the cached attributes.

**Institution ID to wallet binding (reverse path).** When an external system (such as a student information system or a credential issuer) queries the REST API with an institutional identifier, the system computes the HMAC of that identifier with Key B and looks up the binding by `institution_identifier_hash`. This enables third-party systems to discover whether a given institutional user has a wallet binding, and to retrieve the associated identity information.

Both lookup paths are supported by database indexes and return the same binding record. The dual-hash approach avoids the need for a join through the `identity_match` table when looking up by institution identifier, keeping the reverse-lookup path fast.

## Persisted Attributes Envelope

The `persisted_attributes_envelope` is the core data payload of the binding. It contains the canonical claims that were selected by the attribute rules during reconciliation, specifically those marked with `persist: true` in the rule configuration.

Typical contents include:

- **eduid**: The user's eduID identifier
- **eduperson_principal_name**: The scoped institutional identifier (e.g., `user@university.nl`)
- **email**: The user's institutional email address
- **given_name**: The user's first name
- **family_name**: The user's surname
- **eduperson_affiliation**: The user's role within the institution (e.g., `student`, `employee`)
- **schac_home_organization**: The institution's domain identifier

These attributes are serialized to a JSON object, then encrypted as a single AES-256-GCM blob using Key C. The encryption uses a unique nonce for each write, ensuring that two bindings with identical attributes produce different ciphertext.

On read, the system decrypts the blob using Key C, deserializes the JSON, and projects the individual attributes into the OIDC token according to the `project` rules in the attribute configuration. Not all persisted attributes are necessarily projected into every token -- the projection rules determine which attributes appear in the final response based on the requested scopes and the relying party's configuration.

The `canonical_schema_version` field tracks which version of the attribute rules was in effect when the envelope was created. When the rules change (for example, when a new attribute is added or an existing attribute's mapping is modified), the schema version is incremented. On read, the system compares the binding's schema version against the current configuration. If they differ, the binding is flagged as stale and will be refreshed on the next reconciliation opportunity.

## Assurance Summary

The `assurance_summary` field is a JSON blob containing authentication assurance metadata captured at the time of reconciliation. This metadata describes the strength and method of the authentication that established the binding.

```json
{
  "walletAssuranceLevel": "high",
  "oidcAcr": "urn:mace:surfnet.nl:assurance:loa2",
  "oidcAmr": ["pwd"],
  "executionId": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "evidenceReferenceHash": "sha256-a1b2c3d4e5f6..."
}
```

The fields in the assurance summary serve the following purposes:

- **walletAssuranceLevel**: The assurance level of the wallet itself, as determined by the wallet attestation or the VP metadata. Values such as `"high"`, `"substantial"`, or `"low"` correspond to eIDAS assurance levels.
- **oidcAcr**: The Authentication Context Class Reference from the OIDC token issued by SURFconext. This indicates the level of assurance of the institutional authentication (e.g., single-factor vs. multi-factor).
- **oidcAmr**: The Authentication Methods Reference from the OIDC token. This is an array listing the authentication methods used (e.g., `"pwd"` for password, `"mfa"` for multi-factor authentication).
- **executionId**: A unique identifier for the specific reconciliation execution that created this binding. Useful for audit trail correlation.
- **evidenceReferenceHash**: A SHA-256 hash of the evidence that was evaluated during reconciliation. This provides a tamper-evident reference to the original evidence without storing the evidence itself.

This metadata enables step-up authentication decisions. If a relying party requires a higher assurance level than what is recorded in the binding's `assurance_summary`, the system can request re-verification rather than serving the cached attributes. For example, a financial service might require `loa3` while the binding was established at `loa2`, triggering a step-up flow.

## Version Tracking and Staleness Detection

The binding includes three version fields and a fingerprint field that together enable the system to detect when a binding's cached data may be outdated.

### `canonical_schema_version`

This version tracks the attribute rules configuration. When the rules that define which claims are canonical, how they are mapped, and which are persisted are updated, the schema version is incremented. A binding whose `canonical_schema_version` does not match the current configuration may be missing newly added attributes or may contain attributes that have been remapped.

### `material_profile_version`

This version tracks the material profile configuration. Material profiles define the full set of parameters used during reconciliation, including which OIDC scopes to request, which claims to extract, and how to handle optional vs. required attributes. When the material profile changes, bindings created under the old profile may need to be refreshed.

### `selector_rule_version`

This version tracks the reconciliation selector rules. These rules determine the conditions under which reconciliation is triggered (for example, "reconcile when the VP contains a PID credential but no institutional affiliation"). When the rules change, existing bindings may have been created under different triggering conditions and may need re-evaluation.

### `material_fingerprints`

This is a hash of the material inputs (attribute values, rule configurations, profile settings) that were used to create the binding. Unlike the version fields, which track configuration changes, the fingerprint detects changes in the actual data. If the same reconciliation were performed today with the same configuration but different input data (because the user's institutional attributes have changed), the fingerprint would differ.

When any of these versions or the fingerprint do not match the current configuration or expected values, the binding is considered stale. Stale bindings continue to function -- the cached attributes are still served to avoid disrupting the user experience -- but the system flags the binding for refresh on the next reconciliation opportunity. This lazy refresh approach avoids the need for bulk re-materialization when configurations change.

---

# Key Rotation

# Key Rotation

Cryptographic key rotation is essential for security compliance and incident response. Regulatory frameworks such as eIDAS and institutional security policies typically mandate periodic key rotation, and the ability to rotate keys immediately is critical when a key compromise is suspected. The challenge with HMAC keys is that changing the key changes every hash -- which would break all existing lookups if handled naively. A wallet user who was registered under Key A version 1 would become invisible to lookups using Key A version 2, because the HMAC of the same input with a different key produces a completely different hash.

The portal solves this with a dual-read mechanism that enables zero-downtime key rotation without requiring a bulk migration before the new key can be activated. The moment a new key is configured, the system begins using it for all new writes while continuing to recognize records created with the previous key.

## The Dual-Read Mechanism

During a rotation window, the system maintains both the current key and the previous key in its configuration. The dual-read mechanism works as follows:

**For writes**, only the new key is used. Any new `identity_match` records or `identity_link_binding` records are created with hashes computed using the current key version. This ensures that the system is always moving forward -- no new records are created with the old key.

**For reads**, the system attempts the current key first, then falls back to the previous key:

```text
1. Receive external identifier (e.g., wallet public key fingerprint)
2. Compute hash_current = HMAC-SHA256(identifier, current_key)
3. Query database: SELECT * FROM identity_match
     WHERE identifier_hash = hash_current AND ...
4. If found -> return result (current key match)
5. If NOT found -> compute hash_previous = HMAC-SHA256(identifier, previous_key)
6. Query database: SELECT * FROM identity_match
     WHERE identifier_hash = hash_previous AND ...
7. If found via old key -> return result
   AND optionally re-hash with new key on next write operation
8. If neither found -> identifier is genuinely unknown
```

This approach has several important properties:

- **Zero downtime.** The moment the new key is deployed, the system is fully functional. There is no migration window during which some users cannot authenticate.
- **No bulk re-hashing required upfront.** Existing records are migrated lazily as they are accessed, or proactively through an optional background migration job. Either way, the system works correctly throughout.
- **Transparent to users.** A returning wallet user experiences no difference whether their record has been migrated to the new key or is still being resolved through the dual-read fallback.
- **Bounded performance impact.** The worst case is two database queries instead of one, but this only affects records that have not yet been migrated. As migration progresses, more lookups are resolved on the first query.

## Key Version Tracking

Every record in the matching system stores the version of the key that was used to create its hashes and ciphertexts. This version tracking is what makes targeted migration possible -- the system knows exactly which records need processing without scanning every row.

The following version fields are maintained:

- **`identity_match.hash_key_version`**: Records which HMAC key version produced the `identifier_hash` in the match record. During dual-read, if a match is found via the previous key (step 7 above), this field's value will be less than the current key version.

- **`identity_link_binding.holder_hash_key_version`**: Records which version of Key A was used to compute the `holder_identifier_hash`. Independent of the match record's key version because the binding may have been created or migrated at a different time.

- **`identity_link_binding.institution_hash_key_version`**: Records which version of Key B was used to compute the `institution_identifier_hash`. Key A and Key B can be rotated independently, so their version tracking is separate.

- **`identity_link_binding.encrypted_institution_id_key_version`**: Records which version of Key C was used to encrypt the `encrypted_institution_id` and the `persisted_attributes_envelope`. Unlike HMAC key rotation (which changes lookup hashes), encryption key rotation requires decrypting with the old key and re-encrypting with the new key.

## Configuration

Key rotation is configured through the application's YAML configuration. The configuration supports both the current key and the previous key for each of the three key types.

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    identity:
      reconciliation:
        crypto:
          # Key A - Holder HMAC key
          holder-hmac-key-alias: "reconciliation:holder"
          holder-hmac-key-version: 2
          # Previous Key A for dual-read during rotation
          previous-holder-hmac-key-alias: "reconciliation:holder-v1"
          previous-holder-hmac-key-version: 1

          # Key B - Institution HMAC key
          institution-hmac-key-alias: "reconciliation:institution"
          institution-hmac-key-version: 2
          previous-institution-hmac-key-alias: "reconciliation:institution-v1"
          previous-institution-hmac-key-version: 1

          # Key C - Encryption key
          encryption-key-alias: "reconciliation:encryption"
          encryption-key-version: 2
          previous-encryption-key-alias: "reconciliation:encryption-v1"
          previous-encryption-key-version: 1
```

Each key type has four configuration properties:

- **`*-key-alias`**: The alias of the current key in the KMS or HSM. This is the key used for all new writes.
- **`*-key-version`**: The version number of the current key. This value is stored in every new record's key version field.
- **`previous-*-key-alias`**: The alias of the previous key. This key is used only for dual-read fallback during the rotation window. When set to null or omitted, dual-read is disabled for this key type.
- **`previous-*-key-version`**: The version number of the previous key. Used to identify which records in the database were created with this key and need migration.

The three key types (A, B, C) can be rotated independently. For example, you can rotate Key A (holder HMAC) without touching Key B (institution HMAC) or Key C (encryption). This is useful when only one key type is affected by a policy change or security incident.

## Migration Job

While the dual-read mechanism ensures that the system works correctly without any migration, it is advisable to proactively migrate all records to the new key. This eliminates the dual-read fallback overhead and allows the previous key to be deactivated.

The migration job is a background process that iterates through all records with old key versions and re-hashes or re-encrypts them with the current key. Progress is tracked in the `key_migration_history` table.

### Migration Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    identity:
      reconciliation:
        migration:
          enabled: true
          target-version: 2
          operations: FULL    # Migrate all record types
          batch-size: 100     # Records per batch
```

- **`enabled`**: Whether the migration job is active. Set to `true` to start migration, `false` to pause or disable.
- **`target-version`**: The key version to migrate to. Must match the current key version in the crypto configuration.
- **`operations`**: Which record types to migrate. `FULL` migrates both `identity_match` and `identity_link_binding` records. Other options may include `MATCH_ONLY` or `BINDING_ONLY` for targeted migration.
- **`batch-size`**: The number of records processed in each batch. Smaller batches reduce the impact on database performance but increase the total migration time. A value of 100 is a reasonable default for most deployments.

### Migration Process

For each batch, the migration job performs the following steps:

1. **Select records** with key versions older than the target version.
2. **For HMAC fields** (in `identity_match` and `identity_link_binding`): Decrypt the original identifier using the old key is not possible (HMAC is one-way), so the migration job must have access to a mapping or must re-derive the hash. In practice, the system re-hashes from the original identifier only if it is available. For records where the original identifier is not available, the record is flagged and the dual-read mechanism continues to handle lookups.
3. **For AES fields** (in `identity_link_binding`): Decrypt the ciphertext using the old Key C, then re-encrypt with the new Key C. Update the `encrypted_institution_id_key_version` field.
4. **Update key version fields** on all migrated records.
5. **Record progress** in `key_migration_history`, including `records_processed`, `records_failed`, and `records_skipped`.

### Migration History

The `key_migration_history` table tracks the progress and outcome of each migration run:

| Field | Description |
|-------|-------------|
| `id` | Primary key for the migration run |
| `tenant_id` | Which tenant this migration run applies to |
| `source_version` | The key version being migrated from |
| `target_version` | The key version being migrated to |
| `records_processed` | Number of records successfully migrated |
| `records_failed` | Number of records that failed migration (logged for investigation) |
| `records_skipped` | Number of records skipped (e.g., already at target version) |
| `started_at` | When the migration run began |
| `completed_at` | When the migration run finished |
| `status` | Current status: `RUNNING`, `COMPLETED`, `FAILED`, `PAUSED` |

## Rotation Procedure

The following step-by-step procedure describes how to perform a key rotation in a production environment.

### Step 1: Generate New Key

Generate a new cryptographic key in the KMS or HSM under a new alias. For example, if the current Key A alias is `reconciliation:holder` (version 1), create a new key under `reconciliation:holder` (version 2) or a new alias like `reconciliation:holder-v2`, depending on the KMS's key versioning model.

Verify that the new key is functional by performing a test HMAC operation (for Keys A and B) or a test encrypt/decrypt round-trip (for Key C).

### Step 2: Update Configuration

Update the application configuration to set the new key as primary and the old key as previous:

- Set `holder-hmac-key-version: 2` (or the appropriate new version number)
- Set `previous-holder-hmac-key-alias` and `previous-holder-hmac-key-version` to the old key's values
- Repeat for Key B and Key C if they are also being rotated

### Step 3: Deploy

Deploy the updated configuration. The moment the new configuration is active, dual-read begins. All new records are created with the new key. Lookups for existing records fall back to the previous key transparently.

There is no downtime during this step. The deployment can be a rolling update, a blue-green deployment, or any other deployment strategy -- the dual-read mechanism is stateless and works correctly even if different application instances are temporarily running different configurations.

### Step 4: Run Migration Job (Optional but Recommended)

Enable the migration job to proactively migrate all existing records to the new key version. Monitor the `key_migration_history` table to track progress.

```yaml
migration:
  enabled: true
  target-version: 2
  operations: FULL
  batch-size: 100
```

The migration job can run concurrently with normal operations. It does not lock records or block lookups. If a record is accessed during migration, the dual-read mechanism handles it transparently.

### Step 5: Monitor Completion

Monitor the `key_migration_history` table until the migration run reports `status: COMPLETED` with zero `records_failed`. If any records failed, investigate the failures and re-run the migration for those records.

You can also query the database directly to verify that no records remain with the old key version:

```sql
SELECT COUNT(*) FROM identity_match
WHERE hash_key_version < 2 AND deleted_at IS NULL;
```

### Step 6: Remove Previous Key Configuration

Once all records have been migrated, remove the `previous-*` configuration entries. This disables dual-read, which means the system will no longer attempt fallback lookups with the old key. Deploy this configuration change.

### Step 7: Deactivate Old Key

Deactivate (or schedule for deletion) the old key in the KMS or HSM. This is the final step -- once the old key is deactivated, it cannot be used for any operation. Ensure that the migration is fully complete before taking this step, as it is irreversible.

## Inactive Key Cleanup

Records that have not been accessed within the inactivity threshold (default 2 years) and still use the old key version are candidates for purge rather than migration. There is no value in migrating a record to the new key if the record is going to be deleted for inactivity anyway.

The `findInactiveOldKeyMatches` query identifies these records:

```sql
SELECT * FROM identity_match
WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id
  AND hash_key_version < :target_version
  AND last_used_at < :inactivity_threshold
  AND deleted_at IS NULL;
```

These records are soft-deleted with `deletion_reason = 'inactivity'` rather than being migrated. This reduces the workload of the migration job and ensures that inactive records do not consume migration resources. The soft-deleted records follow the standard retention and hard-delete lifecycle.

## ReconciliationCryptoService Interface

The cryptographic operations for key rotation are encapsulated in the `ReconciliationCryptoService` interface. This interface abstracts the underlying KMS or HSM, providing a clean API for the matching logic.

```kotlin
interface ReconciliationCryptoService {
    /**
     * Compute HMAC-SHA256 of the given value using the current key.
     * Returns the hex-encoded hash string.
     */
    suspend fun hmacHash(value: String): String

    /**
     * Encrypt the given plaintext using AES-256-GCM with the current Key C.
     * Returns the Base64-encoded ciphertext (including nonce and auth tag).
     */
    suspend fun encrypt(plaintext: String): String

    /**
     * Decrypt the given ciphertext using AES-256-GCM.
     * Automatically detects the key version from the ciphertext envelope
     * and uses the appropriate key (current or previous).
     */
    suspend fun decrypt(ciphertext: String): String

    /**
     * Compute HMAC-SHA256 of the given value using the PREVIOUS key.
     * Returns null if no previous key is configured (dual-read is not active).
     * Used by the dual-read mechanism to attempt fallback lookups.
     */
    suspend fun hmacHashWithPrevious(value: String): String?
}
```

The key method for dual-read support is `hmacHashWithPrevious`. When this method returns `null`, it signals that no previous key is configured and dual-read is not active -- the system should not attempt a fallback lookup. When it returns a hash string, the system uses that hash for the fallback query.

The `decrypt` method is designed to handle both current and previous key versions transparently. The ciphertext envelope includes metadata that identifies which key version was used for encryption, allowing the method to select the correct key without the caller needing to specify a version. This simplifies the calling code: it simply calls `decrypt` and the service handles key version detection internally.

This interface is implemented by a KMS-backed service in production and by an in-memory service in tests. The in-memory implementation uses the same algorithms (HMAC-SHA256 and AES-256-GCM) with locally generated keys, ensuring that the test behavior matches production behavior without requiring access to a real KMS.

---

# Identity Reconciliation

# Identity Reconciliation

Reconciliation answers the fundamental question: **"What should the system do when this user presents their wallet credentials?"** The answer depends on context. Is the holder key already known? Has the binding expired? Does the credential match any rules? The reconciliation engine is a policy-driven decision system that evaluates these conditions and produces a plan of action -- without any hard-coded business logic.

Every authentication attempt that involves a verifiable credential passes through the reconciliation engine. The engine inspects the current state of the world -- the tenant configuration, the entry point that triggered the flow, the credential presented, and any existing bindings in the database -- and decides what to do next. The output is always one of five possible plans, each representing a distinct operational path. This design makes the system predictable, auditable, and configurable per tenant without touching application code.

## Why Reconciliation Exists

A wallet credential -- specifically, a trusted eduID credential from a verified issuer -- proves the holder possesses a cryptographic key and carries identity attributes like the eduPersonPrincipalName. However, the institution's backend systems also need the institution-scoped eduID, which is only available through SURFconext federation. The wallet credential and the institution-scoped identifier live in fundamentally different namespaces with no inherent connection between them.

It is important to understand that the system does not accept arbitrary credentials. The DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) configuration defines exactly which credential types and issuers are trusted for reconciliation. Only a valid eduID credential from a trusted issuer triggers the matching and reconciliation process. This trust boundary is the first line of defense.

Reconciliation bridges the gap between the wallet credential and the institutional identity by establishing a trusted link -- once, securely, and with user consent. The first time a user presents their eduID credential from their wallet, the system verifies the credential, extracts the holder key and credential attributes, and then asks the user to authenticate with their institutional account (via an OIDC redirect to SURFconext). This one-time ceremony provides the institution-scoped eduID from SURFconext and creates a cryptographic binding: an HMAC-hashed association between the wallet holder key and the institutional identity, stored in the database with an encrypted attribute envelope containing both the wallet-sourced and OIDC-sourced attributes.

After reconciliation, the link persists in the database, and all future wallet logins resolve instantly. The system looks up the holder key hash, finds the existing binding, decrypts the attribute envelope, and produces an STS token -- all without any user interaction or external calls. This "fast path" is the steady-state experience for returning users, and it completes in milliseconds.

## Decision Tree

The following diagram illustrates the reconciliation decision tree. Each branch corresponds to a different evaluation of the input context, and each leaf corresponds to one of the five reconciliation plans.

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-reconciliation-decision-tree.svg" alt="Decision Tree" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

The decision tree is evaluated top-down. The first condition that matches determines the plan. If no condition matches, the engine falls through to the default behavior, which is typically `FailClosed` (deny access) unless a catch-all rule has been configured.

## Five Reconciliation Plans

The reconciliation engine produces exactly one of five plans. Each plan is a sealed interface variant -- there are no other possibilities. This exhaustive enumeration makes the system's behavior fully predictable and testable.

### SkipReconciliation

No action is needed. This plan is used when reconciliation is disabled for the current tenant or not applicable for the entry point type. The authentication completes without identity matching, and the downstream system receives whatever claims were available from the credential alone. This plan is appropriate for entry points where the wallet credential is used purely for attribute presentation rather than identity binding (for example, age verification scenarios where no institutional identity is required).

### UseExistingBinding

A valid, non-expired binding already exists for this holder key. The system uses the cached binding directly, decrypts the attribute envelope, and proceeds to STS token generation. This is the "fast path" -- the most common case for returning users after their initial reconciliation. No external calls are made, no user interaction is required, and the entire operation completes from local database state. The binding's `last_used_at` timestamp is updated to track activity and support inactivity-based expiration policies.

### RunIdv (Identity Verification)

The holder key is unknown -- no binding exists in the database for this wallet. The system initiates an identity verification flow: typically, an OIDC redirect to SURFconext where the user authenticates with their institutional credentials. This is the one-time reconciliation ceremony that happens on a user's first wallet login.

The flow creates a reconciliation session to track the OIDC state (PKCE verifier, nonce, state parameter), redirects the user to the identity provider, receives the callback with an authorization code, exchanges it for tokens, extracts the institutional identity claims, and creates both an `identity_match` record (the HMAC-hashed lookup key) and an `identity_link_binding` record (the encrypted attribute envelope). After this ceremony, all subsequent logins for the same wallet key follow the `UseExistingBinding` fast path.

### StepUp

A binding exists but does not meet the current assurance requirements. The user needs to re-verify at a higher assurance level. This plan is similar to `RunIdv` in its mechanics -- it creates a reconciliation session and redirects to an identity provider -- but it is triggered by assurance policy rather than an unknown key.

Step-up scenarios arise when institutional policy changes after the initial binding was created. For example, if an institution raises its minimum assurance level from "low" to "substantial," existing bindings created at the "low" level would trigger `StepUp` on the next authentication attempt. The user re-authenticates at the higher level, and the binding is updated with the new assurance metadata.

### FailClosed

No matching rule applies, and the system is configured to deny access rather than allow unreconciled authentication. This is the safe default when no selector rule matches the input context. The authentication attempt is rejected with an appropriate error, and no binding is created or used.

`FailClosed` is a deliberate security design choice. In a defense-in-depth configuration, the lowest-priority selector rule should always be a catch-all that produces `FailClosed`. This ensures that unanticipated combinations of tenant, entry point, credential type, and holder state are denied rather than silently allowed.

## How It Works

The reconciliation engine takes an input context and evaluates it against configured selector rules. The process is deterministic: the same input always produces the same plan.

**Input context:**

- **Tenant ID** -- which institution or organizational unit initiated the authentication
- **Entry point type** -- how the authentication was triggered (e.g., `oid4vp` for wallet presentation, `oidc` for traditional login)
- **Credential types** -- which verifiable credential types are present in the VP (Verifiable Presentation)
- **Credential issuers** -- which issuers signed the credentials
- **Known holder state** -- the result of the database lookup for the holder key (matched, not found, expired, etc.)
- **Extracted attributes** -- claim values from the credential that can be used in predicate matching

**Evaluation process:**

1. **Filter** -- remove all disabled rules from consideration
2. **Match** -- for each remaining rule, check all non-null conditions against the input context; a null condition matches anything, but all non-null conditions must match for the rule to qualify
3. **Sort** -- order qualifying rules by priority (descending), with rule ID as an alphabetical tiebreaker
4. **Select** -- the first qualifying rule wins; its plan template becomes the reconciliation plan
5. **Default** -- if no rule qualifies, the engine returns null, which the caller interprets as `FailClosed`

All decisions are data-driven configuration, not code. Different tenants can have different rules. Rules can be updated, reordered, enabled, or disabled without redeployment. The rule evaluation logic itself is fixed and well-tested; the variability lives entirely in the rule definitions.

## Further Reading

- **[Selector Rules](./selector-rules)** -- how to define, configure, and extend the declarative rule engine that drives reconciliation decisions
- **[Material Profiles](./material-profiles)** -- recipes for constructing identity link bindings, controlling which identifiers are hashed and which attributes are encrypted
- **[Reconciliation Sessions](./reconciliation-session)** -- the OIDC-based session lifecycle for identity verification flows, including PKCE, state management, and token exchange

---

# Selector Rules

# Selector Rules

Selector rules are the reconciliation engine's decision table. Each rule specifies a set of conditions and a plan to execute when those conditions match. Rules are evaluated in priority order, and the first matching rule determines the outcome. This declarative approach means reconciliation behavior can be changed entirely through configuration -- no code changes, no redeployment.

The rule engine is intentionally simple. There are no nested conditionals, no scripting languages, and no dynamic evaluation. Each rule is a flat list of conditions with AND semantics: every non-null condition must match for the rule to fire. This simplicity makes rules easy to reason about, easy to audit, and easy to test. If you can read a table, you can understand the reconciliation policy.

## Rule Structure

Every selector rule consists of an identifier, an enabled flag, a priority, a set of optional conditions, and a plan template. Conditions that are not specified (null) are treated as wildcards -- they match any value. Only conditions that are explicitly set participate in matching.

| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | String | Unique rule identifier (e.g., `"default-surf"`). Used for logging, auditing, and as a tiebreaker when two rules share the same priority. |
| `enabled` | Boolean | Whether this rule is active. Disabled rules are skipped during evaluation, allowing rules to be temporarily deactivated without deletion. |
| `priority` | Integer | Evaluation order. Higher values are evaluated first. When two rules match, the one with the higher priority wins. If priorities are equal, the rule ID is used as an alphabetical tiebreaker. |
| `tenants` | List&lt;String&gt;? | If set, this rule only applies to the listed tenant IDs. If null, the rule applies to all tenants. Use this to create tenant-specific reconciliation policies. |
| `entryPointTypes` | List&lt;String&gt;? | If set, this rule only applies to the listed entry point types (e.g., `"oid4vp"`, `"oidc"`). If null, the rule applies regardless of how the authentication was initiated. |
| `triggerTypes` | List&lt;String&gt;? | If set, this rule only applies when the evaluation was triggered by one of the listed trigger types. Trigger types represent the reason the reconciliation engine was invoked. |
| `credentialTypes` | List&lt;String&gt;? | If set, the Verifiable Presentation must contain at least one credential of a listed type. Used to differentiate reconciliation behavior based on the kind of credential presented. |
| `issuers` | List&lt;String&gt;? | If set, at least one credential in the VP must be issued by a listed issuer. Used to apply different reconciliation policies based on credential provenance. |
| `knownHolderStates` | List&lt;String&gt;? | If set, the holder key's database lookup result must be one of the listed states. This is the most commonly used condition, as it determines whether the user is new, returning, or expired. |
| `attributePredicates` | Map? | If set, attribute values extracted from the credential must satisfy the specified predicates. Used for fine-grained matching based on claim values (e.g., only match credentials where `assurance_level` equals `"high"`). |
| `plan` | PlanTemplate | The reconciliation plan to execute when this rule matches. Specifies the plan type and any additional parameters (provider ID, material profile ID, etc.). |

## Evaluation Algorithm

The evaluation algorithm is deterministic and straightforward. Given an input context, the engine applies the following steps:

### Step 1: Filter disabled rules

All rules with `enabled: false` are removed from consideration. This is a simple boolean check that runs before any condition evaluation.

### Step 2: Match conditions

For each remaining rule, the engine checks every non-null condition against the input context. The matching semantics are:

- **Null condition**: matches anything. If a rule does not specify `tenants`, it matches all tenants. If it does not specify `credentialTypes`, it matches all credential types. And so on.
- **Non-null condition**: must match. For list-type conditions (tenants, credentialTypes, issuers, etc.), the input value must be present in the list. For map-type conditions (attributePredicates), all predicates must be satisfied.
- **AND semantics**: ALL non-null conditions on a rule must match for the rule to be considered a candidate. If even one non-null condition fails, the entire rule is rejected.

This means a rule with no conditions set (all nulls) matches everything -- it is a universal catch-all. A rule with multiple conditions set is highly specific -- it only matches when all conditions are simultaneously satisfied.

### Step 3: Sort candidates

All matching rules are sorted by priority in descending order (highest priority first). If two rules share the same priority, their IDs are compared alphabetically in ascending order as a tiebreaker. This ensures deterministic ordering even when priorities collide.

### Step 4: Select the winner

The first rule in the sorted list is selected. Its plan template becomes the reconciliation plan for this evaluation. No further rules are examined.

### Step 5: Handle no match

If no rules matched (the candidate list is empty), the engine returns null. The calling code interprets a null result as `FailClosed` -- the authentication is denied. This fail-safe behavior ensures that a misconfigured rule set (or an empty rule set) never accidentally permits access.

## KnownHolderState Values

The `knownHolderStates` condition is the most frequently used discriminator in selector rules. It reflects the result of the database lookup that runs before reconciliation evaluation begins.

| State | Description |
|---|---|
| `MATCHED_HOLDER_KEY` | The database contains an active, non-expired `identity_link_binding` for this holder key hash. The binding was found via a KEY-type `identity_match` record. This is the normal state for returning users. |
| `MATCHED_CLAIM_TUPLE` | The database matched via a composite attribute hash (CLAIM_TUPLE-type `identity_match`) rather than the holder key directly. This occurs when the wallet key has changed but the user's attribute combination still maps to an existing binding. |
| `NOT_FOUND` | No existing binding was found for any identifier associated with this holder. This is the state for first-time users who have never completed reconciliation. |
| `EXPIRED_BINDING` | A binding exists for this holder key, but it has exceeded the configured inactivity threshold (`binding-inactivity-threshold`). The binding's `last_used_at` timestamp is too far in the past. The binding still exists in the database but is not considered valid for authentication. |

## Portal's Default Rule Configuration

The portal ships with a minimal rule configuration that is sufficient for the proof-of-concept deployment:

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    identity:
      reconciliation:
        rule-version: "2026-03-24"
        selector-rules:
          - id: "default-surf"
            enabled: true
            priority: 0
            plan:
              type: "RUN_IDV"
              provider-id: "surf"
              material-profile-id: "holder-only-v1"
```

This single rule means: **"For any authentication attempt, regardless of tenant, entry point, credential type, or holder state, run identity verification via the SURF provider using the holder-only-v1 material profile."**

Since no conditions are set (no `tenants`, no `credentialTypes`, no `knownHolderStates`, etc.), this rule matches everything. It sits at priority 0, which is irrelevant when there is only one rule. The `rule-version` field is a metadata tag for tracking configuration changes -- it does not affect evaluation.

This configuration is sufficient for the PoC because:

- There is only one reconciliation path (SURFconext via OIDC).
- The `UseExistingBinding` fast path is handled by the engine's built-in binding lookup, which runs before selector rule evaluation. If a valid binding exists, reconciliation is skipped entirely before any rule is consulted.
- There are no tenant-specific policies, no credential-type-specific behavior, and no assurance-level requirements.

## Extended Rule Examples

In a production deployment, you would typically configure multiple rules with different priorities to handle various scenarios. Here is an example of a defense-in-depth rule set:

```yaml
selector-rules:
  - id: "known-holder-accept"
    enabled: true
    priority: 100
    knownHolderStates: ["MATCHED_HOLDER_KEY"]
    plan:
      type: "USE_EXISTING_BINDING"

  - id: "expired-step-up"
    enabled: true
    priority: 75
    knownHolderStates: ["EXPIRED_BINDING"]
    plan:
      type: "STEP_UP"
      provider-id: "surf"
      material-profile-id: "holder-only-v1"

  - id: "new-holder-idv"
    enabled: true
    priority: 50
    knownHolderStates: ["NOT_FOUND"]
    plan:
      type: "RUN_IDV"
      provider-id: "surf"
      material-profile-id: "holder-only-v1"

  - id: "fallback-deny"
    enabled: true
    priority: 0
    plan:
      type: "FAIL_CLOSED"
```

### Priority ordering explained

The priority values determine evaluation order:

1. **`known-holder-accept` (priority 100)** -- Evaluated first. If the holder key is already known and the binding is active, accept immediately. This is the fast path for returning users. No external calls, no user interaction.

2. **`expired-step-up` (priority 75)** -- Evaluated second. If the holder key is known but the binding has expired due to inactivity, require the user to re-verify. The `STEP_UP` plan creates a reconciliation session and redirects to SURFconext, similar to initial IDV. After successful re-verification, the existing binding is refreshed.

3. **`new-holder-idv` (priority 50)** -- Evaluated third. If no binding exists at all, this is a new user. Run the full identity verification flow to create the initial binding.

4. **`fallback-deny` (priority 0)** -- Evaluated last. This catch-all rule has no conditions, so it matches anything that was not caught by the higher-priority rules. Any unanticipated holder state (such as `MATCHED_CLAIM_TUPLE` without a specific rule) is denied. This defense-in-depth approach ensures no unanticipated case slips through.

### Tenant-specific overrides

You can layer tenant-specific rules on top of the default set:

```yaml
selector-rules:
  - id: "tenant-a-skip"
    enabled: true
    priority: 200
    tenants: ["tenant-a"]
    plan:
      type: "SKIP_RECONCILIATION"

  # ... default rules at lower priorities ...
```

This adds a rule at priority 200 that matches only `tenant-a` and skips reconciliation entirely. Because it has the highest priority, it is evaluated before any other rule, and `tenant-a` authentication attempts never reach the lower-priority rules. All other tenants are unaffected and continue to use the default rule set.

---

# Material Profiles

# Material Profiles

A material profile defines the recipe for constructing an identity link binding during reconciliation. It specifies which identifiers to hash and store (the "materials"), which attributes to persist in the encrypted envelope, and how to merge attributes from different sources. Think of it as a template that controls what data gets captured during the one-time reconciliation event.

Material profiles are referenced by selector rules. When a rule's plan is `RUN_IDV` or `STEP_UP`, it includes a `material-profile-id` that points to the profile to use. This indirection means you can change what data gets captured without changing the rules themselves, and you can share a single profile across multiple rules.

## Material Types

Four types of materials can be specified in a profile. Each material type produces a different kind of `identity_match` record in the database, representing a different lookup path to the same `identity_link_binding`.

### HolderKeyMaterial

Hashes the wallet holder's public key fingerprint using Key A (the holder HMAC key). The fingerprint is computed as the JWK thumbprint ([RFC 7638](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7638)) of the holder key extracted from the Verifiable Presentation's proof. The resulting HMAC hash is stored as a KEY-type `identity_match` record.

This is the primary lookup path for wallet authentication. When a user presents their wallet, the system computes the JWK thumbprint of the holder key, HMACs it with Key A, and searches for a matching `identity_match` record. If found, the associated `identity_link_binding` is retrieved and used.

The JWK thumbprint is a deterministic, canonical representation of the public key that is independent of key serialization format. This means the same physical key always produces the same thumbprint regardless of how it is encoded in the VP.

### ProviderSubjectMaterial

Hashes the OIDC subject identifier (the `sub` claim or another configured claim) from the reconciliation provider's response using Key B (the institution HMAC key). The resulting hash is stored as a SUBJECT_ID-type `identity_match` record.

This material enables reverse lookup: given an institutional identifier, find the associated wallet binding. The external REST API uses this path to look up identities by institutional ID hash. Without this material, lookups can only go in one direction (wallet key to identity). With it, lookups are bidirectional (wallet key to identity, and institutional ID to identity).

The choice of which claim to hash is configured on the reconciliation provider via the `identifier-attribute-name` field. For SURFconext, this is typically the `sub` claim, which is a persistent, pairwise pseudonymous identifier unique to each user-client combination.

### AttributeTupleMaterial

Creates a composite hash from multiple claim values extracted from the OIDC provider's response. For example, a hash of `given_name + family_name + date_of_birth` could be used as a composite lookup key. The resulting hash is stored as a CLAIM_TUPLE-type `identity_match` record.

This material is useful for matching when no unique single identifier exists, or as a fallback when the primary identifier changes. For example, if a user's institutional `sub` claim changes (perhaps due to a migration), the attribute tuple can still match them to their existing binding.

The composite hash is order-dependent: the claim values are concatenated in the order specified in the profile, separated by a delimiter, and then HMAC-hashed. Changing the order or adding/removing claims produces a different hash, so the tuple definition should be treated as immutable once bindings have been created with it.

### CredentialAttributeTupleMaterial

Similar to AttributeTupleMaterial but uses claims extracted from the wallet credential itself rather than from the OIDC provider's response. This is useful when the wallet credential contains identifying attributes that should serve as an additional lookup path.

For example, if the wallet credential includes a student number or national identifier, a CredentialAttributeTupleMaterial can hash that value to create a lookup path from the credential attribute to the binding. This enables scenarios where the wallet key has changed (e.g., the user reinstalled their wallet app) but the credential still contains the same identifying attributes.

## Portal's Default Profile

The portal ships with a minimal material profile that creates a single lookup path:

```yaml
material-profiles:
  - id: "holder-only-v1"
    version: "1"
    materials:
      - type: "holder_key_fp"
        hmac-domain: "holder"
```

This profile creates a single `identity_match` record of type KEY, derived from the wallet holder key fingerprint hashed with the "holder" HMAC domain (Key A).

What this means in practice:

- **The system can look up an identity from a wallet key.** When a user presents their wallet, the holder key fingerprint is hashed and used to find the binding. This is the primary authentication path.
- **The system cannot look up an identity from an institutional ID alone.** There is no `ProviderSubjectMaterial`, so the reverse lookup path does not exist. The external REST API's "lookup by institutional ID" endpoint will not find any matches.
- **There is no fallback matching.** If the user's wallet key changes (e.g., they reinstall their wallet app), the system will treat them as a new user and require fresh reconciliation.

This is sufficient for the PoC, where all lookups originate from wallet authentication and there are no external API consumers that need reverse lookup. For production deployments, a more complete profile is recommended.

## Extended Profile Example

A production-ready profile might include multiple materials for bidirectional lookup:

```yaml
material-profiles:
  - id: "holder-plus-institution-v1"
    version: "1"
    materials:
      - type: "holder_key_fp"
        hmac-domain: "holder"
      - type: "provider_subject"
        hmac-domain: "institution"
        claim-name: "sub"
```

This profile creates two `identity_match` records for each binding:

1. **KEY type** -- from the holder key fingerprint, hashed with Key A ("holder" domain). Used for wallet-initiated lookups during authentication.
2. **SUBJECT_ID type** -- from the OIDC provider's `sub` claim, hashed with Key B ("institution" domain). Used for institution-initiated lookups via the external REST API.

With both materials in place, the identity graph supports bidirectional traversal:

- **Wallet to identity**: User presents wallet credential, system hashes holder key with Key A, finds KEY-type match, retrieves binding.
- **Institution to identity**: External system provides institutional ID, system hashes it with Key B, finds SUBJECT_ID-type match, retrieves binding.

The two HMAC domains (Key A and Key B) are deliberately separate. Even if one key is compromised, the attacker cannot use it to forge lookups in the other direction. This key separation is a core privacy design principle.

## Attribute Rules

Attribute rules control what gets persisted in the encrypted binding envelope and what gets projected into the STS token. They are defined within the material profile and apply during the reconciliation ceremony when claims are collected from both the wallet credential and the OIDC provider.

```yaml
attribute-rules:
  - canonical-name: "eduid"
    merge-mode: "OIDC_ONLY"
    persist: true
    project: true
    source-aliases:
      - "eduid"

  - canonical-name: "eduperson_principal_name"
    merge-mode: "OIDC_WINS"
    persist: true
    project: true
    source-aliases:
      - "eduperson_principal_name"
      - "urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:eduPersonPrincipalName"

  - canonical-name: "given_name"
    merge-mode: "OIDC_WINS"
    persist: false
    project: true
```

Each attribute rule has the following fields:

### merge-mode

Determines how to resolve conflicts when both the wallet credential and the OIDC provider supply a value for the same canonical attribute.

- **`OIDC_WINS`** -- Use the OIDC provider's value if available. If the OIDC provider does not supply the attribute, fall back to the wallet credential's value. This is the most common mode, as institutional identity providers are generally considered the authoritative source for identity attributes.
- **`WALLET_ONLY`** -- Only use the value from the wallet credential. Ignore the OIDC provider's value entirely, even if available. Use this for attributes that are specifically attested by the credential issuer and should not be overridden by the identity provider.
- **`OIDC_ONLY`** -- Only use the value from the OIDC provider. Never source this attribute from the wallet credential. Use this for institution-specific identifiers (like `eduid`) that only the identity provider can authoritatively supply.

### persist

Whether to include this attribute in the encrypted binding envelope that is written to the database. Persisted attributes are available on subsequent authentications without requiring a fresh OIDC call. Set to `true` for attributes that are needed on the fast path (UseExistingBinding) and `false` for attributes that are only needed during the initial reconciliation.

Consider data minimization when deciding what to persist. Every persisted attribute increases the sensitivity of the encrypted envelope. Only persist attributes that are genuinely needed for subsequent authentications.

### project

Whether to include this attribute in the STS token claims that are made available to downstream systems (relying parties). An attribute can be projected without being persisted (it is included in the token during the reconciliation flow but not stored for future use) or persisted without being projected (stored for internal use but not exposed to relying parties).

### source-aliases

A list of alternative claim names from different providers that map to this canonical attribute name. During reconciliation, the system collects claims from both the wallet credential and the OIDC provider. These claims may use different names for the same semantic attribute. Source aliases handle this normalization.

## Canonical Attribute Normalization

Different identity providers and credential issuers use different claim names for the same data. This is a practical reality of federated identity: OIDC providers use one naming convention, SAML providers use URN-based names, and wallet credentials may use yet another vocabulary.

Source aliases handle this mapping transparently. For example, the canonical attribute `eduperson_principal_name` might arrive as:

- `eduperson_principal_name` from a modern OIDC provider
- `urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:eduPersonPrincipalName` from a SAML-to-OIDC bridge
- `eppn` from a simplified claim mapping

By listing all known aliases in the `source-aliases` array, the reconciliation engine can recognize the attribute regardless of which name the provider uses. The canonical name is what gets persisted and projected -- the aliases are only used during claim collection.

This normalization happens once, during reconciliation. After that, the binding envelope contains only canonical names, and all downstream systems see a consistent attribute vocabulary.

## Version Tracking

Every material profile has a `version` field, and every `identity_link_binding` record stores the `material_profile_version` that was used when the binding was created. This enables detecting when a profile has changed since a binding was last created or refreshed.

When the reconciliation engine encounters an existing binding whose `material_profile_version` does not match the current profile's version, it knows the profile has been updated. Depending on the deployment's policy, the system can:

- **Ignore the mismatch** and continue using the existing binding as-is. The binding still works, but it may be missing materials or attributes that were added in the newer profile version.
- **Trigger re-materialization** on the next authentication. The user goes through a fresh reconciliation flow, and the binding is recreated with the new profile's materials and attribute rules. This ensures the binding is up-to-date but requires user interaction.
- **Flag the binding** for batch migration. An administrative process can identify all bindings with outdated profile versions and schedule them for re-materialization.

The version field is an opaque string -- there is no automatic comparison or ordering. It is the operator's responsibility to set a new version when the profile changes meaningfully. A common convention is to use a date string (e.g., `"2026-03-24"`) or a sequential number.

---

# Reconciliation Sessions

# Reconciliation Sessions

When the reconciliation engine decides to run IDV (identity verification), it creates a reconciliation session to manage the OIDC flow state. The session tracks the authorization parameters (PKCE code verifier, state, nonce), the redirect to the external identity provider (SURFconext), and the resulting identity claims. Sessions are short-lived (default 5 minutes) and encrypted at rest.

A reconciliation session exists for exactly one purpose: to carry state across the asynchronous OIDC authorization code flow. The flow involves a browser redirect to an external identity provider, user interaction at that provider, and a callback to the portal. The session ensures that the callback can be securely correlated with the original request and that no state is lost during the redirect.

## Session State Machine

The following diagram illustrates the session state transitions from creation through completion or failure.

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-reconciliation-session-states.svg" alt="Reconciliation Session State Machine" style={{maxWidth: '600px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

Each session passes through a well-defined sequence of states. Forward transitions are the only valid transitions -- a session never moves backward.

| State | Description |
|---|---|
| **CREATED** | Session initialized. PKCE code challenge, state parameter, and nonce have been generated. The authorization URL has been constructed but the user has not yet been redirected. |
| **REDIRECTED** | The authorization URL has been returned to the frontend, and the user's browser is being redirected to the external identity provider. The session is now waiting for the callback. |
| **CALLBACK_RECEIVED** | The identity provider has called back with an authorization code and the state parameter. The state has been validated against the session's stored value. Token exchange has not yet occurred. |
| **COMPLETED** | Token exchange succeeded. The ID token has been validated. Identity claims have been extracted. The `identity_match` and `identity_link_binding` records have been created. The resolved identity is encrypted and stored on the session. This is a terminal state. |
| **EXPIRED** | The session exceeded its TTL (default 300 seconds) without reaching COMPLETED. This typically happens when the user takes too long at the institutional login page or abandons the flow. This is a terminal state. |
| **ERROR** | An error occurred during processing. This could be a failed token exchange, an invalid ID token, a network error contacting the provider, or any other unrecoverable failure. The `error_message` field contains details. This is a terminal state. |

COMPLETED, EXPIRED, and ERROR are terminal states -- no further transitions are possible once a session reaches one of these states.

## Session Record Structure

Each reconciliation session is persisted as a database record with the following columns:

| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | TEXT (UUID) | Primary key. A randomly generated UUID that uniquely identifies this session. Used in the callback URL to correlate the response with the session. |
| `tenant_id` | TEXT | The tenant that initiated the authentication. Used for multi-tenant isolation -- sessions from one tenant cannot interfere with sessions from another. |
| `status` | TEXT | Current state of the session (CREATED, REDIRECTED, CALLBACK_RECEIVED, COMPLETED, EXPIRED, or ERROR). |
| `identifier_hash` | TEXT | HMAC hash of the authenticated user's identifier (typically the holder key fingerprint). Links the session to the wallet authentication that triggered it. |
| `identifier_type` | TEXT | Type of the identifier being reconciled (e.g., KEY for holder key, SUBJECT_ID for institutional ID). |
| `provider_id` | TEXT | Which reconciliation provider is being used (e.g., `"surf"`). References the provider configuration in the application settings. |
| `authorization_url` | TEXT | The full OIDC authorization URL with all parameters (client_id, redirect_uri, response_type, scope, code_challenge, state, nonce). This is the URL the frontend redirects the user to. |
| `state` | TEXT | The OIDC state parameter. A cryptographically random string generated for this session, used for CSRF protection. Validated when the callback is received. |
| `nonce` | TEXT | The OIDC nonce parameter. A cryptographically random string included in the authorization request and expected in the ID token. Used for replay protection. |
| `code_verifier` | TEXT | The PKCE code verifier. A cryptographically random string generated for this session. Stored encrypted in the database. Sent to the token endpoint during code exchange to prove that the caller is the same entity that initiated the authorization request. |
| `redirect_uri` | TEXT | The callback URL registered with the OIDC provider. The provider sends the authorization code to this URL after the user authenticates. |
| `token_endpoint` | TEXT | The provider's token endpoint URL, discovered from the OIDC discovery document. Used during the authorization code exchange. |
| `encrypted_identity` | TEXT | The resolved identity, encrypted with AES-256-GCM using Key C. Only populated when the session reaches COMPLETED status. Contains the merged and normalized claim set that will be used to create the identity link binding. |
| `encrypted_identity_key_version` | INTEGER | The version of Key C that was used to encrypt the `encrypted_identity` field. Enables key rotation -- the system can decrypt using the correct key version even after rotation. |
| `error_message` | TEXT | Human-readable error details. Only populated when the session reaches ERROR status. Useful for debugging but never exposed to end users. |
| `created_at` | TEXT | ISO 8601 timestamp of when the session was created. Used together with `expires_at` to determine session validity. |
| `expires_at` | TEXT | ISO 8601 timestamp of when this session expires. Computed as `created_at + TTL` (default TTL is 300 seconds). After this time, the session is considered expired and the callback will be rejected. |

## Session Lifecycle Walkthrough

The following sections walk through each phase of the session lifecycle in detail, explaining what happens at each step and why.

### Step 1: Creation (CREATED)

The Auth Bridge creates a reconciliation session when the reconciliation plan is `RunIdv` (or `StepUp`). This happens after the wallet credential has been verified and the holder key has been extracted, but before any external identity provider is contacted.

During creation, the following cryptographic parameters are generated:

- **State parameter**: A cryptographically random string (typically 32 bytes, base64url-encoded) used for CSRF protection. This value is included in the authorization URL as the `state` query parameter and is validated when the callback is received. If the callback's state does not match the session's state, the callback is rejected.
- **Nonce**: A cryptographically random string used for ID token replay protection. This value is included in the authorization URL as the `nonce` query parameter and is expected to appear in the `nonce` claim of the returned ID token. If the ID token's nonce does not match, the token is rejected.
- **PKCE code verifier**: A cryptographically random string (43-128 characters per RFC 7636) used for Proof Key for Code Exchange. The code verifier is stored (encrypted) in the session record. A SHA-256 hash of the verifier (the "code challenge") is included in the authorization URL. During token exchange, the original verifier is sent to the token endpoint, which verifies it against the stored challenge.

The provider's OIDC discovery document is fetched (or retrieved from cache) to determine the authorization endpoint and token endpoint URLs. The full authorization URL is constructed with the following parameters:

- `client_id` -- the registered client identifier for this provider
- `redirect_uri` -- the portal's callback URL
- `response_type=code` -- authorization code flow
- `scope` -- the configured scopes (e.g., `openid profile email eduid`)
- `code_challenge` -- S256 hash of the code verifier
- `code_challenge_method=S256` -- indicates PKCE with SHA-256
- `state` -- the session's state parameter
- `nonce` -- the session's nonce

### Step 2: Redirect (REDIRECTED)

The authorization URL is returned to the frontend as part of the authentication response. The frontend redirects the user's browser to this URL. At this point, control passes entirely to the external identity provider -- the portal has no visibility into what happens at the provider's login page.

The session transitions to REDIRECTED status, and the session timer is effectively running. The user must complete authentication at the identity provider and return via the callback before the session's TTL expires.

From the user's perspective, this is the moment they see their institution's login page (via SURFconext). They authenticate with their institutional credentials (username/password, multi-factor, etc.) and consent to sharing their identity attributes with the portal.

### Step 3: Callback (CALLBACK_RECEIVED)

After the user authenticates at their institution, the identity provider redirects the browser back to the portal's callback URL with two query parameters:

- `code` -- the authorization code, a one-time-use token that can be exchanged for identity tokens
- `state` -- the state parameter that was included in the original authorization URL

The Auth Bridge receives the callback and performs the following validation:

1. **State validation**: The `state` parameter from the callback is compared against the session's stored `state` value. If they do not match, the callback is rejected (this would indicate a CSRF attack or a session confusion error).
2. **Session lookup**: The session is retrieved from the database using the session ID embedded in the callback URL.
3. **Expiry check**: The session's `expires_at` timestamp is compared against the current time. If the session has expired, the callback is rejected with an appropriate error.
4. **Status check**: The session must be in REDIRECTED status. If it is already COMPLETED, EXPIRED, or ERROR, the callback is rejected (preventing replay of the authorization code).

If all validations pass, the session transitions to CALLBACK_RECEIVED and the authorization code is retained for the next step.

### Step 4: Completion (COMPLETED)

The Auth Bridge exchanges the authorization code for tokens by sending a POST request to the provider's token endpoint. The request includes:

- `grant_type=authorization_code`
- `code` -- the authorization code from the callback
- `redirect_uri` -- the same redirect URI used in the authorization request
- `client_id` -- the registered client identifier
- `client_secret` -- the client secret (retrieved from the configured secret reference)
- `code_verifier` -- the PKCE code verifier stored in the session (this proves the token request comes from the same entity that initiated the authorization)

The token endpoint responds with an access token, an ID token, and optionally a refresh token. The Auth Bridge then validates the ID token:

1. **Signature verification**: The ID token's JWS signature is verified against the provider's published JWK set (from the discovery document).
2. **Issuer validation**: The `iss` claim must match the expected issuer URL.
3. **Audience validation**: The `aud` claim must contain the portal's client ID.
4. **Expiry validation**: The `exp` claim must be in the future.
5. **Nonce validation**: The `nonce` claim must match the session's stored nonce value.

If `user-info-enabled` is true for the provider, the Auth Bridge also calls the userinfo endpoint using the access token to retrieve additional claims that may not be present in the ID token.

Claims from the ID token and userinfo response are merged and then mapped through the material profile's canonical attribute rules. The merge mode for each attribute determines which source takes precedence when both provide a value.

With the merged claim set in hand, the Auth Bridge creates the identity records:

- **identity_match records**: One for each material in the profile (e.g., a KEY-type match for the holder key fingerprint, a SUBJECT_ID-type match for the institutional sub claim).
- **identity_link_binding**: The binding record that ties the matches together, containing the encrypted attribute envelope (encrypted with Key C via AES-256-GCM).

The resolved identity is encrypted and stored in the session's `encrypted_identity` field. The session transitions to COMPLETED. From this point forward, the wallet holder key is bound to the institutional identity, and all subsequent authentications will follow the UseExistingBinding fast path.

## Session TTL

The default session TTL is 300 seconds (5 minutes), configurable via the `session-ttl-seconds` property:

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    identity:
      reconciliation:
        session-ttl-seconds: 300
```

The TTL covers the entire round-trip duration: session creation, user redirect to SURFconext, user authentication at their institution (which may involve multi-factor authentication), callback to the portal, and token exchange. If the user takes too long at the institutional login page -- perhaps they need to look up a password, complete an MFA challenge, or step away from their computer -- the session expires and they must restart the reconciliation flow.

Five minutes is generally sufficient for the round-trip, but institutions with slow MFA flows or complex authentication chains may need a longer TTL. The TTL should be kept as short as practical to limit the window for session-related attacks.

A background cleanup job runs at a configurable interval (default every 5 minutes, set via `session-cleanup.interval-minutes`) and deletes expired sessions from the database. This prevents the accumulation of abandoned sessions and reduces the database's storage footprint. The cleanup job is idempotent and safe to run concurrently across multiple application instances.

## Reconciliation Provider Configuration

Reconciliation providers define the external identity providers that can be used for identity verification. Each provider wraps an OIDC client configuration with additional reconciliation-specific settings.

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    identity:
      reconciliation:
        oidc-clients:
          surf-oidc:
            discovery-url: "https://connect.test.surfconext.nl/.well-known/openid-configuration"
            client-id-ref:
              key: "IDENTITY_RECONCILIATION_PROVIDERS_SURF_CLIENT_ID"
            client-secret-ref:
              key: "IDENTITY_RECONCILIATION_PROVIDERS_SURF_CLIENT_SECRET"
              provider-id: "env"
            scopes:
              - "openid"
              - "profile"
              - "email"
              - "eduid"
            user-info-enabled: true

        providers:
          - id: "surf"
            name: "SURFconext"
            oidc-client-id: "surf-oidc"
            identifier-attribute-name: "sub"
            enabled: true
```

### Configuration breakdown

**OIDC client (`oidc-clients.surf-oidc`)**:

- `discovery-url`: The OIDC discovery endpoint for SURFconext. The portal fetches this document to discover the authorization endpoint, token endpoint, JWK set URL, and supported features. The discovery document is cached to avoid repeated network calls.
- `client-id-ref`: A reference to the client ID. The `key` field names an environment variable that contains the actual client ID. This keeps credentials out of the configuration file.
- `client-secret-ref`: A reference to the client secret. The `provider-id: "env"` indicates that the secret is stored in an environment variable named by the `key` field. Other provider types (e.g., vault, secrets manager) could be supported.
- `scopes`: The OIDC scopes to request during the authorization flow. `openid` is mandatory. `profile` and `email` provide standard identity claims. `eduid` is a SURFconext-specific scope that provides the eduID identifier.
- `user-info-enabled`: When true, the portal calls the userinfo endpoint after token exchange to retrieve additional claims. Some providers include all claims in the ID token; others require a separate userinfo call for certain attributes.

**Provider (`providers[0]`)**:

- `id`: The provider identifier referenced by selector rules' plan templates (e.g., `provider-id: "surf"`).
- `name`: A human-readable display name for the provider.
- `oidc-client-id`: References the OIDC client configuration defined above.
- `identifier-attribute-name`: Which claim from the provider's response is used as the institutional identifier. This claim is hashed with Key B to create the SUBJECT_ID-type `identity_match` record (if the material profile includes a `provider_subject` material). For SURFconext, this is typically `"sub"`.
- `enabled`: Whether this provider is active. Disabled providers cannot be used by selector rules.

## Security Properties

Reconciliation sessions incorporate multiple layers of security to protect against common attacks on OIDC authorization code flows.

### PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange)

The code verifier is generated on the server side and stored encrypted in the session record. The code challenge (S256 hash of the verifier) is sent to the authorization endpoint. During token exchange, the original verifier is sent to the token endpoint. This prevents authorization code interception attacks: even if an attacker intercepts the authorization code from the callback URL, they cannot exchange it for tokens without the code verifier, which never leaves the server.

### State parameter (CSRF protection)

The state parameter is a cryptographically random string unique to each session. It is included in the authorization URL and validated on the callback. This prevents cross-site request forgery attacks where an attacker tricks a user's browser into completing an authorization flow initiated by the attacker. Without a matching state parameter, the callback is rejected.

### Nonce (ID token replay protection)

The nonce is a cryptographically random string included in the authorization request and expected in the returned ID token's claims. This prevents ID token replay attacks: an attacker cannot reuse an ID token from a previous session because the nonce will not match the current session's expected value.

### Session isolation

Each reconciliation session has its own state, nonce, and code verifier. There is no shared state between sessions. This prevents session confusion attacks where an attacker attempts to mix parameters from different sessions. The session ID, state parameter, and nonce are all independently generated random values, making it computationally infeasible to correlate or substitute them.

### Short TTL

The default 5-minute TTL limits the window during which a session is valid. An abandoned session (where the user started but did not complete the flow) becomes unusable after 5 minutes, reducing the risk of stale authorization codes being replayed or sessions being hijacked after the user has walked away.

---

# Encryption & Key Management

# Encryption & Key Management

The portal's security model ensures that no plaintext identifiers or sensitive attributes are ever stored in the database. Every external identifier is either **HMAC-hashed** (irreversible, used for lookup) or **AES-256-GCM encrypted** (reversible, used for attribute retrieval). Three domain-separated cryptographic keys provide distinct protections, so the compromise of one key does not cascade to the others.

This design means that even an attacker with full read access to the database sees only opaque hashes and ciphertext. Recovering any meaningful data requires access to the corresponding key material, which is managed by a dedicated Key Management Service (KMS) and, in production, never leaves the HSM boundary.

## Three-Key Architecture

The following diagram illustrates the three cryptographic keys and their roles within the portal:

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-three-keys.svg" alt="Three Keys" style={{maxWidth: '700px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

Each key operates in its own domain. Key A and Key B are HMAC keys used exclusively for irreversible hashing of different identifier types, while Key C is a symmetric encryption key used for reversible encryption of sensitive payloads. This separation is fundamental to the security model.

## Key Summary

| Key | Alias | Algorithm | Purpose | Reversible? |
|-----|-------|-----------|---------|-------------|
| **Key A** | `reconciliation:holder` | HMAC-SHA256 | Hash wallet holder key fingerprints | No |
| **Key B** | `reconciliation:institution` | HMAC-SHA256 | Hash institutional identifiers (eduid) | No |
| **Key C** | `reconciliation:encryption` | AES-256-GCM | Encrypt sensitive data (claims, IDs) | Yes |

Key A and Key B are both HMAC-SHA256 keys, but they are entirely separate secrets. Using two distinct HMAC keys rather than one prevents cross-correlation between wallet-side identifiers and institution-side identifiers, even if one key is compromised.

Key C is a 256-bit AES key operating in Galois/Counter Mode (GCM), which provides both confidentiality and integrity. Every encryption operation generates a fresh random initialization vector (IV), so encrypting the same plaintext twice produces different ciphertext.

## Why Domain Separation?

Using three keys instead of one provides defense in depth. Each compromise scenario is isolated:

- **If Key A is compromised:** An attacker can compute holder key hashes and potentially match them against known public keys, but they cannot reverse institution hashes (protected by Key B) or decrypt any sensitive data (protected by Key C). The attacker gains no access to institutional identifiers or encrypted claims.

- **If Key B is compromised:** An attacker can compute institution identifier hashes and potentially match them against known institutional IDs, but they cannot correlate those hashes with holder keys (protected by Key A) or decrypt any data (protected by Key C). The link between wallet holders and institutional accounts remains hidden.

- **If Key C is compromised:** An attacker can decrypt encrypted data such as claims, institutional IDs, and auxiliary payloads, but they cannot correlate the hashed identifiers stored alongside that data with external identifiers (protected by Keys A and B). They can see what data exists but cannot easily determine which external identity it belongs to.

- **Full database access without any key:** An attacker sees only meaningless hashes and ciphertext. No identifiers, no claims, no institutional IDs, and no way to correlate records with external systems.

Each key serves a fundamentally different purpose (lookup indexing vs. data protection), and domain separation prevents a single point of cryptographic failure. This architecture also supports independent key rotation schedules, different access control policies per key, and regulatory compliance requirements that may mandate separate key management for different data categories.

## KMS Providers

The portal uses a pluggable Key Management Service (KMS) that supports multiple backends. The KMS abstraction layer means that application code never directly handles raw key material in production. Instead, it sends data to the KMS for cryptographic operations (HMAC, encrypt, decrypt), and the KMS performs those operations using its internally managed keys.

### Software (Development)

For local development and testing, keys are generated and stored in a PKCS#12 keystore file on disk. This provider is straightforward to set up and requires no external infrastructure, but it offers no hardware protection for key material.

```yaml
kms:
  providers:
    - id: "software"
      type: "SOFTWARE"
      config:
        keystore-path: "data/keystore/auth-bridge.p12"
        keystore-password-ref:
          key: "KMS_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD"
```

:::caution
The software KMS provider stores key material in a file on the local filesystem. This is acceptable for development and testing but is **not recommended for production** deployments. In production, use an HSM-backed provider such as Azure Key Vault or AWS KMS.
:::

### Azure Key Vault (Production)

For production deployments on Azure, the portal integrates with Azure Key Vault backed by HSM (Hardware Security Module) protection. Keys are generated inside the HSM and marked as non-exportable, meaning the raw key material never leaves the hardware boundary. All cryptographic operations (HMAC computation, AES-GCM encryption, AES-GCM decryption) are performed within the HSM itself.

Azure Key Vault also provides comprehensive audit logging, role-based access control (RBAC), and automatic key versioning. Access to the Key Vault is authenticated via Azure Managed Identity, eliminating the need for stored credentials.

### AWS KMS (Production)

For deployments on AWS, the portal supports AWS Key Management Service, which provides similar HSM-backed key storage and management. Like Azure Key Vault, AWS KMS ensures that key material is non-exportable and that cryptographic operations occur within the HSM boundary. Access is controlled via IAM policies and CloudTrail provides audit logging.

## Key Initialization

On first startup, the Auth Bridge service initializes the required keys if they do not already exist. The initialization process creates four keys:

1. **JAR signing key (ES256/P-256):** Used to sign OID4VP authorization request objects (JARs). The corresponding public key is published as a `did:jwk` identifier that wallets use to verify the verifier's identity.

2. **Key A (HMAC-SHA256):** A 32-byte (256-bit) secret used exclusively for computing HMAC hashes of wallet holder key fingerprints. This key is used during the OID4VP verification flow when the holder's public key is extracted from the Verifiable Presentation.

3. **Key B (HMAC-SHA256):** A 32-byte (256-bit) secret used exclusively for computing HMAC hashes of institutional identifiers (such as the SURFconext `sub` claim or `eduperson_principal_name`). This key is used during the reconciliation flow when the institution authenticates the user.

4. **Key C (AES-256-GCM):** A 32-byte (256-bit) secret used for encrypting and decrypting all sensitive data that must be recoverable, including the actual eduid, canonical claims, reconciliation session data, and auxiliary data.

In production environments using Azure Key Vault, keys are pre-provisioned by infrastructure automation and marked as non-exportable. The initializer verifies that the expected keys exist and are accessible, but does not attempt to create them.

## Next Steps

For detailed specifications of each key, including their algorithms, configuration parameters, and version management strategy, see [Cryptographic Keys](./cryptographic-keys).

To understand how data is encrypted before persistence and decrypted on read, including the envelope encryption pattern and the zero-plaintext guarantee, see [Encrypted Storage](./encrypted-storage).

---

# Cryptographic Keys

# Cryptographic Keys

This page provides detailed specifications for the three domain-separated cryptographic keys used by the portal: Key A (holder HMAC), Key B (institution HMAC), and Key C (data encryption). Each key has a distinct alias, algorithm, and purpose. Understanding how each key is used is essential for security auditing, key rotation planning, and incident response.

## Key A: `reconciliation:holder` (HMAC-SHA256)

**Purpose:** Hashes wallet holder public key fingerprints for identity matching lookup.

Key A is used exclusively in the wallet verification flow. When a holder presents a Verifiable Presentation via OID4VP, the portal needs a way to recognize that holder in future interactions without storing the raw public key. Key A enables this by producing a deterministic but irreversible hash of the holder's key fingerprint.

### How It Works

The hashing process follows these steps:

1. **Public key extraction:** The holder's public key is extracted from the Verifiable Presentation (VP) submitted via the OID4VP protocol. This key is typically an EC key on the P-256 curve.

2. **JWK thumbprint computation:** The JWK thumbprint is computed according to [RFC 7638](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7638). This produces a deterministic fingerprint of the key by serializing the key's essential parameters in a canonical JSON form and hashing the result with SHA-256. The thumbprint is the same regardless of how the key is represented (PEM, JWK, etc.).

3. **HMAC computation:** `HMAC-SHA256(jwk_thumbprint, Key_A)` is computed. The HMAC function takes the JWK thumbprint as the message and Key A as the secret, producing a 256-bit (32-byte) output.

4. **Encoding:** The HMAC output is encoded as a multibase-encoded multihash string. This self-describing format includes the hash algorithm identifier and the hash length, making it forward-compatible with future algorithm changes.

5. **Storage:** The encoded hash is stored as `identifier_hash` in the `identity_match` table (with `type=KEY`) and as `holder_identifier_hash` in the `identity_link_binding` table.

### Properties

- **Deterministic:** The same holder public key always produces the same hash, enabling reliable lookup across sessions and time.
- **Irreversible:** It is computationally infeasible to recover the original public key or JWK thumbprint from the hash. HMAC-SHA256 is a one-way function.
- **Collision-resistant:** It is practically impossible for two different public keys to produce the same hash. The probability of a collision is approximately 1 in 2^128.
- **Key-dependent:** Without Key A, the hash cannot be computed or verified. An attacker with database access but no key access cannot determine which hash corresponds to which public key, even if they know the public keys.

### Configuration

```yaml
identity.reconciliation.crypto:
  holder-hmac-key-alias: "reconciliation:holder"
  holder-hmac-key-version: 1
```

The `holder-hmac-key-alias` specifies the key alias in the KMS provider. The `holder-hmac-key-version` tracks the current active version of the key, which is important for key rotation (see [Key Version Management](#key-version-management) below).

---

## Key B: `reconciliation:institution` (HMAC-SHA256)

**Purpose:** Hashes institutional identifiers (SURFconext subject IDs, `eduperson_principal_name`) for identity matching lookup.

Key B serves a parallel role to Key A but operates on a completely different class of identifiers. While Key A hashes wallet-side cryptographic key fingerprints, Key B hashes institution-side user identifiers. These are the identifiers that SURFconext (or another OIDC provider) returns when a user authenticates with their institutional account.

### How It Works

1. **Identifier retrieval:** During the reconciliation flow, the user authenticates with their institutional identity provider via SURFconext. The OIDC provider returns the user's institutional identifier, typically the `sub` claim (a persistent, pairwise pseudonymous identifier) or the `eduperson_principal_name`.

2. **HMAC computation:** `HMAC-SHA256(institutional_id, Key_B)` is computed. Key B is used as the HMAC secret, and the institutional identifier is the message.

3. **Encoding and storage:** The result is encoded as a multibase-encoded multihash string and stored as `identifier_hash` in the `identity_match` table (with `type=SUBJECT_ID`) and as `institution_identifier_hash` in the `identity_link_binding` table.

### Why a Separate Key from Key A?

It may seem simpler to use a single HMAC key for both holder keys and institutional identifiers, but domain separation provides critical security benefits:

- **Cross-correlation prevention:** Even with full database access and one compromised key, an attacker cannot determine which wallet belongs to which institutional account. Compromising Key A reveals which database rows correspond to known public keys, but without Key B, those rows cannot be linked to institutional identifiers. The reverse is also true.

- **Independent compromise containment:** If Key A is compromised through a vulnerability in the wallet verification flow, Key B remains secure. The attacker's ability to compute holder key hashes does not extend to institutional identifier hashes.

- **Regulatory compliance:** Different data categories (wallet identifiers vs. institutional identifiers) may be subject to different regulatory requirements regarding key lifecycle, rotation frequency, and access control. Separate keys enable separate policies.

- **Incident response clarity:** In the event of a key compromise, the blast radius is immediately clear. Security teams know exactly which data category is affected and can scope their response accordingly.

### Configuration

```yaml
identity.reconciliation.crypto:
  institution-hmac-key-alias: "reconciliation:institution"
  institution-hmac-key-version: 1
```

---

## Key C: `reconciliation:encryption` (AES-256-GCM)

**Purpose:** Encrypts all sensitive data that must be recoverable -- the institution-scoped eduID, canonical claims, auxiliary data, and reconciliation session data.

While Keys A and B produce irreversible hashes suitable for lookup, Key C provides reversible encryption for data that the portal must be able to read back. This includes the user's actual institutional identifier (needed for token issuance), cached user attributes (needed for fast-path token projection), and institution-specific metadata.

### What Gets Encrypted with Key C

| Data | Storage Location | Why It Is Encrypted |
|------|-----------------|---------------------|
| Institution-scoped eduID | `identity_link_binding.encrypted_institution_id` | The actual institutional identifier must be recoverable for STS token issuance, but must not be stored in plaintext |
| Canonical claims | `identity_link_binding.persisted_attributes_envelope` | Cached user attributes (name, email, etc.) for fast-path token projection without re-authenticating |
| Resolved identity | `reconciliation_session.encrypted_identity` | Temporary storage of claims during the reconciliation flow; short-lived but still protected |
| Auxiliary data | `auxiliary_data.encrypted_payload` | Institution-specific metadata such as enrollment status, role, or programme information |

### How AES-256-GCM Works

AES-256-GCM (Advanced Encryption Standard with 256-bit key in Galois/Counter Mode) is an authenticated encryption algorithm. It provides both confidentiality (data cannot be read without the key) and integrity (any tampering with the ciphertext is detected on decryption). Here is how it operates in the portal:

- **256-bit key:** Provides a 128-bit security level, which is considered secure against both classical and near-term quantum attacks. The key is 32 bytes long and is generated by the KMS provider.

- **Unique IV per operation:** Each encryption operation generates a fresh random 12-byte initialization vector (IV), also called a nonce. This ensures that encrypting the same plaintext twice produces different ciphertext, preventing pattern analysis.

- **Galois/Counter Mode:** GCM combines counter-mode encryption (for confidentiality) with Galois-field multiplication (for authentication). The counter mode turns AES into a stream cipher, and the Galois-field computation produces an authentication tag.

- **Authentication tag:** Each encryption produces a 16-byte authentication tag that is stored alongside the ciphertext. On decryption, the tag is verified first. If the ciphertext has been modified in any way (even a single bit flip), the tag verification fails and decryption is rejected. This prevents both accidental corruption and deliberate tampering.

- **Output format:** The encrypted output is structured as `IV (12 bytes) + ciphertext + authentication tag (16 bytes)`. This is encoded and stored as a TEXT column in the database.

### Configuration

```yaml
identity.reconciliation.crypto:
  encryption-key-alias: "reconciliation:encryption"
  encryption-key-version: 1
```

---

## Key Version Management

Every record in the database stores the key version that was used when it was created or last updated. This is essential for supporting key rotation without requiring a full database re-encryption in a single operation.

The version is tracked in the following columns:

```
identity_match.hash_key_version              → Key A or Key B version (depending on match type)
identity_link_binding.holder_hash_key_version → Key A version
identity_link_binding.institution_hash_key_version → Key B version
identity_link_binding.encrypted_institution_id_key_version → Key C version
auxiliary_data (implicitly via schema_version) → Key C version
```

### What Version Tracking Enables

- **Targeted migration during key rotation:** When a key is rotated, only records created with the old version need to be re-processed. The system can query for records with a specific `key_version` and re-hash or re-encrypt them with the new key version. This avoids a costly full-table migration.

- **Audit trail:** For any given record, you can determine exactly which key version was used to create it. This is valuable for security audits, incident investigations, and compliance reporting.

- **Dual-read during rotation:** During a key rotation window, the system can attempt decryption or hash verification with the current key version first, and if that fails, fall back to the previous version. This enables zero-downtime key rotation where old and new versions coexist temporarily.

- **Forward compatibility:** If the cryptographic algorithm itself needs to change in the future (for example, migrating from HMAC-SHA256 to a post-quantum hash), the version tracking infrastructure is already in place to support a gradual migration.

---

## AuthBridgeKeyInitializer

On application startup, the `AuthBridgeKeyInitializer` ensures that all required cryptographic keys exist in the configured KMS provider. If a key does not yet exist (typical for first-time setup with the software KMS provider), it is generated automatically.

```kotlin
// Simplified from AuthBridgeKeyInitializer.kt
object AuthBridgeKeyInitializer {
    suspend fun initialize(kms: KeyManagerService, config: AuthBridgeConfig) {
        // JAR Signing Key (ES256 for OID4VP request objects)
        kms.getOrGenerateKey(
            alias = config.jarSigningKeyAlias,  // "auth-bridge-jar-signing-key"
            algorithm = Algorithm.ES256,
            keyType = KeyType.EC_P256
        )

        // Key A: Holder HMAC
        kms.getOrGenerateKey(
            alias = config.holderHmacKeyAlias,  // "reconciliation:holder"
            algorithm = Algorithm.HS256,
            keyLength = 256
        )

        // Key B: Institution HMAC
        kms.getOrGenerateKey(
            alias = config.institutionHmacKeyAlias,  // "reconciliation:institution"
            algorithm = Algorithm.HS256,
            keyLength = 256
        )

        // Key C: Encryption
        kms.getOrGenerateKey(
            alias = config.encryptionKeyAlias,  // "reconciliation:encryption"
            algorithm = Algorithm.A256GCM,
            keyLength = 256
        )
    }
}
```

The `getOrGenerateKey` method is idempotent: if the key already exists under the given alias, it returns the existing key without modification. If the key does not exist, it generates a new one with the specified algorithm and key length.

:::note
In production deployments using Azure Key Vault, keys are pre-provisioned by infrastructure automation (such as Terraform or ARM templates) and marked as non-exportable. The initializer in this case only verifies that the expected keys exist and are accessible. It does not attempt to create new keys, as the KMS provider's access policy would not permit key creation from the application.
:::

The JAR signing key (ES256/P-256) is listed here for completeness, but it is not part of the three-key encryption model. It is an asymmetric key used for signing OID4VP request objects, and its public key is published as part of the verifier's `did:jwk` identity. See the [Authentication Flows](../authentication-flows) documentation for details on how the JAR signing key is used in OID4VP request objects.

---

# Encrypted Storage Patterns

# Encrypted Storage Patterns

The portal implements a strict **zero-plaintext-at-rest policy**. Every sensitive field in the database is either HMAC-hashed (irreversible, for lookup) or AES-256-GCM encrypted (reversible, for attribute retrieval). The encryption and decryption happen transparently in the service layer -- HTTP endpoints and reconciliation orchestrators work with plaintext objects, while the persistence layer never sees or stores plaintext.

This page describes the encryption patterns used throughout the portal, the data structures involved, and the guarantees they provide.

## Encrypt-on-Write, Decrypt-on-Read

The service layer acts as the encryption boundary. All encryption and decryption operations occur at this layer, creating a clean separation between application logic (which works with plaintext) and storage (which only ever contains ciphertext).

```
[HTTP Endpoint] → plaintext → [Service Layer] → encrypt(plaintext, Key_C) → [Store/DB]
[HTTP Endpoint] ← plaintext ← [Service Layer] ← decrypt(ciphertext, Key_C) ← [Store/DB]
```

Application code above the service layer never needs to think about encryption. Controllers, orchestrators, and business logic work exclusively with plaintext domain objects. Application code below the service layer (SQL queries, repository implementations, database drivers) never sees plaintext sensitive data. This clean separation provides several important benefits:

- **Automatic coverage for new features:** Any new feature that reads or writes sensitive data through the service layer automatically gets encryption. Developers do not need to remember to add encryption calls -- the service layer handles it transparently.

- **Secure database backups:** Database dumps and backups contain only encrypted data. A backup file that falls into the wrong hands reveals nothing without KMS access.

- **DBA isolation:** Database administrators can perform their duties (monitoring, query optimization, schema migrations) without ever having access to sensitive content. They see ciphertext in their query results, which is operationally sufficient for performance analysis.

- **Safe read replicas:** Read replicas used for analytics or reporting contain only encrypted data, reducing the security surface of the replication infrastructure.

## Persisted Attributes Envelope

The persisted attributes envelope is the primary encrypted data structure in the portal. It contains the canonical claims selected by attribute rules that have `persist: true` configured in the tenant's attribute mapping.

### What Goes Inside

The envelope contains the subset of user attributes that the portal needs to persist for fast-path token projection. A typical envelope might contain:

```json
{
  "eduid": "urn:mace:surf.nl:eduid:12345",
  "eduperson_principal_name": "student@institution.nl",
  "email": "student@institution.nl",
  "schemaVersion": "2026-03-24"
}
```

The `schemaVersion` field tracks the attribute mapping version that was used to produce this envelope. If the tenant's attribute rules change, the portal can detect that the persisted envelope was produced under an older schema and trigger a re-reconciliation to refresh the attributes.

### How It Is Stored

The storage process works as follows:

1. The JSON object is serialized to a UTF-8 string.
2. The string is encrypted with AES-256-GCM using Key C, producing an output consisting of: IV (12 bytes) + ciphertext + authentication tag (16 bytes).
3. The encrypted output is encoded and stored as a TEXT column in `identity_link_binding.persisted_attributes_envelope`.

On read, the process is reversed: the TEXT value is decoded, decrypted with Key C (which also verifies the authentication tag), and deserialized back into a JSON object.

### Data Minimization

It is important to note that attributes with `persist: false` in the tenant's attribute rules are **not** included in the envelope. For example, if the default configuration marks `given_name` and `family_name` as `persist: false`, those attributes are projected into the STS token during the current active session (because the OIDC provider's response is still in memory) but are never written to the database.

This implements the principle of data minimization: only the minimum necessary data is persisted. Attributes that are needed only during the live session (such as display names for the UI) are never stored, reducing both the security risk and the GDPR compliance burden. If those attributes are needed in a future session, the user must re-authenticate with their institution, which fetches fresh values from the OIDC provider.

## Auxiliary Data Encryption

The `AuxiliaryDataService` provides encrypted storage for institution-specific metadata that does not fit into the standard identity link model. This includes information such as enrollment status, academic role, programme of study, or any other institution-specific attributes that need to be stored alongside the identity link.

```kotlin
interface AuxiliaryDataService {
    suspend fun store(
        tenantId: String,
        internalIdentityId: String,
        category: String,
        data: Map<String, JsonElement>,
        expiresAt: Instant? = null,
    ): AuxiliaryDataRecord

    suspend fun getDecrypted(
        tenantId: String,
        internalIdentityId: String,
        category: String? = null,
    ): List<DecryptedAuxiliaryData>

    suspend fun deleteAll(tenantId: String, internalIdentityId: String): Int
    suspend fun delete(tenantId: String, id: String): Boolean
    suspend fun findExpired(tenantId: String, cutoff: Instant): List<AuxiliaryDataRecord>
}
```

### How It Works

The `store()` method accepts plaintext data as a `Map<String, JsonElement>`, encrypts it with Key C, and persists the ciphertext to the `auxiliary_data` table. The caller never needs to handle encryption directly.

The `getDecrypted()` method retrieves records from the database and decrypts them on the fly. It returns `DecryptedAuxiliaryData` objects containing the original plaintext map. It never returns or exposes raw ciphertext to callers. If the optional `category` parameter is provided, only records of that category are returned.

### Categories and TTL

Categories allow organizing auxiliary data into logical groups. For example, a tenant might store enrollment data under the `"enrollment"` category, role information under `"role"`, and programme details under `"programme"`. Each category is stored as a separate record, enabling fine-grained retrieval and deletion.

The optional `expiresAt` parameter enables automatic expiration of auxiliary data. The `findExpired()` method returns records that have passed their expiration time, and a background cleanup process periodically removes them. This is useful for data that is inherently time-limited, such as a temporary enrollment status or a session-scoped authorization.

## What Gets Encrypted Where

The following table provides a complete inventory of encrypted fields in the database:

| Data | Table.Column | Key | Purpose |
|------|-------------|-----|---------|
| Institution-scoped eduID | `identity_link_binding.encrypted_institution_id` | Key C | Recoverable institutional identifier for token issuance |
| Canonical claims | `identity_link_binding.persisted_attributes_envelope` | Key C | Cached attributes for fast-path token projection |
| Resolved identity | `reconciliation_session.encrypted_identity` | Key C | Temporary session data during IDV flow |
| Auxiliary payload | `auxiliary_data.encrypted_payload` | Key C | Institution-specific metadata (enrollment, grades, etc.) |

All four fields use the same key (Key C) and the same algorithm (AES-256-GCM), but each encryption operation uses a unique random IV, so identical plaintext values stored in different fields or different rows produce different ciphertext.

## Zero-Plaintext Database Guarantee

The combination of HMAC hashing (Keys A and B) and AES-256-GCM encryption (Key C) ensures that the database contains zero plaintext sensitive data. Here is exactly what an attacker would see with full database read access but no access to the KMS:

| Column | What Is Stored | What the Attacker Sees |
|--------|---------------|----------------------|
| `identifier_hash` | `HMAC(identifier, Key_A or Key_B)` | Opaque hash string with no discernible pattern |
| `holder_identifier_hash` | `HMAC(holder_key, Key_A)` | Opaque hash string |
| `institution_identifier_hash` | `HMAC(institution_id, Key_B)` | Opaque hash string |
| `encrypted_institution_id` | `AES-GCM(eduid, Key_C)` | Opaque ciphertext blob |
| `persisted_attributes_envelope` | `AES-GCM(claims_json, Key_C)` | Opaque ciphertext blob |
| `encrypted_payload` | `AES-GCM(aux_data, Key_C)` | Opaque ciphertext blob |
| `subject_hash` (audit) | `HMAC(subject_id, Key_A or Key_B)` | Opaque hash string |

Non-sensitive metadata such as timestamps (`created_at`, `updated_at`), status enums (`ACTIVE`, `PENDING`), configuration IDs, and tenant IDs is stored in plaintext. This metadata is necessary for database operations (indexing, querying, cleanup) and does not identify individuals. The determination of what constitutes "sensitive" vs. "non-sensitive" is made based on whether the data could be used to identify, correlate, or profile an individual.

### What the Attacker Cannot Do

Even with full database access, an attacker without KMS access cannot:

- Determine which wallet holder is linked to which institutional account
- Recover any institutional identifier (eduid, subject ID, email)
- Read any cached user attributes (name, email, affiliation)
- Read any auxiliary data (enrollment status, programme, role)
- Correlate database records with external systems
- Determine whether two hash values in different tables refer to the same entity (because different keys produce different hashes for the same input)

### What the Attacker Can See

The attacker can observe:

- How many identity links exist (row count)
- When they were created and last updated (timestamps)
- Their status (active, pending, etc.)
- Which tenant they belong to (tenant ID)
- The structure of the data (table schema)

This metadata is considered acceptable exposure because it does not reveal personal data or enable identification of individuals.

## Crypto-Shredding for GDPR

An elegant property of this architecture is that destroying Key C makes **all** AES-256-GCM encrypted data permanently and irreversibly irrecoverable. Combined with deleting the HMAC hashes from the database, this achieves complete data erasure in O(1) time -- regardless of how many records exist. No need to find and delete individual records across multiple tables and backups; simply destroying the encryption key renders all encrypted data meaningless.

In practice, GDPR erasure for a single user uses per-record deletion through the external API's `DELETE` endpoint, which removes specific rows from the database. This is the normal path for individual right-to-erasure requests.

However, crypto-shredding provides a nuclear option for catastrophic scenarios:

- **Complete tenant decommissioning:** If a tenant (institution) leaves the portal, destroying the encryption key immediately renders all their encrypted data irrecoverable, even in database backups that have not yet been purged.
- **Catastrophic breach response:** If the database is known to have been exfiltrated, destroying the encryption key ensures that the stolen data is permanently unreadable.
- **End-of-life data destruction:** When the portal is decommissioned, destroying the encryption keys provides a verifiable guarantee that no encrypted data can ever be recovered.

It is worth noting that crypto-shredding only affects data encrypted with Key C. HMAC hashes (produced by Keys A and B) are already irreversible -- they cannot be "decrypted" regardless of whether the HMAC keys exist. However, the HMAC keys should also be destroyed during full decommissioning to prevent an attacker from computing hashes of known identifiers and matching them against a stolen database.

## Encryption in Reconciliation Sessions

During the identity verification (IDV) reconciliation flow, the user authenticates with their institutional identity provider, and the OIDC provider returns a set of claims (name, email, institutional ID, etc.). These claims need to be temporarily stored while the reconciliation process completes, which may involve additional steps such as user consent or attribute selection.

The resolved identity (the full set of claims from SURFconext) is encrypted with Key C before being stored in the `reconciliation_session.encrypted_identity` column. This ensures that even temporary session data is protected at rest.

Reconciliation sessions have a short time-to-live (TTL) of 5 minutes. After the TTL expires, a background cleanup process deletes expired sessions. However, the encryption ensures that the data is protected regardless of timing:

- If the cleanup process runs on schedule, the encrypted data is deleted promptly.
- If the cleanup process is delayed (due to load, errors, or maintenance), the data remains encrypted and unreadable without KMS access.
- If the database is backed up during the session's brief lifetime, the backup contains only ciphertext.

This belt-and-suspenders approach (short TTL combined with encryption) reflects the principle that security mechanisms should not depend on a single control working perfectly. The TTL minimizes the window of exposure, and the encryption ensures that exposure during that window is harmless.

---

# REST API Overview

# REST API Overview

The eduID Wallet Matching Portal exposes its functionality through five distinct API groups spread across three backend services. Every endpoint communicates with JSON request and response bodies and follows standard HTTP status-code semantics: `2xx` for success, `4xx` for client errors (validation, authentication, not-found), and `5xx` for unexpected server-side failures. Understanding the boundary between these API groups is essential for integrating with the portal, debugging issues, and reasoning about the security model.

The three services are:

- **Auth Bridge** (Java / Spring Boot) -- handles wallet presentation verification, identity reconciliation, and the external third-party API.
- **STS** (Java / Spring Boot) -- a lightweight OAuth2 / OIDC authorization server that issues tokens consumed by the portal frontend and, optionally, by external clients.
- **Portal** (Next.js) -- the user-facing web application whose server-side API routes act as a Backend-For-Frontend (BFF), ensuring that no browser-originated request ever reaches Auth Bridge or STS directly.

## API Surface Summary

The table below lists every API group, the service that hosts it, the base URL used to reach it, the authentication mechanism it expects, and a short description of its purpose.

| API Group | Service | Base URL | Auth | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **OID4VP Sessions** | Auth Bridge | `:8090/auth/oid4vp` | Internal (service-to-service) | Wallet authentication session lifecycle -- create, poll, and complete OID4VP presentation sessions |
| **IDV Reconciliation** | Auth Bridge | `:8090/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{id}/idv` | Internal (service-to-service) | Identity verification during reconciliation -- initiate OIDC-based IDV, handle callbacks, check status |
| **External API** | Auth Bridge | `:8090/api/external/v1/reconciliation` | OAuth2 Bearer token | Third-party access to reconciled identity data, auxiliary data storage, and GDPR erasure |
| **STS Endpoints** | STS | `:8080` (or `:8092`) | OIDC / OAuth2 | Full OAuth2 authorization server -- authorization, token, introspection, revocation, JWKS, and discovery |
| **Frontend BFF** | Portal | `:3000/api` | Session Cookie (NextAuth.js) | Browser-to-backend proxy routes that mediate all frontend communication with STS and Auth Bridge |

## Service Ports and Environment Configuration

Each service listens on a well-known port. In the default Docker Compose configuration the ports are mapped as follows:

| Service | Container Port | Docker Compose Host Port | Environment Variable |
|---|---|---|---|
| Auth Bridge | 8090 | 8090 | `AUTH_BRIDGE_URL` |
| STS | 8080 | 8092 | `STS_ISSUER_URL`, `STS_INTERNAL_URL` |
| Portal (Next.js) | 3000 | 3000 | `NEXTAUTH_URL` |

The STS port deserves special attention. Inside the Docker network the STS container listens on its default port `8080`, but the `docker-compose.yml` file maps it to **`8092`** on the host to avoid conflicts with other services (such as Keycloak) that might also claim port `8080`. When configuring environment variables, use the host-mapped port for any URL that the browser or an external client will resolve, and the container port for URLs resolved inside the Docker network:

```bash
# Resolved by the browser (host port)
STS_ISSUER_URL=http://localhost:8092

# Resolved inside Docker network (container port)
STS_INTERNAL_URL=http://sts:8080
```

The `AUTH_BRIDGE_URL` follows the same pattern. The portal's server-side code uses the internal Docker hostname (`http://auth-bridge:8090`), while any documentation or tooling running outside Docker should target `http://localhost:8090`.

## Authentication Patterns

The portal uses three distinct authentication patterns, each tailored to the trust relationship between the caller and the service being called.

### 1. STS Tokens for User-Facing Flows

When a human user authenticates -- whether through institutional federation or wallet presentation -- the STS issues a standard OAuth2 authorization-code-with-PKCE flow. The resulting `access_token` (a signed JWT) and `refresh_token` are stored in the NextAuth.js session on the portal backend. The frontend never sees or stores raw tokens; it relies on its HTTP-only session cookie to prove its identity to the BFF layer, which then attaches the appropriate bearer token when proxying requests to Auth Bridge.

```
Browser --[session cookie]--> Portal BFF --[Bearer access_token]--> Auth Bridge
```

### 2. Client Credentials for the External API

Third-party systems that need to query reconciled identity data or store auxiliary information authenticate using the OAuth2 `client_credentials` grant. They obtain a bearer token from the STS (or a configured external identity provider such as Keycloak) and present it in the `Authorization` header when calling the External API. The token is validated against the configured JWKS endpoint, and the client's allowed scopes and projected claims are enforced server-side.

```
External System --[client_credentials grant]--> STS/Keycloak
External System --[Bearer token]--> Auth Bridge External API
```

### 3. Session Cookies for the Frontend

The portal frontend communicates exclusively through the BFF routes at `/api/*`. These routes are protected by the NextAuth.js session middleware, which validates the encrypted HTTP-only cookie attached to every browser request. No token or credential is ever exposed to client-side JavaScript. This design eliminates an entire class of token-theft attacks and keeps the browser's security surface minimal.

```
Browser --[encrypted cookie]--> Next.js API route --[internal call]--> Auth Bridge / STS
```

## What to Read Next

Each API group has its own dedicated page with full request/response schemas, status codes, error formats, and integration guidance:

- [OID4VP Sessions](./oid4vp-sessions) -- create, poll, and complete wallet authentication sessions.
- [IDV Reconciliation](./idv-reconciliation) -- initiate identity verification when the wallet holder is unknown.
- [External API](./external-api) -- third-party access to reconciled identities and auxiliary data.
- [STS Endpoints](./sts-endpoints) -- the OAuth2/OIDC authorization server surface.
- [Frontend BFF](./frontend-bff) -- the Next.js proxy routes that tie everything together for the browser.

---

# OID4VP Session API

# OID4VP Session API

The OID4VP Session API is the primary integration surface for wallet-based authentication. It lives on the Auth Bridge service at base path `/auth/oid4vp/sessions` (port `8090`) and manages the full lifecycle of a verifiable presentation session: creation, status polling, and completion. Every wallet login begins with the frontend (via the BFF) creating a session, rendering the returned QR code, polling until the wallet holder has presented their credentials, and finally completing the session to obtain resolved identity claims.

These endpoints are designed for internal service-to-service communication. The portal's BFF layer calls them on behalf of the browser; external clients should not call them directly.

## POST /auth/oid4vp/sessions

Creates a new OID4VP session. The Auth Bridge generates a presentation request according to the referenced DCQL query configuration, produces a QR code encoding the `request_uri`, and returns all the data the frontend needs to render the QR and begin polling.

### Request Body

```json
{
  "queryId": "portal-eduid-vc",
  "oauthSessionId": "optional-correlation-id",
  "forceReconciliation": false
}
```

| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `queryId` | string | Yes | References a named DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) query in the Auth Bridge configuration. This determines which credential types and claims are requested from the wallet. |
| `oauthSessionId` | string | No | An opaque correlation identifier, typically the STS session ID, used to tie the OID4VP session back to the OAuth2 authorization flow that triggered it. |
| `forceReconciliation` | boolean | No | When `true`, forces the reconciliation flow even if the wallet holder already has a known binding. Useful for re-verification or account-linking scenarios. Defaults to `false`. |

The `queryId` is the key link between the session API and the credential request logic. It tells the Auth Bridge which presentation definition to embed in the authorization request object. See the [DCQL Query Configuration](#dcql-query-configuration) section below for details.

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "sessionId": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "qrCodeDataUri": "...",
  "requestUri": "openid4vp://authorize?request_uri=https://auth-bridge.example.com/auth/oid4vp/requests/550e8400...",
  "statusUri": "/auth/oid4vp/sessions/550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000/status",
  "qrPageUri": "/auth/oid4vp/qr/550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000"
}
```

| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `sessionId` | string (UUID) | Unique identifier for this session. Used in all subsequent status and completion calls. |
| `qrCodeDataUri` | string | A Base64-encoded PNG image of the QR code, ready to be rendered in an `<img>` tag's `src` attribute. The QR encodes the `requestUri`. |
| `requestUri` | string | The full `openid4vp://` deep link that the wallet app will open. On mobile devices, this can be used directly as a clickable link instead of the QR code. |
| `statusUri` | string | The relative path to poll for session status updates. The frontend should append this to the Auth Bridge base URL. |
| `qrPageUri` | string | A relative path to a standalone HTML page that renders the QR code. Useful for iframe embedding or as a fallback. |

### How It Works

When this endpoint is called, the Auth Bridge performs the following steps internally:

1. Looks up the DCQL query configuration identified by `queryId`.
2. Generates a cryptographic nonce and creates an OID4VP authorization request object.
3. Stores the request object at a unique `request_uri` that the wallet will fetch.
4. Generates a QR code image encoding the `openid4vp://` URI.
5. Creates a session record in the in-memory session store with status `CREATED`.
6. Returns the session metadata to the caller.

## GET /auth/oid4vp/sessions/\{sessionId\}/status

Polls the current status of an OID4VP session. The frontend calls this endpoint at regular intervals after rendering the QR code, waiting for the wallet holder to scan and present their credentials.

### Path Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `sessionId` | string (UUID) | The session identifier returned by the creation endpoint. |

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "sessionId": "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "status": "VERIFIED",
  "idvRequired": false,
  "idvRequirementReason": null,
  "reconciliationPlanType": "USE_EXISTING_BINDING"
}
```

| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `sessionId` | string (UUID) | Echo of the requested session ID. |
| `status` | string (enum) | Current session status. See the [Status Values](#session-status-values) table below. |
| `idvRequired` | boolean | Whether identity verification is needed before the session can be completed. Only meaningful when status is `VERIFIED` or `IDV_REQUIRED`. |
| `idvRequirementReason` | string or null | Human-readable explanation of why IDV is required, e.g. `"No existing binding found for this wallet holder"`. Null when IDV is not required. |
| `reconciliationPlanType` | string or null | The reconciliation strategy the Auth Bridge has selected. Values include `USE_EXISTING_BINDING`, `RECONCILE_VIA_IDV`, `AUTO_MATCH_BY_ATTRIBUTE`. Null until the status reaches `VERIFIED`. |

### Polling Strategy

The recommended polling interval is **2 seconds**. This provides responsive feedback to the user without placing excessive load on the Auth Bridge. The frontend should:

1. Start polling immediately after rendering the QR code.
2. Continue polling while the status is `CREATED`, `PENDING`, `INTERACTION_STARTED`, or `VERIFYING`.
3. Stop polling when the status reaches a terminal state: `VERIFIED`, `IDV_REQUIRED`, `COMPLETED`, `EXPIRED`, or `ERROR`.
4. Implement a maximum polling duration (recommended: 5 minutes) as a client-side safeguard against stuck sessions.

```typescript
const pollStatus = async (sessionId: string): Promise<SessionStatus> => {
  const MAX_POLL_DURATION_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000;
  const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2000;
  const startTime = Date.now();

  while (Date.now() - startTime < MAX_POLL_DURATION_MS) {
    const response = await fetch(`/api/wallet/sessions/${sessionId}/status`);
    const data = await response.json();

    if (['VERIFIED', 'IDV_REQUIRED', 'COMPLETED', 'EXPIRED', 'ERROR'].includes(data.status)) {
      return data;
    }

    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, POLL_INTERVAL_MS));
  }

  throw new Error('Session polling timed out');
};
```

## POST /auth/oid4vp/sessions/\{sessionId\}/complete

Completes the wallet authentication session and returns the resolved identity claims. This endpoint must be called after the status has reached `VERIFIED` (or `COMPLETED` if auto-reconciliation succeeded). The response varies depending on whether the wallet holder is already known to the system.

### Path Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `sessionId` | string (UUID) | The session identifier. |

### Response for Known Holder (200 OK)

When the wallet holder has an existing identity binding, the Auth Bridge resolves their canonical identity and returns the full claim set:

```json
{
  "userId": "internal-identity-id",
  "claims": {
    "eduid": "urn:mace:surf.nl:eduid:12345",
    "eduperson_principal_name": "student@institution.nl",
    "email": "student@institution.nl"
  },
  "isNewUser": false,
  "authenticatedAt": "2026-03-27T10:30:00Z",
  "acr": "urn:sphereon:oid4vp:vp",
  "amr": ["vp"],
  "claimSource": "CANONICAL_BINDING"
}
```

| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `userId` | string | The internal identity identifier that the STS will embed as the `sub` claim in the issued tokens. |
| `claims` | object | The resolved identity claims. The exact set depends on the DCQL query and the reconciliation outcome. |
| `isNewUser` | boolean | `false` for known holders with an existing binding, `true` for newly reconciled identities. |
| `authenticatedAt` | string (ISO 8601) | Timestamp of the wallet authentication event. |
| `acr` | string | Authentication Context Class Reference, always `urn:sphereon:oid4vp:vp` for wallet-based login. |
| `amr` | array of strings | Authentication Methods References. Includes `"vp"` for verifiable presentation. |
| `claimSource` | string | Indicates where the claims were resolved from. `CANONICAL_BINDING` means the identity was found via an existing wallet-to-identity link. |

### Response for Unknown Holder (202 Accepted)

When the wallet holder is not yet known to the system, the Auth Bridge cannot resolve an identity and instead signals that identity verification is required:

```json
{
  "idvRequired": true,
  "idvMethod": "oidc",
  "idvSteps": ["Authenticate with your institution account to link your wallet"]
}
```

| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `idvRequired` | boolean | Always `true` in this response. |
| `idvMethod` | string | The verification method to use. Currently always `"oidc"`, meaning the user must authenticate with an external OIDC provider (e.g., SURFconext). |
| `idvSteps` | array of strings | Human-readable instructions that the frontend can display to guide the user through the verification process. |

The **200 vs 202 distinction** is deliberate and meaningful. A `200 OK` response means the authentication is fully resolved -- the STS can issue tokens immediately. A `202 Accepted` response means the request was valid but the identity resolution is incomplete -- the frontend must now redirect the user into the [IDV Reconciliation](./idv-reconciliation) flow before the session can be completed. After IDV completes successfully, the frontend should call this endpoint again to obtain the `200` response with full claims.

## Session Status Values

The following table describes every status value a session can have, along with the expected frontend behavior for each.

| Status | Description | Frontend Action |
|---|---|---|
| `CREATED` | Session has been created; QR code is ready for scanning. | Display QR code, begin polling. |
| `PENDING` | Alias for `CREATED`. Waiting for the wallet to scan. | Continue polling. |
| `INTERACTION_STARTED` | The wallet has fetched the request object from the `request_uri`. | Optionally update the UI to indicate the wallet is processing. Continue polling. |
| `VERIFYING` | The verifiable presentation has been received and is being validated (signature checks, credential status, revocation). | Show a "Verifying..." indicator. Continue polling. |
| `VERIFIED` | The VP is valid and the identity resolution process has begun. Check `idvRequired` to determine next steps. | Stop polling. If `idvRequired` is `false`, call the complete endpoint. If `true`, begin the IDV flow. |
| `IDV_REQUIRED` | The wallet holder is unknown and identity verification must be performed before completion. | Stop polling. Redirect user to the IDV flow. |
| `COMPLETED` | The session is fully resolved. Claims are available via the complete endpoint. | Stop polling. Call the complete endpoint. |
| `EXPIRED` | The session has timed out. The default timeout is 5 minutes from creation. | Stop polling. Show an expiration message. Offer to create a new session. |
| `ERROR` | Verification or processing failed. | Stop polling. Show an error message. Offer to retry. |

## Error Responses

All error responses follow a consistent JSON structure:

```json
{
  "error": "session_not_found",
  "error_description": "No OID4VP session exists with the given identifier"
}
```

| HTTP Status | Error Code | When It Occurs |
|---|---|---|
| `404 Not Found` | `session_not_found` | The `sessionId` does not match any known session. The session may have been cleaned up after expiration. |
| `409 Conflict` | `invalid_session_state` | The operation is not valid for the session's current status. For example, calling `complete` on a session that is still in `CREATED` status. |
| `410 Gone` | `session_expired` | The session existed but has expired. Unlike `404`, this confirms the session did exist. The client should create a new session. |
| `400 Bad Request` | `invalid_request` | The request body is malformed or missing required fields. |
| `500 Internal Server Error` | `server_error` | An unexpected error occurred during processing. The error is logged server-side for investigation. |

## DCQL Query Configuration

The `queryId` parameter in the session creation request references a named DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) query defined in the Auth Bridge configuration. DCQL is the mechanism used in OpenID4VP to specify which credentials and claims the verifier (Auth Bridge) wants the wallet to present.

A typical configuration entry looks like this:

```yaml
oid4vp:
  queries:
    portal-eduid-vc:
      credentials:
        - id: "eduid-credential"
          format: "jwt_vc"
          type: "EduIDCredential"
          claims:
            - path: "$.credentialSubject.eduid"
              required: true
            - path: "$.credentialSubject.eduperson_principal_name"
              required: true
            - path: "$.credentialSubject.email"
              required: false
            - path: "$.credentialSubject.given_name"
              required: false
            - path: "$.credentialSubject.family_name"
              required: false
          trusted_issuers:
            - "did:web:eduid.nl"
            - "did:web:test.eduid.nl"
```

This configuration tells the Auth Bridge to request a `jwt_vc`-format credential of type `EduIDCredential`, requiring at minimum the `eduid` and `eduperson_principal_name` claims, while optionally requesting `email`, `given_name`, and `family_name`. Only credentials issued by the listed trusted issuers will be accepted.

The query configuration is entirely server-side. The frontend does not need to know which credentials are being requested; it simply passes the `queryId` and lets the Auth Bridge handle the rest. This separation of concerns keeps the presentation logic out of the browser and allows the credential requirements to be changed without redeploying the frontend.

---

# IDV Reconciliation API

# IDV Reconciliation API

When a wallet holder presents a verifiable credential but has no existing identity binding in the system, the Auth Bridge cannot resolve their institutional identity. The IDV (Identity Verification) Reconciliation API handles this gap by orchestrating an out-of-band verification flow -- typically an OIDC authentication against an institutional identity provider like SURFconext -- that establishes the link between the wallet credential and the institutional identity.

All IDV endpoints are scoped to a specific OID4VP session and live under the base path `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{sessionId}/idv` on the Auth Bridge (port `8090`). The one exception is the OIDC callback endpoint, which uses a fixed path that the external identity provider redirects to.

## POST /auth/oid4vp/sessions/\{sessionId\}/idv/initiate

Starts the identity verification flow by generating an OIDC authorization request for the configured identity provider (e.g., SURFconext). The Auth Bridge creates a PKCE challenge, generates state and nonce parameters, and returns a fully formed authorization URL that the frontend should redirect the user's browser to.

### Path Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `sessionId` | string (UUID) | The OID4VP session that requires identity verification. The session must be in `VERIFIED` or `IDV_REQUIRED` status. |

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "reconciliationSessionId": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890",
  "authorizationUrl": "https://connect.test.surfconext.nl/oidc/authorize?client_id=portal-auth-bridge&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fauth-bridge.example.com%2Fauth%2Foid4vp%2Fidv%2Fcallback&response_type=code&scope=openid+profile+email+eduid&code_challenge=E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM&code_challenge_method=S256&state=xyz123&nonce=abc456",
  "providerId": "surf"
}
```

| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `reconciliationSessionId` | string (UUID) | A unique identifier for this reconciliation attempt. Used internally to correlate the OIDC callback with the correct OID4VP session. |
| `authorizationUrl` | string | The complete OIDC authorization URL. The frontend must redirect the user's browser to this URL. The user will authenticate at SURFconext (or whichever provider is configured), and the provider will redirect back to the Auth Bridge callback endpoint. |
| `providerId` | string | An identifier for the identity provider being used. Currently always `"surf"` for the SURFconext integration. |

### What the Frontend Should Do

After receiving this response, the frontend should redirect the user's browser to the `authorizationUrl`. This takes the user away from the portal and into the SURFconext login flow. The frontend should persist the `sessionId` and `reconciliationSessionId` (e.g., in session storage or in the URL state) so it can resume polling after the user returns.

```typescript
const initiateIdv = async (sessionId: string) => {
  const response = await fetch(`/api/wallet/sessions/${sessionId}/idv/initiate`, {
    method: 'POST',
  });

  const data = await response.json();

  // Persist session info for after the redirect
  sessionStorage.setItem('idv_session_id', sessionId);
  sessionStorage.setItem('idv_reconciliation_id', data.reconciliationSessionId);

  // Redirect the browser to the identity provider
  window.location.href = data.authorizationUrl;
};
```

### Internal PKCE and State Management

The Auth Bridge generates a fresh PKCE `code_verifier` and `code_challenge` pair for each IDV initiation. The `code_verifier` is stored server-side alongside the reconciliation session and is never exposed to the frontend. The `state` parameter is a signed, opaque token that encodes the OID4VP session ID and reconciliation session ID, ensuring that the callback can be matched to the correct session even if multiple reconciliations are in progress simultaneously.

## GET /auth/oid4vp/idv/callback

This endpoint is called by the external identity provider (SURFconext) after the user has authenticated -- it is not called by the frontend. The identity provider redirects the user's browser here with an authorization code and state parameter.

### Query Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `code` | string | The authorization code issued by the identity provider. |
| `state` | string | The state parameter that was sent in the authorization request. Contains the encrypted session correlation data. |

### Processing Steps

When the callback arrives, the Auth Bridge performs the following sequence:

1. **Validate state**: Decrypts and verifies the `state` parameter to recover the OID4VP session ID and reconciliation session ID. Rejects the request if the state is invalid, expired, or has already been used (replay protection).

2. **Exchange code for tokens**: Sends the authorization `code` to the identity provider's token endpoint, along with the stored PKCE `code_verifier`, the `client_id`, and the `client_secret`. This exchange happens server-to-server, never through the browser.

3. **Validate ID token**: Verifies the signature of the returned ID token against the identity provider's JWKS endpoint. Checks the `iss`, `aud`, `exp`, `nonce`, and other standard claims.

4. **Extract claims**: Reads the identity claims from the ID token (and optionally from the UserInfo endpoint). The critical claims for reconciliation are:
   - `eduid` -- the user's eduID identifier
   - `eduperson_principal_name` -- the institutional principal name
   - `email` -- the user's email address
   - `sub` -- the identity provider's subject identifier

5. **Create identity records**: Stores the extracted claims as a new identity record and creates a binding that links the wallet credential's holder DID to this institutional identity.

6. **Encrypt resolved identity**: Packages the resolved identity into an encrypted token that the session completion endpoint will use to construct the final claims.

7. **Redirect the user**: After processing, the Auth Bridge redirects the user's browser back to the portal frontend, typically to a page that resumes the wallet authentication flow.

### Callback Redirect

After successful processing, the browser is redirected to:

```
https://portal.example.com/wallet/callback?session={sessionId}&status=success
```

On error, the redirect includes an error indicator:

```
https://portal.example.com/wallet/callback?session={sessionId}&status=error&reason=token_exchange_failed
```

## GET /auth/oid4vp/sessions/\{sessionId\}/idv/status

Checks the current status of the IDV reconciliation flow. The frontend polls this endpoint after the user returns from the identity provider to determine whether the reconciliation completed successfully.

### Path Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `sessionId` | string (UUID) | The OID4VP session ID. |

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "reconciliationStatus": "COMPLETED",
  "errorMessage": null
}
```

| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `reconciliationStatus` | string (enum) | The current status of the IDV reconciliation. See the status table below. |
| `errorMessage` | string or null | A human-readable error description when the status is `ERROR`. Null for all other statuses. |

### IDV Status Values

| Status | Description |
|---|---|
| `CREATED` | The IDV reconciliation has been initiated but the user has not yet been redirected to the identity provider. |
| `REDIRECTED` | The user's browser has been redirected to the identity provider's authorization endpoint. The Auth Bridge is waiting for the callback. |
| `CALLBACK_RECEIVED` | The identity provider has redirected back to the callback endpoint and the Auth Bridge is processing the authorization code. |
| `COMPLETED` | The identity verification succeeded. The claims were extracted, identity records were created, and the wallet-to-identity binding was established. The OID4VP session can now be completed. |
| `ERROR` | The identity verification failed. Check `errorMessage` for details. Common causes include token exchange failure, invalid ID token, or missing required claims. |

### Polling Example

After the user returns from SURFconext, the frontend should poll the IDV status before attempting to complete the session:

```typescript
const waitForIdvCompletion = async (sessionId: string): Promise<void> => {
  const MAX_ATTEMPTS = 30;
  const POLL_INTERVAL_MS = 2000;

  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < MAX_ATTEMPTS; attempt++) {
    const response = await fetch(`/api/wallet/sessions/${sessionId}/idv/status`);
    const data = await response.json();

    if (data.reconciliationStatus === 'COMPLETED') {
      return; // IDV succeeded, session can be completed
    }

    if (data.reconciliationStatus === 'ERROR') {
      throw new Error(`IDV failed: ${data.errorMessage}`);
    }

    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, POLL_INTERVAL_MS));
  }

  throw new Error('IDV polling timed out');
};
```

## POST /auth/oid4vp/sessions/\{sessionId\}/idv/submit

Submits the reconciliation for final processing. This endpoint is used when manual confirmation is required -- for example, when the system detects a potential match but wants the user to confirm that the institutional identity belongs to them before creating the binding.

### Path Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `sessionId` | string (UUID) | The OID4VP session ID. |

### Request Body

```json
{
  "confirmed": true,
  "selectedMatchId": "optional-match-id-if-multiple-candidates"
}
```

| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `confirmed` | boolean | Yes | Whether the user confirms the identity match. If `false`, the reconciliation is aborted and a new IDV attempt can be started. |
| `selectedMatchId` | string | No | When multiple potential identity matches are found, this field specifies which one the user has selected. |

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "reconciliationStatus": "COMPLETED",
  "message": "Identity binding created successfully"
}
```

After a successful submit, the OID4VP session status transitions to `COMPLETED` and the session's complete endpoint will return a `200` response with full identity claims.

## Complete IDV Flow Walkthrough

The following sequence describes the entire IDV reconciliation flow from the frontend's perspective, from the moment the wallet session reports that IDV is required to the point where the user is fully authenticated.

```typescript
const handleWalletLoginWithIdv = async () => {
  // Step 1: Create OID4VP session and display QR code
  const session = await createWalletSession('portal-eduid-vc');
  displayQrCode(session.qrCodeDataUri);

  // Step 2: Poll until session reaches a terminal status
  const status = await pollSessionStatus(session.sessionId);

  if (status.status === 'VERIFIED' && !status.idvRequired) {
    // Happy path: known holder, complete immediately
    const result = await completeSession(session.sessionId);
    onAuthenticated(result);
    return;
  }

  if (status.status === 'VERIFIED' && status.idvRequired) {
    // Unknown holder: start IDV reconciliation
    showMessage('Please authenticate with your institution to link your wallet.');

    // Step 3: Initiate IDV and redirect to SURFconext
    const idv = await initiateIdv(session.sessionId);
    // This redirects the browser away from the portal
    window.location.href = idv.authorizationUrl;
    return; // Browser navigates away here
  }

  // Handle other terminal states
  if (status.status === 'EXPIRED') {
    showError('Session expired. Please try again.');
  } else if (status.status === 'ERROR') {
    showError('Wallet verification failed. Please try again.');
  }
};

// This function runs when the user returns from SURFconext
const handleIdvCallback = async () => {
  const sessionId = sessionStorage.getItem('idv_session_id');
  if (!sessionId) {
    showError('Session context lost. Please start over.');
    return;
  }

  // Step 4: Wait for IDV to complete
  try {
    await waitForIdvCompletion(sessionId);
  } catch (error) {
    showError(`Identity verification failed: ${error.message}`);
    return;
  }

  // Step 5: Complete the OID4VP session (now with resolved identity)
  const result = await completeSession(sessionId);
  onAuthenticated(result);
};
```

## Error Handling

### SURFconext Authentication Failure

If the user cancels the SURFconext login or the authentication fails at the identity provider, the callback endpoint receives an error response instead of an authorization code. The Auth Bridge sets the IDV status to `ERROR` with a descriptive message:

```json
{
  "reconciliationStatus": "ERROR",
  "errorMessage": "Identity provider authentication failed: user_cancelled"
}
```

The frontend should display an appropriate message and offer the user the option to retry the IDV flow from the beginning.

### Session Expiry During IDV

OID4VP sessions have a configurable timeout (default: 5 minutes). If the user takes too long at the SURFconext login, the underlying OID4VP session may expire. When this happens, the IDV callback will fail because the session is no longer valid:

```json
{
  "reconciliationStatus": "ERROR",
  "errorMessage": "OID4VP session has expired. Please start a new wallet authentication."
}
```

To mitigate this, the session timeout should be configured generously enough to account for the time the user spends at the identity provider. A timeout of 10 to 15 minutes is recommended for deployments that use IDV reconciliation.

### Attribute Mapping Failure

The Auth Bridge expects certain claims from the identity provider's ID token (at minimum, `eduid` or `sub`). If these claims are missing, the reconciliation fails:

```json
{
  "reconciliationStatus": "ERROR",
  "errorMessage": "Required claim 'eduid' not present in identity provider response"
}
```

This typically indicates a misconfiguration in the OIDC scope or a change in the identity provider's claim mapping. The error should be escalated to an administrator.

### Duplicate Binding Detection

If the institutional identity extracted during IDV is already bound to a different wallet, the Auth Bridge raises a conflict:

```json
{
  "reconciliationStatus": "ERROR",
  "errorMessage": "Institutional identity is already bound to a different wallet holder"
}
```

This situation requires manual intervention or an explicit unbinding of the previous wallet before the new binding can be created.

---

# External Reconciliation API

# External Reconciliation API

The External Reconciliation API enables authorized third-party systems -- such as student information systems, learning management platforms, or institutional enrollment services -- to interact with reconciled identity data managed by the Auth Bridge. Unlike the OID4VP Session and IDV APIs, which are designed for internal service-to-service communication, this API is explicitly designed for consumption by external clients.

All endpoints live under the base path `/api/external/v1/reconciliation` on the Auth Bridge (port `8090`). Every request must include a valid OAuth2 bearer token obtained through the `client_credentials` grant. The API enforces per-client projection rules that restrict which claims and auxiliary data categories each client can access.

## Authentication

External clients authenticate using OAuth2 bearer tokens. The typical flow is:

1. The client obtains an access token from the configured OAuth2 authorization server (e.g., Keycloak or the STS) using the `client_credentials` grant with the scope `reconciliation:read`.
2. The client includes the token in the `Authorization` header of every API request.
3. The Auth Bridge validates the JWT against the configured JWKS endpoint, checks the issuer, audience, expiration, and scopes.

### Obtaining a Token

```bash
curl -X POST https://keycloak.example.com/realms/portal/protocol/openid-connect/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "grant_type=client_credentials" \
  -d "client_id=enrollment-service" \
  -d "client_secret=<secret>" \
  -d "scope=reconciliation:read"
```

Response:

```json
{
  "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9...",
  "token_type": "Bearer",
  "expires_in": 300,
  "scope": "reconciliation:read"
}
```

### Using the Token

```bash
curl -X GET https://auth-bridge.example.com/api/external/v1/reconciliation/{id}/claims \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9..."
```

If the token is missing, expired, or lacks the required scope, the API responds with `401 Unauthorized` or `403 Forbidden`.

## Per-Client Projection Configuration

A key security feature of the External API is per-client projection. Each registered client is configured with explicit lists of which identity claims and auxiliary data categories it is allowed to access. The Auth Bridge enforces these restrictions server-side; even if a client requests data outside its projection, the response will only contain the authorized subset.

The configuration lives in the Auth Bridge's `application.yml`:

```yaml
external-api:
  enabled: true
  jwt:
    issuer: "http://keycloak:8080/realms/portal"
    jwks-uri: "http://keycloak:8080/realms/portal/protocol/openid-connect/certs"
  clients:
    enrollment-service:
      scopes: ["reconciliation:read"]
      projected-claims: ["eduid", "eduperson_principal_name", "email"]
      auxiliary-categories: ["enrollment", "role"]
    analytics-platform:
      scopes: ["reconciliation:read"]
      projected-claims: ["eduid"]
      auxiliary-categories: ["enrollment"]
```

In this example, `enrollment-service` can access three identity claims and two auxiliary data categories, while `analytics-platform` can only see the `eduid` claim and `enrollment` auxiliary data. The client identity is extracted from the `azp` (authorized party) or `client_id` claim in the JWT. If a client is not listed in the configuration, all requests are rejected with `403 Forbidden`.

This projection model follows the principle of least privilege: each client receives only the data it needs to perform its function, reducing the blast radius of a compromised credential.

## POST /lookup

Looks up an identity by a hashed identifier. This is the primary entry point for external systems that know a user's wallet key or credential identifier but need to resolve it to the internal identity record.

### Request

```json
{
  "identifierHash": "dGhpcyBpcyBhIGJhc2U2NHVybC1lbmNvZGVkLWhtYWMtaGFzaA",
  "identifierType": "KEY"
}
```

| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `identifierHash` | string | Yes | A Base64url-encoded HMAC-SHA256 hash of the identifier. The caller computes this hash using a shared HMAC key that has been exchanged out-of-band. This design ensures that raw identifiers are never transmitted over the wire. |
| `identifierType` | string | Yes | The type of identifier being looked up. Supported values: `KEY` (wallet holder key/DID), `EDUID` (eduID URN), `EPPN` (eduPersonPrincipalName). |

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "internalIdentityId": "f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479",
  "claims": {
    "eduid": "urn:mace:surf.nl:eduid:12345",
    "email": "student@institution.nl"
  },
  "auxiliaryCategories": ["enrollment"],
  "assurance": {
    "acr": "urn:sphereon:oid4vp:vp",
    "amr": ["vp"]
  }
}
```

| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `internalIdentityId` | string (UUID) | The internal identity ID. Use this to call the other endpoints for this identity. |
| `claims` | object | The identity claims, filtered to only those allowed by the client's projection configuration. |
| `auxiliaryCategories` | array of strings | The auxiliary data categories that have data stored for this identity, filtered to those the client is allowed to access. |
| `assurance` | object | Authentication assurance metadata describing how the identity was verified. |

### Response (404 Not Found)

```json
{
  "error": "identity_not_found",
  "error_description": "No identity record matches the provided identifier hash"
}
```

### HMAC Hash Computation

The caller is responsible for computing the HMAC-SHA256 hash of the identifier before sending it to the API. The shared HMAC key is provisioned during client onboarding and must be stored securely. Here is an example in Python:

```python
import hmac
import hashlib
import base64

shared_key = b"your-shared-hmac-key"
identifier = b"did:key:z6Mkf5rGMoatrSj1f..."

hash_bytes = hmac.new(shared_key, identifier, hashlib.sha256).digest()
identifier_hash = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(hash_bytes).rstrip(b"=").decode("ascii")

# Use identifier_hash in the lookup request
```

## GET /\{internalIdentityId\}

Retrieves the full identity record for a given internal identity ID. The response includes claims (subject to projection), auxiliary data category availability, assurance metadata, and binding information.

### Path Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `internalIdentityId` | string (UUID) | The internal identity identifier, obtained from the lookup endpoint or from a previous API call. |

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "internalIdentityId": "f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479",
  "claims": {
    "eduid": "urn:mace:surf.nl:eduid:12345",
    "eduperson_principal_name": "student@institution.nl",
    "email": "student@institution.nl"
  },
  "auxiliaryCategories": ["enrollment", "role"],
  "assurance": {
    "acr": "urn:sphereon:oid4vp:vp",
    "amr": ["vp"]
  },
  "bindings": {
    "walletBound": true,
    "federationBound": true,
    "lastAuthenticatedAt": "2026-03-27T10:30:00Z"
  }
}
```

## GET /\{internalIdentityId\}/claims

Retrieves only the projected identity claims for this identity, without binding or auxiliary metadata. This is a lightweight endpoint for systems that only need to resolve claim values.

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "eduid": "urn:mace:surf.nl:eduid:12345",
  "eduperson_principal_name": "student@institution.nl",
  "email": "student@institution.nl"
}
```

The response body is a flat JSON object containing only the claims that the calling client is authorized to see. If the client's projection allows `["eduid", "email"]` but not `eduperson_principal_name`, the response would omit that field entirely.

## GET /\{internalIdentityId\}/auxiliary/\{category\}

Retrieves auxiliary data stored under a specific category for this identity. Auxiliary data is arbitrary JSON that external systems store alongside the reconciled identity to enrich it with domain-specific information.

### Path Parameters

| Parameter | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `internalIdentityId` | string (UUID) | The internal identity identifier. |
| `category` | string | The auxiliary data category (e.g., `enrollment`, `role`, `preferences`). Must be in the client's allowed `auxiliary-categories` list. |

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "category": "enrollment",
  "data": {
    "enrollment_status": "active",
    "programme": "Computer Science",
    "institution": "University of Amsterdam",
    "start_date": "2025-09-01"
  },
  "storedBy": "enrollment-service",
  "storedAt": "2026-03-15T14:22:00Z",
  "expiresAt": "2027-01-01T00:00:00Z"
}
```

### Response (404 Not Found)

Returned if no auxiliary data exists under the specified category for this identity, or if the client is not authorized to access the category.

## PUT /\{internalIdentityId\}/auxiliary/\{category\}

Stores or updates auxiliary data for a specific category. If data already exists under this category for this identity, it is replaced entirely (not merged). The `storedBy` field is automatically set to the calling client's identifier.

### Request Body

```json
{
  "data": {
    "enrollment_status": "active",
    "programme": "Computer Science",
    "institution": "University of Amsterdam",
    "start_date": "2025-09-01"
  },
  "expiresAt": "2027-01-01T00:00:00Z"
}
```

| Field | Type | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `data` | object | Yes | Arbitrary JSON data to store. The structure is entirely defined by the calling system; the Auth Bridge treats it as an opaque blob. Maximum size is 64 KB. |
| `expiresAt` | string (ISO 8601) | No | Optional expiration timestamp. After this time, the data is eligible for automatic cleanup. If omitted, the data does not expire. |

### Response (200 OK)

```json
{
  "category": "enrollment",
  "storedBy": "enrollment-service",
  "storedAt": "2026-03-27T11:00:00Z",
  "expiresAt": "2027-01-01T00:00:00Z"
}
```

### Response (201 Created)

Returned when the auxiliary category did not previously exist for this identity. The response body is identical to the `200` case.

## DELETE /\{internalIdentityId\}/auxiliary/\{category\}

Deletes all auxiliary data stored under a specific category for this identity. This operation is idempotent; calling it when no data exists returns `204 No Content` without error.

### Response (204 No Content)

No response body. The auxiliary data has been deleted (or did not exist).

## DELETE /\{internalIdentityId\}

**GDPR erasure endpoint.** Permanently and irreversibly deletes all data associated with this identity, including:

- All `identity_match` records (the reconciled identity claims)
- All `identity_link_binding` records (the wallet-to-identity and federation-to-identity links)
- All `auxiliary_data` records across every category
- All session artifacts and cached tokens related to this identity

This operation is designed to fulfill GDPR Article 17 (Right to Erasure) requests. It is **irreversible** -- once executed, the identity cannot be recovered. The user would need to go through the full wallet authentication and IDV reconciliation flow again to re-establish their identity in the system.

### Response (204 No Content)

No response body. All data has been deleted.

### Audit Trail

Even though the identity data itself is deleted, the Auth Bridge logs an audit event recording that an erasure was performed, who requested it (the client ID from the JWT), the internal identity ID that was erased, and the timestamp. This audit log is retained separately for compliance purposes and does not contain any personal data.

```
[AUDIT] GDPR_ERASURE client=enrollment-service identity=f47ac10b-58cc-4372-a567-0e02b2c3d479 timestamp=2026-03-27T12:00:00Z
```

### Safety Considerations

Because this operation is destructive and irreversible, consider the following:

- Ensure the calling client has been explicitly authorized for erasure operations. The `reconciliation:read` scope alone is not sufficient; a separate `reconciliation:delete` scope (or equivalent policy) should be required.
- Implement a confirmation step in the calling system's workflow before invoking this endpoint.
- Test erasure behavior in a staging environment before enabling it in production.

## Common Error Responses

All endpoints share a consistent error response format:

```json
{
  "error": "error_code",
  "error_description": "Human-readable description of the problem"
}
```

| HTTP Status | Error Code | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `400 Bad Request` | `invalid_request` | The request body is malformed or missing required fields. |
| `401 Unauthorized` | `invalid_token` | The bearer token is missing, expired, or has an invalid signature. |
| `403 Forbidden` | `insufficient_scope` | The token does not include the required scope, or the client is not configured for this API. |
| `403 Forbidden` | `category_not_allowed` | The client attempted to access an auxiliary category outside its projection. |
| `404 Not Found` | `identity_not_found` | No identity exists with the given internal ID. |
| `404 Not Found` | `auxiliary_not_found` | No auxiliary data exists under the requested category. |
| `413 Payload Too Large` | `data_too_large` | The auxiliary data payload exceeds the 64 KB limit. |
| `429 Too Many Requests` | `rate_limited` | The client has exceeded the configured rate limit. Retry after the duration indicated in the `Retry-After` header. |
| `500 Internal Server Error` | `server_error` | An unexpected error occurred. Logged server-side for investigation. |

---

# STS (OAuth2/OIDC) Endpoints

# STS (OAuth2/OIDC) Endpoints

The Security Token Service (STS) is a lightweight OAuth2 / OpenID Connect authorization server that issues and manages tokens for the eduID Wallet Matching Portal. It acts as the single point of trust for token issuance: the portal frontend obtains its access and refresh tokens from the STS, and any service that needs to verify a token checks its signature against the STS's published JWKS.

The STS base URL is configured via the `STS_ISSUER_URL` environment variable. In the default Docker Compose deployment, the STS container listens on port `8080` internally but is mapped to **port `8092`** on the host. This means:

- Inside the Docker network: `http://sts:8080`
- From the host or browser: `http://localhost:8092`

All OIDC-standard paths are relative to this base URL.

## Discovery

The STS publishes its full configuration at the standard OpenID Connect discovery endpoint. Any OIDC-compliant client library can auto-configure itself by fetching this document.

### GET /.well-known/openid-configuration

```bash
curl http://localhost:8092/.well-known/openid-configuration
```

Response (abbreviated):

```json
{
  "issuer": "http://localhost:8092",
  "authorization_endpoint": "http://localhost:8092/authorize",
  "token_endpoint": "http://localhost:8092/token",
  "introspection_endpoint": "http://localhost:8092/introspect",
  "revocation_endpoint": "http://localhost:8092/revoke",
  "jwks_uri": "http://localhost:8092/.well-known/jwks.json",
  "userinfo_endpoint": "http://localhost:8092/userinfo",
  "response_types_supported": ["code"],
  "grant_types_supported": ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"],
  "subject_types_supported": ["public"],
  "id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": ["RS256"],
  "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": ["client_secret_basic", "client_secret_post"],
  "code_challenge_methods_supported": ["S256"],
  "scopes_supported": ["openid", "profile", "email", "eduid", "offline_access"]
}
```

### GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server

The STS also publishes OAuth2 Authorization Server Metadata per [RFC 8414](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414). This document contains the same information as the OpenID discovery document but follows the OAuth2 metadata format. Most clients will use the OpenID discovery endpoint, but this is available for OAuth2-only clients that do not support OpenID Connect discovery.

## Standard Endpoints

| Endpoint | Method | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| `/authorize` | GET | Authorization code request (PKCE required) |
| `/token` | POST | Token exchange (`authorization_code`, `refresh_token`) |
| `/introspect` | POST | Token introspection ([RFC 7662](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662)) |
| `/revoke` | POST | Token revocation ([RFC 7009](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7009)) |
| `/.well-known/jwks.json` | GET | JSON Web Key Set for token signature verification |
| `/userinfo` | GET | OpenID Connect UserInfo endpoint |
| `/.well-known/openid-configuration` | GET | OpenID Connect Discovery document |
| `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` | GET | OAuth2 server metadata ([RFC 8414](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8414)) |

## Authorization Code Flow with PKCE

The STS requires PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) for all authorization code flows. Plain authorization code grants without PKCE are rejected. This is a security best practice that prevents authorization code interception attacks.

### Step 1: Generate PKCE Parameters

The client generates a random `code_verifier` (43-128 characters, URL-safe) and derives the `code_challenge` from it using SHA-256:

```typescript
import crypto from 'crypto';

const codeVerifier = crypto.randomBytes(32).toString('base64url');
const codeChallenge = crypto
  .createHash('sha256')
  .update(codeVerifier)
  .digest('base64url');
```

### Step 2: Authorization Request

Redirect the user's browser to the authorization endpoint with the required parameters:

```
GET /authorize?
  response_type=code
  &client_id=portal-frontend
  &redirect_uri=http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/sts
  &scope=openid profile email eduid offline_access
  &state=random-state-value
  &nonce=random-nonce-value
  &code_challenge=E9Melhoa2OwvFrEMTJguCHaoeK1t8URWbuGJSstw-cM
  &code_challenge_method=S256
```

| Parameter | Required | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `response_type` | Yes | Must be `code`. |
| `client_id` | Yes | The registered client identifier. |
| `redirect_uri` | Yes | Must exactly match a registered redirect URI for this client. |
| `scope` | Yes | Space-separated scopes. `openid` is required for OIDC. `offline_access` requests a refresh token. |
| `state` | Recommended | An opaque value for CSRF protection. The STS returns it unchanged in the callback. |
| `nonce` | Recommended | A random value bound to the session. Included in the ID token for replay protection. |
| `code_challenge` | Yes | The PKCE challenge derived from the `code_verifier`. |
| `code_challenge_method` | Yes | Must be `S256`. |
| `login_hint` | No | Optional hint that influences the authentication method. See [Authentication Paths](#authentication-paths). |

### Step 3: Token Exchange

After the user authenticates, the STS redirects back to the `redirect_uri` with an authorization `code`. The client exchanges this code for tokens:

```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:8092/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "grant_type=authorization_code" \
  -d "code=SplxlOBeZQQYbYS6WxSbIA" \
  -d "redirect_uri=http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/sts" \
  -d "client_id=portal-frontend" \
  -d "client_secret=portal-frontend-secret" \
  -d "code_verifier=dBjftJeZ4CVP-mB92K27uhbUJU1p1r_wW1gFWFOEjXk"
```

### Token Response

```json
{
  "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwOi8vbG9jYWxob3N0OjgwOTIiLCJzdWIiOiJpbnRlcm5hbC1pZGVudGl0eS1pZCIsImF1ZCI6InBvcnRhbC1mcm9udGVuZCIsImV4cCI6MTcxMTUzNjIwMCwiaWF0IjoxNzExNTMyNjAwLCJzY29wZSI6Im9wZW5pZCBwcm9maWxlIGVtYWlsIGVkdWlkIn0.signature",
  "token_type": "Bearer",
  "expires_in": 3600,
  "refresh_token": "tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA",
  "id_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJodHRwOi8vbG9jYWxob3N0OjgwOTIiLCJzdWIiOiJpbnRlcm5hbC1pZGVudGl0eS1pZCIsImF1ZCI6InBvcnRhbC1mcm9udGVuZCIsImV4cCI6MTcxMTUzNjIwMCwiaWF0IjoxNzExNTMyNjAwLCJub25jZSI6InJhbmRvbS1ub25jZS12YWx1ZSIsImVkdWlkIjoidXJuOm1hY2U6c3VyZi5ubDplZHVpZDoxMjM0NSJ9.signature",
  "scope": "openid profile email eduid offline_access"
}
```

The `access_token` is a signed JWT containing the following claims:

| Claim | Description |
|---|---|
| `iss` | The STS issuer URL. |
| `sub` | The internal identity ID of the authenticated user. |
| `aud` | The client ID that requested the token. |
| `exp` | Token expiration time (Unix timestamp). |
| `iat` | Token issuance time (Unix timestamp). |
| `scope` | The granted scopes. |
| `eduid` | The user's eduID (if the `eduid` scope was granted). |
| `acr` | Authentication Context Class Reference (e.g., `urn:sphereon:oid4vp:vp` for wallet login). |
| `amr` | Authentication Methods References (e.g., `["vp"]` for wallet, `["federation"]` for institutional login). |

## Token Configuration

The STS token lifetimes and security parameters are configured in its `application.yml`:

| Parameter | Default Value | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Access token lifetime | `3600` seconds (1 hour) | How long an access token remains valid. |
| Refresh token lifetime | `86400` seconds (24 hours) | How long a refresh token remains valid. |
| ID token lifetime | `3600` seconds (1 hour) | How long an ID token remains valid. |
| PKCE required | `true` | Authorization code grants without PKCE are rejected. |
| DPoP (Demonstrating Proof-of-Possession) | `false` | DPoP is disabled for the proof-of-concept. May be enabled in production. |
| Signing algorithm | `RS256` | The algorithm used to sign JWTs. The corresponding public key is published via JWKS. |

## Refresh Token Rotation

The STS implements refresh token rotation for security. Each time a refresh token is used to obtain a new access token, the STS issues a **new** refresh token and invalidates the old one. This limits the window of exposure if a refresh token is compromised.

```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:8092/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "grant_type=refresh_token" \
  -d "refresh_token=tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA" \
  -d "client_id=portal-frontend" \
  -d "client_secret=portal-frontend-secret"
```

Response:

```json
{
  "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs...<new access token>",
  "token_type": "Bearer",
  "expires_in": 3600,
  "refresh_token": "dGhpcyBpcyBhIG5ldyByZWZyZXNoIHRva2Vu",
  "scope": "openid profile email eduid offline_access"
}
```

Note that the response includes a **new** `refresh_token`. The client must store this new token and discard the old one. If the old refresh token is used again (for example, by an attacker who intercepted it), the STS detects the reuse, revokes the entire token family, and forces re-authentication. This is known as **refresh token reuse detection** and provides a strong defense against token theft.

## Authentication Paths

The STS supports two distinct authentication paths, selected based on how the authorization request is initiated.

### 1. Federation (Upstream OIDC)

The standard authentication path uses an upstream OIDC identity provider (e.g., SURFconext) for institutional login. When the user navigates to the `/authorize` endpoint without a wallet-specific `login_hint`, the STS initiates an OIDC authorization code flow with the configured upstream provider. The user authenticates at the institution, and the STS receives the institutional identity claims.

This path sets `acr` to the upstream provider's assurance level and `amr` to `["federation"]`.

### 2. Wallet (Delegation to Auth Bridge)

When the authorization request includes a `login_hint` in the format `oid4vp:{sessionId}`, the STS delegates authentication to the Auth Bridge's OID4VP Session API. Instead of redirecting the user to an upstream OIDC provider, the STS renders the wallet QR code page and monitors the OID4VP session for completion.

```
GET /authorize?
  response_type=code
  &client_id=portal-frontend
  &redirect_uri=http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/sts-wallet
  &scope=openid profile email eduid offline_access
  &state=random-state-value
  &nonce=random-nonce-value
  &code_challenge=...
  &code_challenge_method=S256
  &login_hint=oid4vp:550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000
```

The `login_hint` parameter tells the STS to:

1. Look up the OID4VP session identified by the UUID after the `oid4vp:` prefix.
2. Wait for the session to reach `COMPLETED` status.
3. Retrieve the resolved identity claims from the Auth Bridge.
4. Issue tokens with `acr` set to `urn:sphereon:oid4vp:vp` and `amr` set to `["vp"]`.

This mechanism allows the STS to remain a standard OIDC provider while supporting wallet-based authentication as an alternative to institutional federation.

## Client Configuration

Clients are registered in the STS's `application.yml`. Each client entry specifies the client credentials, allowed redirect URIs, grant types, and scopes:

```yaml
sts:
  clients:
    portal-frontend:
      client-id: "portal-frontend"
      client-secret: "{noop}portal-frontend-secret"
      redirect-uris:
        - "http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/sts"
        - "http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/sts-wallet"
      grant-types:
        - "authorization_code"
        - "refresh_token"
      scopes:
        - "openid"
        - "profile"
        - "email"
        - "eduid"
        - "offline_access"
      token-settings:
        access-token-time-to-live: "PT1H"
        refresh-token-time-to-live: "PT24H"
      require-pkce: true
```

Key points about client configuration:

- **`{noop}` prefix**: Indicates the client secret is stored in plaintext. In production, use `{bcrypt}` or another supported encoder.
- **Multiple redirect URIs**: The portal registers separate callback URLs for the federation (`/callback/sts`) and wallet (`/callback/sts-wallet`) authentication paths because they use different NextAuth.js provider configurations.
- **`require-pkce: true`**: Enforced per-client. All portal clients must use PKCE.
- **Token lifetimes**: Can be customized per client. The values shown above are suitable for a web application with active session management.

## Token Introspection

Services that receive a bearer token can verify it by calling the introspection endpoint ([RFC 7662](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7662)):

```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:8092/introspect \
  -u "resource-server:resource-server-secret" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "token=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIs..."
```

Response for a valid token:

```json
{
  "active": true,
  "sub": "internal-identity-id",
  "client_id": "portal-frontend",
  "scope": "openid profile email eduid",
  "exp": 1711536200,
  "iat": 1711532600,
  "iss": "http://localhost:8092",
  "token_type": "Bearer"
}
```

Response for an invalid or expired token:

```json
{
  "active": false
}
```

## Token Revocation

Tokens can be explicitly revoked before their natural expiration using the revocation endpoint ([RFC 7009](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7009)):

```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:8092/revoke \
  -u "portal-frontend:portal-frontend-secret" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "token=tGzv3JOkF0XG5Qx2TlKWIA" \
  -d "token_type_hint=refresh_token"
```

The endpoint always returns `200 OK`, regardless of whether the token was found or already revoked. This is by design (per RFC 7009) to prevent token-existence oracle attacks.

---

# Frontend BFF Routes

# Frontend BFF Routes

The eduID Wallet Matching Portal follows the Backend-For-Frontend (BFF) pattern: the browser never communicates directly with the STS or Auth Bridge. Instead, every API call from the browser goes through server-side Next.js API routes running at `http://localhost:3000/api`. These routes authenticate the browser session, attach the appropriate backend credentials, proxy the request to the correct internal service, and return the response.

This architecture provides several important security properties:

- **No token exposure**: Access tokens, refresh tokens, and client secrets never reach client-side JavaScript. They are stored in the server-side session and attached to proxied requests server-side.
- **Reduced attack surface**: The browser only needs to manage an encrypted HTTP-only session cookie. XSS attacks cannot steal tokens they cannot access.
- **Centralized auth logic**: Token refresh, error handling, and retry logic live in one place (the BFF layer) rather than being duplicated across frontend components.
- **Network isolation**: The Auth Bridge and STS can be deployed on an internal network unreachable from the public internet, with only the Next.js server having access.

## API Routes

The following table lists all BFF routes, their HTTP methods, which backend service they proxy to, and their purpose.

| Route | Method | Proxies To | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| `/api/auth/[...nextauth]` | GET, POST | STS OAuth2 endpoints | NextAuth.js catch-all route handling OIDC authorization, callbacks, session management, and sign-out |
| `/api/wallet/sessions` | POST | Auth Bridge `/auth/oid4vp/sessions` | Create a new OID4VP session and receive QR code data |
| `/api/wallet/sessions/{id}/status` | GET | Auth Bridge `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{id}/status` | Poll the current status of a wallet authentication session |
| `/api/wallet/sessions/{id}/complete` | POST | Auth Bridge `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{id}/complete` | Complete a wallet session and retrieve resolved identity claims |
| `/api/wallet/sessions/{id}/idv/initiate` | POST | Auth Bridge `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{id}/idv/initiate` | Start the IDV reconciliation flow for an unknown wallet holder |
| `/api/wallet/sessions/{id}/idv/callback` | GET | Auth Bridge `/auth/oid4vp/idv/callback` | Handle the OIDC callback from the identity provider after IDV |
| `/api/wallet/sessions/{id}/idv/status` | GET | Auth Bridge `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{id}/idv/status` | Poll the status of the IDV reconciliation flow |
| `/api/wallet/sessions/{id}/idv/submit` | POST | Auth Bridge `/auth/oid4vp/sessions/{id}/idv/submit` | Submit IDV reconciliation data for manual confirmation |
| `/api/health` | GET | -- (handled locally) | Health check endpoint returning the portal's status and version |

## NextAuth.js Integration

The portal uses [NextAuth.js](https://next-auth.js.org/) (v4) to manage OIDC authentication with the STS. NextAuth.js handles the authorization code flow, token storage, session management, and automatic token refresh. The catch-all route at `/api/auth/[...nextauth]` handles all NextAuth.js operations.

### Two Providers

The portal registers two distinct NextAuth.js providers, both pointing at the same STS but configured for different authentication paths:

```typescript
import NextAuth from 'next-auth';
import type { NextAuthOptions } from 'next-auth';

export const authOptions: NextAuthOptions = {
  providers: [
    {
      id: 'sts',
      name: 'Institutional Login',
      type: 'oauth',
      wellKnown: `${process.env.STS_ISSUER_URL}/.well-known/openid-configuration`,
      clientId: process.env.STS_CLIENT_ID,
      clientSecret: process.env.STS_CLIENT_SECRET,
      authorization: {
        params: {
          scope: 'openid profile email eduid offline_access',
        },
      },
      idToken: true,
      checks: ['pkce', 'state', 'nonce'],
      profile(profile) {
        return {
          id: profile.sub,
          name: profile.name,
          email: profile.email,
          eduid: profile.eduid,
        };
      },
    },
    {
      id: 'sts-wallet',
      name: 'Wallet Login',
      type: 'oauth',
      wellKnown: `${process.env.STS_ISSUER_URL}/.well-known/openid-configuration`,
      clientId: process.env.STS_CLIENT_ID,
      clientSecret: process.env.STS_CLIENT_SECRET,
      authorization: {
        params: {
          scope: 'openid profile email eduid offline_access',
          login_hint: '', // Set dynamically per request
        },
      },
      idToken: true,
      checks: ['pkce', 'state', 'nonce'],
      profile(profile) {
        return {
          id: profile.sub,
          name: profile.name,
          email: profile.email,
          eduid: profile.eduid,
        };
      },
    },
  ],
  session: {
    strategy: 'jwt',
    maxAge: 24 * 60 * 60, // 24 hours
  },
  callbacks: {
    async jwt({ token, account }) {
      // Persist tokens from the initial sign-in
      if (account) {
        token.accessToken = account.access_token;
        token.refreshToken = account.refresh_token;
        token.idToken = account.id_token;
        token.expiresAt = account.expires_at;
        token.provider = account.provider;
      }
      return token;
    },
    async session({ session, token }) {
      // Expose non-sensitive user info to the frontend
      session.user.id = token.sub;
      session.user.eduid = token.eduid;
      session.provider = token.provider;
      return session;
    },
  },
};

export default NextAuth(authOptions);
```

The **`sts`** provider handles standard institutional login via federation. The **`sts-wallet`** provider handles wallet-based login by passing a `login_hint` of the form `oid4vp:{sessionId}` to the STS authorization endpoint. Both providers use PKCE, state, and nonce checks for security.

### Callback URLs

Each provider has its own callback URL:

- Federation: `http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/sts`
- Wallet: `http://localhost:3000/api/auth/callback/sts-wallet`

These must be registered as allowed redirect URIs in the STS client configuration. The two separate callback paths allow NextAuth.js to route the response to the correct provider handler.

## Session Management

NextAuth.js is configured with the `jwt` session strategy, meaning the session data is stored in an encrypted JWT cookie rather than in a server-side session store. This makes the portal stateless and horizontally scalable.

The JWT session contains:

| Field | Description |
|---|---|
| `sub` | The user's internal identity ID (from the STS `sub` claim). |
| `accessToken` | The STS-issued access token. Used by the BFF when proxying requests to Auth Bridge. |
| `refreshToken` | The STS-issued refresh token. Used to obtain new access tokens when the current one expires. |
| `idToken` | The OIDC ID token. Contains identity claims like `eduid` and `email`. |
| `expiresAt` | The Unix timestamp when the access token expires. The BFF checks this before each proxied request. |
| `provider` | Which authentication path was used (`sts` or `sts-wallet`). |

The session cookie is encrypted using `NEXTAUTH_SECRET`, is marked `HttpOnly` (inaccessible to JavaScript), `Secure` (sent only over HTTPS in production), and `SameSite=Lax` (protects against CSRF in most scenarios).

### Automatic Token Refresh

The BFF layer checks `expiresAt` before proxying each request to Auth Bridge. If the access token has expired (or is about to expire within a configurable grace period), the BFF automatically uses the `refreshToken` to obtain a new access token from the STS before proceeding with the proxied request. This happens transparently; the browser is never aware of token refresh cycles.

## Environment Variables

The following environment variables configure the BFF layer:

| Variable | Required | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `STS_ISSUER_URL` | Yes | -- | The public-facing STS URL used in OIDC discovery and token validation. Example: `http://localhost:8092` |
| `STS_INTERNAL_URL` | No | Same as `STS_ISSUER_URL` | The internal STS URL used for server-to-server communication within Docker. Example: `http://sts:8080` |
| `STS_CLIENT_ID` | Yes | -- | The OAuth2 client ID registered with the STS for the portal frontend. |
| `STS_CLIENT_SECRET` | Yes | -- | The OAuth2 client secret. Must be kept confidential; never exposed to the browser. |
| `AUTH_BRIDGE_URL` | Yes | -- | The Auth Bridge URL used by the BFF for proxying wallet session requests. Example: `http://auth-bridge:8090` |
| `NEXTAUTH_SECRET` | Yes | -- | A random secret used to encrypt the NextAuth.js session JWT. Must be at least 32 characters. Generate with `openssl rand -base64 32`. |
| `NEXTAUTH_URL` | Yes | -- | The canonical URL of the portal. Used by NextAuth.js for callback URL construction. Example: `http://localhost:3000` |
| `AUTH_TRUST_HOST` | No | `false` | When set to `true`, NextAuth.js trusts the `Host` header for URL construction. Required when running behind a reverse proxy. |

### Docker Compose Example

```yaml
portal:
  environment:
    STS_ISSUER_URL: "http://localhost:8092"
    STS_INTERNAL_URL: "http://sts:8080"
    STS_CLIENT_ID: "portal-frontend"
    STS_CLIENT_SECRET: "portal-frontend-secret"
    AUTH_BRIDGE_URL: "http://auth-bridge:8090"
    NEXTAUTH_SECRET: "a-very-long-random-secret-at-least-32-chars"
    NEXTAUTH_URL: "http://localhost:3000"
    AUTH_TRUST_HOST: "true"
```

## Auth Bridge Client

The BFF uses a typed HTTP client to communicate with the Auth Bridge. This client handles URL construction, bearer token attachment, error mapping, and response parsing. Here is a representative implementation:

```typescript
interface AuthBridgeClientConfig {
  baseUrl: string;
}

interface WalletSession {
  sessionId: string;
  qrCodeDataUri: string;
  requestUri: string;
  statusUri: string;
  qrPageUri: string;
}

interface SessionStatus {
  sessionId: string;
  status: string;
  idvRequired: boolean;
  idvRequirementReason: string | null;
  reconciliationPlanType: string | null;
}

class AuthBridgeClient {
  private baseUrl: string;

  constructor(config: AuthBridgeClientConfig) {
    this.baseUrl = config.baseUrl;
  }

  async createSession(
    queryId: string,
    oauthSessionId?: string,
    forceReconciliation?: boolean
  ): Promise<WalletSession> {
    const response = await fetch(`${this.baseUrl}/auth/oid4vp/sessions`, {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
      body: JSON.stringify({ queryId, oauthSessionId, forceReconciliation }),
    });

    if (!response.ok) {
      throw new AuthBridgeError(response.status, await response.json());
    }

    return response.json();
  }

  async getSessionStatus(sessionId: string): Promise<SessionStatus> {
    const response = await fetch(
      `${this.baseUrl}/auth/oid4vp/sessions/${sessionId}/status`
    );

    if (!response.ok) {
      throw new AuthBridgeError(response.status, await response.json());
    }

    return response.json();
  }

  async completeSession(sessionId: string): Promise<any> {
    const response = await fetch(
      `${this.baseUrl}/auth/oid4vp/sessions/${sessionId}/complete`,
      { method: 'POST' }
    );

    if (!response.ok) {
      throw new AuthBridgeError(response.status, await response.json());
    }

    return response.json();
  }

  async initiateIdv(sessionId: string): Promise<any> {
    const response = await fetch(
      `${this.baseUrl}/auth/oid4vp/sessions/${sessionId}/idv/initiate`,
      { method: 'POST' }
    );

    if (!response.ok) {
      throw new AuthBridgeError(response.status, await response.json());
    }

    return response.json();
  }

  async getIdvStatus(sessionId: string): Promise<any> {
    const response = await fetch(
      `${this.baseUrl}/auth/oid4vp/sessions/${sessionId}/idv/status`
    );

    if (!response.ok) {
      throw new AuthBridgeError(response.status, await response.json());
    }

    return response.json();
  }
}

class AuthBridgeError extends Error {
  constructor(
    public statusCode: number,
    public body: { error: string; error_description: string }
  ) {
    super(`Auth Bridge error ${statusCode}: ${body.error_description}`);
  }
}

// Singleton instance used by all BFF routes
export const authBridge = new AuthBridgeClient({
  baseUrl: process.env.AUTH_BRIDGE_URL!,
});
```

Each BFF route handler uses this client to forward requests. For example, the session creation route:

```typescript
// /api/wallet/sessions/route.ts
import { getServerSession } from 'next-auth';
import { authOptions } from '@/app/api/auth/[...nextauth]/route';
import { authBridge } from '@/lib/auth-bridge-client';

export async function POST(request: Request) {
  const session = await getServerSession(authOptions);
  if (!session) {
    return Response.json({ error: 'unauthorized' }, { status: 401 });
  }

  const body = await request.json();
  const walletSession = await authBridge.createSession(
    body.queryId,
    session.user.id,       // correlate with OAuth session
    body.forceReconciliation
  );

  return Response.json(walletSession);
}
```

## CORS Configuration

Because the BFF pattern routes all browser requests through the same origin (`localhost:3000`), cross-origin resource sharing (CORS) is largely a non-issue for the frontend. The browser makes same-origin requests to `/api/*`, and the Next.js server forwards them internally.

However, CORS headers are still relevant in two scenarios:

1. **Development with separate frontend dev server**: If the Next.js development server runs on a different port than the API routes (uncommon with Next.js but possible with custom setups), CORS headers must be configured on the API routes.

2. **Auth Bridge and STS direct access**: The Auth Bridge and STS should **not** set permissive CORS headers in production. These services are internal and should only be accessible from the BFF. Restricting CORS on these services acts as defense-in-depth against misconfigured networks.

In the default deployment, no additional CORS configuration is needed. The Next.js server handles both the frontend assets and the API routes on the same origin, and the backend services are not exposed to browsers.

---

# Database Overview

# Database Overview

PostgreSQL serves as the single persistence layer for the Auth Bridge service in the eduID Wallet Matching Portal. The database schema is deliberately compact, consisting of seven carefully designed tables that together cover the full spectrum of identity matching, reconciliation workflow state, auxiliary institution metadata, cryptographic key migration tracking, and regulatory audit logging.

Every piece of sensitive data stored in these tables is protected at rest. External identifiers are never stored in plaintext; instead, they are transformed through HMAC-SHA256 hashing before being written to any column. Sensitive attributes such as institution identifiers and persisted identity attributes are encrypted using AES-256-GCM before storage. This means that even in the event of a full database breach, an attacker would find only opaque hashes and ciphertext, with no way to recover the original values without simultaneous access to the corresponding cryptographic keys held in the KMS.

## Entity Relationship Diagram

The following diagram illustrates the relationships between all seven tables, their primary keys, foreign key references, and the flow of data through the system.

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-database-erd.svg" alt="Database ERD" style={{maxWidth: '900px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Table Summary

The seven tables each serve a distinct role in the system. The following summary provides a quick reference for what each table holds and whether it contains cryptographically protected data.

| Table | Purpose | Sensitive Data |
|---|---|---|
| `identity_match` | Hash-to-identity lookup index. Maps HMAC-hashed external identifiers to internal identity IDs, enabling fast lookups without exposing the original identifier values. | HMAC-SHA256 hashes of external identifiers |
| `identity_link_binding` | Encrypted holder-institution mapping. Records the binding between a wallet holder and an institutional identity, including encrypted institution identifiers and persisted attribute envelopes. | HMAC hashes (Key A and Key B) plus AES-256-GCM ciphertext (Key C) |
| `reconciliation_session` | IDV session state machine. Tracks the lifecycle of each identity verification reconciliation flow, from authorization URL generation through token exchange to completion or failure. | AES-256-GCM encrypted identity data |
| `reconciliation_provider` | OIDC provider configurations. Stores the configuration for each upstream identity provider used during reconciliation, including client IDs and attribute mappings. | None (configuration data only) |
| `auxiliary_data` | Encrypted institution metadata. Holds supplementary data associated with an identity, such as enrollment information or institutional attributes, encrypted at rest. | AES-256-GCM ciphertext (Key C) |
| `key_migration_history` | Key rotation tracking. Records the progress and outcome of cryptographic key migration operations, enabling operators to monitor and audit key rotation events. | None (operational metadata only) |
| `audit_event` | Append-only audit trail. Captures every significant operation performed by the system, including identity lookups, binding creation, GDPR erasure requests, and key migrations. | HMAC-hashed subject identifiers |

## SqlDelight: Type-Safe Database Access

The database schema is defined using SqlDelight `.sq` files, which are compiled at build time into type-safe Kotlin code. This approach eliminates raw SQL strings from the application codebase entirely, providing several important benefits:

- **Compile-time SQL validation**: Every SQL statement is checked against the schema at compile time. If a query references a column that does not exist or uses an incompatible type, the build fails immediately rather than at runtime.
- **Generated type-safe API**: SqlDelight generates Kotlin data classes for query results and type-safe function signatures for all named queries. This means the compiler enforces that all parameters are supplied and that result columns are accessed with their correct types.
- **IDE auto-completion**: Because the generated code is standard Kotlin, developers get full auto-completion, navigation, and refactoring support in their IDE for all database operations.
- **Schema as source of truth**: The `.sq` files serve as the canonical schema definition. There is no separate migration framework to keep in sync; the schema files are the migrations.

## Connection Pool Configuration

The Auth Bridge service maintains a connection pool to PostgreSQL, configurable through the `database.max-pool-size` property in `application.yml`. The default pool size is 5 connections, which is appropriate for typical development and light production workloads.

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    database:
      url: "jdbc:postgresql://localhost:5432/auth_bridge"
      username: "auth_bridge"
      password: "${env:DB_PASSWORD}"
      max-pool-size: 5
```

The connection pool is managed through the PostgreSQL JDBC driver as configured by SqlDelight's JDBC driver adapter. For production environments with higher concurrency requirements, the pool size should be tuned based on the expected number of concurrent reconciliation sessions and external API requests.

## Multi-Tenancy

The database is designed for multi-tenant operation from the ground up. Every table that holds tenant-specific data includes a `tenant_id` column, and every query that accesses tenant-specific data filters on this column. This design ensures strict data isolation between tenants at the database level.

The multi-tenancy model extends beyond simple row filtering. The HMAC hashing scheme incorporates the tenant ID into the hash computation, which means that even if two tenants happen to have a user with the same external identifier, the resulting hash values will be different. This prevents any possibility of cross-tenant correlation through hash comparison.

Tenant isolation is enforced at the application layer through the query design. Every named SqlDelight query that touches tenant data requires a `tenant_id` parameter, making it impossible to accidentally omit the tenant filter. There is no "superuser" query that bypasses tenant isolation in the application code.

## Further Reading

The remaining pages in this section provide detailed information about each aspect of the database:

- **[Schema Reference](./schema-reference)** -- Complete DDL for all seven tables, including column types, constraints, indexes, and encryption annotations. This is the definitive reference for understanding what each column holds and how tables relate to one another.
- **[GDPR Data Lifecycle](./gdpr-data-lifecycle)** -- Data retention policies, soft delete and hard delete mechanisms, inactive binding cleanup, GDPR Article 17 erasure implementation, and crypto-shredding. This page explains how data flows through its lifecycle from creation to eventual deletion.

---

# Schema Reference

# Schema Reference

This page provides the complete DDL (Data Definition Language) for all seven tables in the Auth Bridge database. Each table definition is accompanied by detailed explanations of its columns, constraints, indexes, and the role of encryption or hashing on specific columns. The SQL shown here mirrors the SqlDelight `.sq` schema files that serve as the canonical source of truth for the database.

All tables use `TEXT` for primary keys, storing UUIDs as strings. Timestamps are stored as ISO-8601 formatted `TEXT` values rather than native PostgreSQL timestamp types, ensuring consistent serialization across all layers of the application. Columns that hold cryptographic material are annotated with comments indicating which key is used for the HMAC or encryption operation.

---

## identity_match

The `identity_match` table is the primary lookup index for the identity matching system. When a wallet holder presents a verifiable credential, the system computes an HMAC-SHA256 hash of the relevant identifier and queries this table to find whether a matching internal identity already exists.

```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS identity_match (
    id              TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
    tenant_id       TEXT NOT NULL,
    identifier_hash TEXT NOT NULL,       -- HMAC-SHA256 (Key A or B)
    identifier_type TEXT NOT NULL,       -- KEY, SUBJECT_ID, EMAIL, DID, CLAIM_TUPLE
    internal_identity_id TEXT NOT NULL,
    hash_key_version INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
    metadata_json   TEXT,
    created_at      TEXT NOT NULL,
    updated_at      TEXT NOT NULL,
    last_used_at    TEXT NOT NULL,
    deleted_at      TEXT,
    deletion_reason TEXT,
    UNIQUE(tenant_id, identifier_hash, identifier_type)
);

CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_match_identity
    ON identity_match(tenant_id, internal_identity_id);
```

### Column Details

| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | TEXT, PK | UUID primary key for the match record. |
| `tenant_id` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Tenant identifier for multi-tenant isolation. Every query filters on this column. |
| `identifier_hash` | TEXT, NOT NULL | HMAC-SHA256 hash of the external identifier. Uses Key A for wallet/holder identifiers or Key B for institution identifiers. The original identifier value is never stored. |
| `identifier_type` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Discriminator indicating the type of identifier that was hashed. Valid values include `KEY` (wallet key), `SUBJECT_ID` (OIDC subject), `EMAIL`, `DID` (decentralized identifier), and `CLAIM_TUPLE` (composite claim hash). |
| `internal_identity_id` | TEXT, NOT NULL | The system's internal UUID for the identity. Multiple match records can point to the same internal identity, representing different identifiers for the same person. |
| `hash_key_version` | INTEGER, NOT NULL | Version of the HMAC key used to compute `identifier_hash`. Incremented during key rotation so the system knows which key version to use for verification. Defaults to 1. |
| `metadata_json` | TEXT, nullable | Optional JSON metadata associated with the match, such as the credential type or presentation context. |
| `created_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of when the match record was first created. |
| `updated_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of the most recent update to this record. |
| `last_used_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of the most recent successful lookup against this record. Updated on every access. Used for inactivity detection and GDPR retention. |
| `deleted_at` | TEXT, nullable | ISO-8601 timestamp of soft deletion. When set, the record is considered logically deleted but remains in the database for the retention period. |
| `deletion_reason` | TEXT, nullable | Human-readable reason for the soft deletion (e.g., `INACTIVE`, `GDPR_ERASURE`, `ADMIN_REQUEST`). |

### Unique Constraint

The composite unique constraint on `(tenant_id, identifier_hash, identifier_type)` ensures that within a single tenant, the same hashed identifier of the same type can only map to one match record. This prevents duplicate entries and enforces the one-to-one relationship between an external identifier and its internal identity mapping.

### Index: idx_match_identity

The index on `(tenant_id, internal_identity_id)` supports efficient reverse lookups: given an internal identity ID, find all match records (and thus all known identifiers) associated with that identity. This is essential for GDPR erasure operations, which must locate and delete all records for a given identity.

### Soft Delete

The `deleted_at` and `deletion_reason` columns implement a soft delete pattern. When a record is soft-deleted, it is no longer returned by standard lookup queries, but it remains in the database for a configurable retention period (default 30 days). After the retention period expires, a background job performs a hard delete, permanently removing the record. This two-phase approach provides a safety window during which accidental deletions can be recovered.

---

## identity_link_binding

The `identity_link_binding` table records the binding between a wallet holder and an institutional identity established during the reconciliation process. Each binding represents a verified link between a holder's wallet credential and their identity at a specific institution.

```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS identity_link_binding (
    id                                    TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
    tenant_id                             TEXT NOT NULL,
    match_id                              TEXT NOT NULL REFERENCES identity_match(id),
    holder_identifier_hash                TEXT NOT NULL,       -- HMAC (Key A)
    holder_hash_key_version               INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
    institution_identifier_hash           TEXT,                -- HMAC (Key B)
    institution_hash_key_version          INTEGER,
    encrypted_institution_id              TEXT,                -- AES-256-GCM (Key C)
    encrypted_institution_id_key_version  INTEGER,
    persisted_attributes_envelope         TEXT,                -- AES-256-GCM (Key C)
    provider_id                           TEXT,
    institution_id_label                  TEXT,
    assurance_summary                     TEXT,                -- JSON
    canonical_schema_version              TEXT,
    material_profile_version              TEXT,
    selector_rule_version                 TEXT,
    material_fingerprints                 TEXT,
    created_at                            TEXT NOT NULL,
    updated_at                            TEXT NOT NULL,
    last_used_at                          TEXT NOT NULL,
    reconcile_time                        TEXT
);

CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_binding_match
    ON identity_link_binding(tenant_id, match_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_binding_holder
    ON identity_link_binding(tenant_id, holder_identifier_hash);
```

### Column Details

| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | TEXT, PK | UUID primary key for the binding record. |
| `tenant_id` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Tenant identifier for multi-tenant isolation. |
| `match_id` | TEXT, FK | Foreign key referencing `identity_match(id)`. Links this binding to the parent match record. |
| `holder_identifier_hash` | TEXT, NOT NULL | HMAC-SHA256 hash of the wallet holder's identifier, computed using Key A. Used for looking up all bindings belonging to a specific holder. |
| `holder_hash_key_version` | INTEGER, NOT NULL | Version of Key A used for the holder hash. Defaults to 1. |
| `institution_identifier_hash` | TEXT, nullable | HMAC-SHA256 hash of the institution-side identifier (e.g., SURF sub), computed using Key B. Nullable because the binding may exist before reconciliation completes. |
| `institution_hash_key_version` | INTEGER, nullable | Version of Key B used for the institution hash. |
| `encrypted_institution_id` | TEXT, nullable | The institution identifier encrypted with AES-256-GCM using Key C. This allows the system to recover the plaintext institution ID when needed for token issuance, without storing it in the clear. |
| `encrypted_institution_id_key_version` | INTEGER, nullable | Version of Key C used for the encryption. |
| `persisted_attributes_envelope` | TEXT, nullable | AES-256-GCM encrypted envelope (Key C) containing persisted identity attributes. Only attributes with `persist: true` in the canonical attribute rules are included. |
| `provider_id` | TEXT, nullable | Identifier of the reconciliation provider (e.g., SURF) that was used to establish this binding. |
| `institution_id_label` | TEXT, nullable | Human-readable label for the institution identifier, such as `eduperson_principal_name` or `sub`. |
| `assurance_summary` | TEXT, nullable | JSON object summarizing the assurance level of the binding, including ACR and AMR values from the reconciliation provider. |
| `canonical_schema_version` | TEXT, nullable | Version of the canonical attribute schema that was in effect when this binding was created or last updated. |
| `material_profile_version` | TEXT, nullable | Version of the material profile configuration used during reconciliation. |
| `selector_rule_version` | TEXT, nullable | Version of the selector rule configuration used during reconciliation. |
| `material_fingerprints` | TEXT, nullable | Fingerprints of the material (attributes) used to establish the binding. Enables detection of whether the binding needs to be refreshed. |
| `created_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of binding creation. |
| `updated_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of the most recent update. |
| `last_used_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of the most recent access. Used for inactivity detection. |
| `reconcile_time` | TEXT, nullable | ISO-8601 timestamp of when the reconciliation that established this binding was completed. |

### Index: idx_binding_match

The index on `(tenant_id, match_id)` supports efficient lookups of all bindings associated with a particular identity match. This is the primary access pattern when the system needs to retrieve a holder's institutional bindings after an identity match has been found.

### Index: idx_binding_holder

The index on `(tenant_id, holder_identifier_hash)` enables direct lookup of all bindings for a specific wallet holder without first going through the `identity_match` table. This is used when the holder hash is known directly from a wallet presentation.

### Domain-Separated Keys

This table is the clearest illustration of the domain-separated key architecture. The `holder_identifier_hash` is computed with Key A, the `institution_identifier_hash` with Key B, and the `encrypted_institution_id` and `persisted_attributes_envelope` are encrypted with Key C. Compromising any single key does not expose the data protected by the other keys.

---

## reconciliation_session

The `reconciliation_session` table tracks the lifecycle of each identity verification (IDV) reconciliation flow. A reconciliation session is created when a wallet holder initiates the process of linking their wallet identity to an institutional identity through an upstream OIDC provider such as SURF.

```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS reconciliation_session (
    id                              TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
    tenant_id                       TEXT NOT NULL,
    status                          TEXT NOT NULL,
    identifier_hash                 TEXT,
    identifier_type                 TEXT,
    provider_id                     TEXT NOT NULL,
    authorization_url               TEXT,
    state                           TEXT,
    nonce                           TEXT,
    code_verifier                   TEXT,
    redirect_uri                    TEXT,
    token_endpoint                  TEXT,
    encrypted_identity              TEXT,
    encrypted_identity_key_version  INTEGER,
    error_message                   TEXT,
    created_at                      TEXT NOT NULL,
    expires_at                      TEXT NOT NULL
);

CREATE UNIQUE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_recon_session_state
    ON reconciliation_session(state) WHERE state IS NOT NULL;
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_recon_session_status
    ON reconciliation_session(tenant_id, status);
```

### Column Details

| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | TEXT, PK | UUID primary key for the session. |
| `tenant_id` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Tenant identifier for multi-tenant isolation. |
| `status` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Current state of the session. Values include `PENDING`, `AUTHORIZED`, `COMPLETED`, `FAILED`, and `EXPIRED`. |
| `identifier_hash` | TEXT, nullable | HMAC hash of the identifier that initiated the reconciliation. Set after the initial identity match is found. |
| `identifier_type` | TEXT, nullable | Type of the identifier (e.g., `KEY`, `SUBJECT_ID`). |
| `provider_id` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Identifier of the reconciliation provider being used for this session. |
| `authorization_url` | TEXT, nullable | The full OIDC authorization URL that the user is redirected to. Stored so it can be logged or debugged. |
| `state` | TEXT, nullable | OIDC state parameter, a random value used to prevent CSRF attacks. Must be unique across all active sessions. |
| `nonce` | TEXT, nullable | OIDC nonce parameter, bound to the ID token to prevent replay attacks. |
| `code_verifier` | TEXT, nullable | PKCE code verifier for the authorization code exchange. Stored temporarily until the token exchange completes. |
| `redirect_uri` | TEXT, nullable | The redirect URI registered for this session's OIDC flow. |
| `token_endpoint` | TEXT, nullable | The token endpoint URL for the provider, cached at session creation to avoid repeated discovery lookups. |
| `encrypted_identity` | TEXT, nullable | AES-256-GCM encrypted identity data received from the provider after successful token exchange. |
| `encrypted_identity_key_version` | INTEGER, nullable | Version of the encryption key used for `encrypted_identity`. |
| `error_message` | TEXT, nullable | Error description if the session ended in a `FAILED` state. |
| `created_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of session creation. |
| `expires_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp after which the session is considered expired and eligible for cleanup. |

### Unique Index: idx_recon_session_state

The partial unique index on `state` (where `state IS NOT NULL`) ensures that no two active sessions share the same OIDC state parameter. This is critical for security: when the OIDC callback arrives with a `state` value, the system must be able to unambiguously identify which session it belongs to.

### Index: idx_recon_session_status

The index on `(tenant_id, status)` supports efficient queries for sessions in a particular state, such as finding all expired sessions for cleanup or all pending sessions for monitoring.

### Session Lifecycle

A reconciliation session progresses through the following states:

1. **PENDING** -- Session created, authorization URL generated, waiting for the user to authenticate with the provider.
2. **AUTHORIZED** -- The OIDC callback has been received with an authorization code, token exchange is in progress.
3. **COMPLETED** -- Token exchange succeeded, identity data received and encrypted, binding created or updated.
4. **FAILED** -- An error occurred at any stage. The `error_message` column contains details.
5. **EXPIRED** -- The session exceeded its TTL without completing. Cleaned up by the background session cleanup job.

---

## reconciliation_provider

The `reconciliation_provider` table stores configuration for each upstream OIDC identity provider that can be used during the reconciliation process. This is pure configuration data with no sensitive content.

```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS reconciliation_provider (
    id                    TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
    name                  TEXT NOT NULL,
    oidc_client_id        TEXT NOT NULL,
    identifier_attr_name  TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT 'sub',
    enabled               INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 1,
    attribute_mappings    TEXT,   -- JSON
    assurance_acr         TEXT,
    assurance_amr         TEXT,
    created_at            TEXT NOT NULL,
    updated_at            TEXT NOT NULL
);
```

### Column Details

| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | TEXT, PK | Unique identifier for the provider (e.g., `surf`, `keycloak`). |
| `name` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Human-readable display name for the provider (e.g., `SURF eduID`). |
| `oidc_client_id` | TEXT, NOT NULL | The OIDC client ID registered with this provider. |
| `identifier_attr_name` | TEXT, NOT NULL | The name of the claim in the ID token or userinfo response that serves as the primary institution identifier. Defaults to `sub`. |
| `enabled` | INTEGER, NOT NULL | Whether this provider is currently enabled (1) or disabled (0). Disabled providers are not offered during reconciliation. Defaults to 1. |
| `attribute_mappings` | TEXT, nullable | JSON object mapping provider-specific claim names to canonical attribute names. Enables normalization of attributes across different providers. |
| `assurance_acr` | TEXT, nullable | Expected Authentication Context Class Reference value for tokens from this provider. Used to assess the assurance level of reconciliation. |
| `assurance_amr` | TEXT, nullable | Expected Authentication Methods Reference values for tokens from this provider. |
| `created_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of provider creation. |
| `updated_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of the most recent update. |

### Configuration vs. Runtime

This table is typically populated during deployment or initial setup and rarely changes during normal operation. Changes to provider configuration (such as updating an OIDC client ID or modifying attribute mappings) take effect immediately for new reconciliation sessions but do not retroactively affect existing bindings.

---

## auxiliary_data

The `auxiliary_data` table stores supplementary encrypted data associated with an identity. This is a flexible key-value store where the "key" is the combination of `identity_id` and `category`, and the "value" is an encrypted payload. Common use cases include storing institution-specific metadata such as enrollment status or organizational unit.

```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS auxiliary_data (
    id                    TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
    tenant_id             TEXT NOT NULL,
    identity_id           TEXT NOT NULL,
    category              TEXT NOT NULL,
    encrypted_payload     TEXT NOT NULL,    -- AES-256-GCM (Key C)
    schema_version        TEXT NOT NULL DEFAULT '1',
    created_at            TEXT NOT NULL,
    updated_at            TEXT NOT NULL,
    expires_at            TEXT,
    UNIQUE(tenant_id, identity_id, category)
);

CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_aux_identity
    ON auxiliary_data(tenant_id, identity_id);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_aux_expires
    ON auxiliary_data(expires_at) WHERE expires_at IS NOT NULL;
```

### Column Details

| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | TEXT, PK | UUID primary key. |
| `tenant_id` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Tenant identifier for multi-tenant isolation. |
| `identity_id` | TEXT, NOT NULL | The internal identity ID that this auxiliary data is associated with. |
| `category` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Category label for the data (e.g., `enrollment`, `org_unit`, `student_status`). Together with `identity_id`, forms the logical key. |
| `encrypted_payload` | TEXT, NOT NULL | The data payload encrypted with AES-256-GCM using Key C. The plaintext structure depends on the category and schema version. |
| `schema_version` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Version of the payload schema, allowing the system to handle schema evolution gracefully. Defaults to `'1'`. |
| `created_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of record creation. |
| `updated_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of the most recent update. |
| `expires_at` | TEXT, nullable | Optional ISO-8601 timestamp after which this data is considered expired and eligible for automatic cleanup. Useful for time-limited data such as semester-specific enrollment. |

### Unique Constraint

The unique constraint on `(tenant_id, identity_id, category)` ensures that each identity has at most one auxiliary data record per category within a tenant. Writing to the same identity-category pair performs an upsert, replacing the previous encrypted payload.

### Index: idx_aux_identity

The index on `(tenant_id, identity_id)` supports efficient retrieval of all auxiliary data records for a given identity, which is needed during token issuance and identity lookup operations.

### Index: idx_aux_expires

The partial index on `expires_at` (where `expires_at IS NOT NULL`) supports efficient identification of expired records during background cleanup. Only records that actually have an expiration date are included in this index, keeping it compact.

---

## key_migration_history

The `key_migration_history` table tracks cryptographic key rotation operations. When a key is rotated, the system must re-hash or re-encrypt all affected records. This table records the progress and outcome of each migration, enabling operators to monitor the process and verify that it completed successfully.

```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS key_migration_history (
    version           INTEGER NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
    status            TEXT NOT NULL,
    config_snapshot   TEXT,
    records_processed INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
    records_failed    INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
    records_skipped   INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
    records_purged    INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
    created_at        TEXT NOT NULL,
    completed_at      TEXT
);
```

### Column Details

| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `version` | INTEGER, PK | The target key version that this migration is transitioning to. Serves as both the primary key and a monotonically increasing version counter. |
| `status` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Current status of the migration. Values include `IN_PROGRESS`, `COMPLETED`, `FAILED`, and `ROLLED_BACK`. |
| `config_snapshot` | TEXT, nullable | JSON snapshot of the key configuration at the time the migration started. Useful for debugging and auditing. |
| `records_processed` | INTEGER, NOT NULL | Number of records successfully re-hashed or re-encrypted during the migration. Defaults to 0. |
| `records_failed` | INTEGER, NOT NULL | Number of records that could not be migrated due to errors. Defaults to 0. |
| `records_skipped` | INTEGER, NOT NULL | Number of records skipped because they were already at the target version. Defaults to 0. |
| `records_purged` | INTEGER, NOT NULL | Number of records purged (deleted) during the migration, typically soft-deleted records past their retention period. Defaults to 0. |
| `created_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of when the migration was initiated. |
| `completed_at` | TEXT, nullable | ISO-8601 timestamp of when the migration finished (whether successfully, with failures, or rolled back). |

### Migration Workflow

A key migration progresses through the following steps:

1. A new migration record is inserted with `status = 'IN_PROGRESS'` and the target version as the primary key.
2. The migration process iterates through all affected records, re-computing hashes or re-encrypting ciphertext with the new key version.
3. As records are processed, the counters (`records_processed`, `records_failed`, `records_skipped`, `records_purged`) are updated.
4. Upon completion, the `status` is updated to `COMPLETED` and `completed_at` is set.
5. If the migration fails partway through, the `status` is set to `FAILED` and operators can investigate using the counter values and config snapshot.

---

## audit_event

The `audit_event` table is an append-only log of all significant operations performed by the system. No UPDATE or DELETE operations are ever executed against this table in normal operation, ensuring the integrity of the audit trail for regulatory compliance.

```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_event (
    id              TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
    tenant_id       TEXT NOT NULL,
    event_type      TEXT NOT NULL,
    correlation_id  TEXT,
    subject_hash    TEXT,
    client_id       TEXT,
    detail          TEXT,    -- JSON
    created_at      TEXT NOT NULL
);

CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_type
    ON audit_event(tenant_id, event_type);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_time
    ON audit_event(created_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_correlation
    ON audit_event(correlation_id);
```

### Column Details

| Column | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | TEXT, PK | UUID primary key for the event. |
| `tenant_id` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Tenant identifier for multi-tenant isolation. |
| `event_type` | TEXT, NOT NULL | Type of event (e.g., `session_created`, `binding_created`, `gdpr_erasure`). See the [Audit Trail](../security/audit-trail) page for the complete list. |
| `correlation_id` | TEXT, nullable | Links related events across a single user flow. For example, all events during a single reconciliation session share the same correlation ID. |
| `subject_hash` | TEXT, nullable | HMAC-hashed identifier of the subject of the event. Never stored in plaintext. |
| `client_id` | TEXT, nullable | Identifier of the client (application) that triggered the event, when applicable. |
| `detail` | TEXT, nullable | JSON object containing additional operational context. The contents vary by event type but never include plaintext PII. |
| `created_at` | TEXT, NOT NULL | ISO-8601 timestamp of when the event occurred. |

### Indexes

Three indexes support the most common audit query patterns:

- **idx_audit_type** on `(tenant_id, event_type)` -- Find all events of a specific type within a tenant, such as retrieving all GDPR erasure events.
- **idx_audit_time** on `(created_at)` -- Time-range queries across all tenants, useful for operational dashboards and monitoring.
- **idx_audit_correlation** on `(correlation_id)` -- Retrieve all events belonging to a single user flow, enabling end-to-end tracing of a reconciliation session.

---

## Key Queries

The following table lists the most important named SqlDelight queries defined in the application, providing a quick reference for what each query does and which table it primarily operates on.

| Query Name | Table | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `findMatchByHash` | identity_match | Look up a match record by tenant, identifier hash, and identifier type. The primary lookup path for identity matching. |
| `findMatchesByIdentity` | identity_match | Find all match records for a given internal identity ID. Used during GDPR erasure and identity inspection. |
| `insertMatch` | identity_match | Create a new match record with all required fields. |
| `softDeleteMatch` | identity_match | Set `deleted_at` and `deletion_reason` on a match record. |
| `hardDeleteMatch` | identity_match | Permanently remove a soft-deleted match record from the database. |
| `findBindingsByMatch` | identity_link_binding | Retrieve all bindings associated with a match record. |
| `findBindingByHolder` | identity_link_binding | Look up bindings by holder identifier hash. |
| `findInactiveBindings` | identity_link_binding | Find bindings where `last_used_at` is older than the inactivity threshold. |
| `insertBinding` | identity_link_binding | Create a new binding record. |
| `updateBinding` | identity_link_binding | Update an existing binding after re-reconciliation. |
| `hardDeleteBinding` | identity_link_binding | Permanently remove a binding record. |
| `findSoftDeletedMatchesPastRetention` | identity_match | Find soft-deleted matches where the retention period has elapsed. |
| `findSoftDeletedBindingsPastRetention` | identity_link_binding | Find soft-deleted bindings where the retention period has elapsed. |
| `insertSession` | reconciliation_session | Create a new reconciliation session. |
| `findSessionByState` | reconciliation_session | Look up a session by its OIDC state parameter. Used during the callback. |
| `updateSessionStatus` | reconciliation_session | Transition a session to a new status. |
| `deleteExpiredSessions` | reconciliation_session | Remove sessions past their `expires_at` time. |
| `findAuxByIdentity` | auxiliary_data | Retrieve all auxiliary data for an identity. |
| `upsertAux` | auxiliary_data | Insert or update auxiliary data for an identity-category pair. |
| `findExpiredAux` | auxiliary_data | Find auxiliary data records past their `expires_at` time. |
| `deleteAuxByIdentity` | auxiliary_data | Delete all auxiliary data for an identity. Used during GDPR erasure. |
| `insertAuditEvent` | audit_event | Append a new audit event. |
| `findAuditEventsByType` | audit_event | Paginated query for audit events of a specific type within a tenant. |
| `findAuditEventsByCorrelation` | audit_event | Retrieve all audit events sharing a correlation ID. |
| `countMatches` | identity_match | Count total match records per tenant. Used for monitoring. |
| `countAllBindings` | identity_link_binding | Count total binding records per tenant. |
| `countInactiveBindings` | identity_link_binding | Count bindings past the inactivity threshold. |
| `countAllAux` | auxiliary_data | Count total auxiliary data records per tenant. |
| `insertMigration` | key_migration_history | Record the start of a key migration. |
| `updateMigrationProgress` | key_migration_history | Update counters during a running migration. |
| `completeMigration` | key_migration_history | Mark a migration as completed. |

---

# GDPR Data Lifecycle

# GDPR Data Lifecycle

The eduID Wallet Matching Portal implements a comprehensive data lifecycle management system designed to comply with the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Every piece of identity data in the system has a defined lifecycle, from creation through active use to eventual deletion. This page describes the mechanisms that govern how data ages, how inactive data is detected and cleaned up, how deletion requests are handled, and how cryptographic techniques provide an ultimate guarantee of data destruction.

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-gdpr-lifecycle.svg" alt="GDPR Data Lifecycle" style={{maxWidth: '900px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Active Data

When identity data is first created -- whether through a wallet presentation, a reconciliation binding, or an auxiliary data write -- the `created_at` timestamp is set to the current time, and the `last_used_at` timestamp is initialized to the same value.

On every subsequent access, the `last_used_at` field is updated to the current timestamp. This applies to identity match lookups, binding retrievals, and auxiliary data reads. The consistent update of this field is the foundation of the inactivity detection system: it provides a reliable signal of whether a piece of data is still being actively used.

The `last_used_at` field is updated regardless of whether the access originates from a wallet presentation, an external API lookup, or an internal system operation. This ensures that any form of legitimate use resets the inactivity clock.

## Inactivity Detection

The system runs a background job that periodically scans for identity link bindings that have not been accessed within a configurable inactivity threshold. The default threshold is two years (730 days), reflecting the assumption that an identity binding not used for two full years is likely no longer needed.

### Configuration

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    retention:
      inactive-days: 730
```

The `inactive-days` property controls the number of days of inactivity after which a binding is considered stale. This value can be adjusted per deployment to meet specific regulatory or institutional requirements.

### How It Works

The background cleanup job runs every 60 minutes and executes the `findInactiveBindings` query, which selects all bindings where the `last_used_at` timestamp is older than the current time minus the configured inactivity threshold. The query also filters for records that have not already been soft-deleted (i.e., `deleted_at IS NULL`).

For each inactive binding found, the system performs a soft delete: it sets the `deleted_at` timestamp to the current time and the `deletion_reason` to `INACTIVE`. The corresponding `identity_match` record is also checked; if all bindings for a given match have been soft-deleted, the match itself is soft-deleted as well.

An audit event of type `binding_soft_deleted` is logged for each affected binding, providing a traceable record of the automated cleanup action.

## Soft Delete

Soft deletion is the first phase of the two-phase deletion process. When a record is soft-deleted, it remains physically present in the database but is excluded from all standard queries. The `deleted_at` timestamp records when the deletion occurred, and the `deletion_reason` field documents why.

### Deletion Reasons

| Reason | Trigger |
|---|---|
| `INACTIVE` | Automated inactivity detection exceeded the configured threshold. |
| `GDPR_ERASURE` | Explicit deletion request via the external API (Article 17). |
| `ADMIN_REQUEST` | Manual administrative action. |
| `KEY_MIGRATION` | Record purged during a key rotation migration. |

### Retention Period

Soft-deleted records are retained in the database for a configurable period before being permanently removed. The default retention period is 30 days.

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    retention:
      soft-delete-days: 30
```

During this retention window, the data is not accessible through normal application operations, but it remains available for recovery if the deletion was made in error. This is particularly important for automated inactivity deletions, where a temporary period of non-use (such as a year-long sabbatical) might be mistaken for permanent abandonment.

## Hard Delete

After the soft-delete retention period has elapsed, the background cleanup job identifies candidates for permanent deletion. Two queries are used:

- **`findSoftDeletedMatchesPastRetention`**: Finds identity match records where `deleted_at` is older than the current time minus the soft-delete retention period.
- **`findSoftDeletedBindingsPastRetention`**: Finds identity link binding records under the same criteria.

For each candidate, the system performs a hard delete, which permanently removes the record from the database. This is an irreversible operation; once a record is hard-deleted, it cannot be recovered from the database.

The hard delete process follows a specific order to respect foreign key constraints:

1. First, all bindings associated with a match are hard-deleted.
2. Then, the match record itself is hard-deleted.
3. Any auxiliary data associated with the identity is also hard-deleted.

An audit event is logged for each hard-deleted record, ensuring that even though the data itself is gone, there is an immutable record that the deletion occurred.

## GDPR Article 17: Right to Erasure

The GDPR grants data subjects the right to request the erasure of their personal data (Article 17, commonly known as the "right to be forgotten"). The eduID Wallet Matching Portal implements this through a dedicated external API endpoint.

### Erasure API

```
DELETE /api/v1/identities/{internalIdentityId}
```

When this endpoint is called with a valid internal identity ID, the system performs an immediate and complete deletion of all data associated with that identity:

1. **All `identity_match` records** for the given `internal_identity_id` are permanently deleted (hard delete, not soft delete).
2. **All `identity_link_binding` records** associated with those matches are permanently deleted.
3. **All `auxiliary_data` records** for the given `identity_id` are permanently deleted.

Unlike the inactivity-based cleanup process, GDPR erasure does not go through a soft-delete phase. The deletion is immediate and permanent, reflecting the urgency and legal weight of an Article 17 request.

### Audit Trail

An audit event of type `gdpr_erasure` is logged with the following details:

- The `correlation_id` linking the erasure to the API request that triggered it.
- The `subject_hash` (HMAC-hashed, not plaintext) of the erased identity.
- A `detail` JSON object recording the number of match records, bindings, and auxiliary data records that were deleted.

This audit record serves as evidence that the erasure was performed, satisfying the GDPR requirement to demonstrate compliance. The audit record itself contains no plaintext personal data -- only hashed identifiers and operational counts.

### Important Considerations

- **Irreversibility**: GDPR erasure is irreversible. There is no undo mechanism. The API should be called only after appropriate authorization checks have been performed by the calling system.
- **Cascading deletion**: The erasure cascades across all three data tables. There is no option for partial deletion; the entire identity is removed.
- **Concurrent access**: If a wallet holder happens to be in the middle of a session when their erasure is processed, the session will fail gracefully. The reconciliation session itself is not deleted by the erasure endpoint (sessions are cleaned up by their own expiration mechanism), but any binding creation or update that the session attempts after the erasure will find no match record and will fail.

## Auxiliary Data Expiration

Auxiliary data records support an optional `expires_at` timestamp. When set, this timestamp indicates that the data is only valid until a specific point in time. This is useful for time-limited data such as semester-specific enrollment information, temporary access grants, or certification validity periods.

### Background Cleanup

A background job periodically executes the `findExpiredAux` query, which identifies auxiliary data records where `expires_at` is in the past. Expired records are permanently deleted.

```yaml
# Auxiliary data expiration is handled by the same cleanup job
# that manages session and inactive binding cleanup.
```

### Use Cases

| Category | Example Expiration | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| `semester_enrollment` | End of academic semester | Enrollment status is only valid for the duration of the semester. |
| `temp_access_grant` | 24 hours after issuance | Temporary access tokens should not persist beyond their validity. |
| `certification_validity` | Certificate expiry date | Professional certifications have defined validity periods. |
| `course_registration` | End of course period | Course-specific data is irrelevant after the course concludes. |

Auxiliary data without an `expires_at` value is retained indefinitely (subject to the identity-level inactivity detection and GDPR erasure mechanisms).

## Session Cleanup

Reconciliation sessions are inherently ephemeral. Each session has an `expires_at` timestamp set at creation (typically 5 to 15 minutes after creation, depending on configuration). A background job runs every 5 minutes to delete expired sessions.

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    session-cleanup:
      interval-minutes: 5
```

The session cleanup process executes the `deleteExpiredSessions` query, which permanently removes all sessions where `expires_at` is in the past. This is a hard delete; there is no soft-delete phase for sessions, as they are transient by nature and contain no long-term value.

Session cleanup is particularly important because sessions may contain sensitive temporary data such as PKCE code verifiers and OIDC nonces. Prompt deletion of expired sessions limits the window during which this data is present in the database.

## Crypto-Shredding

Crypto-shredding is the ultimate data destruction mechanism. All sensitive data in the database is encrypted with keys managed by the KMS (Key Management Service). If a key is destroyed, all data encrypted with that key becomes permanently irrecoverable, even if the database itself is fully intact.

### How It Works

The system uses three domain-separated keys:

| Key | Purpose | Tables Affected |
|---|---|---|
| **Key A** | HMAC hashing of wallet/holder identifiers | `identity_match.identifier_hash`, `identity_link_binding.holder_identifier_hash` |
| **Key B** | HMAC hashing of institution identifiers | `identity_match.identifier_hash` (for institution-type identifiers), `identity_link_binding.institution_identifier_hash` |
| **Key C** | AES-256-GCM encryption of sensitive data | `identity_link_binding.encrypted_institution_id`, `identity_link_binding.persisted_attributes_envelope`, `reconciliation_session.encrypted_identity`, `auxiliary_data.encrypted_payload` |

Destroying **Key C** makes all encrypted institution identifiers, persisted attributes, session identity data, and auxiliary data payloads permanently unreadable. The HMAC hashes (protected by Keys A and B) would remain, but they are one-way functions and cannot be reversed to recover the original identifiers.

Destroying **all three keys** renders the entire database contents meaningless: the hashes cannot be correlated with any external identifiers, and the ciphertext cannot be decrypted. The database would contain only opaque strings with no recoverable information.

### When to Use Crypto-Shredding

Crypto-shredding is an extreme measure and should be considered only in scenarios such as:

- **Tenant decommissioning**: When a tenant is being permanently removed from the system, destroying their keys provides a cryptographic guarantee that no residual data can be recovered.
- **Regulatory requirement**: Some data protection frameworks may require the ability to demonstrate that data has been rendered permanently inaccessible, beyond what database deletion alone can provide.
- **Breach response**: In the event of a suspected database compromise, destroying the encryption keys immediately neutralizes any exfiltrated data.

## Configuration Reference

The following table summarizes all data lifecycle configuration properties:

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `retention.inactive-days` | `730` | Number of days of inactivity before a binding is soft-deleted. |
| `retention.soft-delete-days` | `30` | Number of days a soft-deleted record is retained before hard deletion. |
| `session-cleanup.interval-minutes` | `5` | How often the session cleanup background job runs. |
| Inactivity check interval | `60 minutes` | How often the inactive binding cleanup job runs (hardcoded). |
| Session TTL | Configured per provider | How long a reconciliation session remains valid before expiring. |
| Auxiliary data `expires_at` | Set per record | Optional per-record expiration for auxiliary data. |

---

# Deployment Guide

# Deployment Guide

This guide covers the complete deployment process for the eduID Wallet Matching Portal, from a quick-start local development setup using Docker Compose to production deployment considerations. The portal consists of multiple interconnected services that must be configured and orchestrated correctly to function as a cohesive system.

## Prerequisites

Before deploying the portal, ensure the following tools and runtimes are available in your environment:

| Prerequisite | Version | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Docker | 24+ | Container runtime for all services |
| Docker Compose | v2.20+ | Service orchestration and dependency management |
| PostgreSQL | 15+ | Primary database (provided via Docker or external) |
| Node.js | 20+ | Portal frontend development and build (development only) |
| JDK | 21+ | Kotlin backend service development and build (development only) |

For local development, Docker and Docker Compose are the only strict requirements, as all other dependencies are encapsulated in the container images. Node.js and JDK are needed only if you intend to build the services from source rather than using pre-built images.

## Quick Start

The fastest way to get the full portal running locally is through the provided Docker Compose configuration:

```bash
cd deploy/docker
docker compose up
```

This single command starts all services with their default development configurations. Once all containers are healthy, the following endpoints become available:

| Service | URL | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Portal (Frontend) | http://localhost:3000 | The web application that wallet holders interact with |
| STS (Security Token Service) | http://localhost:8092 | Issues and validates OAuth2/OIDC tokens |
| Auth Bridge | http://localhost:8090 | Identity matching, reconciliation, and binding management |

To start the services in the background (detached mode):

```bash
cd deploy/docker
docker compose up -d
```

To stop all services and remove the containers:

```bash
cd deploy/docker
docker compose down
```

To stop all services and also remove persistent volumes (this deletes all database data):

```bash
cd deploy/docker
docker compose down -v
```

## Docker Compose Services

The Docker Compose configuration defines five services with explicit dependency relationships. The following table describes each service, its image, exposed port, and what it depends on:

| Service | Image | Port | Depends On | Description |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `postgres` | `postgres:15` | 5432 | -- | PostgreSQL database shared by the STS and Auth Bridge services. Initialized with the required databases and roles on first startup. |
| `service-sts` | `portal/service-sts` | 8092 | `postgres` | Security Token Service. Handles OAuth2 authorization server functionality, token issuance, and upstream federation with providers like SURF and Keycloak. |
| `service-auth-bridge` | `portal/service-auth-bridge` | 8090 | `postgres` | Auth Bridge service. Manages identity matching, reconciliation sessions, identity link bindings, and the external API for third-party lookups. |
| `service-blobstore-camel` | `portal/blobstore` | 8081 | -- | Blob storage service based on Apache Camel. Handles document and artifact storage. Does not depend on the database. |
| `portal` | `portal/frontend` | 3000 | `service-sts`, `service-auth-bridge` | Next.js frontend application. Depends on both backend services being available for API calls. |

### Startup Order

Docker Compose manages startup ordering through the `depends_on` configuration with health checks. The startup sequence is:

1. **PostgreSQL** starts first and becomes healthy when it accepts connections.
2. **STS** and **Auth Bridge** start in parallel once PostgreSQL is healthy. Each runs its own database migrations on startup.
3. **Blobstore** starts independently (no database dependency).
4. **Portal** starts last, once both STS and Auth Bridge report healthy status.

## Environment Variables

Each service is configured through environment variables. The following sections list the key variables for each service, organized by category.

### PostgreSQL

| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `POSTGRES_USER` | `portal` | Superuser name for the PostgreSQL instance. |
| `POSTGRES_PASSWORD` | `portal` | Superuser password. Must be changed for production. |
| `POSTGRES_DB` | `portal` | Default database name. |

### STS (Service Token Service)

| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `DATABASE_URL` | `jdbc:postgresql://postgres:5432/sts` | JDBC connection URL for the STS database. |
| `DATABASE_USERNAME` | `portal` | Database username. |
| `DATABASE_PASSWORD` | `portal` | Database password. |
| `ISSUER_URL` | `http://localhost:8092` | The issuer URL included in issued tokens. Must match the externally reachable URL in production. |
| `SURF_CLIENT_ID` | -- | OIDC client ID registered with SURF for federation. |
| `SURF_CLIENT_SECRET` | -- | OIDC client secret for SURF. |
| `SURF_DISCOVERY_URL` | -- | OIDC discovery endpoint URL for SURF. |
| `KEYCLOAK_URL` | `http://keycloak:8080` | Keycloak instance URL for upstream authentication. |
| `KEYCLOAK_REALM` | `portal` | Keycloak realm name. |
| `KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID` | `portal-sts` | OIDC client ID registered in Keycloak. |
| `KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET` | -- | OIDC client secret for Keycloak. |

### Auth Bridge

| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `DATABASE_URL` | `jdbc:postgresql://postgres:5432/auth_bridge` | JDBC connection URL for the Auth Bridge database. |
| `DATABASE_USERNAME` | `portal` | Database username. |
| `DATABASE_PASSWORD` | `portal` | Database password. |
| `DATABASE_MAX_POOL_SIZE` | `5` | Maximum number of connections in the connection pool. |
| `KMS_PROVIDER` | `software` | KMS provider type. Use `software` for development, `azure` or `aws` for production. |
| `KMS_KEY_A_ID` | -- | Key identifier for HMAC Key A (holder hashing). |
| `KMS_KEY_B_ID` | -- | Key identifier for HMAC Key B (institution hashing). |
| `KMS_KEY_C_ID` | -- | Key identifier for AES Key C (encryption). |
| `EXTERNAL_API_JWT_ISSUER` | -- | Expected issuer claim in JWT tokens for the external API. |
| `EXTERNAL_API_JWT_AUDIENCE` | -- | Expected audience claim in JWT tokens for the external API. |
| `RETENTION_INACTIVE_DAYS` | `730` | Days of inactivity before soft deletion of bindings. |
| `RETENTION_SOFT_DELETE_DAYS` | `30` | Days a soft-deleted record is retained before hard deletion. |

### Portal (Frontend)

| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `NEXTAUTH_URL` | `http://localhost:3000` | The canonical URL of the portal. Must match the externally reachable URL in production. |
| `NEXTAUTH_SECRET` | -- | Secret used for encrypting NextAuth.js session tokens. Must be a strong random value in production. |
| `STS_URL` | `http://service-sts:8092` | Internal URL of the STS service. |
| `AUTH_BRIDGE_URL` | `http://service-auth-bridge:8090` | Internal URL of the Auth Bridge service. |
| `NEXT_PUBLIC_STS_URL` | `http://localhost:8092` | Publicly accessible URL of the STS service (used by the browser). |

### Blobstore

| Variable | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `BLOB_STORAGE_PATH` | `/data/blobs` | File system path where blobs are stored inside the container. |
| `MAX_FILE_SIZE` | `10MB` | Maximum allowed file size for uploads. |

## Volumes

The Docker Compose configuration defines the following persistent volumes:

| Volume | Mounted To | Service | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| `pgdata` | `/var/lib/postgresql/data` | `postgres` | PostgreSQL data directory. Persists database contents across container restarts. |
| `blobdata` | `/data/blobs` | `service-blobstore-camel` | Blob storage directory. Persists uploaded files across container restarts. |
| `auth-bridge-keystore` | `/app/keystore` | `service-auth-bridge` | Keystore directory for the Auth Bridge. In development mode with the software KMS provider, key material is stored here. Not used when an external KMS (Azure Key Vault, AWS KMS) is configured. |

To inspect the contents of a volume:

```bash
docker volume inspect deploy-docker_pgdata
```

## Production Deployment Considerations

The Docker Compose setup is designed for local development and testing. Deploying to production requires several important changes:

### External PostgreSQL

In production, use a managed PostgreSQL service (such as Azure Database for PostgreSQL or AWS RDS) rather than the containerized PostgreSQL instance. This provides:

- Automated backups and point-in-time recovery
- High availability with failover
- Monitoring and alerting
- Security patching

Update the `DATABASE_URL` environment variables for both STS and Auth Bridge to point to the external PostgreSQL instance.

### Azure Key Vault for KMS

The software KMS provider stores key material on the local filesystem and is suitable only for development. In production, configure the Auth Bridge to use Azure Key Vault (or AWS KMS) for cryptographic key management:

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    kms:
      provider: azure
      azure:
        vault-url: "https://your-vault.vault.azure.net/"
        tenant-id: "${env:AZURE_TENANT_ID}"
        client-id: "${env:AZURE_CLIENT_ID}"
        client-secret: "${env:AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET}"
```

This ensures that cryptographic keys are managed by a hardware security module (HSM) and never leave the KMS boundary.

### Real SURF Credentials

The development setup may use mock or test credentials for SURF federation. In production, register proper OIDC client credentials with SURF and configure them in the STS environment variables.

### HTTPS Termination

All services must be accessed over HTTPS in production. Use a reverse proxy (such as NGINX, Traefik, or a cloud load balancer) to terminate TLS and forward traffic to the backend services. Ensure that:

- The `ISSUER_URL` for the STS uses the `https://` scheme.
- The `NEXTAUTH_URL` for the portal uses the `https://` scheme.
- The `NEXT_PUBLIC_STS_URL` uses the `https://` scheme.
- All redirect URIs registered with OIDC providers use `https://`.

### NEXTAUTH_SECRET

The `NEXTAUTH_SECRET` must be set to a cryptographically strong random value in production. Generate one with:

```bash
openssl rand -base64 32
```

This secret is used to encrypt session tokens and must remain consistent across portal container restarts. Store it in a secrets manager rather than in plain text in the Docker Compose file.

### Image Registry

In production, push built images to a private container registry (Azure Container Registry, AWS ECR, GitHub Container Registry) and reference them by digest rather than tag to ensure immutable deployments.

### Resource Limits

Set CPU and memory limits on all containers to prevent any single service from consuming all available resources:

```yaml
services:
  service-auth-bridge:
    deploy:
      resources:
        limits:
          cpus: '2'
          memory: 1G
        reservations:
          cpus: '0.5'
          memory: 512M
```

## Health Checks

Each service exposes a health check endpoint that can be used for monitoring and orchestration:

| Service | Health Endpoint | Healthy Response |
|---|---|---|
| Portal | `GET /api/health` | 200 OK with `{"status": "ok"}` |
| STS | `GET /health` | 200 OK |
| Auth Bridge | `GET /health` | 200 OK with readiness details |
| PostgreSQL | TCP connection on port 5432 | Connection accepted |

Docker Compose uses these health checks to determine when a service is ready to accept traffic and to manage the startup ordering of dependent services. In a Kubernetes deployment, these same endpoints should be configured as liveness and readiness probes.

### Verifying Health After Startup

After starting the services, verify that all health checks pass:

```bash
# Check portal health
curl -s http://localhost:3000/api/health | jq .

# Check STS health
curl -s http://localhost:8092/health | jq .

# Check Auth Bridge health
curl -s http://localhost:8090/health | jq .
```

If any service reports unhealthy, check the container logs for error details:

```bash
docker compose logs service-auth-bridge --tail 100
```

---

# Configuration Reference

# Configuration Reference

Both the STS (Security Token Service) and Auth Bridge services are configured through `application.yml` files, with all custom properties nested under the `sphereon.app.*` prefix. Environment variables can be interpolated into the configuration using the `${env:VARIABLE_NAME:default_value}` syntax, where the portion after the colon is the fallback value used when the environment variable is not set. Secrets are referenced via indirect references (`*-ref.key`) that resolve to environment variables at runtime, ensuring no plaintext secrets ever appear in configuration files.

This page provides a comprehensive reference for all configuration properties, organized by service and by functional section within each service.

## Configuration Structure

The general structure of an `application.yml` file follows this pattern:

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    section:
      property: value
      nested-section:
        property: "${env:ENV_VAR:default_value}"
```

Environment variable interpolation is resolved at application startup. This approach allows the same configuration file to be used across environments (development, staging, production) by varying only the environment variables.

### Configuration Precedence

Configuration values are resolved in the following order of precedence (highest to lowest):

1. **Environment variables** set on the process or container
2. **System properties** passed via `-D` JVM flags
3. **application.yml** values in the working directory
4. **application.yml** values bundled in the JAR
5. **Default values** specified in the `${env:VAR:default}` syntax

---

## STS Configuration

The STS service handles OAuth2 authorization server functionality, token issuance, and federation with upstream identity providers. Its configuration is organized into the following sections.

### OAuth2 Server Settings

These properties control the behavior of the OAuth2 authorization server built into the STS.

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    oauth2:
      servers:
        primary:
          mode: "HOSTED"
          issuer: "${env:STS_ISSUER_URL:http://localhost:8092}"
          access-token-lifetime-seconds: 3600     # 1 hour
          refresh-token-lifetime-seconds: 86400    # 24 hours
          id-token-lifetime-seconds: 3600          # 1 hour
          pkce-mode: "REQUIRED"                    # Always require PKCE
          dpop-mode: "DISABLED"                    # Disabled for PoC
          token-exchange-mode: "SUPPORTED"         # RFC 8693
          introspection-mode: "SUPPORTED"          # RFC 7662
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `mode` | `HOSTED` | Server mode. `HOSTED` means the STS operates as a full OAuth2 authorization server capable of issuing tokens. |
| `issuer` | `http://localhost:8092` | The issuer URL included in all issued tokens. Must match the externally reachable URL of the STS. This value appears in the `iss` claim of JWT tokens and must be consistent with the OIDC discovery document at `/.well-known/openid-configuration`. |
| `access-token-lifetime-seconds` | `3600` | Lifetime of access tokens in seconds (1 hour). After this period, clients must use a refresh token or re-authenticate. |
| `refresh-token-lifetime-seconds` | `86400` | Lifetime of refresh tokens in seconds (24 hours). |
| `id-token-lifetime-seconds` | `3600` | Lifetime of ID tokens in seconds (1 hour). |
| `pkce-mode` | `REQUIRED` | PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) enforcement level. Valid values: `REQUIRED` (all clients must use PKCE), `SUPPORTED` (PKCE accepted but not mandatory), `DISABLED`. Should always be `REQUIRED` in production to prevent authorization code interception attacks. |
| `dpop-mode` | `DISABLED` | DPoP (Demonstrating Proof of Possession) enforcement. `REQUIRED` provides sender-constrained tokens that cannot be replayed by an attacker who intercepts them. Recommended for production but disabled in the proof-of-concept configuration. |
| `token-exchange-mode` | `SUPPORTED` | RFC 8693 token exchange support. Allows clients to exchange one token type for another. |
| `introspection-mode` | `SUPPORTED` | RFC 7662 token introspection support. Allows resource servers to validate tokens by calling the STS. |

### STS Client Registrations

Each registered OAuth2 client is configured under `oauth2.servers.clients`. Client registrations define which applications are permitted to request tokens from the STS and under what conditions.

```yaml
          clients:
            - client-id: "portal"
              client-secret-ref:
                key: "STS_CLIENT_SECRET"
              redirect-uris:
                - "${env:FRONTEND_URL:http://localhost:3000}/api/auth/callback/sts"
                - "${env:FRONTEND_URL:http://localhost:3000}/api/auth/callback/sts-wallet"
              scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email"]
              grant-types: ["authorization_code", "refresh_token"]
```

| Property | Description |
|---|---|
| `client-id` | Unique identifier for the client application. Used in authorization requests and token exchanges. |
| `client-secret-ref.key` | Environment variable name containing the client secret. The STS reads the value from this environment variable at runtime. Never hardcode the secret in the YAML file. |
| `redirect-uris` | List of allowed redirect URIs for the authorization code flow. The STS rejects authorization requests with redirect URIs not in this list. Supports environment variable interpolation for the base URL. |
| `scopes` | Allowed scopes that this client may request. Requests for scopes not in this list are rejected. |
| `grant-types` | Allowed OAuth2 grant types. Common values are `authorization_code` (for interactive browser flows) and `refresh_token` (for silent token renewal). |

### Federation Providers

Federation providers are upstream identity providers that the STS delegates authentication to. When a user chooses to authenticate via SURF or Keycloak, the STS acts as an OIDC relying party to the selected upstream provider.

```yaml
    federation:
      providers:
        surf:
          issuer-url: "${env:SURF_ISSUER_URL:https://connect.test.surfconext.nl}"
          client-id-ref:
            key: "FEDERATION_CLIENT_ID"
          client-secret-ref:
            key: "FEDERATION_CLIENT_SECRET"
            provider-id: "env"
          scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email", "eduid"]
          user-info-enabled: true
          state-mode: "JWT"

        keycloak:
          enabled: "${env:KEYCLOAK_ENABLED:false}"
          issuer-url: "${env:KEYCLOAK_ISSUER_URL:http://localhost:8083/realms/portal}"
          client-id-ref:
            key: "KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_ID"
          client-secret-ref:
            key: "KEYCLOAK_CLIENT_SECRET"
            provider-id: "env"
          scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email"]
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `issuer-url` | -- | OIDC issuer URL of the upstream provider. The STS appends `/.well-known/openid-configuration` to discover endpoints. |
| `client-id-ref.key` | -- | Environment variable containing the OIDC client ID registered with this provider. |
| `client-secret-ref.key` | -- | Environment variable containing the OIDC client secret. |
| `client-secret-ref.provider-id` | `env` | Secret provider type. `env` reads from an environment variable. |
| `scopes` | `["openid"]` | Scopes to request from the upstream provider. SURF supports the `eduid` scope for eduID-specific claims. |
| `user-info-enabled` | `false` | Whether to call the provider's UserInfo endpoint after token exchange to obtain additional claims. |
| `state-mode` | `RANDOM` | How to generate the OIDC state parameter. `JWT` encodes session metadata in the state as a signed JWT; `RANDOM` uses a random opaque string. |
| `enabled` | `true` | Whether this provider is active. Set to `false` to disable without removing the configuration. |

### STS Auth Bridge Delegation

The STS delegates wallet-based authentication (OID4VP flows) to the Auth Bridge service. When a user presents a verifiable credential from their wallet, the STS forwards the presentation to the Auth Bridge for verification and identity matching.

```yaml
    oid4vp:
      auth-bridge:
        base-url: "${env:AUTH_BRIDGE_URL:http://localhost:8090}"
        default-query-id: "portal-eduid-vc"
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `oid4vp.auth-bridge.base-url` | `http://localhost:8090` | Internal base URL of the Auth Bridge service. Used for service-to-service communication. |
| `oid4vp.auth-bridge.default-query-id` | `portal-eduid-vc` | The default DCQL query identifier to use when initiating OID4VP sessions. References a query defined in the Auth Bridge configuration. |

### Identity Reconciliation Attribute Rules (STS)

The STS includes attribute rules that control how claims from different sources are assembled into tokens. These rules determine which claims appear in ID tokens and access tokens issued to clients.

See the [Canonical Attribute Rules](#canonical-attribute-rules) section below for the full definition and attribute table.

---

## Auth Bridge Configuration

The Auth Bridge service is the core of the identity matching and reconciliation system. Its configuration is more extensive than the STS, covering OID4VP session management, cryptographic key management, reconciliation provider setup, database access, external API security, and data lifecycle management.

### OID4VP Settings

These settings control how the Auth Bridge handles verifiable presentation sessions initiated by wallets.

```yaml
sphereon:
  app:
    oid4vp:
      universal:
        external-base-url: "${env:AUTH_BRIDGE_EXTERNAL_URL:http://localhost:8090}"
      auth-bridge:
        session-ttl-seconds: 300    # 5-minute session timeout
        require-reconciliation: true
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `oid4vp.universal.external-base-url` | `http://localhost:8090` | The externally reachable base URL of the Auth Bridge. Used to construct authorization request URLs that are sent to wallets. Must be publicly accessible when wallets are external devices. |
| `oid4vp.auth-bridge.session-ttl-seconds` | `300` | Lifetime in seconds of an OID4VP presentation session. After this period, the session expires and cannot be completed. The wallet holder must start a new session. |
| `oid4vp.auth-bridge.require-reconciliation` | `true` | Whether identity reconciliation is mandatory. When `true`, wallet holders must complete the reconciliation flow (linking to an institutional identity) before a binding is created. When `false`, bindings are created from wallet data alone. |

### DCQL Queries

DCQL (Digital Credentials Query Language) queries define what credential types and claims the Auth Bridge requests from wallets during OID4VP sessions.

```yaml
    oid4vp:
      dcql-queries:
        portal-eduid-vc:
          credential-type: "eu.europa.ec.eudi.pid.1"
          claims:
            - "family_name"
            - "given_name"
            - "birth_date"
            - "issuance_date"
```

Each query is identified by a unique ID (e.g., `portal-eduid-vc`) and specifies the credential type to request and the list of claims that should be included in the presentation. The STS references these query IDs when delegating OID4VP flows to the Auth Bridge.

### KMS (Key Management Service)

The KMS configuration determines where cryptographic keys are stored and how the Auth Bridge accesses them. The system supports multiple KMS providers, allowing development environments to use a software-based keystore while production environments use a hardware-backed cloud KMS.

#### Software Provider (Development)

```yaml
    kms:
      providers:
        - id: "software"
          type: "SOFTWARE"
          config:
            keystore-path: "data/keystore/auth-bridge.p12"
            keystore-password-ref:
              key: "KMS_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD"
```

The software provider stores keys in a PKCS#12 keystore file on the local filesystem. This is convenient for development but provides no hardware protection for key material and should never be used in production.

#### Azure Key Vault Provider (Production)

```yaml
    kms:
      providers:
        - id: "azure"
          type: "AZURE_KEY_VAULT"
          config:
            vault-url: "https://your-vault.vault.azure.net"
            tenant-id: "${env:AZURE_TENANT_ID}"
            client-id: "${env:AZURE_CLIENT_ID}"
            client-secret-ref:
              key: "AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET"
```

| Property | Description |
|---|---|
| `vault-url` | Azure Key Vault URL. |
| `tenant-id` | Azure AD tenant ID for authentication. |
| `client-id` | Azure AD application (service principal) client ID. |
| `client-secret-ref.key` | Environment variable containing the Azure AD client secret. |

Azure Key Vault provides HSM-backed key storage, ensuring that key material never leaves the hardware security module boundary. Cryptographic operations (HMAC, encrypt, decrypt) are performed within the HSM.

### Cryptographic Key Configuration

Three domain-separated keys are used throughout the system. Each key is referenced by an alias (its name in the KMS) and a version number that tracks key rotation.

```yaml
    identity:
      reconciliation:
        crypto:
          holder-hmac-key-alias: "reconciliation:holder"
          holder-hmac-key-version: 1
          institution-hmac-key-alias: "reconciliation:institution"
          institution-hmac-key-version: 1
          encryption-key-alias: "reconciliation:encryption"
          encryption-key-version: 1
          # Uncomment during key rotation:
          # previous-holder-hmac-key-alias: "reconciliation:holder-v1"
          # previous-holder-hmac-key-version: 1
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `crypto.holder-hmac-key-alias` | -- | KMS key alias for Key A. Used for HMAC-SHA256 hashing of wallet/holder identifiers. |
| `crypto.holder-hmac-key-version` | `1` | Current version of Key A. Stored on records so the system knows which version to use for verification. |
| `crypto.institution-hmac-key-alias` | -- | KMS key alias for Key B. Used for HMAC-SHA256 hashing of institution identifiers. |
| `crypto.institution-hmac-key-version` | `1` | Current version of Key B. |
| `crypto.encryption-key-alias` | -- | KMS key alias for Key C. Used for AES-256-GCM encryption of sensitive data. |
| `crypto.encryption-key-version` | `1` | Current version of Key C. |
| `crypto.previous-holder-hmac-key-alias` | -- | Previous Key A alias, used during key rotation. The system will attempt to verify hashes against both the current and previous key. |
| `crypto.previous-holder-hmac-key-version` | -- | Previous Key A version. |

### Reconciliation Rules

The rule version is a date-stamped identifier that tracks when the reconciliation rules were last updated. This version is stored on each binding so that operators can determine which rule set was in effect when the binding was created.

```yaml
        rule-version: "2026-03-24"
        selector-rules:
          - id: "default-surf"
            enabled: true
            priority: 0
            plan:
              type: "RUN_IDV"
              provider-id: "surf"
              material-profile-id: "holder-only-v1"
```

#### Selector Rules

Selector rules determine which reconciliation provider is used for a given identity match. Rules are evaluated in priority order (lowest number = highest priority), and the first matching enabled rule is selected.

| Property | Description |
|---|---|
| `selector-rules[].id` | Unique identifier for the rule. |
| `selector-rules[].enabled` | Whether this rule is active. |
| `selector-rules[].priority` | Evaluation order (0 = highest priority). |
| `selector-rules[].plan.type` | Action type. `RUN_IDV` initiates identity verification with an upstream provider. |
| `selector-rules[].plan.provider-id` | Which reconciliation provider to use (must match a provider ID in the providers list). |
| `selector-rules[].plan.material-profile-id` | Which material profile to apply for determining binding staleness. |

#### Material Profiles

Material profiles define which attributes are considered "material" -- that is, which attributes are significant enough that a change in their values should trigger re-reconciliation of the binding.

```yaml
        material-profiles:
          - id: "holder-only-v1"
            version: "1"
            materials:
              - type: "holder_key_fp"
                hmac-domain: "holder"
```

| Property | Description |
|---|---|
| `material-profiles[].id` | Unique identifier for the profile. |
| `material-profiles[].version` | Version of this profile. Stored on bindings for traceability. |
| `material-profiles[].materials` | List of material definitions. Each material specifies a type and the HMAC domain used for fingerprinting. |

### Reconciliation Providers

Each reconciliation provider represents an upstream identity verification source (such as SURF) that users authenticate with to link their wallet identity to an institutional identity.

```yaml
        oidc-clients:
          surf-oidc:
            discovery-url: "https://connect.test.surfconext.nl/.well-known/openid-configuration"
            client-id-ref:
              key: "IDENTITY_RECONCILIATION_PROVIDERS_SURF_CLIENT_ID"
            client-secret-ref:
              key: "IDENTITY_RECONCILIATION_PROVIDERS_SURF_CLIENT_SECRET"
              provider-id: "env"
            scopes: ["openid", "profile", "email", "eduid"]
            user-info-enabled: true

        providers:
          - id: "surf"
            name: "SURFconext"
            oidc-client-id: "surf-oidc"
            identifier-attribute-name: "sub"
            enabled: true
```

The configuration separates OIDC client settings (`oidc-clients`) from provider definitions (`providers`). This allows multiple providers to share the same OIDC client if needed, or for a provider to be reconfigured to use a different OIDC client without changing its identity.

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `oidc-clients[].discovery-url` | -- | OIDC discovery endpoint URL for automatic endpoint discovery. |
| `oidc-clients[].client-id-ref.key` | -- | Environment variable containing the OIDC client ID. |
| `oidc-clients[].client-secret-ref.key` | -- | Environment variable containing the OIDC client secret. |
| `oidc-clients[].scopes` | `["openid"]` | Scopes to request during reconciliation. |
| `oidc-clients[].user-info-enabled` | `false` | Whether to call UserInfo for additional claims. |
| `providers[].id` | -- | Unique provider identifier. Referenced by selector rules and stored on bindings. |
| `providers[].name` | -- | Display name shown to users during the reconciliation flow. |
| `providers[].oidc-client-id` | -- | References an OIDC client definition from the `oidc-clients` section. |
| `providers[].identifier-attribute-name` | `sub` | The claim name to use as the institution identifier. The value of this claim is HMAC-hashed with Key B and stored as `institution_identifier_hash`. |
| `providers[].enabled` | `true` | Whether this provider is currently active. |

### Database

```yaml
    database:
      url: "${env:DATABASE_URL:jdbc:postgresql://localhost:5432/authbridge}"
      username: "${env:DATABASE_USERNAME:postgres}"
      password-ref:
        key: "DATABASE_PASSWORD"
      max-pool-size: 5
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `database.url` | `jdbc:postgresql://localhost:5432/authbridge` | JDBC connection URL for the Auth Bridge database. |
| `database.username` | `postgres` | Database username. |
| `database.password-ref.key` | -- | Environment variable containing the database password. |
| `database.max-pool-size` | `5` | Maximum number of connections in the connection pool. Tune based on expected concurrency. |

### External API

The external API allows authorized third-party systems to look up identity information. Access is controlled through JWT bearer tokens and client-specific attribute projections.

```yaml
    external-api:
      enabled: true
      jwt:
        issuer: "${env:EXTERNAL_API_JWT_ISSUER:http://keycloak:8080/realms/portal}"
        jwks-uri: "${env:EXTERNAL_API_JWT_JWKS_URI}"
      clients:
        api:
          scopes: ["reconciliation:read"]
          projected-claims: ["eduid", "eduperson_principal_name", "email"]
          auxiliary-categories: ["enrollment", "role"]
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `external-api.enabled` | `true` | Whether the external API is active. |
| `external-api.jwt.issuer` | -- | Expected `iss` claim in JWT bearer tokens. Tokens from other issuers are rejected. |
| `external-api.jwt.jwks-uri` | -- | JWKS endpoint URL for validating JWT signatures. The Auth Bridge fetches the signing keys from this endpoint. |
| `external-api.clients[].scopes` | -- | Required scopes in the JWT token for this client. |
| `external-api.clients[].projected-claims` | -- | List of canonical attribute names this client is allowed to receive in identity lookup responses. Claims not in this list are filtered out even if they exist on the binding. |
| `external-api.clients[].auxiliary-categories` | -- | List of auxiliary data categories this client may access. Requests for categories not in this list are denied. |

Client projections implement the principle of least privilege at the data level. Each API consumer sees only the attributes they need, even though the system may have more data available for the identity.

### Retention and Cleanup

```yaml
        retention:
          inactive-days: 730              # 2-year inactivity threshold
          soft-delete-days: 30            # 30-day soft-delete retention
          cleanup-interval-minutes: 60    # Inactivity check frequency

        session-cleanup:
          interval-minutes: 5             # Expired session cleanup frequency

        session-ttl-seconds: 300          # Reconciliation session timeout
```

| Property | Default | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `retention.inactive-days` | `730` | Number of days of inactivity after which a binding is soft-deleted. Based on the `last_used_at` timestamp. |
| `retention.soft-delete-days` | `30` | Number of days a soft-deleted record is retained before permanent hard deletion. |
| `retention.cleanup-interval-minutes` | `60` | How often (in minutes) the background job checks for inactive bindings. |
| `session-cleanup.interval-minutes` | `5` | How often (in minutes) the background job cleans up expired reconciliation sessions. |
| `session-ttl-seconds` | `300` | Default lifetime of a reconciliation session in seconds. |

---

## Canonical Attribute Rules

Attribute rules control how claims from different sources (wallet credentials and OIDC providers) are merged, which claims are persisted in the encrypted binding envelope, and which claims are projected into STS tokens and API responses. Both the STS and Auth Bridge have attribute rules: the Auth Bridge rules govern persistence, while the STS rules govern token projection.

### Merge Modes

| Mode | Behavior |
|---|---|
| `OIDC_WINS` | Use the OIDC provider's value if available; fall back to the wallet credential value if the OIDC provider does not supply this claim. This is the default for most attributes, reflecting the higher assurance of institutionally verified data. |
| `WALLET_ONLY` | Only use values from the wallet credential. OIDC provider values for this claim are ignored. Appropriate for claims that are inherent to the wallet identity itself. |
| `OIDC_ONLY` | Only use values from the OIDC provider. Wallet credential values for this claim are ignored. Used for claims like `eduid` and `sub` that are definitionally tied to the institution. |

### Auth Bridge Attribute Rules (Persistence)

The following table shows the complete set of canonical attributes as configured for the Auth Bridge. The `persist` column determines whether the attribute is stored (encrypted) in the binding's `persisted_attributes_envelope`. The `project` column determines whether the attribute is included in API responses and STS token assembly.

| Canonical Name | Merge Mode | Persist | Project | Source Aliases |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `eduid` | OIDC_ONLY | true | true | `eduid` |
| `eduperson_principal_name` | OIDC_WINS | true | true | `eduperson_principal_name`, `urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:eduPersonPrincipalName` |
| `email` | OIDC_WINS | true | true | `email` |
| `given_name` | OIDC_WINS | false | true | `given_name` |
| `family_name` | OIDC_WINS | false | true | `family_name` |
| `sub` | OIDC_ONLY | true | true | `sub` |
| `schac_home_organization` | OIDC_ONLY | true | true | `schac_home_organization` |
| `eduperson_affiliation` | OIDC_WINS | true | true | `eduperson_affiliation` |
| `eduperson_scoped_affiliation` | OIDC_WINS | true | true | `eduperson_scoped_affiliation` |

The data minimization principle is visible in the `persist` column: `given_name` and `family_name` have `persist: false`. These personally identifiable information (PII) fields are available during the active session -- they flow through the system and may appear in tokens issued by the STS -- but they are **never written to the database**. If the database is compromised, an attacker will find no names or other directly identifying PII, only encrypted institutional identifiers and affiliation data.

### Source Aliases

The `Source Aliases` column lists all claim names that map to a given canonical attribute. Different OIDC providers may use different claim names for the same concept (e.g., `eduperson_principal_name` vs. the URN-based `urn:mace:dir:attribute-def:eduPersonPrincipalName`). The attribute mapping normalizes these into a single canonical name.

---

## Secret References

Secrets are never stored in configuration files. Instead, they use indirect references that are resolved at runtime from environment variables:

```yaml
# Reference an environment variable
client-secret-ref:
  key: "ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE_NAME"
  provider-id: "env"    # Optional, defaults to env

# The service reads the secret at runtime:
# System.getenv("ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLE_NAME")
```

This indirection pattern ensures that `application.yml` files can be safely committed to version control without exposing credentials. The actual secret values live exclusively in the runtime environment.

### Production Secret Management

For production deployments, populate the environment variables from a dedicated secrets manager:

- **Azure Key Vault**: Use the Azure Key Vault CSI driver (Kubernetes) or Azure App Service key references to inject secrets as environment variables.
- **AWS Secrets Manager**: Use the AWS Secrets and Config Provider for Kubernetes, or ECS task definition secrets.
- **HashiCorp Vault**: Use the Vault Agent sidecar or CSI provider to inject secrets.
- **Kubernetes Secrets**: As a baseline, create Kubernetes Secret objects and reference them in pod specifications:

```yaml
# In Kubernetes, the environment variable is populated from a Secret:
# envFrom:
#   - secretRef:
#       name: portal-secrets
```

Never commit `.env` files, `.pem` files, `.key` files, or any other files containing plaintext secrets to version control. The repository's `.gitignore` should include entries for all such file patterns.

---

# Monitoring & Observability

# Monitoring and Observability

The eduID Wallet Matching Portal provides several mechanisms for monitoring the health and operational status of the system. Because the system handles sensitive identity data, traditional application performance monitoring (APM) approaches must be adapted to avoid inadvertently logging or exposing personal information. The monitoring strategy relies on aggregate counts, event types, and operational metadata rather than data content.

This page covers the key monitoring areas: audit event analysis, database-level health metrics, background job monitoring, key migration tracking, and service health indicators.

## Audit Events

The `audit_event` table is the primary source of operational visibility into the system. Every significant operation -- identity lookups, binding creation, reconciliation flows, GDPR erasure requests, and key migrations -- generates an audit event. Each event includes a `correlation_id` that links related events across a single user flow, enabling end-to-end tracing of authentication and reconciliation operations. These events provide a structured, queryable record of system activity without exposing personal data.

For the complete event type reference, structure details, and querying patterns, see the [Audit Trail](../security/audit-trail) page.

### Key Metrics from Audit Events

Audit events can be aggregated to derive several important operational metrics. The following table lists the most useful metrics, how to compute them, and what thresholds should trigger alerts.

| Metric | Query Approach | Normal Range | Alert Threshold |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reconciliation rate | Count `idv_completed` events per hour | Varies by deployment | Sudden spike may indicate an automated attack or misconfigured client |
| Reconciliation completion rate | Ratio of `idv_completed` to `idv_initiated` | 80-95% | Sustained drop below 70% indicates upstream provider issues or UX problems |
| Authentication failures | Count `session_failed` events per hour | Near zero | Sustained increase needs investigation; high volume may indicate credential stuffing |
| GDPR erasures | Count `gdpr_erasure` events per day | Low, sporadic | Unexpected bulk erasures require immediate investigation |
| External API usage | Count `external_api_lookup` events by `client_id` per hour | Varies per client | Unusual patterns or unknown client IDs warrant review |
| Binding creation rate | Count `binding_created` events per day | Proportional to reconciliation rate | Divergence from reconciliation rate suggests errors in binding logic |

### Monitoring Approach

Audit events are best consumed through a log aggregation pipeline. The recommended approach is to forward audit events (or the application logs that record them) to a centralized logging system such as Elasticsearch/Kibana, Azure Monitor, or Grafana Loki. This enables:

- Real-time dashboards showing event volume by type
- Alerting rules triggered by abnormal event patterns
- Historical analysis for compliance reporting and incident investigation

## Capacity Monitoring via Database Count Queries

The Auth Bridge database includes several named SqlDelight queries designed specifically for monitoring purposes. These queries return aggregate counts rather than individual records, making them safe to expose to monitoring systems without risk of data leakage.

### Available Count Queries

| Query | Table | Description | Recommended Check Interval |
|---|---|---|---|
| `countMatches` | `identity_match` | Returns the total number of active (non-deleted) identity match records for a given tenant. | Daily |
| `countAllBindings` | `identity_link_binding` | Returns the total number of identity link binding records for a given tenant. | Daily |
| `countInactiveBindings` | `identity_link_binding` | Returns the number of bindings where `last_used_at` is older than the inactivity threshold. | Weekly |
| `countAllAux` | `auxiliary_data` | Returns the total number of auxiliary data records for a given tenant. | Daily |

### How to Use These Metrics

These counts serve several important operational purposes:

- **Capacity planning**: Track the growth rate of each table over time to project storage requirements and database performance characteristics. If the identity match table is growing by 1,000 records per month, you can extrapolate when index sizes will require attention.
- **Cleanup validation**: After the inactive binding cleanup job runs, the `countInactiveBindings` value should decrease (or remain stable if new bindings are aging into the inactive window at the same rate they are being cleaned up). If this number only ever increases, the cleanup job may not be running.
- **Tenant monitoring**: Compare counts across tenants to detect disproportionate growth. A tenant with 10x the bindings of other tenants may need investigation (is this legitimate growth, or a misconfigured client creating duplicate bindings?).
- **Ratio analysis**: The ratio of `countAllBindings` to `countMatches` indicates how many institutional links each identity has on average. A ratio significantly greater than 1.0 may indicate that some identities have an unusually large number of bindings.

### Dashboard Recommendations

Recommended dashboard panels for a monitoring system:

- **Total identities** (from `countMatches`): Line chart over time, per tenant.
- **Total bindings** (from `countAllBindings`): Line chart over time, per tenant.
- **Inactive binding ratio** (`countInactiveBindings` / `countAllBindings`): Gauge showing what percentage of bindings are approaching the inactivity threshold.
- **Auxiliary data volume** (from `countAllAux`): Bar chart per tenant.

## Background Job Monitoring

The Auth Bridge runs several background jobs that perform essential maintenance tasks. Each job should be monitored to ensure it is running on schedule and completing successfully.

### Session Cleanup (Every 5 Minutes)

The session cleanup job removes expired reconciliation sessions from the `reconciliation_session` table. Reconciliation sessions are inherently ephemeral (typical TTL is 5 minutes), so expired sessions should be cleaned up promptly to prevent the table from growing unboundedly and to minimize the window during which sensitive temporary data (PKCE code verifiers, OIDC nonces) exists in the database.

| Indicator | Normal Range | Concern |
|---|---|---|
| Sessions deleted per run | 0-50 | Hundreds of expired sessions per cleanup cycle may indicate that the session TTL is too short, that users are abandoning sessions frequently, or that an automated process is creating sessions without completing them. |
| Time since last cleanup | 0-10 minutes | If the cleanup job has not run for significantly longer than the configured interval (default 5 minutes), the background scheduler may be stuck, the service may be under memory pressure, or the JVM may be in a prolonged garbage collection pause. |
| Total active sessions | 0-100 | A very large number of active (non-expired) sessions may indicate a session creation leak or an ongoing denial-of-service attack. |
| Accumulated expired sessions | Near zero between runs | If the count of expired sessions grows despite cleanup running, the job may be failing silently or the session creation rate exceeds cleanup capacity. The query `findExpiredSessions` with the current timestamp should return zero or near-zero results between cleanup runs. |

The session cleanup job logs the number of deleted sessions at the INFO level after each run. Monitor application logs for messages like:

```
Session cleanup completed: deleted 12 expired sessions
```

### Inactive Binding Cleanup (Every 60 Minutes)

The retention cleanup job scans for identity link bindings that have not been accessed within the configured inactivity threshold (default: 730 days / 2 years) and soft-deletes them. It also performs hard deletes on records that have been soft-deleted for longer than the retention period (default: 30 days).

| Indicator | Normal Range | Concern |
|---|---|---|
| Bindings soft-deleted per run | 0-10 | A large number of soft-deletions in a single run may indicate a mass inactivity event (e.g., an institution discontinuing the service) or a recent configuration change that lowered the inactivity threshold. |
| Hard deletions per run | 0-10 | Hard deletions remove data permanently. A sudden increase may indicate that a batch of soft-deleted records from a previous bulk operation has reached the end of the retention period. |
| Soft-delete backlog | Low and stable | If soft-deleted records are accumulating without being hard-deleted, the hard-delete job may not be running or may be encountering errors. |

The cleanup job logs its activity at the INFO level:

```
Inactive binding cleanup: soft-deleted 3 bindings, hard-deleted 7 past-retention records
```

### Auxiliary Data Expiration

Expired auxiliary data (records where `expires_at` is in the past) is cleaned up alongside the general cleanup jobs. Monitor `findExpiredAux` results to ensure that records with `expires_at` in the past are being removed promptly. Auxiliary data with no `expires_at` value is retained indefinitely (subject to identity-level GDPR erasure).

## Key Migration Tracking

Key rotation is a critical security operation, and monitoring its progress is essential to ensure that all records are successfully migrated to the new key version. The `key_migration_history` table provides detailed status and progress information for each migration.

### Migration Status Values

| Status | Description | Expected Duration |
|---|---|---|
| `IN_PROGRESS` | The migration is currently running. Records are being re-hashed or re-encrypted with the new key version. | Minutes to hours, depending on data volume. |
| `COMPLETED` | The migration finished successfully. All records have been migrated to the new key version. | Terminal state. |
| `FAILED` | The migration encountered an error that prevented completion. Check `records_failed` for the count of unmigrated records. | Terminal state. Requires investigation. |
| `ROLLED_BACK` | The migration was rolled back to the previous key version, either automatically on failure or manually by an operator. | Terminal state. |

### Migration Progress Counters

| Counter | Description | What to Watch |
|---|---|---|
| `records_processed` | Number of records successfully re-hashed or re-encrypted. | Should increase steadily during an `IN_PROGRESS` migration. Stalling indicates a problem. |
| `records_failed` | Number of records that could not be migrated due to errors. | Any non-zero value requires immediate investigation. Failed records remain on the old key version and may become inaccessible if the old key is decommissioned. |
| `records_skipped` | Number of records skipped because they were already at the target key version. | A high skip count is normal if the migration was restarted after a partial completion. |
| `records_purged` | Number of inactive records deleted instead of migrated. | These are soft-deleted records past their retention period that were cleaned up opportunistically during migration. A high purge count is acceptable. |

### Alerting Rules for Key Migrations

The following alerting rules should be configured for any environment that performs key rotations:

- **Alert on `FAILED` status**: Any migration that enters the `FAILED` state should trigger an immediate alert to the operations team. The old key must be retained in the KMS until the failure is resolved and the migration is retried or completed manually.
- **Alert on `IN_PROGRESS` exceeding expected duration**: Set a timeout alert based on the expected migration duration for your data volume. A general guideline is to allow 1 second per 100 records; a migration of 100,000 records should complete within roughly 20 minutes. A migration that exceeds 2x the expected duration may need manual intervention.
- **Alert on `records_failed` greater than zero**: Even a single failed record means that some data was not migrated. This record will remain on the old key version, and if that key is decommissioned, the data will be unrecoverable.
- **Alert if migration has not started after key configuration change**: If the configuration is updated with a new key version but no migration record appears in `key_migration_history`, the migration may not have been triggered.

## Database Connection Pool Monitoring

The Auth Bridge maintains a connection pool to PostgreSQL (default: `max-pool-size: 5`). Connection pool health is a critical factor in overall service performance, as pool exhaustion is one of the most common causes of service degradation in database-backed applications.

### Key Metrics

| Metric | Description | Concern Threshold |
|---|---|---|
| Active connections | Number of connections currently checked out from the pool and in use. | Sustained values near `max-pool-size` indicate the pool may be undersized for the workload. |
| Idle connections | Number of connections waiting in the pool, available for use. | Zero idle connections under load indicates all connections are in use and new requests must wait. |
| Connection wait time | Time a database request waits for a connection to become available in the pool. | Any non-zero wait time indicates pool contention. Sustained wait times directly degrade response latency. |
| Connection creation failures | Failed attempts to establish new connections to PostgreSQL. | Any failure indicates a PostgreSQL connectivity issue (network, authentication, max_connections exceeded). |
| Slow queries | Queries taking longer than expected to execute. | May indicate missing indexes, lock contention, or resource exhaustion on the PostgreSQL server. Particularly watch for slow queries during key migration. |

### Pool Sizing Guidelines

For production deployments, size the connection pool based on:

- **Expected concurrent reconciliation sessions**: Each active session may hold a connection during database operations (session creation, status update, binding write).
- **External API request concurrency**: Each API request requires a connection for the identity lookup query.
- **Background job connections**: Session cleanup, inactive binding cleanup, and key migration each require connections when they run.

A common rule of thumb is to set the pool size to 2-3x the expected peak concurrent request count. However, never set it higher than the PostgreSQL `max_connections` setting minus a buffer for administrative connections and connections from other services (such as the STS).

## Health Check Endpoints

Each service exposes a health check endpoint that can be used for monitoring and orchestration. These endpoints are lightweight and designed to be polled frequently without impacting service performance.

### Service Health Summary

| Service | Endpoint | Checks Performed | Healthy Response |
|---|---|---|---|
| Portal (Frontend) | `GET /api/health` | Next.js server running, API routes accessible | `200 OK` with `{"status": "ok"}` |
| STS | `GET /.well-known/openid-configuration` | JVM running, OIDC discovery document can be generated | `200 OK` with the OIDC discovery document |
| Auth Bridge | `GET /health` | JVM running, database accessible, KMS accessible | `200 OK` with readiness details |
| PostgreSQL | TCP connection on port 5432 | PostgreSQL accepting connections | Connection accepted |

### Auth Bridge Health Details

The Auth Bridge health endpoint provides additional detail about the readiness of its subsystems:

| Subsystem | Healthy When | Unhealthy Indicator |
|---|---|---|
| Database | Connection pool has available connections and a test query succeeds. | Connection failures, query timeouts, pool exhaustion. |
| KMS | The configured KMS provider responds to a test operation. | KMS connectivity failure, authentication failure, key not found. |
| Session Cleanup | The background job has run within the last 2x the configured interval. | Job has not run for an extended period, indicating the scheduler may be stuck. |
| Inactive Binding Cleanup | The background job has run within the last 2x the configured interval. | Job has not run for an extended period. |

### Verifying Health After Startup

After starting the services, verify that all health checks pass:

```bash
# Check portal health
curl -s http://localhost:3000/api/health | jq .

# Check STS health (via OIDC discovery)
curl -s http://localhost:8092/.well-known/openid-configuration | jq .

# Check Auth Bridge health
curl -s http://localhost:8090/health | jq .

# Check PostgreSQL health
pg_isready -h localhost -p 5432 -U portal
```

### Integration with Orchestrators

In Docker Compose, health checks are configured directly in the `docker-compose.yml` file. Docker uses these to determine when a service is ready and to manage startup ordering of dependent services.

In Kubernetes, configure liveness and readiness probes on each pod:

- **Liveness probe**: Determines whether the container should be restarted. Use for unrecoverable failures (e.g., deadlocked threads, corrupted state).
- **Readiness probe**: Determines whether the container should receive traffic. Use for temporary conditions (e.g., database connection issues, KMS initialization still in progress).

## Operational Runbooks

The following runbooks provide step-by-step guidance for investigating common operational scenarios.

### High Reconciliation Volume

If reconciliation events spike unexpectedly:

1. Check audit events for `idv_initiated` and `idv_completed` patterns. Is the spike correlated with a specific tenant or client?
2. Verify the reconciliation selector rules have not changed recently (a misconfiguration could cause unnecessary re-reconciliation).
3. Check if a key rotation caused bindings to become unresolvable, triggering mass re-reconciliation.
4. Review external API usage for unusual patterns that might be driving reconciliation requests.
5. If the spike appears malicious, consider rate-limiting at the load balancer or temporarily disabling the affected provider.

### Expired Session Accumulation

If expired sessions are accumulating in the database:

1. Verify the cleanup job is running by checking application logs for cleanup execution messages.
2. Check database connectivity -- the cleanup job requires write access to delete expired sessions.
3. Verify the `session-cleanup.interval-minutes` configuration has not been accidentally set to an extremely high value.
4. Check for database lock contention that might prevent the DELETE operations from completing.
5. As a last resort, manually delete expired sessions with a direct SQL query (after verifying that all expired sessions have passed their TTL).

### Key Migration Stalled

If a key migration stops progressing:

1. Check the `key_migration_history` table for the current `status` and `records_failed` count.
2. Review application logs for migration-related error messages (search for the migration version number).
3. Verify that both the old and new keys are accessible in the KMS. A common cause of stalled migrations is that the old key was decommissioned before the migration completed.
4. Check database connection pool availability. The migration process uses connections from the same pool as normal operations, so a heavily loaded system may starve the migration of connections.
5. If the migration is stuck on specific records, investigate those records individually. They may have corrupted data or reference a key version that no longer exists in the KMS.

---

# Privacy Architecture

# Privacy Architecture

The eduID Wallet Matching Portal is designed around a single foundational principle: **the database should be useless to an attacker**. Even with complete, unrestricted access to every table, every row, and every column in the database, an attacker would find only HMAC hashes and AES-256-GCM ciphertext. No plaintext identifiers, no cleartext names, no recoverable email addresses. This is not an add-on security layer bolted onto a conventional application; it is the fundamental architecture of the system, built in from the first line of schema design.

This page describes the privacy-by-design principles that govern the system, explains how each principle is implemented, and provides a comprehensive threat model analysis.

## Core Principle: No Plaintext Identifiers

Every external identifier that enters the system is cryptographically transformed before it touches the persistence layer. The transformation happens in the service layer (Kotlin application code), before data reaches any database query or storage operation.

- **Wallet holder keys** are HMAC-hashed with Key A before any database operation. The hash is used for lookup and matching; the original key value is never stored.
- **Institutional identifiers** (eduID, OIDC subject IDs, eduPerson principal names) are HMAC-hashed with Key B before storage. This prevents an attacker from correlating database records with known institutional identities.
- **Sensitive attributes** (the actual institution ID, canonical identity claims) are encrypted with AES-256-GCM using Key C. Only the encrypted ciphertext is stored; the plaintext is reconstructed only when needed for token issuance, and only in memory.

The following table illustrates what an attacker with full database access would actually see:

| Column | Stored Value | Can Attacker Recover Original? |
|---|---|---|
| `identifier_hash` | `zQmXk7f9a2b...` (HMAC-SHA256) | No -- requires Key A or Key B, held in KMS |
| `holder_identifier_hash` | `zQm8hJ3kL9...` (HMAC-SHA256) | No -- requires Key A |
| `institution_identifier_hash` | `zQmP4nR7wQ...` (HMAC-SHA256) | No -- requires Key B |
| `encrypted_institution_id` | AES-GCM ciphertext blob | No -- requires Key C |
| `persisted_attributes_envelope` | AES-GCM ciphertext blob | No -- requires Key C |
| `encrypted_payload` (auxiliary) | AES-GCM ciphertext blob | No -- requires Key C |
| `subject_hash` (audit) | `zQmY9kM2nP...` (HMAC-SHA256) | No -- requires Key A or Key B |
| `tenant_id` | `kw1c` (plaintext) | Yes -- but this is not PII |
| `status` | `COMPLETED` (plaintext) | Yes -- but this is not PII |
| `created_at` | `2026-03-27T10:00:00Z` (plaintext) | Yes -- but this is not PII |

Non-sensitive metadata -- timestamps, status enumerations, configuration references, tenant identifiers, version numbers -- is stored in plaintext because it does not identify individuals. The system draws a clear line between operational metadata (safe to store in the clear) and identity data (always hashed or encrypted).

## Domain-Separated Keys

The system uses three cryptographic keys, each serving a distinct and non-overlapping purpose. This domain separation means that the compromise of any single key does not cascade to data protected by the other keys. An attacker must compromise multiple independent keys simultaneously to achieve meaningful data access.

| Key | Algorithm | Purpose | Data Protected |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Key A** | HMAC-SHA256 | Hashing wallet/holder identifiers | `identity_match.identifier_hash` (holder type), `identity_link_binding.holder_identifier_hash` |
| **Key B** | HMAC-SHA256 | Hashing institution identifiers | `identity_match.identifier_hash` (institution type), `identity_link_binding.institution_identifier_hash` |
| **Key C** | AES-256-GCM | Encrypting sensitive data at rest | `identity_link_binding.encrypted_institution_id`, `identity_link_binding.persisted_attributes_envelope`, `reconciliation_session.encrypted_identity`, `auxiliary_data.encrypted_payload` |

The following table analyzes every possible key compromise scenario and its impact:

| Scenario | Impact | What Remains Protected |
|---|---|---|
| Key A compromised alone | Attacker can compute holder key hashes and identify which rows belong to which wallet holder | Cannot reverse institution hashes (Key B). Cannot decrypt any stored data (Key C). Cannot determine which institution a holder is linked to. |
| Key B compromised alone | Attacker can compute institution ID hashes and identify which rows reference which institution | Cannot reverse holder key hashes (Key A). Cannot decrypt any stored data (Key C). Cannot determine which wallet holder is linked to which institution. |
| Key C compromised alone | Attacker can decrypt encrypted attributes and institution IDs | Cannot correlate the decrypted data with any specific wallet holder (Key A) or identify which hash corresponds to which institution (Key B). The decrypted data is orphaned. |
| Key A + Key B compromised | Attacker can correlate holder keys with institution IDs through hash comparison | Still cannot decrypt any data (Key C). Can build a mapping of "wallet X is linked to institution Y" but cannot see what attributes are stored. |
| Key A + Key C compromised | Attacker can identify holders and decrypt their stored data | Cannot identify which institution the data belongs to (Key B). Knows "wallet X has these attributes" but not "at institution Y". |
| Key B + Key C compromised | Attacker can identify institutions and decrypt stored data | Cannot identify which wallet holder the data belongs to (Key A). Knows "institution Y has these attributes" but not "for wallet X". |
| All three keys + database | Complete data access, full correlation | Requires simultaneous compromise of both the database AND the KMS -- two separate systems with independent access controls, authentication, and audit trails. |
| Database breach only (no keys) | Attacker has hashes and ciphertext | All three keys are in the KMS, not in the database. The data is cryptographically inert without the keys. |

The defense-in-depth design means an attacker needs to compromise multiple independent systems to gain meaningful access. Each additional system the attacker must breach dramatically increases the difficulty and the likelihood of detection.

## Tenant Isolation

Every table that holds tenant-specific data includes a `tenant_id` column. Every query that accesses tenant-specific data filters on `tenant_id`. Every HMAC computation includes the tenant context as part of the hash input. This comprehensive tenant isolation means:

- **Hash isolation**: A hash computed for Tenant A cannot match a record belonging to Tenant B, even if the underlying identifier is identical. The tenant ID is mixed into the HMAC computation, producing different hashes for the same input across tenants.
- **Query isolation**: Every named SqlDelight query that operates on tenant data requires a `tenant_id` parameter. There are no "superuser" queries that bypass tenant filtering. It is architecturally impossible to accidentally query across tenants.
- **Correlation prevention**: Even with full database access, an attacker cannot determine whether two identifiers from different tenants represent the same person. The hash values will be different due to the tenant-scoped HMAC computation.
- **Cryptographic silos**: Each tenant effectively operates in its own cryptographic silo. While the same KMS keys are used across tenants (the key material is shared), the tenant-scoped hashing means that cross-tenant correlation is impossible at the data level.

## Data Minimization

The canonical attribute rules system enforces data minimization at the configuration level, implementing the GDPR principle that personal data processing should be limited to what is necessary for the specified purpose.

Each attribute in the system has a `persist` flag:

- **`persist: true`**: The attribute is encrypted and stored in the binding's `persisted_attributes_envelope`. These are attributes necessary for ongoing identity resolution and token issuance (e.g., `eduid`, `eduperson_principal_name`, `schac_home_organization`).
- **`persist: false`**: The attribute is used transiently during the current session -- it may flow through the system and appear in JWT tokens issued by the STS -- but it is **never written to the database**. These are attributes that are useful for the user experience but not necessary for the core identity linking function (e.g., `given_name`, `family_name`, `email`).

This means that names and other directly identifying PII are ephemeral. They exist only in memory during an active session and in the JWT token for its lifetime (typically 1 hour). After the session ends and the token expires, these values are gone. They are not stored in the database, not in the encrypted binding envelope, and not recoverable by any means.

The default configuration persists only the minimum necessary for identity resolution: the institutional identifier (eduid), the scoped principal name, affiliation data, and the home organization. Human-readable names are intentionally excluded from persistence, dramatically reducing the value of a database breach to an attacker.

## Encryption at Rest

All sensitive attributes stored in the database are encrypted with AES-256-GCM (Galois/Counter Mode). This encryption algorithm provides two guarantees:

- **Confidentiality**: The data is unreadable without the encryption key (Key C). The ciphertext reveals nothing about the plaintext.
- **Authenticity**: Any tampering with the ciphertext is detected on decryption. AES-GCM produces an authentication tag that validates the integrity of both the ciphertext and any associated data. If an attacker modifies even a single bit of the ciphertext, decryption will fail.

Each encryption operation uses a unique random nonce (number used once), preventing ciphertext analysis attacks. Even if the same plaintext is encrypted twice, the resulting ciphertext will be different because a new random nonce is generated for each operation.

The following columns contain AES-256-GCM encrypted data:

| Table | Column | Contents When Decrypted |
|---|---|---|
| `identity_link_binding` | `encrypted_institution_id` | The institution identifier (e.g., eduID) in plaintext |
| `identity_link_binding` | `persisted_attributes_envelope` | JSON object containing all `persist: true` canonical attributes |
| `reconciliation_session` | `encrypted_identity` | The resolved identity data from the OIDC provider |
| `auxiliary_data` | `encrypted_payload` | Arbitrary supplementary data (enrollment info, organizational metadata) |

## Crypto-Shredding

Crypto-shredding is the ultimate data destruction mechanism enabled by the encryption architecture. Because all sensitive data is encrypted with Key C, destroying that key in the KMS makes all encrypted data permanently and irrecoverably unreadable. Combined with the fact that HMAC hashes are one-way functions, destroying all three keys renders the entire database contents meaningless.

This property provides several important capabilities:

- **O(1) data destruction**: Rather than scanning and deleting millions of individual records, a single key deletion operation in the KMS destroys all encrypted data instantly.
- **Provable destruction**: The KMS provides audit logs proving that the key was destroyed at a specific time. This is stronger evidence of data destruction than database record deletion, which could potentially be recovered from backups or transaction logs.
- **Complete system decommissioning**: When a deployment is being permanently retired, crypto-shredding provides a cryptographic guarantee that no residual data can be recovered from the database, backups, or any other storage.

In normal operation, per-record deletion (via the GDPR erasure API or automatic inactivity cleanup) is preferred because it is targeted and preserves other identities. Crypto-shredding is reserved for scenarios where blanket destruction is appropriate.

## Consent by Design

The reconciliation process requires explicit user action at every step, implementing the GDPR principle of consent-based processing:

1. **Wallet presentation**: The holder actively chooses to present their credential by scanning the QR code displayed in the portal. The system cannot initiate a wallet presentation without the holder's participation.
2. **IDV reconciliation**: The user explicitly clicks through the reconciliation flow and authenticates at their institution. The system cannot link a wallet to an institution without the user completing this multi-step process.
3. **No silent tracking**: There is no background correlation, no passive fingerprinting, no automatic identity linking. Every link between a wallet identity and an institutional identity is the result of a deliberate, conscious action by the holder.

An important privacy property of the reconciliation design is that **SURF (the federation provider) receives no wallet-related data** during the reconciliation flow. From SURF's perspective, the reconciliation is a standard OIDC login. SURF does not know that the login was triggered by a wallet authentication, and it receives no holder key, wallet credential, or binding information. This prevents the federation provider from building a correlation between wallet identities and institutional identities.

## Privacy Flow Summary

The following diagram illustrates the privacy transformations at each stage of the system -- from wallet authentication through reconciliation, token issuance, and GDPR erasure:

<img src="/img/diagrams/portal-privacy-flow.svg" alt="Privacy Flow Summary" style={{maxWidth: '740px', width: '100%', height: 'auto'}} />

## Threat Model Summary

The following table provides a comprehensive analysis of attack scenarios and the mitigations the privacy architecture provides against each one.

| Attack Scenario | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Database breach (external attacker) | Only HMAC hashes and AES-256-GCM ciphertext are stored. Keys reside in a separate KMS with independent access controls. The attacker gains no usable personal data. |
| Database breach (insider / DB admin) | Same protection as external breach. A database administrator sees only hashes and ciphertext. No amount of SQL access reveals plaintext identifiers. |
| KMS Key A compromise | Attacker can compute holder key hashes but cannot reverse Key B hashes (institution identifiers) or decrypt Key C data (encrypted attributes). Can identify wallet holders but not their institutional links. |
| KMS Key C compromise | Attacker can decrypt encrypted attributes but cannot correlate them with specific wallet holders (Key A) or specific institutions (Key B). The decrypted data is orphaned without the hash keys. |
| Full database + all 3 keys | Requires simultaneous compromise of the database server AND the KMS -- two separate systems with independent authentication, authorization, network controls, and audit trails. This is the highest-cost attack. |
| Cross-tenant correlation | Tenant ID is mixed into HMAC computation, producing different hashes for the same identifier across tenants. Even with full database access, cross-tenant identity correlation is cryptographically impossible. |
| SURF tracking wallet users | SURF receives no wallet or holder key data during reconciliation. From SURF's perspective, it processes a standard OIDC login. No correlation between wallet identity and institutional identity is possible at the SURF side. |
| Historical traffic analysis / correlation | The one-time nature of the reconciliation flow limits the correlation time window. Timestamps and operational metadata in the database are non-identifying. No persistent session cookies or tracking mechanisms exist. |
| Replay of reconciliation flow | PKCE (S256 challenge method) prevents authorization code interception. Single-use OIDC state parameters prevent session fixation. Nonces bound to ID tokens prevent token replay. |
| Session hijacking | HttpOnly, Secure, and SameSite cookie attributes prevent client-side script access and cross-site request inclusion. The BFF (Backend for Frontend) pattern ensures no tokens are accessible in the browser. |
| Authorization code interception | PKCE S256 is required on all authorization code flows. An intercepted authorization code is useless without the corresponding code verifier, which is held server-side. |

---

# Audit Trail

# Audit Trail

Every significant operation in the eduID Wallet Matching Portal is recorded in the `audit_event` table, an append-only log where records are only ever inserted, never updated or deleted. This design provides three critical capabilities: compliance evidence for GDPR accountability obligations, operational visibility for monitoring and incident investigation, and a complete, tamper-evident history of identity lifecycle events.

The audit trail is designed to be thorough without compromising privacy. Every event captures enough operational context to reconstruct what happened and why, but it never stores plaintext personal data. Subject identifiers are HMAC-hashed before being written to the audit log, and the JSON detail field contains operational metadata (session IDs, provider names, status transitions, error codes) but never names, email addresses, or other PII.

## Audit Event Structure

Each audit event is a single row in the `audit_event` table with the following fields:

| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `id` | TEXT (UUID) | Unique identifier for the event. Generated at the time the event is created. No two events share the same ID. |
| `tenant_id` | TEXT | The tenant that the event belongs to. All monitoring and compliance queries should filter by tenant to maintain multi-tenant isolation. |
| `event_type` | TEXT | Categorizes the event into one of the defined event types (see the complete list below). This field is the primary filter for operational dashboards and compliance reports. |
| `correlation_id` | TEXT | A UUID that links related events across a single user flow. For example, all events generated during one reconciliation session -- from session creation through IDV initiation to binding creation -- share the same correlation ID. This enables end-to-end tracing. |
| `subject_hash` | TEXT | HMAC-hashed identifier of the user (subject) involved in the event. This is not a plaintext identifier. It allows correlation of events for the same subject (same hash means same person) without revealing who the person is. |
| `client_id` | TEXT | The identifier of the API client or application that triggered the event. For external API operations, this is the client ID from the JWT bearer token. For user-initiated operations, this identifies the portal frontend. |
| `detail` | TEXT (JSON) | A structured JSON object containing additional operational context. The exact contents vary by event type but always follow the principle of containing operational metadata only, never PII. Examples include record counts, provider names, status codes, and error descriptions. |
| `created_at` | TEXT (ISO 8601) | The timestamp of when the event occurred, in ISO 8601 format with timezone. This field supports time-range queries for operational monitoring and historical investigation. |

### Privacy in the Audit Trail

The privacy design of the audit trail deserves special attention because audit logs are inherently long-lived and broadly accessed.

The `subject_hash` field contains an HMAC hash of the subject's identifier, computed using the same key (Key A or Key B) used for the main identity tables. This means even the audit trail does not contain PII. An investigator can correlate events for the same subject (same hash equals same person) without knowing who the person is. If identification is required for a specific investigation, the hash can be matched against the `identity_match` table -- but this requires deliberate action, appropriate authorization, and access to the KMS key.

The `detail` JSON contains operational context such as session IDs, provider names, status transitions, error codes, and record counts. It never contains names, email addresses, plaintext identifiers, or any other directly identifying information. This ensures that even if audit logs are exported to a SIEM or log aggregation system with broader access controls than the main database, no PII is exposed.

## Event Types

The following table lists all audit event types, with descriptions of what each event represents and when it is logged.

| Event Type | Description | When Logged |
|---|---|---|
| `session_created` | An OID4VP wallet authentication session has been initiated. The portal has generated a QR code and is waiting for the wallet to respond. | When `POST /auth/oid4vp/sessions` is called and a new session is created. |
| `session_completed` | A wallet authentication session has completed successfully. The wallet presented valid credentials and the system processed them. | When `POST /auth/oid4vp/sessions/{id}/complete` returns a 200 status. |
| `session_expired` | An OID4VP session timed out without being completed. The wallet holder did not present credentials within the session TTL. | When the background session cleanup job detects and removes an expired session. |
| `session_failed` | A wallet authentication session failed. This could be due to an invalid verifiable presentation, an unsupported credential type, or a verification error. | When VP verification fails or the session transitions to a FAILED state. |
| `idv_initiated` | An identity verification (IDV) reconciliation flow has been started. The user has been redirected to the upstream OIDC provider to authenticate. | When `POST .../idv/initiate` is called and the authorization URL is generated. |
| `idv_completed` | An IDV reconciliation flow has completed successfully. The user authenticated with the upstream provider, and the system received and processed the identity claims. | When the OIDC callback is processed, the token exchange succeeds, and the identity is resolved. |
| `idv_failed` | An IDV reconciliation flow failed. This could be due to a token exchange failure, missing required claims, or an error in the upstream provider's response. | When the token exchange fails, claim extraction encounters an error, or the provider returns an error. |
| `binding_created` | A new identity link binding has been created, linking a wallet holder to an institutional identity for the first time. | When the reconciliation process creates a new `identity_link_binding` record. |
| `binding_updated` | An existing identity link binding has been refreshed. The user completed re-reconciliation, and the binding's attributes or timestamps were updated. | When the reconciliation process updates an existing binding (e.g., after step-up authentication or attribute refresh). |
| `binding_soft_deleted` | A binding has been marked for deletion (soft-deleted). The record remains in the database for the retention period. | When the inactivity cleanup job or an administrative action soft-deletes a binding. |
| `binding_hard_deleted` | A binding has been permanently removed from the database. This is irreversible. | When the hard-delete cleanup job removes a soft-deleted binding that has exceeded the retention period. |
| `gdpr_erasure` | A complete identity deletion has been performed in response to a GDPR Article 17 (right to erasure) request. All match records, bindings, and auxiliary data for the identity have been permanently deleted. | When `DELETE /api/external/v1/reconciliation/{id}` is called and the deletion completes. |
| `external_api_lookup` | A third-party system has performed an identity lookup through the external API. | When `POST /api/external/v1/reconciliation/lookup` is called. |
| `auxiliary_data_write` | Auxiliary data has been stored or updated for an identity. | When `PUT .../auxiliary/{category}` creates or updates an auxiliary data record. |
| `auxiliary_data_delete` | Auxiliary data has been deleted for an identity. | When `DELETE .../auxiliary/{category}` removes an auxiliary data record. |
| `key_migration_started` | A key rotation migration has begun. The system is re-hashing or re-encrypting records with a new key version. | When the migration job starts processing and inserts a new `key_migration_history` record. |
| `key_migration_completed` | A key rotation migration has finished. The `detail` field includes the final counts (processed, failed, skipped, purged). | When the migration job completes and updates the `key_migration_history` record to COMPLETED. |

## Correlation

The `correlation_id` field is one of the most powerful features of the audit trail. It is a UUID that links related events across a single user flow, enabling an investigator to reconstruct the complete sequence of operations that occurred during a specific interaction.

### Example: Complete Wallet Authentication with Reconciliation

A user scans a QR code, presents their wallet credential, and then completes the reconciliation flow by authenticating with SURF. The following sequence of correlated audit events would be generated:

1. `session_created` (correlation_id: `abc-123`) -- The OID4VP session is created and the QR code is displayed.
2. `idv_initiated` (correlation_id: `abc-123`) -- The user clicks "Link with institution account" and is redirected to SURF.
3. `idv_completed` (correlation_id: `abc-123`) -- The user authenticates with SURF, the callback is processed, and identity claims are received.
4. `binding_created` (correlation_id: `abc-123`) -- A new binding is created linking the wallet holder to their institutional identity.
5. `session_completed` (correlation_id: `abc-123`) -- The overall wallet authentication session is marked as completed.

By querying for all events with `correlation_id = 'abc-123'`, an investigator can see the complete flow from start to finish, including the exact timestamps of each step, which provider was used, and whether any errors occurred along the way.

### Querying Correlated Events

The named SqlDelight query for retrieving correlated events:

```sql
-- Named query: findAuditEventsByCorrelation(tenant_id, correlation_id)
SELECT * FROM audit_event
WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id
  AND correlation_id = :correlation_id
ORDER BY created_at ASC;
```

The `idx_audit_correlation` index on the `correlation_id` column ensures this query executes efficiently even against a large audit table.

## Querying by Event Type

For operational monitoring and compliance reporting, events can be queried by type with pagination support:

```sql
-- Named query: findAuditEventsByType(tenant_id, event_type, limit, offset)
SELECT * FROM audit_event
WHERE tenant_id = :tenant_id
  AND event_type = :event_type
ORDER BY created_at DESC
LIMIT :limit OFFSET :offset;
```

The `idx_audit_type` index on `(tenant_id, event_type)` supports efficient filtering by event type within a tenant.

### Example: GDPR Erasure Report

To generate a compliance report of all GDPR erasure events in the last 30 days:

```sql
SELECT * FROM audit_event
WHERE tenant_id = 'kw1c'
  AND event_type = 'gdpr_erasure'
  AND created_at >= '2026-02-25T00:00:00Z'
ORDER BY created_at DESC;
```

This query uses both the `idx_audit_type` index (for tenant and event type filtering) and the `idx_audit_time` index (for the time range predicate) to execute efficiently.

### Useful Query Patterns

The following table suggests which event types to query for common operational and compliance tasks:

| Purpose | Event Type Filter |
|---|---|
| Authentication activity overview | `session_completed`, `session_failed` |
| Reconciliation activity | `idv_initiated`, `idv_completed`, `idv_failed` |
| Data lifecycle monitoring | `binding_created`, `binding_soft_deleted`, `binding_hard_deleted` |
| GDPR compliance reporting | `gdpr_erasure` |
| External API usage tracking | `external_api_lookup`, `auxiliary_data_write` |
| Key management operations | `key_migration_started`, `key_migration_completed` |
| Security incident investigation | `session_failed`, `idv_failed` (high volume may indicate an attack) |

## Retention

Audit events are retained **indefinitely** by default. There is no automatic cleanup or expiration mechanism for audit records. This is an intentional design decision based on several considerations:

- **Regulatory compliance**: Different jurisdictions and regulatory frameworks may require different retention periods. Rather than imposing a specific period, the system retains all events and delegates the retention policy decision to the deploying organization.
- **GDPR accountability**: Article 5(2) of the GDPR requires controllers to demonstrate compliance with data processing principles. The audit trail provides evidence of lawful processing, and this evidence may need to be produced years after the events occurred.
- **Incident investigation**: Security incidents may not be discovered until months or years after they occur. A complete audit trail is essential for forensic analysis and determining the scope and impact of a breach.

Organizations should define a retention policy based on their specific regulatory requirements and configure periodic archival or deletion accordingly. A common approach is to archive events older than a specified period (e.g., 5 years) to cold storage, and delete events older than the maximum regulatory requirement (e.g., 10 years).

Note that because audit events contain no plaintext PII (only HMAC-hashed subject identifiers), the GDPR storage limitation principle (Article 5(1)(e)) is less directly applicable. The hashed identifiers cannot be used to identify individuals without access to the HMAC keys, so the privacy impact of long-term retention is minimal.

## Immutability

The audit trail is append-only by design. In the application layer, only INSERT operations are ever performed on the `audit_event` table. The SqlDelight schema defines no UPDATE or DELETE queries for audit events. This application-level guarantee means that under normal operation, once an audit event is written, it cannot be modified or removed.

However, application-level guarantees are insufficient to protect against scenarios where an attacker (or a malicious insider) gains direct database access and executes raw SQL. For production deployments, additional immutability guarantees are strongly recommended.

### Database-Level Protection

A PostgreSQL trigger can enforce immutability at the database engine level, preventing UPDATE and DELETE operations regardless of how they are issued:

```sql
CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION prevent_audit_modification()
RETURNS TRIGGER AS $$
BEGIN
    RAISE EXCEPTION 'audit_event table is append-only: % not allowed', TG_OP;
END;
$$ LANGUAGE plpgsql;

CREATE TRIGGER audit_immutability
    BEFORE UPDATE OR DELETE ON audit_event
    FOR EACH ROW
    EXECUTE FUNCTION prevent_audit_modification();
```

This trigger causes any UPDATE or DELETE operation on the `audit_event` table to fail with an exception, regardless of whether the operation originates from the application or from a direct SQL session. Even a database superuser cannot silently modify audit records without first dropping the trigger, which would itself be logged in the PostgreSQL activity log.

### External Immutable Storage

For the strongest audit guarantees, forward audit events to an external immutable store in addition to the database. This provides defense-in-depth against scenarios where an attacker gains database superuser access and could bypass even trigger-based protections.

Recommended external immutable storage options:

- **Azure Append Blobs**: Azure Blob Storage in append-only mode prevents any modification of written data. Each audit event is appended as a new block, and the blob cannot be modified or deleted while the immutability policy is in effect.
- **AWS S3 Object Lock**: S3 Object Lock in WORM (Write Once Read Many) compliance mode prevents object deletion or modification for a specified retention period. This provides a regulatory-grade immutability guarantee.
- **Dedicated SIEM**: Security Information and Event Management systems (such as Splunk, Azure Sentinel, or Elastic Security) with immutable log storage provide both immutability and sophisticated querying, alerting, and correlation capabilities.

The external store serves as an independent verification source. If there is any suspicion that the database audit trail has been tampered with, the external store provides an authoritative reference.

## Audit Event Example

The following is a complete example of a GDPR erasure audit event as it would appear in the database:

```json
{
  "id": "evt-550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000",
  "tenant_id": "kw1c",
  "event_type": "gdpr_erasure",
  "correlation_id": "req-661e9500-f39c-52e5-b827-557766551111",
  "subject_hash": "zQmXk7f9a2bC3dE4fG5hI6jK7lM8nO9pQ0rS1tU2vW3xY4z",
  "client_id": "student-info-system",
  "detail": "{\"matches_deleted\":2,\"bindings_deleted\":1,\"auxiliary_deleted\":3,\"requested_by\":\"privacy-officer\"}",
  "created_at": "2026-03-27T14:30:00Z"
}
```

Key observations about this event:

- The `subject_hash` is an HMAC hash, not a plaintext identifier. An investigator can search for other events with the same hash to find all operations related to this subject, but cannot determine the subject's identity from the hash alone.
- The `detail` JSON contains counts (`matches_deleted`, `bindings_deleted`, `auxiliary_deleted`) and operational context (`requested_by`) but no PII. The `requested_by` field identifies the role that authorized the request, not the individual.
- The `client_id` identifies which system initiated the request (`student-info-system`), enabling tracking of which systems are exercising the erasure API.
- The `correlation_id` links this event to any other events that were generated as part of the same API request, enabling full reconstruction of the erasure operation.

## Database Schema

The audit event table and its indexes are defined as follows:

```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS audit_event (
    id              TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
    tenant_id       TEXT NOT NULL,
    event_type      TEXT NOT NULL,
    correlation_id  TEXT,
    subject_hash    TEXT,
    client_id       TEXT,
    detail          TEXT,
    created_at      TEXT NOT NULL
);

CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_type
    ON audit_event(tenant_id, event_type);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_time
    ON audit_event(created_at);
CREATE INDEX IF NOT EXISTS idx_audit_correlation
    ON audit_event(correlation_id);
```

Three indexes optimize the most common query patterns:

- **idx_audit_type** on `(tenant_id, event_type)`: Supports filtering by event type within a tenant. This is the most common query pattern for operational dashboards and compliance reports (e.g., "show all GDPR erasure events for tenant X in the last 30 days").
- **idx_audit_time** on `(created_at)`: Supports time-range queries across all tenants. Used for operational monitoring (e.g., "show all events in the last hour") and historical investigation (e.g., "show all events between March 1 and March 15").
- **idx_audit_correlation** on `(correlation_id)`: Supports reconstruction of complete user flows from a single correlation ID. This is the primary tool for incident investigation and debugging.

As the audit table grows over time (it is never cleaned up by default), these indexes will also grow. For very large deployments, consider partitioning the `audit_event` table by `created_at` (e.g., monthly partitions) to manage index size and enable efficient archival of historical partitions.